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1964-1968 Volume XXX China |
90. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, June 29, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. III. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Staff mtg Fri. McGB."
SUBJECT
China Travel ProblemIn the event that State's China travel paper/2/ (which I have not seen but have heard about) is raised at your luncheon with the President today, the following points seem to me pertinent:
/2/Reference is to a June 28 memorandum from Rusk to the President that recommended adding a new category, medical doctors and public health specialists, to the existing categories of Americans entitled to receive passports valid for Communist China and stated that if the President approved, Rusk proposed to instruct Cabot to mention it at the June 30 Warsaw meeting. It is filed as an attachment to a June 28 memorandum from Bundy to the President with an agenda for his Tuesday lunch meeting with his top advisers. (Ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy)
1. The current proposal that we permit doctors and public health specialists to travel to Communist China is irrelevant and inadequate. It is irrelevant because we have had only two requests in the past several years for validated passports from such types (from Paul Dudley White and the famous ear specialist). In both cases the Chicoms have refused visas. State's proposal is inadequate because it fails to meet our basic 2-fold need on this subject: to shift the onus to the Chinese dramatically, and once and for all, for obstinacy, rigidity and self-isolation; and to be responsive to persistent pressure from bona fide American scholars who for years have patiently accepted State's assurance that the travel ban will be shortly lifted. (These scholars have been very cooperative, but their cooperation has predictable limits.)
2. State's proposal that we give the Chinese at Warsaw tomorrow a preview of this mouse makes no sense. The Chinese reaction is utterly predictable (they will reject the idea as a pure propaganda ploy). Furthermore, State's request for Presidential decision on this matter today creates a false sense of urgency on a subject whose full dimensions should receive unhurried Presidential consideration.
For your information. Abba Schwartz, Meeker, and the FE specialists all favor a considerably broader lifting of the travel ban for scholars, scientists and journalists to Red China and Albania. In my view, it would be far better procedure to defer any Presidential action on the present proposal until State can present the President with the full travel picture, including alternatives which the 7th floor has rejected.
Jim
91. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/
Warsaw, June 30, 1965, 1900Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, Geneva, Moscow, and Stockholm.
2614. Cabot-Wang talks. Deptel 2224./2/ 126th meeting./3/ Content of meeting relatively routine except for occasional outbursts of tough and intemperate language from Wang. Next meeting is scheduled for September 15. Wang opened with condemnation U.S. "occupation" Taiwan. He claimed U.S. using Taiwan as "ever-floating aircraft carrier" from which to attack mainland, that U.S. plotting create two Chinas, that U.S. crimes of aggression against Taiwan beyond description. He said Taiwan inalienable part of Chinese territory. Chinese people will strive to end to liberate Taiwan. Claimed U.S., while expanding war in Indo-China, also intensifying efforts make military provocations against China in Taiwan Straits area and that U.S. trying draft Chiang gang into war by ordering them place airfields at U.S. disposal etc. Cited serious warnings 378 to 387.
/2/Telegram 2224 to Warsaw, June 24, modified by telegrams 2245 of June 28 and 2261 of June 29, provided guidance for the meeting. (All ibid.)
/3/Cabot commented on the meeting in telegram 6 from Warsaw, July 1 (ibid.), and sent a detailed report in airgram A-16, July 5. (Ibid., POL CHINAT-US)
Wang said he instructed lodge strong protest April 24 presidential executive order which included Paracel Islands in combat waters. Wang said Paracels are Chinese. U.S. Govt must be held responsible for all grave consequences arising therefrom.
Second part Wang's opener devoted to U.S. actions Viet-nam. Wang stated U.S. openly declaring war on Vietnamese people and embarking on fighting major war. He repeated standard line on 17th parallel and that all Vietnamese people including those in North have right hit back at U.S. aggressors. Since U.S. has sent own and lackey's troops Chinese have secure right to do all in their power to hit back at U.S. aggressors. U.S. attempting cover up crimes by playing peace hoax. All peace talks doomed to failure. U.S. should never be able to get by political deception what U.S. cannot get on battlefield.
I responded by strongly refuting Wang's argument on U.S. aggression against Taiwan. Also denied ChiCom claim to Paracel Islands. Followed with text Department's instruction. Wang retorted with at times intemperate but familiar attack on U.S. position claiming U.S. on one hand pursuing war and on other giving lip service to peace. He said empty words alone cannot alter atmosphere between our two countries. Wang claimed U.S. instead of ending aggressive acts was redoubling aggression. Claimed every time U.S. said prayer for peace we add fagot to fire of aggression.
Wang said U.S. suffering one defeat after another in war of aggression, hence desire to talk about peaceful settlement. Peace talk plot a vicious one but it impossible pull wool over eyes of people of world. Wang gave standard ChiCom position on Indian proposal, 17-nation appeal, and Wilson mission (but for once in more temperate language). Repeated line only way settle Viet-nam problem is for U.S. Govt to stop war of aggression against South Viet-nam, withdraw all U.S. lackey forces from South Viet-nam, stop acts of war against DRV, implement Geneva Agreements of 1954 and let Vietnamese people settle own affairs. Claimed Front, as true representative South Vietnamese people, must have decisive voice. Referring to Front's March 22 statement as only way settle problem.
Wang then became impassioned and, after saying U.S. hands stained with blood South Vietnamese people, he departed from text and referred to our comments that Chinese youth should be steeled in war. Wang said "We should deal with your unjust war with a just war. You are not only committing aggression against Viet-nam but are also posing threat to China every day." He then quickly shifted subject to repetition U.S. aggression against Taiwan. Wang said as long as U.S. refuses to give up policy of aggression we will continue have struggle. If this root cause not removed, no way to settle problem. If U.S. has sincere desire for peace, U.S. must immediately withdraw forces and stop aggression. Otherwise, all other talks of peace are useless and nothing but a swindle.
I told Wang his side had rejected numerous efforts towards peaceful discussions but had offered no suggestions in return. Wang made weak retort that Hanoi's four points and Front's March 22 position constituted only basis for settlement.
