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1964-1968 Volume XXX China |
70. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/
Warsaw, November 25, 1964, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, Geneva, Moscow, and Stockholm.
1174. Cabot-Wang talks./2/ Deptel 980./3/
/2/This was the 123d meeting of the Ambassadorial talks. Cabot reported the meeting in more detail in airgram A-544, November 30. (Ibid.)
/3/Telegram 980, November 19, provided guidance for the meeting and stated that the deterioration of language at the last meeting might have been a deliberate effort to taunt Cabot into breaking off the talks; if so, and for the record, "it seems desirable at this time to recapitulate our stance in broadest terms." (Ibid.)
(1) I opened with substance most points reference telegram except paragraph one and contingency items and appealed for avoidance polemics far as possible.
(2) Wang replied with review Chinese position on number issues often discussed before plus lengthy reiteration position on nuclear weapons. Nothing in this not already made known through Chou letter to President,/4/ enclosed statement, and recent press accounts of Chinese position. Wang read aloud and passed to me draft agreed announcement saying in effect two governments determined make joint effort eliminate nuclear weapons and effect thorough destruction of them. Both governments to undertake not to use such weapons and the two Ambassadors, on behalf their governments, solemnly declare that at no time and under no circumstances will either government be first to use nuclear weapons. Two governments propose governments of all nations of world hold summit conference as proposed in Chou letter (text in tomorrow's pouch)./5/
/4/Chou's October 17 letter to Johnson was delivered to the Embassy in Warsaw on October 19; the text was transmitted in telegram 885 of that date from Warsaw. (Ibid., DEF 12-1 CHICOM) The letter enclosed a copy of the PRC Government's announcement on October 16 of China's first nuclear test. The text of the statement is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 882-884. The text of the letter, also sent to other heads of government, is printed ibid., p. 1077.
/5/Not found.
(3) Wang continued UN had proved incapable handling question of disarmament and in any event so long as UN fails restore legitimate rights Chinese Government and does not nullify illegal status Chiang clique his government would have nothing to do with UN. Spoke of increased reconnaissance provocations including pilotless craft and said he hereby demands US immediately stop these provocations and threats.
(4) I promised transmit draft announcement, assuring him it would receive attention it merited, but observed question of verification and control obviously vital consideration in any disarmament proposal and noted no mention made of conventional armament which is intimately related question.
(5) Wang observed we had no competence speak of contamination of atmosphere on part others when we were first to test and use nuclear weapons. Said tripartite treaty designed to tie hands of peace loving countries and his government continued oppose treaty.
(6) Wang asked for careful, sober-minded consideration before we attempted link China question with that of Vietnam by using Chiang troops in South Vietnam.
(7) I reviewed sequence developments in Far East since World War II in refutation Wang's accusation aggressive intentions USG because of alleged arms build up. I said it was clear Viet Cong was armed, trained and financed by ChiCom connivance with North Vietnam and his side was playing very dangerous game. I continued with substance paragraph six A and Rusk quote paragraph 18.
(8) Wang continued with lengthy tirade on alleged US aggressions worldwide and said we should stay home, asking who has committed aggression against US--the Congolese? I said his government had done so in Korea when we were opposing under UN banner North Korean aggression. Lengthy discussion of who supporting whom in Southeast Asia and where charges of aggression properly lay. This was chiefly repetition worn themes on Wang's part.
Next meeting December 24.
Cabot
71. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/
Warsaw, November 26, 1964, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, Geneva, Moscow, and Stockholm.
1176. Cabot-Wang talks. Embtel 1174./2/ Comments and recommendations following 123rd meeting.
/2/Document 70.
1. Wang's tone better than last time, and never so severe that I considered terminating meeting. However it was at times a bit contemptuous, often patronizing and always ex cathedra.
2. No mention of Khrushchev political demise.
3. Wang spoke smugly of their development of nuclear device. Draft agreed announcement re Summit, non-use of and eventual destruction nuclear weapons so patently unacceptable do not believe Chinese themselves take it seriously. Fact Wang proposed next meeting at three-month interval would seem indicate lack of interest in response. I did not refer to obvious unacceptability their proposal, but did point out crucial aspect controls and intimate relation conventional arms and force levels to whole question.
