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1964-1968 Volume XXX China |
41. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, August 5, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Cabot-Wang Talks. Secret.
SUBJECT
Possibility of an Emergency Warsaw MeetingRegardless of how Peking and Hanoi respond to our air strikes, I think we should consider the advisability of an emergency Warsaw meeting as soon as possible between Cabot and Wang. (A precedent: the Chicoms called for a special session in the Taiwan Straits build-up of 1962.)
The purpose of such a meeting would be to make clear to the Chinese once again that we have no desire to expand the war but are willing to do so if forced by their actions and those of Hanoi. I realize that we have tried to make this point in a number of ways over the past few months. However, our air strikes and our dramatic and visible build-up in Southwest Pacific may well combine, despite our best intentions, to communicate a significantly different message: one of U.S. determination to destroy the North Vietnam regime and even to strike Hainan and South China.
So far, the Chinese have appeared to be opposed to escalation of the conflict; they also appear to have believed that we are similarly opposed. Their relatively cautious pattern of response seems to bear this out. Once they conclude that our objectives have changed, however, this can produce a basic shift in their own thinking and actions. In such altered circumstances, they might well consider taking any pre-emptive actions available to them (i.e. air or naval attacks against vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin and a full-scale southward thrust of their own armed forces) on the assumption that all-out war was in the offing anyway.
In short, it seems to me imperative that where misinterpretation and miscalculation may well produce rashness rather than caution, we should move to use any channel of communication available to us. With such potential targets as Port Wallut so close to the Chinese border, the burden of communication rests with us. We have communicated to all other governments; we should not neglect our prime adversary.
The Warsaw channel was re-opened on July 29th; Ambassador Cabot is now in Washington. He could be thoroughly briefed and flown right back to Warsaw, if we decided to call such a meeting./2/
/2/A note in Komer's handwriting on the source text reads as follows: "Mac--I'm less concerned than Jim that Chicoms or Hanoi will misinterpret. Nor do I see merit in reassuring them just now. But I do see value in using Warsaw for communicating our real purposes. RWK."
JCT Jr.
42. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, August 8, 1964.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, 303 Committee Meetings (1964). Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone.
SUBJECT
Meeting of 303 Committee/2/ on 6 August 1964/2/The 303 Committee was an interdepartmental committee that reviewed and authorized covert operations. Established under NSC 5412/2, December 28, 1955, it was known as the Special Group or 5412 Committee until National Security Action Memorandum No. 303, June 2, 1964, changed its name to the 303 Committee. In 1964-1968, it consisted of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]
6. I then brought up the question of a U-2 flight over high priority targets in South China, presented a flight plan and a weather map. Pointed out that a weather phenomena would occur over the next two days because of the approaching hurricane and that we could expect reasonably good weather--categories 2 and 3--over the area of interest in the next two days. For that reason I recommended that CIA be authorized to fly a U-2 [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] with a CIA civilian pilot, utilizing a cover story which was discussed in its broad outline. Messrs. Vance and Thompson expressed approval. Bundy saw the advantages but withheld judgment. Vance reported that Secretary McNamara opposed. Thompson reported that he felt that Secretary Rusk opposed, but was not sure of his position. Bundy stated this was a matter for Presidential decision and that the President should meet with McCone, McNamara and Rusk to hear the arguments and make the decision and he agreed to arrange such a meeting immediately. I stated this was not possible from my standpoint because of the necessity to go to Gettysburg to brief General Eisenhower. It was agreed, therefore, that the subject would be discussed separately with Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk and then Mr. Bundy would approach the President. However, he called the President on the telephone in the meeting room, outlined the problem to him; the President indicated he desired to think the matter over and would render a decision later in the day.
I then went to Vance's office and reviewed the program with Secretary McNamara. In this discussion I made the specific recommendation that the flight be conducted on one or both of the next two days, taking advantage of the break in the weather, and that if it was not so conducted, we probably would not have another opportunity for some time because of the weather which would close in. I told the Secretary there was a very definite intelligence gap that worried me and that I felt the risk of the flight was worth it. The Secretary said he was unalterably opposed on the grounds that the flight would become known to the ChiComs and it would exacerbate the situation and he wished to take a "wait and see" attitude before making any further move which could be construed by Hanoi or Peiping as a further United States provocation. McNamara said he was quite agreeable for me to present my views to the President and he felt that, from the standpoint of my responsibilities, this should be done, but from his standpoint he was opposed.
