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Development of the Supersonic Transport Aircraft 111. Editorial Note The Soviet Union had begun work on an SST design in the late 1950s, and the Kennedy administration begin a feasibility study under the chairmanship of Federal Aviation Agency Administrator Najeeb Halaby soon after taking office. (See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pages 26-43 and page 56.) The Soviet threat to the international prestige of the United States would be a major factor in the decision-making process. (Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGhee, February 18, 1963; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, AV 12-7 US, and memorandum from McGhee to Welsh, February 28, 1963; ibid., AV 12 US) State Department officials were concerned that the psychological aspects of the proposal had not been adequately researched and agreed on March 4, 1963, to survey the attitudes of U.S. Ambassadors in key countries. (Memorandum from Welsh to McGhee, March 1, 1963, and memorandum from Johnson to McGhee, March 6, 1963; both ibid.) Reaction from the Ambassadors was mixed, but all were concerned with the possible impact on the overseas image of the United States. (For example, see telegram 2280 from Moscow, March 14, 1963, and telegram 423 from Budapest, March 15, 1963; both ibid.) In a personal cable for Edward R. Murrow, George F. Kennan, Ambassador to Yugoslavia, wrote: "Would like to say that personally I regret to see question placed in this way. Have long held view . . . that we should be careful not to give impression to world opinion that our competition with USSR was some sort of sporting contest to show who could first achieve spectacular but unnecessary material successes. Fact is that whether it becomes possible to fly to Paris on American planes in two hours rather than six is matter of supreme unimportance from standpoint of anything that really matters in our civilization." (Telegram 1258 from Belgrade, March 19, 1963; ibid.) The State Department concluded that the United States should focus on developing a safe and commercially viable SST and should not compress the time frame simply to "win" a race. (Memorandum from Harriman to Welsh, April 16, 1963; ibid., AV 12-7 US) Others within the administration, especially at the FAA and Treasury, felt the nation needed to move more quickly. Halaby wrote: "If the United States does not develop a supersonic transport, this nation will lose prestige in the eyes of the world. The presumption will be that this country does not have the technological and financial capability to be competitive." (Memorandum from Harriman to the Acting Secretary, May 22, 1963; ibid.) On June 5, 1963, President Kennedy told the graduating class at the U.S. Air Force Academy that the United States would commit itself to build an SST: "This commitment, I believe, is essential to a strong and forward-looking Nation, and indicates the future of manned aircraft as we move into a missile age as well." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pages 440-443) In August 1963 President Kennedy appointed Eugene R. Black and Stanley de J. Osborne as special advisers on the financial aspects of the commercial SST program. Their report, completed in December 1963, was made public by President Johnson on February 29, 1964. (Ibid.: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book I, page 323) In their report, Black and Osborne concluded: "We recommend that the United States must proceed with the Supersonic Transport program. It is in the national interest so to do, it is of great economic importance to the nation, and failure to do so might well leave our important airline and aircraft industries in potentially dangerous competitive situations." Black and Osborne did not believe it would be in the interest of the United States either to enter the Anglo-French consortium or to compete with it: "We conclude that one of the basic philosophies of the current program, namely, that of tying the United States effort to the 'Concorde,' and therefore compressing the time of development and construction is dangerous, technically and economically. We feel that a superior aircraft which is available within two or three years of the first 'Concorde' deliveries will still be able to capture the bulk of the world market." (Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Secretary Rusk, March 2, 1964; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, AV 2-7 US) The Anglo-French consortium was a joint development project launched by the British and French Governments because of the high cost of developing a supersonic transport. The SST project faced considerable technical and economic difficulties. On March 28, 1964, when President Johnson announced the formation of an SST advisory board, he commented: "We believe the technical challenge of the SST is manageable. We think that the main problem lies in the financial area." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book I, page 428) The project was delayed when potential contractors failed to meet technical standards, and by December 3 the President took the delays and difficulties into account: "The development of a commercially profitable supersonic transport is a very difficult and complex understanding. I believe that this country must take, in the words of Senator Monroney, 'time for deliberate, proven development' and time to make certain that this will be the best supersonic in the world's airways." (Ibid., Book II, page 1635)
