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1964-1968 Volume XXX China |
80. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 13-3-65
Washington, March 10, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, NIE 13-3-65. Secret. Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on March 10, except the Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
COMMUNIST CHINA'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
The Problem
To assess the character and present effectiveness of Communist China's armed forces, and to estimate trends which would affect their future capabilities.
Note
This estimate is the first to attempt a comprehensive analysis of the broad range of questions pertaining to Communist China's military establishment. The Chinese Communist regime's intensive and highly effective security measures make China, in general, a difficult intelligence target. Estimating the nature and scope of the Chinese military production effort is made more difficult because much of the program is still in the developmental and factory construction stages. We are thus unable to make confident judgments on many important matters concerning the nature, scope, and prospects of Chinese Communist military developments and this paper should be read in the light of this general caution.
Conclusions
A. Communist Party influence permeates all levels of the Peoples Liberation Army (the entire Chinese Communist military establishment). The senior political and military leaders are united by ties of comradeship in a long revolutionary war. Political commissars are assigned to every command down to company level. Although the troops are conscripts, they are selected for political reliability and receive constant political indoctrination. (Paras. 12-13, and para. 1 of Annex B)
B. The Chinese Communists continue to proclaim the military doctrine of Mao Tse-tung which stresses self-reliance, the dominance of men and politics over weaponry, and the concept of a protracted "people's war." This doctrine, deemed applicable to "wars of national liberation," is also applied to a potential conflict with the US. Communist China is apprehensive regarding the possibility of a US nuclear attack followed by a large-scale invasion, but holds that in such a case China could accept nuclear devastation and still overwhelm the invaders in a protracted "people's war." The Chinese leaders hope that this prospect will deter the US. (Paras. 6-10)
C. The Chinese leaders, however, cannot derive much comfort from this rationalization of their present strategic situation. Since coming to power in 1949, they have steadily sought to modernize their military establishment. They have considered it a matter of first importance to develop an independent nuclear capability. (Paras. 1, 11)
D. Communist China's military power derives primarily from the numerical strength of the Chinese Communist Army (CCA), some 2.3 million men, and tremendous reserves of manpower. Although the CCA is essentially an infantry force, its capabilities for combat are formidable. In open warfare against modern opposition, it would be hampered by shortages of armored equipment, heavy ordnance, mechanical transport and POL. In mountainous or jungle terrain, these shortages would be of less importance. In 1961, many Chinese units had serious shortages of equipment and were understrength. The Chinese have sought to ameliorate this situation by bringing up to strength and fully equipping selected divisions. We estimate that as many as one-third of the combat divisions have been so improved, and are distributed throughout most of China's military regions. We lack the information to make any confident estimates of present production rates of specific items of army equipment, but Communist China has sizable facilities for the production of such materiel. We believe that the production at land armaments plants has increased over the low 1960-1963 level and that it will continue to increase. (Paras. 15-17, 28, 38, and paras. 1-10 of Annex B)
E. The mainstay of the Chinese Communist fighter force in the air force and navy is the some 1,600 MIG-15s and MIG-17s. There are also about 150 MIG-19s and 25 to 35 MIG-21s. Except for the MIG-21s, these aircraft are obsolescent and probably less than 10 percent of these fighters have airborne intercept equipment. The backbone of China's air offense would be the 270 or so IL-28 jet light bombers. They also have 12 or so TU-16 medium bombers capable of carrying a bulky nuclear weapon. Attrition has taken its toll of aircraft in service and the Chinese aircraft industry is only now approaching the capability to arrest this decline. The Chinese have been adding to all of their aircraft development and production centers, and there are indications that they are getting ready to produce the MIG-19, or the MIG-21 and may, indeed be in the early stages of production. We believe the chances are less than even that production of bombers will begin during the next two or three years. (Paras. 22, 27, 41-43, and paras. 1-7 of Annex A)
F. The primary mission of the Chinese Communist Navy (CCN) is coastal defense. Its major combatant units are 21 operational W-class submarines, 4 Gordy-class destroyers, 4 Riga-class destroyer escorts, and 14 patrol escorts. The CCN also has about 155 motor torpedo boats. The capabilities of the CCN against modern opposition would be limited by obsolescent equipment and probably by substandard combat proficiency of its crews. We believe the Chinese have placed a high priority on construction of submarines. We estimate that by mid-1966 the Chinese Communist naval order of battle will include 25 W-class submarines. (Paras. 15, 25, 44, and paras. 8-11 of Annex A)
G. The Chinese have given top priority to their nuclear weapons and missile programs. On the basis of our scanty evidence, we estimate that the Chinese, over the next two years, will be able to carry out a nuclear test program and stockpile about 10 bombs. In the ballistic missile field, we believe the Chinese are developing a medium-range missile (1,000 n.m.) modeled on the Soviet SS-4. It is possible that by 1967 or 1968 the Chinese could have a few such missiles with compatible fission warheads. The Chinese almost certainly are determined to develop a nuclear strike capability against US territory. This determination could be reflected in the initiation of programs in the near future looking toward longer run development of a limited number of ICBMs and the construction of a small fleet of missile carrying submarines. Even if the Chinese have already begun work on such programs, we believe that they could not pose a threat to the US until sometime after 1970. (Paras. 51-52, 56)
H. During the last year or two, Communist China's industry has begun to revive from the severe setbacks it suffered when the Great Leap Forward collapsed and the Soviets withdrew most of their assistance in 1960. We believe the Chinese leaders will sustain substantial military production even at the risk of serious economic difficulty. However, China's economy will not be able to support anything approaching a maximum production effort by all sectors of military industry and in coming years the Chinese will have to make a number of difficult decisions regarding priorities. We cannot predict in what quantities Peiping may decide to turn out the various items of equipment, and there is a good chance that the Chinese themselves do not yet see their way clearly. (Paras. 31, 34, 56)
I. Nevertheless, barring some major setback, Communist China's military power will gradually grow and this growing power will almost certainly increase Peiping's political leverage against its Asian neighbors--whether or not Chinese Communist leaders actually engage in direct hostilities or commit armed forces abroad. (Paras. 53, 55)
[Here follow the Discussion portion of the estimate and two annexes.]
81. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, March 23, 1965, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-1 CHICOM. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC For POLAD.
869. On March 20 President Chiang held special meeting for discussion MAP and requested Ambassador to attend. Present were Admiral Gentner, COMUSTDC; General Sanborn, CHMAAG; General Peng, Chief of General Staff; Minister of National Defense Chiang Ching-kuo and Major General Hu, liaison.
This message in three parts. First deals with possible second nuclear explosion and GRC concern of shortage of ADC equipment. Second part (MAP programs, priorities and deliveries). Third part--conclusions.
Part 1. President stated all intelligence indications are that second atomic blast by ChiComs is about to take place. It is possible that this will be delivered from the air. This possibility brings our attention to area of air defense. President indicated ChiComs have 15 TU4 aircraft. Our air defense system just cannot afford even one of them to come through and deliver the weapon. After looking into present status of missiles, President not satisfied with number of missiles (Nike-Hercules and Hawk) on hand. President noted that at present we have only a few missiles per launcher. This certainly will not be adequate. Fortunately this fact is not known to general public. If it were it would cause feeling of panic among general public to know that we only have a small number of missiles on hand. Therefore, President requests that ground-to-air missiles (Nike-Hercules and Hawk) which are already programmed be delivered expeditiously. If possible we would like to have some extra missiles stored here in reserve. President also mentioned need for more air-to-air Sidewinder missiles.
In addition to missiles the President also mentioned the importance of maintaining aircraft support. He referred particularly to spare parts program. Some of them, he stated are at very low stock level.
Part 2. President referred to FY65 Military Aid Program. He mentioned some of the items, funds for which have already been approved and their delivery has been programmed, such as Bull Pup missiles and F 100 modification kits, M113 (APD), and M 41 tanks. President feels that these items, since they are already programmed should be delivered with the highest priority.
President hopes thorough review be held with regard to equipment and weapons status of 15 forward look divisions in the five-year program.
Part 3. In conclusion, President mentioned during the past he has asked the Ministers and Agencies to discuss problems of economic aid and military aid with American counterparts and he has not previously discussed these with Ambassador himself. He is not satisfied with attention given Military Aid Program in Washington. He does not understand why items already appropriated for and programmed have not been delivered. ROC should receive highest priority in military aid next after South Vietnam. President feels Military Aid Program is critical and US Govt has not, so far, given ROC enough priority in delivery of military priority items. He urged Ambassador to convey his view to US Govt.
First meeting with Defense Minister Chiang took place Monday, March 22, to discuss shortages mentioned by President and get into priorities for 15 forward look divisions. Will be reported through military channels.
Comment: Following should be noted: First, that these are view of President not subscribed to by US Embassy or military commanders. Second, this is first time detailed military requirements have been placed on echelon of President to Ambassador. Third, we believe that President is concerned with what he considers deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. His greatest concern, however, is with propaganda effect of prospective second ccne, particularly if it is an air drop.
Specific comment on part 1: We have on several previous occasions emphasized to President and his principal supporters that GRC's best air defense is US nuclear deterrent. However, President has consistently downplayed its effectiveness against ChiCom probable intentions, particularly toward GRC. He states need for a military air defense system as only defense his people will understand. We believe US deterrent is better understood and appreciated by his principal subordinates, political and military.
President states desire for more ground-to-air missiles although he has a full battalion allowance. They do not have trained personnel to handle more at present.
Parts 2 and 3: It is obvious President has not been kept up to date by his subordinates on details of programs and deliveries, although MAAG has made all pertinent information available to them. The five-year program is under constant review and discussion by MAAG and MND representatives.
Recommendations: It is obvious that we must continue our efforts to sell President on US nuclear deterrent as his best air defense, emphasizing our defensive commitment to GRC which is as strong as that to any other free nation. We cannot provide complete air defense for all nations liable to nuclear attack.
With respect to remaining points on shortages and delays in delivery, I have directed MAAG to prepare detailed presentation of present status all items, which will be delivered direct to President. MAAG will contact Dept of Defense for up-to-minute information.
A special ROC-US committee will be established in MND to study Communist nuclear threat and how best to meet it. COMUSTDC will coordinate US participation. Any recommendations which committee may produce as to accelerated deliveries will be forwarded through military channels.
Unless Dept desires action different from above or has amplifying information not available here, I do not see any instructions needed in addition to current MAP programs. Would appreciate any views Department may wish to convey to President in addition to above, particularly with respect to his comments on Washington policy./2/
/2/Telegram 927 to Taipei, March 25, replied that the Department concurred in the measures Wright had taken in response to Chiang's comments and that he could assure Chiang that his comments on priority for GRC military assistance deliveries were being given careful consideration. (Ibid.)
Wright
82. Airgram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
A-801
Taipei, April 14, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1-4 CHINAT. Secret. Drafted by Wright. Repeated to CINCPAC.
SUBJECT
Conversation with Minister of Defense on U.S. Nuclear DeterrentOn Friday, April 9, I had the following at the Residence for lunch: the Minister of Defense, General Chiang Ching-kuo; Chief MAAG General Sanborn; CG 13th Air Force General Wilson; and interpreter S.K. Hu. The purpose of the lunch was to discuss certain important military matters with the Defense Minister.
