NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
10. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State/1/ Paris, March 1, 1967, 2020Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, SCI 1-1 EURW-US. Confidential. Repeated to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Brussels for BUSEC, London, and Rome. 13261. NATUS. Subj: International technological cooperation. 1. The Italian proposal for international technological cooperation was discussed in the NAC meeting March 1. In addition to Bowie and FonMin Fanfani, UK represented by Edmond Dell, MP, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Technology, and Belgium by Spaey, Secretary General of National Council of Science Policy. The most important results of the meeting were (a) consensus that this was a highly complex problem which could not be solved by a give-away program by the US nor simply by concentration on technology; (b) the main responsibility for making progress in diminishing the gap belongs to the Europeans themselves, with some cooperation by the US at appropriate but later stages; (c) a consensus that duplication of effort among international institutions should be avoided. (None of these points were formally summarized as NAC consensus, however.) On procedure, NAC agreed on terms of reference for a special working group to draft a report for the Permanent Council to submit to the NATO Ministers in June (see below). 2. As for the complexity of the problem, most speakers said that if progress was to be made on narrowing the gap it could not be the result of a simple device. Fanfani for instance did not mention "sharing patents" or anything of this type in his remarks. He stressed instead the serious political consequences for the future if the gap is allowed to grow. The other main point of his remarks concerned procedure (see below). Dell warned that there was a danger in getting too involved with the gaps that exist in glamour industries. The real problems lay in less dramatic fields such as industrial management and market organization. Spaey also stressed the complexity of the problem and the need to distinguish between the study aspect and the operational aspect. Boon (Netherlands) stated that Europeans must avoid only analyzing symptoms and should get to the roots. In the Dutch view there were four key elements that made up the roots of the problem: 1) mentality, 2) management, 3) organization, 4) finance. He believed no progress could be made in any of these areas unless there was increased European integration. 3. There also seemed to be agreement that the Europeans had to tackle this problem themselves in the first instance. While the speakers did not ignore the possible cooperation of the US it seemed obvious that they realized that they could not and should not look to US initially for help. Spaey underlined that Europe cannot simply depend on US assistance but must grow to a point where there can be a profitable two-way exchange between Europe and the US. The primary responsibility of the Europeans was in the remarks of all speakers, ranging from the emphatic to the implicit. 4. Within the same range there was also agreement that duplication of effort among the international institutions had to be avoided. While it seemed to be agreed that NATO should initially identify the various aspects of the gap problem which come under cognizance of other international organizations and that NATO would eventually end up itself with the defense technology aspect, it was not wholly clear from the Europeans discussion how work between the OECD and the EEC would be split up or phased. Fanfani talked about 5 stages of activity which might take place in dealing with the gap: a) each country first takes stock of its national situation; b) then stock-taking by the EEC, by EFTA and then by both organizations as a whole; c) after that discussions between the two sides of the Atlantic; d) gap diminution efforts would then be widened to other European countries; and e) such efforts would then extend to other countries of the world. Greece and Turkey did not hesitate to point out that the 6 should certainly become the 8 when they discuss gaps and that special consideration had to be given to Greece and Turkey. Grewe (Germany) repeated the German position that the discussion should start in the EEC with non-members added. He did not mention the OECD, although most other members talked about the responsibility of the OECD. 5. Bowie's remarks stressed the necessity to have a common definition of the problem, which is extremely complex involving many interrelated economic, social and technological factors. He agreed that much of the action will have to be taken in Europe, and assured NATO members that the US stands ready to cooperate. In addition to the role that NATO can play in the area of defense technology, Bowie underlined the fact that other international organizations have competence in different aspects of the over-all problem. 6. On the basis of a UK draft and considerable discussion NAC agreed on the following terms of reference for the special working group: "The Council decided to create a special working group to assist the Council in its study of the procedure which might be followed for further examination and implementation of the Italian proposals. "The working group should in particular--a. define further the nature of the problems to be faced; b. report on the progress of the studies being made on the consideration of the issues by other organizations concerned; c. report to the Council on any means of furthering the achievement of the objectives set out in the Italian proposals; d. define the area of work which may properly be done within NATO, including particularly the area of cooperation in defense technology. "The working party should prepare a draft of the report which the Council has to submit to Ministers at their meeting next June." 7. Comment: This NAC meeting served very well to sharpen the focus of the Europeans on the gap problem. Although there was not a deep discussion of substance, it was nevertheless clear that movement so far seems to be in the right direction--the direction of Europe. The recognition by the Europeans that the problem, and its origins, are basically theirs seems to reflect conclusion that the more responsible thinkers on this subject are so far resisting the temptation to give it an anti-American twist. Accordingly, our current posture of standing ready to be helpful but not forcing the pace seems to be the right one. 8. A following cable reports meeting Brosio held this afternoon with Bowie and other visitors to get some drafting started. Cleveland
11. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 15, 1967, 1:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Donald F. Hornig, Box 4. Secret. Drafted by Daniel F. Margolies, Beckler, and Hornig. SUBJECT /2/In a May 18 memorandum to the President, Hornig raised the idea of a mission to Europe to discuss technology gap issues. (Ibid.) He explained that since November 1966, when he had been named to chair the interagency committee studying the problem, the Europeans had been expecting a visit, an idea that was supported by the State Department. Prior to his departure on June 21, Hornig updated the President's Special Assistant, Marvin Watson, on the issues and included a request: "Since it is a tight rope walk, I would very much like to meet very briefly with the President to get his point of view so I can take a stance which coincides with his outlook." (Memorandum from Hornig to Watson, June 21; ibid., National Security File, Agency File, Office of Science and Technology, Vol. 1 (1967)) No record that Hornig spoke with the President prior to his departure has been found. Political concern in Europe with the technological gap remains high. However, there has been a healthy shift in emphasis. Last year European political leaders seemed to feel the United States had developed a mysterious technique for moving ahead in science and technology which Europe could not match. They (e.g. Fanfani of Italy and Harmel of Belgium) called on the United States to restore the balance. Today, they see the problem more clearly as one of putting technological knowledge rapidly to effective use. They recognize that all of the major factors are ones they must deal with themselves, and there is no longer talk of a "Marshall Plan for technology." But a deep uneasiness remains. There is a quite general feeling of having to defend themselves against the American colossus. They still want a "helping hand." Two favorable developments have resulted from the heightened political interest in the technological gap. First, all the countries have stepped up the amount of resources devoted to higher education and to scientific research and development, some of them dramatically. Second, there is a growing feeling that European industry must be restructured on a continental scale, including the U.K., to get the scale of operation needed to take advantage of the opportunities offered by modern science and technology. In France this view was strongly held by industrial leaders, although it runs counter to de Gaulle's European policy. On the other hand, we encountered evidence of rising nationalism everywhere, most clearly in Germany,/3/ where the view was expressed, for example, that a major modern State must have an independent capacity to produce computers which are the key to the new society of the electronic age. In France and the U.K. this view was shared and applied as well to the aeronautics industry./4/ Concern was expressed about extra-territorial controls resulting either from decisions taken in the home office in the United States affecting investment and employment policies of European subsidiaries or from the various U.S. Government rules and regulations applicable to transactions of subsidiaries in Europe by reason of the control of the parent company in the United States (e.g., trade with Eastern Europe). Of course, their economists generally agree with us that from a purely economic standpoint we all do best by letting the most efficient source provide new technology, no matter where it is. /3/Hornig's discussions in Germany are detailed in telegram 162 from Bonn, July 6. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, ORG 7 OST) /4/The meetings in France are summarized in telegram 3 from Paris, July 1. (Ibid., SCI 1-1 EURW-US) The London visit is reported in airgram A-454 from London, August 2. (Ibid., ORG 7 OST) The critical policy issue to be faced by these countries, therefore, is the economic price they want to pay for such independence of national operations. It is clear that they are willing to pay some price, and this could lead to discriminatory measures against U.S. corporations. The Europeans feel they will ultimately find a European solution to their problems. Their principal concern is that this may be a slow process and in the interim American industry will securely establish itself in the lead in the key technologically advanced sectors and control important elements of the European economy. The U.S. posture of refraining from taking initiatives--and of friendly cooperation--has proved to be successful. However, the fear within Europe of U.S. domination in key European industries is a source of political strain. There are undercurrents of concern on this issue in certain countries that could damage our political and commercial ties with Europe. A possible constructive action which was discussed generally in every country was a "code of corporate good citizenship" which might be generated informally or through international agreement. It would (1) be a guide to good citizenship of international corporations in host countries and (2) protect corporations against discrimination if they complied. It was my general impression that in all of the six countries visited (plus NATO, OECD and EEC) there was real appreciation of the concern by the U.S. for their problem and the search for constructive action. The Ambassadors all felt that the visit had created a great deal of good will. The conclusions from this trip, as well as the results of the studies undertaken here, will be incorporated in the report of our Technological Gap Committee which we hope to submit to you on September 1st. Donald F. Hornig/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
12. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, September 18, 1967, 5:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, SCI 1-1 EURW-US. Secret. The source text is Part IV of VI. Drafted by Neil Seidenman (LS), approved in S on September 2 and by the White House (Edward Fried) on October 5. The meeting was held at the White House. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS United States The President said that Foreign Minister Fanfani's proposal made in NATO to narrow the technological gap between the US and Western Europe had aroused considerable interest. On this point we are attempting to co-operate in every possible way, both through NATO and the OECD. Dr. Hornig, the President's Scientific Adviser, is presently engaged in a thoroughgoing study of the matter. We must still arrive at a definition of the problem which will help us discover the ways in which we can co-operate further. We are very much in debt to the Foreign Minister for his leadership in this field.
13. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ US/MS/2 Brussels, December 11, 1967, 9:30 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, SCI 1-1 EURW-US. Secret. This memorandum is Part IV of IV. The meeting was held in the Prime Minister's office. In an attached memorandum from Bowie to Rusk of December 22, Bowie told the Secretary that the idea of a major speech by President Johnson on the technological gap had been considered by the Interdepartmental Committee and rejected. Rusk agreed to discuss the issue with the President in light of the Hornig committee's decision if the Belgian Prime Minister raised the issue again, but there is no indication that he did so. UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE FORTIETH MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL PARTICIPANTS Belgium SUBJECT The Prime Minister said that there was widespread talk in Belgium and all of Europe that the technological gap between the United States and Europe was increasing and was becoming very dangerous. Sometime ago President Johnson made a speech saying that it was not the intent of the United States to broaden that gap but that speech came at a moment when public opinion in Europe was not prepared to understand it and it did not produce much effect. At present public opinion is much more alive to the problem and if President Johnson were, again, to make a speech along the same lines and in particular to say that he urged American firms investing in Europe to carry out technically advanced production in Europe so as to close rather than increase the gap, this would have the most salutary effect. The Secretary said that indeed the United States does not seek to increase the gap and it is possible that a statement of this kind may be made. It is important, however, that as at the time when the Marshall Plan was first announced, there should be European leadership in evidence to show that the Europeans are interested in cooperating with the United States in narrowing the technological gap. The Prime Minister agreed with this point of view that European leadership can and should be forthcoming. The Secretary said that he would report this conversation to the President immediately upon his return and that he would suggest that the Prime Minister might direct a personal message to the President on this subject. The President would certainly be most interested in receiving such a communication.
14. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 22, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Donald F. Hornig, Box 4. No classification marking. Attached is a report of the "Technological Gap Committee"/2/ you asked me to chair just a year ago. Your request came after the "Gap" had been raised during the visits of several Heads of State. At that time it had acquired political and emotional significance--for example, in the Fanfani suggestion of a Technological Marshall Plan. /2/Not attached; see Document 15. Although the issue has subsequently been raised from time to time (e.g., by Prime Ministers Wilson and Harmel), the "low-key" strategy suggested in our preliminary report last January has paid off handsomely. The analyses carried out in OECD, NATO and EC agree with each other and with this report as to what is involved--education, management, markets, etc.--and much of the heat has come off. For the present, the mystique has gone out of the "Gap." But we should not be deceived into thinking the problem has gone away. Europeans now understand it, but they have yet to solve it. As they feel the hot breath of American competition, the pressure for us to "do something" will likely increase again. This view seems to be borne out by the December 13th cable from Brussels from Secretary Rusk pointing to rising concern. Although we suggest many small steps, big steps can only be taken in Europe. However, the steps we suggest do add up to a constructive response, and I consider it important that we take such steps as are feasible at regular intervals so as to maintain a posture of concern and interest. A very important move in that direction is a proposal on its way to you from the Bureau of the Budget that government-purchased computers must be compatible with internationally established standards. I recommend that you approve the actions outlined in the Committee's cover memorandum/3/ and would like an opportunity to discuss the Committee's recommendations with you, after which I might brief the press on the outcome of this effort. /3/Document 15. Donald F. Hornig/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
15. Memorandum From the Interdepartmental Committee on the Technological Gap to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 22, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Senior Interdepartmental Group, Memos and Misc. [II], Box 60. Confidential. Transmitted to the President under cover of a memorandum from Hornig, Document 14. SUBJECT The final report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Technological Gap is submitted herewith for your consideration (Attachment B)./2/ /2/Not printed. This Committee was created in November 1966 by NSAM 357/3/ to examine the problem of technological disparities between the U.S. and Western Europe and to explore possible courses of action. /3/Document 5. We submitted a preliminary report in January 1967 and subsequently have completed a detailed analysis of the problem including a survey of American direct investments in Europe (Attachment C)./4/ Members of the Committee have had discussions with key European governmental and industrial leaders, and with leaders from American industry and universities. We have also cooperated in a joint study with the OECD countries in preparation for a Ministers of Science meeting next March. /4/Not printed. In our study, we have started from the proposition that the expansion of technological capability and freer exchange of technology on both sides of the Atlantic can be to the mutual advantage of the U.S. and Western Europe and, indeed, the entire world. THE "TECHNOLOGICAL GAP" The problem of the "technological gap" is only partly technological. Psychological, political, economic, and social factors are probably more important. --The European lag in technological know-how is largely in a few sectors of advanced technology, principally those that have benefited from U.S. military, space, and atomic energy programs--computers, advanced aircraft, microminiature electronic components, civil nuclear power, space communications. --Although Europeans are concerned about the long-term national implications of these technological disparities, they also recognize the existence of an economically