ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL ON INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL

bbbbb The Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities (Inspection Protocol) consists of a preamble, 18 Sections, and 12 Annexes.

bbbbb Pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty, the Protocol provides detailed procedures for implementing the Treaty's on-site inspection and continuous monitoring procedures. These extensive and intrusive on-site procedures will work in conjunction with national technical means of verification provided for in Articles IX, X, and XII, and the information exchanges provided for in Article VIII, to assist in verification of compliance.

bbbbbThe Protocol provides details on the facilities and systems that are subject to inspection and sets forth procedures for continuous monitoring activities and the 12 types of on-site inspections that are permitted by different paragraphs of Article XI. These types of inspections and activities are as follows, with the corresponding paragraph from Article XI of the Treaty shown in parenthesis: baseline data inspections (paragraph 2); data update inspections (paragraph 3); new facility inspections (paragraph 4); suspect-site inspections (paragraph 5); reentry vehicle inspections (paragraph 6); post-exercise dispersal inspections of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles (paragraph 7); conversion or elimination inspections (paragraph 8); close-out inspections (paragraph 9); formerly declared facility inspections (paragraph 10); technical characteristics exhibitions (paragraph 11); distinguishability exhibitions (paragraph 12); baseline exhibitions (paragraph 13); and continuous monitoring activities (paragraph 14).

bbbbb Baseline data inspections may be conducted between 45 and 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty. These inspections will be carried out at inspectable declared facilities to help confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such facilities as of entry into force. Such numbers and types of items, as of September 1, 1990, were specified in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and will be updated in the initial exchange of data to be provided 30 days after entry into force, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

bbbbb Data update inspections may be conducted beginning 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter. Each Party will have a combined quota of 15 data update and suspect site inspections each year for the duration of the Treaty, with a maximum of two per year at any one facility. Data update inspections will be carried out to help confirm the numbers and types of items specified for such facilities in the notifications and regular exchanges of updated data that are required by paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

bbbbb New facility inspections may begin 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty. These inspections are essentially baseline data inspections for inspectable facilities that come into being after the entry into force of the Treaty. Each Party will have up to 60 days to conduct such an inspection after notification of a new facility.

bbbbb Suspect-site inspections may be conducted, beginning 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty, to help confirm that covert assembly of mobile ICBMs or covert assembly of first stages of such ICBMs is not occurring at facilities on an agreed list (see paragraph 12 of Annex I of the Memorandum of Understanding). These inspections count against the quota for data update inspections.

bbbbb Reentry vehicle inspections may be conducted, beginning 165 days after the entry into force of the Treaty, on ICBMs that are deployed in silos, on road-mobile launchers in restricted areas, on rail-mobile launchers in rail garrisons, and on SLBMs that are deployed on submarines at submarine bases to help confirm that they are not deployed with more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads that are attributed to them. The inspected Party is required to demonstrate that the number of reentry vehicles does not exceed the number of warheads attributed to that missile. There is an annual quota of 10 reentry vehicle inspections, with a maximum of two per year at any one base.

bbbbb Post-exercise dispersal inspections (referred to for convenience as post-dispersal inspections in the Inspection Protocol) may be conducted to help confirm that mobile launchers of ICBMs and their missiles have returned to their bases after completion of an exercise dispersal or are otherwise accounted for. Up to forty percent of the bases involved in an exercise dispersal may be selected at random by the inspecting Party for inspection, with a minimum of one base of each type of mobile missile that took part in the dispersal.

bbbbb Conversion or elimination inspections are conducted to help confirm that the procedures specified in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol for conversion or elimination of strategic systems -- mobile ICBMs and their launch canisters, mobile ICBM launchers, heavy bombers, or former heavy bombers -- were followed. The right, or in some cases the obligation, to conduct these inspections begins 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty.

bbbbb Close-out inspections are conducted to help confirm that the standards for elimination of inspectable facilities have been met. The other Party has 60 days after notification of the elimination of the facility to conduct a close-out inspection, if it chooses to do so. These inspections may also be conducted during the baseline period at facilities that existed at the time of Treaty signature, but not at the time of entry into force.

bbbbb Formerly declared facility inspections may be conducted, beginning 165 days after entry into force, to help confirm that eliminated facilities continue to meet the elimination standards. These inspections may be conducted after a close-out inspection is conducted or after the 60-day period for conducting a close-out inspection has expired. Each Party has the right to conduct a total of three formerly declared facility inspections each year, with no more than two per year at any one facility.

bbbbb Technical characteristics exhibitions provide each Party the opportunity to inspect each type and variant of ICBM and SLBM and each version of mobile launcher of ICBMs of the other Party. The purpose is to help confirm the dimensions and certain other data given in the Memorandum of Understanding for these systems. Exhibitions of existing systems are to be completed no later than 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty. Under the terms of the Agreement on Early Exhibitions, the exhibitions will be carried out within 240 days after Treaty signature, but any item or characteristic not exhibited prior to entry into force under that Agreement must be exhibited after entry into force.

bbbbb Distinguishability exhibitions provide each Party with the opportunity to inspect one of each type, category, and variant (as applicable) of heavy bomber (except heavy bombers of a type that has never been tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs, such as the B-2), former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs of the other Party. At these exhibitions, the inspecting Party will observe the technical characteristics specified in the Memorandum of Understanding for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs (including equipment for ALCMs), confirm the features that distinguish categories of heavy bombers (except test heavy bombers) from one another and from former heavy bombers, and observe the features that distinguish variants of heavy bombers and long-range nuclear ALCMs, respectively, from one another. This will prepare the inspecting Party so that during future inspections it can confirm the identity of these systems and the number of them that are declared to be present. Exhibitions of existing systems are to be completed no later than 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty. Under the terms of the Agreement on Early Exhibitions, the exhibitions will be carried out within 240 days after Treaty signature, but any item or characteristic not exhibited prior to entry into force under that Agreement must be exhibited after entry into force.

bbbbb Baseline exhibitions, to be conducted during the period for baseline inspections, are required of each heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, each training heavy bomber, and each former heavy bomber declared as of entry into force of the Treaty. These exhibitions allow the other Party to confirm that such airplanes meet the standards of conversion provided in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Subsequent baseline exhibitions are also required when a long-range nuclear ALCM is first flight-tested from a deployed type of bomber from which no long-range nuclear ALCM has previously been flight-tested.

bbbbb Continuous monitoring will be conducted at final assembly facilities for mobile ICBMs (for missiles in canisters) or assembly facilities for the first stage of mobile ICBMs (for missiles that exist as stages). Such monitoring will assist in counting the number of mobile ICBMs that are produced. For the purposes of continuous monitoring under the Treaty, the U.S. Peacekeeper is treated as a mobile ICBM; it is subject to non-deployed limits, its production is monitored, and each missile must have a unique identifier.

bbbbb In addition to specific provisions for each type of inspection and for continuous monitoring, the Inspection Protocol provides for: the legal status of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members; notifications concerning inspections and continuous monitoring activities; arrangements for air transportation; activities beginning upon arrival at the point of entry; general rules for the conduct of the inspection and continuous monitoring activities; the cancellation of inspections; and the preparation of inspection reports and continuous monitoring reports.

bbbbb The 12 Annexes to the Inspection Protocol contain detailed procedures on: (1) how to inspect covered objects, containers, launch canisters, vehicles, and structures; (2) how to inspect silo launchers of ICBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, and SLBM launchers; (3) how to conduct reentry vehicle inspections; (4) how to conduct exhibitions and inspections of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, long-range ALCMs, and their facilities; (5) how to conduct continuous monitoring; (6) how to inspect unique identifiers; (7) how to deliver and examine equipment and supplies; (8) types of equipment for inspections and continuous monitoring activities and methods of use; (9) characteristics and methods of use of equipment for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system; (10) types of inspection airplanes; (11) how to conduct technical characteristic exhibitions and inspections of ICBMs and SLBMs; and (12) the size criteria to be used during inspections and continuous monitoring.

bbbbbThis analysis refers to short-notice" types of inspections. These are baseline data, data update, new facility, suspect-site, reentry vehicle, post-exercise dispersal, and formerly declared facility inspections. Scheduled" types of inspections include conversion or elimination and close-out inspections, as well as technical characteristics, distinguishability, and baseline exhibitions.

PREAMBLE

bbbbb The preamble links the Inspection Protocol to the basic rights concerning inspection and continuous monitoring that are provided by Article XI of the Treaty.

SECTION I - GENERAL OBLIGATIONS

bbbbb Section I establishes the overarching principle that each Party is obliged to facilitate the conduct of inspections and continuous monitoring activities by the other Party. An obligation to facilitate includes an obligation not to hinder or interfere with an activity. Thus, there is no need for a separate provision on non-interference with inspections that would be analogous to the prohibition on noninterference with national technical means, set forth in paragraph 2 of Article IX of the Treaty.