I stated that at our March 20 meeting with the President he had expressed very grave concern over the condition and capabilities of the Republic of China's air defense. I said the President had stated the Communists had 14 TU4's and when they had developed a nuclear weapon these 14 planes could be used for an attack on Taiwan. The President stated that with the current state of air defenses it would be impossible to assure that at least one of these planes would not penetrate the air defense net for a nuclear attack on the Island. The President had asked that a missile allowance be increased to guard against this contingency and that the current status of aircraft spares be increased to provide more effective employment of intercept aircraft. The President had requested also that the Republic of China be given high priority in MAP allocations, particularly in air defense. The President had stated that his principal concern was public consciousness of the vulnerability of air defenses and their apprehension about air defense weaknesses if the present shortages of equipment were publicly known.
I told the Minister of Defense that we appreciated the President's thoughts in this matter. I said that no air defense system, however elaborate, could guarantee against the penetration of a small number of planes. I stated that even the air defense system of the United States was inadequate to give this assurance. I stated also that having no anti-missile capability, U.S. defense against a missile attack was probably non-existent. I stated that in realization of this fact the United States had placed the maximum air defense reliance on the Strategic Air Command and that retaliatory capability of this organization was the principal contributing factor to our deterrence against such a nuclear attack against the United States. I stated that by far the largest component of our military expenditures in the air defense field were allocated to the Strategic Air Command.
I stated also that the deterrent effect of this nuclear capability was equally applicable and effective in the air defense of Free World nations which were associated with or allied with us in opposition to the Communist threat. I stated that our strong defensive alliance with the Republic of China has certainly placed them in this category and that the entire retaliatory capability of our nuclear forces would be equally effective in deterring an attack against Taiwan. Recognizing the possibility of penetration of Taiwan air defenses by Chicom aircraft, I said that this was most unlikely in the face of the probability of large-scale U.S. retaliation against the Communist mainland.
I stated that I shared the President's concern in the ability to convince his people of the strong defensive potential of our retaliatory forces and that I would do anything I could along these lines to assist him in informing and educating his people of the unlikelihood of any nuclear attack on Taiwan against the possibility of retaliation by the United States.
Generals Sanborn and Wilson seconded my thoughts and, in addition, added the thought that Chinese defense systems as they were were in excellent shape and although many more forces could be used, those which we had would make a good showing for themselves in the event of an attack. Both emphasized the need for good organization and coordination with the forces and facilities which the United States might make available.
The Minister expressed appreciation for our thoughts and said that the President was principally concerned with the factors of time and space. He said the Formosa Strait was a very narrow body of water and therefore the time interval in which an attack could be conducted was extremely short. He said it was his opinion an active joint study should be conducted which would develop the maximum coordination of Chinese and United States efforts in the matter of air defense.
I replied that the committee recently established and consisting of the Minister, Admiral Gentner, General Sanborn and their respective assistants had been charged with a detailed study on air defense matters and that the findings of this committee would be available to both our governments. I assured him that the United States would give very careful consideration to anything this committee might propose.
Comment: I think the meeting was extremely useful in bringing to an important member of the Government and a close associate of the President our thoughts on the value of our nuclear capability in deterring an attack on Taiwan. In our previous contacts with the President he has tended to ignore this deterrent and has concentrated on getting more military hardware for air defense. We will continue to keep the facts of air defense life before both the President and all of his principal military and political advisors with the hopes of generating a greater appreciation of the unlikelihood of Chicom nuclear attack on Taiwan against the likelihood of United States retaliation.
I then raised the question of the 20 per cent increase in the military budget. I stated that the military budget was a matter entirely internal to the Republic of China. I stated, however, that an increase in the budget must be at the expense of funds available for the economy. We of the United States sincerely hoped that the economy could continue to grow at the rate which over the past two years has made such a tremendous impression on the outside world and be of such enormous benefit to the people of the Republic of China. I said any slow-down in economic growth of the ROC would be sure to have an adverse effect in their world position, both politically and commercially, and particularly would affect their ability to borrow needed funds in the international money market. I sincerely hoped, speaking for the U.S. Government, that military expenditure would not prevent a continuation of this very satisfactory economic growth.
The Minister of National Defense stated that he appreciated my thoughts on the matter and that the effect on the economy of the increased military budget had been carefully considered by the economic branches of the Government. It has been decided that the effect would not be damaging.
Comment: In the minds of myself and my assistants I believe it is inevitable that there will be increased inroads into funds otherwise available for economic growth in order to meet the demands of the military establishment, particularly in those fields in which U.S. military aid is being reduced. We will continue to observe this important matter and bring it up with the higher echelons of the government as necessity and occasion arise.
Jerauld Wright
Ambassador
83. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, April 15, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, China (GRC). Secret. The source text is a copy sent to Komer; a copy was also sent to NSC staff member Chester Cooper.
SUBJECT
The Taiwan SituationAs a follow-up to my preliminary travel report of March 29,/2/ I offer the following comments and recommendations on the situation in Taiwan. I must stress that these views reflect only a 48-hour visit; they also reflect, however, extensive conversations in Washington and elsewhere in the field, both before and after my trip.
/2/In his March 29 memorandum, Thompson reported briefly on a 2-week trip to the Philippines, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Okinawa, and Japan. (Ibid., Name File, Thomson Memos)
The key word in Taiwan's present apparent health and longer-term sickness is "stability". Most of our current actions--and all of our current inaction--are explained in terms of the maintenance of stability. Where, one is asked, can one find a more stable nation in all East and Southeast Asia than the Republic of China? Why upset the apple cart?
The problem is that underneath the surface lie major factors of instability. As long as we minimize them or pretend that they don't exist--and as long as the GRC does the same--we are courting bad trouble in the very near future.
I identify three chief problem areas, all of which are interrelated:
1. The Problem of Morale
From both Chinese and Americans (I talked to no Taiwanese) I developed a disturbing impression of a severe and deepening crisis of morale on the part of most elements of the island's population. It is a new and particularly significant factor among the mainlanders. Its ingredients appear to be:
(a) The growing awareness, on the part of most of the emigres, that a return to the mainland is simply not in the cards. It is probable that a good many have doubted the feasibility of return for sometime now; but the Chicom nuclear explosion has confirmed their doubts.
