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International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1996 Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State Washington, DC, March 1997

AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

I. Summary

Cote d'Ivoire serves as a transit point for narcotics from Asia and South America destined for European and North American markets, although there is no evidence that significant amounts reach the US. There is minimal production of low­grade cannabis, primarily for domestic consumption. Domestic use of psychotropic substances, particularly amphetamines and barbiturates, is rising. The vast majority of those arrested for drug­related offenses are of Ivorian nationality. The National Drug Police (NDP), while recognizing the danger of illicit narcotics, continued to be hampered by insufficient resources in 1996. Cote d'Ivoire is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

II. Status of Country

The fact that Abidjan serves as a West African regional hub for international airline travel as well as a major financial center provides the greatest challenge for the Government of Cote d'Ivoire (GOCI) in terms of trafficking and money laundering.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. There have been no significant counternarcotics policy initiatives during the reporting period, but the GOCI did take steps toward meeting the 1988 UN Convention objectives. It created the post of National Security Advisor to assist in this effort. In February 1997, the GOCI will host an Economic Community of West African Nations (ECOWAS) inter­ministerial meeting on narcotics.

Accomplishments. There have been no significant developments in the past year in achieving or maintaining compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention. Nevertheless, the GOCI cooperated closely with the UNDCP in the areas of training and regional cooperation. The European Union initiated discussions with the GOCI on training requirements. The primary concerns revolved around the type of training that would be most beneficial, as well as the ever­present scarcity of resources.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The GOCI law enforcement authorities increased the number of drug seizures and arrests; cocaine seizures increased 33 kgs) as did cannabis (4.5 kgs), though both amounts remained relatively low. Nevertheless, law enforcement efforts focused primarily on minor traffickers; most major traffickers are Europeans and groups from the Middle East. The GOCI created the position of National Security Advisor in late summer, primarily to be the central coordinator of all military and law enforcement activities including counternarcotics. Law enforcement efforts on the working level were hampered by a lack of funds.

Corruption. There were no significant arrests and/or prosecutions for drug­related corruption during the year. In general, law enforcement efforts in this area are given the lowest priority.

Agreements and Treaties. The GOCI is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention, the 1972 Protocol and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. In 1991, the GOCI ratified the 1988 UN Convention. In 1992, 1993 and 1994, it signed letters of agreement (LOA) with the USG for the establishment of a GOCI capability to suppress the cultivation, processing, trafficking, consumption and export of illicit narcotics. The GOCI is a party to several regional counternarcotics cooperation agreements.

Cultivation/Production. Cannabis is grown in limited quantities in the southern, eastern and western areas of Cote d'Ivoire, primarily for local consumption. The NDP has no reliable methodology for determining crop size and yields. When they come upon illicit crops, they burn them.

Drug Flow/Transit. Houphouet­Boigny Airport is used as a transit point for the flow of heroin and cocaine to European and North American destinations. There is no reliable data that would confirm the increase or decrease of drugs transiting the country. Vehicles, followed by aircraft, boat, and the mail service, are the primary method of transporting illicit narcotics. The use of the coastal lagoon for trafficking narcotics between Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire increased dramatically during the year.

Domestic Programs. The GOCI's demand reduction is limited to infrequent news articles on drug abuse and the publication in the media of the penalties associated with illicit narcotics use and trafficking.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. USG counternarcotics goals in Cote d'Ivoire focus on limiting the use of Abidjan as a transit point for narcotics traffickers.

Bilateral Cooperation. The bilateral agreements of 1992, 1993, and 1994 have eased some of the GOCI's logistical problems, which has allowed officers to return to the field better equipped with US­provided vehicles and radios. The next step will be to increase training efforts.

The Road Ahead. The foremost USG counternarcotics interest will be to prevent the transit of illicit narcotics via Houphouet­Boigny Airport and to discourage the use of Cote d'Ivoire's financial system for money laundering.

I. Summary

The Arab Republic of Egypt is a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention, as well as a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Egyptian drug laws are strict, but enforcement is erratic. Penalties for drug trafficking are severe. In view of the fact that combating terrorism remains the number one security priority for the Government of Egypt (GOE), combating narcotics continues to be of secondary importance.

Egypt is a minor player in the production, trafficking and money laundering associated with illicit narcotics and precursor drugs. In contrast, Egypt is a major transshipment point for heroin destined for Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, North America. Within Egypt, the Sinai region is the most prominent area for the cultivation of opium poppy and cannabis. Domestic heroin and cocaine addiction is rising according to anecdotal evidence from both Egyptian law enforcement officials and medical professionals. Hashish is still the primary drug of choice in Egypt due to its low cost and availability. GOE eradication efforts have not decreased total opium poppy and cannabis cultivation.

Counternarcotics efforts in Egypt are controlled and managed by the Egyptian Anti Narcotics General Administration (ANGA), which is commanded by a newly appointed Assistant Minister of the Interior, Major General Mohammed Sayed Sha'arawi, who took over ANGA on August 1. ANGA consists of 120 officers, with approximately 20 of them holding the rank of general. According to DEA Cairo, the number of narcotics investigations noticeably increased since General Sha'arwi's appointment. ANGA's duties roughly coincide with those of DEA. The 1991 Bilateral Narcotics Control Agreement between the US and Egypt was amended in 1993 to provide greater funding for ANGA. In 1996, the US disbursed $80,000 to enhance ANGA's counternarcotics efforts.

II. Status of Country

Egypt's long, barren borders and numerous entry points, including Cairo International Airport and the Suez Canal, provide natural cover for the transshipment of heroin and opium moving from Asia to Europe and, in less significant quantity, North America. Hashish and pharmaceutical drugs are the main drugs of abuse in Egypt. The majority of hashish on the local market comes from Lebanon. Moroccan hashish is also available, but its quality is judged to be inferior. Egyptian hashish is also sold locally.

ANGA reports decreases in the use of maxton fort, a locally produced liquid amphetamine first introduced for the workers of the Aswan Dam. The number of users and amount of heroin seized in Egypt is rising. Use of heroin in Egypt is most concentrated within university circles, and among young professionals and the children of Egyptian expatriate workers.

Cultivation of opium poppy plants in the Sinai continues unabated. To a lesser extent, cultivation in upper Egypt also is increasing. GOE control over these areas is limited due to the remoteness of the regions and the lack of infrastructure for roads. ANGA reports that the Southern Sinai Region around Wadi Pharaoun is the preferred location for opium poppy cultivation. Poppy cultivation in Upper Egypt is less prominent due to the effectiveness of the GOE's anti­terrorist campaign in the region. ANGA conducts eradication operations in the winter for poppy cultivation and year­round for cannabis. DEA Cairo supplied land navigation training in 1996 to assist ANGA with its eradication efforts.

According to ANGA, cocaine use in Egypt first appeared in 1983; it continues at a low level. Use of cocaine in Egypt is limited by its cost, as the average salary for a white collar worker remains constant at approximately $150 per month. Thus, cocaine use is concentrated in the wealthier segments of Egyptian society: the entertainment industry, the expatriate community, and among wealthy Arab tourists.

Pharmaceutical drug abuse is increasing. Most of these drugs have legitimate medical purposes. Unfortunately, this industry remains unregulated and abuse goes unchecked. Prescriptions are not required to buy pharmaceuticals in Egypt. While the GOE continues to work on implementing stricter controls over their distribution, ANGA has stated that many of these so­called "prescription drugs" originate in Greece. Cairo DEA recently substantiated these claims. Due to the poor health care delivery system and a lack of funds and resources, the pharmaceutical abuse problem in Egypt will continue. There are no effective diversion programs.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1996

In November 1994, the GOE formally adopted a comprehensive drug control strategy which outlines a multifaceted approach to drug interdiction. This approach combines the use of the Coast Guard, Customs, police, selected military units and ANGA to interdict controlled substances entering Egypt. As of January 1997, the GOE is working toward effective implementation of this initiative; however, resources are limited. A drug awareness program developed by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, the Coptic Church and El­Azhar University is being implemented on a limited scale to target school­age children. The GOE also strives to provide medical treatment and facilities for addicts. Interdiction is a top priority for ANGA, with success limited by the lack of resources. Cairo Airport is a principal target of ANGA efforts. The airport is staffed by police, Customs officials and ANGA personnel. British Customs has in the past provided training to airport security personnel in tracking drug traffickers via airline computer systems. More recently, the ANGA deputy at Cairo Airport attended a DEA­sponsored training course in advanced airline ticket profiling. In June, DEA sponsored a senior ANGA officer to attend its Senior Manager Administrative Course, and the senior chemist within ANGA attended a DEA­sponsored Forensic Analysis Course. Two ANGA officers also attended the US­sponsored counternarcotics conference in Addis Ababa in March 1996.

Egyptian drug laws are severe in dealing with drug use and trafficking. Legislation passed in 1989 expanded the scope of punishable offenses and included capital punishment for producers and traffickers of hard drugs, but use of capital punishment has been infrequent. Egypt ratified and signed the 1988 UN Convention in 1991. The GOE is attempting to fulfill the precepts of this Convention as it relates to the Egyptian constitution and religious customs. ANGA has provided the People's Assembly with programs for cracking down on money laundering and asset forfeiture. These proposals have been under study by the Assembly's sub­committees for some time, but with no sign of progress. ANGA would like to see legislative approved in 1997, but has no authority to push this through the Assembly.

Accomplishments. The eradication of opium poppy and cannabis is a top priority for ANGA, especially in the Sinai. ANGA's counternarcotics efforts are focused on reducing consumption and interdicting trafficking in controlled substances in Egypt.

The Ministry of Justice is trying to change banking laws in Egypt in an attempt to control money laundering; it is suggesting a $10,000 currency transfer limits reduction of bank secrecy laws and control of casino gaming operations. Unfortunately, implementation is still elusive. ANGA does conduct controlled delivery operations, though these are limited due to the approvals required by the prosecutor. This process is burdensome due to the bloated Egyptian bureaucracy.

Egyptian counternarcotics policy was unchanged during the year. While domestic drug abuse is recognized by the GOE, the number one national security priority is combating terrorism in Egypt. ANGA has expanded its units along the border with Libya and has increased the size of its eradication unit. ANGA's eradication unit is commanded by a full colonel with four officers and 23 constables. There are five regional eradication offices dispersed throughout Egypt which are supplemented by between two and three thousand central security personnel standing by as reserve units. ANGA is discussing the exchange of drug liaison officers with Lebanon and Libya, although this has yet to occur.

Corruption. Corruption is prevalent in Egyptian society, but DEA has seen no evidence that ANGA officers are corrupt.

Agreements and Treaties. Current bilateral agreements exist with Tunisia, Syria, Pakistan, India, Germany, Jordan, Italy, the UK and the US. All these agreements are based on USG models. The Ministry of Justice is the lead government entity in negotiating and monitoring all agreements. During 1996, ANGA met with several regional counternarcotics officials both in Egypt and abroad. ANGA hosted the HONLEA (Heads of Narcotics Law Enforcement in Africa) conference in June.

Cultivation/Production. There was an increase in the acreage of opium poppy and cannabis under cultivation in 1996. DEA is providing ANGA with equipment and training to assist in determining crop sizes and yield per acre. There is no crop substitution program in Egypt. Local DEA representatives are convinced that there is domestic heroin production, based on the increase in opium poppy cultivation without a corresponding opium addiction problem in Egypt. There is very limited heroin addiction in Egypt.

Drug flow/Transit. Egypt is a major transit point for heroin and hashish. The Suez Canal and Cairo International Airport are the main transshipment points. Statistical evidence is unavailable, but DEA believes the prevalence of Egyptian airport immigration stamps in passports found on drug couriers arrested in Sub­Saharan Africa supports the assertion that Cairo Airport is a major transshipment point for illicit drugs.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

The primary US goal is the implementation of a task force approach to Egyptian narcotics law enforcement. Improved sharing of intelligence is an important priority. Under the new leadership of General Sha'arawi, ANGA has begun to cooperate in joint operations with the local DEA office, thus increasing information exchange. Concentration of US efforts will continue at the airport due to the multiple security units involved in detecting and stopping the transshipment and importation of narcotics. This plan provides the best opportunity for closer working relationships without having to battle the bureaucracies of the Ministries of Defense and Interior.

