NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
100. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ RSB-46 Washington, March 25, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, TEL 6. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. SUBJECT An assessment of the factors shaping Soviet attitudes toward the question of international satellite communications. Abstract Since the President invited the USSR and its allies to join INTELSAT last August, the Soviets--after a delay--have parried with vague counterproposals of cooperation between INTELSAT and MOLNIYA (the USSR's satellite communications system), possibly under UN auspices. Moscow has been countering such proposals in one way or another since 1964 (when it rejected the first US invitation to participate in INTELSAT), proposing first UN control of communications satellite arrangements, later an international hookup based on MOLNIYA. Cooperative arrangements such as the Soviets now hint at, however, may well represent their first preference, for cooperation combines the best of two Soviet worlds: use of INTELSAT's communications facilities without the drawbacks of joining what the Soviets see as a US-dominated organization. Soviet Hints at Cooperation In his message to Congress of August 14, 1967, the President urged the USSR and Eastern European countries to give serious consideration to membership in INTELSAT. This proposal was conveyed formally to the USSR on August 28, 1967, and repeated March 12, 1968. While the Soviets have not yet responded directly to these invitations or expressed interest in them, they have been dropping a few hints about their view of the future development of international comsat (satellite communications): --In an interview published in Trud on December 27, 1967, Soviet Deputy Minister of Communications Sergeichuk stated that "questions of exchanges of television programs will constitute a substantial part of the activity of the international systems of satellite communications now being created--the joint system of socialist countries and the INTELSAT system. The regular intercontinental exchange of black-and-white and color programs will depend on cooperation between them." --In mid-January, the USSR hosted an international conference on development of communications equipment. A TASS dispatch of January 17 reported that the main result was to establish close contacts between Western and Soviet specialists. It also quoted an ITT official to the effect that establishment of a global comsat system required the participation of Soviet specialists. --A French official told us in early March that, during talks between French and Soviet space experts in February, the Soviets showed interest in participating in a global comsat organization along UN lines, possibly as a UN-attached agency. (A few days later, a Yugoslav telecommunications official, in urging a more flexible US attitude toward comsat arrangements, suggested that UNESCO was interested in this matter and should, if possible, be accommodated.) Soviet Attitudes to INTELSAT For Use of INTELSAT as Facilities. There are several reasons why the USSR would probably accept cooperation with INTELSAT, if conditions were right. In view of the actual direction of Soviet telecommunications development and the relatively high cost of establishing a worldwide comsat network, MOLNIYA was probably intended from the outset mainly as a national system./2/ The USSR has launched 7 communications satellites and built 20 ground stations and appears well on the way to achieving a high level of domestic comsat service. With this core of facilities, Molniya also has potential for expansion into a regional system, accommodating Eastern European and perhaps southern and Far Eastern border countries. In addition, the USSR reportedly concluded agreements in 1966 to construct ground stations in Egypt and Cuba. In none of these cases, however, has there been confirmation of follow-up action. /2/See Research Memorandum RSB-26, "The Molniya Satellite of the USSR: Its Place in International Communications," March 22, 1966 (Limited Official Use/No Foreign Dissem). [Footnote in the source text.] It seems doubtful that the Soviets ever seriously considered breaking out of a regional framework and mounting a self-sufficient world hookup competing across-the-board with INTELSAT. To be sure, the USSR for a while went through motions consistent with such a policy; while beefing up Molniya ground and space facilities, the Soviets proceeded to exchange color-television transmissions with Paris via MOLNIYA and last April got Eastern European regimes to sign a joint communiqué endorsing international development of MOLNIYA. These motions, however, may merely have been ploys designed