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International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1996 Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State Washington, DC, March 1997

THE CARIBBEAN

I. Summary

Aruba serves as a major transshipment point for cocaine from Colombia, Venezuela, and Suriname to the US and Europe, primarily the Netherlands. International narcotics trafficking organizations transship drugs through Aruba to the US, mostly via container cargo shipments, but also via commercial airlines and cruise ships. Entrenched money laundering organizations direct large cash deposits into land development and other construction projects. There are increasing indications that money launderers are using legitimate businesses as front companies.

During 1996, significant increases in large scale smuggling and trafficking--inspired violence, slow--moving progress on money laundering and extradition legislation, and a denial of a USG extradition request for Colombian narcotics trafficker Marco Antonio Vargas Patino, raised concerns about Aruba's commitment to counternarcotics efforts. There were also press reports of questionable relationships between Aruban Government officials and known narcotics traffickers and money launderers.

Aruba is part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (GON). Since 1986, Aruba has enjoyed a "status aparte", under which it has autonomy over internal affairs, but not foreign affairs or defense. Within the constraints of the constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Dutch government has been assisting the GOA in its efforts to counter narcotics trafficking. Aruba has the right to exercise independent decision-making in a number of counternarcotics policy areas. The Government of the Netherlands (GON) is responsible for the defense and foreign policy of all three parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

In April, the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of the Netherlands established a special committee, the De Ruiter Committee, within the framework of legal cooperation between Aruba and the Netherlands, to look into law enforcement in Aruba. The De Ruiter Report contained a list of recommendations which the Kingdom's Council of Ministers decided would be implemented. Aruba has begun implementing the committee's recommendations, which are in part designed to address corruption.

The Government of Aruba (GOA) introduced criminal procedure reforms, which advanced in the legislature, but were not implemented in 1996. That legislation, expected to be adopted in 1997, will modernize many aspects of criminal law, including broadening the search and seizure and other investigatory powers of local law enforcement agencies. It would also strengthen police powers against detention and questioning of suspects, and money laundering.

The GON has actively encouraged an increased focus on narcotics trafficking in Aruba and its surrounding waters. The 1988 UN Convention does not yet apply in Aruba. The GON became a party to the Convention in 1993. The Netherlands has not yet acceded to it on behalf of Aruba because domestic legislation necessary in Aruba to fulfill its obligations has not been enacted by Aruba. The USG is working with the Kingdom to assist Aruba in countering the narcotics trafficking that occurs there. The USG is negotiating a Maritime Cooperation Agreement with the GON, which would strengthen cooperation in the Caribbean and provide a legal framework for prosecution of traffickers in that area.

II. Status of Country

Aruba is located off the South American coast just 40 miles from Venezuela, and near Colombia. Since 1986, Aruba has been a separate entity within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The GON oversees defense and foreign policy.

Most of the cocaine shipments flowing through Aruba arrive via ocean--bound vessels from Colombia and small fishing vessels from Venezuela. Traffickers then use large-scale commercial shipments, air-freight shipments and container cargo vessels to move drugs to the US and Europe. Tourists on cruise ships or commercial aircraft also collude in transshipping cocaine to the US and the Netherlands. In Aruba, traffickers are believed to have begun paying their associates in cocaine instead of cash. Payment in cocaine has probably caused an increase in drug abuse, particularly of crack cocaine. The presence of crack was reported in Aruba in 1996.

Colombian heroin in 1-2 kgs packages is transshipped through Aruba via couriers from Colombia. Couriers also conceal the drugs by ingesting about 500 to 700 grams of heroin encased in large numbers of small packages.

Sophisticated off-shore limited liability companies (AEC's and NW's), offering strong secrecy provisions for account holders, and casino and resort complexes, make Aruba attractive to money laundering organizations.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. The Aruban Government was initially slow to acknowledge that Aruba was being used for criminal purposes. Concerned about what appeared to be a deteriorating situation, the GON in early 1996 urged change in Aruba, and began investigations of the situation in Aruba, careful to remain within constitutional constraints of Aruba's status aparte. In March, the justice ministers of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba signed an agreement to intensify their police and judicial cooperation and to fight organized crime. Aruba passed laws that placed more controls on banking and financial institutions, and gave local law enforcement officials greater authority to investigate money laundering activities and suspicious cash transactions.

Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles have a unified Criminal Procedure Code. Both governments are considering bills to reform the code and strengthen local law enforcement agencies' ability to cope with activities related to narcotics trafficking and associated criminal activities. Dutch authorities have approved extension of the Council of Europe Prisoner Transfer Treaty to Aruba­­expected to pass Aruba's legislature in 1997­­which will permit the extradition of Aruban nationals, pursuant to the USG­Netherlands extradition treaty. As part of its comprehensive criminal reform legislation, the GOA sought authority allowing limited electronic surveillance of suspected criminals, but the legislation was not enacted during 1996.

The GOA participated in a UNDCP meeting focusing on trafficking problems specific to the Caribbean region held in Barbados in 1996. Sixty­eight recommendations generated at the meeting focused on strengthening national antidrug bodies, general application of law enforcement methods, legislative and judicial tools, maritime interdiction methods and demand reduction programs.

In April, the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of the Netherlands released a statement that it had decided to establish a special committee within the framework of the legal cooperation between Aruba and the Netherlands in law enforcement. The De Ruiter Committee was instructed to look into institutional law enforcement problems in Aruba. The De Ruiter Committee's report contained a list of recommendations to reorganize the Attorney General's office and institute measures to curb corruption. The GOA agreed to implement the recommendations that are designed to improve the functioning of law enforcement entities on the island. One such recommendation ensures the legal independence of the office of the Attorney General. At the end of the year, the GOA had replaced the police commissioner and his deputy, and the GON had recalled the Dutch Attorney General, as recommended in the report.

Four joint commissions were called for to examine areas of economic activities where tighter regulations were required. Two of these commissions completed their reports on casinos and free trade zones. A joint Dutch­Aruban commission completed a study of the Aruba Free Trade Zone (FTZ) late in the year. The GOA requested and received US and Dutch technical assistance in 1997 on implementing the recommendations on the FTZ. The recommendations are to relocate the FTZ to the area called Barcadera, east of Oranjestaad and just east of the airport, which would facilitate authorities' control over the FTZ. Other recommendations focus on stricter inspections of the manifests of goods moving to and from the Free Zone, and on making the conduct of business in the Free Zone without a license a crime.

The Dutch/Antillean/Aruban Coast Guard became operational in January 1996. It is co­located with the Dutch Naval Headquarters in Curacao under the command of the ranking Dutch naval officer. Officials from the US and the Netherlands are working to conclude a Maritime Agreement for shipriders, drug enforcement officers who board and search suspicious vessels. The GON renewed a port visit and overflight agreement which facilitates pre­clearance for USG vessels and aircraft to overfly and land at its airports, and vessels to dock at its seaports.

In Aruba, the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) operates a pre­flight inspection program. Another planned initiative is a US Customs pre­flight inspection facility. The US Customs Service may agree to operate such a facility upon expansion of a new security complex at the Queen Beatrix Airport. There was no progress towards building such a complex during the year.

Accomplishments. Aruba took part in Dutch/Antillean/Aruban Caribbean Coast Guard operations during 1996. Aruba established and implemented in March Unusual Transaction Monitoring Centers (MOT) to review such transactions in the banking sector, but many banks and financial institutions are not currently covered by the MOTs. Aruban law enforcement officials participated in USG­sponsored training courses for drug enforcement during the year.

The GOA worked with the joint Dutch­Aruban Commissions looking into ways to improve the regulation of the FTZ and Casino operations in Aruba. The GOA declared its intention to implement the measures recommended by these commissions. A committee was established in Aruba to oversee the implementation of the recommendations dealing with the FTZ. Aruba will be drawing on USG and Dutch expertise to regulate FTZ's. A second committee is expected to be set up to discuss implementing the recommendations on casino operations.

The GOA, after discussion with the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, agreed to implement the recommendations of the De Ruiter Committee, which was looking into law enforcement problems in Aruba. Among the committee's recommendations were the removal of the Dutch Attorney General, the Aruban Chief of Police and Deputy. The removal was completed and it resolved a crisis in law enforcement on Aruba. The ministers of justice of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba scheduled consultations and met during 1996 to discuss needed improvements in their coordination and cooperation.

Law Enforcement Efforts. USG law enforcement agencies estimate that every year about 155 mt of cocaine are transshipped through the Caribbean to the US, and that more than 100 international trafficking organizations operate in that region. Out of this estimated traffic, the GOA seized about 171 kgs of cocaine, about 2.5 kgs of heroin and 99 coca leaf tea bags. In comparison in 1995, the GOA seized 153 kgs of cocaine and four kgs of heroin.

In 1996, the GOA made 148 drug­related arrests, comprising individuals from 11 different nations. Of the 148 arrested, 66 were convicted and incarcerated.

The Aruban Parliament is considering a revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which would facilitate the progress of cases through the court system. Adoption of the revisions is expected in 1997.

Aruba passed a law in May on the import and export of essential chemicals in an effort to bring local management of chemical commerce into compliance with the 1988 UN Convention.

Money Laundering. Offshore banking facilities, casino/resort complexes, high volume tourism, and stable currency make Aruba attractive to money laundering organizations. Aruba has not enacted legislation meeting international standards for money laundering countermeasures specified in the UN Convention.

In 1993, Aruba adopted a law that made money laundering illegal. In 1996, it passed a law requiring financial institutions to know their clients, and another which allows law enforcement officials to take actions against corporations as well as officers, managers and employees.

Aruba passed and implemented asset forfeiture regulations and issued ordinances on defining unusual transactions. Its MOT's function in a limited fashion. Its money laundering legislation provides for client identification and verification of the origin of cash deposits of 10,000 Aruban florins or more in on­shore banks in Aruba, but the law does not apply to off­shore financial institutions.

Laws are pending that would regulate off­shore banks, casinos and the Aruba Free Trade Zone. The impact of the anti­money laundering measures will be put to the test when the Aruban government systematically enforces the laws and prosecutes money laundering cases.

Corruption. Corruption and the appearance of conflicts of interest have been a significant problem in Aruba. The USG received reports indicating that GOA officials met with suspected narcotics traffickers and money launderers in 1996.

US law enforcement relations with Aruba weakened during the year, due to mistrust of some of the Aruban law enforcement leadership. The De Ruiter Committee, established to evaluate Dutch­Aruban law enforcement cooperation, issued a report in September and recommended a variety of changes to improve law enforcement investigations. In November, senior Aruban law enforcement officials were replaced. The GOA authorities have taken some steps to prevent and punish official corruption. Although GOA officials are seeking to confront narcotics traffickers and money launderers in Aruba, they face a momentous challenge in discouraging them from running their illicit trade in Aruba.

The USG has no evidence that the GOA encourages or facilitates the illicit production or distribution of narcotics or other controlled substances. However, allegations during the year of corruption within the police force plagued Aruba and hindered effective counternarcotics efforts. There were reports that some members of the Aruban Government met regularly with individuals associated with narcotics trafficking and money laundering syndicates.

Agreements and Treaties. As noted, the GON has not extended the terms of the 1988 UN Convention to Aruba. This step is anticipated after Aruba finally passes and implements its comprehensive Criminal Procedure Code Reform legislation and assents to be included as a party to the 1988 UN Convention. The GON ratified the Convention in 1993.

The bilateral USG­GON extradition treaty applies in Aruba. Some foreign nationals have been extradited from Aruba in the past. However, in 1996, the joint court of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba denied a USG extradition request for a Colombian narcotics trafficker, Marco Antonio Vargas Patino, under that treaty.

Demand Reduction. Abuse of drugs, especially of crack cocaine, is increasing at an alarming rate. The GOA is seeking to establish more rehabilitation programs, treatment centers and mobile training teams to address the growing domestic substance abuse problem. Aruba has developed the Foundation Against Alcohol & Drug Abuse (S.A.M.B.A), Rescue Me (Rescatami). Several support groups focus on counseling and rehabilitation. Such groups include Aruba Recovery, Narcotics Anonymous, Al­Anon and Alateen. Pride USA conducted several training programs in Aruba during the year. The Health Department and Ministry of Education sponsor sports and other recreational programs, and promote drug awareness in other ways.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs.