SECTION II - PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE LEGAL STATUS OF INSPECTORS, MONITORS, AND AIRCREW MEMBERS

bbbbb Section II deals with two issues: development and maintenance of the agreed lists of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members, and the privileges and immunities enjoyed by these inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members. The Agreement on the Early Exchange of Lists provides for exchanging the initially proposed names before the entry into force of the Treaty.

bbbbb Paragraph 1 of Section II establishes the basic ground rules for inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members. Individuals on each list are agreed upon in accordance with provisions of this Section and the Agreement on the Early Exchange of Lists. Paragraph 1 provides that only inspectors may conduct inspections, and that only monitors may conduct continuous monitoring activities (which include not only monitoring, but also construction and maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system). Inspectors and monitors will arrive in the territory of the other Party only on inspection airplanes that are operated by specified aircrew members or on regularly-scheduled commercial flights to the point of entry.

bbbbb Paragraph 2 of Section II sets limits on the number of inspectors (400) and monitors (300) on the current lists; these numbers may be changed by mutual agreement. These levels were selected to provide a sufficient pool of individuals, while keeping at a manageable level the job of checking the background and identity of proposed individuals. The number of individuals on the list of aircrew members is not limited, so that the high rate of personnel turnover in the US Military Airlift Command can be accommodated. With respect to the content of the list, "blast" is an administrative subdivision used within the Soviet Union.

bbbbb Paragraph 3 of Section II provides each Party with the basic right to agree with or object to the designation of each inspector, monitor, and aircrew member proposed by the other Party; it also refers to the appropriate notification to be used in such circumstances. The acceptable grounds for objections are set forth in paragraph 6 of Section II.

bbbbb Paragraph 4 of Section II limits the frequency with which the lists may be changed, limits the number of new names that may be added during a change, and refers to the appropriate notification. There are two reasons for these limits: First, they ease the burden on the FBI, which is responsible for conducting background checks on proposed Soviet inspectors and monitors. Second, these limits bound the administrative burden of keeping the list updated. A response to a proposed change is required within a limited time, just as in the case of the initially proposed names.

bbbbb Paragraph 5 of Section II requires that each Party provide visas to the individuals that it has agreed to allow to enter. These individuals are to use such visas in accordance with the Treaty. Under the provisions of the Twenty-second Agreed Statement, the Parties may also agree to use such visas for conducting continuous monitoring inspections under the INF Treaty.

bbbbb Paragraph 6 of Section II provides the grounds for objecting to proposed or already-agreed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members. While proposed monitors and aircrew members may be objected to for any reason, specific and serious reasons (i.e., being under indictment for a criminal offense on the territory of the inspected Party, having been convicted in a criminal prosecution, or having been expelled by the inspected Party) are required to object to proposed inspectors or to object to any individual once that individual has been agreed to by the Parties. The stricter standard in the latter case recognizes the fact that there are lesser counter-intelligence concerns in the case of inspectors than monitors, since inspectors will spend less time in the inspected country and their movements are more restricted.

bbbbb Paragraph 7 of Section II entitles inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members to various privileges and immunities. Proceeding from the basis of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, paragraph 7 provides inviolability to individual inspectors and monitors, and to their work spaces, living spaces, and papers. Subparagraph 7(h) sets forth the approach for dealing with any abuses. During the negotiations, the Parties agreed that attics and basements adjacent to office and living spaces are inherently part of these spaces and thus are accorded inviolability and protection; the operations center is excluded because the inspected Party has the right to be escorted into the operations center when it desires, pursuant to paragraph 28 of Section XVI of the Protocol. The provisions on privileges and immunities are drawn from, and substantially identical with, those found in the Annex to the Protocol on Inspections of the INF Treaty. There are two small differences, however. The START provisions are explicit that the immunity of individuals and the inviolability of airplanes does not apply to regularly scheduled commercial flights; INF is silent on the subject. In addition, under INF the responsibility to prevent repetition of an abuse is the subject of joint consultations; in START, if the inspected Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities, consultations will be held to determine whether such an abuse has occurred. If it is determined that such an abuse has occurred, the inspecting Party is responsible for taking the necessary measures to prevent a repetition of such an abuse.

SECTION III - NOTIFICATIONS CONCERNING INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES

bbbbb Section III contains all notifications dealing exclusively with inspections and monitoring. There are notifications that are integrated with the sequence of events associated with an inspection (see paragraphs 3 through 9 of this Section) or with continuous monitoring (paragraphs 10 through 19), and there are notifications dealing exclusively with the administrative aspects of inspections and continuous monitoring (paragraphs 2 and 20 through 25). These notifications were put in the Inspection Protocol, rather than the Notification Protocol, for ease of use by those persons who will be responsible for implementing the inspection and continuous monitoring provisions. The timing and sequence of events are similar for all the short-notice" types of inspections. Similarly, the timing and sequence of events are similar for the scheduled" types of inspections.

bbbbb Paragraph 1 of Section III provides that the notifications sent pursuant to this Section will follow the general provisions for notifications in Article VIII of the Treaty. Thus, the notifications will be sent through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.

bbbbb Paragraph 2 of Section III sets the times for providing and updating the diplomatic clearance numbers for inspection airplanes.

bbbbb Paragraph 3 of Section III is the notification that alerts the other Party to an impending short-notice" type of inspection. Such notifications will include a statement of when, after arrival at the point of entry, the named inspectors will reveal what type of inspection will be conducted at which inspection site.

bbbbb Paragraph 4 of Section III specifies the amount of time the inspecting Party has to reveal the type of inspection and inspection site. For baseline data and new facility inspections, there is more flexibility than for other short-notice" inspections; this recognizes the scheduling difficulties associated with the large number of baseline data inspections to be completed between 45 and 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty. The special provisions for post-exercise dispersal inspections balance the inspected Party's need to complete the inspections in a timely manner, so the bases can return to normal operations, with the inspecting Party's need for sufficient time to assemble the inspection teams and transport them to the site.

bbbbb Paragraph 5 of Section III provides for the notification that will alert the inspected Party that inspectors will be arriving for a scheduled" type of inspection (i.e., conversion or elimination inspection, close-out inspection, or one of the three kinds of exhibitions); such notification must specify the inspection site and the type of inspection.

bbbbbParagraph 6 of Section III provides for the notification of the arrival of replacement inspectors to relieve those already on duty at an elimination site, as provided for in paragraph 4 of Section XI of the Inspection Protocol. Such replacements would be allowed if the eliminations continued for more than three weeks at that elimination site.

bbbbb Paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 of Section III provide for the set of notifications for a sequential inspection -- one that is to be carried out at a different site by an inspection team already in the country to carry out an inspection. These notifications are designed not only to provide the same amount of warning to the facility designated for inspection as that facility would have had if the inspectors were arriving from outside the country, but also to preserve the surprise element for short-notice" types of inspections. Paragraph 7 alerts the inspected Party that there will be a sequential inspection. If the sequential inspection is of the scheduled" type, the inspection team simply provides the name of the next site. For an inspection of the short-notice" type, paragraph 7 requires the inspection team to state whether it intends to go directly to the next site or to go first to the point of entry; paragraph 8 provides for the notification of when the type of inspection and site will be revealed, and paragraph 9 gives the time window for revealing that information. Paragraph 33 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol limits sequential inspections to those associated with the same point of entry.

bbbbb Paragraphs 10 through 13 of Section III are the notifications associated with setting up the equipment for continuous monitoring and starting to monitor the production of mobile ICBMs. They provide timelines both for notifying the start of monitoring production and for entering the country to conduct the engineering survey to prepare for building construction and equipment installation as early as 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. For this to be accomplished, the paragraph 10 and 11 notifications would have to be given immediately upon entry into force since they are 30-day pre-notifications.

bbbbb Paragraph 10 of Section III provides for the notification of the intention to establish a monitoring system and to bring in a team to conduct the engineering site survey. This notification precedes any other notification regarding a given facility subject to continuous monitoring.

bbbbb Paragraph 11 of Section III provides for setting the date at which continuous monitoring will commence and alerting the other Party of the arrival of the initial team of monitors who will actually carry out continuous monitoring at a particular facility. Beginning on the specified date, all vehicles and containers large enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring (as defined in paragraph 20 of Section VI) may exit from the facility only through the designated portal under the surveillance of the monitors.

bbbbb Paragraph 12 of Section III provides for the notification that starts the six-month period for the host country to provide the logistic support that is requested, taking into account the findings of the engineering site survey of the site.

bbbbb Paragraph 13 of Section III provides for the notification alerting a Party of the planned first arrival of monitors to set up the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system at a facility.

bbbbb Paragraph 14 of Section III provides for notification of the intention to replace monitors; it applies to monitors setting up equipment or monitoring a facility. Paragraph 28 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol permits temporary increases in the number of monitors present at a facility to accommodate changeovers of monitors to take place at the facility.

bbbbbParagraph 15 of Section III provides for the notification of the intended entry of monitors to maintain a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system. The flexible limits provided for in Paragraph 28 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol permit temporary increases in the number of monitors present at a facility.

bbbbb Paragraph 16 of Section III provides for notification to be provided when monitors intend to leave a facility -- either to leave the country or to move to another facility.

bbbbb Paragraphs 17, 18, and 19 of Section III address the notifications associated with the use of special cargo flights for facilities subject to continuous monitoring and for monitored facilities. A notification pursuant to paragraph 17 alerts the other Party at least 20 days in advance of the planned use of a special cargo flight and provides sufficient information on the amount and destination of the cargo for transportation within the territory of the inspected Party to be arranged. A notification pursuant to paragraph 18 confirms the paragraph 17 notification and provides additional information at least 7 days in advance of the flight. The permission of the inspected Party is required before the flight may land at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility rather than the point of entry. If the paragraph 17 and 18 notifications indicate a desire to land at the airport associated with the facility, the inspected Party must, pursuant to paragraph 19, provide a notification either granting or denying permission. If the inspected Party grants permission to land at the airport associated with the facility, it has the right to have an aircrew escort on-board the aircraft.

bbbbb Paragraphs 20, 21, and 22 of Section III address the lists of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members. Pursuant to paragraph 20, notifications are used to provide proposed changes to the lists. Pursuant to paragraph 21, notifications are used to convey the agreement with or objection to inclusion of the proposed names. Pursuant to paragraph 22, notifications are used to object to a name to which the Parties had previously agreed.

bbbbb Paragraph 23 of Section III provides for the notification to be used by a Party to change the points of entry to its territory; such a change does not require agreement by the other Party. However, the number of points of entry must be two or three as required by paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol, and the time limits for transporting inspectors to an inspection site require a Party to select points of entry well-situated with respect to inspectable facilities.

bbbbbParagraph 24 of Section III provides for the notification of the flight plan of an inspection airplane prior to departure to the inspected Party's territory.

bbbbb Paragraph 25 of Section III provides for the notification acknowledging and approving the flight plan of an inspection airplane in response to a paragraph 24 notification.