to increase Soviet bargaining power in future negotiations on a deal with INTELSAT. The transmissions to and from Paris never passed the experimental stage and were probably aimed mainly at dramatizing the Paris-Moscow "dialogue" and advertising the French SECAM process. (Even in the latter sphere, Franco-Soviet cooperation has so far been stunted; mass production of color-television sets has been stymied by technical difficulties, and marketing prospects are dimmed by Eastern European malaise about SECAM's cost and incompatibility with Western color-television processes./3/ /3/See Research Memorandum RSB-132, "Signs of Eastern European Indecision about Adopting French Color TV," December 12, 1967 (Secret/No Foreign Dissem). [Footnote in the source text.] Lacking worldwide facilities themselves, the Soviets have little alternative but to sacrifice the convenience of future comsat or to make a deal with other regional systems, which at this stage means INTELSAT. The time is appropriate for such a deal. INTELSAT's 61 member nations are now developing definitive arrangement proposals for consideration at an international conference early in 1969. These definitive arrangements will, when they become effective, supersede the present Agreement on Interim Arrangements. Against INTELSAT Organization as Presently Constituted. Soviet silence in the face of recent US invitations to join INTELSAT is consistent with the initial Soviet posture when the organization was formed in 1964. The USSR declined a US invitation on that occasion also, suggesting that any international comsat system should come under UN control. In the Soviet view, the main drawback to membership in INTELSAT is probably that it would, inter alia, amount to an official Soviet endorsement of an organization that seems to be dominated by the US. (The formula for allocating voting power among INTELSAT members--their share of international communications traffic--gives the US about 53 percent of the vote.) The USSR has consistently avoided such endorsements, as in the case of the Asian Development Bank (where the US subscribes the majority of capital). Vietnam of course makes the Soviets doubly wary of overt demonstrations of direct cooperation with the US. Furthermore, INTELSAT itself is currently undergoing some ferment which, in the Soviet calculus, no doubt appears promising and which might be discouraged by a sudden Soviet entry at this time. Moscow has no doubt gotten wind of various French proposals for either decreasing the US voting share or forming separate regional comsat systems. The Alternative of INTELSAT-MOLNIYA Cooperation. This probably represents the Soviet first preference in international comsat arrangements. A cooperative setup might well involve the best of both worlds for the USSR, securing the advantages of INTELSAT service without the drawbacks of INTELSAT membership. Moscow could stay out of what it may feel is a US-operated club, yet at the same time plug Molniya into a world hookup and accordingly enhance its international standing and earnings. The Soviets would also probably obtain considerable leverage in international satellite-communications affairs if cooperative arrangements gave MOLNIYA a regional monopoly and if user countries came to rely on MOLNIYA as a link in the world system. Soviet interest in comsat cooperation has been demonstrated as well as referred to in recent statements. In 1967 the Soviets agreed to transmit two television shows to a global audience in conjunction with INTELSAT. Satellites of this organization were allowed to relay live telecasts between Moscow and Tokyo on the occasion of the inauguration of Japanese-Soviet air service last April. One MOLNIYA and three INTELSAT satellites were also scheduled to cooperate in a global television spectacular last June, but this agreement was not carried out because of Soviet reaction to the Middle East crisis; Moscow claimed that Western TV stations were "conducting a smear campaign against Arab countries." The Future. The USSR is no doubt still quite uncertain about the likelihood of comsat cooperation and about Western views on this question. Soviet statements to date have been framed in low key and channeled through spokesmen of middling authority. Future Soviet tactics and postures in the comsat game will doubtless be strongly affected by the emerging moves of Western players--and perhaps spasmodically by the East-West "political climate"--as the 1969 renegotiation date approaches. The main Soviet objectives, however, will probably remain fairly constant: a Soviet monopoly on comsat over or near the USSR, plus close and regular telecommunications exchanges with other international systems--whether they remain one, INTELSAT, or become several.
