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70. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ Washington, July 10, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications System, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. 1 [1 of 2]. No classification marking. SUBJECT This confirms information which has been conveyed to you informally concerning a meeting of interested Government departments to consider the subject matter on July 8, 1964./2/ At that meeting a consensus was reached that the Department of Defense recommendations for changes in the Draft International Agreements were of such nature as to make them non-negotiable with the other signatories of the proposed international agreements. It was therefore concluded that these proposed changes should not be introduced into the negotiations preparatory to the international meeting scheduled for July 21, 1964. /2/Not found. As a part of the record, I am attaching memoranda from the Department of State and the Federal Communications Commission expressing their concern over the introduction of proposals for changes of such importance into the international negotiations at this time./3/ /3/Not attached. FCC objections to the proposed changes are in a July 8 memorandum from Chairman of the FCC Henry to O'Connell. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications System, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. 1 [1 of 2]) A handwritten note attached to the first page reads: "Mr. Bundy: FYI. This is largely for the record in view of DOD's decision to give up on the shared system. However, it is a clear statement and FCC deserves credit for not hiding behind State. LBJ." The State Department's objections, also apparently written for the record, are in a July 10 memorandum from Thompson to O'Connell. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, TEL 6) J.D. O'Connell/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that indicates O'Connell signed the original.
71. Editorial Note The Communications Satellite Conference convened in Washington on July 21, 1964, and concluded an intergovernmental agreement that established organizational principles for the system and another agreement that provided for the commercial, financial, and technical operations of the system. The latter would be signed by COMSAT on behalf of the United States. Together, the two agreements provided a framework for a global commercial communication satellite system. (Memorandum from Rusk to President Johnson, July 24; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications System, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. 1 [1 of 2]) The COMSAT Board, however, refused to convene, threatening the success of 6 months of negotiations. General O'Connell, in a July 28 memorandum for the record, described the problems: "many [Board members] were outspoken in their disagreement with actions taken by the management; the philosophy of the international consortium; the details of the international agreements; lack of information which had been furnished to the Board in the past; [and] pressure which had been put on the Board to make decisions prematurely or too rapidly." (Ibid.) In a July 28 memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, O'Connell foresaw the possibility for "further adverse action," including "Rejection by the Board of the International Agreement in toto and recommendation for unilateral U.S. action to put up a Comsat system" and "Refusal of this Board of Directors to act to approve the new International Agreement so that it may be signed by the United States." (Ibid.) Nonetheless, on July 24 the agreements were initialed by representatives from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United States, and the Vatican. The documents would be open for signature for 6 months, beginning on August 19, 1964. (Circular airgram CA-1278, July 31; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, TEL 6) For text of the agreement establishing the Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System and the Special Agreement, signed at Washington and entered into force August 20, 1964, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pages 1137-1154. President Johnson spoke to the COMSAT Board on August 17, lauding the satellite system as one that would make possible 24-hour-per-day telephone service and the transmission of photo facsimile messages. "All the human knowledge stored in computers will be available in seconds to help solve problems half-a-world away." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book II, pages 971-972)
72. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to the President's Special Assistant (Watson)/1/ Washington, May 7, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, FG 806 COMSAT CORP. Confidential. SUBJECT Activities and controversies by and among (primarily European) members of the International Communications Satellite Consortium have provided evidence to indicate: (1) Dissatisfaction of the European entities with the dominant role of the U.S. and the Communications Satellite Corporation in the managing of the operation./2/ /2/On April 23, officials from eight Western European Embassies met with Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Solomon to voice their displeasure. Led by the Swiss, the Belgians, Danes, French, West Germans, Dutch, Norwegians, and Swedes pressed the United States for changes in COMSAT's administration. Three days later, Richard Faber, First Secretary of the British Embassy, told Deputy Assistant Secretary Richard Gardner that the British position was not as extreme and that the United Kingdom would help mediate the dispute. (Memorandum of conversation, April 27; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, TEL 6) (2) A desire to build their national capabilities in the communications satellite field by requesting direct assistance from U.S. Government agencies and U.S. manufacturing firms having know-how in this field instead of obtaining this know-how through the International Consortium as specified in international agreements. (3) One U.S. firm has proposed to the United Kingdom the activation of a U.K. system to be operational before the Consortium system becomes operational. This and other firms have been promoting foreign satellite communications activity which could tend to proliferate development of competitive systems and violate the spirit and letter of the agreements establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Because of these trends action was initiated by this office in January 1965 to: (1) Coordinate the formulation of a U.S. National Policy Statement to cope with the developing situation. (2) Make all interested U.S. Government agencies aware of the situation. (3) Moderate the over-aggressive activities of certain U.S. firms to better serve the U.S. overall national interests. These actions have to a considerable extent moderated a situation which was becoming increasingly confused and embarrassing to the U.S. and the Communications Satellite Corporation. The coordinated policy paper, after prolonged negotiation among the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch, is now in a final form and ready for formal concurrences by the departments and agencies prior to submission to the President for approval. A copy is attached for your information./3/ As soon as the global commercial communications satellite system is established and providing service some of the provisions of this policy will have less significance. At that time revision to relax these provisions should be initiated promptly. /3/Not attached; the formal concurrence copy is in the Johnson Library, White House Central Files, FG 806, COMSAT CORP. See Document 73 for the final, revised version. J.D. O'Connell
73. Policy Paper/1/ Washington, August 25, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT--US Communication Policy NSAM No. 338, #1 [1 of 2], Box 13. Confidential. There is no drafting information on the source text. POLICY CONCERNING U.S. ASSISTANCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CAPABILITIES General: It is the policy of the United States to support the development of a single global commercial communications satellite system to provide common carrier and public service communications. The intent of the United States to exploit space technology for the service of all mankind, and to promote its use in support of peace, understanding and world order has been stated clearly in legislation and in Administration speeches and official releases. The U.S. Government is committed to use global commercial communications facilities for general governmental communications purposes wherever commercial circuits of the type and quality needed to meet government requirements can be made available on a timely basis and in accordance with applicable tariff or, in the absence of Federal Communications Commission jurisdiction, at reasonable cost. Separate satellite communications facilities including surface terminals may be established and maintained by the U.S. Government to meet those unique and vital national security needs which cannot be met by commercial facilities. The capacity of these separate facilities shall at all times be limited to that essential to meet such unique needs. These policies underlie the spirit and the letter of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, its legislative history and the position of the United States in the negotiations leading to the signing of agreements establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Provisions for the establishment of the global commercial communications satellite system and a U.S. national defense communications satellite system consistent with these policies have now advanced to the point where it is desirable to amplify and interpret these policies in order to guide United States relations with other countries in the development of communications satellite capabilities, and particularly with respect to providing technology and assistance therefor. Discussion: Most major countries of the World other than the United States provide international public communications services through governmental agencies or chartered chosen instrument corporations partially or wholly owned by the government. Assistance to any of these foreign governments in the development of communications satellite systems can potentially develop competitors seeking to divert traffic from the single global system being developed by the international consortium established as a result of U.S. actions initiated by the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 and now joined by forty-six nations. The communications satellite activities of U.S. Government agencies, including the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, have