more significant lag in European industrial abilities to utilize available technology. For example, many inventions made in Europe were first introduced commercially in the U.S. --The European lag in the utilization of technological know-how is due to a number of long-standing structural factors that only the European countries themselves can overcome, including: underinvestment in education; less aggressive and skilled management; less profit-oriented social customs and work habits; slowness in industrial modernization; small size of firms and national markets; conservative investment attitudes; and lack of mobility and inadequate number of highly trained personnel. This general view of the situation is now widely shared by informed European leaders. It represents a marked change in their understanding during the past year. In our view, the technological gap problem is a current manifestation of the historical differences between Europe and the U.S. in aggressiveness and dynamism, reflecting the American frontier past and its restless quest for progress and change. The Problem for the U.S. Improved European understanding of the nature of the technological gap has already led to some corrective steps, both nationally and European-wide--a constructive response to American competitive pressures. However, many Europeans are concerned that during the time they are taking corrective actions the U.S. will move further ahead of them in advanced technological development and industrial innovation, and will capture greater control of world markets for advanced technological products. This concern has been sharpened by the very rapid growth of American direct investments in the technology-intensive industries of Western Europe. Some Europeans are also concerned that major decisions affecting the future of European industry, and even their national independence, may not be in their hands. They feel they may be undesirably influenced by American corporate decisions and by U.S. governmental trade and financial controls. Other Europeans recognize that American investment has been a highly valuable force in moving their economies forward. As we see it, the technological gap issue is one aspect of the broad disparities in power and economic strength between the U.S. and a fragmented Europe which will be a recurrent problem for a long time to come. The frictions caused by these general disparities will continue, and will take different forms--economic and political--from time to time. Although European concerns about the technological gap may be exaggerated, they may nonetheless result in European counteractions to discriminate against American firms or products and in other measures that would pose political and economic difficulties for the U.S. However, we believe that the adoption of restrictive measures by Western European countries and ensuing pressures for countermeasures by the U.S. can be deterred (if not prevented) by: (a) a continuing long-range program of U.S. actions designed to show our cooperativeness, our desire to promote European advance, and our willingness to remove obstacles to the exchange of technology, and (b) the self-interest of European countries and their firms in maintaining the flow of American technology and management skills. U.S. Strategy The only long-range "cure" for the disparities problem lies in actions which must be taken by Europeans themselves: internal reforms in the European countries and moves toward greater European integration and cooperation. There is little that the U.S. government can or should do by way of direct assistance. But, the U.S. can play a significant complementary role--primarily through promoting scientific and technological cooperation and through the mutual reduction of obstacles to the flow of technology and related trade. At the same time, we should maximize both the short-term and long-term economic benefits to the U.S. from the transfer of technology. We should utilize our technological position to achieve the objectives set forth in this report. Events of the past year have confirmed the soundness of the overall strategy recommended in our report of last January. Although we should look mainly to European initiatives, the U.S. should provide a positive response to European concerns. The U.S. should try to convert European resentment about the technological gap into a constructive source of support for greater intra-European cooperation for solving the underlying problems. At the same time, we should discourage parochial solutions and attempt to ensure an outward-looking Europe which will be a strong force in the world economy. Specifically, the U.S. should: --stress that the U.S. and Europe have a joint stake in technological and economic progress; that our future prosperity is mutually interdependent; and that all stand to gain by promoting an open technological market, the international flow of scientific and technological advances, as well as management and organizational skills; --acknowledge (in low-key) that there is a U.S.-European gap in ability to utilize technological know-how, and to a certain extent in technological know-how per se; that this is a problem of mutual concern; and that the U.S. is prepared to participate constructively in seeking mutually beneficial actions--but that the basic actions to strengthen Europe must be taken by the Europeans themselves; --underscore the very extensive U.S. governmental programs and efforts to share the results of federally-financed research and development and to cooperate in R&D activities with Western European countries--in defense, aerospace, atomic energy, and other sectors; --emphasize that the technological gap issue reveals an essential need for the effective integration of Western Europe, and encourage Europeans to strengthen institutions which can deal comprehensively with the disparities problem, particularly the OECD and the European Communities; --avoid U.S. actions that might divert European attention from the need to act within a European framework, while taking initiatives that promote multilateral cooperation; --continue to work toward a common understanding of the nature and causes of the disparities and the role of governments in creating an atmosphere conducive to innovation, in the forthcoming meeting of the OECD Ministers of Science and other forums as they arise. In implementing the foregoing strategy, the U.S. should: --carry out the Kennedy Round agreements and avoid the imposition of new barriers to trade; --take the initiative to cooperate with Western European countries in the mutual reduction of non-tariff trade barriers (including "Buy American" and corresponding European restrictions on government procurement) through appropriate channels as soon as preparations and conditions permit; --analyze the contributions of American direct investments abroad to achieving U.S. national goals (optimum growth of national income, full employment, price stability, satisfactory balance of payments, freedom of international capital movements, foreign assistance), and minimize the inconsistencies of various national policies in relation to these goals; --continue to develop among COCOM members a better understanding of the major technological-security issues involved in their controls in advance of the need for a particular control action; --explore ways to encourage joint U.S.