The Road Ahead. The USG is committed to seeking full implementation of the 1991 Bilateral Agreement and the 1992 and 1993 Amendments. The arrival and installation of USG­provided equipment was accomplished in 1996. If we can strive for Egyptian controlled deliveries, timely extradition of traffickers and a more complete exchange of intelligence information, and the GOE develops a Suez Canal program, the US will benefit significantly. That said, Egypt's narcotics control resources will not increase in 1997. The lion's share of money, training and innovative ideas is being used to fight terrorism, not drugs.

I. Summary

Ghana remains committed to the fight against drug abuse and the illicit trafficking of narcotics. The Government of Ghana (GOG) admits that cannabis cultivation is a significant problem, but is taking steps against it. Ghana is a party to the 1988 UN Convention. The Narcotics Control Board (NCB) is working to achieve compliance with all provisions of the Convention in spite of the competition for scarce resources.

II. Status of Country

Farmers grow cannabis throughout the country, often on plots also used for staples. Cannabis cultivation is clandestine and the volume of production is not easily determined. Recent arrests and interception of cannabis at Kotoka International Airport, as well as other police interdiction efforts, indicate an upward trend in the availability of cannabis.

Cocaine and heroin arrive from South America and Southeast and Southwest Asia. Consumption of these drugs is increasing within Ghana. Trafficking of cocaine and heroin through Accra's Kotoka International Airport has decreased considerably due to intensified security checks, but the same cannot be said of the western and eastern borders. Nigerian traffickers move cocaine and heroin through the Republic of Benin and Togo largely unimpeded, and Ghana is likely to experience heavier importation through the border stations at Aflao and Elubo. Illicit trade in diamonds, gold and narcotics are responsible for some money laundering, which occurs primarily within the foreign exchange bureaus.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. The NCB has set out to determine the most effective ways of controlling the drug problem in Ghana. It attempts to coordinate both governmental and non­governmental counternarcotics efforts, and has nearly completed revisions of its narcotics control strategy, placing more emphasis on international awareness and cooperation. The NCB has submitted proposals to the GOG to amend Ghana's Narcotic Drugs Law, seeking to standardize sentences and increase fines. It also wants to have property and funds seized in narcotics cases turned over to the NCB rather than the general treasury.

Accomplishments. The NCB's rapid deployment team joined the police narcotics unit to actively seek out producers/distributors and carry out eradication efforts. The Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS) narcotics units seized 6.1 mt of cannabis being prepared for export.

Enforcement Efforts. Ghana sent students to take part in several UNDCP courses held in Abidjan. The police cooperate with the NCB and CEPS in interdictions, seizures and arrests. Regional narcotics squads operate in drug­prone areas and on the borders with Togo and Cote D'Ivoire.

Corruption. In April, authorities arrested a prominent businessman with alleged connections to high­ranking government figures for importing 417 grams of heroin by mail, but no official involvement is suggested. Ghana has tough laws against narcotics­related government corruption; there was no evidence during 1996 of corruption within the ranks of Ghana's police or antinarcotics forces.

Agreements and Treaties. Ghana is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Ghana is also covered by a 1931 extradition treaty between the US and the UK, although no extraditions took place during the year.

Cultivation/Production. Cannabis is grown throughout the rural areas of the country, often hidden within fields of legal staples.

Drug Flow/Transit. Ghana is a drug transit country. Trafficking routes are old and established; drugs are moved across the borders with Togo and Cote D'Ivoire, by air via Kotoka International Airport and by sea through the ports of Takoradi and Tema. Heroin is still the principal drug transiting Ghana, and Europe the is the primary destination. Nigerian traffickers work in partnership with Ghanaians, with the former often seeking poor Ghanaians to serve as couriers. Both cocaine and heroin seizures increased in 1996, a result both of better law enforcement efforts and increased drug shipments.

Demand Reduction. The NCB is working with local governments and schools to educate both children and adults regarding the dangers of drug use, cultivation and trafficking. Ghana's governmental drug rehabilitation efforts are not as strong as its preventive efforts, but several NGO's opened drug treatment centers in 1996.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. The USG is working with the GOG to support self­sufficient, well trained antinarcotics forces, and thus to improve interdiction efforts and make Ghana a less attractive transit point for traffickers. The USG will offer training opportunities for GOG counternarcotics agents and will cooperate with Ghanaian counterparts in the fight against international drug trafficking and money laundering.

Bilateral Cooperation. The USG purchased over $8,000 worth of equipment for the NCB in 1996. In addition, US Embassy officials in Accra worked closely with Ghanaian counterparts to combat illicit trafficking and abuse. DEA provided a course in February for 25 members of the police, CEPS and the NCB. The topics covered included asset seizure, financial investigation and money laundering.

The Road Ahead. The USG will continue to support the GOG in its antinarcotics efforts. In addition to including Ghana in regional training plans, US Embassy personnel will work with GOG individuals and agencies to curb the trafficking of cocaine and heroin through the country. The USG also will seek to achieve expeditious extradition of narcotics fugitives wanted by the US.

I. Summary

Israel is primarily a drug consuming country. Heroin and cannabis are the drugs of choice, according to the Israel National Police (INP), but use of cocaine, LSD, amphetamines (and derivatives) and fenetylline is also widespread. The Government of Israel (GOI) is concerned that its economic success is leading to a drug environment that mirrors that of Europe and the US. Israel augmented its counter­drug efforts with the creation of a National Drug Enforcement Unit (under Customs) numbering 50 (of 200 planned) and taking over responsibility for border, port and airport drug interdiction. Efforts to pass legislation on money laundering and mutual legal assistance have been delayed by the change in government; the INP hopes to see movement in Israel's Parliament (the Knesset) in early 1997. Increased police efforts to counter domestic terrorism in the wake of this year's bus bombings and planning for probable program cuts to balance the national budget stretched police resources devoted to law enforcement, including narcotics. INP cooperates closely with foreign counterparts, with overseas offices in the US, Europe and South America; there are preliminary plans to open a new office in Southeast Asia and possibly one in Washington DC. Israel cooperates with regional neighbors including Egypt and Jordan, as well as the Palestinian Authority's infant antinarcotics group. Israel has signed, but not ratified, the 1988 UN Convention.

II. Status of Country

The GOI is concerned about drug production in neighboring states, particularly Lebanon and Egypt, and drugs that enter through Jordan. Israeli police officials believe that drugs do not transit Israel, but rather are consumed domestically. In addition, relatively tight customs and border procedures hinder transshipment. Besides the drugs that have customarily arrived via Europe, the GOI is beginning to detect the entry of US­origin or transited drugs. Police officials note that the low relative price of narcotics in the US and the active exchange of goods and people between the two countries could fuel such a development. The GOI also is concerned about drug abuse rates, particularly among youth, and an increase in the use of hard drugs.

The major weakness in Israel's counternarcotics effort remains its failure to pass a money laundering law. Without such a law, and with strict banking secrecy and liberal immigration policies (which Russian organized crime has used to its advantage), Israel is a prime potential center for money laundering. GOI and police officials confirm that Israel's sophisticated financial infrastructure is being used by money launderers, although they are unable to judge the volume. Israel's Ministry of Justice has drafted money laundering legislation, but the Knesset has yet to take it up. Currently, criminals may not be prosecuted for acts of money laundering, but may be prosecuted in conjunction with a criminal conviction and assets may be forfeited. In practice, however, cases involving asset forfeiture are rare and declining, as criminals are able to avoid full prosecution through successful plea bargaining.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. The Anti­Drug Authority (ADA), which answers directly to the Prime Minister and coordinates creation of Israel's drug strategy, focused its efforts on demand management and rehabilitation, spending over half of its budget treating 1,000 drug addicts yearly. The National Drug Enforcement Unit (NDEU) of the Department of Customs has taken over responsibility for searching for narcotics at Israel's borders and at points of entry. With 50 of its proposed staff of 200, the unit is bringing to bear sophisticated technical as well as animal detection methods. With an eye towards adopting similar laws, the research team of the NDEU also is examining policies adopted in other countries designed to stem the flow of chemicals used in the production of drugs.

Accomplishments. The GOI improved its capabilities for both interdicting the flow of illicit drugs and cooperating with foreign drug agencies. In June, the Israeli National Police, with the support of the ADA, established a Drug Liaison Officer (DLO) position in Miami with responsibility for covering all of Central and South America, bringing to six the number of DLO's overseas. Israel's Customs and VAT service expanded the staffing, technology and scope of its Drug Enforcement Unit. The GOI, however, has fallen short in meeting 1988 UN Convention goals related to money laundering, asset seizure and mutual legal assistance by failing to pass relevant legislation. The GOI also is making no headway in reducing the domestic demand for illicit narcotics.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The Israel National Police is responsible for enforcing Israel's drug laws and is the sole investigative body attempting to stem the flow of drugs into the country. As noted above, police efforts are being augmented by the growth of a Customs Service Drug Unit responsible for detecting drugs at all land and sea borders and at Ben Gurion International Airport. Currently consisting of about 50 officers, the unit will eventually grow to 200, or about 10 percent of the Customs Service. The unit uses both dogs and technical means to search passengers, luggage, shipments and air mail packages in border areas, post offices and warehouses.

Corruption. Although drug­related corruption has not previously been an issue in Israel, INP Deputy Commander Hezi Leder recently told the Knesset that between 40 and 50 individuals associated with organized crime are attempting to buy influence in Israeli political circles. The INP considers such attempts a "strategic threat."

Agreements and Treaties. The US and Israel signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 1991, calling for bilateral cooperation to combat illicit narcotic trafficking and abuse by sharing information, experience, and training methods. The MOU calls for annual meetings to coordinate counterdrug efforts, drug abuse and awareness research programs, and cooperation in developing drug treatment and rehabilitation models. Both governments initialed a customs cooperation agreement, have not yet signed it. The 1995 dual taxation treaty grants US tax authorities limited access to bank account information.

Israel has acceded to the European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, and is a party to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. In addition, Israeli law permits legal assistance in the absence of a treaty. Israel signed cooperative agreements with France, Hungary, Italy, Chile and Turkey. Israel has signed, but not ratified, the 1988 UN Convention. It is expected to ratify once Israel adopts a money laundering law.

Israel has extradition treaties with roughly 30 countries, including the US, the UK, France and Italy. Since 1977, however, Israel has rarely extradited its own citizens. Israel also is cautious about extraditing foreign Jews. Instead, Israel has applied the principle of Universal Jurisdiction, holding trials in Israel for crimes committed elsewhere.

Cultivation/Production. The Israel National Police believe that Israel neither cultivates nor produces significant quantities of illicit drugs. The IDP, however, reports an increase in the cultivation of marijuana and in the discovery of small­scale drug labs.

Drug Flow/Transit. According to the Drug Intelligence Unit, Israel is not a transit country for narcotics, based on the relatively high market price that illegal drugs command in Israel and its seizure experience. INP drug seizure statistics indicate that much of the cocaine, heroin, LSD, and marijuana entering Israel comes via Europe. The INP National Drug Unit reports that it has yet to seize any drugs exiting Israel and is not aware of any drugs seized abroad that transited Israel.

Domestic Programs/Demand Reduction. ADA now has a 12­ to 16­hour drug awareness program in over one­third of all primary and secondary schools in Israel. Special programs to combat increasing drug abuse among the Israeli Arab minority are carried out jointly by government ministries, Arab local authorities, the Red Crescent and the ADA. The Palestinian Authority is conducting its own drug education efforts among children and students.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. US­Israel cooperation is focused on helping Israel maintain a self­sustaining, professional drug interdiction force, enact effective antidrug legislation, and foster regional cooperation with Israel's neighboring countries on drug control issues.