Policy Initiatives. There is no USG program of counternarcotics assistance in Aruba, which receives substantial funding from the GON. Cooperation on counternarcotics efforts is largely based on policy efforts and multilateral cooperation between the GOA, the USG and the GON. The GOA works with USG officials by participating in counternarcotics training courses and seminars, exchanging narcotics information to arrest foreign traffickers, primarily from Colombia and Venezuela, and consulting on anti­money laundering and other legislation. The GOA also participates in UNDCP­sponsored activities designed to bolster international cooperation on drug control efforts. There was initial progress toward reviving in Aruba a Joint Information Coordination Center (JICC), a database to track trafficker movement. In­fighting between police agencies has stalled progress on the JICC. The Netherlands and USG officials are working to sign a maritime cooperation agreement to increase control over Caribbean waters, often heavily travelled by international narcotics syndicates.

The Road Ahead. The USG intends to forge closer cooperation with the GOA. A high priority for 1997 must be completion of the technical review and implementation of the changes in legal procedures on the Criminal Procedure Code that would allow the GON to extend the terms of the 1988 UN Convention to Aruba. Other specific areas the US will watch closely include the extradition of nationals, reducing transshipment of narcotics, attacking corruption, and implementing anti-trafficking and anti-money laundering laws. The US also expects substantial progress on laws regulating the FTZ, casinos and off-shore banks, and effective and fully functioning MOTs.

I. Summary

Over the past ten years, successful joint US./Bahamian counternarcotics efforts have dramatically reduced the amount of cocaine and marijuana transiting The Bahamas en route to the US. Nevertheless, significant quantities of illicit drugs continue to pass through The Bahamas, despite the vigorous efforts of the GCOB to reduce this trafficking. The Bahamas is also a dynamic financial services center and a tax haven with bank secrecy laws, which are both factors conducive to money laundering. Some marijuana is grown in The Bahamas, but the country is not a major drug producer.

The Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas (GCOB) places a high priority on combatting drug trafficking and is extraordinarily cooperative with USG counterdrug efforts. The first country to ratify the 1988 UN Convention, The Bahamas took further steps during 1996 to implement it. Strong anti­money laundering legislation and implementing regulations entered into force in 1996. During the year, the GCOB continued its successful efforts to strengthen its judicial system, with assistance from the USG. US and Bahamian law enforcement officials worked closely together to apprehend drug traffickers. Domestic drug abuse remains a problem, but the number of new drug users has declined notably since the mid­1980s. Over the past several years, The Bahamas has prosecuted and convicted some middle­ and low­level officials on charges of narcotics corruption. The GCOB is also making some headway in its efforts to bring about forfeiture and disposition of trafficker assets.

Although enormous progress has been made, more can be done. In coming years, The Bahamas should improve the effectiveness with which its judicial system handles drug cases, further emphasize forfeiture of trafficker assets and effectively enforce its new anti­money laundering controls.

II. Status of Country

The Bahamas is a country of 275,000 people scattered over an area the size of California, strategically located on the air and sea routes between Colombia and the US. The Bahamian archipelago contains hundreds of small, deserted islands used for transshipment and temporary drug storage, and is only 40 miles from south Florida at its closest point. Traffickers' aircraft and boats blend in with the many legitimate craft moving among the islands and to the US, making it difficult to detect smuggling activity.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. During 1996, the GCOB extended its efforts to fulfill the objectives of the 1988 UN Convention by enacting stronger money laundering legislation, and by strengthening its justice system. An anti­money laundering law passed by parliament in 1995 entered into force in March, but regulations enforcing many aspects of this legislation did not become effective until December. Without these implementing regulations, which are seen as part of a very strong anti­money laundering regime in The Bahamas, the impact of the government's money laundering law was limited. The legislation makes money laundering an explicit criminal offense and makes it a crime not to report suspicious financial transactions. During 1996, the Central Bank conducted an extensive campaign to educate bankers on their responsibilities under the law. The Bank also set up a special anti­money laundering unit to implement the legislation and regulations.

Accomplishments. Working closely with the US, the GCOB continued to place special emphasis on strengthening its judicial system. The GCOB made significant progress in this area during 1996. Justice system inefficiencies, the practice of granting bail while convictions are appealed, and the reluctance of juries to convict Bahamians for drug offenses, have long resulted in too few Bahamian traffickers spending substantial time in jail. To rectify this situation the GCOB has, over the last several years, significantly increased the justice sector budget. During 1996, the GCOB continued to work closely with the USG to speed the processing of narcotics and other cases by improving court administration, increasing the use of court reporters and computerizing the courts. Bahamian prosecutors also actively pursued pending cases against significant drug traffickers.

Late in the year, parliament passed new legislation designed to further strengthen the justice system. Under the new law, most appeals from convictions in magistrates courts (where many drug cases are heard) will go directly to the Court of Appeal rather than through an intermediate court. This should speed disposition of these cases significantly. Further, during 1996, prosecutors began making significant use of "voluntary bills of indictment," obviating the need for a time­consuming preliminary hearing process. Legislation passed in 1996 will also make it substantially more difficult for defendants charged with drug trafficking or other major crimes to be granted bail.

There were clear signs toward the end of the year that the GCOB's efforts in the judicial area were producing results. In early December, the Attorney General's office reported that at least fourteen Bahamians -- including several figures prominent in the drug trade for years -- were serving prison sentences for significant trafficking offenses. This was a major increase from the beginning of the year and almost certainly the highest number ever.

Law Enforcement Efforts. For over ten years, the Royal Bahamas Police Force has participated with Turks and Caicos Islands Police and DEA in Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos (OPBAT). OPBAT is a joint program designed to intercept narcotics shipments and arrest traffickers in the Turks and Caicos Islands (a neighboring British Dependent Territory) and The Bahamas. USG helicopters, operating from three bases in The Bahamas established with considerable USG assistance, facilitate these operations. The GCOB's strong commitment to OPBAT during 1996 was unwavering, as evidenced by the dedication of almost all of the police 27­person counternarcotics strike force to the operation.

During 1996, cocaine seizures continued their multi­year decline and are far below the levels of the mid­1980s. The USG believes, however, that, despite bilateral counternarcotics efforts, significant quantities of illicit drugs escape interdiction and continue to transit The Bahamas. Traffickers use tactics that are difficult for US and Bahamian law enforcement to counter. For example, they make non­stop round trip flights from Colombia, make airdrops directly to waiting boats, use Cuban waters to evade OPBAT efforts, drop off drugs from aircraft making only momentary landings, and introduce drugs into The Bahamas via low profile boats and freighters.

Maritime smuggling through The Bahamas increased in importance relative to air smuggling during the year. Sizable amounts of cocaine and marijuana are being smuggled into The Bahamas from Jamaica for transshipment to the US. In August, the Bahamian Defence Force, working closely with OPBAT, detained a small Bahamian vessel, confiscated over 900 kgs of marijuana and arrested five persons on board. The marijuana was probably being transported from Jamaica. The Defence Force also made at least two drug seizures on boats transiting between The Bahamas and Haiti. During 1996, the GCOB announced that it would purchase two 198 foot patrol craft for the Defence Force at a cost of approximately $26 million. These vessels will facilitate maritime interdiction efforts.

In October, the police and DEA discovered a large marijuana field on Grand Bahama Island and destroyed 9,000 plants. Smaller plots were found elsewhere in the country. Bahamian police believe that Jamaican marijuana cultivators have provided technical assistance to their Bahamian counterparts. Despite these discoveries, The Bahamas is not a major marijuana producer by international standards. These plots were probably cultivated for domestic consumption.

The Bahamian Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU), usually working closely with DEA, is increasingly able to conduct complex drug conspiracy investigations. The DEU is part of the police force and, at the end of 1996, had an actual strength of 81 officers (including the counternarcotics strike force). During 1996, 1,576 persons were arrested on drug charges, according to GCOB statistics.

The enactment of the new money laundering legislation reflects the GCOB's increased emphasis on combating this problem. The GCOB has agreed to an independent evaluation of its money laundering controls by the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force. This is scheduled to occur during 1997. Nevertheless, the Bahamas remains a major financial services center and a tax haven with strong bank secrecy laws, conditions attractive to financial criminals. An area of continuing concern are the more than 44,000 Bahamian shell companies. Controls over these companies, which can be established easily and quickly, and which can issue bearer shares, are very limited. Such companies could be used to facilitate money laundering.

Under Bahamian law, the assets of a convicted drug offender are subject to forfeiture. A procedure also exists for the civil forfeiture of assets which are the proceeds of trafficking or which are used for trafficking. Unfortunately, the delays which plague the legal system complicate the GCOB's efforts to bring about forfeiture of assets. Moreover, although the Attorney General's office has been able to bring about forfeiture of commodities used to facilitate trafficking, it has had little success in forfeiting trafficking proceeds.

Nevertheless, important progress has been made on carrying out forfeiture and disposition of drug­related assets over the past two years. The Attorney General's office has given increased attention to asset forfeiture issues. Furthermore, an inter­agency committee coordinated by the Finance Ministry has arranged for the sale of a large inventory of goods seized from traffickers which had been allowed to accumulate for years. Proceeds from these sales have been limited, however, because many items had deteriorated badly while in government custody. Funds from the sale of forfeited assets are deposited in the government's general fund.

Corruption. As a matter of policy, the GCOB does not encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of drugs, or the laundering of illicit proceeds therefrom. Over the past several years, some mid­ and low­level officials who engaged in narcotics­related corruption were prosecuted successfully. In 1996, proceedings continued against three police officers accused of plotting to steal drugs from a police storage facility. At year's end, the matter remained unresolved. Also at year's end, a former senior passport officer remained free on bail while appealing his 1995 conviction for accepting a bribe from a trafficker. In December, an individual convicted in 1994 of trafficking while serving as a police sergeant had his appeal rejected and began serving his sentence. Despite the GCOB's willingness to prosecute, the judicial system's weaknesses reduce the possibility that narcotics traffickers and corrupt officials who assist them will serve appropriately lengthy prison sentences.

Agreement and Treaties. The GCOB works to accomplish the goals and objectives of US­Bahamas bilateral narcotics control agreements, which facilitate cooperative action on a wide range of narcotics­control measures, such as improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the judicial system, controlling money laundering, reducing the demand for drugs in The Bahamas, and stemming the flow of drugs via OPBAT and other cooperative efforts.

The US­Bahamas Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) facilitates the bilateral exchange of information and evidence for use in criminal proceedings. The MLAT can be used to pierce Bahamian bank secrecy laws where credible evidence exists of narcotics crimes, money laundering, or other serious offenses. The GCOB generally responds positively to MLAT requests, although the response time can be very slow. During November 1996 consultations, US and Bahamian officials agreed on new MLAT procedures which should significantly speed the processing of requests.

A new US­Bahamas extradition treaty entered into force in 1994. While the GCOB has been receptive to US extradition requests, it often takes years for the Bahamian justice system to resolve such cases. In 1996, Glenn Davis, a major Bahamian trafficker, was extradited to face US trafficking charges.

In May, the US and The Bahamas entered into a Maritime Counternarcotics Cooperation Agreement which permits The Bahamas to embark Defence Force or police officers to act as shipriders on US vessels operating in Bahamian waters. The agreement permits the US vessels with these shipriders to enter Bahamian territorial seas to board, search, and, if evidence warrants, seize US, stateless, or third­nation vessels with the permission of that state; to enter Bahamian territorial seas to assist Bahamian law enforcement personnel in the enforcement of Bahamian laws; and to board, search, and seize Bahamian vessels on the high seas suspected of involvement in criminal activity. This agreement also authorizes USG law enforcement aircraft to overfly Bahamian territory.

