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Hidden Killers 1998: The Global Landmine Crisis Chapter III: Mine-Affected Countries (continued)

COUNTRY PROFILE: SOMALIA

Somalia, with a total area of 637,660 square kilometers, is located on the eastern coast of Africa, with Ethiopia and Kenya to the west and Djibouti to the northwest. The terrain is a flat-to-undulating plateau rising to hills in the north. The population of 6,590,325 is 85 percent Somali, with small Bantu and Arab ethnic groups and a large number of nomads and semi-nomads. The country has no functioning national government following the ouster of Major General Mohamed Barre in 1991; anarchy prevails, marked by inter-factional fighting and banditry. Agriculture is the primary economic sector, with livestock making up 40 percent of the GDP and 65 percent of export earnings. The industrial sector is small, accounting for less than 10 percent of the GDP. With few resources, Somalia is one of the poorest and least developed nations in the world, and the civil war has devastated much of the economy that does exist. This, coupled with continued instability, has hindered any recovery (footnote 79).

Landmine Problem

Somalia is one of the most insecure and unstable nations in the world. The disintegration of the national government began with the bungled invasion of Ethiopia's Ogaden province in 1977 and the war with Ethiopia that followed. After the conclusion of the war, factional fighting continued and led to the eventual collapse of the national government. The heaviest mining occurred between 1977-1992, during the conflict with Ethiopia, with landmines being laid primarily by the Soviet-trained Somali Armed Forces. After the collapse of the government, the warring factions continued to lay landmines.

Characterization of the Problem. More than 1 million landmines were laid in Somalia to protect against enemies and terrorize civilians; they are found along the Ethiopian border and around military bases, schools, water sources, and even individual homes. Sixty percent of the landmines are estimated to be antipersonnel mines. Landmines that have been found were manufactured in more than 24 countries, the majority from Czechoslovakia, Russia, Pakistan, and Belgium. Compounding the problem is that approximately 50 percent of the landmines are non-metallic, and no minefield records have been located, although minefield locations are known locally. The anarchy that exists makes any demining effort very dangerous and coordination of a national effort even more difficult.

Location of Landmines. Seventy percent of all the landmines are found in barrier minefields located in the mountainous terrain along the Ethiopian border. A section of the border from Djibouti to Barbein Genyo contains some 76-96 minefields. The northern part of the country is heavily mined, including the northern capital of Hargeisa and 18 roads leading into it. Concentrations of landmines are found on the grazing lands between Burao and Erigavo in Zeyla. Landmines have also been found in the towns of Burao, Erigavo, and the port town of Berbera; in water sources at Selel-Derjob, Tur Debe, and the Sab'ad refugee camp; and at the pumping station for Hargeisa. The central and southern areas are less severely mined than the north, and these roads are relatively clear, although some southwestern roads have been mined. Kismaayo on the southwestern coast is mined along with the triangular region bounded by Dusa Mareb-Galcaio-Obbia (footnote 80).

Impact. The presence of landmines has disrupted traditional life for many Somalis. Agriculture has suffered, and livestock losses have been heavy. Northern Somalia is a pastoral society that is dependent upon livestock grazing, and landmines laid in fields there have disrupted grazing cycles. Landmines have also reduced sheep exports to Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Landmines laid in grazing fields and watering holes have prevented many refugees from resettling in their former lands, and many nomads are afraid to return to their grazing lands, and their traditional ability to roam throughout the country is restricted (footnote 81).

Notwithstanding the preceding, the humanitarian impact has diminished in recent years. Most people know the locations of minefields in their immediate regions and avoid them. The overall instability and security concerns in the country are a double-edged sword, because while they keep people from traveling, they also prevent them from venturing into areas where they might encounter unknown minefields (footnote 82).

Casualties. Physicians for Human Rights estimated that in 1992 there were 4,500 people disabled as a result of landmine accidents. According to the Hargeisa Hospital, for the one-year period beginning in February 1991, 75 percent of mine casualties were children 5-15 years of age. Casualties are compounded by the lack of proper medical facilities (footnote 83). Currently the incidence of casualties is low, but no detailed figures are available (footnote 84).