112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, November 7, 1964, 5:20 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, AV 12. Confidential. Drafted by W.E. Knight (OA/AN) and cleared by Richard G. Long (WE), J. Amstutz (OA/AL), Lieutenant General Grant (FAA), and Trezise (E). Also sent to Paris. 3064. Pass Assistant Secretary Johnson. In response your request for guidelines for any conversation on SST that may occur in your meetings in London or Paris,/2/ position that U.S. should adopt has been discussed with Halaby and Boyd. Consensus is that situation is still fluid and you should be noncommittal on any possible U.S. collaboration with Concorde program, hearing out British and French without taking any particular position. At same time we believe you should be careful to avoid giving impression that door is already closed to U.S. collaboration. Subject has implications going beyond technical and financial aspects and U.S. interest is to leave issue open pending further study here and further developments in UK and France./3/ /2/The United States had been meeting with the French and British in a series of informal Tripartite Meetings on the Supersonic Transport. This was the fourth in the series; the third session had been held in Paris in June 1964. (Airgram A-3137 from Paris, June 12; ibid., AV 3) /3/Bohlen reported from Paris that the British Ambassador had shared with him a message from Pompidou to Wilson: "Message stated in effect that since appears UK may not wish to go through with project French would appreciate yes or no answer on British intentions. In subsequent conversations Couve pointed out to Sir Pierson that continued shilly-shallying would permit US to close gap." (Telegram 2957 from Paris, November 13; ibid., AV 12) FAA official Cecil Mackey, who will meet Boyd in Paris Tuesday is fully familiar with latest FAA assessment of economics of SST. See also Deptel 2623 to Paris rptd info London 3030./4/ /4/Dated November 5. (Ibid.) Rusk
113. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/ Paris, November 10, 1964, 6 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, AV 12. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London for CAA and FAA. 2868. In conversations with Boyd, Chairman of CAB, and Prill, Asst. Administrator FAA, Vergnaud today informed us of meeting of Ministers planned for tonight to prepare French position on Concorde for submittal President de Gaulle this week. Choice appears to be "abdication" or proceeding alone. Vergnaud seems to feel time too late for American-French cooperation and that British-French cooperation no longer possible. While responsible French officials do not believe accusations of American duplicity that have been appearing in French press for last week they do not seem to regret their appearance. As present US position based on assumption of continuation present Concorde program, we not able to discuss alternatives with GOF until all facts available on past discussions. Would appreciate all information to help alleviate anti-American aspect of cancellation if this is forthcoming./2/ /2/In telegram 2829 to Paris, November 16, the Department informed Bohlen that the French had never formally approached the United States requesting cooperation on the SST project. "Oblique references" had been made in conversations with American officials in 1962, but "when U.S. officials did not react affirmatively, subject was not pressed." The original initiative and approach came from the British in September 1960. "Lack of positive US response was probably major reason leading UK turn to France." (Ibid.) Bohlen
114. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, December 5, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, AV 12. No classification marking. Prepared by Califano on December 10. Copies were sent to Secretary of Defense McNamara, Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance, Secretary of State Rusk, and Deputy Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs McNaughton. SUBJECT General Quesada visited me this morning and told me that the French Ambassador had discussed the French SST program with him on December 5. He said the Ambassador went out of his way to bring up the SST program. The Ambassador said he was going to discuss the SST when he returned to France and made the following points. 1. The French were disturbed about the actions of the British. If the British pulled out, he doubted that the French would continue. 2. He pursued a reorientation of the program as a tripartite program, mentioned that the current "race" atmosphere was most unfortunate, said he was interested in retrieving the French position, and asked about our attitude towards a three-way deal. 3. He asked whether America was bound to the Mach 3 regime. He favored the prolonging of the program, and was disturbed by the increased costs. 