SECTION IV - ARRANGEMENTS FOR AIR TRANSPORTATION

bbbbb Paragraph 1 of Section IV bounds the number of points of entry on the territory of each Party: two or three at each Party's discretion. Access to each inspectable facility may be made only through the point of entry with which it is associated. The associations between points of entry and inspection sites are set forth in paragraph 9 of Annex I of the Memorandum of Understanding.

bbbbb Paragraph 2 of Section IV provides for identification of a nearby airport for each facility subject to continuous monitoring and each monitored facility to be used by special cargo flights if so requested by the inspecting Party and agreed by the inspected Party. Many, but not all, of the general rules governing points of entry also apply at such airports when used by special cargo flights.

bbbbb Paragraph 3 of Section IV establishes the inspecting Party's general right to use inspection airplanes of specified types for the transportation of inspectors or monitors and their equipment to points of entry. The notifications that must be made, as appropriate, are cited.

bbbbbParagraph 4 of Section IV establishes the inspecting Party's right to use inspection airplanes of specified types for the transportation of cargo to points of entry. With the consent of the other Party, such cargo flights may land at the airport associated with a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. These airplanes are also allowed to carry monitors and, if landing at a point of entry, inspectors. The inspected Party has the right to provide an escort crew because the flight will not necessarily be on established international airways. The notifications that must be made, as appropriate, are cited.

bbbbbParagraph 5 of Section IV provides that during an operational dispersal conducted by one of the Parties, flights to transport monitors and to transport cargo to the territory of the Party that has declared an operational dispersal and to the territory of the Party that has declared the suspension of inspections in connection with such a dispersal conducted by the other Party, must be agreed through diplomatic channels. During operational dispersals, continuous monitoring activities continue and cannot be suspended. Suspending monitoring would decrease confidence that the inspected Party had not exceeded the non-deployed limits on mobile ICBMs.

bbbbb Paragraph 6 of Section IV provides the option to use regularly scheduled commercial flights, rather than inspection airplanes, to transport inspectors and monitors and their equipment to points of entry having such service.

bbbbb Paragraph 7 of Section IV provides the right to use special cargo flights (see paragraph 4 of this Section) to transport equipment and supplies for more than one monitored facility if all these facilities are associated with the same point of entry and the flight is made to that point of entry.

bbbbb Paragraphs 8 through 11 of Section IV provide administrative procedures for dealing with inspection airplanes, including procedures for issuing diplomatic clearance numbers, flight plan filing and approval in accordance with recognized international rules, and assignment of call signs.

bbbbb Paragraph 12 of Section IV establishes the general limit of ten aircrew members for inspection airplanes, but allows up to 25 to be on the special cargo flights provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section. Additional aircrew members could also be brought into the country, with permission of the host, to deal with the breakdown of an inspection airplane.

bbbbbParagraph 13 of Section IV spells out the services to be provided for the inspection airplanes of the inspecting Party and specifies which Party pays for each type of service. Allocating the cost of parking and security protection to the inspected Party is intended to avoid a problem that arose in INF when the Soviets billed the US for such services, and the US did not charge the Soviets for the equivalent service.

bbbbb Paragraph 14 of Section IV requires agreement in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) on the maximum weight of equipment and supplies that may be carried on a routine flight of an inspection airplane bringing in monitors. Having such a limit assists the inspected Party in arranging adequate transportation to deliver the equipment to the monitored facility. The agreement on the actual number was deferred to the JCIC because a similar limit was being negotiated in the Special Verification Commission (SVC) for INF, and the Parties wanted the START number to be consistent with the INF number.

SECTION V - ACTIVITIES BEGINNING UPON ARRIVAL AT THE POINT OF ENTRY

bbbbb Section V contains provisions for activities that are carried out at the point of entry (POE) and obligations that apply throughout the in-country period, which begins with arrival at the POE. These provisions deal primarily with the duties of escorts for the inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members; examination, clearance, impoundment, and storage of equipment; designation of the inspection site and type of inspection; services to be provided and allocation of costs; and mass media. They draw on, and elaborate upon, similar provisions contained in the INF Treaty and Memorandum of Agreement.

bbbbb Paragraph 1 of Section V requires the in-country escort (which may consist of several individuals representing the inspected Party) to meet inspectors or monitors and aircrew members when they arrive at the point of entry and to assist them throughout their stay in the country. The escort is required to accompany inspectors throughout their stay; the escort has the right to accompany the monitors throughout their stay, but is not required to do so continuously.

bbbbb Paragraph 2 of Section V requires personnel from the inspecting Party's embassy or consulate to meet inspectors or monitors and aircrew members when they arrive at the point of entry. These personnel may accompany inspectors and monitors only during their stay at the POE, but may accompany aircrew members throughout the in-country period.

bbbbb Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Section V address the case of Soviet inspectors or monitors arriving at the San Francisco point of entry and incorporate procedures from our INF experience. Paragraph 3 deals with Soviet inspection airplanes, which are required to land at Travis Air Force Base; paragraph 4 provides for transportation of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members to Travis if they arrive on a commercial flight at San Francisco International Airport. Detailed procedures are provided for Soviet diplomatic personnel who are assigned to the San Francisco consulate to travel between San Francisco and Travis Air Force Base to meet and accompany Soviet inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members who have arrived at the Base, as required in paragraph 2 of this Section. Such procedures are required since the normal free movement zones for such diplomats do not include Travis Air Force Base.

bbbbb Paragraph 5 of Section V makes clear that the provisions of the Treaty dealing with the rights and obligations of inspectors and monitors apply only to those who have arrived and are still in the territory of the other Party.

bbbbb Paragraph 6 of Section V sets the standards for clothing (civilian) and identification (unique badges provided by the inspecting Party) of inspectors and monitors during their time in the country.

bbbbb Paragraphs 7 through 14 of Section V deal with equipment and supplies brought by inspectors and monitors and how the items are cleared upon entry into the country. Paragraph 7 exempts such equipment and supplies from customs duties and requires that they be expeditiously processed at the point of entry.

bbbbb Paragraph 8 of Section V establishes the right of the host Party to examine, in the presence of representatives of the inspecting Party, equipment and supplies each time that they are brought into the country. Permitted equipment will be that listed in Annexes 8 or 9 of the Inspection Protocol. The purpose of such examination is to ascertain, to the satisfaction of each Party, that the equipment or supplies cannot perform functions unconnected with the requirements of inspections or continuous monitoring activities. There is a presumption that, if the equipment is a model listed in Annex 8 or 9, it cannot perform functions unconnected with these requirements. However, this does not affect the right of the Parties to challenge such equipment on the grounds that it has been modified to perform such functions.

bbbbb Paragraph 9 of Section V provides for equipment and supplies brought on commercial flights or inspection airplanes other than special cargo flights to be examined at the POE.

bbbbb Paragraph 10 of Section V refers to Annex 7 of the Inspection Protocol for provisions on the procedures and locations for examining equipment and supplies brought on special cargo flights.

bbbbb Paragraph 11 of Section V gives the inspected Party the right to impound at the location of the examination any equipment or supplies found to be capable of performing functions unconnected with inspection or monitoring requirements. Equipment and supplies impounded at the POE or the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility cannot be brought to such a facility or inspection site unless the inspected Party informs the inspecting Party otherwise. Note that Annex 7 of the Inspection Protocol contains procedures related to examination and impoundment at the monitored facility.

bbbbb Paragraph 12 of Section V outlines procedures for on-the-spot resolution of disagreements on whether equipment or supplies should be cleared for entry into the country. If the disagreement cannot be resolved during the examination, the Parties would record their views in a joint document and refer the matter for resolution in diplomatic channels, in the JCIC, or by another agreed method.

bbbbb Paragraph 13 of Section V provides for removal of impounded equipment or supplies and for any necessary storage pending removal to be under dual control. Unless the inspected Party expressly states that impounded items need not be removed from its territory, such items must be removed no later than the departure of the inspection team that brought them, or no later than the next departure of monitors from the country.

bbbbb Paragraph 14 of Section V provides for secure storage, under dual control, of cleared inspection and monitoring equipment and supplies at the POE.

bbbbb Paragraph 15 of Section V requires that, for a short-notice" type of inspection, the inspection site and type of inspection be revealed in writing at or before the time specified for designation of the site and inspection type in the notification of intent to conduct an inspection.

