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International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1996 Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State Washington, DC, March 1997

Introduction

The diversion of chemicals from legitimate commerce to illicit drug manufacture cannot be prevented on an individual country basis; there are too many alternative source countries for adept traffickers to turn to when effective controls deny them chemicals from one particular country. Nor can chemical diversion control be only the responsibility of chemical source countries; importing countries where diversion takes place must cooperate in efforts to ensure that their imports of drug precursor and essential chemicals are for legitimate purposes.

Developing the necessary cooperation among chemical source countries and between chemical source countries and chemical importing countries to curtail chemical diversion has been the principal international policy­level objective of the USG in chemical control. We are seeking to increase recognition of the need for cooperation, and working with other major chemical source and importing countries to develop mutually agreed procedures to achieve it.

Diversion Tactics

Traffickers use the following tactics, exploiting the noted legal and regulatory weaknesses, to circumvent national chemical control laws and regulations.

Chemicals are diverted to illicit drug manufacture from domestic chemical production. This requires the capacity to manufacture the needed chemicals coupled with poor domestic controls on them.

Chemicals are imported legally into the drug­producing country with a valid import permit and are subsequently diverted. In this case, the importing country does not adequately investigate the legitimate end­use of the chemicals before issuing the import permit, and the exporting country makes no independent effort to ensure legitimate end­use, accepting the import permit at face value.

Chemicals are imported into a neighboring country, diverted, and smuggled into the drug­producing country. This occurs due to lax border controls and inadequate efforts by the chemical source and conduit countries to determine legitimate end­use before authorizing the shipment and import.

• Chemicals are manufactured in one country, diverted from domestic commerce, and smuggled into neighboring drug­producing countries. Inadequate internal controls and weak border security make this type of diversion possible.
• Chemicals are shipped to countries or regions where no systems exist to control precursor and essential chemicals. This occurs because some chemical source countries do not insist that exports of these chemicals be only to countries that have in place viable, country­wide regulatory systems.

All these methods are embellished, or masked, by the use of front companies, false invoicing, mislabelling, use of free trade areas, multiple transshipments, bribery, and any other device that will conceal the nature of the product or the ultimate recipient. Also, as authorities implement measures to prevent diversion by one method or from one source, traffickers react by shifting among diversion methods and source countries. Smuggling continues to increase as international cooperation among enforcement authorities enhances the effectiveness of controls over import and export transactions.

An additional complicating factor for chemical control is that many of the essential chemicals used for heroin and cocaine manufacture, such as acetic anhydride, acetone and hydrochloric acid, have widespread industrial uses and are traded internationally in vast quantities from many source countries. The pharmaceutical­type precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of synthetic drugs are less widely traded and more closely controlled, but much smaller quantities are needed for synthetic drug manufacture.

Recycling of solvents is another tactic used by some traffickers to reduce the impact of international chemical controls. The process involves either distillation or a filtration/drying method to remove waste products from solvents. Recycling cannot be used for acids, alkaline materials or oxidizing agents, the other types of chemicals used in cocaine processing. The extent of solvent recycling is unknown, but it cannot be utilized until the solvents have been diverted using one of the methods noted above. The result is to "multiply" the impact of the initial diversion.

1996 Chemical Control Developments

The 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 UN Convention) is the fundamental instrument for international counternarcotics cooperation. Article 12 of that Convention sets out the basic obligations of signatories in chemical control, and the tables in its Annex identify the 22 chemicals most necessary to drug manufacture and, therefore, subject to control.

Many major chemical source and drug producing countries have laws and regulations to fulfill their chemical control obligations under the 1988 UN Convention. Many of these are compatible, being based either on the 1990 Model Chemical Regulations of the Inter­American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) or the 1991 recommendations of the G­7 Chemical Action Task Force.

Therefore, the foundation for international cooperation exists. Its essential elements are communication between enforcement authorities, respect for each others' denials of authorizations to export (so traffickers cannot acquire chemicals from another source country), and common ground rules for handling transactions with sensitive drug producing areas.

There are, however, fundamental differences of approach to the implementation of national chemical control laws and regulations that can hinder multilateral cooperation. Chemical diversion control is basically the regulation of commerce in key drug­essential chemicals to ensure that these chemicals will be used for legitimate purposes and will not be diverted to illicit drug manufacture. The vast majority of transactions in these chemicals are legitimate. No crime has been committed.