an important bearing on the U.S. support of the objectives of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. These activities may contribute to the dissemination of scientific and technical knowledge of the subject to foreign countries which might be used to the detriment of U.S. policy in this field. A policy to guide government agencies in the dissemination of satellite technology and in the provision of assistance which is consistent with the overall policies enunciated above is necessary. Such policy should be sufficiently comprehensive to give due regard to the specific requirements of national security. For purposes of this policy statement it is intended that restrictions upon transfer of technology and provision of assistance refer to detailed engineering drawings, production techniques and equipment, and manufacturing or fabrication processes pertaining to complete communications satellites or a significant portion thereof, and to provision of launching services or launch vehicles for communications satellites. It is not intended that this policy statement apply to surface terminals and stations or limit dissemination of information concerning systems concepts, description of spacecraft and normal scientific and technical publications of a professional character. Furthermore, it is not intended that this statement shall limit the dissemination of information required to be disclosed under the provisions of the Special Agreement of August 20, 1964, pertaining to the establishment of a global commercial communications satellite system. Specific principles to guide United States arrangements for assistance to other countries in the development of communications satellite capabilities are: 1. The United States should conform fully with the 1964 Agreements Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System. 2. The United States should refrain from providing assistance to other countries which would significantly promote, stimulate or encourage proliferation of communications satellite systems. 3. The United States should not consider requests for launch services or other assistance in the development of communications satellites for commercial purposes except for use in connection with the single global system established under the 1964 Agreements. 4. The United States should recognize the vital national security needs of other allied nations which can be met by satellite communications and which cannot be met by the commercial system. For example, the United Kingdom has indicated its need for highly reliable satellite communications from England to Australia and to other Far East terminals. 5. The United States aim is to encourage selected allied nations to use the U.S. national defense communications satellite system rather than to develop independent systems and to accommodate allied needs within the U.S. system (with additional costs normally to be borne by the participants). Recognized needs should be restricted to those, similar to ours, which are vital to the national security of the selected allied nations and which cannot be met by commercial facilities. To accommodate the needs within the U.S. national defense system it may prove necessary to include one or more satellites, synchronous or otherwise, whether of the same or different design. In this case, such satellite(s) should be designed to be electronically interoperable with the satellites of the basic U.S. national defense communications satellite system in order to permit mutual usage. 6. Agreements for direct assistance to allies which may significantly promote their communications satellite capability should require satisfactory assurance that the assistance furnished will be used only within the framework of agreements and arrangements to which the United States is a participant and will not be transmitted or transferred to a third nation without prior U.S. authorization. No agreement should be concluded with any nation until information has been made known to other allied nations concerning the U.S. willingness to cooperate in meeting other nations' national security needs which are similar to ours. 7. U.S. firms are required to comply with the Munitions Control licensing procedure prior to communicating satellite or related technology, transferring equipment or components as embraced by the United States Munitions List, including booster technology and launch services, to foreign nations or firms. 8. U.S. firms are also required to comply with the Department of Commerce's export licensing requirements prior to communicating or transferring to foreign nations or firms certain other relevant technology, equipment or components, not covered by the U.S. Munitions List. 9. All transactions approved under paragraphs 7 and 8 involving technology and assistance pertaining to complete communications satellites or a significant portion thereof, and to provision of launching services or launch vehicles for communications satellites should be conditioned upon express (written) assurances to this government by the foreign nations(s). The assurances should be that technology and assistance obtained will be used only within the framework of the existing international consortium agreements for a single global system or the framework of such special agreements as are referred to in paragraph 6 above and will not be transmitted or transferred to a third nation without prior U.S. authorization. 