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KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV EXCHANGES

1. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President-elect Kennedy

Moscow, November 9, 1960.

//Source: American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, p. 476. No classification marking.

ESTEEMED MR. KENNEDY, Allow me to congratulate you on the occasion of your election to the high post of the President of the United States.

We hope that while you are at this post the relations between our countries would again follow the line along which they were developing in Franklin Roosevelt's time, which would meet the basic interests not only of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and the United States but all mankind which is longing for deliverance from the threat of a new war.

I think you will agree that the eyes of many people are fixed on the United States and the Soviet Union because the destinies of world peace depend largely on the state of Soviet-American relations.

We have declared and declare our respect for the peaceable and gifted people of the United States and we are ready to develop the most friendly relations between the Soviet and the American peoples, between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

We are convinced that there are no insurmountable obstacles to the preservation and consolidation of peace.

For the sake of this goal we are ready, for our part, to continue efforts to solve such a pressing problem as disarmament, to settle the German issue through the earliest conclusion of a peace treaty and to reach agreement on other questions, the solution of which could bring about an easing and improvement of the entire international situation.

Any steps in this direction will always meet with the full understanding and support of the Soviet Government.

I wish you fruitful activity in the responsible capacity of United States President and prosperity to the American people./1/

/1/Printed from an unsigned copy.

2. Message From President-elect Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

November 10, 1960.

//Source: American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, p. 476. No classification marking.

I am most appreciative of your courtesy in sending me a message of congratulations./1/ The achievement of a just and lasting peace will remain a fundamental goal of this nation and a major task of its President. I am most pleased to have your good wishes at this time./2/

/1/Document 1.

/2/Printed from an unsigned copy.

3. Message From Chairmen Khrushchev and Brezhnev to President Kennedy

Moscow, January 20, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking. The source text is a Department of State translation of a commercial telegram from Moscow. Another copy of this message is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. This message is also printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 3, and American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 559.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We congratulate you on the occasion of your inauguration. Availing ourselves of this opportunity we wish to express the hope that by our joint efforts we shall succeed in achieving a fundamental improvement in relations between our countries and a normalization of the whole international situation. We are convinced that, step by step, it will be possible to remove existing suspicion and distrust and cultivate seeds of friendship and practical cooperation between our peoples. On its side the Soviet Government is always ready to support any good undertakings in this direction and do everything in its power in order that durable peace may be established in the world, so that all nations may live in friendship and without enmity.

N. Khrushchev
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

L. Brezhnev
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

4. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, January 21, 1961, 6:34 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-KE/1-2161. Unclassified; Niact. Drafted by McSweeney and Veliotes (SOV) and cleared by Goodpaster, Kretzmann, and Rusk. Another copy of this message is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. Also printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 3, and American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 560.

1174. For Ambassador. Please pass following Presidential message to Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

"N. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

L. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, The Kremlin, Moscow.

Please accept this expression of my appreciation for your kind message of congratulations/1/ on the occasion of my inauguration as President of the United States of America. I welcome your expression of hope for a fundamental improvement in relations between our two countries and in the world situation as a whole; it is a hope which we share. We are ready and anxious to cooperate with all who are prepared to join in genuine dedication to the assurance of a peaceful and a more fruitful life for all mankind. Speaking on behalf of the Government and people of the United States of America, as well as on my own behalf, I can assure you that the efforts of the United States Government will be directed toward this imperative goal.

/1/Document 3.

Sincerely, John F. Kennedy."

Message being released to press approximately 7:00 pm Washington time, January 21, 1961.

Rusk

5. Telegram From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, February 13, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/2-1361. Unclassified. Drafted by Rusk. A typed note on the source text indicates it was sent by commercial telegram. A copy of this message is also in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence, and Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.

I wish to extend my congratulations and those of the American people for the impressive scientific achievement represented by the launching of your space vehicle to Venus. We shall watch its progress with interest and wish you success in another chapter of man's exploration of the universe.

John F. Kennedy

6. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, February 15, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking. The source text is a Department of State translation of a commercial telegram from Moscow. Other copies of this message are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence, and Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/2-1561. The transliterated Russian text is ibid.

Received your telegram of congratulations on the occasion of the launching of the Soviet cosmic spaceship to the planet Venus./1/ I express gratitude to you for this telegram giving high appraisal to this outstanding achievement of peaceful science and for wishes for success in the new stage of the exploration of the cosmos. In your speech of inauguration to the office of President, and likewise in the message to Congress of January 30 you, Mr. President, said that you would like for the Soviet Union and the United States of America to unite their efforts in such areas as the struggle against disease, mastering the cosmos, development of culture and trade. Such an approach to these problems impresses us and we welcome these utterances of yours.

/1/Document 5.

We consider that favorable conditions for the most speedy solution of these noble tasks facing humanity would be created through the settlement of the problem of disarmament. And we would like every country to make every effort for the solution of this problem with the establishment of such a strict international control under which no one could arm secretly and commit aggression.

All agree to the fact that the solution of the problem of disarmament depends to a great extent on agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. If we reached such an agreement, it would be a great joy for all people on Earth and a great blessing for all mankind.

N. Khrushchev/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

7. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, February 22, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking. At the top of the source text is written "2/22/62?". The final drafting of this message was done at a meeting at the White House on February 21 attended by the President, Rusk, Thompson, Harriman, Bohlen, Kohler, and Bundy. No record of this meeting has been found, but it is noted in Rusk's Appointment Book (Johnson Library) and the President's Appointment Book (Kennedy Library), and is also mentioned in the first sentence of a February 26 memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy scheduled for publication in volume V. At noon on February 22 Rusk, Kohler, and Harriman briefed French Ambassador Alphand and British Ambassador Caccia on the content of this message stating that it was general in nature and informing them that specific questions would be addressed in further messages after consultations with their governments. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/2-2261) Regarding delivery of this letter to Khrushchev, see vol. V, Document 28. Printed in part in Claflin, The President Wants To Know, pp. 50-51.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have had an opportunity, due to the return of Ambassador Thompson, to have an extensive review of all aspects of our relations with the Secretary of State and with him. In these consultations, we have been able to explore, in general, not only those subjects which are of direct bilateral concern to the United States and the Soviet Union, but also the chief outstanding international problems which affect our relations.

I have not been able, in so brief a time, to reach definite conclusions as to our position on all of these matters. Many of them are affected by developments in the international scene and are of concern to many other governments. I would, however, like to set before you certain general considerations which I believe might be of help in introducing a greater element of clarity in the relations between our two countries. I say this because I am sure that you are conscious as I am of the heavy responsibility which rests upon our two Governments in world affairs. I agree with your thought that if we could find a measure of cooperation on some of these current issues this, in itself, would be a significant contribution to the problem of insuring a peaceful and orderly world.

I think we should recognize, in honesty to each other, that there are problems on which we may not be able to agree. However, I believe that while recognizing that we do not and, in all probability will not, share a common view on all of these problems, I do believe that the manner in which we approach them and, in particular, the manner in which our disagreements are handled, can be of great importance.

In addition, I believe we should make more use of diplomatic channels for quite informal discussion of these questions, not in the sense of negotiations (since I am sure that we both recognize the interests of other countries are deeply involved in these issues), but rather as a mechanism of communication which should, insofar as is possible, help to eliminate misunderstanding and unnecessary divergencies, however great the basic differences may be.

I hope it will be possible, before too long, for us to meet personally for an informal exchange of views in regard to some of these matters. Of course, a meeting of this nature will depend upon the general international situation at the time, as well as on our mutual schedules of engagements.

I have asked Ambassador Thompson to discuss the question of our meeting. Ambassador Thompson, who enjoys my full confidence, is also in a position to inform you of my thinking on a number of the international issues which we have discussed. I shall welcome any expression of your views. I hope such exchange might assist us in working out a responsible approach to our differences with the view to their ultimate resolution for the benefit of peace and security throughout the world. You may be sure, Mr. Chairman, that I intend to do everything I can toward developing a more harmonious relationship between our two countries.

Sincerely, John F. Kennedy/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

8. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, April 12, 1961, 1:24 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-KE/2-1261. Official Use Only; Niact. Drafted at the White House. Also printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 257.

1724. Deliver following message to Khrushchev from the President. Message being released 2:00 p.m. April 12 Washington time.

"The people of the United States share with the people of the Soviet Union their satisfaction for the safe flight of the astronaut in man's first venture into space. We congratulate you and the Soviet scientists and engineers who made this feat possible. It is my sincere desire that in the continuing quest for knowledge of outer space our nations can work together to obtain the greatest benefit to mankind.

John F. Kennedy"

Rusk

9. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, April 18, 1961, 2 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Another copy of this message is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. A slightly different translation is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 8, 1961, p. 662, and American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 295. The Russian-language text was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 747 from Moscow, May 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/5-361)

2550. Following letter to President Kennedy from Khrushchev handed me by Acting Foreign Minister Semenov at 12:15 today. Begin text:

Mr. President, I send you this message in an hour of alarm, fraught with danger for the peace of the whole world. Armed aggression has begun against Cuba. It is a secret to no one that the armed bands invading this country were trained, equipped and armed in the United States of America. The planes which are bombing Cuban cities belong to the United States of America, the bombs they are dropping are being supplied by the American Government.

All of this evokes here in the Soviet Union an understandable feeling of indignation on the part of the Soviet Government and the Soviet people.

Only recently, in exchanging opinions through our respective representatives, we talked with you about the mutual desire of both sides to put forward joint efforts directed toward improving relations between our countries and eliminating the danger of war. Your statement a few days ago that the USA would not participate in military activities against Cuba created the impression that the top leaders of the United States were taking into account the consequences for general peace and for the USA itself which aggression against Cuba could have. How can what is being done by the United States in reality be understood, when an attack on Cuba has now become a fact?

It is still not late to avoid the irreparable. The Government of the USA still has the possibility of not allowing the flame of war ignited by interventions in Cuba to grow into an incomparable conflagration. I approach you, Mr. President, with an urgent call to put an end to aggression against the Republic of Cuba. Military armament and the world political situation are such at this time that any so-called "little war" can touch off a chain reaction in all parts of the globe.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, there should be no mistake about our position: We will render the Cuban people and their government all necessary help to repel armed attack on Cuba. We are sincerely interested in a relaxation of international tension, but if others proceed toward sharpening, we will answer them in full measure. And in general it is hardly possible so to conduct matters that the situation is settled in one area and conflagration extinguished, while a new conflagration is ignited in another area.

I hope that the Government of the USA will consider our views as dictated by the sole concern not to allow steps which could lead the world to military catastrophe. End text.

Freers

10. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, April 18, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking. The source text is a press release from the Office of the White House Press Secretary, which was marked for release at 6:45 p.m. April 18. Another copy of this message is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. Also printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 286-287; American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 296-297; and Claflin, The President Wants To Know, pp. 59-60.