I left for Gettysburg feeling that Bundy would follow through as agreed and discuss the subject further with the President.
The next morning Bundy called me and said that Thompson had talked to Rusk and Rusk was unalterably opposed to the flight despite Thompson's recommendation, and the fact that the flight involved a comparatively "low risk," and since both Rusk and McNamara were definitely opposed to the flight, he, Bundy, felt it would serve no useful purpose to bring my recommendation again to the attention of the President as he would undoubtedly look to his two Secretaries for advice and would be governed accordingly. Therefore Bundy had, on his own initiative, decided not to present the matter to the President.
43. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/
SNIE 13-4-64
Washington, August 26, 1964.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIE Files. Top Secret; Ruff/[codeword not declassified]. According to a note on the cover sheet, it was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on August 26. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, AEC, and NSA participated in its preparation. All USIB members concurred, except the FBI Assistant Director who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
THE CHANCES OF AN IMMINENT COMMUNIST CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION
The Problem
To assess the likelihood that the advanced stage of construction at a probable nuclear test site in Western China indicates that the Chinese Communists will detonate their first nuclear device in the next few months.
Conclusion
On the basis of new overhead photography, we are now convinced that the previously suspect facility at Lop Nor in Western China is a nuclear test site which could be ready for use in about two months. On the other hand the weight of available evidence indicates that the Chinese will not have sufficient fissionable material for a test of a nuclear device in the next few months. Thus, the evidence does not permit a very confident estimate of the chances of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation in the next few months. Clearly the possibility of such a detonation before the end of this year cannot be ruled out--the test may occur during this period. On balance, however, we believe that it will not occur until sometime after the end of 1964.
Discussion
1. Overhead photography of 6-9 August shows that the previously suspect facility near Lop Nor in Sinkiang is almost certainly a nuclear testing site. Developments at the facility include a ground scar forming about 60 percent of a circle 19,600 feet in diameter around a 325-foot tower (first seen in April 1964 photograph), and work on bunkers near the tower and instrumentation sites at appropriate locations is underway. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] the outward appearance and apparent rate of construction indicate that the site could be ready for a test in two months or so. The characteristics of the site suggest that it is being prepared for both diagnostic and weapon effect experiments.
2. Analysis of all available evidence on fissionable material production in China indicates--though it does not prove--that the Chinese will not have sufficient material for a test of a nuclear device in the next few months. The only Chinese production reactor identified to date is the small, air-cooled reactor at Pao-t'ou. As of September 1963, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Construction was continuing throughout the site, including some fairly substantial work around the building which houses the reactor. Photography of March 1964 indicated that major construction at the site--including service roads, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and additional security provisions--had apparently been completed. Thus we believe the reactor went into operation possibly in the latter part of 1963 but more probably in early 1964. We estimate that, even if no major obstacles were encountered, it would take at least 18 months, and more likely two years, after the starting up of the Pao-t'ou reactor before a nuclear device would be ready for testing. Thus, if the Pao-t'ou reactor started operation no earlier than late 1963 and if it is China's only operating production reactor, the earliest possible date for testing is mid-1965.
3. It is, of course, possible that the Chinese have another source of fissionable material. Such a facility might have been started with Soviet aid as a result of the 1957 Soviet-Chinese aid agreement, probably about the same time as the Lanchou gaseous diffusion building. We would expect this reactor to be a fairly large water-cooled production reactor. There are areas, particularly parts of Szechwan, which are suitable for such a reactor and have not been photographed. Since it is doubtful that a reactor of this type could have been finished before the withdrawal of Soviet technicians in 1960, its completion would have depended on a native Chinese effort, a difficult but not impossible task. Such a reactor might have started operations in 1962 or 1963, thus making available sufficient plutonium for a test by the end of this year.
4. On the other hand we have photographed much of the area around virtually all locations where A-E activity is indicated [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] about half of all locations that might be geographically suitable for reactor sites. Apart from Pao-t'ou, no operating production reactor or isotope separation plant has been found. We believe it unlikely--though clearly not impossible--that such an operating facility exists.
5. It is also possible that the Chinese may have acquired fissionable material from a foreign source, [9 lines of source text not declassified]. As for the Soviets, we do not believe that in the past they have transferred appreciable amounts of weapon-grade material to the Chinese. In the current state of their relations with the Chinese, they would almost certainly not furnish fissionable materials to them.