-European technological contributions to governmental programs of common interest (such as defense, space pollution, and transportation), particularly through appropriate consortia of U.S.-European companies; --assist European initiatives toward intra-European technological cooperation in space science and technology, in atomic energy, and in the application of computers in research, industry, and government; --lead in the strengthening of international mechanisms for the exchange of scientific and technical information and for the development of internationally agreed commercial standards, and in promoting international patent cooperation; --promote exchanges between the U.S. and Western Europe of scientists, engineers, industrialists, and public officials to transfer technical skills and management understandings in relation to the problem of technological disparities; --cooperate with European governments in applying science and technology to the common problems of highly industrialized countries--in air and water pollution and urban problems, for example. Recommendations The Interdepartmental Committee has agreed on the substance of the attached report and recommends: a. that you endorse the foregoing strategy and the proposed assignment of responsibilities set forth in the attachment to this memorandum (Attachment A);/5/ /5/Not printed. No action was taken on this attachment, and on March 16, 1968, Hornig wrote to the President: "Last December I sent you the report of the Technological Gap Committee which you had asked me to chair. Since I have had no response and have been unable to locate the report in the White House, another copy is attached for your attention." (Memorandum from Hornig to Johnson, March 16, 1968; Johnson Library, Papers of Donald F. Hornig, Box 6) b. that the responsibility for annual review of the implementing studies and actions be placed in the Senior Interdepartmental Group; c. that the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments undertake a broad examination of the role of American direct investment in Western Europe in relation to U.S. overall economic and foreign policy goals, making use of studies by other agencies including the office of the President's Special Trade Representative; d. that this memorandum and its attachments be distributed to appropriate U.S. officials and Ambassadors to communicate the understandings in the report and to facilitate follow-up actions; and e. that the Department of Commerce publicly release an appropriate version of the background analytical report (Attachment C). Since we are not recommending major U.S. initiatives, we do not believe it desirable to make a Presidential statement concerning this report. However, in view of the considerable public interest in this report, I will be pleased to make a statement to the press reporting its submission and explaining its general thrust, if you so desire. Donald Hornig National Aeronautics and Space Administration Ambassador William M. Roth (Observer) /6/The following typed names appear on the source text.
16. Telegram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State/1/ Paris, March 12, 1968, 1909Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, SCI 3 OECD. Limited Official Use. Also sent to Brussels for USEC and pouched to all OECD capitals. 11403. CEDTO. Subject: Science Ministerial Discussion--Technological Gaps. 1. Discussion completed March 11 this major agenda item highlighted general endorsement OECD studies, need for European economic unity, and follow-up work on diffuse issue involving non-tariff barriers, restrictive business practices and patent-licensing procedures research intensive industries. 2. Chairman Stoltenberg (Germany) set tone for conference by stressing increasing significance OECD forum, particularly European-US dialogue, all common problems science and technology. He referred directly to value OECD discussions backing up current EC planning for concerted attack on technological problems which has objective of extension other European countries. CSP Chairman Spaey (Belgium) followed by underscoring current and future OECD efforts in creating conditions for success in development through science (education, research technology transfer). 3. Lead off speaker on gaps Rubinacci (Italy) pointed to need for effective European political economic social unity in order to have constructive competition and dialogue with US for balanced economic development. His proposals to ministerial meeting included international scientific and technical info system for industry needs, unification patent rules and technical standards, encouragement of research by US firms in Europe, technological forecasting studies, promotion research in large public sectors concerned with social economic goals. 4. Some 20 speakers including EC and Council of Europe observers praised and endorsed OECD work but focused little on CSP recommendations. Statements and follow-up discussion pushed by French, Belgian and Japanese reps focused largely on removal obstacles to technology transfer between US and other member countries. Issue took form of need for further work on non-tariff barriers, restrictive business practices, with extended discussion of patent licensing arrangements. 5. French Minister Schuman noting irreplaceable value OECD forum, and positive Hornig statement January US science policy review concerning availability technology, stated value of Kennedy negotiations put in doubt unless access to technology improved. He proposed OECD identify obstacles, set up negotiating machinery to facilitate transfer, particularly government patents, establishment code good business conduct. 6. Belgian PM Vanden Boeynants stressed value European technological community, enlarged EC, need for Europeans agree among themselves in order to negotiate with US. 7. Japanese Vice Minister Inoue as expected pushed for OECD work on international understanding aimed at removing restrictions on "basic" patent licenses which they say are common property of all mankind. 