101. Airgram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/ A-2127 Paris, May 13, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, TEL 6. Limited Official Use. Drafted by John H. Buehler (SCI) and A. Eugene Frank (TRC), cleared by Edgar L. Pire (SCI) and Richard G. Long (POL), and approved by Robert A. Brand (MINECON). SUBJECT REF /2/Not printed. (Ibid.) Summary In a meeting with Embassy and COMSAT officials, French communications system experts explained and defended their view that definitive arrangements for the INTELSAT global communications satellite system should provide for the extensive implementation of regional systems. They believe commercial considerations must be kept paramount, that systems investment must bear a direct relationship to circuit ownership and control, and decisions affecting regional services must be taken directly by those member nations having a declared regional interest. M. Rene Sueur, Assistant to the Director General for Telecommunications, Ministry of P & T, invited Embassy representatives to participate in discussions with the COMSAT Corporation's Geneva office representatives, Colino and Mellen. These discussions, which took place at CNET on April 23 and 24, provided an opportunity for an expose of the views of COMSAT and especially by the French P & T on possible definitive arrangements for global communications via satellite. In its essentials the discussions centered around two largely contradictory philosophies, the US view as put forth by the COMSAT representatives that the communications needs of the world can be satisfied by a highly integrated network of high capacity satellites, and the French view that provision must be made for system member countries to buy and own circuits in their selected areas of world interest. The exposition of the French views which follows is a very brief summary of the principal contentions, reiterated several times in one form or another by Sueur and the French representative to INTELSAT, Jean Paul Voge. [Here follow four pages detailing the French views. The sections include: "General Views on Development of the Global System"; "French Views on Regional Systems"; "Socialist Communications Satellite Systems"; "Global Coordination"; "Joint Efforts within INTELSAT"; "Services to Underdeveloped Areas"; "INTELSAT and France"; "System Optimization"; "System Investment--The Practical View"; and "Extension of INTELSAT Interim Arrangements."] Comment: Although all these discussions were amicable, the French representatives stated their views with a conviction and force which seemed to indicate that there is presently little negotiating latitude in the French position. Colino, acting as spokesman for the COMSAT views, tried patiently to cite instances and areas in which INTELSAT had either shown flexibility or is moving in a direction to respond at least partially to the French position. Where the French motivation was obviously political such counter arguments fell on very barren ground. The political ends which a French regional communications satellite system must serve completely elude the cool, patient, statistical study of the growth in world communications and its extension to probable future needs. It seemed clear that the French do not see INTELSAT as providing either the political or the industrial "satisfactions they seek"--to use Voge's words. At this point in time when France fears television broadcasts directly from satellites into her sphere of political interest with as much passion as she yearns to beam broadcasting into that area from her own satellites, she feels that she cannot afford too much objectivity in her communication satellite policy. A global system in which France would of necessity play not the smallest, but certainly a rather minor role, especially in its sphere of major interest, does not respond to what the French believe are their political needs. A regional system, on the other hand, covering the French sphere of interest would probably permit France to play the dominant role. Shriver
102. Editorial Note On June 4, 1968, President Johnson returned to Glassboro, New Jersey, the site of his 1967 summit with Soviet Chairman Kosygin. Johnson spoke of the progress and setbacks of the previous year and proposed additional fields in which the two nations could build cooperation. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968, Book I, pages 679-684) One of his "new" proposals called for stepping up efforts to develop a global communication satellite system. "The United States believes that better communications are essential to mutual understanding between nations," he said. "We look forward to the day when the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe will join the system." Henry Owen, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, commented on the proposal the next day: "it is unrealistic to suppose that the Soviets would join an organization which is subject to a U.S. veto and managed by a private U.S. corporation." The questions of vetoes and voting rights were sensitive ones: "If the Soviets were not willing to settle for a respectable piece of the action, then their participation would not be much of a bonus for cooperation anyway." Owen concluded: "In brief, we should try to show the Soviets that they can't beat INTELSAT, so they might as well join it." (Memorandum from Owen to Starr, June 5; Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 156, Task Force on Communications Policy, Meeting Minutes, August 1967-November 1968) On July 19 the Department transmitted another proposal to the Soviets, following it up with an offer of talks at the upcoming UN Outer Space Conference in Vienna in August. (Airgram A-307 to Vienna, July 19; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, TEL 6) Officials in the Embassy in Moscow reported that the Soviet Deputy Director for Space Communications told them that the principles of INTELSAT did not appear "good enough" for the Soviet Union to consider. He was unenthusiastic about the proposed talks in Vienna. (Telegram 5021 from Moscow, August 9; ibid.)
