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30. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (Welsh) to Vice President Humphrey/1/ Washington, March 1, 1965. /1/Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, Outer Space General Files, 1964-April 1967, 150.F.9.10 (F). No classification marking. No official minutes of the Space Council meetings were kept. According to a later Humphrey staff memorandum: "The Executive Secretary has been approached by the staff regarding the preparation of a record of action memorandum signed by the Chairman to be sent to the Council members following the meetings. The Executive Secretary is opposed on the basis that the meeting results are privileged material. At present, interested individuals from the participating Agencies are briefed on the meeting results at their request on an ad hoc basis by the Executive Secretary." The result was that each agency had its own interpretation of the taken decisions which could lead to confusion: "In instances where the participating Agency may be lukewarm about the Council findings the net result can be inaction." ("Suggestions for Improving the Effectiveness of the Space Council," May 3, 1966; ibid.) SUBJECT It would probably be well if you called a Council meeting in the relatively near future./2/ There is a tendency on the part of some, both in and out of the Government, to measure the Vice President's interest in space by the frequency of the Council meetings./3/ I believe that to be unfair as meetings should not be called just for the sake of having them. However, an occasional meeting is clearly warranted. /2/In early December 1964, Secretary Rusk agreed to request a meeting of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC) once Vice President Humphrey assumed the chair to review the overall U.S. effort in space (see Document 28). Rusk charged the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (SCI) to work with the NASC to arrange a meeting. /3/Humphrey had begun preparatory work for his new position as Chairman of the Space Council, scheduling meetings with Glenn Seaborg of the AEC and Brockway McMillan of the Air Force. (Memorandum from Norman Sherman to Humphrey, March 5; Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, Outer Space General Files, 1964-April 1967) The procedure to date has been for there to be a discussion as to a subject or subjects for the meeting; to decide upon a convenient day and time; and then to have me call the members and advise them of the meeting. I follow that up with a written notice as soon as the time has been made firm. You may have a subject or subjects in mind. If not, possible items for joint consideration are: (1) Status and plans for the DOD's Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL); (2) Action if Congress should restore funds for SNAP 8, the 260 solid engine, or the M-1 liquid engine; (3) Review of the Soviet space program; (4) Status of the Supersonic Transport program;/4/ (5) International aspects of the space program, including a report on U.N. activities./5/ /4/"Checked--never occurred" has been noted by hand at the bottom of the page with a line drawn to this item. /5/On March 22 SCI's Acting Director, Herman Pollack, submitted to Rostow for comment a draft request to the Vice President to hold a meeting. Rostow's response and a copy of the draft memorandum are attached to a March 24 memorandum from Rostow to Pollack. (Department of State, S/PC Files: Lot C, Scientific and Technological Development, 1965) On April 8 Welsh sent notification to participants that the meeting would be held on April 13, and that the Vice President "has indicated that he wishes a discussion of the international aspects of the space program." (Memorandum from Welsh to Rusk, April 8; Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, Outer Space General Files, 1964-April 1967) At the meeting, the Vice President circulated a series of questions to which he requested responses from Rusk, McNamara, Webb, and Seaborg. In cases like item (4) above, for example, my recommendation would be to bring Halaby of FAA into the meeting. I would like to discuss this subject with you at your convenience. E.C. Welsh
31. Editorial Note On March 19, 1965, Vice President Humphrey gave his first major speech on space policy at a dinner honoring Robert Goddard, father of the modern space program. Humphrey set out his vision for America's space program and placed it in the context of the administration's goals. "Let me assure you that the Great Society envisioned by President Lyndon Johnson is not one limited to the fight against poverty, ignorance, disease, and intolerance," he said. "The Great Society requires, in addition, an urgent quest for excellence, for intellectual attainment, for crossing new frontiers in science and technology. Let me emphasize that an adequately funded, well-directed space program is an integral part of our nation's commitment to its future, to its greatness." Humphrey argued that the nation's "strong and prosperous" economy would permit the government to simultaneously address domestic problems while exploring space: "We can put a man on the moon at the same time as we help to put a man on his feet." He also reminded the audience that the Soviet Union was enjoying great success in its space program. "Our national security alone would suggest reason enough for us to strive for absolute leadership in space exploration," he said. "Every time we pause, we have had a shock from the Soviet efforts in space," Humphrey explained, citing the first successful space walk completed by a cosmonaut the previous day. The text of the Vice President's speech is in the Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, 1965-68. On April 13, in his first appearance as Chairman of the Space Council, Humphrey expanded on these themes: "I see benefits flowing from the space program in the furtherance of international cooperation and in laying the groundwork for the creation of world peace. It is my belief that the total of these benefits will greatly exceed our total investment in the entire program. Our activities in space and in aeronautics are important parts of President Johnson's Great Society." "I am convinced," he emphasized, "that international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space is a cornerstone of United States policy." The text of Humphrey's speech is ibid., Outer Space General Files, 1964-April 1967.
32. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, April 26, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, SP 1 US. Confidential. Department of State Responses to Questions Raised by the Vice President after the Meeting of the National Aeronautics and Space Council on April 13, 1965/2/ /2/A State Department record of the NASC discussion is in a memorandum from Pollack to Secretary Rusk, April 14. (Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 152, SP 1 NASC 1965) Another perspective on the meeting is in an April 14 memorandum for the files by Humphrey's aide Norman Sherman. (Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, Outer Space General Files, 1964-April 1967) In a separate memorandum for the files dated the same day, Sherman reported on a clash between the Vice President and NASA Chief James Webb: "The Vice President had indicated that we should make the maximum propaganda use of our space activities. He felt that many things could be done which were not being done to involve the interest of peoples around the world. He cited Latin America as one area particularly where more could be done. Webb objected rather strenuously to some aspects of what the Vice President had to say. It was my judgment that Webb responded not to the details of what was offered but to other factors. He indicated that no President had ever told him to use the space program in a propaganda way. The Vice President clearly responded that this was not his intent. It was only after something was done that we should maximize its international impact." (Ibid.) 1. What have overseas public opinion polls shown regarding the relative standing of the United States and the Soviet Union in space activities? Have you any suggestions for improving this standing? The latest world-wide opinion survey conducted by USIA early in 1964 in nineteen countries and major cities indicated that, by large margins, the public abroad believes that the USSR is ahead of the U.S. in space activities and, perhaps by association, in nuclear strength and general scientific development. Only in Ankara was there a majority favoring U.S. superiority. Opinions were close in West Germany, Austria, Manila and Bangkok. In the U.K. measurements of public opinion have been taken frequently over a considerable period of time so as to reflect the variations caused by specific space events. A nationwide public opinion survey taken in the U.K. following the Ranger VII moon shot in July, 1964 showed an improvement in the relative U.S. position. Later, however, on the heels of the Soviet orbiting of the three-man VOSKHOD-1 in October, 1964 British public opinion favored a Soviet lead in space by nearly four to one. The most recent survey, conducted immediately following the Soviet VOSKHOD-2 flight and the U.S. Gemini manned flight in March of this year, suggests that this sequence of space events benefited the Soviets./3/ /3/In a March 19 memorandum for Rusk reporting on VOSKHOD II, Pollack wrote: "This Soviet flight, clearly well in advance of our own program, underlines our growing concern as to the relative impact abroad of U.S. and Soviet space activities over the next few years." (Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 152, SP 11, Research and Development, USSR, 1965) In the short term (between now and 1970) we must anticipate that the Soviets will succeed in confronting us with additional space "coups" and that the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution (1967) will likely see special efforts in this regard. During this period we should attempt to anticipate these Soviet events with a view to softening their impact--particularly any public misreading or exaggeration of military implications--and maximizing the impact of our own successes. An improvement in the image abroad of our space program relative to that of the Soviets requires first and foremost successful completion of the space flight programs to which the U.S. is already committed publicly. From the reactions abroad thus far it is quite clear that there can be no substitute for successful flight programs. In addition, such an improvement will require an enlarged public relations program and extension of the NASA international cooperative program. a. Thus far our public relations program has been modest. Although such a program cannot substitute for successful space accomplishments, it can emphasize the openness, breadth and purposes of our space program. It should