4. At one point Wang said in effect if Geneva agreements were adhered to, there would be no trouble in Indo-China area. I expressed interest in this statement, and said we would be glad conform meticulously to these agreements if only others would do same.
5. I took liberty some omissions and some changes in guidance for opening statement, partly because I wanted emphasize absence polemics and desire for constructive proposals and partly because we could not find references for some of quotes paragraph 1, and feared Wang might ask who said them and when. Hope Department can give documentation all quotes in subsequent guidance.
6. Wang obviously unprepared for moderate tone my opening statement, since he misquoted me three times in his response, assuming that I would naturally say things which in fact I did not say. He paid no attention to my plea for no polemics.
7. As for next meeting, I see no value in lengthy and sterile polemics. I think both sides really know the score, so there is little to gain in propagandizing each others home offices--ostensibly our only audiences until the historians come in. Since two sides differ so basically on so many issues this admittedly leaves little room on constructive side of ledger. Hence if Department agrees, I would propose simply give somewhat shorter responses than has been our habit, adequate to keep record straight, but leaving lengthy preachments up to Wang (he enjoys them so). This would preserve inherent value of holding talks per se, and retain them for time when they can again serve specific useful purpose. For present, Chinese clearly interested in talks only as propaganda forum.
8. Believe we should not go on record as rejecting draft agreed announcement, but ask questions re implementation and control, and reaction conventional force levels.
9. Chinese made no attempt take extensive notes this time, whereas we believe past habit was take seemingly verbatim notes in English shorthand. Do not know whether they have decided it not worth the effort, or whether they now have access to Polish tapes which may emerge from newly activated Mysliewiecki Palace--i.e., we may indeed have a third audience.
Cabot
72. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel/MC/4
New York, November 30, 1964, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2447. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Givan on December 1, and approved in S on December 2. The source text is labeled "Part II of II." Part I is ibid. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York.
SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, November 1964SUBJECT
Chinese RepresentationPARTICIPANTS
US
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary Cleveland
Mr. Foster, Director, ACDA
Mr. Givan, EURCanada
Secretary for External Affairs Martin
Ambassador Tremblay, UN Mission
Mr. H. Basil Robinson, Deputy Undersecretary for External Affairs
Minister Cox, UN Mission
Mr. William Barton, OIC, UN AffairsMinister Martin said that, although he opposed a postponement of the UNGA over Article 19, he would be happy to see a postponement to delay a showdown on the Chinese question. The Secretary said he could see some advantage from that point of view and also to let certain aspects of the Congo question cool off. With regard to the Hanoi-Peiping situation, we will see what the other side is up to in the coming dry season. We feel strongly that anything that causes the Chinese Communists to think they are on the right track is a step toward war.
Martin said he understood the Secretary's feelings and, because they get along well, they can be frank with each other. The Chinese issue has gone beyond the point where he could do anything to turn back his government. The Canadians are, however, resolved not to do anything without the fullest disclosure and consultation. Although their talks with the Belgians and the Italians have been serious, these are not at all as thorough as they undertake to carry on with the United States. Martin said they would not be honest if they did not say they had reached the point where they must speak out. They cannot delay action any longer.
The Secretary asked what action could not be delayed. We certainly want to delay a war with China if possible. Martin agreed. The Secretary said something that deeply distresses us but which may have the seeds of a suggestion is the fact that in the past two years apparently no country with relations with China has expressed concern to Peiping over its policies in Southeast Asia. Perhaps when Canadian diplomats are in touch with Communist Chinese, they could express the Canadian attitude toward Chinese aggression. When the Chinese react negatively, the Canadian Government could draw the obvious conclusions.