Demand Reduction Programs. The GCOB supports demand reduction programs, but budgetary constraints limit their funding. It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of these programs. With the support of a significant grant from UNDCP, demand reduction programs are slowly being extended to less populated islands by the government's National Drug Council. The USG provides some assistance to the Council and to several private sector demand reduction groups. The number of new drug users has declined notably since the mid­1980s, although a high number of chronic cocaine addicts remains a serious problem. There is concern that marijuana use among young Bahamians is increasing, but reliable usage statistics are unavailable.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. The goals of USG assistance to and presence in The Bahamas are to dismantle trafficking organizations, stem the flow of drugs through The Bahamas to the US, and strengthen Bahamian drug control and justice sector institutions. With the permission of the GCOB, US law enforcement agencies operate in The Bahamas in close coordination with their Bahamian counterparts, especially in support of OPBAT. The USG has provided training, equipment and intelligence to support both joint efforts and unilateral GCOB enforcement initiatives.

The Road Ahead. Because of its location, The Bahamas will remain vulnerable to drug trafficking, despite sustained and vigorous Bahamian efforts to combat trafficking. The Bahamians have demonstrated their determination to cooperate fully with USG counternarcotics efforts. Because of the country's small population, archipelagic geography, position as a major financial center, and limited resources, the GCOB will continue to depend upon significant USG assistance to fight international trafficking organizations. A key objective of US counternarcotics assistance in The Bahamas, however, remains the strengthening of the country's institutions to allow the GCOB to assume a greater share of the burden of combating the traffickers.

In coming years, the USG will place special emphasis on the joint judicial enhancement program, designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness with which drug­related and other major criminal cases are handled. The USG also will support GCOB efforts to implement effectively its anti­money laundering legislation. We expect the GCOB to enforce this legislation vigorously, but it has little experience in conducting complex criminal financial investigations. We will maintain our efforts to strengthen the GCOB's capabilities in this area.

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I. Summary

Cuba occupies a key geographic location astride primary air and maritime routes from principal South and Central American drug­exporting countries to the US. As such, traffickers frequently evade US law enforcement agencies by seeking refuge in Cuban territory. During 1996, Cuba was a growing transshipment point. According to Government of Cuba (GOC) officials, the GOC expanded international antinarcotics cooperation during 1996, signing 15 bilateral narcotics control agreements. In October and November, the GOC turned over to the USG six metric tons of cocaine ­­ the largest drug seizure in Cuban history ­­ found by the GOC aboard the M/V "Limerick", and furnished other legal assistance in the case. In February 1996, Cuba ratified the 1988 UN Convention. The USG is undertaking efforts to determine the veracity of occasional reports that GOC officials may be directly or indirectly involved in narcotics trafficking activities.

II. Status of Country

Increased official seizure figures and information from GOC antinarcotics authorities suggest that during 1996 Cuba experienced a growing problem of narcotics transshipment and consumption. Although the absence of commercial traffic between Cuba and the US reduces the opportunity for transshipment, Cuba's geographic location and shortages of equipment and fuel for counternarcotics forces make the island an attractive transshipment point for some traffickers.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. The GOC gave antinarcotics efforts higher public profile, and Cuban authorities claimed resources and enforcement efforts were increased during the year.

Accomplishments. In October and November, GOC authorities made the largest narcotics seizure in Cuban history, discovering six metric tons of cocaine aboard the M/V "Limerick" after the vessel drifted into Cuban waters. The GOC turned over all six tons to the USG for the trial of "Limerick" crew members, who were arrested by the US Coast Guard in international waters before the vessel drifted into Cuban waters.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Cuban law enforcement efforts focused on drug transshipment through Cuban territorial waters and airports, and possession and use of drugs in areas frequented by foreign tourists. Cuban media and authorities attributed the increased narcotics seizures in part to increased effectiveness of Cuban antinarcotics efforts.

The GOC published some accounts of domestic narcotics arrests and prosecutions, focusing mainly on foreigners. As in years past, however, the GOC did not publish complete figures for domestic drug arrests and prosecutions. The GOC denied that domestic consumption and trafficking constitute a significant social problem, although the government­controlled media did admit an unspecified slight increase in domestic consumption.

Corruption. There are occasional reports of GOC officials being involved directly or indirectly in the transshipment of narcotics. The USG is undertaking efforts to determine the veracity of the reports. Cuba denied the existence of any narcotics­related corruption by government officials. In particular, the GOC forcefully denied press accounts in late July linking President Fidel Castro to narcotics traffickers under arrest in the USG; they alleged narcotics were shipped through Cuba with Castro's personal approval.

Amendments adopted in 1994 to Article 190 of the Cuban criminal code provide for increased penalties for public officials who engage in or assist illicit narcotics activities. Amendments to Article 192 punish persons who use their employment to facilitate narcotics trafficking. There were no significant published cases of prosecutions under these laws during 1996.

Agreements and Treaties. Cuba has no counternarcotics treaties with the USG. Cuba has acceded to the World Customs Organization's 1977 International Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance for the Prevention, Investigation, and Repression of Customs Offences. Annex 10 of this Convention, which Cuba has accepted, deals with assistance in actions against the smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. According to Cuban authorities, the GOC signed 15 bilateral narcotics control agreements with other countries during the year, including agreements with the UK, Ecuador and Venezuela. In February 1996, the Cuban National Assembly ratified the 1988 UN Convention. The Assembly also ratified an antinarcotics agreement with Panama.

Cultivation/Production. Cuba is not a significant drug­producing country. The GOC admitted that some marijuana was raised in extreme eastern Cuba, but asserted that the areas involved were small and that the low THC content of the crop made it unattractive for export. There were no published reports regarding crop size estimates, crop yields, or eradication efforts.

Drug Flow/Transit. According to GOC reports and officials, drug transshipment was mainly along Cuba's northern coast. Aerial transshipment typically involved small planes dropping packages of narcotics in the water to be retrieved by "go­fast" boats from Florida. Similarly, maritime transshipment involved vessels that dropped packages in the water for later retrieval. In all known cases, Colombia was the point of origin of cocaine. Jamaica appears to be the common point of origin for marijuana transshipment. In October, GOC media reported that overall "international drug trafficking" in Cuba had increased since 1995.

IV. USG Policy Initiatives and Programs

Bilateral Cooperation. The USG and Cuba have no bilateral narcotics agreement, and the USG has no INL program in Cuba. Cooperation on counternarcotics takes place on a strictly case­by­case basis. USG­GOC cooperation in the case of the M/V "Limerick" was carried out by working­level professionals on both sides.

The Road Ahead. Further cooperation on counter­narcotics matters will continue on a case­by­case basis, focusing on concrete results in specific cases.

I. Summary

Although the Dominican Republic is not a major producer or consumer of psychotropic substances, Colombian and Dominican drug trafficking organizations use the Dominican Republic as a transshipment point for drugs destined for the US and Europe. The Government of the Dominican Republic (GODR) cooperated fully with the USG, but seizures of cocaine and marijuana were lower for the year. Among the GODR's accomplishments was the arrest of Cali Cartel's Rolando Florian­Feliz, the DR's most wanted narcotics trafficker. The GODR is committed to combating drug trafficking and drug consumption, but it is limited by poor resources, the lack of a national narcotics master plan, and a weak judicial system.

The Dominican Republic's attention was focused on election year politics during 1996. As a result, although the out­going government cooperated with counternarcotics operations, it left the new administration with unresolved, long­term narcotics­related issues and an environment of public concern about corruption. The Dominican Republic is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

II. Status of Country

The Fernandez administration, which took office in August, made anti­corruption efforts a hallmark of the government. However, the GODR lacks effective enforcement mechanisms to eliminate the corruption which undermines the country's fragile democratic institutions. Additionally, the country's largely unpatrolled coast, its porous border with Haiti, and poorly paid and under­equipped police and military forces make it attractive to Dominican and Colombian drug transshipment organizations and domestic drug traffickers. Due to the absence of effective government supervision of exchange houses or remittance operations and the presence of large cash flows which could hide money laundering activity, it is believed that narcotics money is laundered in the Dominican Republic. Money laundering is not likely to diminish until the GODR aggressively implements existing money laundering legislation. The majority of Dominicans condemn the use of illegal drugs and support GODR efforts to combat narcotics trafficking; drug consumption levels are considered low.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. The government has not developed a master plan. With USG assistance, however, it began to formulate one, demonstrating a deep commitment to the war against narcotics trafficking and consumption.

Accomplishments. In one of the region's more significant arrests, the GODR captured Cali Cartel's Rolando Florian­Feliz. Florian was the DR's most wanted narcotics trafficker. He remains incarcerated in the DR, while his case is tried for narcotics trafficking. The GODR's Joint Information Coordinating Center (JICC) is the best and most advanced in the Caribbean. JICC­developed information led to numerous trafficking­related arrests in the Dominican Republic and elsewhere. The JICC maintains close contact with USG law enforcement agencies, hosted a regional JICC conference and serves as a model for information sharing.

Law Enforcement Efforts. With USG cooperation and assistance, increased enforcement efforts led to the seizure of significant amounts of cocaine and a number of arrests. Between January 1 and November 30, 1996, the 700 officers of the DNCD, assisted by the armed forces and the National Police, seized approximately 1,105 kgs of cocaine, 103 kgs of marijuana, and smaller quantities of other drugs, and made more than 3,100 arrests for drug­related crimes.

During late summer, the DNCD created two twelve­person Special Investigation Teams (SIT) to conduct in­depth investigations operations with equipment provided by the USG of major international narcotics. The SIT unit has been incorporated into the overall DNCD enforcement effort. In addition to working independently, the unit provides valuable intelligence to all of the DNCD's enforcement arms on a case­by­case basis. As such, they were either directly or indirectly involved in most of DNCD major cases during 1996. In addition, information developed by the teams led to the seizure of more than 100 kgs of cocaine by USG officials.

The DNCD and the Dominican Armed Forces enjoy excellent cooperation. The lack of resources, however, limited military involvement in counternarcotics activities. Insufficient funds for fuel allowed the Navy to make only limited use of a decommissioned Coast Guard cutter provided by the USG in 1995 and rigid­hull inflatable boats provided in 1994. The Air Force was often grounded by the lack of fuel and parts, but participated in routine reconnaissance flights. Both the Navy and the Air Force participated in successful joint counternarcotics/anti­alien smuggling operations with the USG in the Mona Channel.

The DNCD and the military have done an excellent job battling drug trafficking along the southwest and east coast and in the Santo Domingo area, and in providing information to the USG concerning Dominican­related drug trafficking beyond the country's borders. The GODR is unable to provide adequate coverage for most of the coastline, the border area, or the interior, leaving those areas open to trafficking.

The GODR is working on the implementation of the money laundering/asset forfeiture law that was adopted in 1995, and has requested assistance and training from the USG. The effectiveness of the law remains to be seen. Precursor and essential chemicals are controlled and no processing has been detected. Colombian drug trafficking organizations have attempted unsuccessfully to purchase essential chemicals from Dominican suppliers under false pretenses.

Corruption. There is endemic corruption among judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officers. Convictions and assets seizures were undermined by long delays and poorly trained prosecutors and judges, as well as faulty case work by law enforcement officials. According to the President of the CND, there are some 20,000 cases in which the courts have yet to render definitive judgments.

Corruption allegations have been levelled in connection with the dismissal of a number of trafficking cases and in the premature release of convicted traffickers. In numerous well­publicized drug cases, judges ordered the release of defendants under suspicious circumstances prior to trial.

Neither the GODR itself nor senior government officials encourage, facilitate, or engage in drug trafficking or money laundering as a matter of government policy. There is no evidence that senior government officials are involved in drug distribution or money laundering. No senior government official were indicted for drug­related corruption in 1996.

Agreements and Treaties. The GODR's counternarcotics efforts are consistent with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention to which the Dominican Republic is a party. Since 1994, the Dominican Republic participated in the Caribbean Financial Area Task Force (CFATF). On September 27, 1996, the USG and the GODR signed a letter of agreement whereby the USG will provide $197,000 for counternarcotics training and law enforcement­related equipment. The GODR participated in USG regional law enforcement meetings.

The 1909 US/Dominican Republic extradition treaty does not incorporate drug­related crimes as extraditable offenses. The DR is, however, party to the 1988 UN Convention, which certain drug crimes extraditable. A 1969 Dominican law prohibits the extradition of Dominican nationals. Because of this legal prohibition, hundreds of Dominicans who commit criminal offenses in the US find safe haven in the DR. USG and GODR officials met in 1996 to continue negotiations on a new extradition treaty that would address the extradition of nationals problem, but a successful conclusion to this negotiation has not yet been reached. There has been excellent cooperation in bringing US citizens and third country nationals to justice in the US. The GODR is not party to any mutual legal assistance agreements with the US.