be possible at a reasonable additional expenditure to expand our public relations program through more active NASA participation in events abroad such as the Paris Air Show, extension of the NASA exhibits and spacemobile programs sponsored abroad by the USIA, expansion of the NASA lecture program sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences and carefully arranged appearances abroad of U.S. astronauts. b. An active and expanding cooperative program, in addition to serving useful operations and foreign relations purposes, increases foreign identification with our space program and acquires for us the advantages of favorable foreign publicity whose credibility and effect may considerably outweigh our own. c. Obviously neither of these programs should be expanded at the expense of U.S. flight programs to which we are already committed publicly. [Here follow questions 2-7. The questions were: 2) What should be done to enhance international cooperation with friendly countries in the space effort?; 3) What, if anything, should be done to increase cooperation with the Soviet Union in the space effort?; 4) What have West European space organizations, such as ESRO and ELDO, done to increase cooperation with the United States?; 5) What has the United States policy been regarding the release of information about our space program and about the Soviet space activities? What should be done to improve or clarify this policy?; 6) How effective have NASA exhibits been in increasing understanding of our space program abroad? What are the plans for improving this part of the program?; and 7) What should be done to improve foreign understanding of the nature of our military space proposals?] 8. What space programs should be emphasized in our current planning so that the United States does attain and maintain a world leadership position in the future? Our paramount concern is for the successful completion of the programs to which we are publicly committed. In addition, from the viewpoint of U.S. foreign policy objectives in the long run, it appears essential that we maintain an effort in advanced research and development sufficient to enable us to take advantage of important opportunities in the future which will be beyond the present state of the art and may affect our national security and international posture. This would appear to be particularly true in the case of those advanced technologies required for space propulsion and interplanetary missions in the period following the initial manned exploration of the moon and unmanned exploration of the nearby planets. It is also important that we take advantage of all significant opportunities to extend the development and use of practical applications of space technology which can engage the effective participation of other countries and from which other countries can derive direct benefit, e.g.: communications satellites, meteorological satellites and broadcast satellites. Bearing in mind the requirements of our national security and our international posture, it is in these latter areas (advanced capabilities and maximum early development of practical applications) that we urge the members of the Space Council to give particular consideration to the long-range aspects of the space program.
33. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, July 29, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 152, SP 1-1 USSR 1965. Unclassified. Drafted by M.F. Smith (SCI). A notation on the source text indicates that the Secretary saw the memorandum. SUBJECT NASA and the West German Ministry for Scientific Research announced agreement last week on a joint outer space project which it is hoped will culminate in 1968 with the launching by the U.S. of a German-built satellite to investigate the earth's radiation belts and solar proton phenomena. This is the first significant bilateral cooperative space project with West Germany and is, in fact, the first major project undertaken by the Germans as a national space activity. NASA has already carried out cooperative satellite projects with the U.K. (Ariel I, 1962; Ariel II, 1964); with Canada (Alouette, 1962); and with Italy (San Marco, 1964). Additional projects involving foreign satellites are scheduled over the next two years: one with France (late 1965) at least two with Canada (1965 and 1967), another with Italy (1966 or 1967), a third with the U.K. (1967), and two with the European Space Research Organization (both in 1967).
34. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, August 26, 1965, 7:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, SP 10 US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by William H. Edgar (EUR/SOV) on August 25 and cleared in draft by Martin Rosenberg (FE), Peter T. Higgins (AF), Peter D. Constable (NEA), Margaret E. Beshore (ARA), James B. Freeman (P), and James W. Milner (SCI). Cleared in substance by David H. Henry (SOV), Llewellyn Thompson (S/AL), Richard M. Moose (S/SO), Thomas W. Wilson (IO), and Bromley Smith (White House); and approved by Richard H. Davis (EUR). 301. President announced August 25 that NASA Administrator Webb will invite Soviet Academy of Sciences to send "a very high level representative" to observe launching Gemini VI (October). President explained we "continue to hold out to all nations including the Soviet Union the hand of cooperation in the exciting years of space exploration which lie ahead for all of us."/2/ /2/For text of the President's announcement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 917-927. The text of the invitation is in a letter from Webb to Keldysh, August 26. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Cooperation in Space, US-USSR #2, Box 14) This invitation is part of continuing US efforts seek ways to improve relations with USSR where possible. Presence Soviet scientist at Gemini VI launch would dramatize public, open nature of our space program. Hopefully it would lead to further moves toward US-Soviet cooperation this field. It should be noted invitation extended without condition of reciprocity. Invitation tangible step toward declared US goal of international cooperation in peaceful exploration outer space. This goal set before launching of first US manned orbital flight. In January 1961 State of Union message, President Kennedy invited all nations including USSR join with us in preparation for probes outer space. In reply to Khrushchev's congratulations for John Glenn flight February 1962, Kennedy stated he welcomed and shared Khrushchev's statement that US and USSR should cooperate in space exploration, and in subsequent letter made specific proposals. US-USSR agreement signed December 1962 providing for space cooperation in fields of meteorology, geomagnetic survey and a passive communications satellite. In his State of Union message January 1964, President Johnson urged peaceful exploration outer space "in cooperation with other powers if possible." In phone conversation with orbiting astronauts McDivitt and White June 1965 President said: "We can pray that time will come when all men of all nations will join together to explore space together, and walk side-by-side toward peace." Above may be drawn upon in discussions with foreign officials and press representatives. Rusk
35. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/ Moscow, September 8, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, SP 1-1 US-USSR. Limited Official Use; Priority. No time of transmission appears on the source text; the telegram was received at 9:51 a.m. 746. Embtel 606./2/ Following is translation of Keldysh reply to Webb handed today to Embassy officer by Oberemko, Deputy Chief, USA section at MFA: /2/Dated August 27, 1965. (Ibid., SP 10 US) Begin Verbatim Text. "Dear Mr. Webb, I received your letter of August 27. The Academy of Sciences of the USSR is grateful for the invitation transmitted on behalf of the President of the United States, to send its representative to Cape Kennedy to observe the launching of the American spaceship 'Gemini 6.' Soviet scientists positively evaluate cooperation between our countries in the study of cosmic space for purposes of its peaceful use. However, at the present time our representative cannot avail himself of your invitation. Availing myself of the opportunity, I would like on behalf of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR to congratulate you, the Cosmonauts G. Cooper and C. Conrad and also the scientists and engineers who took part in the preparation and execution of the flight of the spaceship 'Gemini 5.' Respectfully, M. Keldysh, President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR." Kohler
36. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State/1/ Paris, December 23, 1965, 1940Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, SP 1-1 EUR-US. Confidential. Repeated to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and NASA for Webb. 3605. NATUS. 1. The President's initiative re outer space cooperation during Erhard visit came at most propitious moment./2/ /2/The text of the December 21 Erhard-Johnson communiqué is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 458-459 and 497-498. The text of President Johnson's toast concerning space is in telegram 2925 to Paris, December 29. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, SP 1-1 EUR-US) See also Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 1161-1167. 2. Long-standing European interest in space activities both as human adventure and as new frontier for industry and science has culminated in recent weeks in acute European sense of participation in Gemini rendezvous and recovery. Sec will recall unprecedented spontaneous applause when Brosio congratulated U.S. during NATO Ministerial meeting./3/ Whatever wariness may be evident in coming months, due to understandable skepticism as to what may be possible between partners as disparate as U.S. and individual European countries in space field, I am certain visit of Presidential commission, which newspapers here report Jim Webb is to head, will be looked forward to with keen anticipation. /3/Manlio Brosio, Secretary General of NATO, spoke at the 36th North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting in Paris December 14-16. 