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Hidden Killers 1998: The Global Landmine Crisis
Chapter III: Mine-Affected Countries |
LATIN AMERICA
[Nicaragua]COUNTRY PROFILE: NICARAGUA
Nicaragua, bordering both the Caribbean Sea and the North Pacific Ocean, is located in the middle of Central America between Costa Rica to the south and Honduras to the north. Covering a landmass of 120,254 square kilometers, Nicaragua's rugged, heavily forested, and mountainous terrain consists of extensive Atlantic coastal plains rising to central interior mountains, with a narrow Pacific coastal plain interrupted by volcanoes. The country, organized into 15 departments and two autonomous regions, has a 1997-estimated population of 4,386,399. The economy is basically agrarian, with industrial production accounting for only about one-fourth of the GDP. Since 1991, Nicaragua has reduced inflation and obtained economic aid from abroad, but unemployment remains a pressing problem; about one-half of the work force is unemployed or underemployed (footnote 181).
Landmine Problem
Nicaragua was involved in armed conflict and civil strife for a period of almost 12 years, ending with presidential and parliamentary elections in 1990. During the conflict, all warring factions used landmines. Government forces mined installations in the interior of the country to prohibit access, possible sabotage, or destruction by the rebel forces (Contras); they also mined portions of the borders to prevent cross-border infiltration by the rebels. The Contras mined roads, transport routes, and economically sensitive areas to disrupt the economic life of the country in an attempt to destabilize the government. They also mined border areas to protect their bases and hinder government troop movements and cross-border pursuit.
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Characterization of the Problem. During the period of armed conflict, the two sides laid about 134,000 landmines (footnote 182). In the post-1990 time frame, mine clearance operations were conducted by the government around key installations and the interior of the country, reducing the number of landmines to an estimated 116,000 by early 1993. In the summer of 1995, the government revised the number of landmines from 116,000 to 108,297 (footnote 183). The ICRC estimates that there are 841 minefields in Nicaragua (footnote 184).
Location of Landmines. The most heavily mined areas during the conflict were the northern and southern borders and the central departments of Esteli, Jinotega, and Matagalpa. Landmines were also laid around internal installations, including 267 electric towers, 31 bridges, two electric power plants, four warehouses, six military bases, 20 agricultural cooperatives, three electric substations, and along the El Rama-Juigalpa road. Most of these internal locations are found in north-central and central Nicaragua, where the fighting was most intense (footnote 185).
Impact. The Jinotega and Matagalpa departments are the most affected. This region of Nicaragua represents the bread-basket of the country and the crossroads of important routes for domestic trade. It is here that 60 percent of the coffee crop (the country's main export and foreign currency earner) is produced, and where the Planta Centroamericana de Apanas, one of the largest hydroelectric projects in Central America, is located (footnote 186). The presence of landmines prohibits the use of fertile land for coffee and food production and rich pastures for raising livestock which, in turn, causes a loss in revenues and places more demographic pressure on the land that is available. For the displaced and rural poor, the problem of land ownership is becoming acute, so any land reclaimed from demining operations would help ease these problems. The government estimates that more than 20,000 families in affected areas would benefit directly from a successful demining program (footnote 187).
Casualties. According to the Nicaraguan Center for Strategic Studies, an NGO that studies civil-military affairs, 424 people have been victims of landmines in Nicaragua since the end of the civil war in 1990. Fifty-six of those victims-- 10 soldiers and 46 civilians-- died as a result of their injuries. The only available data on accident trends since 1990 are OAS figures on civilians who lost limbs due to landmine accidents; those figures were 25 in 1990, decreasing through 1996 to two, but then increasing again to 19 in 1997 (footnote 181). Deminers did not sustain any casualties during the Organization of American States (OAS)- and Inter-American Defense Board (IADB)-supported demining operations in 1997-1998 (footnote 189).
Country Response
Nicaragua has an ongoing demining program. The only organizations directly involved with demining operations in Nicaragua are the Nicaraguan Army, the OAS, and the IADB.
Organization for Demining. From an initially trained five platoons of Nicaraguan soldiers (130 personnel) in 1993, the Army currently provides 11 platoons totaling 250 personnel for demining operations (footnote 190). Nicaragua does not have a civilian MAC; the Army coordinates demining efforts throughout the country.
Mine Clearance. In 1991, the Nicaraguan Government requested the OAS and the IADB to assist it in mine clearing. In April 1993, the government, the OAS, and the IADB launched a national mine clearance operation to clear an estimated 116,000 landmines (footnote 191), but the program was suspended in December 1993 because of lack of funds. Early in 1995, the Nicaraguan Government again asked the OAS for assistance, and the program was restarted in 1997. Today, the OAS and the IADB, in cooperation with the Nicaraguan Army, conduct demining operations in the country.