Country Response

Organization for Demining. There is no national program or organization for demining in Somalia.

Mine Clearance. The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) provided for mine clearance and development of an indigenous clearance capability, and, for purposes of security, UNOSOM emphasized contracting with Somali nationals; at the height of the program, 11 contractors and 200 deminers were working in the country. Rimfire International was contracted to conduct clearing in the northwest to allow thousands of refugees waiting in camps on the Ethiopian border to return, and Kaamil was contracted to clear the former government's UXO firing range and 90 kilometers of roads and trails in the Middle Shabelle region. The Rural Development and Voluntary Organization (RUDEVEO) was the first all-Somali demining project to be conducted under UNOSOM.

UNOSOM, working with Somali and foreign contractors, was successful in removing 32,511 landmines and 72,741 pieces of UXO. Rimfire International was responsible for the majority of the clearance, but Somali firms under UNOSOM contract cleared 127 square kilometers of land and 438 kilometers of roads (footnote 85). Efforts were frustrated by the chaotic security situation, which included worker strikes, car hijackings, and assassinations (footnote 86). All UN demining assistance ended when UNOSOM terminated its presence in March 1995. The national demining capacity is currently limited to those personnel trained under UNOSOM auspices or who worked on UN demining contracts.

Mine Awareness. A Somalia Mine Awareness Campaign, sponsored by the UN and consisting of posters, pamphlets, and a teaching component to enlist teachers to help implement the campaign, was launched in late 1993. The teachers were provided with lesson plans and games designed to teach children landmine safety. In addition, two teams of singers and actors traveled throughout northwestern Somalia performing and depicting the dangers of landmines. In some regions, where security concerns prevented the performers from traveling to present these programs, a mine awareness video was produced and distributed to towns and villages.

Victim Assistance. There are no current victim assistance programs in Somalia. There is one rehabilitation center operated by the Somali Red Crescent Society in conjunction with the Norwegian Red Cross Society.

Other International Involvement

Security concerns and instability have caused most international NGOs and the UN to continue only limited operations in the country. In July 1997, the UNDHA sent an assessment team to Somalia; the team concluded that a serious humanitarian mine-related situation exists, but no program recommendations have been finalized.

Outlook for the Future

Active demining in Somalia effectively ceased when UNOSOM terminated its presence in 1995. Political instability, security concerns, and the absence of mine awareness and victim assistance programs continue to frustrate further demining efforts. The trained deminers that UNOSOM and contractors left behind will undoubtedly decline in proficiency without an organizational structure and proper supervision. In addition, the lack of a functioning national government has made the international community reluctant to provide more assistance. The current landmine problems will not likely be adequately addressed until stability is restored.

COUNTRY PROFILE: SUDAN

Sudan, occupying 2,505,810 square kilometers, is part of northern Africa, bordering Egypt to the north; Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Red Sea to the east; Kenya and Uganda to the south; and Zaire, the Central African Republic, Chad, and Libya in an arc from southwest to northwest. It is the largest country in Africa and is administratively divided into 26 states, with Khartoum, the capital, located in the central part of the country. Sudan's climate varies drastically between the largely desert north and its densely forested, subtropical south. The terrain is mostly a flat, featureless desert with mountains on the east and west. Sudan suffers from chronic political instability, adverse weather, high inflation, a drop in remittances from abroad, and counterproductive economic policies. Agriculture employs 80 percent of the work force, but only 5 percent of the land is arable. Sluggish economic performance over the past decade, attributable largely to declining annual rainfall, has kept per capita income at low levels. A mid-1997 estimate placed the population at 32,594,128 (footnotes 87, 88).