3. As a starter we have a few immediate comments to throw in the hopper. 4. Thoughtful Europeans have become increasingly concerned about the technological gap between the U.S. and its allies as a result of our commanding lead in nuclear, space and related industries, and especially by the prospect that as things are going this gap will continue to widen at an accelerating rate. It seems to us that the U.S. might well share some of that concern for a number of reasons not the least of them being that we would not wish to reach the point where Europe's only chance of studying in the technological game would lie in partnership with Moscow. Gaullists are already talking up this option. 5. The President's initiative could go a long way toward beginning to deal with this gap. Symbolically the Atlantic umbrella is far preferable to a stepped-up series of NASA bilaterals. Impressive though bilaterals are when taken together, their political meaning is either that others are helping U.S. prosecute an American program; or that U.S. is boosting national packages of others; they are correctly not regarded as evidence of U.S. willingness to develop technology jointly with others. Also, they tend to foster nationalistic competition among the European countries cooperating with us, which is contrary to general U.S. policy in Europe. 6. If we are indeed to begin Atlanticizing some aspects of NASA's program, we should not bring Europeans in as last minute passengers on a journey which we have already thought through and under way but should offer them the opportunity to join with us in planning and carrying out new ventures. This has the added advantage of offering to share the more sophisticated future stages and obviates any suspicion that we are offering last season's technology. The suggestion of a Jupiter probe or exploration of sun fits this way of proceeding. 7. But there must also be projects of earlier maturity and even greater popular and industrial appeal which might merit consideration. Particularly attractive is manned lunar exploration. Putting the first men on the moon is a U.S. project with such momentum that it clearly does not offer real prospects for internationalization. But surely lunar exploration thereafter will be a long-term and broad program to which other countries could contribute--and participating in U.S. program on cooperative basis is one chance other countries can have for sharing this experience. Surely it is politically right to offer our friends a chance, through cooperation with us, to reach the moon--and not reserve that achievement of a dream as old as mankind for Americans and Russians alone. 8. As for organizational sponsorship we are, frankly, of two minds. (A) In principle there is much to be said for a defense organization such as NATO, having succeeded in creating a credible military deterrent, then demonstrating that it can go on to logical next steps such as arms control, working toward détente by working at political solutions of underlying problems, and pursuing cooperative scientific and technical projects both in defense and in outer space. This would, or should, gradually revise the image of NATO from that of a supposedly military organization to that of a multipurpose Atlantic institution. (B) On the other hand, the prevailing image might serve to muddy the peaceful purposes of a cooperative outer space program, and to mount the venture under NATO might serve to keep it more exclusive than, in the long run, we might want it to be--by keeping out neutrals like Sweden and non-Europeans like Japan or Brazil. There are also existing European space organizations (ESRO and ELDO) to take into account, if their missions and membership and capabilities match what needs to be done. (C) At outset we lean to an open ended functional organization for which the initial motive power is provided by a small group of Atlantic countries. Believe small group of NATO countries without NATO label could get a cooperative project off the ground, and decide in early discussions what political umbrella (Atlantic or UN or ad hoc) best suits the projects selected as a beginning. 9. In any event, leadership of the commission by person of Webb's stature is indispensable in following up President's suggestion. Europeans will want to speak to someone with authority rather than merely with someone sent to sound out their interests--which will necessarily be uncertain and ill-defined in field where we know so much and they know so little. 10. We hope that at appropriate point, if as newspapers indicate Webb is projecting a trip to Europe, he could meet with North Atlantic Council to review with PermReps of our NATO allies perspectives for future outer space exploration and for common efforts among interested countries. Assuming--as we have every reason to assume--that a number of European countries will be interested in cooperation, the right organizational arrangements can then be devised to fit the breadth of participation that organizing group thinks desirable. 11. But the first step is not to decide how global the proposed program should be, but to find and energize the two or three or four governments with the scientific capacity, the industrial interest, and the political self-confidence to respond to the President's initiative in the spirit that prompted it. The most likely prospects are of course our allies in NATO. Germany (to whose Chancellor this was first extended) is of course an obvious candidate for the short list of enterprising governments. Some useful groundwork can be laid here, even before visit to Europe by a Washington mission. 12. Would appreciate guidance as to whether to begin informally talking up Presidential initiative and need for European response, with representatives of NATO countries here (presumably in parallel with discussions by Embassies in selected capitals), along lines this cable. Meanwhile, would be helpful have full text President's remarks to Erhard this subject and any relevant background material. Cleveland
37. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/ Paris, December 28, 1965, 1630Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, SP 1-1 EUR-US. Confidential. Passed to NASA for Webb on December 28. 3636. Ref: NATUS 3605./2/ /2/Document 36. 1. Embassy sounding French reaction to President Johnson's proposals for space collaboration and will submit assessment of probable French reaction and implications for US-French relations. Meanwhile: following are some initial views, particularly regarding relationship of Franco-Soviet space cooperation. 2. Embassy would agree that there is an element of psychological threat to US and Atlantic concept in both current and potential France-Soviet space cooperation. However, we believe that even Gaullists are not at present seriously considering extensive partnership with Moscow as alternative to present arrangement and prospect of greater cooperation with US (paragraph 4 reftel). 3. French consider US generally ahead of USSR in overall space technology and thus are concerned about maintaining and extending cooperation with US. Soundings made by Embassy during recent Franco-Soviet space talks tend confirm that French aware that talking up the Moscow option may not be compatible with developing space cooperation with US. 4. French also aware that Soviets unlikely to share technology in areas having military implications. This emerged clearly from such information Embassy was able to obtain on Franco-Soviet space talks in October. 5. In short, while de Gaulle may in future make gestures to the East--and ones which are more damaging to Western solidarity than those undertaken in past--we believe institution connections (both governmental and commercial) will limit French freedom in exploiting Moscow option in field of space technology. McBride
38. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/ Paris, December 30, 1965, 1910Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, SP 1-1 EUR-US. Confidential. Also sent to London, The Hague, Bonn, Rome, Brussels for USEC, Stockholm, Bern, Vienna, Madrid, and Luxembourg. 3682. Ref: NATUS 3605, Dec 23, 1965; Embtel 3636, Dec 28, 1965;/2/ Deptel to Paris 2893, Dec 28, 1965./3/ Subject: Possible US-European Space Cooperation. /2/Documents 36 and 37. /3/Dated December 28. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, POL GERW-US) 1. Erhard communiqué has stimulated French speculation on significance and implications of proposal for international space cooperation. Embassy plans probe present thinking both of French space people and of Paris-based European space research experts on possible useful US-European multilateral space research projects. Following interim comments refer to organizational aspects. 2. As Department aware, only viable international space research organization in existence in Europe is the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) which has survived a difficult birth to become an effective basis for a collective European space effort in the face of advanced US and Soviet space technology. We assume any multilateral program of US-European space research cooperation would have to take account of this institutional framework. 3. ESRO constitutes the only space program of most if its members, and it enjoys their strong support, without exception. It enjoys the additional advantage of having no military connection, involvement, or image. Moreover, ESRO has succeeded in surmounting such difficult organizational problems as the apportionment among its members of ESRO research laboratories and test sites and has reached agreement on the distribution of contracts among the industries of its members. 4. ESRO therefore is a natural candidate as an institutional framework through which multilateral international space research cooperation could take place. Although sometimes criticized for establishing unrealistically ambitious goals in terms of its present technical and financial capabilities, such a phase of development is to be expected in the evolution of any new space program, and the US has had a similar experience. 5. Since ESRO is a European endeavor with no direct US participation (although US is already engaged in cooperation with ESRO), it provides a framework within which European countries could work collectively with US on partnership basis; this might be preferable to arrangement in which one member (US) of a multilateral organization held such a dominant role as to discourage effective participation by other. 