bbbbb Paragraphs 16 and 17 of Section V provide for certain situations in which the escort informs the inspection team that the facility it has selected for inspection has few or no items of inspection present. The team can then choose to carry out the inspection anyway, or choose to start over" and designate an inspection type and an inspection site associated with the same POE, or choose not to conduct the inspection (without penalty).Paragraph 16 deals with reentry vehicle inspections and the case when a designated base has no deployed SLBMs or mobile ICBMS. Paragraph 17 deals with heavy bomber facilities, where airplanes are inspectable, that have been designated for data update inspections, and from which more than 30 percent of the inspectable aircraft based at that facility would be absent during the first 20 hours of the period of inspection. If there is no issue regarding the number of airplanes to be present or if the inspection team leader decides to conduct the inspection, paragraph 17 also requires the escort, before the team leaves for the facility, to inform the team of the airfields within national territory at which each absent heavy bomber and former heavy bomber based at that facility will be located. Note that no locational information is provided until it is definite that the inspection will take place at a particular facility. Note also that this information is required only for absent airplanes that are in national territory. (General locations of absent airplanes outside national territory are provided during pre-inspection briefings at the air base.) Note finally that the number and type of test heavy bombers at the facility to be inspected are also provided at the point of entry. This approach strikes a balance that preserves both operational flexibility for bomber activities and efficient utilization of inspection rights.

bbbbb Paragraphs 18 through 21 of Section V specify the services (food, lodging, transportation, etc.) the inspected Party is required to provide for the inspectors, monitors, aircrew, and their equipment and supplies and allocates the costs for these services. Paragraph 18 is for inspectors and aircrew members; paragraph 19 is for monitors; and paragraph 21 is for the escort crew for special cargo flights landing at airports other than the POE. The inspected Party pays for all in-country services connected with inspections. Such services provided by each government are expected to be roughly in balance. In contrast, the inspecting Party pays for almost all in-country services connected with monitoring, since the cumulative services needed to support monitoring may be greater for one Party than the other. Paragraph 20 sets the standards for the meals, lodging, and transportation at inspection sites and monitored facilities to be provided by the inspected Party.

bbbbb Paragraph 22 of Section V sets the conditions for representatives of the mass media to cover the activities of inspection teams and monitoring teams. At the POE the inspected Party provides such representatives an opportunity to photograph and televise the arrival and departure of inspection and monitoring teams. The Parties must agree, on a case-by-case basis through diplomatic channels, on any arrangements to provide representatives of the mass media an opportunity to interview inspectors and monitors, or, in conjunction with such interviews, an opportunity to take photographs and make audio-visual recordings. The activities of representatives of the mass media must be arranged so that such activities do not interfere with the conduct of inspections, continuous monitoring activities, or the process of elimination. Representatives of the mass media are not allowed to accompany inspectors during inspections or monitors during continuous monitoring activities.

SECTION VI - GENERAL RULES FOR THE CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES

bbbbb Section VI provides the general rules that apply to inspections and to continuous monitoring activities. These rules govern the behavior of the inspectors and monitors; the behavior of the in-country escort; activities in the inspectable area at an inspection site; the time limits for transporting inspectors from the POE to an inspection site; the use of equipment, recording of measurements, and handling of ambiguities; the size thresholds for inspections and monitoring; the limits on inspection and monitoring team size; the general sequence of events in an inspection; and the frequency of monitor replacement. These provisions build on lessons learned from INF experience. Additional rules applicable only to certain types of inspection are set forth in Sections VII through XVI.

bbbbb Paragraph 1 of Section VI declares the fundamental obligation that inspectors and monitors are to discharge their functions in accordance with this Protocol.

bbbbb Paragraph 2 of Section VI requires that inspectors and monitors not disclose information obtained during inspections or continuous monitoring activities unless their own government permits it. The assumption is that the Parties will only permit disclosure in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty.

bbbbb Paragraph 3 of Section VI establishes the principle that the boundaries of an inspection site are the boundaries of the facility shown on the site diagram provided for that facility. For those types of inspections that are carried out using the Annex 1 procedures for inspecting objects, containers, launch canisters, vehicles, and structures, these boundaries define the area or areas within which those procedures may be carried out.

bbbbb Paragraph 4 of Section VI deals with facilities that have non-contiguous areas and roads joining those areas. For the provisions of this paragraph to apply, the roads joining the noncontiguous areas must be shown on site diagrams. During an inspection, no item is inspectable while it is on one of those roads, but will be inspectable if it enters one of the noncontiguous areas during the period of inspection. Furthermore, Treaty-limited items moving on those roads from one noncontiguous area of the facility to another are not considered to be in transit; otherwise a notification would be required every time a Treaty-limited item was moved to different parts of the same facility. See the discussion of subparagraph 6(c) of Section VII for pre-inspection movement restrictions as they apply to such a site.

bbbbb Paragraph 5 of Section VI requires that, in discharging their functions, inspectors and monitors communicate with personnel of the inspected Party only through the in-country escorts. This provision is intended to prevent a situation in which inspectors or monitors make requests directly to personnel of the inspected Party who are not part of the in-country escort; such personnel might not be in a position to know whether the request was legitimate under terms of the Treaty.

bbbbb Paragraph 6 of Section VI establishes the principle that the activities of inspectors and monitors should only interfere with the ongoing activities at an inspection site to the extent necessary to carry out the agreed procedures, and not hamper or delay the operation of the facility nor compromise safety.

bbbbbParagraph 7 of Section VI requires that the inspectors or monitors comply with regulations communicated by the in-country escort for safety and for protecting equipment and controlled environments. The hosts will provide protective gear as they deem necessary for these purposes. For example, inspectors must obey instructions, such as not to touch an item, or to wear gloves while inspecting it. The hosts, however, remain bound by the requirement to facilitate the inspection.

bbbbb Paragraph 8 of Section VI requires that appropriate lighting must be provided, not only for photographs, but to enable the inspectors or monitors to carry out the procedures provided for in the Inspection Protocol.

bbbbb Paragraphs 9 and 10 of Section VI are mirror images of one another and provide the mechanism for dealing with personnel of either Party who are not following the provisions of the Inspection Protocol. If the personnel take actions that are not in accordance with the rules...," the team leader or a representative and the in-country escort may consult. This means that only in the case when the team leader and in-country escort have discussed the matter and are in agreement that an inappropriate action has occurred would it be necessary to take measures on the spot to prevent a repetition of the action. If questions or ambiguities are not resolved at the site, the inspection or monitoring team leader or the in-country escort may include a statement in the inspection or continuous monitoring report concerning such actions; the in-country escort or team chief or monitoring chief may include its response to such a statement in the report.

bbbbb Paragraph 11 of Section VI establishes the principle that the host country controls the routes and means of travel of inspecting Party personnel within its territory. Special provisions are made for emergency travel. The inspected Party has the right to examine the personal baggage of inspectors or monitors, except papers, during any travel.

bbbbb Paragraph 12 of Section VI provides that some members of the in-country escort at a facility must be representatives of the inspected facility to ensure that the escort is familiar with local conditions. Further, the inspected Party is required to provide full-time access of monitors to a member of the in-country escort at facilities subject to continuous monitoring and at monitored facilities, although this person need not be associated with the facility being monitored.

bbbbb Paragraph 13 of Section VI requires the hosts to provide means of communication with the embassy of the inspecting Party in the inspected country at any time that the inspectors or monitors are at the point of entry, at the inspection site, or at the monitored area. This provision also establishes the right of monitors to communicate with their country from the monitored facility, using satellite communications when facsimile communications via the embassy cannot be achieved within 20 minutes. The inspected Party must also provide for communication between inspection team subgroups. Such means of communication are under the control of the inspected Party.

bbbbb Paragraph 14 of Section VI requires the inspected Party to transport the inspection team to the inspection site for short-notice" types of inspections within nine hours after the time specified for naming the inspection site at the point of entry. If the team chooses to name the inspection site and type of inspection earlier than the scheduled site designation time, the nine hours will still begin at the scheduled time. An exception is made for data update inspections at road-mobile ICBM bases. Because the road-mobile launchers must return to their restricted areas within 24 hours after the base is designated for a data update inspection, the inspection team does not need to arrive at the inspection site until the 24-hour period for the return of mobile launchers has elapsed.

bbbbb If an inspection is conducted after completion of a previous inspection and the team returns to the point of entry to name the next site, the same times apply; if the team chooses to go directly to the next inspection site, the host Party has 18 hours to transport the team. The rationale for providing a longer time frame for going directly to the next inspection site is that the distance from the first inspected site to the second inspected site may be greater than the distance from the point of entry to the second inspected site; the longer time frame also allows the aircrew to rest.

bbbbb Paragraph 15 of Section VI establishes the right of the inspection team to bring cleared equipment and supplies as well as necessary documentation to an inspection site. Furthermore, for any specific item of equipment, the inspectors can bring the maximum number permitted for any type of inspection (but may only use, at any one time, the number permitted for the type of inspection being conducted). This allows the team to have at its disposal the necessary equipment, and thus preserves the option to conduct a sequential inspection of a different type. Provisions for storage of equipment at the inspection site and observation by the in-country escort are included.

bbbbb Paragraph 16 of Section VI establishes the right of the monitors to have cleared equipment and supplies as well as necessary documentation at a monitored facility. Provisions are included for observation of equipment and supplies by the in-country escort, except cleared equipment or supplies when they are located in inviolable living or office space.

bbbbbParagraph 17 of Section VI provides for completing the information on manufacturer's numbers and model numbers required to be included in the equipment lists of Annexes 8 or 9 . It also provides for reaching expeditious final agreement on the equipment specifications. Provisions are made for replacement equipment. If an item of replacement equipment has the same purpose and similar characteristics as the equipment provided for in Annex 8 or 9, agreement on that replacement equipment can be reached in advance through diplomatic channels or later at the time of the examination. If the Parties have not reached agreement on an item of replacement equipment or if the purpose or characteristics of that replacement equipment differ from the purpose and characteristics provided for in Annex 9 , the JCIC will resolve the question.