Many governments, therefore, regard chemical diversion control as a commercial issue to be handled by ministries of commerce or industry, with the attendant, traditional bias towards facilitating commerce and protecting trade secrecy. In some countries, health ministries are also involved as regulators of the pharmaceutical­type precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of psychotropic drugs such as LSD and methamphetamine.

Law enforcement and intelligence, however, are among the essential sources of information for the identification of illicit activities, and the individuals and companies engaged in such activites, both for the purposes of denying them chemicals and investigating and prosecuting them for their crimes. The multilateral sharing of information among law enforcement agencies is part of the process. It is done with the implicit understanding that law enforcement and intelligence information is inherently confidential and will be protected accordingly by all agencies involved.

Law enforcement cooperation in chemical control has been easier to achieve than regulatory cooperation. It is a natural extension of traditional cooperation among law enforcement agencies and, as the value and effectiveness of chemical control becomes more accepted by law enforcement, cooperation in this area is increasing.

The challenge to expanding international cooperation in chemical control is to meld its regulatory and law enforcement aspects. The USG is in a favorable position, since both are handled by one agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration. Inevitably, we interact with other governments where chemical control efforts are divided among two or more ministries.

In the past year, law enforcement officials of the Czech Republic and Switzerland have been very helpful in working with the USG and others to control commerce in ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, the key precursors for methamphetamine. Bolivia has developed good working relations in chemical control with resident DEA agents and the authorities of surrounding countries, most notably Chile, a primary chemical source country for Bolivia.

Nevertheless, in many countries the regulatory decisions (e.g. whether to authorize the export of a regulated chemical) are made by non­law enforcement agencies where this type of informal cooperation and information exchange is more difficult. Instead, such agencies prefer that cooperation be governed by formal bilateral agreements, influenced by commercial considerations.

While these agreements are useful in preventing diversion from chemical commerce between the parties, they can limit the multilateral information exchange required for effective chemical control. A frequent provision of such agreements is a restriction on sharing the information exchanged to the parties to the agreements. This limits the multilateral sharing of information that is needed to prevent traffickers, when denied by the parties, from successfully turning for chemicals to non­parties that lack the information that resulted in the denial.

The USG is urging a pragmatic approach to multilateral cooperation in chemical control by regulatory and law enforcement agencies. In February 1996, within the context of the Dublin Group (EU member states, Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, and the US), the USG, with the help and cooperation of the Government of Japan, organized a meeting in Vienna, Austria of interested Dublin Group members to consider practical measures to improve cooperation, particularly information sharing. There was considerable unanimity that broader information exchange would enhance the abilities of participating governments in the implementation of their national chemical control laws and regulations, particularly in making decisions on questionable shipments. There remained, however, concern over the protection of commercial information that might be exchanged, and a recognition that there are no existing channels for exchanging it on a multilateral basis.

In July 1996, DEA organized a conference in Bangkok, Thailand on chemical control communications with the participation of some of the major chemical source countries that are not Dublin Group members. The conference reached many of the same conclusions as the February meeting, and identified the same obstacles to expanding cooperation.

An additional concern is cooperation in controlling chemical commerce in areas where there is no government capable of implementing chemical controls, or where governments have only a limited regulatory and law enforcement infrastructure to implement them. Afghanistan is an example of the former; the western Amazon Basin an example of the latter.

In January 1996, DEA organized, with the support of the European Commission and the cooperation of the Government of Brazil, a chemical control meeting in Rio de Janeiro. Six South American countries attended. One of the key agenda items was how to control chemical commerce in the Amazon River basin, particularly its remote western areas. One result of the meeting was agreement by representatives of Brazil, Peru and Colombia to form a tri­border intelligence committee to share information and improve coordination of enforcement efforts.

To address some of the problems identified by the Vienna, Bangkok and Rio de Janeiro meetings, the USG has developed an informal initiative of multilateral cooperation to broaden international participation in chemical control, and to avoid the strictures of formal agreements. Participants would work together to:

• identify emerging problems, including identification of non­regulated chemicals used to manufacture illicit drugs, and common approaches to them,
• develop complementary approaches for dealing with shipments of critical chemicals to geographic areas of special concern because of exceptionally high risk for diversion or difficulty in verifying legitimacy,
• exchange information on questionable shipments on a real­time, confidential basis,
• inform each other about denials of shipments to prevent "shopping," and
• respect each others' denials by not authorizing transactions denied by others.