Wang then discussed standard line on atomic explosion. Accused U.S. of crime in using atomic bombs against Japan. Wang repeated at length ChiCom claim to Paracels; gave standard line on Cambodia and Laos conferences (smoke screen to fool peoples of world). Wang also recited usual line on U.S. interference in Dominican Republic, Congo, and referred to comments in U.S. press (including Senators Morse and Gruening) critical of U.S. actions.
Wang toward end of meeting stated, "Should you impose war on Chinese people we will fight back. We are not warlike. This is shameless slander. If others wish to impose war on Chinese people we are not afraid to fight a war. We shall resolutely strike back to end. Should anyone dare to extend his tentacles to China we will cut them off." At another point Wang said, "we will not watch U.S. riding roughshod in world, particularly in neighboring countries, without doing anything on our part."
Meeting lasted 2 hours 35 minutes.
Cabot
92. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, July 6, 1965, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG-STATE. Top Secret. Drafted by Seymour Weiss and Colonel William F. Lewis of G/PM. The meeting took place in Rusk's office. Filed as an attachment to a July 29 memorandum from Thompson to McNamara enclosing papers that he thought Rusk would want to discuss "at our meeting on problems arising out of the China confrontation study."
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
U--Mr. Ball
G--Ambassador Thompson
FE--Mr. Bundy; Mr. Dean
S/P--Mr. Yager; Mr. Goodby
G/PM--Mr. Kitchen; Mr. Weiss; Col. LewisSUBJECT
China Study/2//2/Not attached to the source text. A copy of the study, prepared by a State-Defense study group, entitled "Communist China (Short Range Report)," April 30, is filed as an attachment to a May 4 letter from Thompson to Ambassador Kohler in Moscow, requesting his comments. (Ibid.) For a summary, see Attachment B, Document 94.
1. The purpose of the meeting was to exchange views with the Secretary on the above subject study.
2. Ambassador Thompson reviewed the activities leading to the study, the organizational arrangements for supervision, and the major policy issues brought to light by the study.
3. The Secretary commented that the study appeared not to have taken into account sufficiently the total capability of the other side to react in other areas to a crisis in Southeast Asia. He cited Berlin as an example. In the event of Soviet pressure in Berlin he foresaw a possible worldwide adverse reaction, but particularly on the part of our European allies, on the grounds that the U.S. had precipitated the European crisis. It was pointed out that the consensus in the intelligence community was that the Soviets preferred to handle one crisis at a time in view of the escalatory potential of concurrent widely spaced crises. Moreover, Ambassador Thompson thought the Soviets would have available a wide range of opportunities to retaliate against the U.S. in Southeast Asia, e.g. against U.S. naval forces, without the same degree of danger that a direct confrontation with the U.S. in Europe would inevitably involve. The Secretary responded that there is considerable latitude with respect to Berlin within which the Soviets could bring pressure before the problem got out of hand.
4. The Secretary indicated his agreement with Ambassador Thompson that the study tends to underestimate the forces which might impel the Soviets to earlier and more extensive participation in a Southeast Asian crisis. He asked what the reactions of our Ambassadors were to this question, especially that of Ambassador Kohler. Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Weiss quoted from Ambassador Kohler's letter/3/ which strongly argued that the study had underestimated probable Soviet involvement.
/3/Kohler's May 22 letter commenting on the study is filed as an attachment to a June 9 memorandum from Thompson to Rusk. (Department of State, Central Files, ORG 1 OSD-State) Letters of May 24 from Rice and May 28 from Reischauer are also attached. A June 4 letter from Maxwell Taylor conveying his views and those of U. Alexis Johnson is filed as an attachment to a June 16 memorandum from Thompson to Rusk. (Ibid.) JCS comments are set forth in JCSM 437-65, June 7. (Ibid.)
5. In connection with Far Eastern attitudes, Mr. Kitchen cited the view of Ambassador Reischauer that even a prolonged conventional war in Southeast Asia is likely to have an adverse effect on U.S. objectives in Japan. Mr. Weiss added that some of our overseas representatives feel that the Japanese are totally out of sympathy with U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. They reason from their own experience in attempting to conquer China that it is a losing proposition. Moreover, the Japanese, as do other Asians, doubt the ability of the Chinese to extend their sovereignty over all of Southeast Asia. They believe the area is too vast and the indigenous populations too hostile to permit this. Thus the Japanese dislike seeing a deepening U.S. involvement. The Secretary responded that it is misleading for the Japanese to argue that their experience was so unsuccessful. At least until Japan made the mistake of attacking the U.S. it was not doing too badly in Asia.
6. Turning to the matter of the longer-range ChiCom study, the Secretary stated that the Study Group should work on alternative hypotheses. This would recognize that some changes are inevitable, e.g., changes in present ChiCom leadership. What happens if China continues to be militant? How do we proceed? On the other hand, what happens if China moves toward peaceful co-existence? Are there other alternatives? In essence, the Secretary believes we should not tie a review of policy to one assumption. Ambassador Thompson agreed and commented that we should not overlook the influence of changes in the USSR. The Secretary went on to cite other variables that need consideration, including the effect of population growth; the ability to arm and feed an increased population; the effect on Chinese policy if attitudes hardened against them, e.g., in Africa or somewhere else; the impingement of Chinese and Japanese policy; and the effect of Sukarno passing from the scene. In concluding these comments, the Secretary asked that he be furnished recent intelligence studies of worldwide Communist party reactions to the Sino-Soviet split. Finally, the Secretary suggested that the long-range study be checked out with McGeorge Bundy. Mr. Yager indicated that he had already been in touch with the White House staff.
7. The Secretary indicated that he wished a meeting to be established with Mr. McNamara and McGeorge Bundy to discuss the China Study. He asked that they be given an opportunity to look at the "Resume" and the "Critical Policy Issues" papers/4/ before the meeting. Ambassador Thompson agreed to set up the meeting./5/
/4/The papers to which Rusk was referring are filed with a May 26 memorandum from Thompson to Rusk. (Ibid.) For revised versions, see the attachments to Document 94.
/5/See Document 99.
93. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to Chester Cooper and James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff/1/
Washington, July 9, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. IV. Confidential. Drafted by Green. Filed as an attachment to an August 21 memorandum from Thomson to Bundy.