bbbbb Paragraph 18 of Section VI establishes the right of inspectors or monitors to use cleared equipment during inspections or continuous monitoring. Inspectors and monitors have the right to use any cleared equipment, except that cameras are to be used only by the in-country escort. At the request of inspectors or monitors, a member of the in-country escort will take two photographs of each object or building, within the inspection site or perimeter continuous monitoring area, about which questions or ambiguities have arisen. Each Party shall retain one photograph of each item.

bbbbbParagraph 19 of Section VI establishes two basic principles regarding any measurements taken during inspections or continuous monitoring activities. First, all measurements recorded during inspections or continuous monitoring activities must be in the report and certified by personnel of both Parties. Note that measurements taken by inspectors that they do not wish to record officially are not subject to this procedure. Second, any measurement of Treaty-limited items that deviates by no more than three percent of the value specified in the Memorandum of Understanding is considered to be consistent with the specified value. The latter rule is meant to account for manufacturing tolerances and deviations due to the process of field measurement.

bbbbb Paragraphs 20 through 25 of Section VI set forth the principles concerning items and size criteria for inspection and continuous monitoring. These principles call for searching for and counting items of inspection" and items of continuous monitoring." They are based on examining and comparing any containers, canisters, vehicles or structures, within the boundaries of the site to determine whether they could contain an item of inspection or item of continuous monitoring. However, for continuous monitoring, such examination occurs at the portal, since monitors may not enter the production plant. The specific items of inspection" are defined in the combined context of the type of inspection (e.g., data update, suspect site, or post-exercise dispersal) and the type of facility or site of the inspection (e.g., an inspection at heavy bomber facilities, ICBM or SLBM facilities, or weapons storage areas at heavy bomber bases). In a suspect site inspection, for example, the items of inspection involve mobile missiles, solid rocket motors for first stages of mobile missiles, and first stages of mobile missiles at the inspection site. Items of continuous monitoring" involve mobile missiles (or their first stages if the missiles are maintained, stored, and transported in stages) that exit from a monitored facility.

bbbbb The size criteria are related in each context to the dimensions of items of inspection" and items of continuous monitoring." For those types of inspections for which size criteria are applicable, inspectors are told where the Treaty-limited items are located and the number and types of items at each location. The inspected Party is required to satisfy the inspectors that the information that they have been given is accurate. By virtue of being told where all the items of inspection are located, the inspectors are also told that there are no other Treaty-limited items at the site. The inspected Party is also required to satisfy the inspectors of this fact. Items of inspection could be in containers, canisters, vehicles, or structures. Inspectors have the right to determine whether such containers, canisters, vehicles, and structures contain one or more items of inspection. If an inspected container, canister, vehicle, or structure is not large enough to contain" any item of inspection meeting the size criteria of that inspection, it is not subject to further inspection. Thus, the size criteria for a specific type of inspection establish a threshold that can be used to demonstrate that the dimensions of a container, canister, vehicle, or structure are insufficient to contain an item of inspection.

bbbbb Alternate procedures for demonstrating whether a container, canister, vehicle, or structure contains an item of inspection are set forth in Annex 1 of the Inspection Protocol. Similar rules and procedures apply to objects, containers, and vehicles when inspecting for items of continuous monitoring at a monitored facility. In the case of monitoring, the Inspecting Party examines such objects only as they are exiting from the monitored facility.

bbbbbIt is important to note that there is not necessarily a single smallest" item of inspection such that, if a given container is not large enough to contain that specific item of inspection, the container could be considered not large enough to contain any other item of inspection. If there is, for example, a short-wide item of inspection and a long-thin item of inspection, a container's dimensions must be compared with the dimensions of both items to be sure neither they nor any other item of inspection specified for that category of inspection could fit. Thus, the Treaty essentially uses a template" approach to size criteria at inspections. Accordingly, one, two, or potentially more items of inspection will be considered in the determination by inspectors that a given container is not large enough to contain any of the items of inspection for a particular type of inspection.

bbbbb During the negotiations, the Parties agreed to one exception to this principle related to solid rocket motors for mobile missiles. Because solid rocket motors could be built into partial stages and then be shipped to covert assembly sites, and due to the stated Soviet practice of only producing mobile missiles as one integrated unit including the launch canister when they leave the production facility, the Parties agreed that there would be specific restrictions placed on the location of such solid rocket motors. The Parties also agreed that, when inspecting Soviet ballistic missile facilities, a template would be used that was based upon the size of the smallest solid rocket motor for a Soviet mobile ICBM system, currently the SS-25.

bbbbb Although the Soviet Union agreed to list solid rocket motors for first stages of mobile ICBMs as items of inspection, it claimed it could not agree, for political reasons, to specifically state in the Treaty that the Parties were actually inspecting for solid rocket motors. The stated Soviet rationale was that solid rocket motors were not specifically numerically limited under the Treaty. Therefore, an agreement was reached whereby the term agreed percentage" was used to indicate that the size criteria for Soviet ballistic missile facilities would be less than that derived from measuring the first stage. The Soviet delegation would not confirm what percentage was sufficient to capture the solid rocket motor; consequently, a percentage was never listed. Instead, the Parties agreed to exhibit the first stage of the SS-25 and the Peacekeeper in a configuration that allows inspectors to make an end-dome to end-dome measurement. This exhibition, done as a part of the technical characteristics exhibition, is intended to help ensure that the dimensions of the solid rocket motor are captured. This is the only case, other than in the determination of a new type, where an end dome-to-end dome measurement of an existing system is required. In addition, the Parties agreed to list the dimensions in Annex 12 of the appropriate items that set the size criteria, subject to the confirmation of the sizes at the exhibition. Consequently, the phrase the agreed percentage of the length of that stage" in subparagraph 23(a)(i) is a euphemism for a mobile missile solid rocket motor.

bbbbb Paragraph 20 of Section VI lists the items of inspection for all types of inspections that use the procedures of Annex 1 of the Inspection Protocol. These are the actual objects for which inspectors are allowed to search, and are specific to the type of inspection and the type of facility.

bbbbb Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 20 lists not only ICBMs and SLBMs, but also first stages. This is because, for missiles maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first stage counts as the missile, whereas for missiles maintained, stored, and transported as fully assembled missiles, first stages are not allowed to exist separately from other stages of such a missile at facilities subject to short-notice" inspections. Likewise, solid rocket motors for the first stage of mobile ICBMs are listed because of the prohibition on locating them at such facilities.

bbbbb Subparagraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 20 establish heavy bombers and former heavy bombers as the items of inspection at heavy bomber-related facilities, except at inspectable weapons storage areas, where the item of inspection is a long-range nuclear ALCM. For heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, any structure within the site diagram of the air base large enough to contain a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, as determined by the inspecting Party, would be subject to inspection. For long-range nuclear ALCMs, the actual dimensions listed in the Memorandum of Understanding would determine the inspection size criteria.

bbbbb Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 20 pertains to suspect-site inspections and establishes mobile ICBMs, their first stages, and the solid rocket motors of their first stages as the items of inspection. The purpose of suspect-site inspections is to detect and deter covert assembly of mobile ICBMs at facilities subject to such inspections. Such covert assembly could not take place in the absence of any of these items.

bbbbbSubparagraph (e) of paragraph 20 pertains to post-exercise dispersal inspections. It establishes mobile launchers with their associated ICBMs of the types based at the facility as the items of inspection in the restricted areas or rail garrisons, and it establishes the mobile launchers as the items of inspection at the maintenance facilities. The purpose of post-exercise dispersal inspections is to account for the mobile launchers and missiles after an exercise dispersal, and this purpose can be accomplished without searching for smaller items. Alternatively, the facility could be designated for a data update inspection, in which smaller items are included among the items of inspection. The launcher itself is the item of inspection at the maintenance facility to allow for the possibility that the missile can be removed from the launcher in the maintenance facility. The actual dimensions of the launcher or launcher-plus-missile, as appropriate, would be taken from the Memorandum of Understanding.

bbbbb Paragraph 21 of Section VI pertains to items of continuous monitoring and establishes mobile ICBMs (for mobile ICBMs that exit from assembly facilities fully assembled, as in current Soviet practice) and first stages of a mobile ICBM (for mobile ICBMs that exit from the assembly facility in stages, as in current US practice) as items of continuous monitoring.

bbbbbParagraph 22 establishes that items are large enough to be" and large enough to contain" an item of inspection or item of continuous monitoring if the measured linear dimensions (length, width, height, and diameter) of a structure, container, launch canister, covered or environmentally protected object, vehicle, or other object are 97 percent or more of the corresponding linear dimensions of the items of inspection or continuous monitoring as specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.

bbbbb Paragraph 23 of Section VI establishes the principle that the size criteria are determined on the basis of all relevant items of inspection or their reference cylinders. For baseline data, data update, new facility, close-out and formerly declared facility inspections at ballistic missile facilities, subparagraph (a)(i) establishes the reference cylinder for mobile ICBMs in terms of the diameter of the first stage and an agreed percentage" of the length of the first stage. The phrase agreed percentage" was negotiated in the context of capturing the solid rocket motor, but this is not explicitly stated in the Treaty. The concept is to confirm the dimension listed in Annex 12, which should be based on an end dome-to-end dome measurement (i.e., the solid rocket motor). Since this measurement for mobile ICBMs establishes the size criteria for baseline and data update inspections, the Parties have the right to confirm this length on all new types of mobile ICBMs, regardless of whether the new type was declared on the basis of a change in the first stage length.

bbbbb The reference to the SS-25 means that the SS-N-6 is excluded, even though it is smaller in at least one dimension than the SS-25 solid rocket motor. Strict application of the size criteria rules would result in listing the SS-N-6 as the size criteria for inspections. However, the sides had agreed during the July 1991 Ministerial in Washington and in subsequent negotiations in Geneva that the dimensions of the SS-25 solid rocket motor would be the inspection size criteria, so these are the dimensions listed in Annex 12. After entry into force, the general principle would apply, and a new type of missile or missile stage smaller than the SS-25 would set the size threshold.