MR. CHAIRMAN: You are under a serious misapprehension in regard to events in Cuba. For months there has been evident and growing resistance to the Castro dictatorship. More than 100,000 refugees have recently fled from Cuba into neighboring countries. Their urgent hope is naturally to assist their fellow Cubans in their struggle for freedom. Many of these refugees fought alongside Dr. Castro against the Batista dictatorship; among them are prominent leaders of his own original movement and government.

These are unmistakable signs that Cubans find intolerable the denial of democratic liberties and the subversion of the 26th of July Movement by an alien-dominated regime. It cannot be surprising that, as resistance within Cuba grows, refugees have been using whatever means are available to return and support their countrymen in the continuing struggle for freedom. Where people are denied the right of choice, recourse to such struggle is the only means of achieving their liberties.

I have previously stated, and I repeat now, that the United States intends no military intervention in Cuba. In the event of any military intervention by outside force we will immediately honor our obligations under the inter-American system to protect this hemisphere against external aggression. While refraining from military intervention in Cuba, the people of the United States do not conceal their admiration for Cuban patriots who wish to see a democratic system in an independent Cuba. The United States government can take no action to stifle the spirit of liberty.

I have taken careful note of your statement that the events in Cuba might affect peace in all parts of the world./1/ I trust that this does not mean that the Soviet government, using the situation in Cuba as a pretext, is planning to inflame other areas of the world. I would like to think that your government has too great a sense of responsibility to embark upon any enterprise so dangerous to general peace.

/1/See Document 9.

I agree with you as to the desirability of steps to improve the international atmosphere. I continue to hope that you will cooperate in opportunities now available to this end. A prompt cease-fire and peaceful settlement of the dangerous situation in Laos, cooperation with the United Nations in the Congo and a speedy conclusion of an acceptable treaty for the banning of nuclear tests would be constructive steps in this direction. The regime in Cuba could make a similar contribution by permitting the Cuban people freely to determine their own future by democratic processes and freely to cooperate with their Latin American neighbors.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that you should recognize that free peoples in all parts of the world do not accept the claim of historical inevitability for Communist revolution. What your government believes is its own business; what it does in the world is the world's business. The great revolution in the history of man, past, present and future, is the revolution of those determined to be free.

John F. Kennedy/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

11. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, April 22, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking. Transmitted in telegram 2562 from Moscow, April 11. A copy of section 1 of 3 of that telegram is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. The source text was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 1183 from Moscow, May 11, and indicates it was "translated from Russian." The Russian-language text was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 747 from Moscow, May 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/5-361) A slightly different text is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 8, 1961, pp. 664-667.

MR. PRESIDENT, I have received your reply of April 18./1/ You write that the United States intends no military intervention in Cuba. But numerous facts known to the whole world--and to the Government of the United States, of course, better than to any one else--speak differently. Despite all assurances to the contrary, it has now been proved beyond doubt that it was precisely the United$States which prepared the intervention, financed its arming and transported the gangs of mercenaries that invaded the territory of Cuba.

/1/Document 10.

United States armed forces also took a direct part in the accomplishment of the gangster attack upon Cuba. American bombers and fighters supported the operations of the mercenaries who landed on Cuban territory, and participated in the military operations against the armed forces of the lawful Government and people of Cuba.

Such are the facts. They bear witness to direct United States participation in the armed aggression against Cuba.

In your message you took the course of justifying, and even lauding, the attack on Cuba--this crime which has revolted the entire world. You try to justify the organization of a military attack on Cuba, committed for the sole reason that the way of life chosen by its people is not to the taste of the ruling circles of the United States and the North American monopolies operating in Latin America, by talk about the United States Government's adherence to the ideals of "freedom". But, one may ask, of what freedom are you speaking?

Of freedom to strangle the Cuban people with the bony hand of hunger through the establishment of an economic blockade? Is that freedom?

Of freedom to send military planes over the territory of Cuba, to subject peaceful Cuban cities to barbarous bombing, to set fire to sugar-cane plantations? Is that freedom?

History records many cases in which, on the pretext of defending freedom, peoples have been drowned in blood, colonial wars waged, and one small nation after another taken by the throat.

In the present case, apparently, the United States Government is seeking to restore to Cuba that "freedom" under which Cuba would dance to the tune of her more powerful neighbour and foreign monopolies would again be able to plunder the country's national wealth, to wax rich on the sweat and blood of the Cuban people. But it is precisely against such "freedom" that the Cuban people accomplished their revolution when they threw out Batista, who may have loyally served the interests of his foreign masters but who was a foreign element in the body of the Cuban nation.

You, Mr. President, display concern for a handful of enemies who were expelled by their people and found refuge under the wing of those who want to keep the guns of their cruisers and destroyers trained on Cuba. But why are you not concerned about the fate of the six million Cuban people, why do you not wish to pay regard to their inalienable right to a free and independent life, their right to arrange their domestic affairs as they see fit? Where are the standards of international law, or even of simple human morality, that would justify such a position? They simply do not exist.

The Cuban people have once again expressed their will with a clarity which should have left no room for doubt, even in the minds of those who prefer to close their eyes to reality. They have shown that they not only know their interests, but can stand up for them. Cuba today is not, of course, the Cuba you identify with the handful of traitors who have come out against their people. It is the Cuba of workers, peasants and intellectuals, it is a people which has rallied round its revolutionary Government headed by the national hero, Fidel Castro. And, judging from everything, this people received the interventionists in a fitting way. Is not this convincing proof of the real will of the Cuban people?

I think it is. And since this is so, is it not time for all to draw from it the right conclusions?

As for the Soviet Union, we have stated on many occasions, and I now state again, that our Government does not seek any advantages or privileges in Cuba. We have no bases in Cuba, and we do not intend to establish any. And this is well known to you, to your generals and your admirals. If, despite this, they still try to frighten the people by fabrications about "Soviet bases" on Cuba, that is obviously designed for consumption by simpletons. But there are fewer and fewer such simpletons, and that applies also, I hope, to the United States.

By the way, Mr. President, I would like to express my opinion concerning the statements made by you and by certain other United States politicians to the effect that rockets and other weapons could be installed on Cuban territory for possible use against the United States.

The inference from this is that the United States has some alleged right to attack Cuba, either directly or through the traitors to the Cuban people whom you arm with your weapons, train on your territory, maintain with the money of United States taxpayers and transport with the resources of your armed forces, covering them from the air and the sea while they fight against the Cuban people and their lawful government.

You also refer to some United States obligations to protect the Western hemisphere against external aggression. But what obligations can possibly apply in the present case? No one can have any obligations to defend rebels against the lawful government of a sovereign State, such as Cuba is.

Mr. President, you are setting out on a very dangerous road. Think of it. You speak of your rights and obligations, and, of course, anyone can claim this or that right. But then you will have to admit that other States, too, can base their actions in similar circumstances on similar arguments and considerations.

You allege that Cuba can lend her territory for actions against the United States. That is your supposition, but it is based on no facts. We, on the other hand, can already refer to concrete facts, not suppositions: in some countries, bordering on the Soviet Union by land and sea, there are at present Governments following a policy that is far from reasonable, Governments which have concluded military agreements with the United States and have made their territory available for the establishment of American military bases. And your military say openly that these bases are spearheaded against the Soviet Union, as if this were not already sufficiently clear. So, if you consider yourself entitled to take such measures against Cuba as the United States Government has been resorting to lately, you must admit that other countries have no lesser grounds for acting in the same way with regard to States whose territories are the scene of actual preparations constituting a threat to the security of the Soviet Union. If you do not want to sin against elementary logic, you must obviously concede this right to other States. We, for our part, do not hold such views. We consider that the arguments advanced on this score in the United States constitute, not merely an extremely free interpretation of international law, but, to put it plainly, open advocacy of a treacherous policy.

A powerful State can of course always find a pretext for attacking a weaker country, and then justify its attack by claiming that that country was a potential menace. But is this twentieth-century morality? This is the morality of the colonialists, of the brigands who once pursued precisely such a policy. Today, in the second half of the twentieth century, it is no longer possible to take the pirate morality of the colonialists as a guide. We all see, today, how the colonial system is crumbling and becoming a thing of the past. The Soviet Union, for its part, is doing everything to promote this process, and we are proud of it.

Or take the United States actions with regard to China. What stand-ards of law can be invoked to justify these actions? Everyone knows that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. This has been admitted even by the Government of the United States, whose signature appears on the Cairo Declaration of 1943. But later the United States seized Taiwan--took, in fact, the road to brigandage. The People's Republic of China announced its natural aspiration to reunite the territory of Taiwan with the rest of Chinese territory. But how did the United States react to this? It declared that it would use armed force to prevent reunification of this Chinese territory, seized by it, with the rest of China. It threatens war if China takes any steps towards the recovery of Taiwan. And this is being done by a country which has officially recognized that Taiwan belongs to China! Is not this perfidy in international relations? If such methods were to become the rule in relations between States, there would be no place left for law. Its place would be taken by lawlessness and arbitrariness.

So, Mr. President, your sympathies are one thing; but actions against the security and independence of other peoples, taken on the basis of such sympathies, are very much another. You may, of course, express your sympathy with the imperialist and colonialist countries; that does not surprise anyone. For example, you vote with them in the United Nations. This is a matter of your morality. But what has been done against Cuba is no longer morality. It is gangsterism.

I should like to stress that if the United Nations is really to become strong and fulfil the functions for which it was established--and at present this Organization, unfortunately, is a body already infected by the bacilli of colonialism and imperialism--the United Nations must resolutely condemn the banditry undertaken against Cuba. And the point here is not merely to condemn the United States. The important thing is that the condemnation of aggression should be seen to be a precedent, a lesson which other countries, too, might learn, so that aggression should never again be repeated. For if we were to take the course of approving or even, simply, condoning the morality of the aggressors, it could be adopted by other States as well, and this would inevitably lead to military conflicts, any of which might result in a third world war.

What you said in your last statement to the Press/2/ must fill the entire world with great alarm. For you simply claim, in fact, some right of yours to employ military force whenever you find it necessary, and to suppress other peoples each time you decide that their expression of their will constitutes "communism". But what right have you, what right has anyone in general, to deprive a people of the possibility of choosing their social and political system of their own free will? Have you never considered that other countries, too, might perhaps advance a demand similar to yours and might declare that you, in the United States, have a system which breeds wars and espouses an imperialist policy, the policy of threats and attacks against other countries? There is every ground for such accusations. And, proceeding from the principles which you now proclaim, one could, apparently, demand a change in the internal system of the United States. We, as you know, do not follow that road. We favour the peaceful coexistence of all States, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

/2/Reference is to President Kennedy's address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 20; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 304-306.