A personal disappointment in leaving FE after almost two years has been our inability over that period of time to strengthen and modernize our China policy by lifting restrictions on travel of Americans to Communist China and by taking certain other measures such as easing the administrative application of FAC controls and recognizing Mongolia. We were unable even to include in our last Warsaw instruction the limited suggestion of informing the Chinese representative that we would be authorizing travel of American medical and public health officials to mainland China. This was a small step in the right direction, although it fell far short of what I hoped would be our position by 1965.
Attached is a talking paper which Lindsey Grant and I prepared almost two years ago providing the argumentation on liberalization of travel regulations governing American citizens./2/ Those arguments are just as valid today although I appreciate that the intensified war in Viet-Nam might make it difficult to liberalize travel to North Viet-Nam and possibly to North Korea. But why not Communist China?
/2/Not attached to the source text.
Over the past four years, both in Hong Kong and in Washington, I have spoken to many members of Congress and the press and have given hundreds of speeches and briefings. Oftentimes the subject of taking new initiatives on travel and recognition of Outer Mongolia has arisen and I have not heard one voice raised in dissent when this issue has been discussed. On the contrary, I feel that the overwhelming opinion amongst our countrymen is in favor of doing that which broadly advertises our freedom and our confidence and of dramatizing Peiping's self-isolation. Clearly the liberalization of our policies, taken at the very moment we are showing toughness in Viet-Nam, would not be misunderstood. It would be widely applauded in the U.S. and elsewhere. And it would do much to cope with criticisms in our scholarly community of US policies in Asia.
I feel that this is a real opportunity for the Johnson administration.
94. Information Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, July 15, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 1 OSD-STATE. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Weiss and James Goodby of S/P.
SUBJECT
China Study1. Pursuant to your request I have proceeded with the arrangements for a meeting on the above subject. The exact date is not yet settled because of uncertainties and conflicts in the schedules of the senior participants in the meeting but I expect that a mutually satisfactory date can be set after Secretary McNamara returns from Viet Nam. In addition to yourself, the Secretary of Defense, and Mac Bundy, I have alerted Bus Wheeler and Cy Vance (who together with me formed the Board of Directors for the China Study), Bill Bundy and John McNaughton.
2. I have also made available to Defense and to Mac Bundy a list of "Critical Policy Problems" (Attachment A), a resume of the China Study (Attachment B), and a precis of the views which we received from Kohler, Reischauer, Rice and Taylor/Johnson (Attachment C)./2/
/2/Attachment C is not printed.
3. You may find it useful, as a means of orienting the discussion, to establish at the outset the purpose for convening the meeting. In this connection, I see the following objectives:
A. A Discussion of the "Critical Policy Problems."
It appears to me that these issues are intrinsically of great significance and to the extent that they are deemed valid, it would be extremely useful to have both an understanding of their nature and a consensus about their significance at the top levels of the government. My own impression, I am bound to make clear, is that both field comments and the study itself seem to suggest that further escalation of our military operations against the DRV (as opposed to prosecuting the war in the RVN) would not have the result of winning the war in which we are presently engaged but would seriously risk changing the character of the war, possibly to the point where the costs are out of proportion to the gains. By and large, it seems to me that the comments on the study which we have received from key U.S. Missions abroad have indicated a preference for the thesis that "the war must be won in the South." Obviously, this issue has been through the crucible of debate many times but perhaps not with the advantage of the "look down the road" which is furnished by the Study Group's report.
B. Discussion of Next Steps.
(1) Long Range Study.
The short range study laid no claims to being a definitive analysis of the problem, nor does it purport to represent a plan of action for the future. We are, of course, committed to undertake a longer range study, in which State will take a leading role, of US-Chinese relations looking through 1975. You may wish to solicit views as to areas of investigation which that study might seek to analyze.
(2) Short Range Politico-Military Planning.
It was my feeling in initiating the China Study that pressures inevitably force too much of a concentration on very immediate objectives and courses of action without permitting the full recognition of longer range implications and without necessarily permitting a relating of individual actions to a comprehensive, long-range politico-military concept. A rather provocative, but trenchant, observation made in the Report epitomizes the concern I think we all share:
"With or without a decision on our part to increase the level of such military pressure, the history of past conflicts worldwide suggests that there is some danger that punitive military operations may acquire a momentum of their own and may be allowed to continue beyond the point of any real military or political utility."
To the extent that the discussion of the study, and more specifically, consideration of the "Critical Policy Problems" and the comments from the Missions identify points which you, the Secretary of Defense and Mac Bundy deem to be significant, you may wish to suggest that these points be taken into account in our current and continuing Southeast Asia politico-military planning.
An INR memorandum responding to your request for the results of recent intelligence studies of world-wide Communist party reactions to the Sino-Soviet split is at Tab D./3/
/3/Not attached to the source text.
Attachment A
CRITICAL POLICY PROBLEMS
1. Degree of Soviet Involvement.
With respect to Soviet interests in Southeast Asia, it has been pointed out that the Chinese did not invent nor have they been in the past the principal supporters of the doctrine of national liberation. The Soviets are equally committed to the concept of wars of national liberation.
The study however appears to underestimate the degree of Soviet involvement and of Soviet reaction to U.S. actions, particularly in the stage where U.S. military operations are confined to the DRV, and consequently overestimates the possibility of reaching a tacit understanding between the U.S. and USSR to avoid a major conflict as each side seeks to defend its own interests. Because of the public commitment which the USSR has made to defend the interests of North Viet Nam, escalation or even continuation of our attacks on North Viet Nam will make it increasingly difficult to maintain any serious dialogue with the USSR for the purpose of trying to influence it to moderate its support of that regime. Moreover, the type of assistance which Moscow has already supplied Hanoi could lead to a confrontation with the United States. As the amount of equipment increases, the possibility of mutual miscalculation or accident also increases.
In general, the assumption that Soviet involvement would be minimal has the effect of making the military equation less difficult for the U.S. If a major Soviet involvement of materiel and perhaps of volunteers was in prospect, the effect this would have on the size, nature and consequences of the U.S. commitment, is a matter not explored by the study.