6. We would add that because initiative by French professor Pierre Auger, Director of ESRO since its creation, has played very important role in organization's formation, suggestions of extra-ESRO organizations as cooperative instrumentalities for international space research are likely to meet unfavorable reception from French as well as from other Europeans. In particular, NATO possibility discussed in NATUS 3605 suffers drawbacks of military image, exclusion of several members of ESRO (European members), and probable opposition of French who are strong ESRO supporters and whose views on NATO are well known. In addition, absence of space research capability makes NATO less suitable vehicle for such a program and encourages speculation that in so proposing it, the US would be using the appeal of space cooperation as an artificial mechanism with which to bolster NATO. 7. Relevant to the above, we note that Arnold Frutkin, in his book International Cooperation in Space comments on past suggestions that a cooperative space program be based on NATO, OECD or another existing body, as follows: "Of primary concern is the fact that the European Community has itself selected the machinery through which it wishes to conduct civil space research and exploration, namely ESRO and ELDO. In the face of this fact, advocacy of an alternate base for cooperation, however commendable in itself, could be viewed only as inimical to the express choice of the European nations."/4/ /4/Arnold Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1965). McBride
39. Letter From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to the Assistant Administrator for International Affairs, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Frutkin)/1/ Washington, February 9, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383. Confidential. Drafted by Trevanion H.E. Nesbitt (SCI) on February 8 and cleared by Leroy F. Percival (EUR/RPE) in draft. Dear Mr. Frutkin: The following reaffirms our agreed understanding as to the guidelines which govern the joint NASA-State, pre-Webb commission advance team which will visit Bonn and other capitals in Europe during the next two weeks to engage in discussions on possibilities for joint exploration of space./2/ /2/During February 14-25 a NASA-State Department advance team visited Bonn, London, The Hague, Paris, and Rome. As you will recall President Johnson, in his meeting with Chancellor Erhard on December 20, 1965, in a toast, made the following proposal concerning space cooperation: "Only last summer, our two governments worked out an agreement whereby we would launch a German-built satellite to probe the inner radiation belts. Now, we would like to discuss with you--and with others--an even more ambitious plan to permit us to do together what we cannot do so well alone. Examples would be two projects which stand high on the space agenda. Both are very demanding and both are quite complex. One would be a probe to the sun, and another a probe to Jupiter. To cooperate on such a major endeavor would contribute vastly to our mutual knowledge and to our mutual skills. So, I propose, early in the year, to send a commission--headed by our able Administrator of NASA, James Webb--to consult with you and other governments of Europe wishing to participate in a joint exploration of space." The communiqué following German Chancellor Erhard's visit to the President in December, 1965, contained the following offer of cooperation in space: "The President and the Chancellor voiced mutual satisfaction at the arrangements worked out, and already successfully under way, between the United States Space Agency and the German Ministry of Scientific Research for a joint project to launch a German-built satellite to probe the inner radiation belts. The President suggested several other possible cooperative projects, including a probe to the sun and a probe to Jupiter. He also indicated his intention to send a commission to Europe early in 1966 to consult with the German Government and other European Governments which wish to join in the cooperative exploration of space."/3/ /3/See footnote 2, Document 36. The President's proposal and the team's mission are to be represented as an American response to the frequently-stated European desire for greater participation in the development of space technology. The President is desirous of accommodating this desire and has therefore suggested certain opportunities which may be taken up by the European nations if they are, in fact, sufficiently interested. These opportunities can and should be formulated in terms consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives and NASA's cooperative program. This means that the United States is willing to cooperate in identifiable, essentially non-duplicating, advanced projects of mutual interest in the mainstream of space exploration. The significant difference is that the examples cited by the President in his suggestion to Chancellor Erhard make clear his readiness to consider cooperative projects of considerably greater magnitude and more far-reaching technological implications than anything proposed heretofore. The President's specific suggestions of Jupiter or solar probes are to be understood only as examples indicating (a) the extent to which the United States is prepared to go in cooperation with European nations, and (b) types of projects which can afford a wide exercise in space technology. The precise levels of cost and difficulty which Europe may be prepared to face are entirely for Europe to decide. It is possible to modify the division of responsibilities in such advanced projects so that certain spacecraft elements would be contributed by the U.S. to lighten the load on Europe. It is also possible to define useful projects of lesser cost and difficulty which yet can contribute toward the advanced projects suggested by the President. NASA is prepared to discuss projects at either