103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, August 13, 1968, 1714Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, TEL 6. Confidential. Drafted by Miller (E) and Loy (E) and cleared by Dubs (EUR), Nesbitt (SCI), James Van R. Springer (L), Solomon (E), Abraham Katz (EUR), Joseph P. Lorenz (IO), Clark (DTM), Carroll Brown (S/S), Ende (FCC), Kemp (DOD), Radius (NASA), Johnson (NASC), and Eugene Rostow. Also sent to Belgrade, Bern, Bonn, Bucharest, Canberra, Copenhagen, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris also for CEDTO, Stockholm, Tokyo, Vienna, USUN, Mission at Geneva, USEC Mission at Brussels, and Mission to NATO. 219721. Subject: Soviet International Satellite Communications System Proposal. 1. As reported London 11433 (NOTAL)/2/ Soviets have put forward in London and apparently in selected other capitals proposal for new international satellite communications organization to be called Intersputnik./3/ According UN Outer Space Secretariat official, text of Soviet draft agreement has been transmitted to UNSYG under cover of joint letter from USSR and seven other Communist countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia). It is presently being translated and will be circulated August 13 as UN document. Distribution may be timed to coincide August 14 opening of UN Space Conference in Vienna./4/ /2/Dated August 2. (Ibid., POL 17 USSR-UK) /3/The Intersputnik proposal was published as UN doc. A/AC.105/46 on August 9, 1968. /4/The UN Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was held in Vienna August 14-27 under the chairmanship of Austrian Foreign Minister Kurt Waldheim. The conference had two objectives: 1) to examine the practical benefits to be derived from space research and exploration and the extent to which non-space powers, especially in the developing world, could benefit, and 2) to examine opportunities available to non-space powers for international cooperation in space. More information on the conference is in the Yearbook of the United Nations 1968, vol. 22, pp. 57-69. Approach was not made to US but on August 9 Soviet official gave Embassy Moscow copy of draft agreement when Emb officer pressed for views on INTELSAT (Moscow 5021 NOTAL/5/). Canadian and Italian Embassies have informed Dept approaches made to their Governments and Emb Paris reports French Government has copy Soviet proposal; no others yet confirmed. Canadians provided additional information in conversation August 6, including very incomplete summary in English of Soviet draft agreement. Full text draft agreement given to UK and Canada in Russian, being translated and not yet available. /5/See Document 102. 2. On basis information available, proposed organization appears similar to INTELSAT in most respects, but with major difference that power would lie in one-nation-one vote council rather than in committee operating with weighted voting. Intended relationship to INTELSAT and whether it is contemplated that latter would continue to exist not stated. 3. Action addresses requested communicate following US views to host governments: A. We have not seen text of draft proposed agreement. Therefore, following views, based on impression we now have, are tentative pending more complete information. B. Most likely among possibilities of what Soviets intend appears to be global satellite communication system in place of INTELSAT. If this is intent, we see two major problems. First, there is in INTELSAT a going, world satellite communications organization which meets the purposes of the Soviet proposal. INTELSAT is operating successfully with very wide coverage, membership including countries of all sizes. (Sixty-two member nations of INTELSAT handle more than 95 percent of world's international telecommunications traffic. INTELSAT now has operating satellite coverage of major parts of world and will by middle of 1969 have satellites capable of handling all major areas. Eighteen earth stations that are part of system now in operation in fourteen countries and about thirty in various stages of construction or planning. Forty to fifty earth stations expected to be operative by 1970. Total investment in satellites and earth stations by that time will be around $350 to $400 million--see CA-7411, April 19, 1968./6/) We have made clear Soviet participation would be welcome; President Johnson reiterated invitation to Soviets to join in August 1967 message on communications policy and in June 1968 Glassboro speech./7/ We do not think progress of INTELSAT or negotiation of INTELSAT definitive arrangements should be held up in favor of new organization. Second problem is voting formula for important decisions. If it is, as it appears, one member-one vote, the formula is unacceptable to US since it does not take account of extreme differences in contributions to and use of the system. /6/Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, TEL 6) /7/See footnote 2, Document 97, and Document 102. C. We welcome Soviet interest in