With respect to U.S. actions against Communist China, the study does say that "in the event of U.S. attacks against South China, the USSR would probably feel compelled to provide the ChiComs, after some period of delay, with military equipment, e.g., advanced fighters and missiles." "Soviet first line aircraft and SAMs might have a critical effect on control of the air over the DRV and China." A threat to the existence of a Communist regime in Peiping would probably force the Soviets to become involved militarily to a highly dangerous degree: "An objective that includes the destruction of the Communist regime in China would be most costly and would carry grave risks of general war with the USSR." This would illustrate a situation in which military activities would have far out-run fundamental U.S. national security interests.
2. The Nature of the Communist Chinese Threat.
While the Chinese are utterly opposed to the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia, they expect to use subversion and infiltration of supplies to achieve their objectives, and not direct military force unless their own immediate lines of defense are threatened. The study does not indicate what, if any, level and intensification of U.S. military operations in North Viet Nam will bring the Chinese into the war but it does indicate that at some point Chinese interests and prestige will become increasingly committed to some sort of participation. It has been suggested that the Communist Chinese might become actively involved in the war if the Communist regime in North Viet Nam were threatened, if Chinese borders were placed in jeopardy, or if large Chinese Nationalist forces were brought to the Southeast Asia mainland.
One form of Chinese intervention, well prior to any land action, might be the commitment of fighters from Chinese bases to the air defense of the DRV. The Study suggests that the U.S. would be at a serious disadvantage if it failed to neutralize bases from which the Chinese fighters were employed. It is hard to believe that such an attack on China could result in anything other than the signal for war with that country. Indeed, a special NIE recently completed estimates that if the Chinese actually commit their aircraft to defend the DRV from Chinese bases they must be assumed to be prepared to fight a major conflict with the U.S. Already we have reports that the Chinese are evacuating various executive offices and factories from certain cities and are also installing large numbers of AA units in key areas apparently in anticipation of an escalation of conflict to the Chinese mainland.
3. The Use of Nuclear Weapons.
The study suggests that military requirements for nuclear weapons will be especially acute in two circumstances: (1) if the ChiComs/DRV launched a massive invasion of Southeast Asia before U.S. forces were deployed there in large numbers; ("It is quite likely that the U.S. would be faced with the decision to use nuclear weapons . . . perhaps the second or third day of the invasion.") (2) if the U.S. were to bombard Communist Chinese military or industrial facilities on any military significant scale; ("The comparable effects of a conventional attack are very much less because the time required to achieve the same level of destruction is very much longer, thus, permitting repair of damage . . ."). There is an inference in the study that planners are also counting heavily on the psychological effects of nuclear weapons to break the ChiCom will to resist. However, the report emphasizes that the use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. would produce an "overwhelmingly adverse reaction from U.S. allies as well as the Communist world and the uncommitted powers" and that "lasting resentment against the U.S. might be generated." It is suggested that U.S. use of nuclear weapons might mean the loss of key military bases in the Far East, the disassociation of NATO countries from U.S. actions in Asia, and the reduction or termination of the U.S. presence in many parts of the non-aligned world.
While it seems highly improbable that the Soviets would turn over nuclear weapons to the Chinese, and at least in the relatively short run the Chinese will not have an inventory of their own, it is not quite so inconceivable that the Soviets might support the Chinese with their own nuclear arsenal by some expedient method. Though this would obviously be very dangerous for the Soviets, they might feel forced to it, and might even devise techniques which were sufficiently ambiguous, such as provision of Soviet volunteers with nuclear capability, which the Soviets might calculate would avoid a direct confrontation with the U.S. In any event, if the enemy did have nuclear weapons for use in the theater, for example, against U.S. and allied bases and forces, is it entirely clear that introduction of nuclear weapons would even be militarily advantageous to the U.S.?
4. Escalation of Political Objectives.
The study lays considerable stress on the upward pressure on U.S. objectives which would result from a major military confrontation with Communist China (e.g., "initial U.S. objectives . . . would appear wholly inadequate to the large-scale hostilities going on and some adjustment would have to be made.") One objective which is frequently mentioned is the reunification of Viet Nam. Others mentioned are the destruction of ChiCom nuclear facilities, the ChiCom industrial base, and even the elimination of the Communist regime in Peiping. "But enlarged objectives also mean enlarged costs, and perhaps a war in Asia which might be decisive only when large-scale strategic nuclear attacks against China were carried out." Since military domination of China by the U.S. seems impractical in military terms, would almost assuredly involve war with the Soviet Union, and seems otherwise to present enormous problems for the U.S., consideration should be given to such questions as how readily we should be prepared to expand political objectives, how insistent we should be on maintaining limited objectives in the face of major hostilities, and whether, in fact, we should not insure that military operations do not create an undesired upward pressure on national objectives.
Attachment B
RESUME
The China confrontation study was undertaken on March 8 under the direct supervision of Mr. Vance, General Wheeler and Ambassador Thompson. It was completed on April 30. The staff work was done by a State/DOD/JCS team under the direction of Lt. General Spivy, newly appointed head of J-5. The study is largely focused on the military implications of a rising crescendo of hostilities with the Red Chinese, the scenarios in some cases being intentionally forced in order to bring out the aforementioned military implications.
The study assumes that the broad political objective of the US in the Far East is to seek the containment of Communist China, working over the longer run and as occasion permits for a softening of the present militant approach of the Chinese Communist leadership. Within this broad framework, the group examined the more immediate and specific political objectives which the US might wish to pursue, assuming that under alternative potential contingency situations the US could find itself faced with the possibility of a military confrontation with Communist China. The study was to examine these political objectives in relation to existing and projected military plans and capabilities. Points of particular concern were to be how to discourage Soviet support for the ChiComs in event of hostilities; how to keep the level of hostilities as low as possible consistent with attainment of objectives; the proper role for our nuclear capability; and what political and military adjustments were indicated by the study.
Essentially the study moves through five basic military situations, starting from the position in which we found ourselves in Southeast Asia in March 1965, through a major nuclear war with the Chinese.