(b) Poverty and corruption. The present low ceiling on civil service salaries cuts across the bureaucracy, the military and all teachers, thereby forcing educated mainlanders to scrape along at below-subsistence levels of income. For officials, this makes corruption essential to survival. My Chinese informants tell me that corruption has spiraled over the past two years, and there is no end in sight. To quote one fortunate mainlander, whose salary is double the civil service norm because he works for a joint Sino-American outfit: "All my friends in the bureaucracy are doing it; and if I were in their place, I would be doing exactly the same thing." As for academics, they have had to support themselves by holding down two and three jobs simultaneously for some years now. One additional by-product of low civil service salaries is inadequate police pay, hence poor police protection and a very high rate of petty crimes.
(c) Conspicuous consumption and the condition of the KMT. Meanwhile, the party apparatus suffers from two familiar maladies--a general lack of vigor, youth and ideas, and a high level of luxurious living at the top. The fat, heavy hand of the party is an obstruction to creative talent in the bureaucracy; the big black limousines and the 30-course feasts of the party bigwigs add to the demoralization of their impoverished underlings. Although the Generalissimo continues to live and preach austerity, his retinue are prime offenders (and have outdone themselves in building a rumored 16 largely unused villas for their Chief at scenic points on the island).
(d) The flight of talent. Twenty-five percent of all Taiwan's college graduates leave the country, mainly for the United States; and over 95 percent of these young people never return.
(e) Feather-bedding. The processes of government are further obstructed by the excessively large number of bureaucrats kept on the job in one province to maintain the paraphernalia of a national government. My informants suggest that a solution to this problem would be to lay off at full salary the 4 out of 6 men in every office who are extraneous, so that the two remaining officials can perform their functions with efficiency.
(f) Communal relations. Those Embassy officers who keep in close touch with mainlander-Taiwanese relations report that little has been accomplished to bridge the gap between the two groups. The apparent political docility of the Taiwanese is a result of the relative prosperity of the farmers and businessmen as well as their sense of the futility of political action; it is not a result of increased support for the GRC or of rapport with the mainlanders. Taiwanese resentment remains a potentially dangerous force on the island.
2. The Malaise of Our Embassy
In our own diplomatic establishment we face a classically dangerous situation. I talked at length with seven of the younger Embassy and Agency China specialists. They were all bright and articulate, largely free of visionary zeal. They were unanimous in their bitter complaint: that the upper echelons of the Embassy will not permit reporting of the facts of life in Taiwan. When I pressed them to clarify their meaning, I was told that reporting which tends to contradict the current U.S. "line" on the stability and prosperity of Taiwan is suppressed. In particular, the reporting of group attitudes, as detected by these younger officers--the attitudes of enlisted men, of mainland lesser bureaucrats, of mainland intellectuals, and of various Taiwanese groups--is strongly discouraged, either through the blue pencil or a refusal to pass such papers forward (a "gentleman's agreement" that such things are not helpful to report).
I regarded this as a very serious charge and said so; but my informants stood their ground.
As far as I can determine, this Embassy gap between young Turks and their seniors has been a Taiwan problem for some years. In its currently acute form, it is largely a reflection of the attitude of the present Ambassador, as implemented by his senior associates. There are also, of course, certain factors endemic to Taiwan: the exploration of group attitudes, particularly among Taiwanese, inevitably causes concern on the part of the GRC security establishment, and this concern is passed to the top Embassy personnel. If your primary purpose is not to "upset the apple cart", it is safer to discourage such snooping.
Needless to say, however, there is a rather more urgent objective to be served: that policy makers in Washington be adequately informed of what underlies the surface stability of Taiwan. That objective is not now being served. The dangers are compounded by the inevitability of political change once Chiang Kai-shek is removed from the apparatus he has controlled and balanced so skillfully for 35 years--and by our unpreparedness for those changes.
3. The High Costs of Ambiguity
I came away from Taiwan deeply disturbed by the debilitating effects on both Chinese and Americans of a non-credible but unquestioned myth: the myth of return to the mainland.
On the face of it, the situation is rather eerie: the GRC knows that we don't believe it; and we know that they know we don't believe it; and we suspect that some of them don't believe it; but no one says it. The result is that our every relationship is affected by the unmentionable dead cat on the floor.
I am most concerned by two costs that are paid out for continued ambiguity: the emotional and intellectual cost, and a more tangible cost in the allocation of economic resources.
In the first category, the general effect of any over-riding myth is to make most serious discussion impossible. In the case of Taiwan, the ambiguity is a breeding ground for continuing suspicion of the U.S. and for latent anti-Americanism. As long as we make a pretense, by silence, of sharing their myth, we are subject continually to the charge that we are not true believers--and, by extension, that we are going to betray their interests. In permitting the ambiguity to linger, we hand to the GRC a considerable instrument of leverage against us: leverage to force us regularly to prove what cannot be proven, i.e., that our hearts are in the right place on this issue. To assuage our guilt and sustain the ambiguity, we have to keep offering up bits and pieces of concessions. Finally, I might add, ambiguity permits some U.S. officials to begin to believe in the myth.
The second category of cost relates to the first. As long as the GRC is tacitly encouraged to honor the myth, its economic planning will be geared to implementing that myth through the maintenance of a foolishly massive defense establishment. One of the tragedies of Taiwan is the fact that the resources do indeed exist to make it a "garden spot", a "beacon of free Chinese development", and a "showcase" for the mainland and the rest of Asia. As one Chinese friend told me, "This place is obviously a paradise relative to the mainland; but the tragedy is that it could have been and could be so much more--a free, dynamic and prosperous alternative to the mainland."