Landmine Problem

Sudan has suffered from more than 40 years of conflict. The country is governed under Islamic law that is opposed by the largely Christian southern region, and, since 1991, the government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) have intensified fighting there. More recently, fighting erupted along the border with Eritrea, further stretching the ruling regime's military, political, and economic capability. Assistance in demining is needed but is not feasible on a large scale until security throughout the country can be assured.

 

Characterization of the Problem. The Sudanese Government recently stated that two to three million landmines and UXO cover some 800,000 square kilometers or 32 percent of the country (footnotes 89). The UN currently cites a figure of one million landmines, and a recent UN assessment mission stated that between 500,000 and two million landmines may exist. Some NGOs suggest that these numbers are still highly exaggerated; The HALO Trust estimates 40,000 (footnotes 90. 91). Without a national survey to provide a baseline estimate, the actual number may never be determined. Mining in the southern region continues to occur. Roughly 40 different types of landmines are known to exist in the country.

Location of Landmines. The desert of northern Sudan was mined during World War II and again recently in new conflicts along the northwestern border with Libya and the eastern border with Eritrea. Landmines have been laid by government forces and the SPLA around towns in southern Sudan to protect access to various areas and on routes by the SPLA to forestall missions by humanitarian and government forces. Most roads in the southern region are mined, and areas between interior towns and the Ugandan border are particularly infested (footnote 92).

Impact. Landmines have crippled the delivery of relief materials to the needy, because some residential locations and corridors are completely surrounded by landmines, causing a considerable part of the huge humanitarian relief effort to be carried out by airlift, barges, rail, and truck convoys (footnote 93). In the south, more than 450,000 Sudanese refugees have fled to Uganda, Zaire, and Ethiopia to escape insecurity and civil strife (footnote 94). Voluntary repatriation is supported in the north by the UNHCR.

Casualties. No specific casualty rates attributable to landmines are available. Armed hostilities during the last decade have caused an estimated 1.3 million deaths and created 4 million IDPs. The government estimates that mine accidents have resulted in more than 700,000 amputees. Most parts of Sudan, particularly in the south, lack medical services and rehabilitation centers, and limited equipment and qualified personnel to conduct basic lifesaving procedures are limited (footnote 95). A recent UN assessment team reported that few landmine victims arrived at medical centers and even fewer received care at prosthetic centers. It was also noted by the team that, of those victims who did reach medical centers, few survived, because it took anywhere from two to six days to reach a hospital. This is supported by ICRC statistics that show that victims who fail to receive medical treatment within 48 hours have a low chance of survival (footnote 96). The ICRC and UN's Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) have recurring difficulties with the government and SPLA forces who prohibit departure or arrival at some airfields in the south, causing delays in moving victims to medical facilities in other parts of the Sudan or nearby countries, e.g., Kenya (footnote 97).

Country Response

The continuing use of landmines in Sudan must be dealt with as part of the ongoing peace process.

Organization for Demining. There is limited capacity for demining in Sudan. The Sudanese have engineer units attached to combat brigades, but demining activities focus on clearing limited routes or lanes in order to deploy military forces.

Mine Clearance. While no current full-scale demining operations are known to exist, in 1996 Germany supported a HALO Trust demining project in Chukudum. The engineer units of the Sudanese Army may not be able to engage in large-scale operations.

Mine Awareness. There are no visible government mine awareness programs in progress. An urgent need for mine awareness training exists throughout the country in refugee camps and with NGOs and UN staff working in southern Sudan (footnote 98).

Victim Assistance. UN relief agencies and NGOs have responded to requests for emergency relief assistance in regions affected by hostilities. Interruptions in the delivery of humanitarian aid are frequent; CARE International has been constantly affected by landmines on roads leading to project areas (footnote 99). Continuing differences with the government led the ICRC to terminate management of two of its programs in Sudan, which have been handed over to local authorities. The government and the ICRC only recently agreed on continuation of the ICRC's medical airlift program (footnote 100). Other NGOs, such as World Vision International, MSF, Save the Children Fund (US and UK), Action International Contre le Faim, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Catholic Relief Services, Oxfam, American Refugee Committee, and the Sudanese Red Crescent Society, distribute food, provide medical and nutritional support, and rehabilitate water and sanitation facilities in various parts of the Sudan. Since 1986, NPA has provided a combination of food aid and agricultural development while supporting three hospitals and the training of Sudanese medical personnel (footnote 101). Movement restrictions on expatriates from these NGOs, the UN, and ICRC have been applied intermittently by the government or the SPLA, hindering the movement and provision of humanitarian relief in southern Sudan.