Bilateral Cooperation. The DEA office in Cyprus works closely with its INP counterparts on a case­by­case basis, while the National Drug Enforcement Unit has developed a close working relationship with the US Customs Service. In 1996, 12 Israeli dog trainers spent two months at the US Customs K­9 training center in Front Royal, Virginia in preparation for setting up Israel's own dog training unit. In 1997, DEA plans to conduct money laundering training for the GOI. In 1995, the US Treasury Department and the GOI co­hosted a money laundering and asset forfeiture conference to highlight these issues for key Israeli policymakers and to assist Israel in developing effective money laundering laws.

The Road Ahead. US­Israel cooperation on drug matters is close and will be even closer if drugs from the US begin appearing on the Israeli market in greater quantities and Israel decides to open an office in Washington to work with US drug authorities. The USG will support Israel's efforts to pass money laundering legislation and to reach agreements on mutual legal assistance and Customs­to­Customs cooperation. Once legislation is passed, the USG will work closely with GOI counterparts to train and share information regarding money laundering. US counternarcotics officials also will work to expand contacts with the Palestinian Authority and assist it in developing an antidrug unit in its civil police force.

I. Summary

Jordan neither produces nor consumes significant amounts of illicit drugs. However, Jordan historically has been a transit country for illicit drugs because of its geographical location between drug producing countries to the north and drug consuming countries to the south and west. Although incidents of illicit drug use have increased recently, drug abuse in Jordan is still considered minor. The majority of trafficking in Jordan is in hashish, although the Jordanian National Police have reported a significant decline in the amount of hashish seized over the past three years. They attribute this decline to the actions of Lebanese and Syrian counternarcotics authorities in the eradication of hashish farms in southern Lebanon. Jordan is a party to the 1998 UN Convention, enforces strict antidrug laws and continues to receive cooperation from bordering states in narcotics interdiction efforts. Germany, the UK and the US provide narcotics assistance to Jordan in the way of grants, equipment and training.

II. Status of Country

The USG does not foresee significant changes in Jordan's minimal involvement in narcotics production and trafficking in the near future. But Jordan is a transit country for narcotics and is vulnerable to illicit drug smuggling across its vast desert borders. Lack of manpower and equipment plague Jordan's interdiction efforts. The peace treaty with Israel has led to cooperation between the two countries in antinarcotics investigations; however, the open borders and increased trade with Israel make Jordan more attractive as a staging area for traffickers who supply illicit narcotics to Israel. Jordan has benefitted from Syrian and Lebanese hashish eradication efforts, but has seen an increase in the movement of Turkish heroin and Captagon pills through Jordan. Jordan lacks a money laundering law which may prove an attraction for drug traffickers in the region whose own countries have adopted money laundering laws.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. In April, the Public Security Directorate (PSD), Jordan's national police, restructured the Antinarcotics and Counterfeiting Bureau. The PSD created a separate Antinarcotics Unit (ANU) with the colonel in charge of the former bureau remaining to head the ANU. The responsibilities for counterfeiting investigations were absorbed by the Criminal Investigations Division (CID). Although the division of the bureau did not produce an increase in budget or personnel, the separation has enabled officers in the new unit to focus exclusively on narcotics investigations.

­­ The PSD has initiated a campaign to randomly search vehicles on the highways for illicit drugs.

• The PSD has opened new antinarcotics unit branches in the cities of Balqa and Karak.
• The PSD commissioned the University of Jordan to undertake a comprehensive study to evaluate the amount of illicit drug consumption in Jordan.
• The PSD assigned a narcotics liaison officer to the Jordanian Embassy in Saudi Arabia to coordinate narcotics investigations with Saudi counter­narcotics authorities.

Accomplishments. Jordanians are primarily concerned with the transiting of illicit drugs through their country. In this regard, Jordan has worked closely with bordering states in narcotics interdiction efforts. Jordan maintains close relations in narcotics investigations with Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt and Israel. In 1996, Jordan established a narcotics liaison office at its embassy in Saudi Arabia. It has also established a working relationship between the PSD and Israel's Interpol representative for narcotics investigations. A highlight in Syria­Jordan cooperation occurred in August when the PSD, acting on information from Syrian authorities, seized 10.65 kgs of heroin and arrested two Syrians and one Turkish national in Amman during a controlled­delivery operation.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The PSD is responsible for enforcing Jordan's drug laws. The PSD seized more heroin in 1996 than in the previous five years combined (over 60 kgs). The PSD attributes this to the increasing demand for heroin in Israel. The PSD reported an increase in the amount of Captagon (stimulants) pills seized in 1996 over 1995. These pills originate in Turkey and are destined primarily for Saudi Arabia.

Corruption. The PSD reported no narcotics­related corruption investigations during the year. There currently is no evidence to suggest that senior Jordanian officials are involved in narcotics trafficking.

Agreements and Treaties. Jordan maintains antinarcotics agreements with Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt. In 1996, Jordan entered into bilateral agreements with Pakistan and Hungary which include counternarcotics cooperation. Jordan and the US concluded an extradition treaty in 1995. To date, there have been no drug­related extraditions.

Domestic Programs/Demand Reduction. Religious and social norms limit the use of illegal drugs in Jordan. The PSD has initiated a program to publicize all major drug seizures and arrests in an effort to deter individuals from engaging in narcotics trafficking. The PSD and the Ministry of Health continued their drug awareness program in public and private schools, which educates children about the dangers of drug abuse.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. The primary goal of US­Jordanian cooperation is the creation of an effective Jordanian interdiction force. The US and Jordan signed a letter of agreement (LOA) in 1996 which provides US­sponsored narcotics investigation courses to the PSD. This training is tentatively scheduled for April of 1997. The USG will encourage Jordan to pursue specific legislation which would make money laundering a crime. In addition, US officials will urge the PSD to work more closely with its desert police and the customs department in narcotics interdiction efforts.

Bilateral Cooperation. The US and Jordan do not have a bilateral narcotics agreement. However, DEA Cyprus and US Embassy officials enjoy a close working relationship with Jordanian authorities on narcotics­related matters.

The Road Ahead. The USG fully expects continued cooperation from Jordan in antinarcotics efforts.

I. Summary

Kenya continues to boost its law enforcement capabilities, assisted in part by training and other assistance from the US and third countries. Kenya is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has fully enacted implementing legislation. The Government of Kenya (GOK) hopes to make more progress in 1997 toward drafting a National Counternarcotics Strategy which would budget funds specifically for narcotics control. Nonetheless, Kenya is a transshipment point for heroin and hashish bound for Europe and sometimes the US, though there is no data to suggest that significant quantities reach the US via Kenya. Law enforcement is hampered by limited resources and public corruption.

II. Status of Country

Kenya's location and transportation and communication infrastructure make it a transshipment point for Southwest Asian heroin and hashish, as well as some Southeast Asian heroin. West African, particularly Nigerian, traffickers are active behind the scenes in Nairobi, recruiting couriers and financing their travel. Porous land borders and insufficient controls in neighboring countries undercut otherwise effective airport interdiction efforts.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. The effort to draft a National Counternarcotics Strategy, begun in 1995 with the formation of an Inter­Ministerial Drug Coordinating Committee, moved slowly during the year due to technical legal problems and the lack of adequate funding. The legal problems have been resolved, but resource limitations remain. The committee plans to raise funds from private donors in order to hold a symposium on a national counternarcotics strategy.

Accomplishments and Law Enforcement Efforts. The year's most significant accomplishments came in training and professionalization of law enforcement personnel and in international cooperation on investigations. Kenyan police and customs officers underwent specialized training provided by the governments of the US, UK, and Germany. Four officers have been chosen for a UNDCP­sponsored canine training program in South Africa. Upon their return, Kenya will use drug­sniffing dogs for the first time at the Nairobi and Mombasa International Airports and the Port of Mombasa. Kenya stepped up operational cooperation with other governments, dispatching an investigator to the UK and hosting officers from the US, UK and other countries. Regional cooperation was enhanced at an operational meeting of the top antinarcotics and criminal investigation officers from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda held in Mombasa in July and funded by the UNDCP. Another similar meeting is planned for February 1997 in Arusha, Tanzania, to be funded by the British Government.

The primary narcotics law enforcement entity is the Anti Narcotics Unit (ANU) of the Kenya police, which has approximately 100 officers nationwide. There is good cooperation among the ANU, DEA and US Embassy officials. Most ANU officers appear to be well­trained and motivated. However, their efforts are hampered by inadequate resources, a problem affecting the entire police force. There is presently no separate item for narcotics control in the national budget. A high priority for the Inter­Ministerial Drug Coordinating Committee is to increase funding and obtain a separate budget for implementation of the planned National Counternarcotics Strategy.

The most significant seizure of 1996 was the discovery of almost 20 mt of hashish on a beach near Mombasa, one of the largest seizures ever made in Africa. Twelve suspects were arrested and charged in the case, while three others eluded capture. In December, ten of the defendants­­officers and crew of the dhow that transported the hashish­­were convicted and sentenced to terms ranging from ten to twenty­five years. Two of those who escaped are alleged to be the masterminds and are believed to have left the country. No major narcotics traffickers were arrested or convicted during the year.

Corruption. Public officials engaged in narcotics trafficking, or who attempt to cover up such crimes, are liable to prosecution under the anti­corruption act. There are no special laws regarding narcotics­related corruption. During 1996, there were no arrests or prosecutions of public officials for narcotics­related corruption. The trial judge in the 20 mt hashish case complained in his judgment that local officials implicated in the case, including a police inspector, a local chief, and one or more customs officers, were not charged and remain in their positions. Unconfirmed reports alleging the involvement of influential politicians and government officials in narcotics trafficking continued to surface during 1996.

Agreements and Treaties. Kenya acceded to the 1988 UN Convention in 1992 and enacted the Kenyan Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Control Act as implementing legislation in 1994 (The 1994 Narcotics Act). It also acceded to the World Customs Organization's 1977 International Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance for the Prevention, Investigation and Repression of Customs Offences. Annex 10 of this Convention deals with assistance in action against the smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Kenya has long had an extradition treaty with the US. In 1991, the GOK entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the USG providing for, among other things, the establishment of an ANU cell of at least six officers at Nairobi's international airport and the sharing of law enforcement information. The USG agreed to provide X­ray equipment valued at $40,000 to the airport unit. The ANU subsequently acquired X­ray equipment from other sources, and in May the two governments amended the MOU to permit the $40,000 to be used to acquire other narcotics control equipment requested by the ANU.

Cultivation/Production. Cannabis is the main drug produced in Kenya. Most is grown for the domestic market, although small amounts are sold to foreign tourists who may export it to their home countries. All cannabis cultivation is illegal, but it is nevertheless grown on a commercial scale in western Kenya and the northwestern provinces, in the central highlands and along the southwestern coast. Authorities have found sizable cannabis plantations deep inside national game reserves. The cannabis plant also grows wild in many areas. Police lack the resources to conduct systematic detection and eradication of cultivated cannabis. Nevertheless, in 1996 Kenyan police officials eradicated 211 acres of cultivated cannabis and 2,741 scattered cannabis plants. No attempt has been made to estimate crop size or yield.

Police arrested a British citizen for growing 150 opium poppies, but this case is believed to be an isolated incident. There have been previous attempts to grow opium poppy in Kenya, however; over 30,000 plants were discovered in 1989, and a second discovery, less well­documented, was made in 1992. Khat (known as miraa in Kenya) is legal and is grown extensively in eastern Kenya. Most of the crop is exported to Somalia, Ethiopia and Yemen, although some is sold domestically.

Drug Flow/Transit. Kenya's sea coast, port facilities, good air connections and tourist industry make it a transshipment point for Southwest Asian heroin and hashish, as well as some Southeast Asian heroin, bound for Europe and occasionally the US, though we have no evidence suggesting that significant quantities actually reach the US via Kenya. Hashish, primarily from Pakistan, comes into Mombasa by sea. Heroin is usually transported in smaller quantities by individuals traveling from Pakistan and India by air. The effective use of profiling by ANU officers at Nairobi's international airport (thanks largely to US­sponsored training) has brought a reduction in the number of couriers flying directly to Kenya. Many now fly to Uganda or Tanzania and enter Kenya via the more porous land border. Most of the incoming couriers now appear to be Kenyan nationals recruited by West African (primarily Nigerian) or Asian traffickers based in Nairobi. The drugs are then exported, usually to Europe, but sometimes to the US. Aggressive profiling of Africans by European police has caused Kenya­based traffickers, particularly Nigerians, to begin recruiting European and American tourists as couriers. Shipments may also be concealed in export commodities. Kenya also is a transit point for India­produced methaqualone (Mandrax) bound for South Africa.