Recommendations
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, I would conclude that the U.S. has a major interest in assuring that Taiwan's apparent stability and prosperity become real stability and prosperity. I would also conclude that we have certain instruments to achieve this result which we are not now using. Specifically, I suggest the following actions:
(1) That we replace Ambassador Wright at the earliest possible moment with an experienced, tough, politically sensitive and shrewd insider. My three top choices for this assignment would be Bill Bundy (if available), Marshall Green, and Henry Byroade. State's tentative candidate, Walter McConaughy, would be an improvement over the present incumbent; but I do not believe that he would be capable of curing the Embassy's present malaise or of moving with skill and swiftness in the fluid situation that may develop after the Generalissimo's death.
(2) That the present DCM be replaced by a Foreign Service Officer of strong economic background. It will be essential in the months ahead to bring to bear on the GRC as much persuasion as we can to make rational use of its economic resources in the development of Taiwan and to edge away from unjustifiable expenditures on the military establishment. (Our AID Mission is closing down this year.) For this job I would suggest the names of Edwin Cronk (Economic Counselor in Bonn) or David M. Bane.
(3) That we explore on an urgent basis ways in which our heavy accumulation of Taiwan counterpart funds could be put to use at once to supplement the GRC's civil service salaries. There are precedents for such a move in the long-standing Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), whose salaries are now double the normal bureaucratic level. The GRC currently hopes to increase civil service salaries by 15 percent next year; but this is clearly inadequate in terms of the current need.
(4) That whoever our new Ambassador in Taipei may be, he be given a Presidential mandate to:
(a) press for a continuation of Taiwan's economic growth;
(b) use every occasion possible to reduce the size of the GRC military establishment; and,
(c) end the present U.S. ambiguity regarding mainland return in his dealing with top GRC officials. (Such a move should be coupled with absolutely firm assurances of our proper unambiguous commitment: support for the continued free existence of Taiwan and the Pescadores. We have many friends and allies with regard to whose grandiose aims we have agreed to disagree; it is high time to do the same with the GRC--it would be a far healthier arrangement, both for them and for us.)
James C. Thomson, Jr./3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
84. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/
Warsaw, April 21, 1965, 1932Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, Stockholm, Moscow, and Geneva.
2153. Cabot-Wang talks. Deptel 1805./2/ 125th meeting. 3 hours 5 minutes./3/
/2/Telegram 1805 to Warsaw, April 16, provided guidance for the meeting. It was modified by telegram 1811, April 17. (Both ibid.)
/3/Cabot commented in telegram 2159 from Warsaw, April 22, that Wang was "rougher this time in both word and manner than at the last meeting." (Ibid.) He sent a detailed report of the meeting in airgram A-966, April 26. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
1) In opening statement I covered all guidance subjects except American prisoners and contingency items. At point where I said I wished pass him copy our reply to 17-nation appeal, he waved it away and would not receive it, saying they already clear on that and did not need it.
2) After consultations on Chinese side Wang replied saying he absolutely did not agree with my statement. Said he had learned about the President's speech. Said we claimed be ready for unconditional discussions for peaceful settlement but he thought this was simply a swindle. Said we had torn up Geneva Agreements and launched aggression and were now trying to play with peace hopes to save ourselves from defeat, but this impossible. When we were bombing day and night, how can we claim to be ready for peaceful negotiations. President said US must be prepared for long conflict. 24 hours after President's speech there was large-scale bombing. In week following there were new landings of forces and more planned. Wang claimed President actually laid down three preconditions, according to what I said:
1) Independent South Viet-nam with its security guaranteed, which Wang said ruled out Vietnamese union; 2) South Viet-nam must have freedom from attacks; and 3) US would not withdraw under the cloak of meaningless agreement. Wang said this was aimed at legalizing our aggressive actions; also aimed at forcing Viet-nam people recognize we have right to act as we please, that is, US demands equal unconditional surrender to which we would never get agreement. Also claimed US plan spend $1 billion was gross insult. US would meet with failure attempting to buy over people with a few stinking dollars. US should listen carefully to the voice of Vietnamese people who determined fight to the end if US forces are not withdrawn.
3) Wang continued Ho Chi Minh declared US imperialistic acts will not prevent Vietnamese people from carrying on patriotic struggle to final victory. US must first withdraw from South Viet-nam. End of Nazi Germany and Japanese militarists was lesson for US. Command of war in Viet-nam was not in Hanoi or Peking but in Washington. On behalf Chinese people Chou En-lai had said Chinese would send South Vietnamese people all their needs, including arms, and would send own men when South Vietnamese people want them.
4) Wang spoke of air engagement Hainan, calling it act of direct military provocation against China. Said he would like launch strongest protest. Said when engagement made public US Defense Department had guilty conscience and tried to hide true meaning. Wang handed to me two photos as evidence of "crime." These showed alleged wreckage downed US plane (forwarded with verbatim text). But this was not only case of military provocation against China. Since last meeting 365th through 377th serious warnings issued, indicating US had stepped up its provocations. Had intruded several times into airspace Hainan Island, fired on Chinese fishing boats near Hainan and given pursuit into territorial waters. US had repeatedly sent spy planes over China and Wang made strongest protest, demanding US put immediate end to military provocations.
5) Wang claimed US actively instigating Chiang clique to raid mainland and mentioned joint maneuvers, delivery newest weapons, and visits of brass to Taiwan. Said US even had plans let Chiang gang occupy Hainan Island and brag about breaking through Chinese coastal defenses. Said If US linked up Chinese civil war with its war of aggression, more disastrous developments were in store for US.
6) I replied saying US had offered enter discussions without conditions. Said at same time we made clear what we expected get out of discussions but these were not conditions. I stressed firmness American purpose wage war for sake of people South Viet-nam. I suggested lesson of Germany and Japan could apply Wang's side if they continued present policies. Re Hainan engagement, I quoted Sylvester press replies with additional sentence from guidance telegram. Then spoke of American prisoners as instructed. Again stressed importance of 17-nation appeal, asking when Chinese reply could be expected.