You allude to Budapest. But we can tell you openly, without any allusions: it is you, the United States, that crushed the independence of Guatemala by sending your mercenaries there, as you are now trying to do with regard to Cuba. It is the United States, and no other country, that still mercilessly exploits and keeps in economic bondage the countries of Latin America and many other countries of the world. This is known to all. And if, Mr. President, your logic is to be followed, actions from without could apparently be organized against your country too, to put an end forever to this imperialist policy, the policy of threats, the policy of suppressing the freedom-loving peoples.

As for your concern for the emigres expelled by the Cuban people, I should like to add the following. You are of course well aware that there are, in many countries, emigres who are dissatisfied with the situation and the system existing in the countries from which they fled. And if the abnormal practice were introduced, in relations between States, of using these emigres, especially with arms in their hand, against the countries they had fled from, it can be openly said that this would inevitably lead to conflicts and wars. It would therefore be well to refrain from such ill-advised actions. This is a slippery and dangerous road which can lead to a new world war.

In your reply, you saw fit to touch upon certain questions unrelated to the subject of my message to you, including the question--as interpreted by you--of the historic inevitability of a communist revolution. I can only regard this as an attempt to evade the main question--that of aggression against Cuba. We are prepared, in appropriate circumstances, to exchange opinions on the question of the ways in which human society develops, although this question cannot be settled by debates between groups or individuals, however high their position may be. The question of whose system is the better will be decided by history, by the peoples themselves.

You, Mr. President, speak often and much of your desire that Cuba should be free. But that attitude is flatly contradicted by all United States actions with regard to this small country, let alone the latest armed attack upon Cuba organized with a view to changing Cuba's internal system by force. It was the United States which nearly 60 years ago imposed on Cuba the enslaving terms of the Havana Treaty and established its Guantanamo naval base on Cuban territory. Yet the United States is the most powerful country in the Western hemisphere, and no one in that hemisphere can threaten you with a military invasion. Consequently, if you continue to retain your naval base on Cuban territory against the clearly expressed will of the Cuban people and its Government, it is because this base is designed, not to serve as a defense against an attack by any external forces, but to suppress the will of the Latin American peoples. It was established to fulfil the functions of a gendarme, to keep the peoples of Latin America politically and economically dependent.

The Government of the United States is now fulminating against Cuba. But this indicates only one thing--your lack of trust in your own system, in the policy pursued by the United States. And this is understandable, as it is a policy of exploitation, a policy for the economic enslavement of under-developed countries. You have no confidence in your own system, and therefore fear that Cuba's example may prove contagious for other countries. But aggressive, bandit actions cannot save your system. In the historic process of the development of human society, each people decides, and will decide, its own destiny.

As for the Soviet Union, the peoples of our country settled this question finally and irrevocably over 43 years ago. We constitute a socialist state. Our social system is the most equitable of all that have so far existed, because in our country all the means of production are owned by those who work. That is indeed a contagious example, and the sooner the need to go over to this system is realized, the sooner will the whole of mankind achieve a really just society. By this very development, an end will be put, once and for all, to war.

You, Mr. President, did not like it when I said, in my previous message, that there can be no stable place in the world if anywhere war is aflame. But this is really so. The world is a single whole, whether we like it or not. And I can only repeat what I said: it is impossible to proceed by adjusting the situation and putting out the flames in one area, and kindling a new conflagration in another.

The Soviet State has always been a consistent defender of the freedom and independence of all peoples. We naturally, therefore, cannot concede to the United States any right to control the destinies of other countries, including the countries of Latin America. We consider that any interference by one State in the affairs of another--especially armed interference--is a violation of all international laws and of the principles of peaceful coexistence which the Soviet Union has invariably upheld since the first days of its existence.

If it is now, more than ever before, the duty of every State and its leaders not to permit actions which are capable of jeopardizing universal peace, that applies with all the more force to the leaders of the great Powers. It is this that I urge upon you, Mr. President.

The Soviet Government's position in international affairs remains unchanged. We wish to build our relations with the United States in such a way that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States, as the two most powerful countries in the world, shall engage in sabre-rattling or push their military or economic superiority to the forefront, since that would lead to an aggravation of the international situation, not to its improvement. We are sincerely desirous of reaching agreement, both with you and with other countries of the world, on disarmament and all the other questions whose solution would promote peaceful coexistence, the recognition of every people's right to the social and political systems established by it, genuine respect for the will of the peoples and non-interference in their internal affairs. Only under these conditions can one really speak of coexistence, for coexistence is possible only if States with different social systems obey international laws and recognize the maintenance of world peace as their highest aim. Only in that event will peace be based on firm foundations.

N. Khrushchev/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

12. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, April 30, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking. The source text is a Department of State translation of a commercial telegram from Moscow. The transliterated Russian text is ibid.

EXCELLENCY: Allow me to express to the people of the United States and to you personally gratitude for congratulations on the occasion of the unprecedented exploit of the Soviet people--the successful launching of the first human being into space./1/

/1/See Document 8.

I express the hope that the Soviet Union and the United States may work together on the matter of mastering the universe, considering the mastering of the universe as a part of the great task of creating peace without armaments and war.

N. Khrushchev

13. Telegram From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, May 6, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 911.802/5-661. No classification marking. Another copy of this message is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. A slightly different translation is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. The Russian-language text is ibid.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

On behalf of the people of the Soviet Union and on my own behalf I send you and all the American people sincere congratulations on the occasion of the successful launching of a rocket, with a man on board, that flew a distance of 300 miles and that, during flight, reached a height of up to 115 miles.

Recent outstanding achievements in man's conquest of the cosmos open up boundless possibilities for understanding nature, in the name of progress.

Please convey my heartfelt congratulations to the pilot, Shepard.

N. Khrushchev

14. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, undated.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking. Drafted by Hartley (S/S-RO) on May 7 and cleared by Davis, Farley (S/AE), and McCloskey (P). The source text, titled "Suggested Reply," is double spaced.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The American people and I sincerely thank you for your/1/ message conveying congratulations on behalf of yourself and the Soviet people on the occasion of the flight of Commander Shepard in the first American manned exploration of space./2/

/1/The word "kind" is crossed out at this point in the source text.

/2/See Document 13.

We believe that the peaceful exploration of space is a venture undertaken on behalf of mankind as a whole. In that spirit, each new step in the conquest and understanding of space, wherever made, will be an achievement in which all of us share.

Sincerely,/3/

/3/Printed from an unsigned copy.

15. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at Geneva

Washington, May 16, 1961, 1:33 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. Secret; Niact; Verbatim Text. Repeated to Moscow. Another copy is in Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/5-1661. A copy of the Russian-language text is ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.

Tosec 121. Eyes only Secretary and Ambassador Thompson. Following is unofficial translation letter from Khrushchev which Menshikov handed President at White House today:

Begin Text

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I would like, although with a certain delay, to thank you for the message which was delivered to me by Ambassador Thompson in Novosibirsk on March 9./1/ I welcome the spirit of cooperation in which this message was composed, and I think I will not be wrong if I say that it cannot be a bad beginning for our personal contacts and mutual exchange of opinions. We share the considerations, which you expressed in the course of your recent conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A.A. Gromyko,/2/ concerning the necessity of avoiding dangerous complications, creating a threat to peace, and to assure peaceful co-existence and the peaceful development of our countries.

/1/See Document 7.

/2/See the March 27 memorandum of conversation in volume V.

Unfortunately, the international atmosphere has recently become somewhat heated in connection with the well-known events relating to Cuba, and a certain open falling out has taken place in the relations between our countries. There is no need to repeat now what I have already said in the name of the Soviet Government concerning the position of the USA in the Cuban events.

Speaking frankly, we regret that these events took place in general. However, we hope that the differences of opinion which have recently arisen will be eliminated with time, that the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States will improve if, of course, a mutual desire for this is demonstrated. Now, as never before, it is necessary without losing time to build and expand the bridges of mutual understanding with the help of which it would be possible to improve relations between our countries, which, if one speaks frankly, are still divided by a muddy stream of mistrust and hostility born of the "cold war."

I consider it necessary in this connection to emphasize especially our positive attitude toward the opinion, which you expressed in your message, about the necessity of deciding international problems and differences of opinion between our countries by peaceful means. I think that the bilateral exchange of opinions between the leaders of the USA and the USSR, so fruitfully carried out during the time of Franklin Roosevelt, can also now contribute to the achievement of this aim to a significant degree. We also, even as you, Mr. President, attach great significance to this. Indeed, the question of easing international tension and consequently the creation of favorable conditions for deciding virtually all important international problems depends to an enormous extent on the improvement of Soviet-American relations.

Ambassador Thompson explained to me your deliberation about the expediency of a personal meeting between us for an exchange of views on questions of mutual interest. Your initiative concerning a meeting has found a favorable response among us and we agree with you concerning the usefulness of such an exchange of views. I confirm by this letter that I accept your proposal for a meeting. The time and place of the meeting which you have proposed, namely June 3-4 in Vienna, are acceptable to me.

One of the problems which, as is apparent from the exchange of views, gives rise to our mutual concern is the situation in Laos. The Soviet Union hopes that at the International Conference in Geneva a peaceful and just solution of this problem will be found. We consider that at the present time there is every possibility to guarantee the establishment of peace in that region and to spare the people of Laos as well as other peoples from the danger of the broadening of the present conflict. For this it is necessary only to proceed steadfastly along the indicated correct path, and not to undertake anything which could lead to a complication of the international situation. If, on the part of all participants of the conference there is revealed a sincere desire for the creation of a truly neutral and independent Laos, I think that from the moment of our meeting with you we could with pleasure state that the settlement of the problem of Laos had become a fact.

There is also a series of other vitally important problems requiring solution. Among these, first of all, is the problem of disarmament. You, Mr. President, naturally are familiar with the views of the Soviet Government and its concrete proposals on this question. Therefore, it seems to me that there is no necessity to repeat all of these considerations in this letter. I wish only to underline that according to our firm conviction a practical implementation of disarmament is the most urgent and important problem in the sphere of international life in our time. Speaking figuratively, the solution of this problem could be compared to the seizure of the highest height which has been unattainable up to this time by mankind, after which it would be significantly easier to solve other unresolved problems. I should like to express the hope that our meeting can create the necessary premises for the success of the bilateral talks which are scheduled for June-July of this year between our countries on the problems of disarmament. We would only welcome this.

There is another international problem which urgently requires a solution. It is important both for the strengthening of peace in Europe and for the support of general peace. This is the problem of a peaceful settlement with Germany, including the question of Western Berlin. I believe that you have at your disposal complete information concerning the views of the Soviet Government in this regard. In conversations with your Ambassador, I have set forth our position in complete frankness. It is to be hoped, Mr. President, that you will approach this position with understanding: we do not demand any unilateral advantages of any sort for ourselves. We propose a peaceful settlement, which proceeds from the actually existing situation and which is directed toward the liquidation of a dangerous source of tension in the very heart of Europe. We seek only that finally the line should be drawn under the Second World War. The signature of a peace treaty with Germany, I am deeply convinced, would be a significant landmark in the improvement of relations between our countries.