In Situation A, US air attacks (2500 sorties) on military targets well removed from urban industrial areas have not produced the results we desire. A number of military installations have been destroyed or damaged; about 20% of the DRV's ammunition storage capacity has been destroyed; and the movement of supplies south of the 20th parallel has been restricted. Despite this limited impact, the bombings have had a cohesive effect on the populace of North Vietnam and there has been no significant reduction in DRV supply and support of the continuing Vietnam operations. Therefore, the US elects to increase the scale and scope of bombing within North Vietnam, to include peripheral industrial targets, such as selected electric power plants.
Situation B represents one step up the ladder of escalation. At this point, a total of 4500 sorties have been flown by US/RVN forces which include the increase in scale and scope as a result of Situation A. However, the Viet Cong have intensified their activity and expanded their control despite the increased bombing; ChiCom volunteers are now operating in North Vietnam with limited numbers of aircraft (50-70) and surface to air missiles; and Soviet missile technicians have manned the SA-2 SAM installation in the vicinity of Hanoi. The US response is to increase the level of bombing again, including more general attack of industrial targets and all categories of transportation, but excluding Hanoi; deploy to South Vietnam the remainder of the Marine division which has elements already there, one Army Division, and one Free World Division (presumed to be ROK); and develop plans and prepare to blockade North Vietnam.
In Situation C, the US response described in Situation B has checked deterioration of the military and political situation in South Vietnam and the DRV gives some indications of wavering. At this point, ChiCom aircraft operating from bases in Hainan and South China engage the US/GVN aircraft which are bombing North Vietnam, and large numbers of ChiCom ground forces are deployed in North Vietnam. The USSR has continued to send "volunteer" units to set up and man missile sites. It has announced also the forming of a "volunteer" division which it implies will be sent to North Vietnam if the US does not halt aggression and agree to negotiations.
The postulated US response in Situation C is to: increase military activity against the Viet Cong; include targets in Hanoi in air attacks; bomb ChiCom air and naval bases on Hainan Island and in South China, as well as the DRV ports; and mine ports of DRV, in South China, and on Hainan. Additional naval units are introduced into the South China Sea and two Army divisions are deployed to Thailand.
The marked improvement in South Vietnam assumed to have been produced by the measures taken by the US in Situation C, causes Communist China and the DRV in Situation D to launch a major attack at the beginning of the dry season. This involves operations by 22 divisions in South Vietnam, Laos and Thailand. Rather than postulating a US response in this situation, the study examined the political and military implications of a variety of courses of action.
The final situation (Alternative Situation A) departs from the forced escalation of Situation A through D by assuming ChiCom/DRV initiation of large scale ground attack prior to the significant build-up of friendly forces which is assumed had been achieved in Situation D as by-product of progressive escalation. Thus the situation when the attack commences is assumed to be that at the outset of the study, i.e., Situation A. The treatment in Alternative Situation A generally parallels that in Situation D: an examination of the political and military implications of a variety of courses of action.
Both Situation D and Alternative Situation A include assessment of the impact of nuclear weapons on ground and air operations. Some interesting comparisons of nuclear and non-nuclear force requirements for the same operations appear in summary charts opposite pp IV-60 and IV-80./4/
/4/Not printed.
95. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, August 5, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 13. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: "For information only." A handwritten "L" on the source text indicates that the President saw it.
SUBJECT
Ray Cline's Talks with Chiang Kai-shekRay Cline, CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence and formerly Taipei station chief, visited Taiwan this week at the urgent personal request of Chiang Kai-shek./2/ Cline had two long talks with the Gimo, the first in the presence of our Chargé, the second one alone on August 3 for five hours at the Gimo's mountain retreat./3/
/2/Wright reported Chiang's request for Cline's visit in telegram 16 from Taipei, July 7, and commented that he thought the request meant that Chiang wanted to use an alternate channel to send a policy proposal to Washington and recommended against such a visit. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US) Telegram 31 to Taipei, July 13, cleared by Bromley Smith and Rusk, stated that Cline should accept Chiang's invitation but not until after Wright's departure and that the visit should be portrayed as having a reporting rather than a policy context. (Ibid., INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel Telegrams, Taipei)
/3/[text not declassified] telegram [text not declassified], August 1, conveyed a message from Clough to Bundy reporting Cline's first meeting with Chiang. (Ibid.) [text not declassified] telegram [text not declassified], August 3, transmitted a message from Cline summarizing his meeting that day with Chiang. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. XIII) A second message from Cline with a more detailed account of the meeting is filed as an attachment to an August 4 memorandum from Walter Elder to McGeorge Bundy. (Ibid.)
Chiang's aim was to use Cline, whom he trusts, in order to communicate a "message" directly to you. (Chiang feels that more normal "diplomatic channels" have distorted and disregarded his views in recent years.)
The Gimo's message, in brief: The Chinese Communists and their Vietnamese allies are about to engage the U.S. in a long ground war of attrition which we cannot hope to win; Chiang stands ready to provide troops to Vietnam if we want them; but most important, he urges that now is the time for an amphibious Chinese Nationalist landing on the South China (Kwangtung) coast in order to cut Peking's supply lines to Vietnam and to begin the reconquest of the mainland. The Gimo believes that it is now or never; the Sino/Soviet dispute assures that the U.S.S.R. will not intervene, and the Chinese Communists have not yet achieved a sufficient nuclear buildup to deter a Nationalist invasion.
Regardless of our views on such undertakings, the Gimo asks that we do some coordinated strategic planning for such a move. He intends to spell out his proposals more fully in a letter to you that will be carried by his son Chiang Ching-kuo, the Defense Minister, when he comes to Washington in late September.
Ray Cline comments that the Gimo was more emotional than the situation warrants and probably fears that his control of Taiwan will weaken unless he appears to be doing something active about fighting the Chinese Communists. Hence the revival of the "counter-attack" theme. In balance, Cline's visit seems to have provided a boost to the Gimo's ego--and a healthy escape-valve for his pent-up feelings that the U.S. had written him off.
JCT Jr.