the advanced or intermediate levels and to hear from interested European authorities ideas of their own which are subject to formulation within the existing guidelines. While Europe must determine its own interest in these prospects, and the United States does not mean to pursue the matter in the absence of such interest, we are nevertheless prepared to explain our own concept of the values, in the near and distant term, which we attach to our own heavy investment in space technology. We are prepared to do this in the thought that our own experience and our own expectations may be of some use to European authorities in determining where their best interests lie. (These values are to be stated in terms of the contribution major advanced technological exercises can make to the partnership of government, university, and industry, to the development of critical management capabilities, to economic security, and to common political objectives of institution-building and western cohesion.) Discussion of the foregoing benefits should establish a basis for pointing out the possible growth implications of a successful collaboration of the kind envisaged by the President. Collaboration in space technology in associating its technical capability with other technology in the future could lead to the development of other broader, political economic and technical interests. Reverting to the specific project formulations which are possible, the President's suggestion is premised on the following conceptual framework. It is possible to define spacecraft whose development would afford a very wide exercise in space technology and whose use would fit into on-going space exploration programs. The European community might undertake responsibility for the preparation of such spacecraft while the U.S. would undertake their launching and, to the extent required, tracking and data acquisition. Tracking and data acquisition by ESRO or its members to the extent they can meet the requirement is not precluded. European recourse to American experience and competence would be available essentially through two channels: (a) a joint working group at the project level, and (b) commercial ties which may arise between European and American firms, with export arrangements facilitated by the United States. Effective precedents and patterns for the functioning of both channels are well established. The conceptual framework should serve (a) to accommodate most alternative project proposals which may be suggested either by NASA or the Europeans, and (b) to direct discussion toward spacecraft responsibilities for Europe rather than delivery vehicle-related responsibilities. The U.S. preference is that any cooperative undertaking should be multilateral in character while allowing scope for West German leadership. (Expanded bilateral cooperation with European countries can go forward as appropriate.) Indeed, German initiative may be useful in motivating the participation of other countries./4/ The utilization of ESRO in such a multilateral undertaking is considered to have political and technical advantages. Even if all members of ESRO would not wish to participate, it remains desirable to explore the use of ESRO as a mechanism for those members who are more positive. An ESRO/NASA memorandum of understanding confirmed by exchanges of notes among all the participating governments, would be a suitable format for agreement. In a major sense, however, the choice of mechanism for implementation would have to be made by the participating European governments. /4/As Humphrey wrote: "I think it especially important that our new program with the German Federal Republic, which might well set a pattern for other programs of peaceful Atlantic cooperation, should be undertaken on a multilateral basis. I should think our German friends would not only agree, but would welcome this opportunity for positive and constructive leadership within Europe." (Letters from Humphrey to Webb and to John Leddy, both January 10; both Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, Outer Space General Files, 1964-April 1967) The team should keep in mind that policy considerations make it desirable for the Japanese to have a full opportunity to cooperate in a comparable space venture. Therefore, as appropriate, the team should explore European interest in the possible association of Japan with whatever undertaking they initiate. The team should attempt to determine, in appropriate ways, the reaction of the governments contacted, their notions of their future courses of action, and the next suitable steps, including the timing of a visit by Mr. Webb and the commission./5/ /5/The team concluded that no firm decision could be taken before mid-April, after talks with British and French officials and tentative meetings of ESRO and ELDO. (Memorandum from Frutkin to Webb, March 22; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Files of the Office of International Affairs) NASA officials continued to monitor European opinion, according to a memorandum from Frutkin to Webb, April 4. (Ibid.) In addition, I urge that every consideration possible be given to requests for visits, beyond the presently planned itinerary, to other countries which may desire a visit by the team. I wish you and your colleagues every success in this mission which is both scientifically and politically important. Sincerely yours, Herman Pollack/6/ /6/Printed from a copy that indicates Pollack signed the original. [Continue with the next documents]
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