10. The principles and policy set forth in this document should be reviewed and updated as communications satellite system developments progress and definitive requirements are determined and after the global commercial communications satellite system has been established and is in substantial use. Policy: Therefore, in keeping with the above, it is the United States policy to: 1. Promote the prompt establishment and successful operation of a single global common carrier and public service communications satellite system in cooperation with other nations as part of an improved global communications network which will provide expanded telecommunications services and which will contribute to world peace and understanding. 2. Avoid measures which would adversely affect either the continued expansion of participation in the existing international agreement for a single global commercial communications satellite system or acceptability of the basic premises of the present agreements on a permanent basis. 3. Make use of commercial communications facilities for general governmental purposes wherever commercial circuits of the type and quality needed to meet government requirements can be made available on a timely basis and in accordance with applicable tariff or, in the absence of Federal Communications Commission jurisdiction, at reasonable cost. Establish and maintain separate satellite communications facilities including ground terminals with capacity limited to that necessary to meet those unique and vital national security needs which cannot be met by commercial facilities. The capacity of these separate facilities shall at all times be limited to that essential to meet such unique needs. 4. Encourage selected allied nations to use the U.S. national defense communications satellite system rather than to develop independent systems and accommodate their needs within the U.S. system (with additional costs normally to be borne by the participants). Recognized needs should be restricted to those, similar to ours, which are vital to the national security of the selected allied nations and which cannot be met by commercial facilities. 5. Withhold provision of assistance to any foreign nation in the field of communications satellites which could significantly promote, stimulate or encourage proliferation of communications satellite systems. 6. Provide technology and assistance in the field of communications satellites to foreign nations: (a) only if such nations are to participate in the U.S. national defense communications satellite system and then only to the extent required for that participation to be effective; or (b) only for use in connection with the single global commercial communications satellite system in accordance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and Special Agreement of August 20, 1964; and only if there exist appropriate assurances that such technology or assistance will not be transmitted or transferred to a third nation without prior U.S. authorization. The policies expressed above will be kept under review by the Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications/Director of Telecommunications Management and the agencies and departments concerned.
74. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 13, 1965, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT--US Communication Policy NSAM No. 338, #1 [1 of 2], Box 13. Confidential. SUBJECT Attached (Tab A)/2/ is a complicated proposed internal U.S. policy statement governing what we do to help other nations become technically able to use communications satellites. It is the product of Jim O'Connell's lengthy negotiations with State, Defense, Commerce, and NASA, and is approved by everybody concerned in the White House and EOB. /2/Document 73. The core of the proposed policy is to use our technological superiority to discourage commercial competition with COMSAT and/or wasteful investment in several duplicative Free World defense-related systems. Essentially, the statement says that we will: 1. Devote our effort and know-how to development of the single, world-wide commercial system envisaged in the COMSAT Act. 2. Use the commercial system ourselves except where security demands that we use our separate defense system. 3. Encourage other governments to promote and use the COMSAT system rather than create or subsidize other systems. 4. Encourage selected allies to buy time on our national defense system for their security needs. 5. Provide technical information, launch vehicles and launching services to other nations only when they: --assure us that what we supply is needed to develop or use the global commercial system, or --assure us in writing that what we provide will only be used pursuant to special bilateral agreements for use of our defense system, and will not be transferred to any third country with out our consent. Though some problems of interpretation and enforcement will inevitably arise, I think that this is the right sort of general policy statement to start with. If you approve, I'll let the affected agencies know through the attached NSAM (Tab B)./3/ And then at an appropriate time the publishable parts of this policy could be a public statement./4/ /3/Document 75. /4/The approve line is checked and a handwritten note beside the final paragraph reads: "CEJ: Will you see if this can be done? Return to Bundy/Pres later." McG. B.