6. Obviously, it is incongruous to bring a test site to a state of readiness described in paragraph 1 without having a device nearly ready for testing. It would be technically undesirable to install much of the instrumentation more than a few weeks before the actual test. We cannot tell from available photography whether the installations have yet reached this point--it seems unlikely that they have, mainly because some heavy construction is still going on. However, it is possible that the basic work will soon be completed, and that final preparations could be made this fall.
7. On the other hand, in such a complex undertaking as advanced weapons development--especially when it is almost certain that there is heavy political pressure for at least some results--it would not be surprising if there were uneven progress among various phases of the program. In a number of instances in the past, Peiping has been unable to prevent--and has seemed willing to tolerate--uneven development in various important programs. Indeed, in other parts of their advanced weapons program we have already observed this. Some facilities seem to be behind schedule--notably the incomplete gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchou; others are larger and more elaborate than present Chinese capabilities warrant--for example, the possible nuclear weapons complex near Koko Nor.
8. As for the test site itself, Lop Nor is extremely remote, with poor transportation and communication facilities, and we might expect to see the Chinese taking a long leadtime in preparing this installation. They have relatively few men with the necessary scientific competence and they cannot be fully confident that unexpected difficulties will not appear. We believe the Chinese would do everything in their power to prevent a last minute hitch on the testing facility from delaying, even briefly, China's advent as a nuclear "power."
9. The evidence and argument reviewed above do not permit a very confident estimate of the chances of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation in the next few months. Clearly the possibility of such a detonation before the end of this year cannot be ruled out--the test may occur during this period. On balance, however, we believe that it will not occur until sometime after the end of 1964./2/
/2/[Footnote in the source text (1 line) not declassified.]
44. Letter From the Ambassador to the Republic of China (Wright) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)/1/
Taipei, August 26, 1964.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files: Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson Administrations, Subject File, Wooe-Wz. Secret; Eyes Only.
Dear Averell:
I well recall our conversations of a little over a year ago in which the subject of "return to the mainland" was given extensive coverage. I recall also that Ambassador Kirk's principal concern was the possibility of a move towards a channel crossing by the GRC which might get underway without our knowledge. Following my several conversations with you, I explored this problem in considerable detail with him with a view to continuation of the informative and preventative measures which he proposed.
Over the past year a noticeable change has taken place in the attitude of the GRC toward "mainland recovery". There has been a very definite quiescence on the extensive preparations and planning which took place in late 1962 and early 1963. During this period you will recall the planning agencies of the Ministry of National Defense were burning the midnight oil to crank out plans for operations toward this objective.
During the past six months there has been a noticeable slacking off, if not disappearance, of this intensive effort and in its place we find a rather keen and increasing interest in developments in Southeast Asia, particularly in Laos and South Vietnam.
I have covered in greater detail the changes which I have noted and the reasons therefor in my Embassy A-138,/2/ of which I am enclosing a copy in the event you care to examine these details.
/2/Airgram A-138 from Taipei, August 21, noted that GRC infiltration attempts and commando raids had not revealed any weak spots in the mainland coastal defenses; on the contrary, the loss well out to sea of two commando teams in July had been a severe setback to the program and had forced a reevaluation of GRC strategy. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CHINAT-US)
I could summarize the situation by relating two circumstances which have deviated the attention of the GRC from across-the-channel amphibious operations to developments in Southeast Asia as follows:
1) The very excellent step taken by Ambassador Kirk in setting up the "Blue Lion" planning committee, consisting of the Ambassador and the Minister of National Defense, in which the GRC detailed plans for cross channel operations were examined by our staff and their inadequacies and deficiencies thoroughly developed. These shortcomings, I am sure, reached the eyes and ears of the President and were instrumental in convincing him of the gargantuan nature of such an operation and the need for massive U.S. support.
2) The worsening situation in Southeast Asia has, I believe, revealed to the President the possibilities of getting into China by the Southern route rather than by the route of direct amphibious assault.
This change in their approach does not signify in any sense a reduction in their desire to return to the mainland but rather a change in the method and approach as to how this might be accomplished.
I am sending a copy of this letter to Bill Bundy in order that he may know of my communication with you.
Best wishes,
Sincerely,
Jerry W.
45. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador to the Republic of China (Wright)/1/
Washington, September 4, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 75 D 76, Blue Lion Consultations. Top Secret. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Republic of China Affairs John B. Dexter on August 31.
Dear Jerry:
Thank you for your letter of August 7 sending us the report on "Blue Lion" planning./2/ We are glad to have your comments and, as you suggested, are transmitting a copy of the report as well as a copy of your letter to CIA.