Martin said his government had no contact at all with Peiping, which is symptomatic of the unreality of the present situation. When the Canadian Broadcasting Company planned to do a series on China, Martin asked the CBC representative to pass on unofficially some thoughts to the Chinese leaders. The man saw Chou En-lai three times and told him forcefully that the Canadians hoped the Chinese attitude on Indochina would enable Canada to do what it believed right in the interests of universality in the UN. Chou replied that this was an old argument, that no one is taking over Indochina, but that no one could stop the march of events; in any case, Canada is merely a satellite of the United States and will do nothing without the US approval. Members of the wheat mission to China had also tried to talk to the ChiComs but the latter said they did not want to talk politics with wheat experts. This illustrates that the GOC has done what it can to convey its views to Chinese leaders. Martin said that, speaking as a friend, he must say that if the Chinese question comes up at this GA and if the vote on substance is close, within perhaps two votes of a majority, the Canadian position as a nation would be impaired for a long time if it did not vote favorably. On the Important Question, Canada would be with the United States.
Martin said that Mr. Cleveland had been in Ottawa when Conservative MPs had asked why the government did not act on China, and if the government was afraid of the United States. Martin had talked with Barbara Ward, who reflected State Department thinking on this issue. She, however, seemed to see something in a parity proposal to protect Formosa's position. The GOC recognizes the difficulties in making any such proposal but feels that if the Chinese question comes up Canada should say something to protect the rights of Formosa. Martin recalled in this regard that Secretary Rusk had asked in a television speech what should be done for Formosa and whether it was to be thrown to the wolves. The Secretary commented that if Canada maintained diplomatic relations with Formosa, Peiping would not allow Canada to establish relations.
Martin said that his government's assessment of the voting alignment in the GA on ChiRep is not good. The Secretary asked what Canada would like to see in Southeast Asia and on the western rim of the Pacific. Martin replied that Canada would naturally want to see peace all over the world, but none of us can avoid recognizing that the Chinese will exert increasing influence. This is not in Canada's interest, nor is it in Canada's interest to have a Communist regime in Russia. But there it is. To make an ideological identification of one's enemies is not the right approach. Coming into the UN will not alter the aggressive tendencies of any state, but it will provide that much more contact. The Secretary commented that inclusion in the UN might confirm the aggressive tendencies of Peiping. He could understand, however, if Canada helped the ChiComs in this way if they were willing to put a division into Southeast Asia to help contain Peiping's expansion. Martin said this was an unfair argument to use with "little fellows" such as Canada that could not put its troops in NATO, Cyprus and everywhere else. If there should be a war, it is axiomatic that Canada would be alongside the United States.
Martin said he had recently asked the Russian Ambassador to Canada what the Soviets would do if the Canadians supported admission of China, and had commented that Chinese admission would pose some difficulties for the USSR. The Ambassador had nodded at this statement.
With regard to the Soviet attitude, the Secretary said that if the Russians had become more cautious lately, it was not because of their contacts in the UN but because of their direct contacts with the United States, and because NATO solidarity had convinced them that they must stop pressing. In addition, since the beginning of the cold war the U.S. defense budget had totalled some 700 billion dollars. With regard to China, Secretary Rusk said he was disturbed by the view that Chinese domination of Southeast Asia is unavoidable. Would Martin say this was equally true of the USSR and Iran? Martin said that it was inconceivable that a nation of 700 million people would not share the authority and influence of Japan and India in Southeast Asia.
The Secretary asked whether the same relationship held between the United States and Canada. Martin said it did indeed, so much so that he had hesitated to speak in this frank way despite his great personal esteem for Secretary Rusk. The Secretary commented that we would never object to a relationship between China and Southeast Asia along the lines of the United States-Canadian relationship.
The Secretary asked what the public reaction in Canada would be if the GOC published an account of what the CBC man had reported of his conversation with Chou En-lai. Secretary Martin said that this would make no difference. People in Canada would tell the government to show that Canada is not a satellite.
The Secretary said he would be in touch further on the subject and it would certainly be discussed in NATO. It would be of some importance to NATO since US interests could easily swing to the Pacific if the situation there grows more serious. He would also be giving Martin data on increased infiltration in South Vietnam.