4. He believed that the U.S. should raise any tripartite interest directly with the French rather than through the British, or rather than have the French come to the U.S. for help. He suggested that if the U.S. raised the SST problem with the French, it might help to heal some of the wounds that have come up from time to time. 5. He indicated that he was anxious to see General Quesada again and pursue their conversation before he returned to France next week. General Quesada also told me he would like to make clear why he started the SST program. He said that he started the program as a result of the B-70 program and he was not advocating an SST but rather exploiting the know-how of the B-70 program and attempting to avoid duplicating programs. He said that he never conceived of the SST program being pushed the way it now is and never thought in terms of the government picking up 90% of the cost on the program. At best, he thought the SST development might follow a successful B-70 development by five or so years. I thanked General Quesada for his views and told him I would inform Secretary McNamara of them. Joseph A. Califano, Jr./2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
115. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/ London, January 19, 1965, 5 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, AV 12. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris. 3350. Pass personally Halaby, FAA. Embtel 3333./2/ Econ Minister and Prill FAA were invited by Minister of Aviation, Jenkins, for briefing on Concorde decision prior to planned announcement first day of new Parliament January 19. Due Churchill illness and reorganization of debate, however, government presentation in Parliament will not be made until later this week or possibly next week. Message on decision is being delivered to Premier Pompidou Tuesday, January 19, and MOA obviously concerned over possible leaks. Embassy will report public statements when made./3/ /2/Not found. /3/The British made an announcement in Parliament the next day. The Embassy reported: "Despite sharp questioning, Jenkins was careful not to commit govt. on whether original program would or would not be maintained. Govt. purpose here appears to be to maintain flexibility to adjust course of action in light further discussions with French and possibly US." (Telegram 3392 from London, January 20; ibid.) Roy Jenkins was U.K. Aviation Minister. Significant points of conversation with Minister were: British have decided continue original Concorde program. As nothing on engineering or production side of program has been changed since election, despite political furor, Jenkins feels that Concorde lead still substantial. He would like Administrator Halaby to discuss possibility of agreement on rate of progress both projects during visit February 15th. Discussions would include Minister Jacquet and could be held either London or Paris. In suggesting London, he had not known of Halaby intention of visiting Paris February 11th, 12th. (Jenkins saw Jacquet secretly in France January 11; only January 17 Observer carried news.) Prill told Minister that he believed Administrator would be willing to discuss subject but that this obviously difficult question for U.S. and that he certain Administrator would wish to discuss with other officials and possibly President before and after meeting British/French. In answer to Prill's question Minister stated that he believed initial agreement should be between governments but that he would have no objection to Boeing or Lockheed making either technical or sales agreements with BAC and SUD. Prill explained normal American competitive practice as affects delivery dates and delivery position and pointed out that the present Concorde/U.S. SST sales relationship followed this pattern, with U.S. airlines leading scramble to be first on both delivery lists. Minister indicated he understood this but felt agreements to delay production of both aircraft until more experience available with sonic boom and proof of prototypes would help both aircraft. Minister confirmed that decision to build only prototypes was worst of both worlds and that they did not intend to follow this course. Minister also made it clear that desire to reach agreement with U.S. on rate of progress was not based upon hope that this would give British another chance to cancel but rather a sincere concern about wisdom of committing money for tooling so long before prototype flight. Minister candidly admitted that initial decision by Labor government to cancel project had been changed by strong French political pressure coupled with obvious French conviction that airplane economically viable. Minister admits there are still many doubters on economic acceptability of airplane. As in U.S., economics and sonic boom are two biggest concerns. Minister related economic capability to five million pounds selling price. He used this figure in a way that indicated at least tentative agreement had been given to this price, recognizing that it would not cover research and development costs, which governments would not expect to recover. No decision taken yet on TSR-2 which, if cancelled, would certainly affect development of Olympus engine. In summary, Embassy believes that if Administrator Halaby willing, he should be prepared to discuss with ministers: 1. Agreed time-table for prototype flying and in particular, delivery dates to carriers. 2. Size, range and speed of aircraft. 3. Sales agreements. 4. Cooperation between Boeing/Lockheed and SUD/BAC. Comment follows. Bruce
116. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/ London, January 21, 1965, 7 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, AV 12. Secret; Limit Distribution. 3415. Pass personally Halaby, FAA. Embtel 3350 sent Paris 628./2/ Embassy understands Jenkins proposal/3/ as effort to stabilize time schedule Concorde and US SST programs in order to: (A) avoid uneconomic crash programs due competitive pressures, (B) reduce at least near term commitments of UKG and, (C) allow ample time for additional research into sonic boom and economic aspects of SST operations. /2/Document 115. /3/U.K. Aviation Minister Jenkins invited Halaby to meet with him and French Minister of Public Works Jacquet in London on February 15. (Memorandum from Johnson to the Acting Secretary, February 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, AV 12-7) Jenkins proposal for talks presents two issues for decision by US. First we must decide almost immediately whether to enter into tripartite talks at all on program stabilization. Two views on this point evident--if we can immediately conclude that US has no interest in agreement of this type, it might be better not to enter into discussions which could lead only to failure and frustration. On other hand it would be discourteous and perhaps even more dangerous to assert we will not even talk. US could then be used by UKG as whipping boy in defending accelerated Concorde program to British public. UKG could use similar argument in event failure of talks but impact would be less, particularly if US has well-reasoned position. Second decision USG must ultimately make is long term. Is it in US interest to stabilize respective SST programs so that each side knows where it stands or is US better off maintaining independence and flexibility? US Govt is now subject more pressures for slowdown in Concorde program than either French or US Govts. Key here is whether British, once over temporary economic and financial embarrassment, would be forced forge ahead as fast as possible on Concorde, given presumed French position, if faced with dynamic and unpredictable US SST effort. On strictly competitive considerations, if we conclude that Concorde is faced with unavoidable slowdown due British political and economic realities, might be to US advantage to maintain free hand to adjust US SST program as we see fit. On other hand if we conclude that Concorde timetable inevitably linked with our own (and vice versa) despite temporary UK problems, might be to mutual advantage to stabilize situation by entering into schedule agreement. Aside from competitive considerations, value of stabilizing agreement to US appears primarily related to extent and importance of unknown factors in US program such as sonic boom and economics. If these problems resolved or can be expected to be resolved in good time, then difficult perceive over-riding considerations favoring US acceptance of commitment on timetable which might inhibit production and delivery viable US SST. If determination satisfactory solution these problems still some time away or unpredictable, then rational approach would seem call for some form agreed schedule on both sides. In any event presume that US, if it decides to enter into discussions leading eventually to a schedule agreement, would not accept any arrangement which would increase time gap contemplated by respective original programs. Above views represent our attempt to present Washington with alternatives available as we see them, and we have at this time not made recommendations, but these will follow shortly./4/ /4/Document 117. Bruce
117. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/ London, January 22, 1965, 6 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, AV 12. Secret. Repeated to Paris. 3443. Pass personally Halaby, FAA. Embtels 3415 and 3350./2/ Reftel attempted present Washington with alternatives facing US re Jenkins proposal. Embassy views on proposal are along following lines: /2/Documents 115 and 116. Believe question SST cooperation must be regarded in wider context than simply aviation. Events of last few months have more than ever involved entire UK Government including PM in SST problem. Assume French Government involvement similar. Result is that reasonable degree of success on Concorde program must be considered important national objective. Failure to achieve this objective, particularly when cause can be ascribed to US intransigence, may well have adverse effect on major US aims vis-a-vis UK and France. For these reasons Embassy believes in over-all US interest to enter into discussions with British and French and reach at least timetable agreement on development respective SSTs. See no particular reason, however, why necessary reach agreement on aircraft characteristics, sales agreements, and industry cooperation (items 2-4 in Embtel 3350) if not sensible from aviation viewpoint. Even on aviation grounds there appears to be some merit in stabilizing respective timetables. Current official target date for