Demand Reduction. Cannabis is the main drug of abuse in Kenya, thanks to its ready availability and low price. Its use is on the upswing, particularly among young people. Heroin use is small, but growing in the large cities of Nairobi and Mombasa and in the coastal resort communities. Heroin's relatively high cost limits the potential domestic market. Hardest hit so far appear to be the children of well­to­do families of South Asian and Arab origin. Mandrax use is also increasing among Kenya's Asian­origin population. It is difficult to gauge the extent of domestic demand as there are no statistics other than police records, which are often spotty and unreliable. To date, preventative education efforts have been hampered by lack of resources and their bureaucratic relegation to the pharmacy department of the Ministry of Health, which lacks the necessary expertise. The only current education programs are UNDCP efforts to add counternarcotics content to existing programs sponsored by other UN agencies. There are no government­funded drug rehabilitation centers. A few NGO's are involved in drug rehabilitation and counseling, but they also suffer from severe resource constraints. Press reports indicate that ANU officers on the coast have had some success enlisting Islamic clerics and elders in local counternarcotics campaigns.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

US Policy Initiatives. The US objective is to encourage of a strong Kenyan Government commitment to narcotics interdiction and the strengthening of its narcotics control capabilities.

Bilateral Cooperation. The GOK cooperates with DEA and the US Embassy on narcotics matters. In early 1997, the USG plans to turn over to the ANU $40,000 of surveillance equipment purchased by the USG under the amended MOU. This equipment should significantly boost the ANU's ability to conduct undercover operations. In June, the US Customs Service conducted a training seminar for ANU and Kenyan Customs officers in Mombasa. The USG also funded the attendance of the chief of the ANU's Nairobi Airport Unit at the DEA's Regional Airport Interdiction Seminar. The DEA provided the ANU with opiate test kits and evidence­handling material. The ANU regularly provides DEA with samples from significant seizures for laboratory analysis.

The Road Ahead. The USG will build a strong working relationship with Kenyan law enforcement, with the goal of improving law enforcement information exchanges. Training will be provided as resources permit in order to boost the professionalism and operational capabilities of narcotics control agencies. The USG will attempt to provide input into the planned National Counternarcotics Strategy.

I. Summary

Lebanon appears to have won the fight against illicit crop cultivation due to the joint Lebanese­Syrian eradication efforts since 1992. There appears to be no cultivation of opium poppy and cannabis (for hashish production) also has all but disappeared. There are some small farms in the Baalbek­Hermel region which are still engaged in illicit cultivation, but they appear to be few in number. When such farms are discovered, authorities make arrests immediately and eradicate the crops. Lebanese Internal Security Forces (LISF) and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), with assistance from the Syrian Army, reported the eradication of approximately 70,000 square meters of cannabis in the Baalbek­Hermel region of the Bekaa Valley during June and July. There were no other reported eradication efforts during the year.

Lebanon is a significant transit country for the purposes of re­export of cocaine, and many small home­type labs for processing opium into heroin are still reported to operate in the Bekaa Valley. Several areas of the Bekaa Valley are not fully controlled by either Syria or the GOL; these areas could lend themselves to illegal lab activity.

Although local authorities deny money laundering is a serious problem, Lebanon still presents itself to narcotics traffickers as a venue for money laundering due to bank secrecy laws, which do not allow for official discovery. Corruption is common within Lebanese law enforcement agencies.

In March 1996, the GOL acceded to the 1988 UN Convention, but expressed formal reservations regarding certain provisions of the Convention, including those which relate to bank secrecy. The US already has indicated its intention to formally object to these reservations if Lebanon does not withdraw them. Parliament is studying a draft antidrug code, which would make money laundering a crime.

II. Status of Country

The joint Syrian­Lebanese effort since 1992 to eradicate the cultivation of cannabis and opium in the Bekaa Valley is a significant accomplishment which has been confirmed by a variety of sources. Absent follow­on programs by the GOL, however, discontinuation of the UNDCP crop substitution program in late 1996 could lead to a resurgence of opium poppy and cannabis cultivation.

Like other countries in the region, Lebanon is still a venue for narcotics processing and transshipment. Opium (from Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan) travels into northern Lebanon for conversion into heroin. Cocaine from South America transits Lebanon for onward transshipment to Europe, the US and, most recently, for increased domestic consumption. Lebanese bank secrecy laws inhibit the LISF and other enforcement officials from investigating possible money laundering activities. Official corruption thrives, although it is extremely difficult to gauge how much is speicifically related to narcotics.

Drug routes and networks have long been established, and flourished during the war years in Lebanon. Distributors, dealers and middlemen continue to use these routes to move their product to Europe and the US.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. The LISF, LAF and other Lebanese law enforcement authorities made steady progress in the fight against drug production and importation. Future progress will have to be measured against their continued success in eradication efforts, their ability to find and destroy reported small mobile heroin labs in the Bekaa Valley and a continued effort against the flow of cocaine into the airport and seaport.

Accomplishments. Opium cultivation has been all but wiped out in the Bekaa Valley, and cannabis cultivation has been relegated to small farms which are eradicated when found. Combined Lebanese/Syrian teams are still working to stem the cultivation of cannabis and keep these levels to an absolute minimum.

Law Enforcement Efforts. In June and July, combined units of the LISF, LAF and Syrian Army eradicated approximately 70,000 square meters of cannabis in the Dar El­Wassiha, Ain El­Baida, Harf El­Madwi, El­Huma and Akkar Heights areas. On November 3, the LISF, in its largest cocaine operation of the year, arrested 14 suspects and seized 106 kgs of cocaine hidden within containers aboard a ship that had departed from Venezuela. Italian police authorities, in cooperation with their Lebanese counterparts, seized an additional 400 kgs of cocaine which had been destined for the same criminal organization in Beirut. Further investigation revealed that 50 kgs had already been sold to a Beirut dentist and another individual. The police recovered 26 kgs of the 50 kgs total; the remaining 24 kgs had been sold on the Lebanese market for prices ranging from $60,000 to $70,000/kg. These seizures indicate commitment by GOL law enforcement officials during the year, but also suggest an increased usage problem within Lebanon.

DEA sources indicate that small heroin labs operate throughout the Bekaa Valley. Lebanese authorities deny, or at least minimize, the existence of these labs and offer to follow up any information given to them by US law enforcement authorities.

Lebanese attachment to bank secrecy laws is strong, though many officials are receptive to suggestions on how to counter money laundering. GOL officials believe USG concerns regarding money laundering are hypothetical. They concede some drug money may be invested in Lebanon, but argue the small size of the economy renders Lebanon unattractive for large­scale laundering. Although there are no formal laws regarding the seizure of assets, the GOL court system does account for assets, usually at the end of a trial.

In June 1995, the GOL restricted the importation and use of acetic anhydride to ensure that it was not diverted for use in the production of heroin. Additional work needs to be done on the enforcement of stringent end­user certificates for all precursor chemicals.

DEA and US Embassy officials maintain a close and effective relationship with GOL law enforcement authorities. DEA coordinates all controlled deliveries and works closely with Lebanese authorities on all active cases.

Corruption. On June 12, a Beirut criminal court convicted Yahya Shammas, a member of Parliament from the Bekaa Valley, to seven years' hard labor on narcotics trafficking charges. Shammas' assets also were seized and transferred to the Lebanese State. This case was particularly important for Lebanon, since Shammas' parliamentary colleagues had voted to lift his parliamentary immunity from prosecution. Authorities arrested several law enforcement officers for participation in narcotics trafficking during the past year. The most recent arrest was of an LAF sergeant who was involved in storing some of the cocaine from the November seizure of 106 kgs at the Port of Beirut. Unofficial sources indicate that corruption within the law enforcement community is still a significant problem in Lebanon, though the extent of narcotics­influenced corruption is unknown.

Agreements/Treaties. Lebanon and the US have no bilateral agreements on narcotics or extradition. In March 1996, Lebanon acceded to the 1988 UN Convention, but with reservations on disclosure provisions relating to bank secrecy. Lebanon is also a party to the 1961 and 1971 UN drug conventions.

Cultivation/Production. The small farms which previously produced opium and cannabis have been almost totally eradicated, according to police sources. There are still reports that heroin labs in the Bekaa Valley process morphine base arriving from Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The GOL authorities claim that the labs, if they exist at all, are small, mobile and difficult to detect. In addition, these labs are located in areas generally controlled by elements of Hizballah and would require a large and concentrated enforcement effort to root them out.

Drug Flow/Transit. There have been major seizures of cocaine at both the seaport and airport during the past year, which would tend to indicate the potential size of the problem. The LISF and LAF have made some large hashish seizures throughout the Bekaa Valley. Syrian authorities made two impressive hashish seizures at the Syrian­Lebanese border, and most recently a 500 kgs hashish seizure in the Lebanese town of Ia'at. Syrian and Lebanese authorities assert that the hashish was several years old and was "weathered" in appearance, indicating that it had been stored for some time.

Hashish is moved most frequently through the Syrian/Lebanese border by truck and car, and infrequently by individual couriers traveling by ship or aircraft. Heroin and cocaine have been routed through the seaport in cargo containers. Human couriers also have been intercepted at the airport.

Domestic Programs. Unofficial, media and anecdotal reports indicate that drug use, especially cocaine, is increasing throughout Lebanese society. It is difficult to determine the extent of the problem because of the lack of accurate statistical information. There are drug rehabilitation efforts run by church­affiliated organizations. The authorities use education programs in the schools as the primary focus of their antidrug campaign.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

US Policy Initiatives. US Embassy and DEA visits to the LISF stress that efforts must be improved to interdict cocaine shipments, both at the airport and seaport, and to improve border interdiction of morphine and opium base coming into Lebanon and hashish departing Lebanon. Efforts should continue to shut down the small heroin processing laboratories in the Bekaa Valley and there should be a on­going eradication of residual cannabis farms. There also should be focussed and coordinated law enforcement efforts to respond to large­scale trafficking organizations, as well as a steady push to pass the new antidrug legislation under review in the Parliament making money laundering a crime. This draft legislation, formulated with the assistance of UNDCP, would add some teeth to the fight against illegal drugs. The GOL should work to establish an independent anti­corruption bureau which could have a significant impact in the total counter­narcotics effort.

Bilateral Cooperation. The US and Lebanon do not have a bilateral narcotics agreement. DEA and US Embassy officials maintain a close working relationship with LISF and other law enforcement entities.

Road Ahead. The GOL is making important strides in its counternarcotics effort, but there remains significant work to be done. The LISF and LAF, in cooperation with Syrian military authorities, have had successful crop eradication efforts. Cocaine seizures and arrests at the ports have shown that tighter controls are having an effect. In addition, efforts to find and dismantle heroin labs in the Bekaa would indicate that the GOL is placing a high priority on drug enforcement. Adoption of antinarcotics legislation and money laundering statutes, creation of an anti­corruption bureau, and establishment of controls on precursor chemicals would provide the law enforcement community with the tools needed to move with increased efficiency against the tide of illegal drugs entering Lebanon.

I. Summary

Morocco is a major producer and exporter of cannabis. Although statistics vary widely, it is estimated that over 2,000 mt are exported annually to Europe, where it is consumed as hashish. In recent years, considerable international publicity has highlighted Morocco's status as one of the world's primary producers of cannabis. To combat this negative publicity, the Moroccan Government (GOM) devoted significant resources to interdiction efforts in 1996. During a campaign to eliminate corruption, contraband and drug smuggling, the GOM claims to have broken up 12 drug networks and arrested several of their leaders. Despite the campaign, producers and large­scale traffickers still operate due to budgetary constraints on enforcement and widespread corruption. Morocco is a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention.