In your letter, you, Mr. President, speak of the fact that we should recognize the fact that there are problems concerning which we cannot agree and concerning which in our governments there can be a different point of view. I agree with you. In the solution of international problems, large or small, there are, and will be, not a few difficulties. But it is our task, as heads of state, to strive to overcome them and to do everything possible for the attainment of agreement concerning questions which are ripe for solution.

I hope that at our forthcoming meeting we will be able to continue the exchange of views both on problems which have been touched on in our letters and on other problems and to indicate the path or, if you wish, the direction for their further examination and settlement.

Respectfully, N. Khrushchev

Chairman of the Council of Ministers, USSR./3/

May 12, 1961. End text.

/3/Following transmission of the text of this letter to Thompson, the Department of State informed him that he should seek an appointment with the Acting Soviet Foreign Minister to say that, subject to Austrian approval, a meeting on June 3 and 4 was agreeable. (Telegram 1980 to Moscow, May 16; Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-KE/5-1661) In a separate telegram the Department of State instructed Ambassador Matthews to ask the Austrian Government if a meeting on June 3 and 4, despite the short notice, was agreeable. (Telegram 1984 to Vienna, May 16; ibid.)

Bowles

16. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, June 10, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking. Another copy of this message is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence.

Dear Mr. Chairman: Many thanks for your kindness in presenting me with a case of beverages during our recent meeting in Vienna./1/ I would also like to express my appreciation to the Soviet Government for the gold cigar chest, caviar and records. For these courtesies I am very grateful.

/1/Regarding these meetings June 3-4, see volume V.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates the original was signed by President Kennedy.

17. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, June 21, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I want to express to you my very great appreciation for your thoughtfulness in sending to me the model of an American whaler, which we discussed while in Vienna. It now rests in my office here at the White House.

Mrs. Kennedy and I were particularly pleased to receive "Pushinka." Her flight from the Soviet Union to the United States was not as dramatic as the flight of her mother, nevertheless, it was a long voyage and she stood it well. We both appreciate your remembering these matters in your busy life.

We send to you, your wife and your family our very best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

John F. Kennedy

18. Letter From Chairmen Khrushchev and Brezhnev to President Kennedy

Moscow, July 3, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking. The source text is a Department of State translation. Another copy is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspond-ence. Also printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, p. 493, and American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 593.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, Personally and on behalf of the Soviet people we send to the American people, and to you personally, our sincere congratulations on the occasion of this important date in the life of the American people, namely, the 185th anniversary of achieving their independence. While sending our congratulations to you today, we want to express the hope that the recent Vienna meeting, and the exchange of opinions which took place there on questions of interest to both countries, will further the mutual efforts of our governments directed to the urgent solution of problems which long ago became pressing and which the last war left to us after the defeat of the aggressors. History imposed on our peoples, on their governments and on their leaders an enormous share of the responsibility for the preservation of peace, for the future of humanity. In order to carry out this great historical mission it is necessary to commence building, from both sides, enduring bridges of trust, of mutual understanding and of friendship. The Soviet Union has always striven and strives now to achieve this aim. The Soviet and the American peoples by right must go down in history as the two great peoples who made a decisive contribution to the cause of ensuring permanent peace on earth.

N. Khrushchev

L. Brezhnev/1/

/1/Printed from a translation that indicates the original was signed by Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

19. Telegram From President Kennedy to Chairmen Khrushchev and Brezhnev

Washington, July 4, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-KE/7J461. Unclassified. Drafted by Davis and cleared by the White House and Rusk. Another copy of this message is ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, and in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. Also printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 493, and American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 594.

I wish to thank you personally and on behalf of the American people for your greetings on the occasion of the 185th Anniversary of the Independence of the United States./1/ It is a source of satisfaction to me that on our 185th Anniversary the United States is still committed to the revolutionary principles, of individual liberty and national freedom for all peoples, which motivated our first great leader. I am confident that given a sincere desire to achieve a peaceful settlement of the issues which still disturb the world's tranquillity we can, in our time, reach that peaceful goal which all peoples so ardently desire. A special responsibility at this time rests upon the Soviet Union and the United States. I wish to assure the people of your country of our desire to live in friendship and peace with them.

John F. Kennedy

/1/Document 18.

20. Editorial Note

On September 5, 1961, Cyrus Sulzberger met with Khrushchev and during an off-the-record conversation Khrushchev gave him a message for President Kennedy, emphasizing that it was off-the-record. Sulzberger transmitted the following message to the President on September 10:

"If you are personally in a position to meet President Kennedy, I wish you would tell him that I would not be loath to establishing some sort of informal contact with him to find a means of settling the crisis without damaging the prestige of the United States--but on the basis of a German peace treaty and a Free City of West Berlin.

"The President might say what is in his mind concerning ways of solving the problem--if he agrees in principle with the peace treaty and a Free City. Otherwise, there is no use in contacts.

"If he does wish some settlement he could, through informal contacts, voice his opinion on various forms and stages and on how to prepare public opinion and not endanger the prestige of the United States or Mr. Kennedy." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163) Also printed in Last of the Giants, pages 801-802.

21. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, September 29, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking. According to Salinger, this letter was handed to him by Bolshakov, at the Carlyle Hotel in New York on September 30, who said that it was for the President's eyes only. (With Kennedy, p. 198) Another copy is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. A copy of the Russian text, dated September 28, and also given to Salinger on September 30, is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. This is the first in a series of letters and messages between Kennedy and Khrushchev, transmitted through special emissaries, that subsequently became known as the "Pen Pal Correspondence."

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, At present I am on the shore of the Black Sea. When they write in the press that Khrushchev is resting on the Black Sea it may be said that this is correct and at the same time incorrect. This is indeed a wonderful place. As a former Naval officer you would surely appreciate the merits of these surroundings, the beauty of the sea and the grandeur of the Caucasian mountains. Under this bright southern sun it is even somehow hard to believe that there still exist problems in the world which, due to lack of solutions, cast a sinister shadow on peaceful life, on the future of millions of people.

But as you will fully understand, I cannot at this time permit myself any relaxation. I am working, and here I work more fruitfully because my attention is not diverted to routine matters of which I have plenty, probably like you yourself do. Here I can concentrate on the main things.

I have given much thought of late to the development of international events since our meeting in Vienna, and I have decided to approach you with this letter. The whole world hopefully expected that our meeting and a frank exchange of views would have a soothing effect, would turn relations between our countries into the correct channel and promote the adoption of decisions which could give the peoples confidence that at last peace on earth will be secured. To my regret--and, I believe, to yours--this did not happen.

I listened with great interest to the account which our journalists Adjubei and Kharlamov gave of the meeting they had with you in Washington./1/ They gave me many interesting details and I questioned them most thoroughly. You prepossessed them by your informality, modesty and frankness which are not to be found very often in men who occupy such a high position.

/1/See Pierre Salinger's June 26 memorandum of conversation in volume V.

My thoughts have more than once returned to our meetings in Vienna./2/ I remember you emphasized that you did not want to proceed towards war and favoured living in peace with our country while competing in the peaceful domain. And though subsequent events did not proceed in the way that could be desired, I thought it might be useful in a purely informal and personal way to approach you and share some of my ideas. If you do not agree with me you can consider that this letter did not exist while naturally I, for my part, will not use this correspondence in my public statements. After all only in confidential correspondence can you say what you think without a backward glance at the press, at the journalists.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 16.

As you see, I started out by describing the delights of the Black Sea coast, but then I nevertheless turned to politics. But that cannot be helped. They say that you sometimes cast politics out through the door but it climbs back through the window, particularly when the windows are open.

I have given careful thought to what you told our journalists in your personal talk with them and to the difficulties to which you referred. Of course, I fully understand that the questions which have now matured and require solution are not of the kind that easily lend themselves to solution. But they have a vitally important significance for our countries and for all the countries of the world. And therefore we cannot escape them. We cannot shift the burden of solving those questions onto the shoulders of others. And who else but the leaders of the two most influential and mighty States--the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.--can the nations expect to work out solutions which could form the basis for the consolidation of peace. After your meeting with Adjubei and Kharlamov I was about to write you a letter right then and, I admit, even drafted one. However, your television address in July,/3/ unfortunately, made it impossible for me to send that letter. After that speech which, putting it bluntly, was belligerent in its nature, my letter would not have been understood by you since it completely differed in spirit, content and tone from what you said. After that we not only made speeches and exchanged statements but, unfortunately, also proceeded to an exchange of actions which will not, and indeed cannot, yield any moral satisfaction either to you as President of the United States or to me as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. Evidently both one side and the other are compelled to undertake their actions under the pressure of the various factors and conditions which exist and which--unless we exert a restraining influence--will propel the development of events in a direction in which you and I, and the more so the peoples of all countries, would not like them to be propelled. It would be most of all unwise from the standpoint of peace to enter into such a vicious circle when some would be responding with counter-measures to the measures of others, and vice versa. The whole world could bog down in such measures and counter-measures.

/3/For text of the President's radio and television address to the American people, July 25, 1961, see Pubic Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 533-540.

Lately I have had not a few meetings with eminent statesmen and political leaders of Western countries. I have talked with Mr. Fanfani, the Prime Minister of Italy. I shall not describe that talk of which I suppose he, as a representative of a State allied with you, had informed you. Recently I had a conversation with the former Prime Minister of France Mr. Paul Reynaud. He raised a number of questions to which I frankly replied. After Paul Reynaud I received Mr. Spaak, the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of Belgium, who for a number of years was the Secretary General of NATO./4/ I listened to him with attention and tried to reply to his questions as exhaustively as possible, to expound our position and explain how we consider it best to solve those questions. I must say that in my opinion understanding can be reached on those questions which were touched upon in my talk with Mr. Spaak. To this end it is only necessary that both sides should display equal interest in settling the problems at issue on a mutually acceptable basis.

/4/Amintore Fanfani visited Moscow August 3-5; Paul Reynaud September 15; and Paul Henri Spaak September 19.

The statesmen of many countries are presently displaying great concern for the destinies of peace, they are seriously troubled by the tense situation that has taken shape and they sincerely fear that some rash actions might bring the world to disaster and to the unleashing of nuclear war. These feelings are dear to me and I understand them because, like many Soviet people, I spent the war years at the front and lived through all the horrors of war. I am against war. The Soviet Government is against war. The peoples of the Soviet Union are against war. I say this to you because I believe that you--a direct participant in the battles of the last war--take the same position.