75. National Security Action Memorandum No. 3381/1/ Washington, September 15, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT--US Communications Policy NSAM No. 338, #1 [1 of 2], Box 13. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Director, Bureau of the Budget; Executive Secretary, NASC; Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; and the Communications Satellite Corporation. TO SUBJECT The President has noted and concurred in the promulgation of the national policy statement concerning U.S. assistance in the development of foreign communications satellite capabilities, transmitted to him by a memorandum dated August 25, 1965, from J.D. O'Connell, Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications and Director of Telecommunications Management./2/ /2/See Document 73. The President also noted that the policy will be kept under review by his Special Assistant for Telecommunications in collaboration with the departments and agencies concerned, and will be updated as necessary in the light of changing circumstances. The President will look to his Special Assistant for Telecommunications to keep him informed of any proposed changes in policy that will require his personal attention and decision. McGeorge Bundy
76. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 21, 1965, 10 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, FG 806, COMSAT CORP. Confidential. Recent events indicate that the future of the Communications Satellite Corporation and of United States participation in the development and operation of the global commercial communications satellite system are in jeopardy in several ways: 1. The European partners in the international consortium dedicated to the establishment of a single global commercial communications satellite system find that their financial interests are better served by the continued use of cable systems in which they have larger ownership participation than they have in the communications satellite consortium./2/ /2/According to unattributed typed notes attached to this memorandum (not printed), the principal problem was lack of European interest. Of the 240 available circuits, only 61 were under contract. "Principal trouble is Great Britain. With only a small ownership in Comsat, they are not eager to destroy their valuable cable business by building up Comsat." 2. It appears that foreign members of the international consortium consider that their chances of exercising influence in effecting advantageous changes in the agreement establishing interim arrangements for the global commercial communications satellite system will be greatly enhanced in 1969, when definitive arrangements are to supersede interim arrangements, if there is lack of progress and coverage of the global system. Furthermore, delays in progress will facilitate foreign-owned cable system extension. 3. Actual and now anticipated usage of the initial Early Bird communications satellite is falling seriously behind the projected usage upon which tariffs were determined. Prospects are for continued serious short falls in usage and the resulting financial embarrassment of the Communications Satellite Corporation. The President has indicated interest in recommendations made by Ambassador Korry for U.S. assistance to African nations in attaining early communications satellite service to further assist in the development of these nations and to bring them closer to the United States. To attempt to provide such service by a government-owned system would be contrary to established U.S. national policy and international agreement. Direct aid to the Communications Satellite Corporation and the international consortium might be politically criticized as subsidy. There is a possibility that the Soviet Union may act soon to assist lesser developed nations attain communications by satellite. Early action by the United States is necessary to preclude this possibility. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has stated an urgent requirement to obtain communication services from the Communications Satellite Corporation. No facilities exist to provide acceptable service to meet this requirement. In response to a request for proposal, the Communications Satellite Corporation on August 26, 1965, submitted a proposal to provide communications services to meet the NASA Apollo Program requirements./3/ /3/According to the attached, typed notes, NASA's Apollo needs would require the equivalent of 120 circuits. The only possible rival for the business was the Department of Defense. "If COMSAT does not get this contract, the company will face serious difficulties." But the NASA contract would "give Comsat a wider global range because of the satellites to be launched to handle the NASA requirement." Contracting with the Communications Satellite Corporation on a commercial common carrier basis to meet the NASA requirement is consistent with established policy (National Security Action Memorandum No. 338) and U.S. international agreement dedicated to the early establishment of a single global commercial communications satellite system. It is my view that satisfaction of the NASA requirement through contract with the Communications Satellite Corporation will accomplish the following important objectives: 1. Substantially advance the advent of global commercial communications satellite service through availability of the capacity of the satellites in excess of that required for the Apollo requirement; 2. Reduce the opposition of the international communications satellite consortium members to rapid growth of the global system; 3. Make possible early availability of communications satellite service for lesser developed nations at reduced cost; and 4. Strengthen the position of the United States in the 1969 international revision of the present interim arrangements and thus further the objectives of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. I strongly recommend that the President support me in the policy position that the urgent NASA requirement for communication satellite service in support of the Apollo Program be met through the Communications Satellite Corporation and that the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration immediately enter into direct negotiations for such services. The requirement and the procurement of services should be coordinated with the Executive Agent, National Communications System, to determine whether additional features or arrangements can be effected to enhance the contribution of the specialized services to the National Communications System without unduly jeopardizing the primary objectives for which the communications are being provided. J.D. O'Connell
77. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 17, 1965, 3:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Comm. System, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. 1 [2 of 2], Box 6. Secret. Copies were sent to Moyers, Valenti, Bundy, Watson, and Califano. SUBJECT Ways and means for the provision of early communications service to African nations have been studied in conjunction with Mr. Bundy's staff, State Department, AID, FCC, NASA, and the Communications Satellite Corporation./2/ Alternatives studied were: /2/Department of State views are in an October 3 memorandum from Loy to O'Connell. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, TEL 6) a. Provision of a U.S. Government-owned experimental-operational satellite with an offer of earth station financing by the U.S. Government to African nations; b. The early provision by the International ComSat Consortium of suitable additional satellites with the U.S. Government financing aid, if needed, to those African nations, initially Ethiopia and Nigeria, which can be furnished assistance without raising serious international problems. The consensus strongly favors alternative b above for the following reasons: --Much lower costs to the United States. --The NASA Apollo Program communications service negotiations with ComSat Corporation (the International Consortium) will provide required satellite capacity by September/October 1966. --Conflict with European nations having communications interests and investments in African nations can be avoided in nation-by-nation negotiation. --Instead of competing with the International Consortium it can be supported and its expansion expedited. --The U.S. Government can avoid competition with financial interests already negotiating with African nations. Nigeria, soon to become a member of the Consortium, reportedly has allocated five million dollars for an earth station. --The orderly negotiation for regional groupings of African nations can be furthered rather than obstructed. --Satellite service can be initiated to some African nations sooner than in any other way. Without promising any U.S. assistance, the State Department has encouraged Ethiopia and Nigeria to consider early establishment of earth stations. No direct U.S. financial aid is presently expected. If these two nations were to request total U.S. financing, the estimated cost is $14,000,000 over three years. I am coordinating actions of U.S. agencies and ComSat Corporation in determining the potential contribution of satellites to communication requirements of other developing nations, including those in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Latin America. J.D. O'Connell
78. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Cater)/1/ Washington, December 22, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT, NSAM No. 342, #2, Box 12. No classification marking. Doug-- I have been keeping an eye for Mac Bundy on the development of COMSAT ever since the legislation was drafted and had been working closely with Jim O'Connell on a number of problems that come to focus on him, such as our policy on giving help to other countries on satellite communications systems, including ground stations. Recently Komer and I wrote a memo for the President urging greater attention to using satellites for international education and information purposes./2/ This happened on the same weekend that Marks talked to the President and got his directive to pull together a Governmental position./3/ Since you tie in with the Marks group, it occurs to me that it might be useful for me to keep you filled in on any peripheral space communication activities that might support your work. I keep an eye on COMSAT through Bob Button and generally try to keep in touch with the space community that is thinking about communications matters. I should talk to you about some of these matters at your convenience. /2/Not identified. /3/In a November 29 memorandum Cater announced the first meeting of a working group composed of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the U.S. Information Agency, the Office of the Science Adviser, the Bureau of the Budget, NASA, AID, and the Office of Telecommunications Management. The first meeting was held on December 3. An agenda, minutes, and list of attendees is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT, NSAM No. 342, #2, Box 12. Meanwhile, in case you missed it, I am attaching two cables subsequent to the Paris 3382 cable on the UNESCO meeting that I know you received./4/ /4/Attached but not printed. Telegram 3382 from Paris, December 14, reported "considerable enthusiasm at the UNESCO experts meeting about the potential of communications satellites." The U.S. experts in attendance recommended an educational pilot project as soon as possible. The Soviets expressed keen interest, and a U.S. delegation member emphasized that such a project "would unquestionably be of historic significance and command worldwide attention." The Ambassador added, "I strongly recommend you explore such a pilot educational satellite project as a means of dramatizing President's new international education program." (Ibid.) The Department's response in telegram 2385 to Paris, November 30, included: "FYI--Because deliberations UNESCO Space Mtg may give US some difficulties, we not interested in building up its importance." (Ibid.) Charles E. Johnson/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
79. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 28, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT--Educational Purposes, Domestic and Foreign, NSAM No. 342, #1, Box 12. Confidential. SUBJECT The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 was based on the premise that the United States would take the initiative in creating a global communications satellite system. The Act contemplates that the communications satellite system will be worldwide in coverage, directed towards providing communications service "to economically less-developed countries and areas as well as those more highly developed." It provides that the President shall see that such objectives are attained in a manner consistent with the national interest and foreign policy of the United States. In the policy statement which preceded the passage of the Act itself, President Kennedy stated that the system should include "service where individual portions of the coverage are not profitable." The Act provides that this mandate be carried out within a unique framework of U.S. commercial enterprise in conjunction with comparable private or governmental organizations throughout the world. Within this framework the global satellite system is being established by an international consortium, now joined by 48 nations and managed by the U.S. Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) which controls a 55.37 percent interest in the consortium. Consortium membership is open to all countries belonging to the International Telecommunications Union. Although it has a majority ownership, COMSAT is restricted in establishing certain policies for the system without the concurrence of additional nations. The establishment of earth stations and thus the provision of access to the global system is the responsibility of the nations desiring access. These provisions have important implications for the President's responsibility to create a global satellite system, particularly in less-developed countries. As business ventures, the COMSAT Corporation and members of the consortium are not likely to subsidize earth stations and related activities in these countries unless profitable operations are forecast. By the end of 1966, the consortium, managed by COMSAT, will have launched communications satellites in a pattern that will cover three-quarters of the globe. These satellites will provide an essentially worldwide network of telephone, telex, radio or TV links. However, while the satellites will be available, complete global participation will not be possible until earth stations are established in both developed and less-developed areas. The present prospect is that only a handful of less-developed countries will have earth stations within the next few years. A Working Group of representative agencies, identified in the appendix/2/ to this report, has considered the following question: /2/Not printed, but see footnote 3, Document 78 for a list of member agencies. Will U.S. national interests be served by encouraging and assisting less-developed countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia to establish earth stations for communications satellite service? As a result of its study, the Working Group has unanimously concluded that: the national interest would be served by actively encouraging the establishment of earth stations in selected less-developed countries as soon as possible. Detailed background information supporting these recommendations can be found in the attached addendum./3/ The Working Group accordingly recommends the following actions: /3/Not printed. 1. You direct the Department of State to intensify its activities leading to the accelerated construction of earth stations and related facilities in less-developed countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, to link them to the worldwide communications satellite network now being established by the consortium managed by COMSAT. 2. Direct the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Agency for International Development, to determine whether U.S. technical and financial aid should be provided to selected less-developed countries which are unable to finance earth stations and related facilities out of their own resources, through commercial sources or through multi-lateral lending organizations. Any projects in this program should be funded out of existing FY 1966 funds or out of regular FY 1967 appropriations. A report of such findings should be submitted to you, through the office of your Special Assistant for Telecommunications/Director of Telecommunications Management by July 1, 1966. 3. Assign responsibility for coordinating this program to the Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications/Director of Telecommunications Management. 4. Instruct the Executive Agent and Manager of the National Communications System and U.S. Government agencies operating facilities outside the NCS to utilize the global communications satellite system in handling traffic wherever possible and where national security requirements will not be compromised in furtherance of the objectives of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, consistent with sound cost-efficiency and other management considerations. 5. Issue a National Security Action Memorandum covering these recommendations. A draft is attached for your approval./4/ /4/Not found. 6. Authorize a Working Group to commence a study of the possibilities of using the satellite communications system to advance information exchange and education in less-developed parts of the world. This project would be consistent with your recommendation on international education in the State of the Union message. Members of this Working Group should include NASA, Health, Education and Welfare, State Department, USIA, AID and the Executive Office of the President./5/ /5/The approve/disapprove line is not checked. The report was sent to the President on February 1. (Memorandum from Marks to the Working Group; Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT--Educational Purposes, Domestic and Foreign, NSAM No. 342, #1, Box 12) Leonard H. Marks [Continue with the next documents]
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