II. Status of Country

Morocco is among the world's largest producers of cannabis. Its cultivation and sale provide the economic base for much of northern Morocco, where up to 85,000 hectares are devoted to cannabis production. Most of the cannabis produced in Morocco is processed into hashish, resin, or oil and exported to Algeria, Tunisia and Europe. Estimates of the portion of the crop consumed domestically range from 15 to 40 percent. Cannabis from Morocco does not enter the US in sufficient quantities to have a significant effect.

Cannabis is typically exported in motor vehicles that cross into southern Spain and France on ferries. Small fishing boats are another common means of transportation. European authorities report that between 70­80 percent of all cannabis seized on the continent is of Moroccan origin.

While cannabis (known locally as kif) is the traditional drug of choice for Moroccans, there is also a small but growing domestic market for harder drugs, such as heroin and cocaine. In addition, these drugs reportedly enter Morocco for transshipment to Europe. Newspaper reports on Morocco's role as a major producer and exporter of drugs indicate a connection between local drug traffickers and international cartels such as Latin American cocaine rings. However, there are few seizures of hard drugs to substantiate these reports.

The proceeds from narcotics exports are easily repatriated. The Government of Morocco makes no serious effort to trace drug or contraband money; in fact, there are no laws against money laundering that would enable the GOM to prosecute offenders effectively. Much of the revenue is invested in real estate, especially in northern Morocco, where drug money is an important source of income and has supported a construction boom. However, as increasing numbers of office and apartment buildings sit unoccupied, drug traffickers are reportedly searching for new investment opportunities.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. Early in the year, the GOM launched a clean­up campaign to combat corruption, contraband and drug smuggling. Although the government claims to have broken up drug rings and prosecuted several leaders of drug networks, authorities have not taken serious action against producers, and the campaign ended in the fall. During the first half of 1996, the GOM arrested and prosecuted over 300 suspects on narcotics charges and seized 15 mt of cannabis resin. During the summer, the government created a development agency for the northern territories which produced an action plan for economic development and crop substitution. The agency plans to use funding promised by the European Union (EU) and others to finance its programs. However, the GOM has not yet met EU requirements which would allow the funds to be released. In January, the GOM created a Coordination Unit for the Struggle Against Drugs (UCLAD) which, as part of the Ministry of Interior, is charged with coordinating antidrug efforts. The Parliament created a fact­finding commission to investigate narcotics­related issues.

Enforcement Efforts. As part of an antidrug initiative launched by King Hassan in 1992, 10,000 police were detailed to drug interdiction efforts in the north and Rif mountains last year. Two hundred checkpoints are scattered throughout the region. Royal Army soldiers staff hundreds of observation posts along the Mediterranean coast, and the Navy carries out routine sea patrols and responds to sightings by the observation posts. In addition, Morocco expanded its cooperation with European law enforcement, increasing the number of foreign drug enforcement officers working with Moroccan counterparts.

Corruption. Despite this year's campaign against corruption, most observers believe that corruption continues to be widespread. The GOM does not promote drug production or trafficking as a matter of policy and it contests accusations that government officials in the northern territories are involved in the drug trade.

Agreements and Treaties. Morocco is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, as well as to the 1961 and 1971 UN conventions. The GOM's announced programs would, if fully implemented, bring it substantially into compliance with the 1988 Convention's goals and objectives. However, progress in that regard was minimal in 1996. The government's purpose in creating UCLAD was to improve cooperation and centralize control on all drug­related matters. But European diplomats believe the operation lacks the resources to fulfill its mandate. The EU will withhold antinarcotics assistance until UCLAD is fully operational. Absent greatly increased funding, the aims of the 1988 Convention will remain unattainable in Morocco. In 1993, Morocco ratified a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) with the US. No narcotics­related cases have yet been considered under the treaty. In 1989, Morocco and the US signed a bilateral narcotics cooperation agreement in compliance with the Chiles Amendment, which calls for cooperation in the fight against illicit drug production and trafficking, and the abuse of narcotics. Morocco also has antinarcotics agreements and or/MLAT's with the EU, France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Portugal and the UK. While Morocco's Parliament has not yet passed legislation to implement the 1988 UN Convention, its laws do provide general authority to prosecute drug producers and traffickers. The US and Morocco do not have a bilateral extradition treaty.

Cultivation/Production. Most Moroccan cannabis is cultivated by small farmers in the northern Rif region, although some is also grown in the Souss Valley of the south. Unofficial sources estimate that from 80,000 to 85,000 hectares are devoted to cannabis production, and claim that this number has increased by a factor of ten in the last decade. European experts report that, due to record rainfall in 1996, the area under cultivation increased by almost ten percent. The average hectare of cannabis produces two to eight mt of raw plant. The government has stated that it is committed to the total eradication of cannabis production. Given the economic dependence of the northern part of the country on cannabis, however, eradication is only feasible if accompanied by a highly subsidized crop substitution program. Consequently, the GOM has not yet made a serious attempt at eradication.

Drug Flow/Transit. There are reports that Morocco is used as a transshipment point for hard drugs such as heroin and cocaine en route to Europe. However, there were no significant hard drug seizures during the year that would substantiate these reports.

Domestic Programs/Demand Reduction. The GOM denies a significant hard­drug addiction problem in Morocco and does not actively promote a reduction in the domestic demand for cannabis. The GOM does have a program to train the staffs of psychiatric hospitals in the treatment of drug addiction.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. Only very small amounts of narcotics produced in or transiting through Morocco reach the US. The USG works to encourage Moroccan antinarcotics efforts through cooperation with Moroccan law enforcement officials in curtailing the production and transshipment of drugs. The USG also provides training in law enforcement techniques, promotes GOM adherence to bilateral and international agreement requirements and provides support, as appropriate, for existing Moroccan­European cooperation in this area. US officials also encourage greater international cooperation to control Moroccan production and export of drugs.

Bilateral Cooperation. Pursuant to the 1989 agreement, the US and Morocco maintain cooperation on antinarcotics issues. The USG has provided training and narcotics intelligence when applicable.

The Road Ahead. The US will monitor the narcotics situation in Morocco, cooperate with the GOM in its narcotics control efforts, and, together with the EU, provide law enforcement training, intelligence and other support where possible.

I. Summary

Nigeria is the focal point of West African narcotics trafficking. Illicit drug producing and trafficking organizations in Asia, South America and, increasingly, Nigeria itself, either use Nigeria as a transshipment point or rely on Nigerian courier networks to transport Asian heroin and South American cocaine destined for US and European markets. Nigerian trafficking organizations are among the leading carriers of Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin into the US. In addition, Nigerian traffickers ship cannabis­­the only illicit drug produced in Nigeria­­to Europe and other West African countries. The Government of Nigeria (GON) has failed to address corruption adequately among law enforcement and other government agencies, hindering counternarcotics efforts.

Nigerian trafficking organizations operate sophisticated money laundering operations in addition to controlling courier networks. These organizations have been quick to adapt in response to vigorous international law enforcement. They have found new ways to evade detection and to alter and expand their narcotics smuggling routes and markets. As GON counternarcotics efforts have effectively reduced the amount of drugs shipped through international airports in Nigeria, courier networks increasingly have relied on overland shipments to transport narcotics. Nigerian trafficking organizations actively recruit couriers of diverse nationalities, backgrounds and ages.

II. Status of Country

Although not a significant producer of drugs or precursor chemicals, Nigeria is a major transit country and the home base of many organizations involved in international narcotics trafficking. Nigerian trafficking organizations control courier networks that move heroin from Asia to the US and Europe and cocaine from South America to Europe and South Africa. Most trafficking through Nigeria is import/re­export oriented, with only a small percentage imported for domestic consumption. The only illicit drug produced in Nigeria is cannabis, which is exported primarily to Europe and, to a lesser extent, other West African countries. Nigerian trafficking organizations also run sophisticated money laundering operations. Of particular concern is the export of Nigerian drug trafficking and money laundering activities to other West African countries.

The GON first formulated a comprehensive drug control strategy in 1995. The GON passed a comprehensive money laundering decree in February 1995 which allows for the seizure of property and assets belonging to suspected narcotics trafficking and money laundering organizations. Unfortunately, the GON has not provided sufficient funding or support to adequately implement the decree. The one positive indigenous force working to combat drug trafficking in Nigeria is the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), which has attempted, albeit not yet successfully, to shift its focus from drug couriers to leaders of narcotics trafficking organizations. Due to counternarcotics efforts by the NDLEA, particularly at Lagos International Airport, some Nigerian trafficking and money laundering organizations have relocated to other West African countries or use businesses in neighboring countries as fronts. They increasingly rely on overland methods of transporting narcotics through neighboring countries whose ports and airports are less­tightly monitored.

Nigeria's land borders are poorly patrolled and border patrol agencies are rife with corruption. Nigerian and US authorities suspect that the amount of drugs shipped through Nigeria's land borders far exceeds the amount that was, or ever could be, shipped by air.

The NDLEA has taken steps to address corruption within its ranks, but has made no effective efforts to address corruption in other agencies of government. The NDLEA's efforts to cooperate with other Nigerian law enforcement agencies are hindered by pervasive corruption in those agencies. The NDLEA also suffers internally from an organizational culture that stifles initiative and requires that all decisions be made at the top. Fear of stiff reprimand for failed operations and possible accusations of corruption make agents reluctant to take the initiative. Counternarcotics efforts have resulted in the arrests of many couriers, but few major traffickers; controlling organizations remain intact. Perhaps the most glaring omission by the GON is its failure to provide adequate funding for its law enforcement employees, thus making them ever more vulnerable to bribery and related forms of corruption. Most law enforcement employees are paid far less than is sufficient to feed, clothe and house their families.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. There were no major positive policy initiatives in 1996. The GON did not enact any new counternarcotics legislation. Moreover, plans were stymied to shift the focus of narcotics control operations from the arrest of couriers to the prosecution of leaders of narcotics trafficking and money laundering organizations in Nigeria.

Accomplishments. Nigeria made only marginal progress in counternarcotics efforts during the year and did not meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, to which Nigeria is a signatory. The NDLEA conducted drug raids and seizures primarily at airports, seaports and border checkpoints. Authorities took few steps to reduce cannabis production in the country. GON efforts focused primarily on the destruction of isolated cannabis fields and a limited program to encourage crop substitution.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Nigeria's counternarcotics efforts were inadequate in 1996. Narcotics control operations lack adequate funding and training, and extraditions to the US have not been forthcoming as promised. Counternarcotics operations also suffer from a lack of cooperation among the NDLEA, police, immigration and customs. The first NDLEA­US DEA/Lagos joint operation, which resulted in the arrest of eight traffickers, was less successful than anticipated. The Nigerian agents' lack of experience, insufficient follow­up investigation efforts and failure to pursue higher­level players within the smuggling ring limited the results of the operation. The lack of broader GON cooperation on other issues of international concern adversely affect NDLEA efforts to cooperate with foreign missions and law enforcement officials.

Corruption. There is rampant corruption at all levels of government which facilitates narcotics trafficking and money laundering in Nigeria. The GON has conducted publicity campaigns against corruption, but has achieved few concrete results. During 1996, the NDLEA dismissed some agents (more than 600, according to the NDLEA's General Bamaiyi) under the Drug Agent Corruption Decree of 1995 in an effort to combat corruption. Paradoxically, agents are reluctant to take responsibility and unwilling to take action for fear that failure may result in allegations of corruption or incompetence. Decision­making responsibility is almost entirely centered at the uppermost levels of the agency.

Agreements and Treaties. Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, as well as the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotopic Substances. The 1931 US­UK extradition treaty, which was made applicable to Nigeria in 1935, is the legal basis for US extradition requests. The US and Nigeria signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) in 1989, but it has not been ratified by the US Senate. The GON and Nigeria Airways (Nigeria's national carrier) signed an Air Carrier Agreement with US Customs in 1993.

Cultivation/Production. The only illicit drug cultivated and produced in Nigeria is cannabis. Nigerian cannabis is produced mainly for domestic consumption and export to Europe and other West African countries. It is shipped in insignificant quantities to the US. The GON took only limited steps to reduce cannabis production in the country during the year, destroying some fields of cannabis and recommending crop substitution to farmers in cannabis­producing regions.