/2/Wright's letter enclosed a letter of June 30 to him from Admiral Melson reporting on the work of the "Blue Lion" committee. (Ibid., Central Files, POL CHINAT-CHICOM)
I believe there are few, if any, on our side who would be surprised at the conclusion reached by COM US TDC that the various operations contemplated in this planning exercise are beyond GRC capabilities with present forces. In my opinion the greatest value of this planning exercise is the point noted in your letter, i.e. that it has brought home to the GRC the magnitude of such operations and its own deficiencies in resources for carrying them out. This has no doubt reduced any tendency the GRC may still have toward irresponsible military ventures and, perhaps even more significant, it should help place GRC political thinking on a more realistic foundation. I am glad to see that the "Blue Lion" Committee is to continue since it has served, and I think can continue to serve, a very important purpose.
In conjunction with the "Blue Lion" report, I was interested in seeing the further amplification of the mainland recovery subject which you sent us in your A-138./3/ The shift in emphasis in GRC planning which you traced is a natural one in the circumstances, though it is not something we can welcome wholeheartedly. Obviously GRC objectives in Southeast Asia differ widely from our own and we must continue to watch closely everything it does there, even while we continue to encourage suitable GRC activities in those limited areas where our interests coincide.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 44.
With best regards,
Sincerely yours,
William P. Bundy/4//4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China/1/
Washington, September 4, 1964, 5:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Dexter, cleared by SEA Director William C. Trueheart and Bundy, and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Bangkok and Rangoon.
210. For Ambassador from Secretary. I have reviewed recent exchange messages concerning approaches to GRC proposed by Dept in connection reported GRC activities Thailand and Burma. In view of recent conversations Gen Yeh and Chiang Ching-kuo in which US views on GRC-sponsored paramilitary activities SEA reaffirmed, I agree with you that we have probably done enough for the present to make our position clear to the GRC. However, I still believe it would be useful bring to GRC attention at highest level two points which apparently have not been mentioned or stressed in conversations with Yeh and Chiang. We should report to GRC fact that Burmese Foreign Office has expressed to our Embassy Rangoon its concern over resumption what they refer to as "legitimate KMT" activities in Thai-Burma border area under direction GRC officials in Thailand; and we should mention our belief, based upon various reports, that these activities were probably a subject of discussion during Chou En-lai's visit Rangoon last July. Both points I believe would be of legitimate interest to GRC even apart from opportunity they provide to restate our position on irregulars.
In connection Burmese Foreign Office approach to us, you might wish say that Burmese did not present evidence of activities in question and our Embassy did not express any opinion as to basis Burmese concern. However, our Ambassador did reaffirm to Burmese our continuing opposition to any recurrence unfortunate Chinese irregulars issue which has left lasting legacy misunderstanding between US and Burma.
I believe it should be possible to bring these points to President Chiang's attention in manner which would subtly complement rather than offensively duplicate recent conversations with Chiang and Yeh. I suggest further that you introduce these points during next appropriate occasion when you meet with President on other business, rather than seek special meeting to discuss them.
You are of course aware that Chinese irregulars question continues to be of concern to us. We are determined to do everything possible assure that GRC does not undertake excessive or indiscreet actions, as they have in past, which could needlessly complicate our problems in SEA. In this we recognize that GRC has its own axes to grind in SEA. In pursuing its objectives against the mainland, it has a natural tendency to go beyond what we consider limits of prudence and to be less than candid with us in doing so.
Rusk
47. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/
Washington, September 5, 1964, 8:02 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 CHINAT. Secret. Drafted by Green and William J. Cunningham of the ROC desk, cleared by UNP Director William B. Buffum, and approved and initialed by Rusk. Sent to all U.S. diplomatic missions except those in the Soviet bloc and to Hong Kong, Lusaka, Valletta, USUN, the Mission at Geneva, and USRO Paris.
446. Personal for Chief of Mission. I trust that you will do all in your power to ensure that countries now recognizing the GRC will continue this policy and that those not now recognizing Peiping will not move closer to Communist China. It is clear that the Chinese Communists are mounting a subtle, persistent offensive, particularly in Africa, with a view to improving their international position at the expense of the GRC. An official Chinese Communist goodwill mission now touring West Africa is trying to undermine the GRC position there. Malawi and Northern Rhodesia appear disposed to establish relations with Peiping.