Cultivation and Production. The Dominican Republic is not a drug cultivating or producing country.

Drug Flow and Transit. With a coastline of more than 1,000 miles, a 193­mile border with Haiti, and its location in the Caribbean, the Dominican Republic is a convenient staging area for the outward movement of drug shipments from South America. The fact that small vessels may depart and re­enter the country freely without reporting to GODR authorities, and the lack of consistent and honest customs and police controls at some international airports, contribute to the trafficking problem.

Off­shore airdrops along the southern coast and in the Mona Channel between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic continued despite heightened enforcement activity. GODR and USG officials have developed intelligence that suggests thousands of kilograms of cocaine are smuggled over the border from Haiti. The army, charged with controlling the border, has had little success in stemming the flow of drugs or other contraband.

Domestic Programs/Demand Reduction. Both DNCD and the National Drug Council (CND) operate successful drug abuse prevention and education programs. DNCD's demand reduction arm, PROPUID, operates under a joint Government of Spain/European Union/UNDCP grant. Both the GODR, through programs administered by the Department of Public Health and the Department of Education, and the Dominican private sector are focusing greater attention on the treatment and rehabilitation of addicts. The CND and PROPUID estimate that no more than 300,000 Dominicans have used cocaine and/or marijuana in the past year.

In 1996, the CND, the Armed Forces, the Department of Public Health and the Department of Education assumed the bulk of support for the baseball­based drug prevention program established in 1995 and are considering expanding it to other sports.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. Primary US goals are to help the GODR strengthen its democratic and law enforcement institutions, improve the administration of justice and curb the flow of illegal drugs through the Dominican Republic to the US, Puerto Rico and Europe.

Bilateral Cooperation. USG assistance focused on strengthening Dominican counternarcotics efforts through training, expanding joint efforts and improving communication between USG and GODR counternarcotics agencies. There was excellent cooperation between US and Dominican authorities on narcotics law enforcement and included assistance to GODR drug agencies for training, computers and other equipment, fuel for vessels and aircraft, technical assistance and support for an antidrug high school baseball program. The USG will support the JICC established and maintained with USG assistance.

The National Drug Control Directorate (DNCD) has shown unprecedented cooperation with USG agencies. Bilateral cooperation in 1996 included information sharing, special operations targeting major international traffickers, and the highly successful Halcon IV and Halcon V joint narcotics and alien smuggling military operations in June and November.

The Road Ahead. The USG and the GODR will strengthen drug control cooperation efforts through increased sharing of information and closer working relations among principal agencies. The USG will focus on judicial reform, implementation of the money laundering law, conclusion of a new extradition treaty, enforcement of the maritime interdiction agreement, development of a national counternarcotics master plan, and support for DNCD's special financial and investigation teams. The USG should also encourage the new government to strengthen the DNCD and to continue the GODR commitment to curb corruption, especially as it affects the prosecution of narcotics traffickers, and to encourage the GODR to develop ways to cooperate with Haiti on law enforcement and alien smuggling.

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I. Summary

Guyana is used as a transshipment point for narcotics, mostly cocaine, which enters Guyana from three neighboring countries; Venezuela, Suriname, and Brazil. Cannabis is grown in Guyana's heavily forested interior, especially along creeks and in riverine areas. It is transported along waterways or roads for export by air or sea. Guyanese authorities have not uncovered any evidence of coca or opium poppy cultivation. Guyana is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and to the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Signs of growing narcotics activity in Guyana have generated enthusiasm for and commitment to counternarcotics activity on the part of the Government of Guyana (GOG), which is taking steps to fulfill the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention. GOG efforts are hampered by lack of resources. The GOG has requested more intensive coordination with the US on bilateral counternarcotics efforts.

II. Status of Country

There are indications that Guyana is increasingly being used as a transshipment point for narcotics. One contributing factor is lack of effective border control. In addition, much of Guyana's territory is uninhabited, dense rain forest. Dozens of small airfields are scattered throughout the country, many in areas almost inaccessible by land.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. In 1996, Guyana took steps to strengthen its counternarcotics programs. A draft of a drug master plan was completed. The GOG is working on getting the Joint Information Coordination Center (JICC) functional and has requested US assistance in obtaining software to accomplish this goal. It is also preparing to draft money laundering legislation and has requested US assistance in this effort.

Accomplishments. In October, Guyana signed a counterdrug overflight agreement with the US. It also signed an agreement with the United Kingdom providing for cooperation in the investigation of drug trafficking and asset forfeiture. The Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) program was instituted in the country's schools. A joint operation between the Guyana Police Force and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) resulted in significant arrests and prosecutions. As one of the poorest countries in the western hemisphere, Guyana's efforts are undercut by a lack of resources and training and obsolete equipment. Guyana has cooperated with UNDCP in the development of a drug master plan. Approval is expected from UNDCP headquarters for a national project for Guyana which will focus on demand reduction and youth at risk. Guyana participates in regional projects sponsored by UNDCP in the areas of law enforcement, customs, and legal assistance (preparation of narcotics cases and adjudication thereof).

Law Enforcement Efforts. In 1996, the Guyana police force charged 459 persons with possession of marijuana and seized 52.3 mt. The police charged 255 persons with possession of cocaine and seized 91.5 kgs of cocaine. The police also conducted joint operations with the RCMP from October 1995 to May 1996, which resulted in the arrest of nine persons including businessmen, an immigration officer, and a customs officer both assigned to the airport, and a cargo loader at Guyana Airways Corporation. Those arrested are presently being tried or awaiting trial. The effectiveness of the Guyana police force to focus on major traffickers and their organizations is hampered by a deficiency of manpower and a lack of funds to purchase or rent vehicles or to pay informants. The availability of information on drug rings is hindered by the Guyanese legal system's prohibition against plea bargaining.

Corruption. Guyana has not put in place any particular legal measures to prevent and punish public corruption connected to narcotics trafficking. However, when government employees have been implicated as a result of operations such as the one conducted with the RCMP, they have been detained and brought to trial.

Agreements and Treaties. Guyana is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The 1931 US­UK extradition treaty is currently in force between Guyana and the US. In October, the GOG signed an overflight counternarcotics agreement with the US. On the same day, an agreement was put into effect with the United Kingdom providing for sharing of narcotics intelligence and for asset forfeiture.

Cultivation/Production. Cannabis is grown in Guyana's heavily forested interior, especially along creeks and in riverine areas. It is difficult for the police and the Guyana Defence Force (GDF) to search for marijuana fields using aerial surveillance because the fields are obscured by the rainforest canopy. Access by vehicles is often impossible due to lack of roads. It is, therefore, difficult to accurately assess the amount of cannabis under cultivation in the country. The police use information provided by local farmers and hunters to determine crop sizes and yields. In 1996, the police destroyed 13.5 acres of cannabis cultivation.

Drug Flow/Transit. The GDF believes that there are fields utilized by light aircraft to smuggle drugs into and out of the country with little chance of interception by law enforcement agencies. There are reports of night air drops into rivers and onto one of the country's major thoroughfares, the Linden highway, which links the capital, Georgetown, with Linden, the country's third largest city. Reports indicate narcotics may be entering Guyana from Venezuela and Brazil. In November, a Guyanese aircraft charter company had one of its planes hijacked by Spanish­speaking men in Kwebana in northwestern Guyana. The plane was later discovered in Colombia. That same month, DEA agents in New York discovered 132 pounds of cocaine concealed in wooden panel doors shipped on a chartered flight from Georgetown operated by Laparkan Air Cargo Service, a Guyanese company. Also in November, GDF troops participating in a training exercise in Takama in east central Guyana, near the Suriname border, observed the overflight of a formation of three aircraft. Civil air control had no knowledge of flights in the area. There are indications, including the erection of many buildings in a sparsely populated area, that narcotics processing may be taking place in New River in southeast Guyana.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). The D.A.R.E. demand reduction program has been put into effect in the nation's schools. The police conduct a youth outreach program in remote areas of the country and in economically depressed sections of Georgetown. The program, run with private contributions from policemen, involves youth in after school programs. Nurse practitioners, employed by the Ministry of Health, are assigned to various communities throughout the country to provide rehabilitation assistance to addicts. In the future, it is expected they will also provide demand reduction information. A Ministry of Health official, who is a member of the National Drug Council, attended a drug counseling training course in Barbados in October. He will use the knowledge earned to train others.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. The US seeks to support the GOG's counternarcotics efforts by assisting in rebuilding the counternarcotics capabilities of the Guyana Police Force.

Bilateral Cooperation. The USG has a bilateral narcotics control project with Guyana. The object of the project is to eliminate illicit cultivation, processing, production, trafficking, consumption, and export of illicit narcotics and to reduce drug abuse in the country.

Road Ahead. The United States will intensify coordination with Guyana on counternarcotics efforts, including information exchanges. The US plans to assist the GOG in drafting counternarcotics, money laundering, and asset forfeiture legislation and in making the JICC fully functional.

I. Summary

Haiti is a significant transshipment point for South American cocaine destined for the US. In 1996, Haiti continued the changeover to a civilian police force that began in 1995, with full deployment throughout the country of the Haitian National Police (HNP) and the final dissolution of former Army (FADH) organizations, including those involved in narcotics law enforcement. Haiti's seaports were largely unmonitored during the year and most of the drug seizures at Port­au­Prince's airport were initiated by US airline security personnel. The HNP began a Haitian Coast Guard (HCG) unit in August, initiated training of a Counternarcotics Unit (CNU), and named new heads for both units. The president appointed former Minister of Justice Rene Magloire to carry forward judicial reform of existing narcotics laws (including asset seizure and forfeiture), and develop a national narcotics plan as well as money laundering legislation. Haiti has been a party to the 1988 UN Convention since 1995.

II. Status of Country

Haiti's largely unprotected coastline, historic reliance on the contraband trade, novice police force, and weak judicial system contribute to its vulnerability to drug smugglers. Several times during the last year, drug­laden vessels moved freely into Haitian waters. Based on in­country seizures, cocaine is the primary drug passing through the country's air and sea ports. Haiti's weak economy and political instability, coupled with the effects of the three­year embargo, has also opened the country to drug trafficking. The lack of a comprehensive bilateral maritime counternarcotics agreement between Haiti and the US frustrated law enforcement efforts several times during the past year.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. Haiti's main counternarcotics initiatives focused on the establishment of the HCG as well as the CNU within the HNP. In addition, former Minister of Justice Rene Magloire was appointed by President Preval as Special Advisor for Judicial Reform in the Ministry of Justice. Magloire's duties include the development of a national narcotics plan, drafting narcotics laws (including asset seizure and forfeiture), and developing money laundering legislation. Magloire represented the GOH at CICAD meetings and other narcotics­related fora during the year.

Accomplishments. In September, the GOH signed a letter of agreement with the USG to continue financial assistance to the Haitian Coast Guard, and to assist with security­related measures affecting the Port­au­Prince airport and seaports. The Haitian Customs Service participated in two US Customs­sponsored training sessions that focused on narcotics interdiction at airport facilities. Both the original leaders of the HCG and CNU were removed and new ones named. While the changeover in leadership proved particularly time­consuming in the establishment of the counternarcotics unit, the commitment of the HNP leadership to maintain high standards of performance is notable.

Cultivation and Production. Haiti is not a major cultivating or producing country. Haitian law bans the cultivation, production, distribution, sale and possession of narcotics.

Money Laundering/Asset Seizure. Haiti does not have existing money laundering legislation.

Haiti's asset seizure laws have not been used by the Aristide or Preval administrations. Two boat seizures made in 1996 by the Haitian Coast Guard resulted in the confiscation of both vessels, one of which the Haitian Coast Guard hopes to keep for use as a supply vessel. The other boat is awaiting disposition, and the Ministry of Justice is attempting to get a court ruling allowing for its sale.

Drug Flow/Transit. The narcotics­related seizures indicate narcotics move relatively unimpeded through Haiti's seaports, with some shipments transiting Haiti overland to the Dominican Republic for onward transport to the US. Smaller quantities of drugs are carried by airline passengers or included in air cargo.