Drug Flow/Transit. Nigeria was Africa's most significant transshipment point in 1996. The shift of some Nigerian drug trafficking and money laundering operations to neighboring West African countries has not resulted in a decline in activity in Nigeria. Nigerian trafficking and money laundering organizations have proven adept at devising new ways of subverting law enforcement efforts and evading detection. Nigerian organizations succeeded in altering and even expanding their smuggling efforts, primarily through Nigeria's porous land borders, despite counternarcotics efforts by the NDLEA.

Demand Reduction. Domestic drug abuse is rising in Nigeria. The GON denies the existence of significant drug abuse in Nigeria and has repeatedly implied that Nigeria's narcotics trafficking problems are the result of demand in the US and Europe. There was no credible demand reduction program in Nigeria in 1996.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. The primary goal of US counternarcotics policy is the reduction of trafficking in illicit drugs by Nigerian organizations, particularly those dealing in heroin destined for the US. Achieving this goal depends substantially on GON willingness to arrest and extradite major traffickers and to enforce anti­conspiracy laws that allow for the prosecution of those controlling courier networks. Operational cooperation, as well as serious anti­corruption efforts, are essential to realizing this goal.

Bilateral Accomplishments. The NDLEA and the DEA office in Lagos reactivated the USG­GON Joint Narcotics Task Force in November 1995. DEA/Lagos supported NDLEA operations throughout 1996, providing information and guidance in many NDLEA operations and one joint investigation. Nonetheless, cooperation between the US and Nigeria fell far below USG expectations. There was little significant change in either narcotics control law enforcement efforts or government policy since the 1995 GON announcement of a narcotics control strategy. Improved USG­GON cooperation can only be achieved if the GON makes an effective effort to move forward with its narcotics control strategy and takes significant steps to combat corruption at all levels of the Nigerian Government. The USG is exploring the possibility of offering counternarcotics assistance to the GON in the areas of training and information sharing.

The Road Ahead. The USG will stress the importance the US attaches to counternarcotics efforts and will seek full GON cooperation in the extradition of prominent drug traffickers and other Nigerian citizens wanted in the US on drug and related charges. The USG will press for the investigation, arrest and prosecution of major drug traffickers and the dismantling of trafficking organizations within Nigeria, in addition to the apprehension of couriers. Furthermore, the USG will aggressively monitor GON willingness to share information with the international community on narcotics trafficking and money laundering organizations in Nigeria, and will look for effective GON efforts to eradicate corruption in the government and promote cooperation among law enforcement agencies. The USG will encourage the enforcement and strengthening of money laundering and asset seizure and forfeiture laws, as well as the reform of financial regulations to increase the integrity of financial transactions. The USG will assist in viable counternarcotics efforts and, depending upon Nigerian cooperation, will focus on training and support programs aimed at strengthening the institutions responsible for narcotics control operations in Nigeria.

I. Summary

Saudi Arabia is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and assigns a high national priority to the elimination of drug trafficking and abuse. While the government provides no statistics on drug consumption, interdiction, and trafficking, Saudi Arabia's relatively affluent population and strict privacy laws make it an attractive target for drug dealers. Under the Saudi Islamic Legal Code (Sharia), drug trafficking is a capital crime, enforced against Saudis and non­Saudis alike. While the number of drug­related executions declined in 1996, arrests continued apace, with Pakistan still ranking as the single largest source of narcotics and Pakistani nationals the largest conduit of illegal substances. Saudi Arabia relies upon a network of overseas drug enforcement liaison offices and on state of the art detection and training programs to apprehend and deter drug traffickers.

USG and Saudi officials are exploring the resumption of regional DEA visits, which have waned during the past few years. Saudi drug enforcement officials welcomed quarterly DEA visits, which were the practice prior to May 1991, and provided an invaluable mechanism for better assessing Saudi strengths and weaknesses in the interdiction effort.

II. Status of Country

There is no significant drug production in Saudi Arabia and it places a high priority on countering narcotics abuse and trafficking. The country's conservative Islamic values provide ample justification for an aggressive approach to substance abuse. The government undertakes widespread antinarcotics educational campaigns in the media, health institutes and schools; since 1988, it has applied the death penalty for drug smuggling. However, a variety of factors combine to make Saudi Arabia a tempting target for drug traffickers: a relatively wealthy population; the absence of conventional social recreation due to a conservative Islamic culture; the influx of over two million Islamic pilgrims annually on Hajj and minor Hajj (Umra) pilgrimages, a portion of whom use pilgrimage visas to mask travel from and through narcotics producing areas; and, with regard to money laundering, the absence of foreign exchange controls.

Saudi authorities are most concerned with domestic narcotics abuse. Authorities jail and deport expatriate substance abusers, while they remand Saudi nationals to one of the country's three drug treatment hospitals. Narcotics and health officials confirm anecdotal reports of a general increase in the level of drug trafficking and substance abuse. However, treatment officials note that Saudi addictions are not severe, reflecting the scarcity of narcotics available and their diluted form. Heroin is more prevalent in the coastal urban areas, with hashish, cocaine, and "pep" pills (particularly Captagon, which is reputed to have an aphrodisiacal quality) also in demand.

Saudi Customs officials state that Saudi Arabia has been used as a transshipment point for narcotics. Authorities tightened inspections of cargo transiting the Kingdom when it became clear that traffickers were capitalizing on the country's antidrug reputation to deflect the suspicion of customs officials in the countries of destination. Some narcotics originating in Pakistan and Southeast Asia may reach the US market, although we have no firm evidence of this. In recognition of worldwide money laundering activities, particularly those involving drugs, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) published money laundering control guidelines in 1995 to assist Saudi banks in recognizing and combating illegal transactions and other criminal activity.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. The lead agency in Saudi Arabia's drug interdiction effort is the Ministry of Interior, which has more than 20 overseas offices in countries identified as representing a trafficking threat. In addition, the Saudi Government signed a number of bilateral drug enforcement cooperation agreements in 1996 and plays a lead role in nascent efforts to enhance intelligence­sharing among the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Saudi Arabia is a member of the UNDCP, and its drug enforcement personnel regularly participate in international fora and training programs.

Accomplishments and Law Enforcement Efforts. Saudi Arabia successfully suppresses drug production, excepting marginal cultivation of the mild stimulant qat in the southwestern tribal areas of the country bordering Yemen. While drug seizures, arrests, prosecutions, and consumption trends are not a matter of public record, Saudi law enforcement officials note that the execution of four Turkish nationals in 1995 on drug trafficking charges resulted in an almost complete cessation of the smuggling of Captagon tablets into Saudi Arabia from Turkey. Narcotics interdiction specialists believe that Saudi efforts against individual drug carriers are more aggressive and successful than follow­on operations designed to identify drug distributors and regional networks. The Ministry of Interior is evaluating a proposed US non­binding drug enforcement cooperation memorandum of understanding (MOU) and has recommended the government's participation in a UNDCP­hosted drug interdiction seminar scheduled for 1997.

Corruption. There is no evidence of involvement by Saudi Government officials in the production, processing, or shipment of narcotic and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances or in other drug­related crimes.

Agreements and Treaties. There are no extradition or mutual legal assistance treaties (MLAT's) between the US and Saudi Arabia. However, there is an on­going American advisory and training presence with Saudi Customs. The non­binding MOU proposed by the Department of State in May, and still under review by the Saudi Ministry of Interior, calls for increased bilateral cooperation in information sharing, legal assistance, training, and demand reduction. The Kingdom has also acceded to the World Customs Organization's 1977 International Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance for the Prevention, Investigation and Repression of Customs Offences. Annex 10 of this Convention deals with assistance in action against the smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Saudi Arabia acceded to the 1988 UN Convention in 1992.

Cultivation/Production. There is only negligible cultivation or production of narcotics in Saudi Arabia.

Drug Flow/Transit. Saudi Customs officials devote a majority of their efforts to curbing the flow of drugs, primarily heroin, traveling from Pakistan to European, and perhaps American, markets. The USG currently has no data that any drugs flowing through Saudi Arabia reach the US in significant quantities.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). In addition to widespread media campaigns against substance abuse, the Saudi Government sponsors drug education programs directed at school­age children, health care officials, and mothers (who, in Saudi Arabia, wield disproportionate influence within the family). Saudi narcotics officials believe the executions of drug traffickers, conducted in public and publicized extensively, serve as a deterrent to narcotics abuse. The country's influential religious establishment preaches actively against narcotics use and several government treatment facilities provide counseling for addicts free of charge. One result is that while drug abuse continues in the privacy of the home, Saudi Arabia is devoid of a public drug culture.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. The US seeks to enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the Saudi Government through the signing of a non­binding MOU on drug enforcement cooperation and by encouraging greater Saudi participation in the UNDCP. US Customs provides on­going training and guidance to Saudi Customs in order to facilitate narcotics interdiction.

Bilateral Cooperation. Saudi officials actively seek and participate in US­sponsored training programs and are receptive to enhanced official contacts with DEA. DEA has undertaken to participate in an in­country UNDCP training program on drug interdiction, now scheduled for the first quarter of 1997.

Road Ahead. The USG will encourage DEA to resume visiting Saudi Arabia regularly, building on contacts made between Saudi and US officials at DEA­hosted or attended international seminars. These visits would enable the Saudis to discuss their objectives and strategies with American narcotics law enforcement specialists and allow DEA to program appropriate training for Saudi counterparts.

I. Summary

Senegal is not a significant drug­producing country. However, the availability of air and sea connections to Europe and North America, coupled with the termination of direct flights between Lagos and New York in 1993, make Senegal a potentially important narcotics transiting point. Most drug­related arrests take place at Senghor International Airport. The level of domestic drug abuse among youth (primarily marijuana) has remained fairly consistent over the past two years, but is not yet considered a major problem. Senegal is a party to all the major international treaties dealing with drug production and trafficking. Inadequate local resources, weak border controls and competing national priorities are the principal obstacles to effective drug enforcement.

II. Status of Country

Senegal is not a significant drug­producing country. The only domestically grown narcotic is cannabis, which is sold mostly for domestic consumption. There is evidence at the same time that European tourists are becoming increasingly important consumers of cannabis. Senegal has increased annually in importance as a transit point for drugs bound for North American and European markets, but there is no evidence that it has a significant effect on the US. Nigerian nationals lead the list of hard­drug arrests. Nigerian traffickers often come to Dakar to either recruit or assist the onward travel of non­Nigerian traffickers who are less likely to attract unwanted attention from immigration authorities at Western points of entry. The principal air trafficking routes are the Bombay­­Addis Ababa­­Dakar route and those flights which either fly directly or connect into Lagos or Abidjan. The most common method of drug smuggling is the use of "body carriers", couriers who have ingested the drugs in capsules, balloons or condoms. Senegalese citizens increasingly are caught up in the international drug trade, as is evident in the growing number of Senegalese involved in both fraudulent documentation and drug­related cases in France, Germany and Italy. US Embassy officials do not believe that Senegal is a major money laundering center.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. Although behind, the Government of Senegal (GOS) is currently pursuing some major policy initiatives on drugs. Drug­related legislation was introduced in Parliament and awaits ratification. Despite meager resources, Senegal has met the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention. The US Embassy believes that the GOS has abided by the multilateral or regional agreements into which it has entered. Furthermore, the GOS has enacted legal and law enforcement measures to prevent and punish narcotics­related public corruption.