Martin recalled that Defense Secretary McNamara had told him that the situation in South Vietnam could go on a thousand years. He could not believe it. Secretary Rusk said that we certainly believe our contribution to security in Europe might have to go on a thousand years, or as long as it is needed. We see no terminal date for it. Martin said that he had suggested to Mr. Cleveland, as he could not suggest to a Secretary of State, that he should not use such arguments because they do not touch reality. Bringing China into the UN would not affect these issues one way or the other. They would affect many people in Southeast Asia; for example, Catholics would be offended beyond words, but this would be temporary.
The Secretary said he appreciated Minister Martin's frankness. It should be quite clear, however, that if all of our allies in NATO do not feel deeply concerned about how China may be turned away from aggression, there could be bad results in NATO as we are forced to turn to problems of the Pacific. Martin said that the difficulty for the Canadians is that they do not believe entry into the UN would affect this situation. It would be a long process, but it cannot start until we "mingle." He had talked with Ikeda six weeks ago in Tokyo. The Japanese want to take part when the Chinese question is resolved, although perhaps the new government will have a different idea on timing. He had also talked with Spaak recently who does not go quite as far as the Canadians but feels that resolution of the Chinese question cannot be delayed much longer. The Canadians are not much concerned about the recognition issue, but would want to overcome this at the same time as ChiRep. They would probably regard UN admission as constituting recognition.
73. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, December 10, 1964, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-CHINAT. Secret; Limdis.
504. A-1110, June 26, 1964./2/ Present were [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] General Chiang Ching-kuo, and interpreter in connection with briefing of President Chiang today on highly classified matters reported [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] separately. President called attention to IL-10 planes recently reported at Foochow. He stated that these planes gave ChiComs considerable added capability for attacks on Taiwan, offshore islands and China shipping. He asked that I recommend speeded delivery of programmed MAP equipment not yet delivered as a means to counter this threat. Asked if request was general or for any specific equipment. President replied that principal fear was raid on shipping by PSA class boats and that Bull Pup would give a capability to handle this threat. I agreed to transmit his request./3/
/2/See footnote 3, Document 31.
/3/Telegram 583 from Taipei, January 7, stated that the U.S. military evaluation was that the IL-10 aircraft did not represent a significant increase in the threat to Taiwan, and that expedited delivery of Bullpup missiles was therefore not warranted; it recommended that Wright should discuss this with Chiang. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-CHINAT) Telegram 745 to Taipei, February 9, concurred. (Ibid., POL CHICOM-CHINAT)
I stated that Dept has recently expressed concern that ChiNat raids launched from off shore islands would stimulate retaliation by ChiComs and that I had so advised FonMin. President stated that US should not be concerned about this matter.
Wright
74. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China/1/
Washington, December 21, 1964, 9:52 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Bennett; cleared by Green, Fearey, Grant, William Bundy, McGeorge Bundy, and the President; and approved by Harriman. A December 19 memorandum from Komer to the President, with the draft telegram attached, noted that the proposed answer to Chiang "gives him such general assurance as we can and simply avoids joining the argument on the things we cannot help him with." Johnson checked the "Let it go" line on Ko-mer's memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspond-ence File, China, Volume I)
593. Embtels 490/2/ and 452./3/ Deliver to President Chiang following letter from the President:/4/
/2/Telegram 490 from Taipei, December 4. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 US-JOHNSON)
/3/Telegram 452 from Taipei, November 23, transmitted the text of Chiang's letter; see footnote 2, Document 69.
/4/Telegram 542 from Taipei, December 24, reported the delivery of the letter. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 US-JOHNSON)
"Dear Mr. President:
Thank you very much for your letter of November 23 and for your congratulations on my election. I greatly value your views on the present situation in Asia and have given them close attention.
The aggressive policies being pursued by the Chinese Communists are indeed a grave menace to all free nations. As both our countries have learned through the years, they are a menace which has many facets--psychological and political as well as military--assuming different forms and dimensions in different parts of the world. Our task must be to bring about the highest possible degree of Free World vigilance and solidarity in defense against the Communists' designs.