Law Enforcement Efforts. In 1996, Haiti was second in terms of the amount of drugs seized and had the fourth­highest number of arrests among the five­office DEA Caribbean field division. These cases typically, however, do not result in criminal prosecution. Most of those accused are able to manipulate Haiti's weak and corrupt judicial system and are released. Occasionally, a non­narcotics substance (e.g., flour) is substituted for the drugs between the seizure site and the police station, or at some point before the suspect goes before a judge, resulting in dismissal of charges for lack of evidence. There were no successful criminal prosecutions of narcotics cases in 1996.

With the dissolution of the FADH, related narcotics agencies (e.g. the Center for Coordination and Intelligence) were also disbanded in March 1996. Narcotics control at the airport largely shifted to the airlines and Airport Security staff, who turned over suspects to the HNP stationed at the airport. The HNP contingent, however, proved itself ineffective. A more disciplined unit is badly needed to tighten security at the airport. Seventy­five members of the counternarcotics unit of the HNP were selected and received partial training during the year. Despite sincere efforts to set up a naroctics control unit at the airport, there were still no HNP narcotics police functioning there by the end of 1996.

The HCG began operations in August and scored two major cocaine seizures amounting to 938 kgs in its first two months of operations. The interdiction and maritime boarding experience represented a training opportunity that will enable the HCG to eventually conduct independent operations.

Given the pressing domestic law enforcement demands on the newly established HNP, the HNP's commitment to counternarcotics through the training and establishment of both the HCG and CNU has been impressive. Lack of infrastructure together with the lack of personnel and material resources will remain a limiting factor in the GOH's ability to combat narcotics trafficking. The HCG is currently limited to the Gulf of Gonave, while most of the nation's narcotics and other contraband problems center on its largely unregulated regional ports; transiting occurs on both the north and south coasts. Haiti's airspace is also unmonitored, with no functional radar system in the country.

Corruption. The Haitian constitution prohibits self­enrichment through the use of public office (articles 241 and 242). Nevertheless, there is rampant corruption in the judicial system, and President Preval in 1996 began his own anti­corruption campaign that touched in part on drug corruption. On October 1, Preval ordered the arrest of one judge for the release of an alleged Dominican trafficker, and released from judicial responsibilities another judge accused of improprieties in narcotics­related cases. Preval and the Minister of Justice presented legislation to Parliament that, if passed, would have given the executive greater authority to hire and fire judges. Corruption also exists within the HNP, but the inspector general's office has shown itself to be somewhat effective in the removal of unfit police officers. Two officers were removed from the force in 1996 for drug­related problems.

The GOH does not encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. The USG is not aware of any senior official of the Haitian Government engaging in, encouraging or facilitating the illicit production or distribution of such drugs or substances or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions.

Agreements and treaties. Haiti is a party to the 1961 UN single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol. Haiti became a party to the 1988 UN Convention in 1995. Although the GOH is engaged in discussions with the USG regarding a bilateral maritime counternarcotics accord, no agreement was in place at the end of 1996.

The Haitian constitution prohibits extradition of Haitian citizens. The current US/Haiti extradition treaty dates from 1904. Haiti is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention and the 1972 Protocol thereto, and the 1988 UN Convention, which do cover narcotics and require that signatory nations extradite or prosecute for covered drug related offenses. The USG currently does not have any narcotics­related extradition requests pending with the MFA.

During the Namphy administration in 1986, the US and the GOH entered into an interim agreement to facilitate bilateral law enforcement cooperation until such time as the two governments could enter into discussions and sign a full mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT). The intervening political situation has not allowed either side to engage in MLAT discussions and the 1986 executive agreement is likely to remain in force.

Domestic Programs/Demand Reduction. Haiti does not have a national narcotics plan nor an action plan in place that addresses prevention and public education.

The GOH is not currently involved in a demand reduction effort. A private non­governmental organization, Association for Alcohol Prevention and Chemical Dependency (APAAC), focuses its efforts on the rehabilitation of addicts, and has a single prevention specialist on its staff. APAAC has not been engaging in demand reduction projects since USAID ceased funding in 1995.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Bilateral Cooperation. In September, the MOJ signed a letter of agreement with the USG accepting assistance for the Haitian Coast Guard, the Haitian Customs Service, and for security­related projects at the airport and seaports.

Although US law enforcement agencies have received GOH approval and assistance in maritime boarding cases on an ad hoc basis, GOH permission often comes too late. GOH officials have indicated a willingness to negotiate an agreement, but continued GOH hesitation illustrates lingering concerns over the perceived relinquishing of Haitian sovereignty.

The HCG program, funded primarily by US security assistance, has been very successful in its first months of operation. The HCG participated in two combined DEA/US Coast Guard/Haitian Coast Guard cocaine seizures, a combined UN/CIVPOL/HNP operation, and several independent operations with other units of the HNP.

The CNU, while not fully operational, is working on a temporary basis out of the police academy until its permanent offices at the Port­au­Prince airport are complete. The USG is financing most equipment and training for the CNU.

DEA maintains an office with two agents in Haiti that works closely with the HNP and other GOH officials on narcotics matters. Bilateral cooperation includes limited information sharing with the HNP and assistance with combined US Coast Guard/HCG operations. The USG has also received assistance on narcotics cases with airport officials (security personnel from the airlines as well as from the Airport Security Service) and the Seaport Authority.

The Road Ahead. The USG intends to work with the GOH towards conclusion of a bilateral maritime agreement, and to continue its efforts to assist MOJ Special Advisor Magloire with his narcotics­related agenda and legal reform programs. The USG will also assist the HNP in establishing regional law enforcement contacts and continue to provide support for both the HCG and the CNU.

I. Summary

Jamaica produces marijuana and is a significant cocaine transit country. The Government of Jamaica (GOJ) made some progress during 1996 to achieve the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention, to which it became a party in December 1995. In December 1996, the Jamaican parliament passed a money laundering law, which, although somewhat limited in scope in that it criminalizes only the laundering of the proceeds of drug-related crime, is the beginning of a money laundering control regime. Although the GOJ has yet to prosecute asset forfeiture cases under the relevant 1994 act, it did establish a special unit which is currently investigating two such cases. Action on drafting a precursor chemical bill was deferred to 1997. GOJ-USG negotiations on a maritime counternarcotics cooperation agreement, which commenced in 1996, had been impeded by Jamaica's declaration of exclusive law enforcement authority in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In December 1996, the GOJ withdrew its EEZ declaration, and negotiations resumed in February 1997, in a spirit of cooperation and willingness to conclude an agreement. Although the rate of extraditions declined markedly, from six in 1995 to one (under a waiver of extradition) in 1996, partly attributable to new Jamaican legal procedures regarding appeals, the GOJ expelled or deported to the U.S. eight U.S.-citizen fugitives during 1996. However, a sizeable number of extradition requests to the GOJ remain open.

According to DEA, Jamaican police counternarcotics cooperation in 1996 remained at the high levels of 1995, but drug arrests, cocaine seizures, and cannabis eradication fell somewhat below the goals and objectives of our bilateral letter of agreement (LOA). Signed by the GOJ and USG, the 1996 LOA set an objective of significantly increasing drug arrests and cocaine and heroin seizures. Drug-related arrests in 1996 (3,263) were down slightly from the 1995 level (3,705). Cocaine seizures in 1996 (236 kg) were also reduced from the 1995 level (571 kg). Heroin seizures increased slightly in 1996 (1 kg) compared to 1995 (zero kg). Marijuana seizures, on the other hand, increased significantly (52.99 mt in 1996, compared to 37.20 mt in 1995), bolstered by one very large seizure late in 1996. The 1996 LOA set an eradication goal of 800 hectares of cannabis. During 1996, 473 hectares were eradicated, compared to 695 hectares in 1995, with the area under cultivation estimated to be the same both years. U.S.-provided helicopters used to assist eradication efforts were grounded for safety reasons for part of the year.

Jamaica's National Council on Drug Abuse (NCDA) continued its demand reduction efforts, becoming increasingly self-reliant and prominent. Jamaica's national drug control strategy has been drafted and is awaiting government approval for implementation. The GOJ has not formally charged any senior government official with drug-related activity, but several Jamaican policemen and court employees have been arrested and charged on drug and drug-related charges. The Jamaican media continues to report allegations of drug-related corruption among public officials including the police.

II. Status of Country

Jamaica is an important marijuana producer with harvestable cultivation rising significantly in 1996 as compared to 1995. Quantities of cocaine seized during 1996 (236 kgs) were about half those seized in 1995 (571 kgs). Money laundering has not yet reached significant levels in Jamaica. The movement of essential and precursor chemicals appears to have moderately increased. The production and manufacture of illicit drugs, and related acts, are criminal offenses.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. The Jamaican Parliament passed a money laundering bill in December. This law does not meet the recommendations of the "Kingston Declaration" (which includes the 40 recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force and the 19 recommendations of the Caribbean financial Action Task Force). Inter alia, the law governs the laundering only of proceeds of drug transactions, and mandates reporting of only large transactions (above $10,000). It permits, but does not require, the reporting of suspicious transactions below the $10,000 threshold. Convictions under the act can entail a penalty up to twenty years imprisonment and an unlimited fine. The five­year national drug strategy, developed by NCDA, in conjunction with the UNDCP, had yet to be approved for implementation. Implementation, planned to begin in early 1996, should start in early 1997. The government plans to take up a bill controlling essential and precursor chemicals in 1997.

In December, the Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement Training Center, a project of the UNDCP and the GOJ funded largely by the USG, completed its first two­week training course. Of the 25 trainees, 13 came from Jamaica and the other 12 were from nine neighboring countries.

Accomplishments. An assets forfeiture/money laundering office was established in May. The office was recently expanded, to facilitate operations under the 1994 Assets Forfeiture Act.

Operation Prop Lock, an on­going operation of the DEA and Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) that seizes suspected trafficking aircraft of U.S. registry, returns the aircraft to the US for forfeiture. The first proceeds from seizures in earlier years were presented to Jamaica in 1996, with $100,000 transferred to Jamaica in October 1996. The proceeds are to be used to enhance Jamaican counternarcotics capabilities. Two additional aircraft were seized by the JCF in 1996, compared to 12 in 1995. The decline reflects the success of Operation Prop Lock in deterring smugglers from using US­registered aircraft. Jamaican cooperation with US law enforcement personnel is an integral part of Operation Prop Lock.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Cocaine seizures by the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) declined in 1996 to 236 kgs, compared to 571 kgs seized in 1995. Marijuana seizures rose significantly in 1996 to 53 mt, as compared to 37 mt in 1995. The current bilateral counternarcotics agreement between the US and Jamaica specifies that Jamaica would, with US assistance, seize at least 50 mt of marijuana in FY­96. Jamaica continued its program of marijuana eradication, but met with less success in 1996 than in prior years. Helicopters are needed to reach some otherwise inaccessible plots, and Jamaica's helicopters were grounded for three months by a US safety­of­flight order. Eradication continued during the June­August period when the helicopters were grounded, with eradicators brought to the fields in trucks. The Jamaican Defense Force (JDF) and the JCF strongly supported DEA's initiative which brought four U.S. Blackhawk helicopters to Jamaica in May for an intensive combined eradication operation.

Reported drug arrests in 1996 included 2,996 Jamaicans and 267 foreigners for a total of 3,263 arrests, which was slightly reduced from the total arrests in 1995 (3,705). The Jamaica Joint Information Coordination Center (JICC) remains among the most active Caribbean centers reporting to DEA's El Paso Information Center (EPIC). Cooperation between the JCF narcotics division and DEA's Kingston country office remains high. This cooperation resulted in the DEA­directed arrest of over 90 major drug traffickers in 1996, versus 86 in 1995 and only 40 in 1994. Convictions of 27 major drug traffickers in 15 separate cases, defined by Jamaica as persons involved in drug transactions valued at more than $28,500, were obtained in 1996.

The 1995 conviction and sentencing of a north coast businessman for drug trafficking, which had resulted in a large fine and four years at hard labor, was reversed on appeal, citing a lack of evidence.

