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120. Editorial Note The second meeting of the FAUSST group, held in Washington February 1-5, 1965, discussed air frames, atmosphere, and the sonic boom. In a report dated June 10, an economic officer observed: "I attended part of one session on the SST. The FAA summarized some of the results of the Oklahoma City and White Sands sonic boom tests. The data on community reaction in Oklahoma City is now being analyzed by the National Academy of Science. A report will be prepared on the community reaction. From casual observation, the FAA felt that there had not been any significant reaction to the booms by the populace of Oklahoma City and FAA did not know of any physiological damage." (Memorandum for the files by Mary Irene Pett, June 10; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, AV 3) On May 7 the Federal Aviation Agency released its reports on the sonic boom studies. It noted that "over 80 per cent of those questioned, when informed of the SST plans of the British, French and Russians, expressed the opinion to opinion researchers that the U.S. should proceed with developing an SST." Nonetheless, "Substantial numbers of residents reported interference with ordinary living activities and annoyance with such interruptions, but the overwhelming majority felt they could learn to live with the numbers and kinds of booms experienced during the six month study." However, the report continued, "the acceptance of the booms fell from about 90 per cent of those residents of Oklahoma City interviewed during the first weeks of the program to about 75 per cent of a comparable sample of the population during the final weeks." (Circular airgram CA-11884, May 7; ibid., AV 12-7 US) On July 1, at the swearing in of the new Administrator of the FAA, President Johnson said that he had received the second interim report of the SST Advisory Committee and that it had recommended a move forward "at the fastest possible rate consistent with the goals that I have outlined." The President said that he would be requesting $140 million over 18 months for SST development. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, page 714)
121. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/ London, October 22, 1965, 1937Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, AV 12-7 US. Confidential. Repeated to Paris for USRO and the Embassy and to the Department of Defense for McNaughton and Enthoven. 1840. Advance indications are that Plowden Report,/2/ which now in revised draft stage, expected to be published latter part November, will make strong recommendation for increased cooperation with France and rest of Europe and aerospace field. Report will contend that cooperation with US difficult if not impossible and attempt to do so would result in demise substantial part of UK aerospace industry. /2/Not found. Report has important politico/military implications for US which will be commented on fully when report published. Of significance at moment, however, are indications we have received that Plowden Report appears be based to great extent on untested assumptions, loose general analysis and inadequate statistical base. Report will lack rigorous analysis and economic-military back up data which should be essential in major report of this kind. Final review of draft report by Plowden Committee now going on. Embassy understands there may be minority of Plowden Committee which does not support conclusions of majority and which may, therefore, release minority report which may call for cooperation with US as well as continent. Embassy believes that in this final review serious weakness in Plowden Report due to lack of sound analytical base may be called to attention of the committee by the minority. Believe minority hand in review would be strengthened by having example of sort of analysis in depth typified by recent DOD economic study of SST if it could be made available./3/ While Embassy suggests that ultimate release of SST report would be useful to British and French in terms Concorde project, its use in context of Plowden Report would be primarily to dramatize what seem to be major deficiencies in Plowden Report. /3/Not found. Since Plowden Committee review expected to be completed next week imperative that immediate decision on this proposal be forthcoming./4/ Please advise. /4/On November 11 Willis Armstrong, Minister for Economic Affairs at the Embassy in London, reported that he had called on Minister of Aviation Roy Jenkins and had given him two copies of the Defense Department paper entitled "The Limited Market for Concorde." "I also observed that in giving it to him we were not attempting to 'shoot down the Concorde.' I told him simply that the Embassy had been acquainted with a study of SST problems being made by the Defense Department, and that we had asked for permission to give to the British Government whatever our authorities in Washington thought suitable, and this was the result." Armstrong told Jenkins that the paper had "some extremely interesting methodology" and thought that perhaps he might want to pass a copy to the Plowden Committee. (Airgram A-1120 from London, November 11; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, AV 12-7) Bruce
122. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 8, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, AV 12. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Amstutz and Luppi. Copies were sent to J. Starkey (BNA), Beigel (WE), Leddy (EUR), and A. Caswell (E). SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The meeting was held at the Federal Aviation Agency on October 8, 1965, at the request of Mr. Loy for the purpose of discussing the problems involved in issuing a United States airworthiness certificate on the Concorde. Mr. Loy referred to FAA Administrator McKee's letter of September 22, 1965, addressed to Under Secretary Mann, in which problems associated with type certification of the Concorde were briefly discussed./2/ Mr. Loy said he was particularly concerned that, in order to minimize possible political repercussions, the British and the French be quickly and fully informed of any perceived deficiencies in the Concorde which might possibly prevent issuance of a United States type certification. /2/Not printed. (Ibid.) The FAA group explained that the Concorde represented a substantial advance in design and technology over the existing generation of aircraft and therefore new airworthiness standards had to be drafted for this aircraft. The FAA was in this regard concerned solely with safety and was worried about certain features of the Concorde such as cockpit visibility and design. The FAA group further explained that on the basis of the information it had available it probably would not be able to issue an airworthiness (Type) certificate for the Concorde unless some substantial changes were made on the aircraft. The refusal of the US to certificate the Concorde would not represent a violation of the US-UK bilateral airworthiness air agreement, for the agreement accorded wide latitude to the parties in the certification of each other's civil aircraft. Furthermore, should the United Kingdom and France certificate the plane, the United States would not stop it from being operated by foreign air carriers to and from the United States. The refusal of the FAA to grant a United States certificate would only affect use of the Concorde by US carriers. However, in view of the probable limited world market for the Concorde (only 50 have been ordered on option, 21 by US carriers) a refusal by the US to issue an airworthiness certificate could very well cripple the Concorde program. The Anglo-French SST people are generally aware of the areas where the FAA is having problems regarding the Concorde. They know this from the two tripartite technical SST meetings which have been held. (These tripartite meetings are referred to as FAUSST meetings; "FAUSST" stands for French-Anglo-US meeting on SST airworthiness standards.) Moreover, the FAA has already issued two SST airworthiness standards publications: the "Red Book" of 1961, and the "Blue Book" of 1963. By early November, the FAA expects to issue its latest version which would be called the "White Book." It is FAA's intention to send copies of the "White Book" to the British and French. Also, in November, the FAA team responsible for certification is to tour UK and French SST facilities, after which the FAA should have a better understanding of Concorde characteristics which might make United States certification difficult. The FAA is to meet with the UK and France at FAUSST meetings in December 1965 and February 1966, and an Anglo-French team will be coming to the US in March to submit an application to the FAA for a preliminary type certificate. It is FAA's thinking that sometime after the February 1966 FAUSST meeting, the FAA should officially inform the UK and France of our reservations, perhaps by means of a letter from George S. Moore (FAA) to his UK and French counterparts. Mr. Loy requested that, after the FAA team returns from Europe in November, the FAA inform us promptly of its views so we can determine how this matter should be brought to the attention of the UK and France. Any airworthiness standards set by the FAA which would restrict use of the Concorde by US airlines would be bound to have undesirable political effects. It is imperative, therefore, that we officially inform the UK and France at the earliest feasible moment of any difficulties foreseen by the FAA. The FAA said it would be in touch with the Department upon the group's return.