I should like in this connection to dwell upon some of the basic problems which now preoccupy the whole world since the future of mankind depends on their solution. It can be said that in the disarmament question which is the major question of our time there have now appeared certain gleams./5/ I would like to see those gleams in the fact that we have reached agreement on submitting to the United Nations General Assembly a "Statement of Principles"/6/ as a joint proposal of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. so that in subsequent negotiations a treaty on general and complete disarmament can be elaborated on its basis. Certainly it must not be forgotten that so far this is an agreement in regard to the principles of disarmament. This is as yet far from the achievement of the actual agreement on general and complete disarmament, and the more so this is not the practical start of such disarmament. But it is precisely the conclusion of such an agreement and its implementation within the shortest possible time that all the nations are expecting of us. For them and for all of us that would mean great joy.

/5/A better translation of "gleams" might be "glimmering of light."

/6/For text of the Statement of Principles, September 20 (U.N. doc A/4879), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1091-1094.

It is important to note that even understanding on the principles of disarmament which we have succeeded in reaching after protracted and intense effort and only after you came to the White House, is a good thing too. Naturally such understanding is not an end in itself. It must, so to say, be the harbinger, the first successful step on the road to general and complete disarmament. That is what we would like to hope.

If, Mr. President, you are striving towards that noble goal--and I believe that is the case--if agreement of the United States on the principles of disarmament is not merely a diplomatic or tactical manoeuvre, you will find complete understanding on our part and we shall stint no effort in order to find a common language and reach the required agreement together with you.

The Soviet Union, as you are well aware, has always advocated the prompt implementation of general and complete disarmament. The solution of that question would, in our profound conviction, radically promote the settlement of other major international problems as well. Our position in that respect is still unchanged.

But you will agree with me, Mr. President, that the present international situation and its tension can hardly be assessed as a simple arithmetical sum total of unsolved issues. After all, the series of measures and counter-measures aimed at strengthening the armaments of both sides which have already been put into effect by our Governments in connection with the aggravation of the German question cannot be disregarded. I do not want here to engage in an argument as to who is right or wrong in this matter. Let us leave this aside for the time being. The main thing is that events are unfortunately continuing to develop in the same unfavourable direction. Instead of confidence we are turning to an even greater aggravation. Far from bringing the possibility of agreement between us on disarmament closer, we are, on the contrary, worsening the situation still further. That is another important reason why the Soviet Union is now attaching such exclusive significance to the German question. We cannot escape the fact that there has been a second world war and that the problems we have inherited from the last war--first and foremost the conclusion of a German peace treaty--require their solution.

History will not be reversed and West Berlin will not be moved to the other side of the Elbe. In that war the peoples of our two countries fought shoulder to shoulder. But if we fought together, we should indeed keep the peace together.

If you were to come to the Soviet Union now--and this incidentally is something I am hoping for--you would surely convince yourself that not a single Soviet citizen will ever reconcile himself to the peace, which was won at such great cost, being under constant threat. But that will be the case until the countries that participated in the war recognize and formalize the results of the war in a German peace treaty. Yes, that is what our people are demanding, and they are right. That is demanded by the Poles, that is demanded by the people of Czechoslovakia, that is demanded by other nations as well. They are right too. The position of the Soviet Union is shared by many. The impression is formed that understanding of the need to conclude a German peace treaty is growing in the world. I have already told you, Mr. President, that in striving for the conclusion of a German peace treaty we do not want somehow to prejudice the interests of the United States and their bloc allies. Neither are we interested in exacerbating the situation in connection with the conclusion of a German peace treaty. What need have we of such exacerbation? It is in the Western countries that they create all sorts of fears and allege that the socialist States intend well-nigh to swallow up West Berlin. You may believe my word, the word of the Soviet Government that neither we nor our allies need West Berlin.

I do not doubt that, given good will and desire, the Governments of our countries could find a common language in the question of a German peace treaty too. Naturally in the solution of that question it is necessary to proceed from the obvious fact, which even a blind man cannot fail to see, that there exist two sovereign German States.

I was gratified to familiarize myself with the statement which, according to press reports, was made by your representative in Berlin Mr. Clay on the need to recognize that there now actually exist two Germanies. It is impossible not to appreciate such a reasonable and sober pronouncement. I recall Senator Mansfield made some statements in the same spirit. All this warrants the hope that evidently the process has started of a quest for a solution of the German question on the basis of a realistic appraisal of the obtaining situation, a solution in which the Soviet Union and the United States of America must, above all, play their part. Naturally this solution must be such as not to inflict any harm to the prestige of one side or the other.

If we fail to agree on the conclusion of one peace treaty for both German States we also have at our disposal such a course as the drafting of two treaties which would be similar in content--one for the German Democratic Republic and the other for the Federal Republic of Germany. In that case the States that were parties to the anti-Hitler coalition would have the opportunity of signing one or two peace treaties depending on their choice. Such an approach would allow of circumventing the difficulties that appear owing to the fact that not all the possible participants in a peace settlement are ready to recognize both existing German States legally and establish diplomatic relations with them.

In any event the contracting parties could assume moral obligations to assist in the unification into one entity of both German States if the Germans so desire. It goes without saying that such obligations would find reflection in the peace treaty itself. As for the achievement of agreement on the unification of Germany, that is the concern of the Governments of the two German States. I believe such a solution would be reasonable and understandable for everyone. It would be understood by the German people as well.

In signing a German peace treaty the States that participated in the war will have to unconditionally recognize the presently constituted frontiers of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. Under the peace treaty those frontiers would be legally formalized, I stress legally, because defacto they already exist and cannot be changed without a war.

We cannot turn our back on the facts and fail to see that until the existing borders of Germany are finally formalized the sluice-gates which release the West German revanchist desires remain open. The followers of Hitler and his policy who, unfortunately, still exist in no small numbers in the Federal Republic of Germany are dreaming of the long-awaited day when, exploiting the lack of a post-war settlement, they will succeed in bringing about a collision between the U.S.S.R., the U.S. and the other former opponents of Hitlerite Germany. Why then should we leave any ground for the activities of those forces which are fraught with the threat of a world conflict? I would think that the legal formalization of the State borders which have taken shape after World War Two equally meets the interests of both the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Thus the borders that have taken shape and presently exist between the two German States would be formalized as well.

There remains the question of West Berlin which must also be solved when a German peace treaty is concluded. From whatever side we approach the matter, we probably will not be able to find a better solution than the transformation of West Berlin into a free city. And we shall proceed towards that goal. If, to our regret, the Western Powers will not wish to participate in a German peace settlement and the Soviet Union, together with the other countries that will be prepared to do so, has to sign a treaty with the German Democratic Republic we shall nonetheless provide a free city status for West Berlin.

Your statements, Mr. President, as well as the statements of other representatives of Western Powers not infrequently show signs of concern as to whether freedom for the population of West Berlin will be preserved, whether it will be able to live under the social and political system of its own choosing, whether West Berlin will be safeguarded against interference and outside pressure. I must say we see no difficulties in creating such conditions, the more so since the assurance of the freedom and complete independence of West Berlin is also our desire, is also our concern. I declare this on behalf of the Soviet Government, and on behalf of the socialist countries allied with us which are interested in the solution of the German question. I wish to emphasize in particular that the German Democratic Republic and the Head of that State Walter Ulbricht are of the same opinion. I say this with full knowledge and in all responsibility.

Voices can also be heard contending that it is not enough to codify in a German peace treaty the guarantees of the freedom and independence of West Berlin since--so it is said--there is no certainty that those guarantees will be honored. The statesmen and political leaders of the Western Powers with whom I have had occasion to meet, sometimes plainly expressed the wish that such guarantees should not only be given under a peace treaty but should also be specially reinforced by the Soviet Union.

Frankly speaking it is hard to understand what such apprehensions are based on. I am convinced that the guarantees established under a peace treaty will be honored and observed by all the States which will have signed the treaty. Furthermore the Soviet Union as a party to the German peace treaty will feel itself responsible for the fulfillment of all the clauses of that treaty, including the guarantees in respect to West Berlin.

But if it is the common desire that responsibility for the observance of the status of West Berlin should be entrusted to the Soviet Union we shall be ready to assume such a responsibility. I and my colleagues in the Government have not infrequently given thought to the way in which the role of the Soviet Union in guarantees for West Berlin could be implemented in practice. If we were simply to make a statement that the Soviet Union will in some special way guarantee the immunity of West Berlin, you will agree that this could prejudice the sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic and the other countries parties to the peace treaty. In order to prevent that, in order not to prejudice the prestige of any State--whether your ally or ours--I believe the question should be solved in the way we have already proposed, namely that token contingents of troops of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union, the four great Powers which participated in the war against Hitlerite Germany, should be left in West Berlin. In my view that is the sole possibility. Naturally such a system should be introduced not for all time but for a specific period. Evidently an appropriate status for the deployment of the troops of the four Powers in West Berlin would then have to be devised which would be subject to the approval of the other countries signatories of the peace treaty.

Given every desire, we could find no other solution which to any greater degree would strengthen confidence in the reliability of guarantees for West Berlin. If you have any ideas of your own on this score we are ready to consider them.

Of course, such alternatives are also conceivable as the deployment in West Berlin of troops from neutral countries or United Nations troops. I have repeatedly expressed and now reaffirm our agreement to such a solution. We also agree to the establishment of the United Nations Headquarters in West Berlin which would in that case become an international city.

It goes without saying that the occupation regime in West Berlin must be eliminated. Under the allied agreements occupation is a temporary measure and, indeed, never in history has there been a case of occupation becoming a permanent institution. But sixteen years have already elapsed since the surrender of Germany. For how long then is the occupation regime to be preserved?

A more stable status should be created for West Berlin than existed under the occupation. If the occupation regime has lived out its time and has become a source of strife among States it means the time has come to discard it. It has completely exhausted itself, has become a burden in relationships among nations and does not meet the interests of the population of West Berlin itself. The transformation of West Berlin into a free city will create a far more durable basis for its independent existence than the regime of occupation. Furthermore the grounds for collisions among States which are generated by the preservation of the occupation regime will disappear.

Of course, no one can be satisfied with half-measures which superficially would seem to erase from the surface differences among States while in effect they would be preserving them under cover and driving them in deeper. What use would there be if we barely covered up this delayed action landmine with earth and waited for it to explode. Indeed, no, the countries which are interested in consolidating peace must render that landmine completely harmless and tear it out of the heart of Europe.

The representatives of the United States sometimes declare that the American side is not advancing its concrete proposals on the German question because the Soviet Union allegedly is not striving for agreed solutions and wants to do everything by itself regardless of what other States may say. It is hard for me to judge how far such ideas really tell on the actions of the United States Government, but they are based on a profoundly mistaken assessment of the position of the Soviet Union. The United States Government can easily verify that, if it wishes to introduce its own constructive proposals at the negotiations on a peaceful settlement with Germany incorporating the question of West Berlin.