No assets have yet been forfeited under the 1994 Asset Forfeiture Act, although investigations of two cases were initiated. The Jamaican constitution requires, as part of its safeguards on the holding of property, that a criminal conviction of drug trafficking be secured, and upheld on appeal, before assets can be forfeited.

The JDF Coast Guard received training from the U.S. Coast Guard, continuing the pattern resumed in 1995 after a two year hiatus.

Corruption. Jamaica does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. The Jamaican media continued to report allegations of drug­related corruption of public officials including police officers. No senior official has been formally charged with engaging in, encouraging, or facilitating the production or distribution of illicit drugs or substances or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions.

Convicted traffickers, and others awaiting extradition, have had access to cellular phones while being held in maximum security installations. Several Jamaican policemen and court employees have been arrested and charged on drug, and drug­related, charges. The charges include possession of, dealing in, and attempting to export illicit drugs, and accepting bribes to destroy files of accused drug dealers.

Policemen are also suspected in the theft of several kilograms of cocaine from police evidence lockers and the JCF forensic laboratory. Susceptibility to such theft is increased by Jamaica's 'common law' practice of retaining as evidence all illicit drugs seized, even after trial, until destruction is ordered by a court. In early 1997, the GOJ issued new guidelines regarding the custody and protection of drugs as exhibits in court.

In December, the legitimate holder of a Jamaican diplomatic passport was arrested in Montego Bay by Jamaican police while attempting to board a commercial flight. He was found to be in possession on 2.2 kgs of hash oil. The holder pled guilty, paying a $1,800 fine in lieu of six months prison. The government ordered his diplomatic passport to be forfeited.

Agreements and Treaties. Jamaica ratified the 1988 UN Drug Convention in December 1995. The Jamaican parliament passed a money laundering bill in December 1996, which is not in full compliance with the 59 recommendations of the "Kingston Declaration" (the 40 recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force and the additional 19 recommendations of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, of which Jamaica is a member). Action on a draft precursor and essential chemical control bill was delayed to 1997. The U.S. has a bilateral counternarcotics agreement with the GOJ, which is amended at least annually, as well as a 1991 extradition treaty. Negotiations on a bilateral maritime counternarcotics cooperation agreement were delayed until the GOJ withdrew its claim of exclusive law enforcement jurisdiction in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in December 1996. Negotiations resumed in February 1997, but to date no maritime agreement has been concluded.

Both countries have begun to utilize the 1995 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, both in combating illegal narcotics traffic and more generally to further the interests of law enforcement. Jamaica has also entered into mutual legal assistance treaties with some 48 designated commonwealth states. Extraditions are covered by a bilateral treaty that entered into force in 1991, replacing a 1931 US­UK treaty which pertained to Jamaica.

Cultivation and Production. Jamaica's climate, soil and rainfall are ideal for the cultivation of cannabis, or "ganja." Usually grown on small plots or between the rows of a legitimate crop, making discovery by the JDF helicopters searching for it more difficult, cannabis offers more profit to the farmer than any other local crop. The most commonly grown varieties are indica and sinsemilla, four to six crops of which can be grown each year. The estimated yield of marijuana per hectare of harvestable cultivation is 675 kgs.

In 1996, the GOJ continued its cannabis eradication operations, eradicating 473 hectares country­wide during 1996, compared to 695 hectares in 1995. The current bilateral narcotics agreement between the US and Jamaica specifies that Jamaica would, with US assistance, eradicate at least 800 hectares in FY­96. Failure to reach that target, or maintain the levels reached in 1995 and 1994, resulted in an increase in estimated harvestable cultivation from 206 mt in 1995 to 356 mt in 1996. The GOJ opposes aerial or platform spraying of cannabis for political and environmental reasons.

Drug Flow and Transit. Cannabis is illicitly grown throughout Jamaica where tourists and Jamaicans buy small quantities of the drug from "higglers." Larger amounts of marijuana enter the US and other markets hidden in agricultural products, apparel, and other export shipments. Colombian cocaine is transported to the US and elsewhere similarly to the way marijuana is transported. Individuals known as "mules" smuggle drugs out of Jamaica to lucrative markets in the US, Canada, and Europe. Heroin smuggling is also on the rise. In August, Jamaican law enforcement officials seized 300 grams of South American/Colombian heroin.

Demand Reduction. The nation's lead governmental organization for demand reduction, the NCDA, continues its "integrated demand reduction" (IDER) program in conjunction with the UNDCP. This program attempts to improve community life and economy throughout Jamaica, hopefully removing some of the underlying factors contributing to drug use. The USG monitors this grass­roots program. Several other USG­initiated demand reduction projects conducted by local non­governmental organizations (NGOs) have become independent of US funding.

The demand reduction programs have expanded to cover rural as well as inner city communities. A pilot project dealing with drug abuse at the workplace, sponsored by the International Labor Organization (ILO) began in 1996. Four treatment centers exist in Jamaica; a fifth is to be established in 1997 or early 1998.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. Working with Jamaican authorities, the US seeks to reduce the transshipment of cocaine and heroin from South America through Jamaica, and of marijuana from Jamaica, to the US. Additionally, the US seeks to cooperate with Jamaica in reducing the demand for drugs in Jamaica and minimize the effect of drug use and drug trafficking on Jamaican society. The bilateral agreement between the US and Jamaica specifically addresses judicial reform, control of money laundering and precursor chemicals, training and equipping of Jamaica's anti­narcotic agencies to enhance their narcotics interdiction capabilities, and the eradication and seizure of marijuana.

Progress toward these mutual goals is measured in terms of reduced availability of illicit narcotics to traffickers and abusers, of arrests and convictions of narcotics law violators, and of quantities of narcotics contraband seized and destroyed.

Bilateral Cooperation. With US assistance, in 1996 the GOJ eradicated 473 hectares of cannabis, significantly less than the amount eradicated in 1995 and below the target of 800 hectares agreed in the bilateral narcotics agreement. Seizures of marijuana rose significantly to 53 mt, surpassing the agreed target of 50 mt. Drug­related arrests declined only slightly from the previous year, but the GOJ experienced difficulties in securing convictions of major traffickers, and sentences were both non­uniform and, by US standards, light. GOJ police cooperated fully with US agencies. Jamaican­US cooperative maritime operations were limited by lack of effective cooperation mechanisms.

Extraditions declined markedly, from six in 1995 to one (under a waiver of extradition) in 1996. As reasons for the decline, the GOJ cites "lost" arrest warrants, a lack of resources, the recent legislative creation of an additional stage of appeals, and the requirements of due process generally. In 1996, the GOJ deported or expelled to the US eight US citizen fugitives. Nevertheless, a sizeable number of extradition requests to the GOJ remain open.

In order to improve the handling of drug cases in the Jamaican courts, the USG is assisting the Ministry of National Security and Justice in a judicial reform project, the jurisprudence data base, the end product of which will be a compendium of Jamaican laws, statutes, and decisions available to the courts on CD­ROM. A 1996 US Military Information Support Team (MIST), deployed in Jamaica for 30 days, spearheaded efforts of several demand reduction NGOs, as well as the NCDA. Using MIST funding, the NGOs produced student stickers, posters, television and radio spot announcements to spread the counterdrug message to school children as well as the general public.

The GOJ effort to procure a new, tamper­resistant passport system has met significant delays, and no vendor for the improved document has been selected. The USG has committed $75,000 to the project, which will be provided once production has begun. By improving the integrity of the Jamaican passport, the US also benefits from a smaller number of Jamaicans successfully entering the US with fraudulent documents. A number of Jamaicans traveling overseas with fraudulent documents are involved in criminal activities, including drug trafficking.

Road Ahead. The USG will encourage the GOJ to fulfill all of its obligations under the 1988 UN Convention, and fully meet all targets under the bilateral counternarcotics agreement. To reach these goals, Jamaica needs to complete its counternarcotics legislation and to improve existing laws as soon as possible and fully implement them­­the key to effecting real counternarcotics achievements in the law enforcement area. USG attention will also be focused on improving the Jamaican judicial system, the objective being to improve the prosecution process to increase the number of convictions and begin asset forfeitures. The USG will work with the GOJ to develop internal controls to counter drug­related corruption among public officials and to control the smuggling of illegal firearms.

With a critical obstacle to negotiations on a maritime counternarcotics cooperation agreement removed by GOJ action in December, the USG looks forward to rapidly concluding an agreement that can meld seamlessly with similar agreements reached with other states in the region.

Click here for JAMAICA chart

I. Summary

The Netherlands Antilles serves as a transhipment point for cocaine from South America (specifically Colombia, Venezuela, and Suriname) to the US and Europe, primarily the Netherlands. The islands of the Netherlands Antilles are located strategically near the country that is the driving force behind the cocaine trade, Colombia, and its neighbor, a major transit zone, Venezuela. The location of the Netherlands Antilles presents drug control challenges. However, it made progress during 1996 in confronting international narcotics trafficking.

The Netherlands Antilles comprises the islands of Curacao, Bonaire, St. Eustatius, Saba and the Dutch half of Sint Maarten, and is used extensively by illicit courier organizations sending shipments to the US via air drops, cruise ships, commercial aircraft, and container cargo shipments. The Netherlands Antilles is a part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Since 1954, it has been a separate entity. Under the Kingdom's constitution, it has autonomy over internal affairs, but not foreign affairs or defense.

The Dutch half of the island of Sint Maarten still shows evidence that it is a major center for cocaine and heroin shipments to both the US and Europe. Money laundering organizations appear to be directing large cash deposits into new building and land development projects. There are increasing indications that money launderers are using legitimate businesses as front operations. On Bonaire, financing from sources linked to drug trafficking organizations has been offered to hotels facing financial difficulties. Such problems require the governments of the Netherlands (GON) and the Netherlands Antilles (GONA) to focus more on addressing the developing problems in international narcotics trafficking there.

The Netherlands has not extended the 1988 UN Convention to the Netherlands Antilles because the Netherlands Antilles lacks revisions in its Criminal Procedure Code that would implement the Convention.

A joint GONA­GOA commission is reviewing the code to make the technical revisions, which it will then submit to the parliaments of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba for approval. After the revisions are approved, the Criminal Procedure Code is expected to facilitate the implementation of the 1988 UN Convention and other GONA laws. Those other laws are expected to combat international and local drug trafficking and money laundering activities, broaden the investigatory powers of local enforcement agencies with regard to search, seizures, extradition of nationals, and questioning and detaining of suspects.

II. Status of Country

The five islands of the Netherlands Antilles are geographically split into two distinct groups. The islands of Bonaire and Curacao are located off the South American coast near Colombia and Venezuela. Saba, St. Eustatius and the Dutch half of Sint Maarten are hundreds of miles away east of the Virgin Islands and the Anegada Passage, just above the Leeward Islands of the Caribbean. Cocaine is the principal drug transiting the Netherlands Antilles. The majority of cocaine enters Bonaire and Curacao on commercial maritime vessels originating in Colombia, and small fishing vessels from Venezuela. The cocaine is then transhipped via couriers on cruise ships or commercial airliners. Large­scale commercial shipments of cocaine, as evidenced by large seizures of cocaine in air­freight shipments and on container cargo vessels, are smuggled primarily through the major ports in these islands, and then on to the US and Europe.

In Curacao, local drug traffickers who are responsible for transhipments of drugs are paid in cocaine instead of cash. This results in increased crime and drug abuse problems. Heroin also enters Curacao via couriers from Colombia. The drug is transhipped to the US and Europe via couriers who ingest 500­700 grams of heroin encased in rubber packages.

The area around Saba, called the Saba Banks, appears to be a favored zone for traffickers' aerial drops of multi­hundred kgs amounts of cocaine destined for Puerto Rico. There is no evidence that indicates large shipments of cocaine continue to enter Sint Maarten by sea. Colombian­based narcotics trafficking organizations appear to wield significant influence in the Antillean island economies and are more than a match for the modest law enforcement resources there. Consequently, narcotics trafficking on a large scale continues.