I am sure you realize, as we move into the weeks preceding the General Assembly, that the GRC's status in the United Nations depends upon a solid international position. Moreover, it would be particularly dangerous for the peace of the world if Peiping were to be rewarded with recognition and admission to the UN at a time when the Chinese Communists are inciting aggression in Asia, encouraging rebellion in Africa and extolling militant revolution in much of the world. This point should be of particular concern in those areas of the world where the Chinese Communists are now actively supporting revolutionary and subversive movements which seek to topple duly constituted authority.
I leave to your judgment what measures will be best suited to the situation in each of your posts. You may find CA-4523, October 23, 1963,/2/ and CA-10131, April 3, 1964,/3/ helpful in this regard. If you desire additional guidance, the Department is prepared to supply background and talking points.
/2/See footnote 7, Document 23.
/3/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 US)
Rusk
48. National Policy Paper/1/
Washington, September 11, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, National Policy Paper, Republic of China. Secret. Portions of the paper, entitled "Future U.S. Role in External Defense" and "Present U.S. Role in External Defense," are filed ibid. under a cover sheet dated June 1964. Drafted by Joseph A. Yager of the Policy Planning Council and approved by Rusk on September 11. The preface states: "All agencies with major responsibilities affecting U.S. relations with the Republic of China participated in drafting the paper and concur in the Strategy and Courses of Action which it sets forth."
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
[Here follow a preface and table of contents.]
PART ONE: U.S. POLICY
[Here follows an introduction comprising 9 pages.]
II. U.S. STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS
A. General
1. Desired Course of Free China's Evolution
An understanding of what progress should be made in Taiwan in the next five years can best be obtained by looking beyond this period and considering what situation we would like to see there in the mid-1970's. The following outline of the hoped-for Taiwan of 1975 necessarily reflects judgments on what is possible as well as on what is desirable. It must be emphasized, however, that it is not an intelligence estimate.
The assumptions used below are those stated in Section I. E., above, which imply the further assumption that Taiwan in 1975 would still be cut off from significant contact with mainland China.
a. Social. By 1975, one might hope that the line between Taiwanese and mainlanders would have become somewhat blurred through increased inter-marriage, expanded cooperation in a wide range of common enterprises, and the unifying effect of a common educational system. Knowledge of Mandarin would have become widespread, and communication between Taiwanese and mainlanders would no longer be a problem. A substantial Taiwanese-mainlander middle class and a Taiwanese-mainlander intellectual elite would have appeared, thus promoting a greater sense of communal unity.
A significant increase in educational standards would have occurred and the body of technically skilled workers greatly expanded. The present nearly stagnant academic life on Taiwan's university campuses would have been replaced by an upsurge of intellectual activity, although some inhibitions would persist in sensitive political areas. Something approaching a cultural renaissance would be underway in literature and the fine arts.
b. Economic. By 1975, Taiwan would have experienced a generation of continuous economic growth. The island would have been free for a number of years from dependence on all forms of concessional economic aid. Growth would be concentrated in a thriving private sector of the economy, operating with little government interference and under rationalized systems of commercial law and taxation.
The rate of population growth would have leveled off to between one and two percent annually, thereby easing the problem of maintaining an adequate rate of investment.
Price levels would have been reasonably stable for at least a decade and interest rates would have fallen to levels only moderately above those prevailing in advanced countries. An efficient money market would have been created
The government would have adopted a liberal trade policy based on the improved competitive strength of the export industries. The new Taiwan Dollar would have become fully convertible.
c. Security. The armed forces would have been reduced in size, but some improvements in fire power and mobility would have avoided a proportionate decrease in combat effectiveness. Taiwanese would form perhaps one-fifth of the officer corps and a few Taiwanese would have risen to general or flag rank.
MAP grant aid would have been significantly reduced in the early 1970's and procurement of military goods and services from the United States shifted in part to a Military Assistance Sales basis, including liberal loan and credit arrangements.
The military situation in the Taiwan Strait would have been stabilized and a cease-fire tacitly established.
No serious threat to internal security would have arisen.
d. Political. Political stability would have been maintained, in part as a consequence of a timely Kuomintang decision to permit greater freedom of political action within the framework of the party itself and to give Taiwanese a growing role in party councils and in government. A non-vocal, but independent, opposition party would have been permitted to organize and function. This party, however, would not be purely Taiwanese in its membership or outlook.
Communications media would be operating more freely and with a greater sense of responsibility.