7) Wang said while we spoke of wanting peaceful negotiations my remarks indicated we would continue war at any cost or risk; US attempting intimidate peoples by war threats but this would not succeed. Repeated favorite phrase about Viet-nam and China being interdependent and close as teeth and lips; two peoples were brothers sharing same weal or woe, and aggression against North Viet-nam was aggression against China. China as one of signatories Geneva Agreements had right to safeguard them. US has torn them up. Wang followed with long description of US alleged aggression in South Viet-nam over past years. Said recently we had carried out all manner atrocities including burning people alive and taking out their internal organs. We are not only using conventional weapons but poison gas and napalm. Said US more cruel than Hitler. These acts could not be permitted by Vietnam, China and world's people. Root cause of war was US aggression and futile try shift blame on others. Only way settle problem was withdrawal US troops from South Viet-nam. If aggression continued debt of blood must be repaid in blood. U-2 and pilotless planes often intrude Chinese airspace and three of them shot down were now on display in Peking. Warned once again if US did not end violation Chinese sovereignty it would certainly be punished. US also had sole responsibility for acts of Chiang clique. Wang said "we do not fear you." Added if Chiang wants to come, let him; all his men will be annihilated.
8) Concerning 17-nation appeal Wang said Chinese completely agreed to the propositions made by the DRV, and he had nothing to add.
9) I gave obvious answers to Wang's points concerning Geneva Agreements, alleged US atrocities, adding I knew of no indication we encourage Chiang attack mainland. I said did not know what two photos he handed me proved and repeated our planes had orders not enter Chinese territory. I said it was of interest that Wang claimed Chinese entirely approved North Vietnamese response but I had not seen text of that and did not wish comment now. Repeated I trusted his side would make suitable reply. I then spoke at some length of chronology aggression in Southeast Asia, saying our support to South Vietnamese had come long after North Vietnamese had aggressed against South, which proceeded even before ink dry on Geneva Agreements.
10) Wang then gave another long tirade on "out-and-out imperialistic policies of US." Said even in Washington large number of people had risen up against our policies demonstrating before the White House. Wang listed number of alleged violations Geneva Agreements on our part but these have all been covered before. Claimed we had turned South Viet-nam into experimental ground for practicing special warfare. Re American prisoners said they had offended Chinese law and of course must receive sanctions of that law. This was question Chinese sovereignty. Said exchange newsmen had always been opposed by USG and while basic problem between us unresolved, discussion specific questions could not come about. Said war in Indochina must also be settled from foundation by withdrawal US troops.
11) I spoke of Communist demonstrations and attacks on embassies and answered Wang's allegations concerning Geneva Agreements and why elections could not be held in 1956 etc. etc.
12) There followed futile exchange concerning motivations both sides' actions in Congo and implications support world opinion each side. Wang again accused US of being world's gendarmes, of using gangster's logic in our policies. Wang said Chinese never engaged in subversive activities in other countries but certainly would support liberation movements which were just, because people of world had had enough of imperialistic oppression and were determined stand up against it. Re Sino-Indian dispute said no Chinese government had ever recognized McMahon line and China had not made single step outside its legal territory. It was futile for US use India as base from which launch attacks on China. Said Chinese did not like to make relations between China and US tense, but if US compelled them they had no other way out.
13) I observed today's talks had made it clear Chinese planned continue abetting of North Vietnamese aggression and continue stir up trouble where they could in other parts of world.
14) Wang said Chinese security was directly threatened by US aggression South Viet-nam. We were now committing aggression not only against others but also against China. Chinese share same destiny with people all over world and must join hands with them.
15) Wang suggested July 7 as date next meeting. I said view so many serious things happening in Southeast Asia might be wise for us meet earlier. Wang then suggested June 30. I replied while I was aware it was Chinese turn to set date, I would still prefer a much earlier date than that suggested. Wang said he still would like to plan for June 30 as date next meeting but of course if need arose earlier than that time, meeting could always be called by either side. I said with that provision I would accept date on which he was insisting. (I shall of course be happy to return for earlier meeting if this is indicated.)
Cabot
85. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 13-9-65
Washington, May 5, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, NIE 13-9-65. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on May 5, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY
The Problem
To analyze the principles and forces which shape the formulation and conduct of Communist China's foreign policy and to estimate the probable course of that policy over the next two or three years.
Conclusions
A. We believe that the principal aims of Chinese Communist foreign policy over the next few years will be as follows: (a) to eject the West, especially the US, from Asia and to diminish US and Western influence throughout the world; (b) to increase the influence of Communist China in Asia; (c) to increase the influence of Communist China throughout the underdeveloped areas of the world; and (d) to supplant the influence of the USSR in the world at large, especially in the presently disunited Communist movement. (Para. 1)
B. These objectives, and the method and style with which they are pursued, are shaped by ideology, by Chinese tradition, by the apparatus of power which the present Chinese Communist leaders can bring to bear to achieve their ends, and by the personalities and experience of these leaders. As a result, their foreign policy in some ways resembles an international guerrilla struggle which attempts to wear down the enemy's strength by attacking the weak points. (Paras. 2-16)
C. For both ideological and nationalistic reasons, China regards the US as its primary enemy. Peiping's immediate security interest and the short reach of its military power lead it to concentrate its main foreign policy efforts on undermining the US position in the Far East, though in other parts of the world the Chinese Communists are also using such means as they have to weaken the US. Among other "capitalistic" nations, which Peiping sees as in some sense victims of US exploitation, Peiping tries simultaneously to build up recognition of China as a major power and to weaken the US position of leadership. (Paras. 17-20)
D. The USSR has come increasingly to rival the US as a dominant problem for Chinese foreign policy. China recognizes the USSR as a pioneer Communist nation and as the most powerful member of the Communist camp. Yet nationalistic and ideological factors join to create a strong enmity. The Chinese leaders will continue to seek the overthrow of the present Soviet leadership, but without great hope of seeing the emergence of new men who would follow the Peiping line. Elsewhere in the Communist world, Peiping will seek to dilute or supplant Soviet influence and to win over or split Communist parties and front movements. (Paras. 21-24)
E. Peiping has chosen the underdeveloped, ex-colonial world as its most advantageous arena of conflict. In this "Third World," the Chinese not only aim to erode US strength but to displace Soviet influence; they seek to establish themselves as the champions and mentors of the underdeveloped nations. The greatest impact of Peiping's policy is felt in Southeast Asia. The theater of primary interest is Indochina, where Pei-ping is seeking a decisive and humiliating defeat of the US. To date, the Chinese leaders have not made risky countermoves to the limited US attacks in North Vietnam, and they almost certainly seek to avoid a wider war. Nevertheless, they have been making preparations for at least limited engagement, and we believe that they would be prepared to risk a major military conflict with the US should they feel China's vital security interests threatened by US actions. (Paras. 25-28)
F. In the rest of Southeast Asia, unless the situation alters sharply, Peiping is likely to support policies designed to maintain and increase pressure against the US. Peiping seems to look on Africa as a second great area of opportunity and is likely to increase both its overt and subversive efforts on that continent. (Paras. 29-33)
G. As long as the present group of leaders remains in control, which is likely to be well beyond the period of this estimate, Peiping's dynamic and aggressive attitudes will persist. Moreover, though we have little information concerning the next generation of leaders, there are many reasons to believe that China's foreign policy will be assertive and uncompromising for a long time to come. (Para. 39)
[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]
86. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State/1/
Taipei, May 18, 1965, 0320Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong.