establishment of global telecommunications organization, though we note that there is such an organization in existence. US for its part would be prepared to consider with INTELSAT partners whether there is some way INTELSAT structure could be made more attractive to USSR. We believe that, in view of apparent similarity of Soviet proposal to INTELSAT, this could be productive if Soviets are serious. We are not, however, prepared to hold up progress of INTELSAT or drop concept of weighted voting on important questions. We note that US proposal for INTELSAT definitive arrangements introduced in October 1967 contained provision for assembly of members which would deal with certain broad policy matters (but would not decide many important, including commercial, questions) and which would act on the basis of a majority vote (counting one-nation-one vote) and a two-thirds vote by investment shares. Precise description of assembly, including voting arrangements, obviously subject to further discussion, subject however to basic US views described above. 4. Dept responding similarly to Canadian approach here and informing British Embassy of substance of above. 5. Would appreciate reactions action addressee host governments soonest; any replies prior August 27 should be repeated Vienna for US Del, Outer Space Conference. Rusk
104. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State/1/ Vienna, August 16, 1968, 1602Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, SP 6 UN. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels, London, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris, and Rome. 6010. Subject: Outer Space Conference (Intersputnik). Ref: State 219721./2/ /2/Document 103. 1. In agreement with USDel Chairman Webb, I met privately with FonMin Waldheim this morning to discuss several matters including Outer Space Conference which he chairs. Drawing on reftel and other messages, developed reasons why we strongly support INTELSAT and why we would be much concerned if Conference acted to inflate Soviet Intersputnik proposal or let it be considered as substitute for INTELSAT or otherwise. Waldheim said he understood and could assure us Conference as such would not go along with any such Soviet maneuvers although he could not, of course, predict what Soviets might do or say. He added when Soviets approached Vice President of Conference Sarabhai (Vienna 5980)/3/ to give a paper on Intersputnik in addition to paper it already agreed they were to present, Sarabhai had consulted Waldheim who instructed Soviet proposal should be rejected on procedural grounds since it had not been cleared by panel as required. /3/Dated August 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, SP 6 UN) 2. Referring to Soviet motivation, Waldheim said Soviets have been opposed to INTELSAT from very beginning (1) on doctrinal grounds since private enterprise (capitalism) is heavily involved and (2) because if Soviets joined they would have virtually no voice because Soviets have less than 5 percent of global communications traffic. Waldheim believes Soviets [garble] making Intersputnik proposal as ploy (that French and some LDC's may be disposed to support) to enhance Soviet capability to bring about revision of INTELSAT charter and rules to make them more acceptable to Soviets. 3. Our discussion concluded with some general talk re role of UN and agreement that while UN indispensable organization, it very dubious that it should try to take over certain types of activity that are today being handled successfully by private enterprise working closely with interested governments. MacArthur
105. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 19, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, TEL 6. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Rostow on August 20 and approved by Robert Brown. The memorandum is Part III of IV. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS At the Secretary's dinner on the Honey Fitz, on August 19, Ambassador Dobrynin invited Under Secretary Rostow to withdraw for a private talk. The topics covered are treated in separate memoranda. Rostow remarked that the reports about the Soviet space proposals were interesting. Why hadn't they been given to us? Dobrynin said they had been made public, and Rostow referred to the fact that they had been handed to other members of Intelsat before being publicly announced. If the Soviets were serious about finding a politically appropriate way to cooperate in the field of satellite communications, Rostow said, we should be glad to discuss the problem with them. They knew the President's policy in this regard, to which he had referred again recently in Glassboro. Dobrynin asked whether the question should be taken up in Vienna. Rostow said that Mr. Loy would be going to Vienna shortly, and would be glad to talk with the Soviet representative, but the problem could also be examined here privately if they wished to do so. As Dobrynin knew, Rostow had these matters on his plate.
106. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State/1/ Vienna, August 21, 1968, 1604Z. 6091. Subject: Outer Space Conference. For IO/OIC and EUR. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, SP 6 UN. Confidential; Priority. 1. Sov and EE intervention Czechoslovakia is major subject of corridor speculation at Outer Space Conf as of 1200 hours GMT today./2/ No indication that question will emerge on floor but corridor comment emphasizes sadness and anger over Sov actions. Italian del making private comment on Sov Intersputnik proposal: "So this is what they mean by 'one-nation, one-vote' procedure". /2/On the night of August 20-21 Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia with 200,000 troops. 2. Italian reception tonight (only national reception scheduled thus far) summarily cancelled by written notice "Because of invasion of Czechoslovakia". 3. Czech occupation appears to have cut ground from under Sov discussion of Intersputnik. US approach to Sovs (State 222051)/3/ here on this matter at this time seems undesirable. Please instruct./4/ /3/Dated August 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, SP 6 UN) /4/In telegram 225355 to Vienna, August 22, the Department wrote: "In view of events of the past twenty-four hours Department agrees it undesirable to seek out Soviets at this particular moment for bilateral discussions re INTELSAT/Intersputnik." Loy canceled his plans to fly to Vienna. (Ibid.) MacArthur
107. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 3, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, TEL 6. Confidential. Drafted by Loy and Nelson and cleared by Rostow and Allen. SUBJECT Just before the Czech invasion, the Soviets, along with seven other Communist countries, floated a proposal for the establishment of an international communications system, which they dubbed Intersputnik. A message from Premier Kosygin announcing the proposal was read at the opening session of the Vienna UN Space Conference, August 14. He said that ". . . in order to satisfy the needs of the developed and underdeveloped countries, the USSR is proposing the creation of an international communications system through artificial earth satellites based on democratic principles with total equality of all its participants". The draft agreement is structurally similar in content to the present INTELSAT agreement. A major difference is the provision for decision making on a one-country/one-vote basis rather than weighted voting based on investment as in the INTELSAT system. At present we can only speculate as to the Soviet motives in putting forth this proposal at this time. We doubt that they seriously expect to establish a truly world-wide system to supplant INTELSAT. It could be that they envision a more limited one which would handle some of the traffic among the Soviet Union and its allies. A number of countries, principally for political reasons, may want to participate in such a system as well as in INTELSAT. Alternatively, the Soviets' real aim may be to force a restructuring of INTELSAT in the forthcoming negotiations on INTELSAT permanent arrangements, so that they can participate on a basis of equality with the United States. Lastly, they may simply be interested in making these negotiations more difficult for the United States. They have not exhibited any interest in INTELSAT to date. You may recall that since the spring of 1964 we have at various times encouraged the Soviets to join INTELSAT, the last time being your speech in June commemorating the Glassboro talks. It is worth noting that both Yugoslavia and Romania are showing interest in joining INTELSAT, and, in fact, the Communications Satellite Corporation just recently concluded a consulting engineering contract with the Government of Yugoslavia to design and prepare earth station specifications for that Government. Jim Webb has reported from Vienna that the Soviets did not gain the propaganda splash they must have intended, and that the United States presentations have been most impressive. While the Soviets have not succeeded in disrupting the agreed agenda of the Conference, they may have set the stage for continuing agitation on this issue./2/ /2/In telegram 6231 from Vienna, August 28, the delegation wrote: "Czech adventure has removed any small possibility of serious consideration of Sov Intersputnik proposal. Item is forgotten except for derision in view Sov real world performance." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, SP 6 UN) I agree with Mr. Webb that we must continue energetically our preparations for the INTELSAT negotiations next February. We should be prepared to make such changes in the structure as are necessary and acceptable to continue the very broad support this organization has built in the last four years. The problem is to ascertain whether the Soviets are interested in discussing this subject with us in a serious manner. In light of the current Czech situation, we will not be able to do that now, but we shall attempt to sound the Soviets out as soon as such contacts are feasible. Dean Rusk
108. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, September 27, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, TEL 6. No classification marking. The date is handwritten on the source text. E--Mr. Solomon's underlying action memorandum/2/ recommends that the United States position on INTELSAT membership eligibility at the 1969 conference should be in favor of an "all states" provision in the agreement (with appropriate safeguards as to recognition of states). /2/Printed below. The recommended fall back position would be to support ITU membership as an INTELSAT membership requirement. M--Mr. Rostow (Tab E) supports Mr. Solomon's recommendation for universal membership./3/ He notes that you and the President have supported the position that INTELSAT should become universal in membership. If the contrary view prevails among the present membership, we should insure that the definitive arrangements negotiated in 1969 should not preclude universal membership. /3/Not printed. Rostow commented: "The provision of commercial communication by satellite should not be a political issue, any more than the international arrangements for delivering mail." There is some confusion over the dating of items in this package. The October 2 Rostow memorandum appears to have been added to the package after the Action Memorandum was submitted to the Secretary on September 27. Rusk did not make a decision until October 10. EUR--Mr. Springsteen (Tab F) opposes the "all states" membership position on the basis that the Germans will not understand why we espouse a position which would allow the East Germans to sign./4/ The majority of the present membership also opposes the "all states" provision. EUR supports ITU membership as a requirement for INTELSAT membership. /4/Dated September 17, not printed. Springsteen believed that this was particularly important in light of East German aggression against Czechoslovakia. He felt that an "all states" course would be "too costly in terms of principle." H--Mr. Schnee (Tab G) raises a strong qualification to E's recommendation. He notes that unless the "appropriate safeguards" under the "all states" provision bar the membership of non-recognized communist countries, especially Communist China and East Germany, there will be considerable Congressional reaction./5/ /5/Dated September 13, not printed. Schnee added, "Barring some dramatic change in our relations with Communist China and the Soviet bloc, I think the majority of Congress will continue to support the current 'hard on Communists' line." BHR Attachment Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) to Secretary of State Rusk/6/ Washington, September 27, 1968. /6/Confidential. Drafted by Stephen E. Doyle (E), Thomas E. Nelson (E), and William K. Miller (E); and concurred in by Allen (IO), Barnett (EA), Springsteen (EUR), Belman (L), and Schnee (H). SUBJECT The purpose of this memorandum is to confirm and establish primary and fall-back United States positions on the INTELSAT membership issue for use during the 1969 Conference on "definitive arrangements" for INTELSAT. 1. INTELSAT was formed and operates under interim arrangements. Pursuant to Article IX of the 1964 Agreement establishing the interim arrangements (Tab A),/7/ we plan to convene a Plenipotentiary Conference in Washington on February 24, 1969, to negotiate definitive arrangements. We have proposed unrestricted eligibility for membership in the permanent organization (an "all states" concept). Other INTELSAT members oppose this concept, and we anticipate that membership will be a controversial issue at the Conference. Preparatory work for the Conference is going forward, both in the INTELSAT Interim Committee and bilaterally, and it will be advantageous for us to know as early as possible where we are going on the issues involved. /7/Tabs A-G are not printed. 2. The 1964 Agreement on interim arrangements provides that to be a member of INTELSAT a state must be a member of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a 135-member specialized agency of the United Nations. 3. In August 1967 President Johnson sent a message to Congress on the "Global Communications System" in which he said: "Today I reaffirm the commitments made in 1962 and 1964. We support the development of a global system of communications satellites to make modern communications available to all nations. . . . We support a global system of commercial satellite communications which is available to all nations--large and small, developed and developing--on a nondiscriminatory basis." On May 4, 1968, in your Law Day address at the University of Georgia, you said: "Next year we will enter into negotiations looking towards a definitive set of arrangements. These will determine whether we can preserve international cooperation in this field and whether we can expand the membership of this international institution [INTELSAT]/8/ to include all members of the world community." We stated in our October 1967 proposals to INTELSAT (Tab B) that "participation in the global commercial communications satellite system shall be available to all nations". All of these statements clearly imply "all states" eligibility, though none of them expressly states it. /8/Brackets in the source text. 4. During a discussion of the membership issue in connection with definitive arrangements which was held by the INTELSAT Interim Committee in March-April 1968, the U.S. spokesman was asked to clarify the United States position on membership. The U.S. spokesman said at that time that it is the United States position to favor unrestricted membership in INTELSAT. A summary of the discussion is attached at Tab C. 5. Having thus proposed an "all states" membership provision, we precipitated responses which indicate that we will be in a minority among the major states in INTELSAT on this issue. To date only Australia and some Latin American countries have supported preliminary consideration of an "all states" membership provision for the INTELSAT definitive arrangements. 