Sophisticated off­shore corporate banking facilities offering secret bank accounts, casino/resort complexes, high volume tourism, and a stable currency make the Netherlands Antilles attractive to money laundering organizations. Local governments, with the assistance of Dutch officials, are attempting to enact legislation that would place more controls on banking and financial institutions, and give local law enforcement officials greater authority to investigate money laundering activities and suspicious transactions. But the problem of controlling money laundering is formidable because launderers rely on sophisticated, highly paid advisors, adept at maneuvering assets out of the purview of local and other authorities. The local governments charged with monitoring money laundering have modest resources, and are relatively unfamiliar with conducting financial investigations.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. In January 1996, the Netherlands Antilles, Aruba and the Netherlands established a joint coast guard to improve drug interdiction efforts in the coastal waters of the Kingdom's Caribbean islands. The US began working with the GON on a Maritime Law Enforcement Agreement. Such an agreement would allow for improved cooperation on surveillance and interdiction efforts in the waters surrounding the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. The Hague, after consulting the Antillean and Aruban governments, renewed a port visit and overflight agreement which allows US vessels and aircraft pre­clearance and access to docking, overflight and landing privileges in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Antillean law enforcement officials maintained good working relations with their USG counterparts. This relationship has been one of the key factors in the increased arrests of drug couriers transiting through the Antilles. The GONA seized 650 kgs of marijuana and 710 kgs of cocaine in 1996, a significant increase from the 111 kgs of cocaine seized in 1995.

The GONA began customs checks in Sint Maarten, including limited vessel inspection. The GONA implemented detection dog controls at all Antillean airports and ocean cargo facilities. The parliament approved laws that permit the establishment of a law enforcement entity designed to detect and counter money laundering, but such entities, called MOT's, are not yet functioning. The Antilles hosted the first International Crime Symposium, focussing on the Caribbean perspective, to better link its efforts with regional anti­crime activities.

Implementing asset forfeiture regulations enacted in 1996, the GONA seized about $1.2 million in real estate and other property, jewelry and two luxury yachts. Authorities confiscated the assets from individuals engaged in activities directly associated with drug trafficking.

The GONA arrested 594 suspects from 48 different nations on narcotics­related charges during the year. In addition, approximately 500 individuals carrying drugs were arrested upon arrival in the Netherlands on international flights originating from the Netherlands Antilles.

Corruption. Corruption is a serious problem in the Netherlands Antilles. The potential for corruption is magnified by the gaming industry and tight bank secrecy, which facilitate money laundering. Limited economic options contribute to a requirement for constant vigilance and severe penalties to prevent corruption from emerging as a main factor eroding frail democratic institutions in the Antilles.

Agreements and Treaties. The GONA is part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The 1988 UN Convention does not yet apply in the Netherlands Antilles. The GON became a party to the Convention in 1993. The Netherlands has not yet acceded to it on behalf of the GONA because the Netherlands Antilles has not enacted domestic legislation necessary to fulfill its obligations.

An extradition treaty in force between the USG and the GON was extended to the GONA. The GONA does not currently extradite its nationals.

Demand Reduction. Drug­related petty crime has increased in the Antilles, further demonstrating growing narcotics problems. Drug abuse is growing at an alarming rate in Curacao, especially the use of crack. Crack seizures confirm this trend. At the national level, the National Drug Coordinator is responsible for the production and distribution of demand reduction materials and media releases. Mobile teams also provide training and coordination assistance to local and neighborhood demand reduction activities. The government is seeking resources for more in­country rehabilitation programs and treatment centers.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs.

The GONA works closely with USG officials on the exchange of narcotics information. Curacao is seeking to implement a Joint Information Coordination Center (JICC). Progress on the JICC was stalled because of in­fighting between police and customs forces.

Signature of a Maritime Agreement between the Netherlands and the USG may increase the international emphasis on counternarcotics activities in the Caribbean. These should be of particular benefit to the Antilles with its disparate groups of islands separated by hundreds of miles.

The Road Ahead. Good cooperation on counternarcotics issues will remain an important factor in law enforcement on the islands and in their surrounding waters. Corruption will be a problem in the Antilles, as narcotics traffickers and money launderers attempt to discourage further changes which would bolster enforcement against trafficking and money laundering. Continued GON financial and material support, especially on the counternarcotics front, will be essential to successful law enforcement in the Netherlands Antilles. The US, through JIATF EAST will augment, where possible, military assets in the region in collaboration with Combined Task Group 4.4. The signing of the maritime ship riders agreement between the USG and the GON is a key objective. The GONA's clearly articulated interest in passing tough laws and receiving antinarcotics training programs conducted by USG agencies bodes well for its counternarcotics progress in the coming year.

I. Summary

Suriname is an increasingly important transshipment point for narcotics shipped from Brazil, Venezuela and Colombia to the Netherlands and the US. Traffickers conduct clandestine landings at airstrips outside the capital city of Paramaribo and in Suriname's densely forested interior. At one airstrip, police seized more than one ton of cocaine in 1996 from a small aircraft piloted by three Colombians and one Venezuelan. Authorities identified about $1.7 million in illicit proceeds in Suriname, and are vigilant towards increased signs of money laundering. But police corruption and fear of trafficker intimidation hinder law enforcement activities. Surinamese police seized more than 1.4 mt of cocaine and almost 30 kgs of heroin in 1996, a dramatic increase from the 1995 figure of 63 kgs of cocaine and no recorded seizures of heroin.

A new president, Jules Wijdenbosch, was elected and took office in September. His coalition government is closely linked to former military strongman Desi Bouterse. A close associate of Bouterse, Etienne Boerenveen, was convicted of conspiracy to import narcotics to the US and served five years in US prisons. He currently occupies a high level position in Suriname's Ministry of Defense.

The Government of Suriname (SG) is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but has not enacted legislation incorporating the provisions of the Convention into its domestic law.

II. Status of Country.

Brazilian, Venezuelan and Colombian narcotics trafficking organizations are developing infrastructure to use Suriname as a transshipment point. Traffickers build clandestine airstrips located outside the capital of Paramaribo to enable small aircraft to refuel and transport one­half to one­ton loads of cocaine from neighboring countries through Suriname to the US. Traffickers also conduct 200­500 kgs airdrops of cocaine on the Suriname river. The cocaine is then retrieved by smugglers who primarily use go­fast boats. Shipments of 500­1,000 kgs are also reportedly brought to Suriname from Brazil by river. The drugs are transported out of Suriname by couriers on international flights to Europe, and in air and maritime shipments of frozen fish, timber and other exports. Traffickers also conceal drugs in storage areas on cargo ships which are off­loaded before the ships arrive at ports of destination.

Precursor chemical trafficking, primarily in acetone, is a developing problem. There are unconfirmed reports of cocaine processing laboratories operating within Suriname's borders. Suriname has not enacted chemical control laws or identified a list of controlled precursor and essential chemicals.

Suriname has a marijuana cultivation problem that is a domestic concern. Construction of luxurious homes and other real estate, as well as car dealerships and other businesses in Suriname with little business to support such operations, suggests an increased money laundering problem.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. Draft comprehensive antinarcotic legislation that would implement the 1988 UN Convention has made virtually no progress in the legislature. Recent SG statements recognizing the need to address the domestic abuse and transhipment problem have had little to no effect on these growing problems to date. Suriname developed a Drug Master Plan in 1995, but did not complete an implementation plan that year or in 1996. Newly inaugurated President Wijdenbosch called for a DEA presence in Suriname in 1996.

Accomplishments. The Surinamese Narcotics Brigade seized 1,200 kgs of cocaine from a small aircraft that landed on a clandestine airstrip outside Paramaribo. Major media attention focussed on the seizure and a press conference accompanied a public burning of the illicit drugs. Authorities identified and seized almost $2 million in narcotics proceeds. Suriname lacks laws on asset forfeiture and money laundering. Whether the government will use seized assets to finance law enforcement efforts is not clear.

Surinamese Narcotics Brigade police participated in USG­sponsored law enforcement training courses. The Narcotics Brigade and the USG share information to detect and dismantle international narcotics trafficking organizations in Suriname.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The USG sponsored a two­week Basic Narcotic Drug Enforcement course, well attended by the members of Suriname's Narcotics Brigade. The Surinamese Narcotics Brigade is underfunded and understaffed, composed of about 18 members, down from 21 members in 1995. The Brigade lacks equipment as basic as telephones. The Brigade and the Police Criminal Intelligence Unit are housed in the same building, encouraging some degree of coordination between the two units. However, much more support from the SG is necessary to enable the Narcotics Brigade to carry out its mission. Certain SG officials have indicated that they are interested in participating in a DEA­sponsored Special Investigative Unit (SIU) with USG assistance.

There is no cooperation between the military and the police. Suriname's military generally does not cooperate with the Narcotics Brigade or with any other nation in antinarcotics efforts. Overall relations between these two forces appear to be worsening. Suriname's Military Police are seeking to oversee the control of visa entries, a police function, at the airport. Further, the Military Intelligence Unit seeks to control the leadership of the Civilian and Police Intelligence Units. The presence of the USG­supported Joint Information Coordination Center (JICC), a database to track trafficker movements, was intended to improve cooperation among these three agencies, and to encourage them to jointly support a counternarcotics mission. More vigorous efforts are needed to generate cooperation to improve interdiction.

Money Laundering. Local traffickers are apparently using restaurants and supermarkets to launder illicit proceeds. So­called "near banking" institutions may also be involved in money laundering. These institutions pay investors excessive rates of interest and are not regulated by the Central Bank. Anecdotal evidence indicates that local cocaine traffickers purchased professional soccer teams in Suriname to help launder money. The Central Bank has some regulations against money laundering, but proposed legislation has not moved forward.

Corruption. Members of the Military Police have been arrested in the US and the Netherlands in recent years for narcotics smuggling violations. Some military personnel stationed at the airport have been reported in collusion with narcotics couriers who use commercial airlines to transport narcotics to the Netherlands and the US. Corruption in the military, the Customs police and other law enforcement agencies hinders effective counternarcotics efforts.

Agreements and Treaties. The Government of Suriname has ratified the 1988 UN Convention, but has no laws in place to implement it. Venezuela and Suriname have formed a bilateral antidrug commission. The US­Netherlands 1889 extradition treaty, extended to Suriname in 1904, remains in force.

Cultivation/Production. Except for small amounts of marijuana, grown mainly for domestic consumption, Suriname is not a major cultivator or producer of illicit drugs.

Drug Flow/Transit. International narcotics traffickers from Colombia and Bolivia ship cocaine primarily by air through Venezuela to clandestine airstrips outside the capital city of Paramaribo. There, traffickers refuel and transport illicit drugs to neighboring Caribbean countries for onward transport to the US and Europe. Traffickers reportedly transport cocaine shipments weighing up to 1,000 kgs from Brazil by river. Shipments weighing as much as 500 kgs are airdropped into Suriname's rivers by small aircraft, and then retrieved primarily by go­fast boats. Once in Suriname, the drugs are shipped north to the US and Europe by large cargo shipments or by various airline passengers acting as couriers. In 1996, USG authorities learned that drug traffickers in Suriname were developing a distribution cell in the US. The increase in clandestine airstrips, increased narcotic seizures and identification of almost $2 million in seized assets have highlighted the need for the SG to strengthen its efforts to address the public health and safety threat created by drug trafficking activities.

Demand reduction. The SG has reported a marked increase in crack cocaine addicts. Suriname's police commissioner participated in a seminar on drug use and the judicial system in the US, and instituted a drug education program aimed at Suriname's youth.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs.

Suriname developed a Master Drug Plan with UNDCP assistance in 1995. However, without laws to implement that plan, as well as to implement the 1988 UN Convention, Suriname is vulnerable to traffickers who exploit the nation's lack of antidrug laws. USG law enforcement agencies visit Suriname on roughly a quarterly basis to assist in identifying and dismantling narcotics trafficking organizations.

Surinamese police participated in a USG­sponsored training course in drug enforcement. The SG has demonstrated an interest in creating an effective border interdiction program.

Bilateral Cooperation. The USG and the SG have a bilateral counternarcotics agreement. Through this agreement, Surinamese officials participate in counternarcotics training courses. On a case­by­case basis, the Narcotics Brigade has arrested suspects or mounted investigations when provided with specific narcotics­related information. Quarterly liaison visits by USG law enforcement agencies help the Narcotics Brigade improve its drug control efforts.