The United States is fully alive to the Chinese Communists' aggressive designs against Taiwan. You may be assured that the American people regard their Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China as one of their basic international commitments, and that their determination to stand by it would in no way be weakened by Chinese Communist development of nuclear weapons. I believe that the continuing strength of our alliance will deter the Chinese Communists from any thought of a nuclear attack on Taiwan, as the NATO alliance has deterred the Soviet Union from an attack on Western Europe. We are considering the deployment of additional fighter aircraft to Taiwan from time to time to enhance the strength of our defense posture, if you agree this would be of value.
The United States is fully conscious of the Chinese Communists' plan to deprive the Republic of China of its place in the United Nations, to destroy the Republic of China and to seize Taiwan. Against these threats too the United States will continue to give your Government full support.
I greatly appreciate your sharing with me your thoughts as to actions we might take to meet the Communist threat. So far as the objective of restoring the mainland of China to freedom is concerned, I believe we should continue to be guided by the principles you and the late Secretary Dulles set forth in the communique of October 23, 1958. As was agreed then, success against the Communists is to be won principally by political means, not by force. The United States Government has no evidence of increased popular restiveness on the mainland or of a weakening of the Communists' internal controls; and it doubts that present political conditions favor the taking of military initiatives.
I do not believe the United States can presume to assert leadership in Asian affairs; but I agree with you that closer consultation among Asian countries could bring important benefits to the Free World cause. The United States would welcome an Asian initiative for such a purpose. In this regard, the United States, as you know, attaches the highest importance to normalization of relations between Japan and Korea. I greatly appreciate what your Government has done to foster the establishment of friendly relations between these two countries and hope you will continue your efforts.
You mention your deep concern for the situation in Southeast Asia. The United States has just ended a review of the situation there and of the policies best suited to frustrate the Communists' aggressive policies. We feel we must take steps to improve the politico-military situation in the area; yet the fragility of political conditions in South Viet-Nam hampers us. As your Government was recently informed in confidence, we are undertaking moderate increases in air activity directed at the infiltration problem and are prepared to take certain other measures in retaliation against Viet Cong actions of any special nature. It is our purpose to impress upon Hanoi that the United States Government is not moving in the direction of retreat but is prepared to respond to Communist pressures by stepping up the level of its activity in Viet-Nam. The United States is of course looking beyond the immediate future, but we must bear in mind that additional actions in Viet-Nam must be based upon a reasonably secure situation in the south of that country.
In the years ahead I look forward to a further strengthening of the friendship between the Republic of China and the United States and to many future exchanges of views between us.
Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending our warm regards to you and Madam Chiang for Christmas and the New Year. Sincerely yours,
Lyndon B. Johnson"
Rusk
75. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 10, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 8. Top Secret. A handwritten "L" on the source text in Johnson's handwriting indicates that he saw the memorandum.
You may have heard of the Red Chinese announcement that a Chinese Nationalist U-2 was shot down over the Chinese Mainland early today. Our intercepts and other data confirm this report, and the Chiang government is now announcing that one of its aircraft is missing and presumed lost.
This is the fourth shoot-down over a period of 2-1/2 years (September '62, October '63, July '64, and January '65). [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
We believe the Chinese are using surface-to-air missiles, but we have less information than we would like on how many there are and where.
[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]
McG. B.
76. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
JCSM-41-65
Washington, January 16, 1965.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 5127, 471.6 Communist China. Top Secret. Filed as an attachment to a letter of February 18 from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Solbert to William Bundy.
SUBJECT
Possible Responses to the ChiCom Nuclear Threat1. By a memorandum, I-30032/64, dated 11 December 1964,/2/ subject as above, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested an analysis of possible responses which the US Government might make to the threat of Chinese communist nuclear blackmail, to include consideration of certain specific points which were expressed as questions.
/2/Not found.