I am closely following the meetings of our Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei A. Gromyko with the Secretary of State of the United States Mr. Dean Rusk. I do not know how you will react to this idea, but it seems to me that it would be useful to broaden contacts between our Governments on the German question. If the United States Government, like the Soviet Government, is searching for understanding and is ready to devise conditions for peace with Germany which would be acceptable for both sides and would not affect the interests or the prestige of any State I believe it could be arranged that you and I would appoint appropriate representatives for private meetings and talks. Those representatives would elaborate for us the contours of an agreement which we could discuss before coming to a peace conference where a decision on the question of a peace treaty with Germany will be taken.

Your wish, Mr. President, that perhaps our Ambassadors in Belgrade should be entrusted with an informal exchange of views, was communicated to me./7/ In fact such meetings have already started. Unfortunately, however, I see from the dispatches of our Ambassador that they are spending too much time in, figuratively speaking, sniffing each other. If this goes on the business will not move forward, whereas it should be tackled with more energy.

/7/Regarding the discussions in Belgrade between Ambassadors Kennan and Yepishev, see vol. XIV, p. 387.

I never met Mr. Kennan but, so far as I can judge by the press, he is, to my mind, a man with whom preparatory work could be done, and we would accordingly authorize our Ambassador. But evidently in that case our Ambassadors would have to be given firm instructions to start talks on concrete questions without needless procrastination and not merely indulge in tea-drinking, not walk round and about mooing at each other when they should talk on the substance.

The following alternative is also possible. You, let us say, could send someone in your confidence to Moscow under some plausible pretext and the necessary contacts could be established there. This method might possibly even expedite the solution of the questions. However, let the final choice be up to you. You might perhaps prefer to charge Mr. Thompson, your Ambassador in Moscow, with that mission. Personally I have had a number of conversations with him and he gives the impression of being a man who can represent you in dealing with the problems that face us. But naturally it is not for me to give you advise in such matters. Please excuse me for intruding in the sphere of questions which are entirely within your own personal competence.

The non-aligned countries addressed messages to you, Mr. President, and to myself./8/ They suggested that we meet to discuss outstanding problems. You gave a positive reply to that appeal. We too reacted favourably to the initiative of the neutrals.

/8/Regarding these messages, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 647-648.

I believe a meeting between us could be useful and, given the desire of both sides, could culminate in the adoption of positive decisions. Naturally such a meeting would have to be well prepared through diplomatic or other confidential channels. And when preliminary understanding is reached, you and I could meet at any place in order to develop and formalize the results of such an understanding. This would undoubtedly be met with great satisfaction by all nations. They would see in that step an important contribution to the settlement of existing differences, to the consolidation of peace. The positive results of such a meeting would generate confidence that all issues can be solved peacefully by negotiation.

We are proposing that a German peace treaty be signed not only to eliminate the vestiges of World War Two, but also to clear the way for the elimination of the state of "cold war" which can at any moment bring our countries to the brink of a military collision. We want to clear the way for the strengthening of friendly relations with you and with all the countries of the world which espouse peaceful coexistence.

You, yourself, understand that we are a rich country, our expanse is boundless, our economy is on the upgrade, our culture and science are in their efflorescence. Acquaint yourself with the Program of our Party which determines our economic development for twenty years to come. This is indeed a grand and thrilling Program. What need have we of war? What need have we of acquisitions? And yet it is said that we want to seize West Berlin! It is ridiculous even to think of that. What would that give us? What would that change in the ratio of forces in the world arena? It gives nothing to anyone.

I often think how necessary it is for men who are vested with trust and great power to be inspired with the understanding of what seems to be an obvious truism, which is that we live on one planet and it is not in man's power--at least in the foreseeable future--to change that. In a certain sense there is an analogy here--I like this comparison--with Noah's Ark where both the "clean" and the "unclean" found sanctuary. But regardless of who lists himself with the "clean" and who is considered to be "unclean," they are all equally interested in one thing and that is that the Ark should successfully continue its cruise. And we have no other alternative: either we should live in peace and cooperation so that the Ark maintains its buoyancy, or else it sinks. Therefore we must display concern for all of mankind, not to mention our own advantages, and find every possibility leading to peaceful solutions of problems.

When I was already closing this letter I was given the text of your address before the United Nations General Assembly./9/ It has long since become my habit, when reading statements by responsible statesmen, in the first instance to search for and find--even a grain at a time--ideas and propositions which could be useful for the building up of peaceful cooperation among States. Almost involuntarily you sift away all the accretions, all that has been said in a fit of temper, under the influence of unduly inflamed passions. If everything is replied to in the same vein such battles of words would have to be entered into that the voice of reason would be drowned out and the shoots of all that is good and hope-giving in relations among States would be nipped in the bud.

/9/For text of the President's address before the U.N. General Assembly, September 25, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 618-626.

Of course, if one were to attune himself to an aggravation of relations between our countries, your speech before the Assembly could easily be evaluated as a challenge to an embittered dispute in the "cold war" spirit and no one could reproach us as being partial. That speech contains no few points in which homage is plainly felt to those who oppose the normalization of the international situation and seek to whip up a military psychosis by spreading all sorts of fables about the intentions of the Soviet Government and ascribing to it what does not even exist. Hence, evidently, the crude sallies tinted with ideological intolerance which are made against the social and public foundations of socialist society and which look to me, if the consolidation of peace is seriously contemplated, like a square peg in a round hole.

If you are fighting for the preservation of capitalism and consider it to be a more just society, we have our own opinion on that score. You speak of communism with disrespect, but I could reply in kind with regard to capitalism. But can we change each other's mind in questions affecting our outlooks? No, to carry ideological differences into relations among States is tantamount to an out-of-hand renunciation of hopes of living in peace and friendship with each other and we should certainly not take that road.

We can argue, we can disagree with one another but weapons must not be brought into play. I recall our conversation in Vienna about peaceful coexistence. I trust you will remember it and agree now, as you agreed then, that the question of the choice of a social system is for the people of each country to decide. Each one of us submits to his own principles, his own system but this should not lead to a collision between our countries. Let us allow history to judge the advantages of this or that social system.

A few words on Laos.

In your statement at the United Nations, Mr. President, you devoted attention to the situation in Laos and voiced certain alarm. I believe that in Vienna you and I worked out a fair basis for the solution of that question. The Soviet Government is doing all that depends on it in order to put into effect the understanding reached to the effect that Laos should become a truly neutral independent State. In your speech at the United Nations, speaking of Laos, you referred to the example of Cambodia and Burma. As we have repeatedly stated, we agree that Laos should take the same road.

As I understand it, you, like ourselves, the Soviet Union and our allies, agree that Prince Souvanna Phouma should become the Prime Minister of the Government of Laos. But obviously there are some difficulties in the question of the composition of the Government. As is known, it was proposed to the Laotians that they include in the Government eight followers of Souvanna Phouma, four representatives of Pathet-Lao and four representatives of Boun Oum. I was informed that the United States did not object to that. Now, however, information is coming in that the American Government seems to insist that of the eight posts given to the Souvanna Phouma group, three or four should be filled by the representatives of Vientiane.

In this connection I should like to make several remarks, and I am asking you to understand me correctly. You and I are being pushed towards engaging in the selection of the personal membership of the Laotian Government. This cannot fail to cause surprise. We would simply confuse the matter if we were to attempt to suggest to the Laotians the names of those persons who should be brought into the Government on behalf of these or those political groups. The Soviet Government is not properly familiar with Laotian public figures and, what is most important, it does not deem it possible to interfere in questions which are exclusively within the competence of the Laotians themselves. Let the three princes decide the question.

Souvanna Phouma has won a certain position in the country as a man of liberal leanings who advocates a policy of neutrality for Laos. His desire to form a stable and viable Government is natural and fully justified. Souvanna Phouma will be justified in fearing the strengthening of both the Pathet-Lao and the Boun Oum groups if they start claiming seats on the Government for their representatives at the cost of the seats provided for the group he himself leads. In our opinion, understanding should be displayed towards the desire of Souvanna Phouma to have a reliable support in the Government in order to effectively govern the country and pursue the policy of neutrality.

If we could reach an understanding with you on this question on the basis of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Laos Souvanna Phouma could, without doubt, quickly form a Government. Naturally, in that case you and I could, by using our influence on the corresponding quarters in Laos, give Souvanna Phouma the necessary assistance.

I note with gratification that you and I are of the same opinion as to the need for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of Laos. This is an essential condition in order to provide Laos with the possibility of consolidating itself as an independent State pursuing a policy of neutrality.

The Soviet representatives in Geneva have been given instructions in the spirit of the ideas described above. I hope your representatives will have the same kind of instructions. This would promote the prompt conclusion of the work of the Geneva Conference and the normalization of the situation in Laos.

I am now working on the preparation of two reports which I shall deliver at the Congress of our Communist Party: a progress report and a report on the Program of the Party. Naturally, in those reports I cannot pass over such questions as disarmament and the German question. These are the major questions of the day because on their solution depends the course which relations between our countries take in their development, and consequently the course world events take: that is whether they will develop towards the consolidation of peace and cooperation among States or whether they will proceed in a different direction, a dangerous one for mankind. We want to find the solutions of both these questions, we want to clear the road for an improvement of relations between our countries, for the assurance of peaceful coexistence and peace on earth.

Please convey my best wishes to your wife. I wish you and your entire family good health.

I should like to believe that by joint effort we shall succeed in surmounting the existing difficulties and in making our contribution to the solution of the international problems which preoccupy the nations. And then together with you we shall be able to celebrate the successes achieved in the strengthening of peace, and this is something that the peoples of our countries, as well as all men on earth, are awaiting impatiently.

Accept my respects,

N. Khrushchev/10/

/10/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

22. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Hyannis Port, October 16, 1961.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Another copy is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I regret that the press of events has made it impossible for me to reply earlier to your very important letter of last month./1/ I have brought your letter here with me to Cape Cod for a weekend in which I can devote all the time necessary to give it the answer it deserves.

/1/Document 21.

My family has had a home here overlooking the Atlantic for many years. My father and brothers own homes near my own, and my children always have a large group of cousins for company. So this is an ideal place for me to spend my weekends during the summer and fall, to relax, to think, to devote my time to major tasks instead of constant appointments, telephone calls and details. Thus, I know how you must feel about the spot on the Black Sea from which your letter was written, for I value my own opportunities to get a clearer and quieter perspective away from the din of Washington.

I am gratified by your letter and your decision to suggest this additional means of communication. Certainly you are correct in emphasizing that this correspondence must be kept wholly private, not to be hinted at in public statements, much less disclosed to the press. For my part the contents and even the existence of our letters will be known only to the Secretary of State and a few others of my closest associates in the government. I think it is very important that these letters provide us with an opportunity for a personal, informal but meaningful exchange of views. There are sufficient channels now existing between our two governments for the more formal and official communications and public statements of position. These letters should supplement those channels, and give us each a chance to address the other in frank, realistic and fundamental terms. Neither of us is going to convert the other to a new social, economic or political point of view. Neither of us will be induced by a letter to desert or subvert his own cause. So these letters can be free from the polemics of the "cold war" debate. That debate will, of course, proceed, but you and I can write messages which will be directed only to each other.