bbbbb Subparagraphs (a)(ii) and (iii) establish the size criteria for non-mobile ballistic missiles. In Subparagraphs (a)(ii) , for ICBMs other than mobile ICBMs and for SLBMs, reference cylinders are based on 90 percent of the length of the first stage for ballistic missiles transported, maintained, and stored in stages. In subparagraph (a)(iii), the size criteria are based on the length of the shortest configuration used for shipment for ICBMs maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles. (Note: The United States intended this subparagraph to cover also SLBMs maintained, stored and transported as assembled missiles, and believes that the Soviet Union had the same intent. The United States will seek Soviet agreement within the framework of the JCIC to correct this omission.) Subparagraph (b) establishes the size criteria for suspect-site inspections, which relate to the "reduced" length of the first stage of a mobile ICBM, just as in subparagraph (a)(i) .

bbbbb Paragraph 24 of Section VI requires that the size criteria used in continuous monitoring, that is, at all monitored facilities of a Party, shall be determined on the basis of the diameters and lengths of all the reference cylinders for the items of continuous monitoring of that Party. The Parties agreed, for existing systems, to use a reference cylinder at Soviet final assembly facilities based on the canister for the SS-25. Although the reference cylinder for the SS-24 is shorter, the reduction to 90 percent of the SS-25 canister effectively makes inspectable any container that could hold either an SS-25 or SS-24. The reduction to 90 percent in length and diameter for canisterized missiles is intended to capture the assembled missile out of a canister, so that such a missile could not exit from a monitored facility without being detected. For missiles that are transported, maintained, and stored in stages, because it is only necessary to verify that no undeclared stages are exiting, the reference cylinder has the actual stage dimensions. Because, currently, there are no mobile missiles of the fully-assembled-but-not- canisterized type, the Parties would have to agree in the JCIC on appropriate reference cylinder dimensions if such a system were ever developed.

bbbbb Paragraph 25 of Section VI provides a size criterion for quota inspections, pursuant to paragraph 15 of Annex 5 to this Protocol, of vehicles, containers, etc., exiting monitored production facilities for MIRVed mobile missiles. This criterion is based on the size of the solid rocket motor for the first stage of such missiles with the nozzle attached. That is the reason the reference cylinder is based on the diameter of the first stage, and a length of the distance from the lower edge of the nozzle to the upper end of the forward end dome of the motor case of the first stage. Both of these dimensions are reduced to 97 percent. The intent of these inspections is to deter the exit from such a facility of partially-assembled first stages of MIRVed mobile missiles.

bbbbbParagraph 26 of Section VI provides that, if the escort has the option to use a certain procedure to demonstrate the absence of an item of inspection or monitoring, but through no fault of the inspected Party the necessary equipment is not available or the equipment cannot function, there is no obligation for the inspected Party to choose another method for such a demonstration.

bbbbb Paragraph 27 of Section VI provides for clarifications to be given by the escort to inspectors or monitors on questions or ambiguities that arise during an inspection or during continuous monitoring activities. If questions or ambiguities remain, they are to be documented by photographs and explained in the report. This paragraph, like the corresponding paragraph in the INF Treaty, establishes the general principle that the inspected Party has an obligation to attempt to satisfy concerns raised by inspectors or monitors during inspection or monitoring activities.

bbbbb Paragraph 28 of Section VI provides the size limits for inspection and monitoring teams. The exemptions for a limited number of days in the case of monitoring teams is intended to allow replacement of monitors at the facility and to permit bringing in additional monitors for construction or maintenance. At least two monitors or inspectors on each monitoring or inspection team must speak the language of the inspected Party. An inspection or monitoring team shall operate under the direction of a team leader and deputy team leader. No more than one team may be at the same facility. Subgroups are allowed, but must consist of at least two members. Unlike other inspection teams, which are generally limited to ten inspectors, inspection teams for exhibitions during the baseline period allow for 15 inspectors because of the numbers and diversity of systems that might be exhibited.

bbbbb Paragraph 29 of Section VI states that pre-inspection procedures, including safety briefings and information on how the inspection will be conducted and information on the inspection site, will begin upon arrival at the inspection site or perimeter continuous monitoring area and shall be completed within one hour. The inspection team will begin the inspection immediately upon completion of the pre-inspection procedures.

bbbbb Paragraph 30 of Section VI provides that, for on-site inspections, the inspection team may designate one sub-group to inspect vehicles leaving the site. If a subgroup is not designated, vehicles are free to leave the site without being inspected. See paragraph 35 of this Section. Note that this paragraph does not apply to continuous monitoring.

bbbbb Paragraph 31 of Section VI establishes the standard that, for most types of inspections, the period of inspection (the time beginning with the end of pre-inspection procedures and ending with the beginning of post-inspection procedures) is 24 hours, and may be extended by 8 hours upon agreement between the escort and inspection team leader. However, certain types of inspections must be extended as long as required to permit them to be completed: baseline data and new facility inspections and all the types of exhibitions. Reentry vehicle inspections and conversion or elimination inspections do not have a specified time limit because of their complexity.

bbbbb Paragraph 32 of Section VI establishes post-inspection procedures, which include completing the inspection report in accordance with the provisions of Section XVIII of this Protocol. Post-inspection procedures will begin when the period of inspection expires and will be carried out at the location designated by the inspected Party. They will be completed no later than four hours after the arrival of the inspection team at that location, or no later than three hours after the arrival of all subgroups of the inspection team at that location, whichever is later. The second alternative is included primarily for inspection of road-mobile ICBM bases that have distant restricted areas.

bbbbb Paragraph 33 of Section VI explains that a sequential inspection is understood to mean an inspection conducted by an inspection team after the completion of an inspection and prior to the departure of the team from the territory of the inspected Party. Sequential inspections will be conducted only at facilities associated with the same point of entry by an inspection team that has not left the territory of the inspected Party.

bbbbbParagraph 34 provides for inspectors during short-notice" inspections to have the right to be present at exits of structures whose entrances and exits are large enough to permit passage of an item of inspection while the structure is being inspected. During an inspection of such a structure, no object, container or vehicle may leave the structure until inspected or until an inspector declares that he or she has no intention to inspect it.

bbbbb Paragraph 35 gives inspectors the right during short-notice" inspections to patrol the perimeter of an inspection site and to be present at the exits of the site. No vehicle may leave the inspection site during the period of inspection until inspected or until an inspector declares that he or she does not intend to inspect it.

bbbbb Paragraph 36 of Section VI specifies that if the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential "short-notice" inspection, the inspection team leader, prior to completion of the pre-inspection procedures, shall provide a notification of the intent to conduct another inspection and whether the team plans to go directly to the next site. Then, prior to completion of post-inspection procedures or no later than one hour after the return of the inspection team to the point of entry, the team leader specifies when the type of inspection and site will be revealed. A team cannot return to the same inspection site during the same sequence of inspections.

bbbbb Paragraph 37 of Section VI specifies that if the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential scheduled" inspection, the inspection team leader, prior to completion of the post-inspection procedures but no less than 24 hours before the planned commencement of the sequential inspection, shall provide a notification of the intent, type of inspection, and inspection site.

bbbbb Paragraph 38 of Section VI provides that if the inspection team does not intend to conduct another inspection upon completion of post-inspection procedures, they must return to the point of entry and leave the territory of the inspected Party within 24 hours.

bbbbb Paragraph 39 of Section VI provides limits on frequency of monitor replacements for each monitored facility. These replacements must adhere to the team size limits of paragraph 28 of this Section. Replacement directly at the monitored facility itself may take place only once in any three-week period. The total number of times that a Party can replace the monitors for a facility, whether the replacements occur directly at the facility or at its associated airport, are limited to 34 each year. These limits were negotiated to provide the replacement flexibility that the United States needed, and to provide the predictability of arrivals that the Soviet Union needed.

bbbbb Paragraph 40 of Section VI provides for the possibility that monitors arriving on the territory of the inspected Party for the purpose of maintaining the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system at a facility may arrive separately from other monitors.