The Taiwan Provincial Government would have been granted considerably greater autonomy, but the central government would still make the basic decisions, at least in the fields of foreign relations, internal and external security and fiscal and monetary policy. The governor of Taiwan would be popularly elected.
The GRC would not have abandoned its claim to be the government of all China and recovery of the mainland would still be proclaimed to be its primary national objective. However, actual preparations for action aimed at recovery of the mainland would have fallen to a low level and major attention would be focused on development of Taiwan and the maintenance of the GRC's international position. The credibility of the mainland recovery policy would have been seriously eroded by the passage of actionless decades, the deaths of many party elders and the emigration of many others to the United States and elsewhere, as well as by the introduction of a significant Taiwanese element into the KMT leadership.
As a consequence of its economic, educational and cultural achievements, the GRC would have won increasing international recognition as a progressive force in the Far East and would continue to be recognized by a large number of non-Communist nations.
2. Dimensions of U.S. Influence During the Next Five Years
As in the past, the GRC's dependence on the U.S. for its very existence will continue, in the final analysis, to provide the principal basis for U.S. influence. We face, however, the problem of adjusting to the declining importance of two of the specific instruments--our economic and military aid programs--through which we have made our influence felt. We must make the best possible use of these instruments while we still have them. We must also learn to work more effectively through international organizations and private U.S institutions.
During the next few years, direct U.S. influence will probably be most effective in influencing specific GRC economic development tactics, diplomatic activities and defensive military policy. We shall have less influence on fiscal policy, military force levels, the missions and tasks of the armed forces, propaganda and clandestine operations. We shall probably be least effective in the field of political reform.
Fortunately, our direct means of exercising influence are reinforced by indirect influence flowing from the continued pervasive penetration of U.S. standards and methods throughout society and from the delayed social and political repercussions of the economic progress which we have supported.
3. General Description of U.S. Strategy
The next five years should see as much progress as possible toward the kind of Taiwan described in section II.A.1, above. The U.S. strategy to bring about this kind of progress will be more fully developed in subsequent sections, but its key ingredients should be:
a. A carefully planned, step-by-step effort to gain broad acceptance of our view of the desirable long-term future of Taiwan among GRC leaders and private leaders of opinion.
b. Continued observance of and reiteration of our commitment to the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus.
c. Continued economic and military aid in amounts and for periods of time needed to ensure: (1) sustained economic growth without concessional aid, (2) maintenance of armed forces needed to support U.S. security objectives, and (3) preservation of the necessary degree of U.S. influence in key elements of Government and society.
d. Reduction and eventual elimination of concessional economic aid as a means of encouraging the GRC to stand on its own feet and adopt self-help measures essential to realization of the economy's full potential for growth.
e. Attachment of explicit or implicit conditions on aid designed to induce adoption of: (1) rational economic policies, including appropriate economic development policies and (2) levels and composition of armed forces consistent with the U.S. view of the missions and tasks of those forces.
f. Encouragement of the GRC--largely through private persuasion--to: (1) relax its political controls, permitting development of more effective opposition activity, (2) bring more Taiwanese into positions of responsibility, (3) promote joint Taiwanese-mainlander enterprises, (4) adopt a rational population policy and a comprehensive manpower program and (5) promote cultural and intellectual activities in a free atmosphere.
g. Identification and appropriate cultivation of future leaders.
h. Continued diplomatic support of the GRC in the UN and elsewhere.
4. Principal Contingencies
Any of the following contingencies would probably require a major change in one or more aspects of the US strategy:
a. Major hostilities in the Far East involving the U.S., the GRC or Communist China; especially: hostilities between the U.S. and Communist China, the U.S. and the USSR; hostilities caused by a Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan, the Penghus or one of the major offshore islands; or hostilities precipitated by a GRC invasion of the mainland.
b. A drastic increase in the vulnerability of the Chinese Communist regime to GRC military or paramilitary operations resulting from economic disaster, internal revolt, a split in the regime or involvement of the regime in major hostilities on another front.
c. A deal between the GRC and the Chinese Communists.
d. The rise to power on Taiwan of a more repressive militaristic regime as a consequence of a succession crisis, suppression of a Taiwanese uprising, military defeat or economic stagnation.
e. Loss by the GRC of its UN seat either through expulsion or through voluntary withdrawal in protest over a UN decision to offer membership to the Chinese Communists.
These contingencies will not be treated explicitly in this paper, but are properly the subject of separate contingency plans.