To date, more than 130,000 square meters (0.13 square kilometers) of territory have been cleared, and an important artery, the El Rama-Juigalpa road, will soon be mine-free. In addition, the areas around the 267 electric towers and two electric power plants have been cleared of landmines so that maintenance can now be performed, facilitating Nicaragua's trade in electricity with its Central American neighbors. (The Government of Japan recently undertook a major hydroelectric power project in northwestern Nicaragua, which reportedly would have been impossible without the demining of the electric towers and the area around the country's largest hydroelectric facility (footnote 192).) According to the Nicaraguan Army, about 31,000 landmines representing nine different types have been located and destroyed, leaving about 85,000 yet to be cleared (footnote 193). The Army also believes that it can maintain its current clearance rate of about 10,000 landmines per year, which would require at least eight more years of demining to clear all the landmines. However, considerably more time and/or an enhanced effort may be needed, since landmines cleared to date have generally been concentrated around bridges and electric towers. Clearing large border areas, which are less densely mined and which tend to be mountainous and inaccessible, may be a considerably slower process. In addition to the landmines, the Nicaraguan Government estimates that 23.5 tons of UXO must be cleared (footnote 194).
Mine Awareness. With OAS funding, the Army conducts education and social prevention programs to inform the public of the dangers associated with landmines, but more funding is required for public awareness campaigns. In some regions of the country, illiteracy has led to accidents because rural inhabitants reportedly have difficulty reading minefield markers. Current funding levels are insufficient for television and radio campaigns, which are most effective in reaching residents in the rural regions (footnote 195). The United States, through the DoD along with UNICEF and Time Warner/DC Comics, is sponsoring a Superman comic book intended to help educate children about the danger of landmines; it will be distributed through the Ministry of Education in the summer of 1998.
Victim Assistance. There are no estimates of the number of refugees or IDPs returned to their homes as a result of mine clearance, but the number is probably small, because demining operations have been targeted mostly at infrastructure installations (footnote 196). Through OAS funding, the Nicaraguan Army provides medical and psychological care and air medical evacuation for landmine victims. However, cutbacks in military spending have removed army hospitals and experienced surgeons from the field, and only the military hospital in Managua is fully prepared to treat amputee injuries (footnote 197). The more experienced surgeons in Managua have recognized the need for correct amputation stumps in order to fit artificial limbs properly, but the same is not true of less experienced surgeons in the countryside. The Erasmo Parades Herrera Orthopaedic Centre of the Ministry of Health is now the only prosthetic facility in the country, and it is chronically underfunded. These medical factors, when combined with a difficult economic situation and government budget cuts, make the treatment and rehabilitation of mine victims a daunting proposition with a high social cost (footnote 198).
Other International Involvement
Denmark, Germany, and the EU undertook direct, bilateral demining aid programs at different times between 1994-1996. The revived program in 1997 was restarted with funding from Brazil, France, Spain, Sweden, the United States, and Venezuela. Currently, only the OAS and IADB are supporting Nicaragua and its army with the demining program. The Nicaraguan Electric Monopoly, ENEL, also has provided funding for demining operations (footnote 199).
Outlook for the Future
With help from the OAS and the IADB, the Nicaraguan Army has cleared a large number of landmines, although more than two and one-half times the number removed remain in the ground. In the process, Nicaragua has reclaimed some land and some infrastructure. As demining operations continue, casualty rates, already declining, should continue their downward trend, and more land should become available for resettlement. More focus is required on clearing the central, revenue-producing agrarian departments and on funding electronic media for mine awareness. Consideration should also be given to whether or not clearing the less densely-populated border areas is a worthwhile endeavor. To promote victim assistance, training and equipment for medical personnel near the northern border are required; the hospitals at Esteli or Ocotal could be upgraded for that purpose (footnote 200). With continued support from the government and external sources, the Army is expected to clear the remaining landmines within the next several years.
Footnotes
181. CIA, 1997 World Fact Book, Nicaragua, undated, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/ factbook/er/html, April 15, 1998, 1-3.
182. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of International Security and Peacekeeping Operations, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, December 1994, 51.
183. UNDHA, Landmine Database. Country Report: Nicaragua, http://www.un.org/depts/landmine/country/ nicaragu.htm, September 1995, 1.
184. ICRC, Antipersonnel Mines in Central America: Conflict and Post-Conflict, February 1, 1996, http://www.icrc/unicc/icrcnews.nsf, February 25, 1998, 4 (cited in Report of the Secretary-General, UN International Meeting on Mine Clearance, July 5, 1996, Addendum, 33).
185. AMEMBASSY Managua message, subject: Updating Hidden Killers: Nicaraguan Response, R062251Z April 1998, 2.
186. ICRC, Antipersonnel Mines in Central America, op. cit., 3.
187. Ibid., 9.
188. AMEMBASSY Managua, op. cit., 2.
189. Idem.
190. OAS, Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, Assistance Program for Demining in Central America, December 1997, 3.
191. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, 1994, op. cit., 51.
192. AMEMBASSY Managua, op. cit., 3.
193. AMEMBASSY Managua, op. cit., 1. These two figures, taken together, suggest a current total estimate of 116,000 landmines, which conflicts with the government's 1995 reduced estimate of 108,297. The sources are different and cannot be reconciled.
194. UNDHA, Landmine Database. Nicaragua, op. cit., 1.
195. AMEMBASSY Managua, op. cit., 2-3.
196. Ibid., 1-3.
197. Ibid., 3.
198. ICRC, Central America, op. cit., 8.
199. Ibid., 2.
200. AMEMBASSY Managua, op. cit., 3.
[End of Section]
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