2. Answers to the specific questions posed are attached hereto as Appendix A./3/ The analysis made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which could provide the basis for further interdepartmental studies, is attached as Appendix B. This memorandum and its appendices are based on and supplement the military appraisal of Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons forwarded by JCSM-1013-64, dated 3 December 1964./4/
/3/The appendices are attached but not printed.
/4/Not found.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:
a. There is no military requirement to modify US commitments at this time. The present ChiCom nuclear capability has not materially affected the existing balance of military power between the United States and Communist China; however, the expansion of this capability will pose difficult problems in the future. Maintaining and using in forward areas, as appropriate, flexible forces with both a conventional and nuclear capability becomes most important to provide visible evidence to our allies, as well as to the ChiComs, that the US defense commitment is firm. We should anticipate pressures which would result in requests by threatened countries for more definitive guarantees, including increased nuclear support.
b. With the exceptions of Japan and probably India, the Free World nations in Asia cannot develop a capability for defending themselves without US support. Japan should be encouraged to increase its defense efforts, providing improved conventional forces for use in the common defense of Asia and providing military assistance to other nations in Asia. Asian nations should continue to provide conventional forces.
c. Should pressures build up to the point that our Asian allies believe the development of a national nuclear capability to be clearly in their national interest, refusal to provide some form of nuclear assistance would put the United States in a position of denying to valued allies a nuclear capability possessed by the common enemy. The United States, therefore, should not rule out the possibility of increased nuclear support including some form of nuclear sharing with our allies in Asia when such is required in the US national interests.
d. In view of the foregoing, some program of positive US action may become necessary. The following appear sufficiently advantageous to warrant further study:
(1) Improvements to our system of alliances oriented at the threat of Communist China. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed studying the feasibility of related concepts in JCSM-1013-64, dated 3 December 1964, subject: "A Military Appraisal of Chinese Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons."
(2) [13 lines of source text not declassified]
e. Specific military courses of action to implement the concepts outlined in subparagraph d, above, should await determination of US policy.
4. It is recommended that interdepartmental studies be initiated to recommend US national policy with regard to:
a. Improvements to our system of alliances in Asia and the Pacific.
b. Increased nuclear support of our allies in Asia, including some form of nuclear sharing.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler/5/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff/5/Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original.
77. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 13-2-65
Washington, February 10, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, NIE 13-2-65. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on February 10, except the FBI representative, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
NIE 13-2-65 was originally issued on January 27. It included a discussion section not included in the later version here printed. The conclusions of the later version are slightly revised but similar in substance. (Central Intelligence Agency, NIE Files)
COMMUNIST CHINA'S ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAM
CONCLUSIONS
The Problem
To assess the current state of Communist China's nuclear weapons and missile program and, insofar as possible, estimate the future course and size of that program.
Note
Although we have obtained a considerable amount of new information in the past year or so, there remain serious gaps in our information and we are therefore not able to judge the present state or to project the future development of the Chinese program with any high degree of confidence. The specific judgments in this paper should be read in the light of this general caution.
Conclusions
A. Communist China's first nuclear test on 16 October 1964 was of an implosion fission device with U-235 as the fissionable material [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. We cannot estimate with confidence its weight or dimensions but believe it was relatively large and heavy. The most likely source of the U-235 was uranium first brought to partial enrichment in the gaseous diffusion facility at Lanchou and then further enriched by the electromagnetic process. We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that the U-235 was of Soviet or other non-Chinese origin though we believe this to be highly unlikely.
B. Although we have no good basis for estimating the current level of production of fissionable material, we believe that the Chinese will have enough material during the next two years to conduct a test program, with enough left over to stockpile at least a few bombs. The Chinese could now build bombs based on the results of their first test which could be carried by their two TU-16 medium jet bombers or their 12 or so TU-4s.
C. The evidence leads us to estimate that the Chinese Communists are developing a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). We believe this system is essentially a Soviet design, probably the SS-4, perhaps with some Chinese modifications. It is possible that the Chinese could have a few MRBMs ready for deployment with compatible fission warheads in 1967 or 1968. A weapon in bomb configuration could be available somewhat earlier and could be delivered by the Chinese air force's light jet IL-28 bombers of which they have about 290.