1132. Deptel 1140./2/ GRC has no capability for taking any effective independent action against Hainan except for covert air drop or sea infiltration of few individuals. Even these actions unlikely to succeed without US technical assistance. Any larger scale action would require US support. Hainan is far beyond range of GRC fighters, and without air cover, no GRC air-borne or sea-borne attempt on any significant scale could succeed. GRC leaders, including President Chiang, are well aware of this.
/2/Telegram 1140 to Taipei, May 14, instructed the Embassy to raise with the GRC the recent calls in the Taiwan press for an invasion of Hainan Island, conveying the feeling that, "while there probably some virtue in keeping ChiComs guessing re GRC intentions toward Hainan, US would be strongly opposed to such an attack." (Ibid.)
While Vietnam situation undoubtedly has brought Hainan more into forefront of GRC's strategic thinking recently, no GRC official has proposed to us GRC action against Hainan. We would prefer not to go to GRC on basis of press stories to urge them not to take action which they have not indicated to us they intend to take, and which they well know they could not undertake anyway without US support.
Possibility remains that ChiComs might be misled by statements in Taiwan press, particularly should GRC undertake infiltration attempt or even leaflet drop against Hainan. Recommend that if demarche considered necessary for this reason, it be directed toward discouraging press statements and those small-scale actions which GRC capable of taking on its own. We would not say to GRC there may be virtue in keeping ChiComs guessing, but rather place emphasis on danger of misleading ChiComs and thus provoking undesirable ChiCom reaction toward Vietnam. If such demarche is made while bombing of North Vietnam suspended, GRC likely to attribute significance to timing. We cannot judge here whether this desirable or not and request further instructions, both as to line proposed above and timing of demarche./3/
/3/Telegram 1167 to Taipei, May 20, replied that the Department did not have a demarche in mind but an informal indication of U.S. views; it requested that the Embassy find an appropriate time and channel to convey U.S. concern. (Ibid.) Telegram 1151 from Taipei, May 21, reported that this had been done. (Ibid.)
Wright
87. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, June 2, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. III. Secret. The handwritten notation "Staff mtg. McGB" appears on the source text.
SUBJECT
U.S. Initiatives on (1) Travel to China, and (2) Mongolia RecognitionOn May 14th the Zablocki (Far East) Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee issued a report on the Sino-Soviet conflict which includes, inter alia, the following recommendations:
"The United States should give, at an appropriate time, consideration to the initiation of limited but direct contact with Red China through cultural exchange activities with emphasis on scholars and journalists;"
and,
"The recognition of Outer Mongolia should be considered."
These two thoughts are tired old chestnuts that have been kicked around in the Government since at least the first months of the Kennedy Administration. As you know, inter-agency agreement has been achieved more than once on a lifting of the travel ban (either specifically for Red China, or across the boards; also, either for special groups--scholars, etc.--or for all citizens). Similar agreement has been reached more than once on recognition of Mongolia. But both proposals have foundered because "now is not the time."
I am convinced that "now" is never going to be the right time--and that right now is actually as good a time as we may ever find for making one or perhaps even both moves.
This conclusion was reinforced by my Far East trip in March. At Baguio, in Hong Kong, in Taiwan and in Japan I discussed possible U.S. initiatives towards Communist China and Mongolia with many of our leading State and CIA specialists. In all cases there was general agreement--as there has been in the U.S. Government since 1961--that our national interest would be served by recognition of Mongolia and by a unilateral freeing of U.S. travel to Communist China. More important, I also found general agreement that the present climate of U.S. firmness in Asia--our Vietnam air strikes, the dispatch of ground forces, etc.--was ideal for such moves that might be judged superficially to be "soft". (Typically, such proposals had not been sent to Washington by any of the people with whom I talked; the fact of the matter is that no post abroad considers itself an "action desk" for U.S. relations with Communist China--a situation that is costly to our Government, I fear.)
In the weeks since my return to Washington, I have found similar views here at the working levels of State and CIA on the conduciveness of the present climate to such initiatives.
Now, to my great interest, we have fresh support for such moves, not only from the Zablocki Subcommittee, but also in part from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in its 1965 Annual Meeting (it urged us to "open channels of communication with the people of Mainland China"). In addition, I have just talked to our Taipei DCM, who assures me that the necessary advance consultations with the GRC on both of these matters would go far more easily in the present climate and would be successful.