McG B96. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 13-7-65
Washington, August 5, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, NIE 13-7-65. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on August 5, except AEC and FBI representatives, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
The Problem
To analyze Communist China's most significant political problems and to estimate its political character over the next few years.
Conclusions
A. The dedicated, narrowly doctrinaire men who rule China initially gained the support of the Chinese people by swiftly unifying a country in chaos. But their adventurist "Great Leap Forward" program failed disastrously, substantially reducing popular faith in the leadership and popular support of its programs. Despite their failures, the dwindling group of elderly leaders remain determined to carry through political and social programs that will produce a modernized China, and a "new Communist man."
B. This policy is the work of a remarkably small and stable group of men. Mao and his lieutenants have, over the past three decades, avoided major internal schisms and refused to admit younger blood into their ranks. In recent years the leadership has turned inward upon itself; it has virtually dispensed with formal party meetings and congresses while cloaking its operations in ever greater secrecy.
C. The party can exact obedience and compliance, but, despite its recurrent campaigns, the people attempt to improve their material lot and to avoid politics. These attitudes have widely infected the lower levels of the party apparatus as well. The regime is currently engaged in massive campaigns to "reform" or weed out errant party cadres and to "educate" the people to accept the regime's collectivist programs. It has announced that it will launch another production upsurge, but this is likely to differ significantly from the ill-fated Great Leap Forward. The outlook is for increased tensions.
D. Mao is 71, and most of his dozen or so closest lieutenants are in their 60s. Mao's departure probably will not split the leadership, and policy is likely to continue along present doctrinaire lines. His successors will not have Mao's authority, however, and this may in time open the door to the growth of factionalism inside the party.
E. Mao's lieutenants will be succeeded in their turn by a generation of party veterans, now in their 50's. Although these men give no evidence of a broader, more moderate viewpoint, they will have to deal with a host of accumulated pressures and may perforce be more flexible and pragmatic. At least for the next several years, however, political and social problems within China are unlikely to prevent economic and military development or to force a softening of Chinese foreign policy.
[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]
97. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary Rusk/1/
Washington, August 23, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-3 CHINAT-US. Confidential. Cleared by Fearey, Deputy Legal Adviser Richard D. Kearney, Eleanor C. McDowell of L/T, G.H. Aldrich of L/FE, George L. Warren of G/PM, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations John P. White, in draft by Eugene T. Herbert of L/FE and Colonel Ramundo of DOD/ISA/FMRA, and in substance by Rubin of DOD/OSD/GC.
SUBJECT
Request for Authority Under Circular 175 to Sign a Status of Forces Agreement with the Republic of ChinaDiscussion:
Article VII of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China, which entered into force on March 3, 1955, provides for the stationing of United States forces in and about Taiwan "as determined by mutual agreement." Discussions with the GRC concerning a status of forces agreement were begun in 1955 but were interrupted by the Taipei riot of 1957 and the Straits crisis of 1958. In 1959 authority to negotiate an agreement was granted by the Acting Secretary to the Ambassador to China, with the understanding that authority to sign the agreement would be sought when negotiations were concluded (Tab A)./2/ On July 30, 1965 the United States and the Republic of China jointly announced the conclusion of negotiations.
/2/The tabs are attached but not printed.
Attached (Tab B) is the English text of the agreement which will be the basis for final agreement.
The twenty article agreement is modeled on the basic NATO status of forces formula, tailored to fit the particular situation in Taiwan. It provides that the United States will bear the cost of the maintenance of its forces, while the Republic of China will furnish facilities and areas and rights of way. The United States is to receive utilities and services at rates and under conditions which are no less favorable than those of any governmental agency of the Republic of China. United States personnel are to enjoy freedom of entry and exit, exemption from local taxes, and exemption from customs duties provided that personal items are brought into the agreement area (Taiwan and the Pescadores) within six months of the person's initial arrival, or are purchased or obtained thereafter through a United States operated exchange, commissary, or military post office, or under certain other specified conditions.
The jurisdiction article is patterned after the Supplementary Agreement between the United States and Germany. In the minutes to be published with the agreement the Republic of China agrees to waive its primary jurisdiction but reserves the right to recall such waiver in specific cases where major interests of Chinese administration of justice make the exercise of Chinese jurisdiction imperative, particularly in cases of security offenses against the Republic of China, offenses causing the death of a human being, robbery and rape.
In a separate exchange of letters, the cases in which the Chinese Government could recall its waiver are limited solely to the following: security offenses against the Republic of China, offenses causing the death of a human being, narcotics offenses, robbery, rape and arson. By limiting Chinese jurisdiction to these offenses, the United States personnel are protected against the operation of the Special Laws (tantamount to martial law) presently in effect in Taiwan. It is also provided that United States personnel will not be tried in Chinese military courts.
The jurisdiction article provides further that the United States shall have the right to custody of an accused person until the completion of all judicial proceedings. The Chinese have agreed to comprehensive trial safeguards and to the conclusiveness of United States duty certifications in determining primary jurisdiction. Under the agreed minutes the adequacy of Chinese confinement facilities will be a matter of joint agreement between United States and Chinese authorities. A Joint Committee is to be formed by the two governments to assist in implementing the agreement.
The claims article provides for unilateral settlement of claims by the United States, with the Chinese having the option to turn to the standard NATO claims formula should they find United States unilateral settlement procedures unsatisfactory.
A memorandum summarizing the provisions of the agreement was transmitted to the staffs of the Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs Committees on July 28.
Recommendation:
That you authorize signature by our Ambassador at Taipei, or by the Chargé d'Affaires, of the Status of Forces Agreement which has been negotiated with the Republic of China, based on the attached text and subject to approval of the final text by the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs or his deputy with the prior concurrence of the Office of the Legal Adviser, Congressional Relations, and the Department of Defense./3/
/3/Thompson initialed his approval on August 24. The agreement was signed at Taipei on August 31; for the text, see 17 UST 373.
98. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, August 24, 1965, 9:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 13. No classification marking.
SUBJECT
Paul Dudley White and Mainland China1. Last week you sent me for comment a letter from White/2/ in which he offered his services in any way that might be useful "in helping to break our deadlock with China."