D. The Chinese have a submarine closely similar in outward appearance to the Soviet G-class submarine which is designed to launch 350 n.m. ballistic missiles while surfaced. We do not know whether the Chinese built this submarine or assembled components supplied by the USSR, or what missile they expect to put in it. We have no evidence that the Chinese are constructing any more of this type submarine and it would be at least several years before any units could be operational with Chinese-produced missiles.
E. The Soviets provided the Chinese with some surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) by mid-1960. We have no evidence to confirm or deny that the Soviets have furnished any more since then and we do not know how many such missiles are now in China. The Chinese have an urgent requirement for SAMs and we believe are working hard on a production program. There are indications that the Chinese are now producing some kind of surface-to-air missile, either Soviet-type SAMs or prototypes of a Chinese version. The evidence is not sufficient to permit a firm judgment but we think it highly unlikely that either will be produced on a large scale for two or three years.
F. It is unlikely that the Chinese will develop a deliverable thermonuclear weapon for several years, and there is little chance of an intercontinental capability until after 1970.
78. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/
Warsaw, February 24, 1965, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Geneva, Moscow, Stockholm, Hong Kong, and Taipei.
1744. Cabot-Wang talks./2/ Deptel 1446./3/
/2/This was the 124th meeting of the Ambassadorial talks. Cabot reported on the meeting in detail in airgram A-779, March 1. (Ibid.)
/3/Telegram 1446 to Warsaw, February 20, provided guidance for the meeting. It instructed Cabot that in response to Wang's anticipated charges, he should restate U.S. policies on Vietnam and disarmament. It noted that the wording had been carefully chosen to avoid polemical arguments but that he should endeavor to present it in a crisp and declaratory manner, without any suggestion that he was attempting to open negotiations on Vietnam. (Ibid.)
(1) Wang opened saying because of defeats suffered in Viet-nam we had recently sent planes to raid North Viet-nam, against the Geneva Agreements and thereby spreading the war. These criminal actions jeopardize peace, arousing condemnation all peace-loving peoples of the world. The Chinese Government made two statements on February 9 and 13 which make clear action against Viet-nam is action against China. U.S. defeat in South Viet-nam is foregone conclusion. Outcome Viet-nam war must be decided on the ground. In Chinese view long as U.S. continues present course Viet-nam people will continue deal heavier and heavier blows until U.S. is kicked out. It is U.S. which has invaded South Viet-nam and taken the lead in breaking up the demarcation line. Only one way out for U.S.: withdraw and let the people of Indochina settle their own problems. Up to U.S. to decide road to be taken. Wang said the more we go on expanding war, the surer is our defeat.
(2) Wang continued, claiming tension Far East is caused by U.S. occupation Taiwan, mentioning Polaris subs in Asian waters and aircraft capable carrying nuclear weapons in area. Said press was saying purpose was destroy all main cities of China. Chinese Government has long pointed out nuclear blackmail will not intimidate Chinese people. Mentioned serious warnings since last meeting and "spy planes" shot down. Said seven groups comprising 196 men of the Chiang clique had raided mainland and no good could come from our support such actions.
(3) I responded with guidance para 3, A through F./4/
/4/Paragraph 3 covered U.S. policy on Vietnam.
(4) Wang said my statement was prevarication to cover up our aggressive acts. Everyone could see we had violated Geneva Agreements in moving U.S. troops to South Viet-nam and spreading flames of war so as to carry out armed aggression to slaughter large numbers Vietnamese people. Facts cannot be covered by pretext. Said we claimed Hanoi was masterminding. This is nonsense. Obviously aggression will cause struggle against aggression. It is United States who forced people South Viet-nam to take up arms. Only correct way to settle this question is for U.S. to implement Geneva Agreements in good faith. U.S. must immediately stop war of aggression, withdraw troops and armament, and let South Vietnamese people settle own problems by selves. Said we lied in saying we came into South Viet-nam to protect freedom and have no selfish aims.