Other International Support

OLS was organized in 1988 by UNICEF, the Sudanese Government, and the SPLA to facilitate the delivery of relief and medical supplies to people trapped by the fighting. Support in the form of air movement continues to be partially provided by the EU. The WFP continues to rely on alternative means of transport due to poor road conditions, the constant threat of landmines, and movement restrictions imposed by the government and the SPLA. For the past six years, the U.S. Government has provided considerable resources (more than $60 million per year) to the UNHCR General Fund to support humanitarian problems in the Sudan. International demining assistance is needed but may not be feasible until a resolution of the conflict in the south is reached between the government and the SPLA or its latest factions.

Outlook for the Future

Sudan is clearly struggling in its efforts to mount a viable and sustainable humanitarian demining program. No minefield survey has been conducted, and no mine clearance other than of a military nature is supported, limiting efforts to reclaim productive land. Mine awareness programs are not evident, and this, in conjunction with a significant lack of primary care facilities to support the very limited rehabilitative services now provided, will continue to result in high casualty rates. As a result of at least a decade of neglect and destruction, the primary care system of the country must be rehabilitated, if victims are to receive any assistance at all, particularly in the southern region. Despite a considerable international effort to deliver humanitarian aid, the Sudanese government and the SPLA continue to interrupt and limit the amount and types of aid provided. The Sudan needs to focus on resolving its internal conflict and restoring internal security before any serious demining program can be supported.

 

 

Footnotes

79. CIA, 1997 World Fact Book, Somalia, http://www.odci.gov/cis/publications/somhtml, March 20, 1998.

80. UNDHA, Landmine Database. Country Report: Somalia, http://www.un.org/depts/landmne/country/somalia.htm, February 25, 1998.

81. Idem.

82. "Somalia: Security Concerns and Governance," Landmines Magazine. Demining News from the United Nations, Vol. 2.3, October 1997.

83. UNDHA, Landmine Database. Somalia, op. cit.

84. "Somalia: Security Concerns and Governance," op. cit.

85. Idem.

86. U.S. Department of State, Landmine Database. Comprehensive Report: Somalia, August 1997.

87. IA, 1997 World Fact Book, Sudan, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/ factbook/bk.html, March 20, 1998.

88. Arthur S. Banks, et al., The Political Handbook of the World: 1995, 787-795.

89. "Sudan: Conflict and Development," Landmines Magazine. Demining News from the United Nations, Vol. 2.3, October 1997.

90. Idem.

91. The Halo Trust Donor Meeting, op. cit.

92. "Sudan: Conflict and Development," op. cit., 1.

93. UNDHA, Landmine Database. Country Report: Sudan, http://www.un.org/depts/landmine/country/sudan.htm, February 25, 1998.

94. UNHCR, "Country Profile: Sudan," http://www.unhcr.ch/world/afri/sudan.htm, June 1997, 1.

95. Ibid., 2.

96. "Sudan: Conflict and Development," op. cit., 2.

97. USAID, Sudan: Civil Strife/Displaced Persons, Situation Report # 3," FY1995, http://www.disaster.net/ sitreps/sudan1.htm, April 5, 1998.

98. "Sudan: Conflict and Development," op. cit., 2.

99. CARE International, CARE and Land Mines, undated, 1.

100. ICRC, ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programmes. ICRC Facts and Figures, March 1997, 1, Appendix.

101. "Sudan: Civil Strife/Displaced Persons," op. cit., 15.

[End of Section]

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