Road Ahead. The USG continues to urge the SG to enact and enforce laws that would implement the 1988 UN Convention, to which Suriname is a party. Until the SG makes progress in establishing the legal framework needed to address trafficking and money laundering activities, the USG will sustain only limited cooperation, primarily in law enforcement liaison visits and counternarcotics training efforts, with the SG. The USG will also be monitoring the SG's progress on implementing the JICC, and on establishing and implementing a Master Drug Plan.

I. Summary

Trinidad and Tobago, located just seven miles off the Venezuelan coast, is a significant transit country for cocaine. Heroin has also been intercepted transitting the country. It is a producer and exporter of marijuana. Narcotics­related violence, money laundering and drug abuse are growing problems.

The Government of Trinidad and Tobago (GOTT) made significant strides in 1996. One of the most notorious traffickers and eight of his associates were convicted of trafficking­related murders and sentenced to death. The GOTT confiscated his 110­acre palatial estate and plans to convert it into a drug treatment facility.

Counternarcotics cooperation between the GOTT and the US reached new heights in 1996, with the signing of an extradition treaty, a mutual legal assistance treaty, and a maritime counterdrug cooperation agreement. The GOTT extradited a major trafficker to the US; a second is in custody awaiting extradition. The GOTT also aggressively pursued and arrested several prominent traffickers.

The GOTT passed several pieces of key legislation aimed at more effective prosecution of drug traffickers. It also hosted a region­wide asset forfeiture conference and is spearheading regional efforts to improve witness security. The Attorney General visited the south Florida High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program and is in the process of establishing a similar counternarcotics task force in Trinidad and Tobago. The GOTT also drafted legislation to stiffen significantly the penalty for drug trafficking. Trinidad and Tobago became a party to the 1988 UN Convention in 1995 and is moving forcefully to fulfill its goals and objectives.

II. Status of Country

By virtue of its proximity to Venezuela, Trinidad serves as a significant transshipment point for Colombian cocaine. The cocaine is generally transported in small boats, or pirogues, from the Venezuelan coast to various points in Trinidad; it is then prepared for shipment via container ship or aircraft to the US or to Western Europe. Although significant, drug shipments from Trinidad to the US are not major. At present, the vast number and small size of these relatively fast smuggling boats make interdiction difficult for the small Trinidadian Coast Guard. A number of radar installations are currently under construction which will help the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard to locate these vessels. Trinidad and Tobago is not a producer of coca or opium. Heroin transshipment could emerge as a problem.

Trinidad and Tobago is a significant producer of marijuana. In September, the police began a new round of its on­going marijuana eradication operation. In just three months, they destroyed millions of mature marijuana plants destined for the export market.

III. Country Initiatives Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. Trinidad and Tobago's ratification of the 1988 UN Convention became effective on May 18, 1995. On March 4, 1996 Trinidad and Tobago signed three major agreements with the US to help combat the drug trade: a mutual legal assistance treaty, an extradition treaty, and a maritime counternarcotics cooperation agreement. The maritime agreement includes provisions for "pursuit and entry," whereby US forces may continue pursuit of suspected drug traffickers into Trinidad and Tobago airspace and territorial waters. Trinidad and Tobago was the first Caribbean state to sign all three agreements.

The GOTT passed several laws to strengthen drug trafficking prosecutions. It amended the Indictable Offenses Act to permit the use of certified copies of depositions to deal with the problem of corrupt officials thwarting prosecutions by destroying original depositions. It amended the Jury Act to institute a system of alternate jurors to prevent jury tampering. The Supreme Court of Judicature Amendment was passed to permit the holding of drug trials in a secure facility at the former US military base in Chaguaramas. Other reforms have been proposed by the Attorney General, including mandatory prison sentences (rather than fines) for traffickers, and stiffer penalties for traffickers operating within a certain radius of school grounds. The Trinidad and Tobago judicial system currently gives judges broad latitude in sentencing, which has led to inconsistent decisions in narcotics cases.

Accomplishments. In June, a narcotics trafficker was extradited to the US; another is in custody awaiting extradition; a third is being sought. In December, the GOTT seized the 110­acre estate of a major drug trafficker who was convicted of a narcotics­related murder.

The police reported the destruction and/or seizure of an estimated almost 5.8 million marijuana plants, 351,000 seedlings and 14.5 mt of cured marijuana during the year. In 1995, authorities seized only 1.6 mt of cured marijuana. The USG suspects that this substantial jump increase in seizures is directly tied to the successful USG­sponsored weed eater operation.

At present, NGOs handle the bulk of demand reduction efforts, with the participation of the Ministry of Education, in drug­awareness and intervention programs directed at students. In one program, principals work with NGO volunteers to identify "at risk" students for participation in special programs designed to promote healthy habits, enhance dignity, and provide some training in vocational skills. The USG and a local NGO cooperatively sponsor the "XL" project, a program aimed at children and teens, which is designed to increase awareness of the negative effects of drugs and promote healthy lifestyles.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The GOTT secured convictions against ten major traffickers in 1996; all were sentenced to death. It disrupted four major trafficking rings with the conviction or arrest of the leaders.

Corruption. There were no arrests or prosecutions of high­level or senior officials for narcotics­related corruption during the year. As a matter of government policy, the GOTT does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of narcotics or the laundering of drug money.

Agreements and Treaties. As noted, the GOTT signed an MLAT, an extradition treaty, and a bilateral maritime counternarcotics agreement with the US during the year. The new extradition treaty is not yet in force, but the 1931 US­UK extradition treaty is in force with Trinidad and Tobago. Trinidad and Tobago is also a party to the 1988 UN Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Trinidad and Tobago has signed Letters of Agreement stipulating counternarcotics cooperation and providing for USG funding annually since 1989. The UK, Canada, France, the Netherlands, the EU and the UN provide other funding for counternarcotics efforts.

Cultivation and Production. Marijuana is the principal drug crop produced and is grown extensively in the forest and jungle areas of northern, eastern and southern Trinidad, and to a minor extent on Tobago. Past joint USG/GOTT marijuana eradication operations uncovered many multi­acre marijuana plantations, as well as previously undiscovered airstrips.

Authorities identified an estimated crop of 25 million marijuana plants by helicopter during the weed eater operation in January 1996. No aerially applied pesticides have been used on illicit crops; eradication is carried out by manually cutting and burning plants. South American cocaine is liquified in Trinidad and Tobago, for export in some cases. Airport security detected several attempts to smuggle liquified cocaine via commercial aircraft at Piarco International Airport during the year.

Drug Flow/Transit. Cocaine enters Trinidad primarily by small fishing boats from Venezuela. Small landing strips also have been discovered near marijuana fields. Cocaine is smuggled out in containers, commercial aircraft, small aircraft and private boats. A fair amount is also carried by drug couriers. There are no reliable statistics on the amount of cocaine that transits Trinidad, though estimates range up to 2,000 kgs per month.

Domestic Programs/Demand Reduction. The GOTT funds the National Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention Program (NADAPP) which coordinates activities of NGOs in demand reduction. Several NGOs, one of which receives USG funding support, run successful rehabilitation centers for addicts. As mentioned above, NGOs also provide drug prevention educational materials to local schools, and maintain community prevention programs. The USG is working jointly with a local NGO to help promote the "XL" Project. The project is designed to fund itself primarily with private contributions; the USG also plans to provide support.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs.

Policy Initiatives and Bilateral Cooperation. The USG and GOTT successfully negotiated and signed treaties relating to extradition and mutual legal assistance, and a bilateral maritime counternarcotics cooperation agreement, thus intensifying bilateral cooperation. The USG is assisting the GOTT to update laws to more effectively prosecute drug traffickers and to establish a counternarcotics task force designed to aid in the successful investigation and prosecution of drug­related offenses. The USG also provides assistance for the establishment of a Caribbean­wide regional witness security program.

The USG is providing the GOTT with radar equipment for six installations to allow the detection of aircraft and boats engaged in trafficking and with speedboats and patrol vessels to intercept seaborne traffickers. The system is expected to be operational in the first quarter of 1997. The USG provided two additional seized or excess speedboats to the GOTT in September, for a total of six. The USG has provided the Trinidad and Tobago police boots, bullet­proof vests, and other equipment for use in their marijuana eradication operations. The USG intends to provide the GOTT with fixed­wing aircraft for air­to­ground surveillance in its marijuana eradication and maritime interdiction efforts. The USG plans to assist the GOTT in eradicating marijuana by providing equipment to police units for eradication activities.

The USG supports the anti­money laundering activities of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) headquartered in Trinidad. In June, an asset seizure/forfeiture conference was held in Trinidad, co­sponsored by the USG and the GOTT. The USG works closely with relevant GOTT officials to provide advice and technical assistance to help update asset seizure/forfeiture laws.

The USG supports NGO demand reduction activity via funding for the drug rehabilitation project and sponsorship of Project Excel ("XL").

The Road Ahead. The USG, in cooperation with the UK, is working with the GOTT to establish a counternarcotics task force, is supporting the GOTT's efforts to implement a regional witness security program, and is providing assistance to update the Trinidad and Tobago legal system. In January 1997, the GOTT hosted a USG­funded Caribbean regional seminar on conducting financial investigations to uncover money laundering.

The GOTT at the highest levels has stated its commitment to combat money laundering and is very receptive to assistance in this area. The USG will also assist the GOTT with implementation of its asset forfeiture laws. The DEA has approved the establishment of an office in Trinidad and Tobago, in response to the GOTT's request.

I. Regional Summary

The seven countries of the eastern Caribbean ­­ Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines ­­ serve as a key transit zone for illegal narcotics entering the US. The DEA estimates that over seven mt of cocaine per month are smuggled through the eastern Caribbean, making the region the second largest cocaine gateway to the US. However, there is no evidence that drugs transiting any one eastern Caribbean country have a significant effect on the US. The region also has become a key transshipment point to Europe, accounting for 30 percent of drug shipments to the UK. St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and Dominica produce substantial amounts of marijuana. Drug use and abuse are increasing within the region, and drug­related crime is also rising. Of the seven countries, Antigua has been regarded as most vulnerable to money laundering, given its sizable offshore financial sector, but the government is now working closely with the US to reduce the potential for money laundering. Other countries in the region are expanding offshore banking activities and could become targets of money launderers in the absence of strengthened regulation.

These island nations' location astride traditional trafficking routes, along with their rugged and inadequately patrolled coastlines, high volume of international travelers, and extensive air and sea connections, make them particularly attractive targets for trafficking organizations. Problems of fragile economies, high unemployment, limited law enforcement resources and capabilities, and susceptibility of small political systems to corruption, increase the vulnerability of eastern Caribbean countries to trafficker manipulation. Consequently, drug trafficking and money laundering have emerged as serious threats to the political stability and integrity of eastern Caribbean countries.

Eastern Caribbean governments are aware of the dangers posed by the drug trade to their institutions and people, and most understand the threat to their sovereignty and territorial integrity posed by drug traffickers. A CARICOM Heads of Government meeting in Barbados in December concluded that "narcotics trafficking, and its associated evils of money laundering, gun smuggling, corruption of public officials, criminality, and drug abuse constitute the major security threat to the Caribbean today." In recognition of these dangers, eastern Caribbean governments took significant steps over the past year, including strengthening police drug squads and coast guards, participating in counterdrug operations, passing stronger antidrug and money laundering legislation, and concluding agreements and treaties to broaden and enhance law enforcement cooperation with the US and other regional partners.

A UNDCP­sponsored Caribbean regional drug conference, held in Barbados in 1996, produced a strong consensus among Caribbean nations on a comprehensive plan of action against drug trafficking and abuse. The plan encompasses law enforcement, maritime cooperation, antidrug and money laundering legislation, demand reduction, and activities of national drug councils. Specifically, the plan of action calls for enhanced law enforcement cooperation through improved exchange of information within the region; expansion of maritime cooperation agreements; toughened and harmonized drug laws and updated investigative techniques; expanded drug education and treatment; and improvements in the operational capabilities of drug bodies. Since the conference, donors have been coordinating efforts through the Bridgetown Mini­Dublin Group and working with local governments to implement the plan.