/2/Dated August 10; attached but not printed.
2. It turns out that Dr. White has had a long interest in this problem! He was invited to China by the President of the Chinese Academy of Medicine in July 1962. The Department of State agreed to his visit, but at the last minute the Chinese withdrew their invitation on the ground that the U.S. "has persistently adopted a reactionary policy against New China, and blockaded every possible channel of communication between the peoples of our two countries."
3. This is a characteristic example of the way in which the Red Chinese have tried to pin on us a responsibility which is really their own. I bet that 80% of those interested in the problem think that the reason more Americans cannot go to Red China is U.S. intransigence--while the fact is that it is mainly the Red Chinese themselves who have prevented such travel.
4. Under our own current policy guidelines, I know of no way we can use Dr. White at this time. If we were to give official backing to a White visit to China, it is predictable that the Red Chinese would turn it down. This would not gain us much.
5. On the other hand, the White case does raise the question whether we are smart to let it appear that we are the people who block communication between our two countries. Our Chinese experts have recommended for some time that we should ease our present travel restrictions and make a general rule that doctors and public health specialists--or perhaps all workers in the fields of health, education, and welfare--would be authorized to receive visas. (Our present rule includes (1) authorized news correspondents, (2) families of the four imprisoned Americans, and (3) individual cases in which the national interest is served--Dr. White's visit would have come under this third category.)
6. We discussed this matter at a Tuesday luncheon earlier this winter [summer?],/3/ and you felt then that it would not be wise to change our current policy. But perhaps if we were to change it in response to an appeal by Paul Dudley White--and at a time when our policy in Vietnam has reached a new level of clarity and firmness--we might make a useful stroke in all directions. I will put this matter on the agenda for our next Rusk/McNamara meeting./4/ Meanwhile, I have given Dr. White a cordial interim acknowledgment, as attached,/5/ and protected your right to answer him yourself when you are ready.
/3/See Document 90.
/4/A September 2 memorandum from Thomson to Bundy states that a proposal on modified travel restrictions had been on Rusk's desk for several days and that Rusk reportedly had doubts about its "breadth" and would probably avoid action for a while. Thomson asked Bundy whether the attached proposal conformed with Bundy's "understanding of what the President authorized" and whether they could do anything to encourage faster action. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. IV) A September 8 memorandum from Thomson to Bundy attached a new draft Department of State memorandum to Rusk and noted that it was "an outgrowth of your phone call to Ben Read last Friday." (Ibid.)
/5/Dated August 24; attached but not printed.
McG. B./6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
99. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, August 27, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1-3 CHICOM. Top Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Weiss and Lewis. A note on the source text reads: "S Clearance not required on Memo for the Record. EJStreator." Another record of the meeting is in a September 21 memorandum for the record prepared by Yager and Hightower, dated September 21. (Washington National Record Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1265, China Reds 092 China Study)
SUBJECT
Meeting on China Study/2//2/See Documents 92 and 94.
PARTICIPANTS
State
The Secretary
G--Ambassador Thompson
FE--Mr. Berger
S/P--Mr. Yager
G/PM--Colonel Lewis
White House--Mr. BundyDefense
The Secretary
Mr. Vance
ISA--Mr. McNaughton
JCS--General Wheeler
JCS--General Spivy
JCS--General Hightower1. The Secretary opened the meeting by commenting that the study was a very useful piece of work. He stated, however, that there are certain aspects which require further thinking through. In this connection, he mentioned to Ambassador Thompson that the Soviet position requires further thought. It is possible the Soviets may not prefer to see a settlement in Southeast Asia. The struggle with Peiping is very deep-rooted and as a result may force the Soviets to take a stronger position than might otherwise be the case. He said he questions whether the Soviets would be willing to suffer another missile crisis setback considering the very major effects this could have upon the Soviet world position. Putting himself in their shoes, were he a Soviet leader he would be inclined to be sure that the US was presented with threats elsewhere in the world but tied to Southeast Asia, for example, by renewed pressure on Berlin. Such action, the Secretary believed, would raise very difficult alliance problems. The US would be blamed. The Secretary said he would be pleased to be proven wrong, but be doubted it. He thinks the study may have been too optimistic concerning Soviet policy, though we would do everything possible on the diplomatic side to avoid a confrontation with the Soviets. Nevertheless, the longer the hostilities continue, the bigger the problem with the Soviets will become.
2. The Secretary went on to say that the second major problem that bothered him was the time factor. He pointed out that the US is concerned with the need "for something to support in Vietnam." The US effort would be very difficult in Southeast Asia if the political position in Vietnam erodes. However, the same might well be applied to the other side. There would be a great advantage to an all-out effort in South Vietnam, perhaps in September, if this could bring the other side to the conclusion that there was too little left for it to support in South Vietnam; too little from which to construct a viable political position. With a basis in military success, a concurrent peace offensive would give us a possibility of effective action before the other side makes the major decision to ask for more support.
3. Thirdly, the Secretary said that the problems of the use of nuclear weapons was perhaps understated in the paper. He noted that the use of nukes is not a line of action which we are going to abandon. He pointed out that the US has been careful not to foreclose this possibility, particularly in the Pacific against China. However, this problem may affect our whole position in the world and could even be influenced by domestic attitudes. The gravity and difficulty of the decision should be recognized.
4. Finally, the Secretary said he was pleased to see that a State-DOD group had been set up to take a longer, more careful look at the problem and that this should be helpful.
5. Secretary McNamara stated that his understanding was that the study was directed at the longer range problem and in this connection he would hope to have more analyses of the way the Communist Chinese are likely to move in their foreign policy, especially in Asia. From this we would be able to derive how the US should move in response. He cited India and Japan as two key areas. Mr. Vance commented in response to Mr. McNamara that the Senior Policy Group (Vance-Wheeler-Thompson) had decided that such a look was not practical in the initial short-range effort, but quite agreed that the longer range study should encompass such considerations.