SECTION VII - BASELINE DATA INSPECTIONS, DATA UPDATE INSPECTIONS, AND NEW FACILITY INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPHS 2, 3, AND 4 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

bbbbb Section VII addresses rights and obligations of the Parties during baseline data, data update, and new facility inspections.

bbbbb Paragraph 1 states that baseline data inspections shall be conducted between 45 and 165 days after entry into force.

bbbbb Paragraph 2 states that the Parties may conduct data update inspections after the end of the period for baseline data inspections. In each year, a Party is entitled to conduct no more than 15 such inspections, and no more than two can be conducted at any single facility. In accordance with Paragraph 1 of Section VIII of this Protocol, suspect site inspections also count toward the data update inspection quota.

bbbbb Paragraph 3 provides for an absolute right to exempt air bases temporarily from data update inspections. The Parties agreed that such exemptions would be infrequent and not related to actions of one Party in relation to the other (i.e., for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty"). This provision stems from intensive negotiations on heavy bomber contingency operations. Because US heavy bombers are used for conventional missions outside the context of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, as they were in the Gulf War, the United States insisted that the period of preparation for such operations not be interruptable by START inspections. Although the United States offered restrictions on the frequency and duration of exemptions from inspection, the Soviet Union refused to accept implementing language, claiming that it would be tantamount to Soviet concurrence, before the fact, on US military operations involving third states. The agreed language, while requiring an explanation of the reason for exemption, does not require a specific description of planned operations, thereby protecting operational security.

bbbbb Paragraph 4 states that when a Party notifies the other Party that a facility is subject to the limitations of the Treaty, the other Party has 60 days to conduct a new facility inspection of that facility. Such an inspection may not be conducted sooner than 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty, and no other inspection may be conducted at that facility until the new facility inspection is completed, or until the 60 days allowed for conducting such an inspection expires, whichever comes first.

bbbbb Paragraph 5 lists inspectable facilities under baseline data, data update, and new facility inspections. Note that until a long-range nuclear ALCM is tested from a B-2 heavy bomber, B-2 bases are not inspectable, except for weapons storage areas at those bases. Weapons storage areas are inspectable to help enforce the ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs at bases for heavy bombers not equipped for such weapons.

bbbbb Paragraph 6 defines pre-inspection restrictions. It states that they go into effect one hour after the time for designation of the inspection site as specified in the notification of inspection, and remain in effect until the inspection team completes the pre-inspection procedures. For inspections at road-mobile ICBM bases, pre-inspection restrictions remain in effect at each restricted area designated for inspection until the inspectors arrive at that restricted area. For a data update inspection at road mobile ICBM bases, only one restricted area may be inspected; for those restricted areas not designated for inspection, the restrictions remain in effect until six hours after the completion of the pre-inspection procedures.

bbbbb At facilities other than those associated with heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, no item of inspection and no object large enough to be or to contain an item of inspection may leave the site while the pre-inspection procedures are in effect. With regard to inspections of facilities associated with heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, pre-inspection restrictions allow heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, of types not based at the facility, to depart; only airplanes of types based at the facility are inspectable.

bbbbb During the July, 1991, Washington Ministerial, the Parties agreed that visiting test heavy bombers, notified at the point of entry in accordance with subparagraph 17(b) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol, and heavy bombers of a type from which long-range nuclear ALCMs have never been flight-tested (e.g., B-2 heavy bombers) would also be exempt from pre-inspection restrictions, since such heavy bombers are not subject to inspection. Language implementing this agreement was inadvertently omitted from subparagraph 5(c) of this Section. This omission will be corrected in the JCIC.

bbbbb For facilities at which the weapons storage area is inspectable, pre-inspection restrictions are imposed on the weapons storage area based on the size of the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM.

bbbbb Subparagraph 6(c) provides that, if a facility is broken up such that several noncontiguous areas are inspectable, a container, launch canister, or vehicle that departed an inspectable area prior to pre-inspection restrictions taking effect is not subject to pre-inspection restrictions until it reenters an inspectable area.

bbbbb Paragraph 7 limits to ten the total number of baseline and new facility inspections a Party may conduct at one time. Additionally, a Party may not conduct more than one such inspection at a specified inspection site. This paragraph also limits the number of data update inspections a Party may conduct at one time to one. (Note that in certain cases more than one inspection site is specified at the same geographical location. For inspection purposes, these are treated as separate, distinct facilities. The Thirty-sixth Agreed Statement, however, prevents simultaneous inspections at the dual-designated or dual-use facilities at four specific US Air Force bases.)

bbbbb Paragraph 8 states that when the inspection team arrives at the site, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the numbers and, if applicable, type, category, variant, and version of each item of inspection located at the site. Additionally, the in-country escort must provide an annotated site diagram showing the location of the items of inspection. Subparagraph 8(a) provides that, at air bases where only the weapons storage area is inspectable (in accordance with paragraph 5 above), such information and site diagram shall not be provided by the in-country escort. This information does not have to be provided for B-2 air bases until long-range nuclear ALCMs are flight-tested from B-2's.

bbbbbThe number of non-deployed missiles that can be at an ICBM base's maintenance facility is limited. If the in-country escort informs the inspection team that there are more ICBMs at the maintenance facility than the allowable number of non-deployed missiles because some ICBMs have been removed from their silos, subparagraph 8(b) requires the identification of those silos that do not contain ICBMs but are considered and counted as containing them.

bbbbb Because there is a separate quota on the numbers of alert heavy bombers subject to inspection, subparagraph 8(c) requires that, at nuclear air bases (except B-2 bases, until long-range nuclear ALCMs are tested from B-2 bombers), the in-country escort must provide information, including identification and location, of alert heavy bombers. Subparagraph 14(d) of this Section limits alert heavy bombers to those actually armed with nuclear weapons. The location provided for alert heavy bombers is wherever they happen to be; there is no designation of any particular area of a base as a permanent alert area. Additionally, data will be provided on how many heavy bombers based at the facility are in excess of the 150/180 U.S.-USSR thresholds, above which the as-equipped" warhead counting rules of subparagraphs 4(e) and 4(f) of Article III apply.

bbbbbSubparagraph 8(d) provides that, if any of the items associated with the site are absent when the inspection team arrives at the inspection site, the in-country escort must inform the inspection team of such items and the reason for their absence. For heavy bomber and former heavy bomber facilities, this entails the repetition and amplification of information provided at the point of entry. The categories of absent airplanes must be provided, and, in the case of heavy bombers that are outside the national territory of the inspected Party, the in-country escort must also give the general location of such airplanes. General location" can be as broad as the area of the world (e.g., Middle East).

bbbbbFor facilities containing noncontiguous parts of an inspection site, subparagraph 8(e) requires that the in-country escort must inform the inspection team of any items of inspection on roads between noncontiguous areas, their approximate location, the reason for the absence of each item from the inspection site, and the estimated time of arrival at an inspection site. Additionally, such items must return to the inspection site no later than 18 hours after the inspection begins.

bbbbb Paragraph 9 provides the right for inspectors to read the unique identifier data on mobile ICBMs unless they are deployed in silos or located on road-mobile launchers which cannot return to their restricted area due to force majeure and for which the in-country escort has specified geographic coordinates. Although paragraph 9 refers only to data update and new facility inspections, paragraph 5 of Annex 6 to the Inspection Protocol extends this right to baseline data inspections as well.

bbbbb Paragraph 10 allows inspectors to confirm that items declared to be training models of missiles are, in fact, training models of missiles and not actual ICBMs or SLBMs. Such training models must have external and functional differences to allow inspectors to differentiate them from actual ICBMs and SLBMs, as provided for in the definition of "training model of a missile" in the Definitions Annex.

bbbbb Paragraph 11 gives inspectors the right to inspect the maintenance facility of an ICBM base in accordance with the procedures set forth in Annex 1 of the Inspection Protocol. This means that for all structures, containers, and other objects that are large enough to contain or to be an object of inspection, but that are declared not to contain such an item, the inspected Party must demonstrate that such structures, containers, or objects do not contain such an item. The number of non-deployed missiles that can be at a silo ICBM base is limited. If the in-country escort informs the inspection team (pursuant to paragraph 8(b) of this Section) that there are more ICBMs at the maintenance facility than the allowable number of non-deployed missiles, paragraph 11 gives inspectors the right to inspect the empty silos to confirm that they do not contain ICBMs, in accordance with Annex 2 of the Inspection Protocol. If the inspection team leader chooses to inspect these silos, he must designate one or more subgroups of no more than four inspectors to perform the inspection, and must designate the launchers to be inspected prior to the end of the pre-inspection procedures. The inspected Party has eight hours from the time the pre-inspection procedures end to transport the subgroup to the designated launcher.

bbbbb Paragraph 12 requires that, for road-mobile ICBM bases, all the launchers associated with that base must return to their restricted areas unless the launchers are at the maintenance facility, engaged in relocation, or cannot return due to force majeure. The return of the launchers must be completed within 18 hours after the period of inspection begins for baseline and new facility inspections, and within 24 hours after the designation of the inspection site for data update inspections. The in-country escort must inform the inspectors of the launchers that cannot return within these periods. For launchers that cannot return to their restricted areas due to force majeure, the in-country escort must either designate the geographic coordinates of such launchers or transport the inspectors to the launchers.

bbbbb Subparagraph 12(c) requires that, prior to the completion of the pre-inspection procedures, the inspection team leader must designate which restricted area or areas are to be inspected. For baseline and new facility inspections, all the restricted areas and the maintenance facility may be inspected. For data update inspections, only one restricted area and the maintenance facility may be inspected. In all cases, these inspections are conducted in accordance with Annexes 1 and 2 of the Inspection Protocol. For baseline data and new facility inspections, at the discretion of the inspecting Party, the inspection team may divide into at least two subgroups (of two or more inspectors), each of which may independently inspect the designated locations. (This provision is redundant with paragraph 28 of Section V of this Protocol.) There is a right to conduct an inspection of road-mobile launchers that have not returned to their restricted areas due to circumstances brought about by force majeure in cases where the geographic coordinates of such launchers have not been provided. In this case, the inspection team leader must indicate whether the inspection team intends to inspect those road-mobile launchers and the team leader must also indicate the subgroup assigned for this purpose.

bbbbb For baseline and new facility inspections, pre-inspection restrictions remain in effect at each designated restricted area until the inspectors arrive at that area. For data update inspections, the restricted areas not chosen for inspection shall have the restrictions remain in effect until six hours after the completion of the pre-inspection procedures.

bbbbb The inspected Party must transport the inspectors to the designated restricted area without undue delay, and within the following time periods: no later than 5 hours after the completion of pre-inspection procedures if the restricted area is located at a straight line distance of less than 100 kilometers from the maintenance facility; no later than 8 hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures if the restricted area is located at a straight line distance of 100 kilometers or more from the maintenance facility. Since the pre-inspection restrictions expire when the inspectors arrive at the restricted area, subparagraph 12(e) also adds that, during the period of inspection, the launchers may not leave the restricted areas without the consent of the inspectors.