In view of the fact that our Asian posture is tougher than ever before, that the Congress has given us a gentle boost, that the GRC is judged to be persuadable, and that we face no election this autumn, I would strongly urge that we get moving on both these items at long last.
Present status of these items: A favorable Mongolia recommendation has been sitting on Secretary Rusk's desk for two months now. He has just asked that FE "update" its recommendation./2/ Meanwhile, Marshall Green was pressed by Fulbright yesterday, at his confirmation hearing, for action on lifting the China travel ban (this item remains buried at State since the 7th Floor got cold feet in January 1964).
/2/See Document 344 and footnote 9 thereto.
We may shortly face the usual State worry as to whether to try one or the other, both, or neither (with the neither-boys probably destined to prevail unless we can give some encouragement from over here).
Question: Can we give such encouragement? In this regard, would you like to see fuller papers on these items?
Jim
88. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 4, 1965, 11:10 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 11. Confidential. A handwritten "L" on the source text indicates that it was seen by the President. Another handwritten notation reads: "Rec'd June 4, 1965, 11:25 a.m."
SUBJECT
Item in CIA daily brief/2//2/The daily briefs are ibid., Intelligence Briefings.
1. The CIA daily brief last night had a very important annex on Chinese Communist policy toward Vietnam, but they did not make it wholly clear that this account was part of a direct effort to send a message from Chou En-lai to the U.S. Government. This is so interesting that I think you will want to read it yourself in the British telegrams which have been provided to us./3/ The first two pages of the attached give a brief summary, and there follows a long reporting telegram which is worth reading in full.
/3/Telegrams 720 and 722 from the British Embassy in Peking to the Foreign Office, May 31 and June 1. The former summarized a meeting with Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi, largely about Vietnam, in which he asked the British to deliver the message from Chou. The latter reported the portion of the meeting relating to Vietnam, including the message, in detail. Copies of the telegrams were sent to William Bundy with a June 2 covering note from British Minister of Embassy Michael N.F. Stewart, asking whether there would be any U.S. objection if the British Charge in Peking told the Chinese that the British had delivered the message. No reply to the note has been found. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 092 Communist China)
2. Dean Rusk's first impression is that this is a relatively defensive message./4/ My own feeling is more mixed. The basic trouble with the message is that it does not tell us at all at what point the Chinese might move in Vietnam itself in a way which would force us to act against China. And that of course is the $64 question.
/4/Telegram 720 stated that Ch'en said Chou En-lai had asked Pakistan President Ayub Khan, when he visited Peking in March, to give a message to the U.S. Government, but since Ayub's visit to the United States had been postponed, the message might not have been delivered. Ch'en therefore asked if the British would pass on the message. The message reads as follows: "(I) China will not provoke war with United States; (II) what China says counts; (III) China is prepared; and (IV) if United States bombs China that wd mean war and there wd be no limits to the war."
McG B
89. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, June 16, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 72 D 175, Travel Controls (Gen), June-July 1965. Confidential.
SUBJECT
Travel of Scholars and Representatives of Humanitarian OrganizationsDiscussion:
The time appears to be at hand to broaden somewhat the categories of Americans entitled to travel to Communist China. I believe we should broaden the categories to include scholars and graduate students with a legitimate professional requirement to visit the area.
We have an unusual opportunity here to put the Chinese Communists on the defensive and to nullify domestic criticism of both the right and the left. Given our stand in Viet-Nam, our critics on the right can hardly accuse us of going soft on Communist China. Since the Chinese Communists will probably not permit any increase in travel at this time, we can demonstrate that we are acting out of boldness, not timidity, and that it is the Chinese Communists rather than ourselves who fear the exchange of ideas. On the other hand, there are few gestures which would better serve both to further our own policy interests and to reassure the academic community that we are interested in the flow of information to and from Communist China.
Even if the Chinese in the future should allow some scholars to enter China, we do not believe there is a significant chance of adverse incidents or ill-treatment of these Americans. We would continue to warn of the inability of the government to provide protection, and to make clear that we are removing restrictions on, rather than promoting, such travel.
Further, a relaxation of certain travel restrictions will show that the Department is exercising the authority, upheld in the Zemel case, in a reasonable and responsible manner.
We have had recommendations for increased efforts at contact from various quarters, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Zablocki subcommittee. You may recall that the proposal to authorize scholars' travel to Communist China was made formally to us by the Joint Committee on Contemporary China and was seriously considered in 1962, but was laid aside in favor of the decision to press for a more general relaxation of our travel rules. A proposal for a general relaxation was made to the White House in January 1963, but was not acted upon at that time. We do not believe that the present situation justifies the resurrection of the more general proposal, but to act now on scholars has many advantages, among which is the circumstance that the scholarly community has been largely mollified by the awareness that we were sympathetically considering their interest in a revision of the rules, but this situation cannot be indefinitely extended if we do not take action.
If after such consultation with the White House as you deem appropriate you decide to authorize such a broadening, it might be worthwhile at the same time to consider whether the President might take advantage of this move, and make the idea of "improved communication" one of the themes for his forthcoming UN commemorative speech in San Francisco. If authorized, FE, SCA and L will draw up and issue appropriate Department regulations and notification of the change. In addition, in announcing the change, we might note the existence of the "national interest" category, which we now use, and explain the terms whereby persons might be eligible to travel in Communist China on the grounds that such travel would be in the national interest. I would propose to cite representatives of bona fide humanitarian, cultural and educational organizations as potential examples of persons entitled to be considered under "national interest" considerations.
Recommendations:/2/
/2/Rusk initialed his disapproval of both recommendations on June 24.
1. That you authorize the broadening of the categories of Americans eligible to travel in Communist China, as above.
2. That you authorize FE to pursue with IO the possibility of writing the theme of "improve communication" into the President's forthcoming San Francisco speech, calling for a greater exchange of visits between the Communist countries and the free world.
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