The importance of this additional attempt to explore each other's view is well-stated in your letter; and I believe it is identical to the motivation for our meeting in Vienna. Whether we wish it or not, and for better or worse, we are the leaders of the world's two greatest rival powers, each with the ability to inflict great destruction on the other and to do great damage to the rest of the world in the process. We therefore have a special responsibility--greater than that held by any of our predecessors in the pre-nuclear age--to exercise our power with the fullest possible understanding of the other's vital interests and commitments. As you say in your letter, the solutions to the world's most dangerous problems are not easily found--but you and I are unable to shift to anyone else the burden of finding them. You and I are not personally responsible for the events at the conclusion in World War II which led to the present situation in Berlin. But we will be held responsible if we cannot deal peacefully with problems related to this situation.

The basic conflict in our interests and approach will probably never disappear entirely, certainly not in our lifetime. But, as your letter so wisely points out, if you and I cannot restrain that conflict from leading to a vicious circle of bitter measures and countermeasures, then the war which neither of us or our citizens want--and I believe you when you say you are against war--will become a grim reality.

I like very much your analogy of Noah's Ark, with both the "clean" and the "unclean" determined that it stay afloat. Whatever our differences, our collaboration to keep the peace is as urgent--if not more urgent--than our collaboration to win the last world war. The possibilities of another war destroying everything your system and our system have built up over the years--if not the very systems themselves--are too great to permit our ideological differences to blind us to the deepening dangers of such a struggle.

I, too, have often thought of our meeting in Vienna and the subsequent events which worsened the relations between our two countries and heightened the possibilities of war. I have already indicated that I think it unfruitful to fill this private channel with the usual charges and counter-charges; but I would hope that, upon re-examination, you will find my television address of July 25th/2/ was more balanced than "belligerent," as it is termed by your letter, although there may have been statements of opinion with which you would naturally disagree. To be sure, I made it clear that we intended to defend our vital interests in Berlin, and I announced certain measures necessary to such a defense. On the other hand, my speech also made it clear that we would prefer and encourage a peaceful solution, one which settled these problems, in the words of your letter, "on a mutually acceptable basis." My attitude concerning Berlin and Germany now, as it was then, is one of reason, not belligerence. There is peace in that area now--and this government shall not initiate and shall oppose any action which upsets that peace.

/2/Reference is to a report by President Kennedy to the American people on the Berlin crisis; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 533-540.

You are right in stating that we should all realistically face the facts in the Berlin and German situations--and this naturally includes facts which are inconvenient for both sides to face as well as those which we like. And one of those facts is the peace which exists in Germany now. It is not the remains of World War II but the threat of World War III that preoccupies us all. Of course, it is not "normal" for a nation to be divided by two different armies of occupation this long after the war; but the fact is that the area has been peaceful--it is not in itself the source of the present tension--and it could not be rendered more peaceful by your signing a peace treaty with the East Germans alone.

On the contrary, there is very grave danger that it might be rendered less peaceful, if such a treaty should convince the German people that their long-cherished hopes for unification were frustrated, and a spirit of nationalism and tension should sweep over all parts of the country. From my knowledge of West Germany today, I can assure you that this danger is far more realistic than the alleged existence there of any substantial number of Hitlerites or "revanchists." The real danger would arise from the kind of resentment I have described above; and I do not think that either of us, mindful of the lessons of history, is anxious to see this happen. Indeed, your letter makes clear that you are not interested in taking any step which would only be "exacerbating the situation." And I think this is a commendable basis on which both of us should proceed in the future.

The area would also be rendered less peaceful if the maintenance of the West's vital interests were to become dependent on the whims of the East German regime. Some of Mr. Ulbricht's statements on this subject have not been consistent with your reassurances or even his own--and I do not believe that either of us wants a constant state of doubt, tension and emergency in this area, which would require an even larger military build-up on both sides.

So, in this frank and informal exchange, let us talk about the peace which flows from actual conditions of peace, not merely treaties that bear that label. I am certain that we can create such conditions--that we can, as you indicate, reach an agreement which does not impair the vital interests or prestige of either side--and that we can transform the present crisis from a threat of world war into a turning-point in our relations in Europe.

What is the framework for such an agreement? Detailed proposals must be a matter of allied agreement on our side; and formal discussion must wait further exploration of specific items. Your letter indicates, however, that you are concerned over how protracted formal diplomatic negotiations can become, with each side asking for the utmost at the outset, making more statements to the press and using extreme caution in feeling out the other side.

I agree with you that these letters should be able to supplement and thus facilitate such negotiations. We are both practical men and these are meant to be private, frank exchanges. I can tell you, for example, that I recognize how difficult it would be to secure your agreement on a plan to reunify Germany by self-determination in the near future (as desirable as I think that is), just as you recognize that we could not be a party to any agreement which legalized permanently the present abnormal division of Germany. That is one reason why we could not be a party to a peace treaty with the East Germans alone, even though, as I said at the UN, we do not view as a critical issue the mere signing by you of such a document. What is crucial, however, is the result which you have asserted that such a signing would have with respect to our basic rights and obligations.

I agree with the statement in your letter that our two governments must, in one framework or another, continue our "obligations to assist in the unification into one entity of both German states if the Germans so desire." While, as you point out, the method of achieving this goal is properly a subject for discussion among the Germans themselves, this does not excuse us from the responsibility we have assumed since the war to see the country peacefully unified--and this is the reason why we cannot attempt any final legalization as a formal international frontier of the present line of demarcation between the Western and Eastern zones. It also enjoins us against any action which would retard movement across this line--although, not being "blind," as you say, we cannot fail to recognize that this line does exist today as the Western limit of East German authority.

Whatever action you may take with East Germany, there is no difficulty, it seems to me, in your reserving your obligations and our rights with respect to Berlin until all of Germany is unified. But if you feel you must look anew at that situation, the real key to deciding the future status of West Berlin lies in your statement that the population of West Berlin must be able to "live under the social and political system of its own choosing." On this basis I must say that I do not see the need for a change in the situation of West Berlin, for today its people are free to choose their own way of life and their own guarantees of that freedom. If they are to continue to be free, if they are to be free to choose their own future as your letter indicates in the phrase quoted above, I take it this includes the freedom to choose which nations they wish to station forces there (limited in number but with unrestricted access) as well as the nature of their own ties with others (including, within appropriate limits, whatever ties they choose with West Germany). Inasmuch as you state very emphatically that you have no designs on West Berlin--and I am glad to have this assurance, for it makes the prospects of negotiation much brighter--I am sure you are not insisting on the location of Soviet troops in that portion of the city.

Thus, although there is much in your letter that makes me doubtful about the prospects in Germany, there are many passages which lead me to believe that an accommodation of our interests is possible. But in our view the situation should be peaceful now, and existing rights and obligations are already clear. What is not clear is how any change would be an improvement. Your letter and earlier aide-memoire, and Mr. Gromyko in his conversations with Mr. Rusk and myself, have made clear what you would hope to gain by a change--a new status for the East German regime, a settlement of frontiers, and relief from what you regard as potential dangers in West Germany--but it is not clear how we in the West are to benefit by agreeing to such a change. It is not enough to say there will be a "free city" in a city that is already free--or that there will be guarantees of our access when the old guarantees are still binding--or that we can maintain token troops in a city when we have troops there now.

You are, as I said before, a practical man; and you can see that there is no way in which negotiations on that basis could conceivably be justified on our part. We would be "buying the same horse twice"--conceding objectives which you seek, merely to retain what we already possess. I hope you will give long and serious thought to this question--for the kind of "mutually acceptable" settlement you mention is possible only if it brings actual improvements, from the standpoints of both parties.

The alternative is so dire that we cannot give up our efforts to find such a settlement. In the weeks ahead, while we are consulting on these matters with our respective allies and you are meeting with your Party Congress, I hope these efforts can continue--both through this correspondence and through other contacts. Let us also both strive during this period to avoid any statement, incident, or other provocation in Berlin which make a proper negotiating climate impossible. For the present, I believe we can agree on Ambassador Thompson as a very acceptable means of continuing the conversation. He knows of this letter; he has my complete confidence, and I am glad that this channel is satisfactory to you. He is in Washington at present, and will return to Moscow after our inter-Allied talks are further under way.

As for another meeting between the two of us, I agree completely with your view that we had better postpone a decision on that until a preliminary understanding can be reached through quieter channels on positive decisions which might appropriately be formalized at such a meeting. This reminds me that your letter also very graciously stated your desire to have me visit your country. If we can reach a reasonable settlement of Berlin and if the international atmosphere improves, I would take great pleasure in such a visit. I visited the Soviet Union in 1932 very briefly, and would look forward to seeing the great changes that have occurred since then.

Let me make it clear that I do not intend to relegate the achievement of complete and general disarmament to a place of secondary importance. I share your conviction that nothing would do more to promote good will among nations and contribute to the peaceful solution of other major disputes. Our agreement on the statement of principles jointly submitted to the UN General Assembly, while barely a beginning on a matter where we remain far apart, at least holds out the hope that we may someday achieve the final stage of such disarmament, verified to remove the fears of any people that devastation may ever again be suddenly rained upon them.

At the same time, however, our attention is urgently needed on those current problems which keep the world poised on the brink of war. The situation in Laos is one example. Indeed I do not see how we can expect to reach a settlement on so bitter and complex an issue as Berlin, where both of us have vital interests at stake, if we cannot come to a final agreement on Laos, which we have previously agreed should be neutral and independent after the fashion of Burma and Cambodia. I do not say that the situation in Laos and the neighboring area must be settled before negotiations begin over Germany and Berlin; but certainly it would greatly improve the atmosphere.

It is now clear that Prince Souvanna Phouma will become the new Prime Minister if an agreement can be reached. But the composition of his government is far from settled, and without assuming either the knowledge or the power to select individual men for individual posts, you and I do have an obligation--if we are to reach our goal--to continue, in your words, "using our influence on the corresponding quarters in Laos" to make certain that Souvanna Phouma is assisted by the kind of men we believe necessary to meet the standard of neutrality. That standard is not met if the eight posts assigned to Souvanna are filled in a manner which heavily weights the scales in favor of one side or the other.

As you note, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of Laos is an essential condition to preserving that nation's independence and neutrality. There are other, similar conditions, and we must be certain that the ICC has the power and the flexibility to verify the existence of these conditions to the satisfaction of everyone concerned.

In addition to so instructing your spokesmen at Geneva, I hope you will increasingly exercise your influence in this direction on all of your "corresponding quarters" in this area; for the acceleration of attacks on South Viet-Nam, many of them from within Laotian territory, are a very grave threat to peace in that area and to the entire kind of world-wide accommodation you and I recognize to be necessary. If a new round of measures and counter-measures, force and counter-force, occurs in that corner of the globe, there is no foretelling how widely it may spread. So I must close, as I opened, by expressing my concern over where current events are taking us.