B. US Political Strategy
1. Political Stability and Political Reform
For the past decade, the U.S. has operated on the assumption that the GRC could maintain political stability on Taiwan if it were protected from Communist military pressures and assisted in the development of the island's economy. This assumption has proved correct, but something more is likely to be required in the years ahead. The stability that has prevailed on Taiwan rests on a balance of opposing forces that cannot easily be maintained. Unless change comes gradually and peacefully, there is a danger that it will come with a disorderly rush, threatening all that the US, the GRC and the people of Taiwan have achieved since the loss of the mainland.
Peaceful change is everywhere a matter of timing, pace and style. This is particularly true of Taiwan where ill-considered, precipitate reform would be as dangerous as blind reaction. In this complex and delicate situation, we must move with caution and deliberation, constantly keeping in mind the limits on both our understanding and our capabilities.
The weight of our influence should be thrown behind the general proposition that a gradual relaxation of political controls, greater observance of civil rights (including giving trade unions freedom of activity and functions usual in democratic countries) and increased Taiwanese participation in responsible levels of government are essential conditions of political stability. We should make our views to the GRC clear whenever appropriate opportunities arise in connection with specific instances in which we feel GRC observance of political or civil rights has been dangerously deficient.
Use should be made of the good offices of prominent Americans outside the government who are known to be sympathetic to the GRC. On occasion, the ILO, the ICFTU and other international organizations might be encouraged to call violations of political or civil rights to the attention of the GRC. Public information media could lend indirect support to the campaign by publicizing advances in popular government in other countries and by applauding constructive steps taken by the GRC. In the field of labor rights, public and private American employers on Taiwan could set a good example by recognizing and dealing with unions of their Chinese employees.
Our campaign for political and civil reforms should be conducted in a low key and largely behind the scenes. Great care should be taken to avoid either unduly whetting Taiwanese and other oppositionist political appetites or frightening GRC leaders into more repressive policies.
The layering of the national and provincial government lends itself to a gradualist approach to the problem of political reform. Increasing the autonomy of the provincial government and the authority of both its legislative and executive branches would automatically lead to more effective popular participation in government and to a more influential role for Taiwanese. At the same time, the mainlander leadership could retain control over defense and international relations and a share in the making of domestic policy that might be adequate for their purposes. U.S. agencies on Taiwan should seek to promote this development by gradually increasing their dealings with the provincial government and seizing appropriate opportunities to build up its prestige and influence.
2. The Possibility of a Presidential Succession
An orderly, constitutional transfer of power upon the death or incapacity of Chiang Kai-shek is strongly in our interest. During the period before Chiang's departure, we should do what we can in all fields--political, psychological, economic and military--to create favorable conditions for a smooth transition at the time of the succession.
3. Return to the Mainland
We should continue to discourage the GRC from military or para-military operations against the China mainland which might provoke a dangerous Chinese Communist reaction or damage our prestige and that of the GRC. We should encourage the GRC to rely more on political and psychological efforts in seeking to undermine Communist control of the mainland.
When appropriate and necessary, we should remind GRC leaders of their obligation under the exchange of notes of December 10, 1954, to obtain our prior agreement to any offensive actions by their armed forces. If the GRC appears intent on taking such actions without our prior agreement, we should make clear that we would be under no obligation to help contain any Communist military counteraction and that our continued economic and military aid to the GRC would be placed in jeopardy. At the same time, we should not foreclose the option of assisting the GRC in playing an effective role on the mainland in the event of a drastic increase in Chinese Communist vulnerability to GRC pressures.
A sharp and damaging confrontation with the GRC, on the return to the mainland issue can probably be avoided, if we maintain our present intimate knowledge of GRC's plans and thinking, and if we continue to be successful in persuading the GRC of our view that, under present circumstances, operations on a scale larger than those we have accepted to date would almost certainly fail with seriously adverse consequences for GRC interests.
4. The International Status of the GRC
We should continue to oppose the admission of the Chinese Communists to the UN and other international organizations by using the abundant evidence disqualifying the Peiping regime from admission to the society of peace-loving nations. We should continue to support the resolution of the 16th General Assembly declaring Chinese representation an important question requiring a two-thirds vote. We should not abandon the possible option of using the veto as the final defense against admission of the Chinese Communists to the Security Council.