6. In western Europe the opinion appears to be unanimously in favor of continuing to require ITU membership as a prerequisite to INTELSAT membership and we anticipate that more than half of the countries participating in the 1969 Conference will support adoption of the ITU membership requirement. A significant political implication arising out of the ITU criterion is that the Communist regimes not recognized by the United States (with the exception of Mongolia) do not belong to the ITU. Thus, neither East Germany, North Korea, North Viet Nam, nor Communist China would be eligible to join INTELSAT if the present ITU membership requirement is continued in effect. 7. As a political manifestation of our commitment to a universal global satellite system, it still may be desirable for the United States to support "all states" eligibility for INTELSAT membership. However, pressure from our allies may later make it advisable to abandon this position in favor of eligibility criteria based on membership in the ITU. We therefore recommend that you approve the following U.S. position and fall-back position with respect to INTELSAT membership. If we have made our position in favor of a universal system clear and it is publicly known, there would be no basis for charges that we had wished to make membership exclusive or isolate any non-member. Recommendation It is recommended that you approve: (1) The United States position on INTELSAT membership eligibility at the 1969 Conference should be in favor of an "all states" provision in the agreement (with appropriate safeguards as to recognition of states)./9/ /9/Rusk initialed the "Disapproved" line on October 10. (2) The fall-back United States position on INTELSAT membership eligibility at the 1969 Conference should be to support ITU membership as an INTELSAT membership requirement./10/ /10/Rusk crossed out "fall-back" and initialed the "Approved" line on October 10.
109. Editorial Note As preparatory negotiations continued for the February 1969 INTELSAT conference, the Soviet Union maintained that it would not join an organization in which usage determined voting rights and control. As reported by the Embassy in Stockholm on October 11, Sweden was planning to raise the issue in the UN Space Committee because Swedish officials "seem prepared to assume that conference will fail." The Swedes believed that the Soviets and their East European allies would find a conference under UN auspices "useful and more attractive." (Telegram 3171 from Stockholm, October 11, 1968; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, TEL 6) On October 15 the Department replied: "While we agree that the Soviet Intersputnik proposal cannot simply be ignored, we believe it is important to maintain proper perspective with respect to it. INTELSAT is going concern with 63 members in most parts of the globe and with effective and important international communications in being. It is also an operating commercial enterprise representing major investments. Intersputnik on the other hand is only a proposal, and its only known support is regional, not global." The Department believed that the Swedish proposal would be counterproductive since it would not prevent the establishment of an independent Soviet satellite system and would seriously undercut U.S. efforts to obtain Soviet participation in INTELSAT. (Telegram 255834 to Stockholm and USUN, October 15; ibid.) In November the United Kingdom launched a strong effort to rally opposition in Europe and dissuade Sweden from approaching the United Nations. (Telegram 27302 from London, November 16; ibid.) U.K. officials found that Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Germany opposed the Swedish initiative, Norway was equivocal, and France was sympathetic. (Telegram 280799 to London, December 3; ibid.) The Department urged the U.S. Mission to the United Nations to explain the problem to its Swedish counterpart: "The Soviets have not responded to our past invitation to discuss membership in INTELSAT, and we simply do not know whether U.S.S.R. is sincerely interested in joining organization or what changes, if any, would make INTELSAT politically acceptable to it. If Sweden believes itself in a position to explore this matter with U.S.S.R. prior to conference establishing definitive arrangements, its assistance would be most welcome." Swedish representatives privately informed USUN officials on December 18 that they would "make no further move re INTELSAT at this session." (Telegram 8567 from USUN, December 18; ibid.)
110. Editorial Note On December 30, 1968, the Department of State named the members of a delegation to the Plenipotentiary Conference To Establish Definitive Arrangement for the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium, scheduled for February 24-March 21, 1969. The delegation was chaired by Leonard H. Marks. Vice Chairmen were Frank E. Loy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and James McCormack of Comsat. Other members were Ward P. Allen, Bureau of International Organization Affairs; Rosel H. Hyde, Federal Communications Commission; John A. Johnson, INTELSAT; William K. Miller, Office of Telecommunications, Bureau of Economic Affairs; and James D. O'Connell of the White House. See Department of State Press Release 284 (Revised) printed in Department of State Bulletin, January 20, 1969, page 69. [Continue with the next documents]
|