(5) I said Wang knew as well as I what he said untrue and I had stated true U.S. position. U.S. clearly prepared observe Geneva Agreements if others would. Reminded Wang had spoken of closeness between China and North Viet-nam and in such case believed could not avoid all responsibility for what was going on. Problem could be simply resolved if North Viet-nam authorities called off their aggression. We cannot abandon South Viet-nam. We willing leave South Viet-nam if North Viet-nam would stop interfering in South Viet-nam.
(6) Wang said China and DRV are fraternal countries and at same time close neighbors and rely on each other. Therefore U.S. aggression against DRV is just like aggression against China. Said if we insist on spreading war flames to North Viet-nam, China will definitely not sit idly by. China does not want war but must make clear its determination. If U.S. continues its aggression China is prepared to carry on to the end. If U.S. really means to abide by Geneva Accords it must first withdraw its troops.
(7) I then gave guidance para 4 A through E./5/
/5/Paragraph 4 covered U.S. policy on disarmament.
(8) Wang then gave repetitious account Chinese/Viet-nam views. Said we blamed North Viet-nam for fighting in both Viet-nam and Laos and asked what we were doing in Laos. Asked what is the reason U.S. launched attacks in Cambodia. Is this also fault North Viet-nam. Said that we had spread war to North Viet-nam. North Viet-nam has right to strike back and signatories Geneva Agreements also have right to act against United States aggression. The situation really grave now and if U.S. refuses withdraw it will be held fully responsible for all the consequences.
(9) Wang continued with meaningless statement concerning reasonableness Chinese draft agreed announcement, saying if we really wanted peace we should find no difficulty in agreeing to it.
(10) I said Wang's side seemed to call those governments it did not like "puppets" and seemed to feel it was all right for them to pursue so-called wars of liberation but not right for us to support free governments against such aggression.
(11) Wang said scale of war in North Viet-nam had developed with scale of U.S. aggression there. Wang said it was our usual practice to call all revolutionary movements Communist-backed, but this is simply attempt cover up our own aggression. Only way out is to withdraw troops from South Viet-nam. Said only practical thing was for countries having nuclear capability to agree not to use it on each other.
Next meeting April 21.
Cabot
79. Paper Sent to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 25, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Cabot-Wang Talks. Confidential. Filed as an attachment to a covering note of the same date from Bromley Smith to the President. A handwritten "L" on the source text indicates that it was seen by Johnson. The paper summarizes Cabot's comments on the meeting, which he transmitted in telegram 1753 from Warsaw, February 25, a copy of which was also sent to the President with Smith's covering note. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US)
Cabot-Wang Talks
Ambassador Cabot's Comments on His Talk with Chinese Ambassador Wang in Warsaw yesterday:
In the one hour and forty minute meeting nothing new of significance was noted. In both content and delivery, Wang's statements were less heated than they might have been expected to be under the circumstances--less, for instance, than after the Tonkin Gulf incidents.
Still, he claimed that an attack on North Vietnam was the same as an attack on China and made it clear, as he had previously, that China supports "wars of liberation," including this one.
Wang did use some intemperate language, such as at one point, he called what I said re US policy in Vietnam "lies." In view of my guidance, I did not respond in kind to the degree I might have otherwise. Also, in view of the tenor of the guidance, I conformed this time to its wording almost verbatim.
In this meeting, Wang predictably put on record Chinese views designed to justify intervention in case of future need. (In addition to the above, his claim is that we have now destroyed the demarcation line, and our bombing of North Vietnam has legitimized retaliation by the signatories of the Geneva agreements.)
I scarcely think his statement indicated that intervention is planned for the moment, at least. In fact, the most notable feature of the meeting was the relative lack of bluster or any show of confidence. Wang did not even attempt to prolong the meeting as he has done in the past, presumably to cause press speculation he had read the riot act to us. Upon entering the meeting room, too, Wang was, if anything, a little more friendly than usual.
The Chinese immediately accepted the April 21 date.
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