STATEMENT OF DATA ON THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS
OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY
The United States of America declares that as of June 18, 1979 it possesses the following
numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty which is
being signed today:
|
Launchers of ICBMs | 1,054 |
| Fixed launchers of ICBMs | 1,054 |
Launchers of ICBMs equipped
with MIRVs | 550 |
| Launchers of SLBMs | 656 |
Launchers of SLBMs equipped
with MIRVs | 496 |
| Heavy bombers | 573 |
Heavy bombers equipped
for cruise missiles
capable of a range in
excess of 600 kilometers | 3 |
Heavy bombers equipped
only for ASBMs | 0 |
| ASBMs | 0 |
| ASBMs equipped with MIRVs | 0 |
June 18, 1979
RALPH EARLE II
Chief of the United States Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
I certify that this is a true copy of the document signed by Ambassador Ralph Earle II entitled
"Statement of Data on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of the Date of Signature of
the Treaty" and given to Ambassador V. Karpov on June 18, 1979 in Vienna, Austria.
THOMAS GRAHAM, JR.
General Counsel
United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency
STATEMENT OF DATA ON THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS
OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that as of June 18, 1979 it possesses the
following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the
Treaty which is being signed today:
|
Launchers of ICBMs | 1,398 |
| Fixed launchers of ICBMs | 1,398 |
Launchers of ICBMs equipped
with MIRVs | 608 |
| Launchers of SLBMs | 950 |
Launchers of SLBMs equipped
with MIRVs | 144 |
| Heavy bombers | 156 |
Heavy bombers equipped
for cruise missiles
capable of a range in excess
of 600 kilometers | 0 |
Heavy bombers equipped
only for ASBMs | 0 |
| ASBMs | 0 |
| ASBMs equipped with MIRVs | 0 |
June 18, 1979
V. KARPOV
Chief of the USSR Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Translation certified by:
W. D. Krimer,
Senior Language Officer,
Division of Language Services, U.S. Department of State
WILLIAM D. KRIMER
JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES FOR
SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter
referred to as the Parties,
Having concluded the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
Reaffirming that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the Parties and
the interests of international security,
Convinced that early agreement on the further limitation and further reduction of strategic
arms would serve to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of
outbreak of nuclear war,
Have agreed as follows:
First. The Parties will continue to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of
equality and equal security, on measures for the further limitation and reduction in the numbers
of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation.
In furtherance of existing agreements between the Parties on the limitation and reduction of
strategic arms, the Parties will continue, for the purposes of reducing and averting the risk of
outbreak of nuclear war, to seek measures to strengthen strategic stability by, among other
things, limitations on strategic offensive arms most destabilizing to the strategic balance and by
measures to reduce and to avert the risk of surprise attack.
Second. Further limitations and reductions of strategic arms must be subject to adequate
verification by national technical means, using additionally, as appropriate, cooperative measures
contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national technical means. The Parties will
seek to strengthen verification and to perfect the operation of the Standing Consultative
Commission in order to promote assurance of compliance with the obligations assumed by the
Parties.
Third. The Parties shall pursue in the course of these negotiations, taking into consideration
factors that determine the strategic situation, the following objectives:
1) significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms;
2) qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the
development, testing, and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the
modernization of existing strategic offensive arms;
3) resolution of the issues included in the Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms in the context of the negotiations relating to the implementation of the principles and
objectives set out herein.
Fourth. The Parties will consider other steps to ensure and enhance strategic stability, to
ensure the equality and equal security of the Parties, and to implement the above principles and
objectives. Each Party will be free to raise any issue relative to the further limitation of strategic
arms. The Parties will also consider further joint measures, as appropriate, to strengthen
international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.
Vienna, June 18, 1979
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
JIMMY CARTER
President of the United States of America
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
L. BREZHNEV
General Secretary for the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
SOVIET BACKFIRE STATEMENT
On June 16, 1979, President Brezhnev handed President Carter the following written
statement [original Russian text was attached]:
The Soviet side informs the U.S. side that the Soviet "Tu-22M" airplane, called
"Backfire" in the U.S.A., is a medium-range bomber, and that it does not intend to give
this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connection,
the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this airplane in such a
way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the U.S.A. Nor does it intend to
give it such a capability in any other manner, including by in-flight refueling. At the same
time, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the production rate of this airplane as
compared to the present rate.
President Brezhnev confirmed that the Soviet Backfire production rate would not exceed 30
per year.
President Carter stated that the United States enters into the SALT II Agreement on the basis
of the commitments contained in the Soviet statement and that it considers the carrying out of
these commitments to be essential to the obligations assumed under the Treaty.
CYRUS VANCE