Accomplishments. The GOS has not made significant progress in the effort to end the illicit cultivation, production, or distribution of cannabis. It is handicapped in its eradication efforts by economic considerations; local growers prefer to plant cannabis, which they can sell for cash at the Gambian border, rather than ground nuts or other legitimate crops for which payment from the government is often delayed. The country does not have the resources to commit to any sort of regular eradication program. Money laundering does not play an important role in the Senegalese drug trade; however, money laundering is not adequately addressed in the new proposed drug legislation. Asset seizure rarely comes into play in Senegal, since most persons arrested are transients rather than Senegalese residents.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The majority of drug arrests are made as a result of search and seizures performed at Senghor International Airport. However, in November Senegalese authorities seized six kgs of heroin from a local post office box, which had been rented under an alias. The drugs had been sent from Bangkok. Local drug officials are unaware of the extent to which post office boxes are used in the illicit drug trade, yet admit that the scheme appeared to be well organized and had been ongoing for an indeterminate amount of time. Although statistics are difficult to obtain, the number of arrests involving hard drugs has averaged around 23 annually. In contrast, cannabis­related arrests nationally number in the thousands. Most cannabis arrests involve users and low­level pushers. There are problems in encouraging more effective cooperation among the myriad government agencies involved in combating drugs. For example, under present laws, customs authorities are required to seize illegal narcotics immediately upon discovery. The police would like to see legislation introduced which would, in certain circumstances, allow the drugs to enter the country so that surveillance could establish the identities of the principal buyers and distributors. The National Commission on Narcotics, created seven years ago, has not proven to be an effective body for the coordination of drug enforcement activities.

Corruption. The low standard of living and comparatively low wage scale of civil servants in Senegal represent serious vulnerabilities, given the large sums of money available to major drug networks. Although difficult to document, it is virtually certain that corruption plays an important role in the illicit narcotics trade in Senegal.

Agreements and Treaties. Senegal is a party to all three major UN drug conventions, including the 1988 UN Convention. It has also acceded to the World Customs Organization's 1977 International Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance for the Prevention, Investigation and Repression of Customs Offences. Annex 10 of this Convention deals with assistance in action against the smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Senegal has extradition treaties with the Cape Verde Islands, The Gambia, Guinea­Bissau, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia and France. Senegal is a member of Interpol and places heavy reliance on drug information obtained through Interpol channels.

Cultivation/Production. Senegal's drug production is limited to cannabis (yamba), including a somewhat more potent West African variant known as lopito. Most of this is grown along the border with Gambia and in the marshy isles of the Saloum Region.

Drug Flow/Transit. Although difficult to chart, drug trafficking through Dakar has been steadily increasing. The government publishes statistics on drug arrests and seizures infrequently, and usually only in connection with a public drug destruction exercise normally held in the spring. The last annual compilation of drug seizures published in the press was in 1989. In that year, authorities seized 14.5 kgs of heroin. Evidence indicates that the flow of drugs through the Port of Dakar may be even harder to control than through the international airport.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. The principal US objective is to assist local authorities in curbing the transit of narcotics through Dakar to North America and Europe. The main obstacle is the lack of local resources and the level of poverty, which present fertile ground for the financial inducements of the drug trade and lead to corruption in border control operations and law enforcement. In addition, the country's low level of economic development makes fighting drugs a relatively low priority in the face of more pressing problems.

The Senegalese Government has been generally supportive of international treaties and conventions to improve or expand drug interdiction programs at the international level. The French and the Germans are Senegal's principal drug­assistance partners. Senegalese complicity in the production of false documentation used in drug­related offenses continues to be a major concern of these donors.

Bilateral Cooperation. In March 1996, the USG facilitated the travel and training of two Senegalese officials to the Africa­­Middle East Regional Drug Enforcement Seminar presented by DEA in Addis Ababa.

The Road Ahead. Although the Senegalese Government is very receptive to counternarcotics training and materials, it has not made serious gains against illicit narcotics trafficking. Despite an increase in local drug use, national priorities are dominated by other more pressing social and economic problems, which preclude an effective, well­coordinated response to the illegal drug problem.

I. Summary

South Africa has become a significant cocaine and heroin transshipment point. Cocaine from South America transits South Africa to Europe, and heroin from the Far East passes through South Africa for onward distribution in Europe and, to a lesser extent, the US. We do not currently have evidence suggesting that the impact of this heroin on the US is significant. South Africa is one of the world's largest cannabis producers, though South African cannabis is primarily destined for domestic and regional markets. South Africa also is the world's largest Mandrax (methaqualone) consumer.

In 1996 South Africa passed long­awaited legislation dealing with asset forfeiture, extradition, and international cooperation on criminal matters. The USG and the South African Government (SAG) signed a Declaration on Mutual Anti­Crime Cooperation, and the SAG signed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on combatting illicit drug trafficking. South Africa is not yet a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but in late 1996 Parliament passed several pieces of legislation that should enable the SAG to accede to the Convention in 1997.

II. Status of Country

South Africa emerged as a major transshipment point for narcotics trafficking after the transition to democracy in the early 1990's ended the country's international isolation. Contributing factors include its geographic position on major trafficking routes between the East Asia and the Middle East, the Americas and Europe; the rapid expansion of international air links; a well­developed transportation infrastructure; and modern international telecommunication and banking systems. Long, porous borders and weak border control, including under­manned ports and numerous secondary airports, give traffickers easy entry into South Africa. South Africa has 96 official ports of entry, including 36 designated international airports.

South Africa ranks among the world's largest producers of cannabis (known locally as dagga). While this cannabis is mostly consumed regionally within southern Africa, there are also shipments to the Netherlands and the UK, sometimes in exchange for designer drugs (ecstasy, LSD). New Mandrax manufacturing laboratories also were discovered in South Africa in 1996.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. While high­level SAG officials profess a strong commitment to combatting drug trafficking, in practice the SAG is more focused on tackling South Africa's serious internal crime problems. The counternarcotics battle is left largely to the South African Narcotics Bureau (SANAB), which is under­staffed, under­funded, and under­trained. South Africa still has no national counternarcotics strategy nor inter­ministerial body that considers narcotics issues. However, the SAG's new National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) identifies drug trafficking as a priority crime. The NCPS, unveiled in May, is a policy initiative bringing several ministries together to deal with South Africa's massive crime problem.

Accomplishments. The Ministry of Justice and Parliament worked hard to draft, introduce, and pass a package of crime bills during the year. The new legislation, approved by Parliament in November, includes laws on asset forfeiture, extradition, and international cooperation on criminal matters. Together with a money laundering bill expected to be tabled before Parliament in early 1997, this legislative package should enable South Africa finally to accede to the 1988 UN Convention. At the August SADC summit, South Africa signed the SADC Protocol on combatting illicit cross­border drug trafficking.

Law Enforcement Efforts. SANAB made numerous cocaine seizures at Johannesburg international airport. In September SANAB also raided two Mandrax­producing factories, arresting several members of international Mandrax syndicates. In December, the organized crime unit broke up a syndicate which specialized in transporting multi­ton shipments of cannabis from storage points in Lesotho.

South African police counternarcotics efforts focused on major traffickers and their organizations. Police are concentrating their efforts on approximately 32 drug smuggling syndicates at present, of which the cocaine syndicates are considered the most important.

The government established a new border control and policing unit to patrol land, sea, and air points of entry. At many land border entry points an officer from this new unit will be the only SAG official present. The commissioner of this new unit, which currently has 800 officers, but will expand to 1,600 officers, professes a strong narcotics control commitment for his unit. South African Customs and Excise merged with the Inland Revenue Service, which will strengthen the revenue­collecting predilection of the service at the expense of its negligible counternarcotics role.

SANAB underwent another significant restructuring in late 1996, which put all SANAB officers throughout the country back under the direction of the central office. After a year­long vacancy of SANAB's top position, Superintendent Kobus Van Aarde became the new head of SANAB in February. SANAB officers were selected to fill the seven new international drug liaison officer positions and are undergoing diplomatic training in advance of their 1997 assignments abroad.

Corruption. Authorities prosecute officials accused of corruption under the South Africa "Corruption Act of 1992." There is no evidence of narcotics­related corruption among senior South Africa law enforcement officials. Low­level corruption among border control officials, however, may facilitate the transport of narcotics across South Africa's borders.

Agreements and Treaties. Vice President Gore and Deputy President Mbeki signed a Declaration on Mutual Anti­Crime Cooperation between the US and South Africa at the July meeting of the Binational Commission. The declaration recognizes the threat posed by international crime and drug trafficking and highlights the desirability of mutual cooperation in combatting these threats.

A 1947 extradition treaty with the US which covers drug trafficking is the only other narcotics­related agreement South Africa has with the US. South Africa is currently seeking to update the bilateral extradition treaty to eliminate gaps in its coverage and to bring it in line with the new extradition legislation passed in 1996.

The new legislation on international cooperation on criminal matters will provide a framework for South Africa to negotiate mutual legal assistance treaties (MLAT's) with other countries. In addition to signing the SADC drug trafficking Protocol, South Africa signed a bilateral Counternarcotics Cooperation Agreement with Brazil in late 1996.

Cultivation/Production. Cannabis is a traditional crop in many rural areas of South Africa, in particular the Eastern Cape and Kwazulu Natal. South African cannabis is primarily destined for domestic and regional consumption, although authorities have uncovered shipments to the Netherlands and the UK, sometimes in exchange for ecstasy and LSD. Revised local statistics still indicate a relatively large area of land under cultivation for cannabis. SANAB has an eradication program to destroy cannabis by spraying herbicides (glyphosate) on targeted areas. SANAB failed to reach its target of destroying 12,600 hectares of cannabis during the October 1995 ­ April 1996 seasonal spraying program because of technical problems with the helicopter fleet. Only 200 hectares were destroyed during this season.

Drug Flow/Transit. Though seizures and statistics are elusive, there is growing concern over cocaine smuggled from South America (particularly Brazil) to South Africa, either directly or through Angola, Namibia, or Zimbabwe. Large amounts of this cocaine are reexported to Europe. Nigerian trafficking organizations control an estimated 80 percent of this trade. Heroin from Southwest and Southeast Asia is also routed to South Africa for onward shipment to Europe and the US. Nigerian, Chinese, Indian and Pakistani groups are thought to be active in heroin smuggling. South Africa is the destination for Mandrax smuggled from India through other Eastern and Southern African countries. According to SANAB, 80 percent of the Mandrax produced worldwide is consumed in South Africa. We do not currently have sufficient data to suggest that the drug trafficking in South Africa has a measurable effect on the US.

Demand Reduction/Domestic Programs. Problems of Mandrax and cannabis abuse among South Africans are long­standing. Authorities are particularly concerned, however, about the increasing availability of cocaine and crack in urban areas. According to SANAB estimates, ecstasy is the second­fastest growing drug in South Africa, after crack. Demand reduction programs are the responsibility of the Department of Welfare and Population Development and the Department of Health. Non­governmental organizations (NGO's) complained that the SAG cut its subsidies to rehabilitation agencies this year.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. DEA Administrator Thomas Constantine visited South Africa in January and Department of State Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Robert Gelbard visited South Africa in August to assess the narcotics/crime situation and to further USG policy goals. In 1996, the US urged that South Africa accede to the 1988 UN Convention as soon as the necessary enabling legislation could be enacted, and that the SAG pass money laundering legislation at an early date. US policy initiatives and strategies focused on improving the effectiveness, coordination, and cooperation of South African and regional counternarcotics organizations and on border control efforts.

Bilateral Cooperation. Although the US and South Africa do not have a bilateral counternarcotics agreement, the two governments have excellent cooperation on narcotics matters. Cooperation between SANAB and the DEA is particularly close and productive. DEA agents conducted two long­term Temporary Duty assignments (TDY's) to South Africa in advance of the establishment of a permanent regional office based in Pretoria, which will open in March 1997.

In September, US Customs conducted a land­border interdiction course and follow­on train­the­trainer course for South African and regional counternarcotics officials. SANAB officers attended the Africa­Middle East drug enforcement course in Addis Ababa as well as management and forensics courses in Washington. INL funding also provided grants for the South African Institute of International Affairs to undertake a study of narcotics trafficking in Southern Africa and for drug demand reduction activities in Cape Town.

The Road Ahead. We will assist South Africa in strengthening its narcotics control institutions and capabilities to limit the use of South Africa as a major narcotics transshipment point. Significant efforts to develop strategies for improving South Africa's border control situation are planned for early 1997.