In the immediate future, our main task will be to dampen down the repercussions of the recent French recognition of Peiping. Over the longer-run--assuming that the French action does not lead to rapid erosion of the GRC's international position--the main threat to our ability to protect the status of the GRC as the representative of China in international organizations will come from the existence of sentiment in many governments for seating both GRC and Chinese Communist representatives. This sentiment might eventually result in the passage of a "two Chinas" resolution in the UN which would seriously undermine the GRC's status as the legitimate representative of China and would probably lead many countries to recognize Communist China and officially proclaim a "two Chinas" policy. This threat would become even more serious if the Chinese Communists reversed their present position and indicated their willingness to sit in international organizations with representatives of the GRC, or if the GRC were to react to a mere invitation to the Chinese Communists to join an international organization by themselves withdrawing. The first of these possibilities is fortunately remote. We should guard against the second by continuing to urge on the GRC the merits of a pragmatic, as opposed to a rigidly doctrinaire, approach to the Chinese representation problem.
We should continue to support GRC efforts to maintain its relations with governments now recognizing it and to establish relations with newly independent governments. We should also continue to encourage the GRC to use its small technical assistance program as a valuable adjunct of its diplomacy, particularly in Africa.
We should view sympathetically the GRC tendency to tighten its ties with other strongly anti-Communist Asian governments, in part to compensate for diplomatic reverses received or feared in other areas. But at the same time we should not now support GRC proposals for new regional alliances. To do so under existing circumstances would add little or nothing to our strength in the Far East and would complicate our efforts to cope with several major problems, notably those in Vietnam and Laos.
5. Two Chinas
Since both the GRC and the Chinese Communists strongly oppose the separation of Taiwan from China, it is most unlikely that an independent state could be created on Taiwan during the next five years--or indeed for a considerably longer period of time. Under present circumstances, adoption by the U.S. of a "two Chinas" policy (i.e., recognition of the Chinese Communist regime as the government of China and the GRC as the government of Taiwan) would be futile and would involve serious losses and risks. The value of the GRC as a diplomatic counter to the Chinese Communists would of course be largely, if not entirely, lost. But beyond this, U.S. adoption of a "two Chinas" policy would have a deeply unsettling effect on political stability on Taiwan, conceivably including opening the door to a deal between KMT leaders and the Chinese Communists. We would also risk arousing the bitter and lasting enmity of many patriotic Chinese who would interpret our action as an effort to separate off part of the national territory.
In the absence of any diminution of the Chinese Communist threat, the governments of South Korea, South Vietnam and Thailand would regard any U.S. moves toward a "two Chinas" posture with considerable apprehension. This feeling would probably be shared by leaders in the Philippines and Malaysia and to some extent even in Burma, Indonesia and India. Pressures for accommodation with the Chinese Communists would increase throughout the area.
We should, therefore, not adopt a "two Chinas" policy. At the same time, we should pursue economic, political, and security policies which will in fact facilitate the survival of Taiwan as an independent national entity if, as now seems possible, this proves to be the ultimate consequence of further prolonged isolation of the island from the mainland of China.
[Here follow the remainder of section II, which concerns U.S. economic and military policy, section III, Courses of Action, and Part Two, Factors Bearing on U.S. Policy.]
49. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, September 15, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 6. Top Secret; Sensitive.
We discussed the question of Chinese nuclear weapons today, first in a lunch at the State Department given by Secretary Rusk for McNamara, McCone, and myself, and later at a meeting with the President in which Rusk, McNamara and I were with him in the Cabinet Room (McCone having left at a time when we thought the President would not be able to join us).
At the luncheon we developed the following position:
(1) We are not in favor of unprovoked unilateral U.S. military action against Chinese nuclear installations at this time. We would prefer to have a Chinese test take place than to initiate such action now. If for other reasons we should find ourselves in military hostilities at any level with the Chinese Communists, we would expect to give very close attention to the possibility of an appropriate military action against Chinese nuclear facilities.
(2) We believe that there are many possibilities for joint action with the Soviet Government if that Government is interested. Such possibilities include a warning to the Chinese against tests, a possible undertaking to give up underground testing and to hold the Chinese accountable if they test in any way, and even a possible agreement to cooperate in preventive military action. We therefore agreed that it would be most desirable for the Secretary of State to explore this matter very privately with Ambassador Dobrynin as soon as possible.
(3) We agreed that it would be much preferable to conduct any overflight of Chinese nuclear test facilities in a plane [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. In the course of the afternoon, Director McCone produced a proposal that such a flight be staged [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
These preliminary decisions were reported to the President in the Cabinet Room, and he indicated his approval. The Secretary of State now intends to consult promptly with the Soviet Ambassador.
McG. B./2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
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