8. Hornig stated US anxious see expansion technological capabilities all OECD countries and US willingness to cooperate mutually beneficial reduction technology transfer barriers on specific issues. He endorsed analysis and recommendations in CSP report on gaps and noted US willingness exchange views on how multinational firms can most effectively complement national scientific and technological efforts. He clearly distinguished between actions US Government could take and those which lie within private sector. 9. Issue resolved by ministerial agreement member governments exchange views for improving condition technology transfer and negotiate as may be appropriate when specific problems identified. OECD requested establish inventory technology transfer obstacles especially field of patent licenses with view possible discussions and negotiations. Inventory to distinguish between patents subject control of government and those which are not. 10. This agreement, para 9 above, contained in recommendations attached to aide-mémoire to governments. Other modification in draft recommendations, ref annex to CMS (68)3, now refers to exchange of views on conditions which multinational companies, foreign owned companies and joint ventures could most effectively complement national scientific and technological effort including question maintaining research activities in countries where they operate plus original text of ref document. Second item under exchange of views shortened to say "the means for facilitating access to patents and scientific and technological information." Hornig stated US Government would like to make it absolutely clear that US not in position to negotiate terms or conditions patent licenses private sector, ministerial aide-mémoire to governments, DAS/SPR/68.12 (1st rev.), essentially same as US text put forward as Secretariat document and approved by CSP. 11. Short press release notes agreement, para 9 above. Proposed text noting economic political fragmentation of Europe presents obstacles requiring concerted action and concrete steps towards European scientific technological policy dropped on French objection. Belgium and Netherlands backed UK in wanting inclusion. 12. Message other aspects science ministerial will follow. Brown
17. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 2, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Donald F. Hornig, Box 6. Confidential. Drafted by Beckler. Attached is a final report of the interagency committee on the "technological gap" between the U.S. and Western Europe/2/ which you created in November 1966 under my chairmanship (NSAM 357). Your action was taken after the "gap" issue had been raised with you by several European leaders, e.g., Prime Ministers Wilson and Harmel and Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani. /2/Attachment A, not attached. The final technology gap committee report as distributed to posts is in circular airgram 8702, June 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, SCI 1-1 EURW-US) The committee report has the agreement of the participating agencies (State, Defense, Commerce, NASA, AEC, CEA). There are no major differences of view for you to resolve, and the agencies are prepared to undertake the follow-up actions. In brief, the report proposes that the U.S. Government continue to follow the "low-key" strategy recommended in our preliminary report a year ago. It concludes that there is little that the U.S. can or should do by way of major initiatives or direct assistance, since the only long-range "cure" lies in actions which must be taken by Europeans themselves. This strategy has already paid off handsomely. During the past year much of the mystique (and political and emotional heat) has gone out of the "gap", largely as the result of studies carried out in the OECD and NATO and in the European Communities. There is now widespread agreement among Europeans that the "gap" is principally a lag in the utilization of technological know-how due to a number of factors--education, management, markets, etc., as well as technology. This was evident at the OECD Ministers of Science meeting which I attended on March 11 and 12. European attention appears to be shifting from "gaps" to creating the conditions needed to relate technological developments to progress. While the committee report recognizes that the big steps needed to improve European industrial performance can only be taken in Europe, it urges that the U.S. make a positive response to European concerns--to deter the possible adoption of restrictive measures against American firms in Europe and to maximize the economic benefits to the U.S. from the transfer of technology. To implement the foregoing strategy, the report proposes a number of steps (Attachment A): --mutual reduction of non-tariff barriers to the flow of technology-intensive products; --improving the administration of our trade and financial controls on the flow of technology to Western Europe, and developing a better understanding among COCOM members of the technological issues involved in their controls; --a study by the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments to define the role of American direct investment in Western Europe in relation to U.S. economic and foreign policy goals; --developing international principles concerning the rights and responsibilities of foreign subsidiaries; --expanding Western European direct investments in the U.S.; --cooperating with Western European countries on government-financed development and procurement; --intensifying U.S./Western European educational exchange programs in selected areas, particularly industrial management; --promoting the exchange of scientific and technical information, international patent cooperation and the development of common commercial standards; --encouraging further U.S.-European technological cooperation on governmental programs of common interest such as pollution, transportation and urban problems. The Committee further recommends: (a) that the report be transmitted to our Ambassadors in Western Europe for comment and for advice regarding the desirability of public release of an edited version, and (b) that the report and recommendations be submitted to the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) for follow-up action. Accordingly, I recommend that you approve these two recommendations and that the agencies be informed that they may proceed along the lines agreed in the report. Donald F. Hornig/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Refer report and recommendations to the SIG for follow-up: /4/Neither option is checked, but see Document 18.
18. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/ Washington, June 13, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Senior Interdepartmental Group, Memos and Misc. [II], Box 60. Confidential. Drafted by Oswald H. Ganley (SCI) and cleared by William M. Kerrigan (E), William G. Barraclough (EUR/RPE), and Donald R. Lesh (U/SIG). The source text is Attachment A to a July 2 memorandum from Arthur Hartman to SIG members, informing them that after Presidential review, the report had been referred to the SIG and circulated to U.S. overseas missions in OECD countries for information. The memorandum also indicated that no immediate action was required. SUBJECT The attached report/2/ prepared by the Interdepartmental Committee on the Technological Gap chaired by Dr. Hornig was submitted to the President on December 22, 1967. The President has reviewed the report and, in line with its recommendations, has referred the report to the Senior Interdepartmental Group. /2/Not printed; footnote 2, Document 17. Studies undertaken by NATO, the OECD, the European Communities and various private organizations, and discussions between ourselves and European leaders during the past year have done much to clarify the economic and social factors involved in the Technological Gap, and have helped dissipate the political pressures which tended to dominate the early stages of the debate on this subject. The OECD Science Ministerial meeting, which was held March 11-12, 1968, constituted another major step in this progression. The most important results of this meeting, attended not only by science and education ministers, but also by some ministers of economics and industry, were: (1) a clear endorsement of the results of the OECD studies, which in most respects parallel the conclusions presented in the Report to the President; (2) a consensus that national and joint action on the part of Europeans will be required as the principal contribution to technological progress in Europe; (3) a general political relaxation and a turning away from a "blame the U.S." philosophy to a more realistic intra-European introspection. Evidence is thus at hand that the U.S. strategy first enunciated in the Preliminary Report to the President in January 1967, and further detailed in the final report of December 22, 1967, has been and is successful in dealing with the problems engendered by the Technological Gap. It is my view that most of the recommendations and tasks enumerated in Annex A/3/ are being pursued in an orderly fashion by appropriate government agencies. I am satisfied that the present efforts in these areas are sufficient to meet U.S. needs and see no need to inject a sense of urgency into the studies and actions now underway. I would suggest that studies underway be continued and remain principally directed at their original aims. Those items requiring additional comments are as follows: /3/Reference is to the attached report. 1. Since this report was written, the Commerce Technical Advisory Board has broadened its scope to include all relevant aspects of government and industrial policies affecting international transfer and use of technology. 2. In the case of the studies of the Cabinet Committee on the Balance of Payments and those underway in the Office of the President's Trade Representative, I propose bringing to the attention of the heads of these groups the report to the President and pertinent reports of the OECD in order that they can take note of some of the special problems inherent in research-intensive sectors of the economy. 3. The Department of Defense is urged in the report to assess the feasibility of reducing selectively the 50% bidding differential for foreign procurement of research-intensive products. DOD, DOT, NASA are asked to study the possibilities for more joint R&D, and promoting consortia between U.S. and European firms including the question of procurement programs. In light of our present Balance of Payments difficulties, it does not seem desirable to pursue either goal at this time. A study, viewing the situation in the long term, may, however, be profitable. 4. Under present budgetary restrictions it does not seem practical to ask the Congress for monies to increase US-Western European educational exchange programs. 5. Intensive and continuous efforts are being made to improve overall scientific and technical cooperation with Western Europe and Japan. The matter of scientific and technical information exchanges is being vigorously and urgently pursued in special committees of the OECD and UNESCO/ICSU. The report is being transmitted to our Ambassadors in OECD countries and they have been asked to comment on the desirability of publishing an edited version of the report. As far as any other publicity is concerned, it is my recommendation that for the present it be kept to a minimum.