I. Summary

For several years Syria has been an important transit country for drugs flowing in and out of Lebanon, and in many cases, on to Europe and the US. The increase in seizures in 1996 over 1995 (especially of hashish) points to improved vigilance by Syrian authorities, but also could imply that the total flow of drugs across Syria is growing. Additionally, the presence of approximately 25,000 Syrian troops in the Lebanese Bekaa Valley makes Syrian Government (SARG) cooperation with Lebanese officials a substantial element in the fight against drug production and trafficking there. There were continuing allegations in 1996 of corruption among Syrian military officials stationed in Lebanon, but as in 1995, the SARG initiated no corruption investigations and brought no charges against any Syrian security or military personnel during the year. Syria is a party to the 1988 UN Convention. Syria does not have a bilateral narcotics agreement with the US.

II. Status of Country

Syria is a major transit country for hashish leaving Lebanon and for opium and morphine entering Lebanon from Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey; in many cases, shipments proceed onward to Europe and the US. Acetic anhydride, a precursor chemical used in the processing of heroin, also reportedly entered Lebanon from Syria in 1996.

There were continuing reports during the year that members of the Syrian military stationed in Lebanon profited from drug trafficking there.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. In the second half of the year, the Syrian National Police was restructured by making the Counter­Narcotics Division a separate agency. While the results of this restructuring are still preliminary, it appears that the Counter­Narcotics Division now has more freedom in planning its operations and that its director has better access to the Syrian Minister of the Interior than he had previously. Additionally, the Counter­Narcotics Division's budget should increase as a result of the restructuring.

In an effort to assist Lebanese authorities with their crop substitution program, the Syrian Government donated over one million fruit trees to Lebanon. Syria continued to apply its tough anti­trafficking law (anti­drug law #2 of 1993). This resulted in several convictions, with sentences that ranged from two to twenty years in prison. Many cases are pending.

Accomplishments. Under Syrian law, there are provisions for seizure of assets financed by profits from the drug trade. Syrian authorities reported one case involving asset seizure in which a house and a farm of approximately two and one­half acres were confiscated.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Movement of precursor chemicals through Syria is currently on a small scale, and Syrian authorities have yet to seize any precursor chemicals in transit. The Syrian Government is working on a new plan for control of these chemicals and hopes to codify this plan in 1997.

Syrian authorities in 1996 seized a far greater amount of drugs transiting Syria than in 1995. In just two seizures, over 1.7 mt of hashish were seized, with a total of 2.18 mt seized for the year; this compared to a total of 1.663 mt seized in 1995. In addition, authorities confiscated more than 1.5 million pills and tablets during the year, up from 66,000 in 1995.

The restructuring of the Syrian National Police and the Counter­Narcotics Division's increased budget could allow the Syrian Government to block the transit of drugs through Syria in 1997 more effectively.

Syria historically cooperates closely with Lebanese authorities in the areas of transit and cultivation/production. In 1996, Syria increased its cooperative efforts with Jordan, resulting in three controlled deliveries cases which led to arrests.

Corruption. There were numerous reports of corruption among Syrian military officials in Lebanon involving individuals permitting the free transit of goods in return for bribes. There were no prosecutions of Syrian military officials for corruption during the year.

Syria has an Investigations Administration (Internal Affairs Division) responsible for weeding out corrupt officers in the Counternarcotics Division as well as in the larger National Police force. The Investigations Administration is independent of both the Counternarcotics Division and the National Police, and reports directly to the Minister of the Interior. According to Syrian authorities, there were no arrests or prosecutions of officers in the Counternarcotics Division for corruption in 1996.

Agreements and Treaties. Syria is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, as well as the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Syria maintains antinarcotics trafficking agreements with Cyprus, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Armenia (draft agreement) and Austria (draft agreement). In 1996, Syria signed a new agreement with Pakistan which calls for increased information sharing in the counternarcotics field. Syria and the US do not have a narcotics agreement, nor is there an extradition treaty between the two countries. Syria is a member of Interpol.

Cultivation/Production. Authorities do not permit the cultivation and/or production of narcotics within Syria.

Drug Flow/Transit. The flow of narcotics transiting Syria to and from Lebanon appears to have increased during the year. At the same time, Syrian authorities have shown increased diligence toward drug interdiction, which has resulted in larger seizures in 1996 than in 1995.

Domestic Programs/Demand Reduction. Due to the social stigma attached to drug use and Syria's strict anti­trafficking law, the incidence of drug abuse in Syria is low. The Syrian Government uses the media to educate the public on the dangers of drug use. This media campaign is highlighted each year by observance of the June 26 International Antinarcotics Day.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. The USG continually emphasizes to the Syrian Government the need to be diligent in preventing narcotics and precursor chemicals from transiting Syrian territory, especially to and from Lebanon; the need to work with the Lebanese Government in dismantling drug laboratories in Lebanon; and the necessity of terminating any involvement, active or passive, of individual Syrian officials in the drug trade.

Bilateral Cooperation. The US and Syria do not have a bilateral cooperation agreement. However, US Embassy officials in Damascus and DEA officials based in Nicosia maintain frequent contact with Syrian authorities in the Counter­Narcotics Division. In addition, high­ranking US officials periodically share their views and recommendations with the Syrian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Interior.

The Road Ahead The USG will continue to press Syrian officials to work with Lebanese officials to find and close drug processing laboratories in the areas of Lebanon where Syrian forces are present, and to end any involvement, active or passive, of Syrian officials in drug trafficking. The USG also will encourage the Syrian Government to increase its efforts to fight drug production and transit in the region.

Botswana Botswana is neither a significant producer nor consumer of illegal narcotics. Small amounts of marijuana, often cultivated and distributed by villagers as an additional source of revenue, are produced and consumed locally. Transshipment of illegal narcotics, such as methaqualone, Mandrax tablets and marijuana, is the greater problem; most of the narcotics transiting Botswana are destined for South Africa. The Botswana National Police (BNP) have made a concerted effort to improve the force's ability to detect, identify and seize illegal narcotics shipments, and to continue its community awareness antinarcotics campaign, although it is generally underequipped and understaffed as compared to sophisticated local smuggling operations. BNP officials have responded enthusiastically to US Customs­sponsored regional training, offers to cooperate with the DEA and offers of financial assistance from the European Community. Botswana is a party to the 1961 UN Convention and its 1972 Protocol, as well as the 1971 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Botswana became a party to the 1988 UN Convention in August and has enacted tough antinarcotics laws. The courts are authorized to identify, freeze and seize drug­related assets, while the Bank of Botswana has the power to provide information regarding large currency transactions to law enforcement agencies.

Ethiopia Addis Ababa is a regional air hub, and the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (GFDRE) believes that significant amounts of Southwest and Southeast Asian heroin move through Bole International Airport. The heroin is routed through Addis Ababa from Mumbai, Karachi and Bangkok, often passing through Dubai or Dhaka en route to Addis Ababa. Nigerian smuggling rings are believed to have the largest role in the heroin trafficking and courier control. After arrival in Addis Ababa, the couriers move westward to Lagos and Lome. All narcotic seizures in 1996 were en route to West African destinations. To date, no narcotics have been seized on a direct flight from Addis Ababa to Europe or South Africa. Ethiopia is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and all previous UN drug conventions. The GFDRE has taken a strong and moderately successful stance against narcotics smuggling. In 1995, the Ethiopian Counter­Narcotics Unit (ECNU) detained only 12 suspects and seized 2.86 kgs of heroin and 152 gms of cannabis. However, in 1996, authorities detained a total of 59 suspects for trafficking and seized 67 kgs of heroin. Of the 59 detainees, 38 were Nigerian, 13 were Tanzanian, 5 were Togolese and 2 were Ghanaian.

In late September, the Ethiopian Parliament began the process of reviewing counternarcotics legislation. Ethiopia does not have a significant domestic narcotics consumption problem. At the request of the USG, the GFDRE has taken a leading role in narcotics interdiction efforts in East Africa. US Embassy officials and the DEA regional attache have spent a considerable amount of time with ECNU agents, teaching them some of the basic profiling techniques, law enforcement procedures and investigative and narcotics interdiction operations. Other US training efforts in 1996 included two USAF narcotic­dog trainers, who re­certified and assisted the fledgling ECNU dog unit, and a DEA­sponsored regional drug enforcement seminar.

Liberia Liberia is a nation caught in the throes of a protracted civil war; it has a failing economy, diminishing social services, an impaired and tarnished civil administration and a nearly­bankrupt government. Furthermore, the inability to police its porous borders makes Liberia an inviting target for the transshipment of controlled substances. The Provisional Government of Liberia (PGOL) ratified the 1988 UN Convention in June 1995, but is still in the process of acceding formally with the UN. The Government also established the National Inter­Ministerial Drug Committee (NIDC) in 1995 and tasked it with coordinating multi­agency efforts to stem the sale and cultivation of drugs in Liberia. The US provided $30,000 in antinarcotics assistance used to train and equip 38 officers of the Liberian National Police (LNP) Anti­Narcotics Unit, the primary enforcement arm of the NIDC. As a result, drug­related arrests and seizures increased as the LNP fielded its first fully functional Anti­Narcotics Unit in nearly seven years.

This success story was short lived, however, as renewed factional violence erupted in Monrovia in April. All equipment and nearly all records were looted or destroyed. Government coffers, controlled by faction leaders, are insufficient to replace basic police infrastructure, let alone equip a specialized unit. While fighting has ceased in Monrovia, factional clashes continued in some areas of the country during most of the year. Disarmament of factional fighters began in November, and by January 31 1997, roughly 20,000 of these fighters had turned in their weapons. Currently, a dedicated and determined group of professional police officers have returned to their gutted headquarters building; among them are remnants of the Anti­Narcotics Unit, who continue to make drug­related arrests despite the absence of proper equipment or a functioning judiciary.

Mozambique In recent years, Mozambique has emerged as a significant and growing transshipment point for narcotics (primarily Mandrax and hashish, but also cocaine) destined for the South African and European markets. The country's drug trade appears to be tied in part to regional arms trafficking and stolen vehicle syndicates and is facilitated by Mozambique's extensive transportation links to neighboring countries. Although marijuana is cultivated widely, particularly in the northern part of the country, and its consumption is deeply embedded in rural culture, Mozambique does not have a serious domestic drug abuse problem.

The Government of the Republic of Mozambique's (GRM) law enforcement agencies and the judiciary have proven largely ineffective in stemming the growing tide of drug trafficking, both as a result of inadequate human and material resources and of corruption. The most significant progress on the narcotics­control front in 1996 resulted from the initiatives of a bipartisan group of National Assembly deputies. These deputies were able to get the 1988 UN Convention passed by the Assembly, and later introduced legislation strengthening the country's drug laws and calling for the creation of a Central Drug Control Office. Though the country is not yet a party to the 1988 UN Convention, this legislation has been approved by the Assembly and, in January of 1997, was prepared to go to the President for his signature.

Seychelles The Republic of the Seychelles, lying off the eastern coast of Africa, is an archipelago with a population of approximately 75,000. Although neither a significant producer nor consumer of illicit narcotics, the Seychelles attracted international attention in 1995 when Parliament approved the Economic Development Act. The Act would have been an invitation to money launderers, as it offered large­scale investors a no­questions­asked opportunity to deposit proceeds from any source, as well as protection against international requests for extradition and asset seizures. In response to international concerns, the Government of the Seychelles decided in 1996 not to implement the Act. There is currently no evidence of substantial money laundering in the Seychelles, but the US and others are monitoring the situation. Seychelles is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

Swaziland Swaziland is neither a major producer nor consumer of illegal drugs. Local production consists of a marijuana cash crop, which is largely consumed within the country, though some of it is exported to South Africa. Swaziland's limited enforcement capabilities, advantageous location, small size and relatively low profile make it an inviting target for international drug trafficking organizations. The Royal Swaziland Police's 15­man antinarcotics unit is aware of the threat, but lacks sufficient training and equipment to interdict drug shipments, although it recently scored some successes in its operations. Swaziland welcomes regional initiatives and cooperation, especially with South Africa. The US provided Swaziland some secure radios and customs training last year; US officials are now helping local authorities address the challenges of demand reduction. Swaziland became a party to the 1988 UN Convention in October 1995.

Togo Togo currently appears to be a staging point for drug shipments bound for Europe and the US, although there is insufficient evidence to clearly document either case. According to Government of Togo reports, cocaine, hashish and heroin transit the country. The cocaine and heroin trade is cont