123. Letter From the Assistant Administrator for International Aviation Affairs, Federal Aviation Agency (Cary) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Loy)/1/ Washington, December 14, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, AV 3. Confidential. A handwritten note on the source text reads, "RMIR Files. Letter drafted in reply by AL--Amstutz 2-17-66." Dear Frank: As you know, there are periodic meetings of the French-Anglo-U.S.-Supersonic Transport (FAUSST) Group; the latest, FAUSST III, has just concluded in London./2/ Actually, there are no formal agenda for these meetings, but merely topics to be discussed. These topics fall within the terms of reference of the Group and are enclosed for your information./3/ /2/The third tripartite session was held December 6-14 in London. A record of the discussion is airgram A-1400 from London, December 16. (Ibid., AV 12-7) /3/Not printed. Our Assistant Administrator for Europe-Africa-Middle East recently held informal discussions with both the French and British, who originated the discussions, on the desirability of inviting the USSR to participate in future FAUSST meetings. The French and British believe this might be desirable because: 1. The Soviets are probably already getting all of our joint regulatory proposals. 2. We may learn more of their thinking. 3. They will be operating their SST in Western European airspace. 4. They seem to have a genuine interest in improving the airworthiness of their designs. Both French and British representatives indicated that while they favor inclusion of the Russians, at least to a limited degree, they have not discussed the proposal with the Soviets and have no idea of Russian reaction. We know relatively little about USSR development in the SST field, and it is possible that if the Soviets participated objectively, we might not only learn something of their development, but they might also contribute something of value to the mutual effort. If it is eventually agreed that the Soviets are to be invited to participate in the meetings, it will, of course, have to be under controlled conditions. They should be active participants and not just observers as they presently are at various ICAO meetings. Our representatives just returned from FAUSST III are available for discussions if you wish. Inasmuch as the proposal presented by the French and British raises policy issues beyond the authority of this Agency to decide, we would appreciate your reaction to this proposal before any further action is taken. Sincerely,
124. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 28, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, AV 12-1 US. Confidential. Drafted by Amstutz on February 15. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Dr. Enke stated that the letter of January 21, 1966, from Stanley Cleveland in Embassy Paris was a good description but not a complete one of his talks in Paris./2/ The objective of his visit to the Department of State was to relate further what took place in Paris and London. /2/Not found. Dr. Enke stated that Mr. Vergnaud, Director of Transport (Civil Aviation), expressed interest in a tripartite agreement among the US-UK-France to delay the introduction of the Concorde and the US SST. Mr. Vergnaud said, however, that in view of the rebuff from the U.S. of February 1965, the ball was in the US court to take any initiative. Dr. Enke suggested to Mr. Vergnaud that he might wish to raise the subject with the two private members of the President's SST Advisory Committee, Eugene R. Black and Stanley de J. Osborne, when they pass through Paris in the near future. Dr. Enke added that the French also continued to be interested in a share-the-market agreement whereby the Concorde would be developed to serve shorter distances than the US SST. In London, Dr. Enke held discussions with various UK Ministry of Aviation and Treasury officials. It was clear to him from these talks that some British officials were unhappy about the UK being associated with the Concorde. They believed that UK participation was a basically political decision to facilitate future British entry into the EEC. To withdraw from the project might result in about a $500 million indemnity to France. Mr. Schaetzel said he was skeptical that UK participation in the Concorde project was political. He suspected that the project appeals to UK and aircraft manufacturers who fear further contraction of the British aviation industry. Dr. Enke stated that the British appeared also to be quite interested in a tripartite extension agreement but said, like Mr. Vergnaud, that any initiative would have to come from the US in view of the decision of February 1965. Dr. Enke believed that the British would be pleased to stretch out the Concorde program to lessen the annual financial commitment for R&D funds and to gain time to produce a better aircraft. Dr. Enke suggested to the British that if they were interested in a tripartite agreement, they raise the question privately with Mr. Black and Mr. Osborne during their visits to London. Dr. Enke said that his interest in seeing a tripartite agreement concluded was based on his conviction that a better US SST and a better Concorde would be built if several more years were allowed for their development. He felt that the schedules of the SST development programs on both sides of the Atlantic were much too fast to produce economical aircraft. Mr. Schaetzel asked if Dr. Enke could prepare and send the Department an economic study and justification for a tripartite agreement./3/ Dr. Enke said he would do so. Mr. Schaetzel said that when it was received, the Department would study it and let him know its views. /3/Not found.
125. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 8, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, AV 12. Confidential. Drafted by Amstutz on February 15. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Mr. Loy said that the purpose of his meeting with General Maxwell was to gain further insight into the US SST program and to obtain the General's views regarding Dr. Stephen Enke's (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense) proposal for a tripartite US-UK-France agreement to delay commercial introduction of the Concorde and the US SST./2/ /2/See Document 124. For purposes of perspective, General Maxwell said that the Concorde was expected to make its first prototype flight in 1968 and to be in commercial operation in 1971. The first flight of the US SST prototype was expected to take place in 1970 with commercial deliveries in 1974 at the earliest. There was a good possibility, however, that the US SST would not be ready for commercial service until 1976 or thereabouts. General Maxwell added that a unique feature of the US SST development schedule was the overlapping of the prototype, certification, and production phases. This is not the normal way civil aircraft are built. All three phases would overlap in 1970, and the certification and production phases would continue to overlap for three and a half more years. This overlapping of phases, with the many retoolings that will be required, promises to be very expensive. The full 4-year certification and production stage will cost $1 to $2 billion, bringing the total bill for the US SST (together with R&D costs) to $3 to $4 billion. This overlapping of phases is a consequence of a decision of the President's Advisory Committee which calls for: go slow now; accelerate later. Elimination of this overlapping of phases would result in an extension of the time necessary to develop a US SST. This would suggest that the FAA was in favor of Dr. Enke's proposal for a tripartite agreement. On the contrary, the FAA was against it. The idea of a tripartite agreement was raised and discussed last fall during a meeting of the President's Advisory Committee and was not adopted. It was discussed again most recently, a few days ago, between FAA Administrator General McKee and Secretary of Defense McNamara. Both agreed the proposal should not be pursued. General Maxwell said that the FAA was opposed to an agreement for several reasons. First, the FAA did not believe that the US was in a good bargaining position or could ever get the UK and France to delay introducing the Concorde. The builders of the Concorde were well aware of the time advantage they enjoyed over the US SST and may be cognizant that the 3-year lead time they now have could stretch to 5 years. They would be foolish to delay introducing their plane. Secondly, even if negotiations could be concluded successfully to delay introduction of the Concorde, FAA would oppose this for fear of the adverse appropriations effect this would have on Congress. Congress would be sure to learn of any attempt to delay introduction of the Concorde and US SST and would probably react by cutting FAA's annual requests for SST development funds. Any cut this year and for the next few years, when we are already in a slow stage, would be particularly unfortunate. In any case, it is hard to believe Congress would not try to stretch out its appropriations, with the effect that at the end of the extended period, the US SST would not be any more ready for service than under the present plan. It is thus doubtful that a more efficient US SST would end up being built by negotiating a stretch-out agreement. Thirdly, this year, 1966, is not the most advantageous time to negotiate with the UK and France. If we were to decide to negotiate, it would best be done in 1968. At that time, the UK and France will be faced with the decision of moving into their expensive production phase costing $1 billion or more. Similarly, the US would be at the point of requesting large appropriations for the first year of the overlapping phases mentioned above. Both sides and the three national legislatures involved would be faced with the need for very large sums and thus might be more amenable to some stretch-out agreement.
126. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency (McKee) to Vice President Humphrey/1/ Washington, March 15, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383. No classification marking. SUBJECT The establishment of the United States Supersonic Transport Program as one of the highest national urgency is considered necessary at this time if the United States is to maintain a reasonable international competitive position. The maintenance of test and prototype construction schedules require the provision of the DX industrial priority rating in the following critical areas: (a) Shortage category test facilities (b) Long lead time numerically controlled and shortage category machine tools (c) The processing of requirements for standard machine tools through the Defense Industrial Plant Equipment Center (d) Material procurement (e) Electronics (f) Forgings and extrusions The total SST Program through the planned delivery and flight test evaluation of two prototype aircraft represents an estimated expenditure of $1.3 billion through 1970. In accordance with existing procedures, the Federal Aviation Agency has coordinated this request with the Secretary of Defense and has received his indication of favorable support. Favorable consideration by the National Aeronautics and Space Council and your subsequent recommendation to the President, as Chairman, is most respectfully requested. William F. McKee
127. National Security Action Memorandum No. 344/1/ Washington, April 1, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964-66, AV 3. No classification marking. TO SUBJECT Under the authority vested in me by the Defense Production Act of 1950, I hereby assign the highest national priority to the Civil Supersonic Transport Development Program for research and development and for construction of two prototype aircraft, in accordance with the unanimous recommendation of the Members of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. Lyndon B. Johnson
128. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Loy) to the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board (Crooker)/1/ Washington, March 22, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, AV 12-7 US. No classification marking. Drafted by M. Styles (E/AN). Dear Mr. Chairman: At our meeting on March 14 concerning the US-Brazil negotiations,/2/ the Board invited the Department's comments on a proposal to undertake a study on the probable impact of the 747 and SST aircraft on our international aviation relations./3/ /2/The United States and Brazil were negotiating a bilateral air transport agreement, February 15-March 18; the agreement was concluded in July 1968. /3/Not found; historians at the FAA speculate that the study was never undertaken. The Department believes that such a study is indeed needed. We have, in fact, felt for some time that it would be desirable to look in depth into the question of the impact of aviation technological advances on U.S. international air transport policy and we had already given some preliminary thought to the question. It has been evident that, while much work has been done on the technical and economic characteristics of the 747 and SST, little or no study has been directed toward the effect which the introduction of these aircraft will have on the whole range of our international aviation policy. We should have a clear idea of what the impact will be, not only to plan for resolution of any problems when these advanced aircraft are introduced, but also to respond to foreign pressures for advance assurances of one sort or another, such as in the Brazilian situation. We believe that the General Counsel's memorandum of March 7,/4/ which was made available to us, provides a general outline of the scope and purpose of such a study. We offer the following comments either in amplification of or in addition to that memorandum: /4/Not found. 1. We agree that attention should be directed toward an appraisal of the introduction of jet aircraft in the late 1950's and 60's. For example, it would be instructive to review the expectations which then existed and whether these expectations proved to be correct or not. Identification of the problems that arose and their causes would be desirable, as well as a review of how these problems were resolved. While there may be differences between this situation and the situation with respect to the introduction of the 747 and SST, some valuable lessons might be learned. 2. Although the question is most simply put in terms of 747 and SST, we suggest that the study focus attention also on the stretched versions of current aircraft. Also, it may be necessary to differentiate among these various categories, since it does not necessarily follow that the situations with respect to the stretched aircraft, the 747, and the SST will be the same. In fact, there may be significant differences among these situations. 3. The possibility of arrangements (such as financing, leasing, or cooperative arrangements) for foreign carrier use of these aircraft certainly deserves close attention, since this may be a means of resolving the foreign competitive impact problem. 4. The fare question also is crucial. Perhaps a case can be made that, since the 747 is expected to have a lower cost per seat mile than present aircraft, there should be a discount on the fares. On the other hand, there may be pressures for a fare surcharge to reduce the competitive impact. Perhaps advance planning can avoid the prospect of having to decide between basically irreconcilable alternatives. 5. The impact of the new aircraft on capacity is perhaps the most critical question for U.S. air transport negotiations. We need to know, first of all, when and where the new aircraft will be used and the extent to which these services will replace existing services. The impact in these particular markets at the indicated times will then have to be determined, based on several sets of assumptions on the state of the market at the time. The Department welcomes the proposal that the Board undertake this study. In view of our very close interest in the subject, we would like to have the opportunity of participating in review of the study at appropriate stages and of contributing in any way we can to a useful end-product. Sincerely yours, /5/Printed from a copy that indicates Loy signed the original.
129. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Transportation for International Affairs and Special Programs (Agger) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Loy)/1/ Washington, April 10, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, AV 6 US. No classification marking. Dear Frank: I think we will need some fairly intensive consultations (including consultations with you), and plenty of careful thought before definitive conclusions can be reached on the points raised in your March 15 letter/2/ concerning the Concorde noise question. We are also well aware here in DOT that the question and its many ramifications have to be brought in hand soon. /2/These points included: "From various sources of late, we understand that the Concorde engines may or will be very noisy. If so, we could have some rather severe problems at the United States airports where these planes will be operated." (Ibid.) Our preliminary information (confirming your understanding) is that the Concorde will be very noisy, reaching levels significantly beyond those we contemplate as standards of tolerance for noise control purposes. Unfortunately, we will not have a fully adequate basis for decisions until we obtain the noise level measurements to be made in connection with the Concorde flight tests. There is no substitute for such data in assessing how the Concorde will really sound in various stages of take-off or landing, and in different modes of operation. We expect to have such information shortly after the forthcoming tests, and our technical authorities here have every confidence (given past experience with their French and British counterparts) that the data will be timely, reliable, and complete. Data should also be available during the early phases of flight testing to permit considering the related and equally if not more difficult question of the sonic boom. Meanwhile, it is obvious that the noise/sonic boom question, coming ripe with the approach of an operational Concorde, is a web of technical, legal, social, economic, and political issues. It is being undertaken here in DOT to put these many aspects into some coherent form, because that kind of understanding will be essential for any decision about the admissibility of aircraft; the conditions (such as speeds, times, routings, or operational modes) to be applied to their flights; and the distribution of responsibility (e.g., as between the DOT and local airport authorities) for various parts of our solutions. We recognize that the overall problem also contains important international factors, and that these must be taken into account. I look forward to discussing these aspects with you very soon. I think it might also be worthwhile if you would indicate a point-of-contact in your office with whom we might be in touch as the DOT work on this problem proceeds. Sincerely, /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. [Continue with the next documents]
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