Concorde is 1971. Embassy estimates more realistic date for original program is 1972. Without outside competitive pressures consider likely Anglo-French re-examination of details and attempt develop more efficient program would delay completion of program by 1 to 2 years, i.e. to 1973 or 74. On other hand, given US program which UK/Fr might reckon would endanger early lead, governments would attempt keep Concorde as close to original timetable as possible. Embassy doubts that current British efforts to reduce near term commitments would stand in the way of accelerated activity on Concorde if UK/Fr saw time lead slipping away. Washington, of course, in better position evaluate completion date US SST program. All estimates Embassy has seen indicate US SST might be 2-4 years later than Concorde, i.e. 1973-75. Understand anticipated substantial advantages US SST over Concorde such that lag not expected affect materially prospects of US project. However, there seems to be general consensus in US that US should not proceed with production until basic economic and technical problems resolved. Thus, it appears to Embassy that US has much to gain and little to lose by entering into stabilizing agreement. First, we would be in a position to develop and complete a sensible program with adequate time to resolve current difficult problems without looking over our shoulder at the competition. Second, an acceptable time lag position would be assured for the US thus permitting ultimate exploration superior performance of US aircraft. Third, a sensible UK program will permit more effective use of that nation's limited resources, and thus strengthen its role as an important US ally. Embassy notes that Halaby will have only one day with Jenkins during forthcoming FAA/MOA meetings. While this would presumably allow only conceptual exploration of possible agreement, see no reason why details could not be worked out in FAUSST committee./3/ /3/Reference is to the French-Anglo-U.S. meeting on SST airworthiness standards. No record of the first meeting, presumably held in January 1965, has been found. Regarding the second meeting, see Document 120. Bruce
118. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Ball to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency (Halaby)/1/ Washington, February 8, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, AV 12-7. Secret. Drafted by Amstutz (OA/AL) on February 4, and cleared by P. Bogart (AL), Maloy (FAA), Johnson (E), Ferguson (OA), Beigel (WE), Tucker (BNA), and Creel (EUR). Dear Mr. Halaby: I refer to the meeting on January 27, 1965, of the Interagency Committee on International Civil Aviation Policy (ICIAP)/2/ regarding the invitation extended by the British Minister of Aviation Roy Jenkins that you meet with him and French Minister of Public Works and Transportation Jacquet to discuss supersonic transport aircraft, including the possibility of a tripartite US-UK-French agreement to delay production of both the Concorde and any American supersonic transport. /2/No record of this meeting was found. As a result of the above meeting and subsequent discussions by the Department of State with the Department of Defense and your Agency, I authorize you to accept the invitation. I further authorize you to inform the UK and French Ministers that: 1. The United States Government has made no decision as to the next step in its supersonic transport program. 2. As in the past, you would be willing to meet periodically with the British and the French to discuss the status of our supersonic transport program and the technical problems of sonic boom, airport capability, air traffic control and the like. 3. The United States will not tie itself to any time schedule for introducing an American supersonic transport and will not agree to any limitation on its design of the supersonic transport. 4. You are willing to discuss the major technical and economic prospects and difficulties of the United States supersonic transport program and the United Kingdom-French supersonic transport program, emphasizing that at this early stage in the program there is great uncertainty as to many of the major operating and economic characteristics that are achievable. 5. In the event that the United Kingdom and/or France seek United States Government permission to approach American manufacturers for help on the Concorde, they should understand that such matters should be handled directly between the companies involved. Further they should understand that this in no way indicates that they have United States Government approval to obtain any information or assistance from those companies and the usual procedures would apply in this case. 6. If the United Kingdom and French Aviation Ministers make any significant proposals on which the United States position has not been determined, you should indicate that you have no authority to agree but would be happy to report them back to your Government. In the discussions every effort should be made to avoid giving the French representatives any basis for charging that the UK has in any way ceded to US pressure at the expense of European technical and production interests. Sincerely yours, /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original.
119. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/ London, February 17, 1965, noon. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, AV 12. Confidential. Repeated to Paris. 3959. Deptel 4949./2/ CIVAIR--Tripartite Meeting on SST. US-UK-French meeting on SST held Feb 16 with Messrs. Halaby, Jenkins and Jacquet leading for respective teams. Jenkins opened meeting by outlining recent British review of Concorde project and decision to proceed with determination and speed. Current schedule called for first prototype 1967, certification in 1970 and service inauguration in 1971/72. He asked Halaby if he could give current status of US program. /2/Dated February 3. (Ibid.) Halaby emphasized govt interest in safety, operational and economic requirements. He was pleased to learn that UK proceeding vigorously with environmental tests. Three unknowns in this area inter alia: (1) Public acceptability sonic boom, (2) noise at airports, and (3) atmospheric temperature conditions. US has been studying SST for 8 years at cost of $110 million. In addition safety and environmental factors, US has been working at economics proposed SST operation in light of current and projected subsonic developments. US program still not established although President expected make decision in next 90 days to do one of following: Terminate, study further, or construct prototype. USG had no time schedule established but US industry had made preliminary estimates that, subject to early decision, prototype could be built by 1968, certification in 1972, with service inauguration some time later. Characteristics US SST--gross weight 500,000 lbs., L:D ratio 8.9, approximate transonic over-pressure 2 lbs., cruise over-pressure 1.5 lbs., cruising altitude 55 to 75 thousand feet, Mach 2.6 to 3, capacity 200 to 250, and operating cost equal current jets. Material would be titanium and new engine would be required. Jenkins noted vast expense SST projects and big govt investment. This demanded govt responsibility ensure economic program. Although in past UK/France had hoped collaboration with US possible, now appeared evident joint development and construction not practical. Nevertheless he felt useful maintain contact on respective schedules. At moment he had no precise proposals but was expressing only general ideas. Halaby agreed not feasible at present reconsider joint construction; this question really determined by UK/French decision to proceed with Concorde. USG position had always been that respective companies could discuss and work out any arrangements not inconsistent with respective statutes. In fact manufacturers had consulted earlier but could not agree on basic concepts. US did not consider situation involved competitive race but attempt to cooperate on safety and economics. He estimated total investment, operation and maintenance cost of SST program worldwide would be 75 to 100 billion dollars by 1990. Impossible to exaggerate importance of sonic boom acceptability which could easily spell difference between profit and loss. Agreed useful to keep in touch on time scale but could not tie US time schedule to Concorde as limited US design on this account. He would be willing consult UK/French further after President's decision as suggested by Jenkins and Jacquet. Jenkins appreciated this response and indicated UK/France would welcome ideas on proceeding faster with sonic boom studies. Halaby indicated in US view UK/French work on sonic boom so far was largely theoretical. What was needed were practical sonic boom tests to determine public acceptability in UK and on continent. Heretofore aircraft have been built first and acceptability determined later. This not possible with SST. US will do everything possible assist UK/France in environmental studies but substantial info so far provided by US with very little forthcoming from other side. Even if President decides to terminate it was desirable to pursue environmental studies. Jenkins felt group had moved as far as possible at the moment and UK/France would expect to hear further from US after Presidential decision. Jacquet's participation largely consisted of indication general support for position advanced by Jenkins who had been selected as UK/French spokesman./3/ /3/Telegram 4714 from Paris, February 18, also reported on this meeting. It reads: "It is interesting note that favorite French theme on possible US cooperation with UK and France on SST did not appear during tripartite talks Feb 16 in London. As previously reported by Embassy, this theme has been: 'Let us agree UK and France build Concorde, US produce bigger, faster and longer range SST and in effect divide the world market.'" At a luncheon, the French stated their rationale for proceeding with Concorde more clearly than ever before: "Old World cannot be left behind. The Concorde is technically feasible. We can do it, we will do it. And we must maintain our aeronautical research, development and production capability." (Ibid.) Bruce [Continue with the next documents]
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