6. In response to Mr. McNamara's question, General Spivy said the longer-range study was due for completion next June, but with internal wrap-ups on various actions from time to time. He commented that the study is not a planning document per se, but an independent look at the problem. Mr. McNamara asked if an outline of the longer-range study could not be developed. General Spivy indicated that an initial outline is available (and passed out copies)/3/ noting that the outline is still being revamped. Mr. Yager said that the outline is considered as a checklist of points to be covered at this stage.
/3/Not found, but see Document 161.
7. The Secretary stated that some of the matters covered in the outline are already operational and others may become so even before next summer, when the report will be completed. It might therefore be most useful if the study group were to look at certain specific problem areas more immediately. For example, if one were to try to influence Peiping toward accepting a more peaceful coexistence attitude then certain problems such as those presented by the India-Pakistan conflict are not very helpful. On the other hand, in Africa things are going very well and we might wish to capitalize on our position there. He said he could think of nothing more important in our longer range relations with Communist China than getting the Kashmir dispute settled so that India and Pakistan can live peacefully. Mr. McNamara agreed fully, and suggested an immediate effort by a very small group to get down on paper in about ninety days some of the more important considerations. It is less important that this be a completed and fully coordinated job, than that it reflect the thoughtful work of a limited number of good minds. Mr. Bundy agreed. He said we need in hand not an interdepartmental coordinated draft but a useful analysis.
8. The Secretary stated that it might be useful for him to dictate the thoughts on his mind as to how events, as he sees them developing, might affect the longer-range problem. He emphasized that this would be a casually dictated paper over a weekend, stressing questions and problems which trouble him, rather than a directive. General Wheeler commented that this would be excellent and just what the study group needed. Mr. McNamara also agreed.
9. Ambassador Thompson agreed that the Secretary's offer would be very useful and suggested that Mr. McNamara, General Wheeler and others might wish to do the same. He commented that the problem is vast. For example, he cited as just one possibility the consideration that China and the Soviet Union could some day get back together again. Leadership in the various countries will eventually change and particularly if the US suffers severe setbacks in Vietnam this could attract the Soviets and Chinese together. The implications of this should be considered. Another thought that he had was the possible utility of attempting to bring pressure on China through the use of wheat, capitalizing on their difficult food problem. In this connection, he noted the problem of the dearth of good intelligence on China, commenting for example that we had little information on Chinese atomic capabilities. He stated he personally doubts that it will be significant soon, though he anticipates an attempt by the Chinese to make maximum use of the political potential of their having become a nuclear power.
10. General Wheeler commented that they are making a major effort in the intelligence community to lay out what we do and what we do not know. For example, he thinks that there is a need for a study in depth on the Chinese economy. He said that the DIA project on the military economy showed a greater capability than what most of the "economists" have been saying. He said doubtless this reflects a dual economy in China, one for peace and one for military use, but that we need a better analysis. Mr. McNamara tended to disagree, stating that he believes a report could be drawn up now. He doubts, for example, that a study in depth of the economy would have much affect upon the results of such a report. In the relatively short run of from five to seven years, China will be able to skim from the top of its economy base whatever is needed for military purposes.
11. Ambassador Thompson said he is struck by the concern of the present Chinese leadership with the possible disaffection of the next generation of Chinese leaders. He believes that the present leadership is taking precisely the wrong measures by insisting on more rigid indoctrination. We might well look at the possibility of capitalizing on this.
12. The Secretary said that we should look at the possibility of a food crisis in China and how the US might capitalize on that. He wondered whether a study by the Department of Agriculture might be useful. Ambassador Thompson said Agriculture had done some studies, but he finds them rather incredible. They tend to show that the Chinese could easily expand their agriculture and feed their population, but this was based on the assumption that US agricultural methods could be used. This was the big hooker. The Secretary agreed that this is a questionable assumption. Ambassador Thompson suggested that perhaps a study independent of the Agriculture Department might be useful.
13. The Secretary asked if the Study Group were in touch with Professor Taylor and his group at the University of Washington. He commented that they were doing work on the economy of China. The response was negative, but that the contact would be made. General Spivy commented that ISA is contracting with IDA for a long run study on China, the information from which would be of interest to the study group.
14. The Secretary suggested that one device which might be used would be to develop a loose leaf study. On some parts we might be able to write useful pieces immediately, developing the other parts as more information becomes available.
15. Mr. Bundy asked if CIA had been involved in the study. It was pointed out that they had been.
16. Ambassador Berger stated that two additional problems particularly interest him. One has to do with the possible admission of Communist China to the UN, and the range of problems which that would present. He suspected that this is a matter which we will have to face up to in the not distant future. The second issue is the possibility of Indonesia being taken over entirely by the PKI.
17. The Secretary stated that the central question, as he sees it, is the need to influence a half-dozen key people in China on the question of how China is doing, and whether its present policy is or is not on the right track. Such actions as the recognition of China by France or its future admission into the UN would, of course, be very bad in that it would persuade the Chinese that they were being successful. Unless other things demonstrate to the Chinese that they are not on the right track we will be faced with much greater danger in the future, not to mention that which we face today.
18. Mr. McNamara agreed, saying in addition that if the US takes positions in opposition to the Chinese which it cannot successfully back up, this only makes things worse. Mr. Bundy agreed, stating there is no point in opposing the Chinese in areas where we do not have the power to influence events.
19. The Secretary pointed out that successful opposition to the Chinese would create a terrific burden. He noted that it required a trillion dollars in NATO defense budgets to stop the Russians in Europe (but noted parenthetically that they still risked the Cuban missile adventure). It is going to require a major decision on the part of the US and its allies to stop the Chinese. Mr. McNamara agreed but stated that as a government we have not really faced the problem of generating sufficient power to convince the ChiComs of their error.
20. Ambassador Thompson raised a question as to how our studies and analysis might be used outside of the US, perhaps in some sanitized version. He stated that he has been impressed as to the lack of serious thought about the Chinese problem on the part of our allies and others. Mr. McNamara agreed and pointed out that since others do not think about the problem, and he doubts the US ability to stop the Chinese unless others are prepared to help, he wonders whether we will not have to say this to them at some point. This applies especially to India and Japan.
21. The Secretary stated that he thought the meeting had been useful and that it perhaps provided sufficient guidance for the next steps to be taken.
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