My wife who is here with me reciprocates your good wishes, and we return the wish of good health to you and all your family. As I recall, I shall be seeing your son-in-law/3/ again in the not too distant future, and I look forward to talking with him.

/3/Aleksei I. Adzhubei.

I hope you will believe me, Mr. Chairman, when I say that it is my deepest hope that, through this exchange of letters and otherwise, we may improve relations between our nations, and make concrete progress in deeds as well as words toward the realization of a just and enduring peace. That is our greatest joint responsibility--and our greatest opportunity.

Sincerely,/4/

/4/Printed from an unsigned copy.

23. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, November 9, 1961.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking. This text was delivered to Salinger at the White House at 12:15 p.m. on November 11 by Georgi Bolshakov, editor of USSR magazine. (Memorandum for the President, November 11; ibid.) Another copy of this letter is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have read your letter of October 16/1/ with great attention. It is good that you had an opportunity to write it in a quiet atmosphere, in your family circle, far from the turmoil of the capital. I received your letter on the very eve of the opening of the 22nd Congress of our Party, at a time when Moscow, and in fact all of our country--was living an especially elated and exciting life.

/1/Document 22.

You have had probably an opportunity to get acquainted with the published reports on the proceedings of the Congress and you can imagine how much energy, time and attention on my part and on the part of my colleagues that work required. The Congress has adopted a program of material and spiritual development of the Soviet peoples' life--a program unprecedented in its scale.

However joyful it was to work out concrete plans for building communism in our country we could not but think of today since it is vitally important for us that these plans are carried out in the conditions of peace. That is why so much attention was given at the Congress to international problems and, first of all, to the security of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social and political systems which has now been included as a corner stone in the program of our Party. Our present struggle against the consequences of the cult of personality, is, if you wish, at the same time a struggle for a consistent realization of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

However I am not going to dwell especially on the importance of our Party's Congress. We may, of course, have a different point of view on this matter. It would seem to be more difficult for us to come to a common view on this point than on the German problem.

Now the Congress is over and my friends and I believe that it was quite a success. Now I am able to reply to your letter and express my views on the points you raised in it.

You ask what advantages the West would get if it agrees to the changes resulting from the solution of the German problem. In your letter you even gave a comparison asserting that the Soviet Union wants to trade an apple for an orchard. I do not intend to argue that--such a comparison might be good by its picturesquesness, but in this case, I think, it is absolutely out of place.

What is the orchard which we are allegedly seeking, what is meant by that and what is the apple which, as you say, we are suggesting to trade? Let us consider it.

Let us look first at the proposals of the Soviet Union. The proposals, as you know, are--to conclude a German peace treaty and on this basis to transform West Berlin into a free city. Does the realization of these proposals require any concessions on the part of the Western powers? No, and, once again, no. The Soviet draft peace treaty is based only on the necessity to consolidate and legalize the situation created as a result of the war, to consolidate and legalize the German borders. Have another look at this draft and you will see that we suggest to consolidate by this treaty what had already been sanctified by the signatures which the leaders of our states put in their time under the Potsdam agreement. We demand no changes in these agreements.

This means that nobody gives anything and nobody takes anything from anyone, and that the only point is to fulfill the obligations which the four powers solemnly took upon themselves in Yalta and Potsdam.

Now, what is the position of the Western powers. If there is anyone who wants to get the whole orchard giving nothing in return--that is you and your allies. Let me show this with the facts.

It was stated in the Potsdam agreements that Germany should not be armed, that an end should be put forever to German militarism and revanchism. In spite of that the United States, Britain and France have made West Germany their ally, are arming it--and arming it rather intensively.

One cannot find a single line in the allied agreements which would allow to regard West Berlin and West Germany as one entity. In reality the Western powers as early as in 1948 introduced in West Berlin the West German mark and even made attempts to spread the FRG laws on this city. Together with the FRG the Western powers are now actively using West Berlin against the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries.

These facts alone show that the Western powers in their present demands are stepping aside from the allied agreements and are seeking for themselves such advantages which would have been unthinkable 16 years ago. But the list of such facts does not end at this.

In 1945 the four powers pledged to do their utmost in order that Germany would never be able to threaten its neighbours and the world peace. But now West Germany with your assistance has acquired such strength that it is openly encroaching on the territory of neighbouring countries and starting to grasp its NATO allies by arms and feet.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the FRG hinders also the US Government in the free conduct of the policy which the latter believes to be reasonable and which corresponds to the interests of your country as well as other countries. You and I have agreed to establish and maintain contacts in order to search jointly for mutually acceptable solutions to the German problem. But actually that has not been accomplished yet. And we understand quite clearly that it is first of all Adenauer who resists it being zealously supported by French President de Gaulle.

It seems to me, that de Gaulle's position is rather accurately described by an allegory which is well known among our people. Once a peasant, so the story goes, boasted that he would go to the forest and catch a bear; he was warned that it was a dangerous undertaking, that bear is a strong beast. Never mind, I'll handle him, said the peasant, and went to the forest. Some time has passed but the peasant still has not come back. The people started looking for him. Where are you?--they cried. The peasant cried back: I am here, I have caught a bear.

--Well, bring him here.

--He won't go.

--Come here yourself.

--But he won't let me go.

More or less the same has happened to France. De Gaulle embraced Adenauer to lean on West Germany and to increase with its help the weight of France in European affairs and, may be, even to try to conduct the events in the whole world. It is an open secret that de Gaulle considers himself to be the most qualified person to determine the political destiny of Europe and not only Europe. Actually it has turned out that West Germany has so squeezed de Gaulle in her arms that he is not able any longer to escape from the embrace. In fact France has been forced to follow in the wake of the policy which is being carried on by Chancellor Adenauer.

That is why de Gaulle is saying now not the things which are helpful for ensuring peace and, consequently, helpful for France and other nations. But whatever pleases Chancellor Adenauer.

There seems to be no need to go back to the question of how and why it has happened that the Potsdam agreements remained to a considerable degree unfulfilled and what effect this fact had on the situation in Germany and in Europe as a whole. This has been stated more than once before. And life itself demands that we should look forward, not backward. It is important now to single out what brings us closer, what will help us to restore the spirit of cooperation and goodwill which was characteristic of the relations between the USSR and the USA during the hard years of war. In our opinion this can be easier and better achieved by a mutually agreed solution of the problem of a German peace treaty. The Western powers not only would not have to sacrifice in any way their interests, they would gain and, indeed, not less than the other states.

To use your comparison, it can be said that by the conclusion of a German peace treaty we would have planted an orchard the fruits of which would be enjoyed by all the states, all the peoples.

It is true that we have to settle this problem in a rather unusual way. At the time when the Potsdam agreement was being signed nobody could have foreseen that two independent states, with different ways of life, would emerge on the territory of Germany. However, it has happened. What can we do? Should we use force so that Germany will again become united? But nobody seems to be anxious to fight for this. President de Gaulle told us frankly that France was not interested in reunification of Germany. And one can understand his position since he fears and, evidently, not without a reason, that a united Germany--if one has in mind the basis for its unification which is advocated by Adenauer--would be a militarist state with all its widely known distinctive habits.

The world public opinion has obviously no sympathy with the idea of reunification of Germany. Such opinion prevails in France, Britain, in wide enough circles of the USA and even in West Germany itself.

The situation existing in Germany is recognized everywhere in the West, but many persons prefer to keep silent. They do so, naturally, not because of a desire to help the reunification of Germany, but because of dislike for the way of life established in the German Democratic Republic. They do not like, of course, the social and political system not only in the G.D.R., but in other socialist countries as well, including, naturally, the Soviet Union. However just as we are not free to establish our systems in capitalist countries, the Western powers have no right to impose one or another way of development on the socialist countries.

I fully agree with you that it would be useless to argue about the advantages of our social systems. We will not find a common language here. That is why the Soviet Government proceeds from the necessity of recognition of what exists in reality; two German states and two systems in the world--capitalist and socialist. Any other approach would inevitably lead us to collision, to war.

We have got an impression that you also want to achieve a mutually acceptable solution of the German problem which would not lead to the deepening of the differences and, eventually, to collision between our countries.

In my opinion we have already passed the stage of sounding out each other's positions. We should now start solving problems, otherwise contacts and negotiations will lead to nothing but marking time.

When I sent you my latest letter I hoped that we would use this line of communication for concrete discussion of still unsettled issues and, first of all, of the German peace treaty as the most complex and urgent one. If both of us departed from concrete discussion and confine ourselves to repeating generalities our confidential correspondence could have been substantially depreciated.

In my recent letter I tried to set forth in detail our position on concrete questions and, I will not conceal, I expected you to do the same. There were, it seemed to me, some grounds for that in the light of the discussions which our Foreign Minister had had in New York and in Washington with you, Mr. President, and with the US Secretary of State. We understand, of course, that you needed some time to study and think over all that had been said. That is why, having found no concrete suggestions in your letter, we expected that Ambassador Thompson would state them on your instructions. So far this has not happened, either.

A certain apprehension is caused by an obvious dissonance between realistic notes which we hear while talking with American statesmen on questions of Germany, and conservative, extremely negative comments on these talks, which are published on the pages of influential newspapers in the United States.

I will not go back to a detailed statement of our position, and will dwell only on the main points. When we talked with you in Vienna you said that the question of Germany should be solved in such a way that the prestige of any of our countries was not hurt. I agreed with you then and I agree with you now. Indeed, the Soviet Union and the USA are great powers and the matter of prestige is important to them. We understand it.

But how the interests of the parties can be taken fully into account when the goal is to draw a line under the past war? It is clear--by the conclusion of a peace treaty on an agreed basis. The conclusion of a peace treaty is a natural way of the completion of war which is accepted by both--civilized and uncivilized peoples. Such a treaty makes it possible to juridically secure the cessation of the state of war and, at the same time, to legalize the changes which resulted from the war. It is in complete agreement with considerations of prestige.

The signing of a German peace treaty would help to liquidate the state of "cold war," to create better conditions for cooperation between our countries, for the development of trade, for the exchange of scientific achievements etc. On the basis of the peace treaty the question of West Berlin will be solved.

It was said that the time, suggested by us, for the conclusion of a peace treaty sounds like an ultimatum and this hurts the prestige of our partners in negotiations. We have, of course, made no ultimatum. But in order to create the best possible conditions for the achievement of an agreed settlement the Soviet Government has decided not to insist that the peace treaty be signed by the end of this year.

We do not dictate any firm terms for the solution of the German question and you probably know it well. The best way, in our opinion, would be the signing of a peace treaty between all countries which fought against Germany and the two German states which have appeared on the ruins of the Hi