19. Airgram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State/1/ CEDTO A-897 Paris, July 15, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, SCI 1-1 EURW-US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Lester E. Edmunds, cleared by Philip R. Cook, and approved by Ambassador Trezise. SUBJECT REF /2/Not printed. (Ibid.) The report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Technological Gap makes a significant contribution to the understanding of the subject. This Mission is in complete accord with the conclusion that the technological gap is only to a very limited degree a question of technological leads and lags. It clearly was the presence of political, psychological and economic considerations that enhanced the danger that the gap might develop into a divisive force of considerable importance in our relations with Western Europe. Due in large measure to United States willingness to cooperate in investigating the causes and effects of the gap in the OECD and NATO, and as a result of the educational process that also took place, much of the sensitivity surrounding the issue has been removed. It is apparent that the subject no longer arouses the strong emotions that it did, as recently as a year ago. The Mission, therefore, believes there would be little advantage in making public an appropriately edited version of the report at this time. Issuance of an official high-level report on the gap, even in a heavily edited version, might only serve to bring the issue once again to the forefront of the political arena, and we believe it best that it remains quiescent. Trezise
20. Airgram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/ A-2504 Paris, August 5, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, SCI 1-1 EURW-US. Confidential; Noforn; Priority. Drafted by Edgar L. Piret and Harding W. Ballough (SCI) on July 30; cleared by Jack R. Perry (POL), Robert J. Morris (ECON), the Minister, and Ambassador Shriver; and approved by Piret. SUBJECT REF /2/See footnote 2, Document 19. Dr. Hornig's final report to the President is an excellent study of the problems which comprise the Technological Gap issue. It is particularly valuable in that it analyses the Gap in terms of a very broad variety of inter-related problems some of which, heretofore, have been approached largely on a piecemeal, sector-by-sector basis. A substantial number of the points brought out in the report were very effectively presented by Dr. Hornig and members of his delegations during the several major OECD science policy meetings of the past three years. As a direct result, many French government and industrial leaders were brought to a more realistic understanding of the nature of the problems and the fact that their resolution (or amelioration) cannot be dependent upon some form of American largesse but, at base, must be approached in terms of structural reforms to be carried out by the Europeans themselves. This broadening awareness has certainly played a large part in vitiating the shrill and relatively uninformed political outcry which characterized initial European approaches to the Technological Gap issue. However, with the subsidence of that initial round of European agitation on the Gap issue, it has become all too easy for us to lose sight of a basic fact--the problem in Europe remains. Many of the underlying causes of the Technological Gap (inflexible and outmoded educational system and managerial practices, lack of innovative climate, severely limited mobility of highly trained personnel, etc.) were among the very factors which led to the May-June upheavals in French universities, government laboratories and high technology industries. These demonstrations cogently pointed up the magnitude and severity of the unresolved problems facing France in these and other areas. Protracted and searching confrontations and discussions during and since the May-June events have brought to surface and underscored the formidable difficulties the French face in their attempts to determine and successfully implement fundamental reforms which can meet their problems. Although some intensive efforts are underway within the French Government to devise new and effective reforms, the prospect of significant near-term successes appears, at best, highly doubtful. There is, in fact, a distinct possibility that failure to achieve timely results in line with expectations could bring the government under renewed pressures. Since some French leaders might then find it difficult to resist a search for scapegoats, a new wave of Technological Gap agitation could result with the United States again cast as the villain of the piece. Such a prospect was foreshadowed only a few days ago when M. Lattes, Managing Director of METRA, the largest French computer service organization operating under "Plan Calcul," expressed the firm belief that the Gap is going to increase rapidly during the next ten years and will become a major divisive force separating the United States and Europe. Lattès, who is active in top advisory committees of the Plan Calcul, DGRST/3/ and IRIA,/4/ displayed very strong feelings on the Gap and spoke of it in highly emotional terms. In another recent conversation, M. Wacrenier, a senior member of the DGRST, pointed out that, on conclusion of the present crash efforts to meet the more immediate crisis problems, he believed that the Technological Gap question could quite possibly receive fresh emphasis. /3/Delegation General Recherche a la Scientifique et Technique. [Footnote in the source text.] /4/Institut de la Recherche d'Informatique Appliquees. [Footnote in the source text.] Foreign Minister Debré himself, at his first Foreign Ministry staff meeting only a few days ago, demonstrated anew his deep concern regarding the presence and role of U.S. industrial firms in Europe. According to Quai Director of American Affairs Jurgensen, after identifying "Le Defi Americain" as one of the principal "dangers" confronting France, Debré went on to expound at length on the Servan-Schreiber economic and financial theme that U.S. industry in Europe constitutes the threat to European independence. (See Embtel 18383, July 23, 1968.)/5/ /5/Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, FN 9 FR-US) Dr. Hornig's report is a national policy paper cast largely in terms of U.S. interests. Consequently, we feel that it would not be suitable in its present form for open publication or presentation to French officials. However, the French Government's intensive search for solutions has created an atmosphere of potential interest among French leaders in constructive analyses of just this nature. These leaders, some of whom only recently came to their jobs with the new government, thus constitute something of a ready-made audience. We believe that this affords an opportunity to employ to advantage the background study on Gap now in preparation in the Department of Commerce. Assuming that it covers--and may expand upon--those elements of the Hornig report which describe and analyze causes of the European lag in utilization of technological know-how, we recommend that it be completed on a timely basis and made available to the Embassy for selective presentation to key French government and industrial leaders. As an objective, analytical background study, that paper could be given a serious and appreciative reception within the French Government. Since the appearance of an American Hornig report is anticipated with widespread interest in France, association of Dr. Hornig's name with the study--perhaps through a brief, signed introduction or in some other manner--would certainly further enhance the authority and effectiveness of the paper. Shriver/6/ /6/Initialed for Shriver by Piret. [Continue with the next documents]
|