bbbbb Paragraph 13 addresses rail-mobile ICBM bases. Inspectors may inspect the maintenance facility, the rail garrison, including all rail lines, rail entrances and exits, parking sites, and associated structures that are part of the base. Such inspections are required to be conducted in accordance with Annexes 1 and 2 of the Inspection Protocol. Structures where reentry vehicles are stored are specifically exempt from inspection. For the baseline and new facility inspections, all the associated launchers must concentrate at the base no later than 18 hours after the beginning of the period of inspection. Since the time to conduct a baseline inspection and a new facility inspection can be extended as long as is necessary to complete the inspection, the time to concentrate the launchers does not detract from the time to conduct the inspection. Launchers may not leave the ICBM base during the period of inspection without the consent of the inspectors. Inspectors have the right to inspect all the rail lines during daylight hours. The in-country escort must provide the necessary transportation to accomplish this.

bbbbbParagraph 14 lays out rights and responsibilities with regard to inspections at inspectable heavy bomber and former heavy bomber facilities. With the exception of alert heavy bombers, test heavy bombers, and types never tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs, all airplanes at the base that are of types specified in the Memorandum of Understanding as based at the base, are inspectable. Visiting heavy bombers of types not so based (e.g., a B-1 at a B-52 base) are not inspectable. This provision was included since equipment needed to support the inspection of a different type of heavy bomber may not be present. The purpose of the inspection is to confirm reported data on numbers, by type and, if applicable, category and variant, as well as to verify weapon equipage, including the maximum equipage for long-range nuclear ALCMs. For a data update inspection, in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol, the inspectors for a data update inspection will be told at the point of entry if less than 70% of the assigned bombers are present. For baseline data and new facility inspections (but not for data update inspections) there is a call-back requirement for airplanes based at the inspected facilities: the airplanes have 20 hours from the beginning of the inspection to return. Exceptions are provided for force majeure, mechanical incapability (including that due to planned maintenance at another facility), and temporary stationing outside national territory (as long as that stationing is for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty). Procedures for the inspection of individual airplanes are laid out in Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol.

bbbbb Subparagraph 14(d) limits alert heavy bombers to those actually loaded with nuclear weapons, and imposes a limit on the number of alert heavy bomber inspections. This restriction was included to preclude avoiding inspection by arbitrarily declaring all heavy bombers at an air base as alert". On September 27, 1991, the President announced the termination of the practice of maintaining heavy bombers on alert. Since the Soviets do not maintain bombers on alert, and have announced they will not do so in the future, this subparagraph is moot unless alert operations resume in the future. Only one airplane of each classification (i.e., category/type/variant combination) of alert heavy bomber is inspectable each year. For the United States, this means that, should alert operations resume, the Soviets each year can inspect one alert B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, one alert B-52G so equipped, one alert B-52G not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, one alert B-1, and, after deployment, (and once a single B-2 has been tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs) one alert B-2.

bbbbb Subparagraph 14(e) establishes that the purpose of the inspections is to count and inspect airplanes; it makes the item of inspection a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber. Note that until the United States tests a long-range nuclear ALCM from a B-2, B-2 bases cannot be inspected at all, with the exception of their weapons storage areas. Such weapon storage area inspections are governed by subparagraph (f). Weapons storage areas at air bases for ALCM-equipped bombers are not inspectable because there is no need: long-range nuclear ALCMs are allowed there. At bases where long-range nuclear ALCMs are not allowed, the size criteria for inspecting the weapons storage areas is the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM of the inspected Party.

bbbbb Paragraph 15 provides for the inspection of test ranges. The entire site may be inspected, except that the inspection team may inspect only one silo that is declared not to contain an ICBM. Inspections of test ranges are required to be conducted in accordance with Annexes 1 and 2 of the Inspection Protocol.

bbbbb Paragraph 16 states that, for facilities other than ICBM bases, facilities associated with heavy bombers, and test ranges, the entire facility is considered inspectable, using the procedures of Annexes 1 and 2 of the Inspection Protocol, for baseline data, new facility, and data update inspections. For ICBM bases, facilities associated with heavy bombers, and test ranges, inspection procedures are limited in some cases, as provided for in paragraphs 11 to 15 of this Section.

bbbbb Paragraph 17 gives inspectors the right to inspect all launch canisters declared to be empty at test ranges, conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs, and ICBM bases. The purpose of this inspection is to confirm that the canisters are, in fact, empty. Launch canisters located at any other inspectable facility are assumed to contain a missile.

SECTION VIII - SUSPECT-SITE INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

bbbbb Section VIII deals with suspect-site inspections -- inspections of locations believed to be capable of covert assembly of mobile ICBMs or first stages of mobile ICBMs. These inspections may be conducted at facilities listed in paragraph 12 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding. If suspicious activities were detected at other locations, the matter could be dealt with within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. One of the possible responses would be to allow a special access visit.

bbbbbParagraph 1 of Section VIII establishes the right to conduct suspect-site inspections as soon as the period for baseline data inspections is over. The combined quota for suspect-site inspections and data update inspections is 15 per year.

bbbbb Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section VIII establish the facilities subject to suspect-site inspections. Paragraph 1 refers to the initial list in paragraph 12 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding. Paragraph 3 establishes the criteria for adding facilities to the list after entry into force of the Treaty: a production facility not subject to continuous monitoring that begins to produce ballistic missiles as large as or larger than any mobile ICBM, unless otherwise agreed, or a previously-monitored production facility that did produce mobile ICBMs, but ceased production.

bbbbb Paragraph 4 of Section VIII limits each Party to no more than one suspect-site inspection at a time and to no more than two inspections each year at any one facility.

bbbbb Paragraph 5 of Section VIII indicates the intent to allow facilities to be removed from the list. This paragraph is superfluous in a legal sense; the right already exists for the Parties to agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to remove a facility from the list of facilities subject to suspect-site inspection. This language was included at the request of the United States to emphasize that the intent was not to 'lock' facilities on the list forever. If the criteria for being on the suspect site inspection list are no longer met, the site should be removed from the list.

bbbbb Paragraph 6 of Section VIII provides for pre-inspection restrictions similar to other types of short-notice" inspections. Because none of the items of inspection are supposed to be present, the restrictions apply to vehicles, containers, and launch canisters that would be large enough to conceal any item of inspection.

bbbbb Paragraph 7 of Section VIII gives inspectors the right to inspect the entire inspection site using the procedures of Annex 1 to the Inspection Protocol. The provision unless the Parties otherwise agreed" indicates the understanding that modifications might be appropriate for unusual situations.

SECTION IX - REENTRY VEHICLE INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

bbbbbThe rights and obligations of the Parties during reentry vehicle on-site inspections are specified in Section IX of the Protocol. The specific procedures for the conduct of such inspections are found in Annex 3 of the Protocol.

bbbbb Paragraph 1 of Section IX states the right of each Party to conduct up to ten such inspections each year beginning at the end of the period of baseline data inspections, with a further limit of no more than two such inspections each year at any one facility. The limit of ten inspections applies whether or not one or both Parties elects to download some of its deployed ballistic missiles; downloading conveys no additional inspection rights.

bbbbb Paragraph 2 of Section IX establishes the right to carry out reentry vehicle inspections at ICBM bases (for both mobile and silo-based ICBMs) and submarine bases. These are the locations of deployed ballistic missiles, which are the subject of reentry vehicle inspections. Note that test ranges are not included; the missiles located there are not considered to be deployed.

bbbbb Paragraph 3 of Section IX further limits the ways in which reentry vehicle on-site inspections may be conducted, by specifying: that there may not be more than one reentry vehicle inspection at any one time; that a reentry vehicle on-site inspection may not be conducted at the same time as any other type of inspection at the same facility; and that no more than one ICBM or SLBM may be inspected during each reentry vehicle inspection. For this last limit, however, the Parties recognized that if the situation arose in which a launcher declared to be empty were to be found with a deployed ballistic missile, the inspection team could choose to conduct a reentry vehicle inspection at both the launcher declared to be empty and at the launcher that was subsequently designated for the reentry vehicle inspection. (See paragraph 18 of this Section.) Note that during a reentry vehicle inspection, inspectors may also confirm the elimination of a fixed structure pursuant to paragraph 9 of Section XI of the Inspection Protocol.

bbbbb Paragraph 4 of Section IX details the pre-inspection procedures to be in effect at the ICBM base or submarine base that was designated for the reentry vehicle inspection. Because the waters in which any ballistic missile submarine assigned to the base would be found are not part of that base, the waters within five kilometers of the boundary of the submarine base are included for the purpose of designating the geographic areas to which pre-inspection restrictions apply. The Parties agreed that the 5 kilometer distance is measured from the boundary of the site diagram.

bbbbbSubparagraph (a) of paragraph 4 prohibits the inspected Party from opening ICBM silo doors or SLBM launcher hatches that are closed when pre-inspection procedures go into effect. This preserves the integrity of the contents of all launchers that had been closed, removing any concern the inspecting Party might otherwise have about the possibility that the front sections on the deployed missiles could have been altered before inspectors arrived at the launcher for the inspection. Note that, since the Treaty is a bilateral agreement, pre-inspection restrictions apply only to US and Soviet ballistic missile submarines. Other submarines (e.g., British SSBNs in US ports) are not subject to Treaty restrictions.

bbbbb Subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), and (e) of paragraph 4 prohibit the inspected Party from initiating any work associated with the removal of missiles from launchers or removing or installing front sections on missiles in launchers, for those silo launchers and submarine launchers (and for all mobile launchers) that are open