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Australia Group
Fact Sheet Released by the Bureau of Nonproliferation
April 1, 2000, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Department of State
[end of file]The Australia Group was founded in 1984 in the aftermath of the massive use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war. During the 1980s, evidence surfaced that several countries, including Iraq, were producing chemical weapons using supplies from the international trade in chemicals and related equipment.
The principal impetus for the AG was to ensure that the industries of the participating countries did not assist, either purposefully or inadvertently, states seeking to acquire a CBW capability.
The AG observes and fully supports international treaties and commitments against chemical and biological weapons.
30 countries participate in the AG: Australia, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the U.S. The AG has no charter or constitution, and operates by consensus. The group meets annually in Paris.
Countries requesting participation in the AG can only be admitted by a consensus of existing participants. Applicant countries must meet certain criteria, including an established, effective, legally-based system of national export controls, and demonstrated compliance with all multilateral treaties banning CBW activities.
The lists of items over which all Australia Group participants exercise national export control include:
The AG seeks to impede the proliferation of CBW by providing a multilateral venue for:
- 54 dual-use chemical precursors;
- dual-use CW-related production equipment (such as corrosion-resistant reactor vessels);
- 93 pathogens and toxins that affect humans, livestock animals, and/or food plants; and
- dual-use biological production equipment (such as containment facilities and fermenters).
The AG's efforts have made it more difficult for proliferators to acquire materials for their CBW programs. Voluntary national monitoring of chemical and biological trade supports nonproliferation goals in a practical manner and is reasonably easy and economical to implement. Export controls do not restrict or impede legitimate trade; they enable responsible governments to review exports and ensure that commercial industries under their respective jurisdictions do not contribute to the development of weapons of mass destruction. Through their participation in the Group, countries demonstrate their determination to prevent the proliferation of CBW, and to support the establishment of a global ban on CBW activities.
- harmonizing export controls on CW precursor chemicals and dual-use facilities and manufacturing equipment that could be used in CW production;
- harmonizing export controls on materials and dual-use manufacturing equipment and facilities that could be diverted to BW production;
- sharing information about global CBW proliferation trends and entities attempting to procure CBW-related materials;
- consulting with AG non-participants, to encourage them to establish similar national export-licensing systems.
The AG's activities complement and serve the objectives and goals of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
The AG urges other countries to adopt comparable export controls. AG participants have agreed on a number of measures to reach out to other countries, and to foster better understanding of the AG and of nonproliferation and export control efforts. Recent AG meetings have sought to refine the Group's internal operations and to regularize contacts with non-participants.
In 1993, the AG adopted a "no-undercut" policy to enhance cooperation in enforcing export controls. AG participants agreed to notify the Group of those export licenses for nonproliferation reasons. Participants will consult with the Government that denied a specific export license before deciding to approve an identical transaction.
More recently, the AG adopted a common approach on licensing exports of chemical mixtures.