Countries would participate on a voluntary basis with the understandings that:

• they can decide how much information they will exchange depending on the case in question (this is primarily to protect sources of information and on­going sensitive investigations),
• they can decide with which countries they will share information (for the same reasons), and
• the information would be exchanged only between regulatory and law enforcement agencies and would be used solely for the purpose of enforcing national chemical control laws and regulations (to prevent the inappropriate dissemination of the information).

President Clinton in his September 24, 1996 address to the United Nations General Assembly urged this type of informal cooperation to deny chemicals to drug producers. The USG used a February 11­14, 1997 international conference of chemical source countries in Prague, Czech Republic organized by the Drug Enforcement Administration, with the support of the European Commission and the cooperation of the Government of the Czech Republic, to launch this initiative.

Chemical control has been firmly accepted in the international community as an essential element of a comprehensive counternarcotics strategy. Authorities recognize that it can be more cost­effective than stopping drugs following their manufacture and entry into clandestine criminal channels. In 1996, countries and multilateral organizations continued to make progress in establishing the multilateral, cooperative procedures required for effective implementation of national systems for chemical control.

Country reports have been prepared on the major source countries for chemicals used in the manufacture of illicit narcotics. The countries in this section are those with large chemical manufacturing and trading industries that have significant chemical trade with drug­producing regions, and those considered to be sources of chemicals diverted from domestic production or imports for local illicit drug manufacture or smuggling into neighboring drug­manufacturing countries. Many other countries manufacture and trade in precursor and essential chemicals, some of which are diverted to illicit drug manufacture, but they are not now considered major source countries. These designations are reviewed annually.

Because of the important role drug­manufacturing countries have in narcotics chemical control, a separate section summarizes the status of chemical control efforts in the countries where chemicals are diverted to significant illicit cocaine and heroin manufacture.

The 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 UN Convention) is the major agreement for international cooperation in chemical diversion control. It includes provisions for maintaining records of transactions in the 22 precursor and essential chemicals listed in the Annex to the Convention.

MAJOR CHEMICAL SOURCE COUNTRIES

Chemical diversion control within the European Union is regulated by two European Community (EC) regulations binding on all 15 member states. The first regulation, issued in 1990, meets the chemical control provisions of the 1989 UN Convention. The second regulation, issued in 1992, amended the first to incorporate the more comprehensive recommendations of the G­7 Chemical Action Task Force. The EC regulations include provisions for record keeping on transactions in the chemicals listed in the 1988 UN Convention, require a system of permits or declarations for exports and imports of regulated chemicals, and authorize governments to suspend chemical shipments. EU member states implement the regulations through national laws and regulations.

The EC regulations govern the regulatory aspects of chemical diversion control. Member states remain responsible for the criminal aspects, investigating and prosecuting violators of the national laws and regulations implementing the EC regulations.

The administrative arm of the EU, the European Commission, is a major contributor to international cooperation in chemical control. It is seeking through bilateral agreements between the EC and individual Latin American countries to increase the effectiveness of diversion control between EU member states and the Latin American signatories. In 1996, an agreement was signed with Mexico to complement earlier agreements with Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.

The EC and the US are negotiating a chemical control agreement. The major concern of the US and the EC and its member states is not diversion from our bilateral chemical trade, but diversion from our respective chemical trade with third countries, especially in drug­producing areas. Therefore, the agreement is designed to assist all parties in implementing their laws and regulations to prevent this diversion.

Germany and The Netherlands are the two European countries with large chemical manufacturing sectors and the most significant trade with drug­producing areas.

Germany is the world's largest producer of pharmaceuticals, and the large German chemical industry produces and/or trades in virtually all types of precursor and essential chemicals.

The German chemical industry is well­regulated. Germany is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, and it has implemented the EC chemical regulations which meet the chemical control provisions of the Convention. The German chemical and pharmaceutical industry generally complies with these regulations.

In the first nine months of 1996, consumption of amphetamines and designer drugs in Germany almost doubled over the same period in 1995. Although most of these drugs are smuggled into the country, German authorities are working to improve their control over their precursor chemicals to curb domestic production.

US/German cooperation in chemical control continues to be close and effective. As part of this cooperation, information and records are shared on suspicious shipments and criminal activities related to chemical diversion.

The Netherlands is a major chemical manufacturing and trading country and, as such, attracts traffickers seeking precursor and essential chemicals for illicit drug manufacture. Foreign traffickers seeking industrial­type essential chemicals for heroin and cocaine manufacture have been a traditional problem. There is also diversion of pharmaceutical­type precursor chemicals for the domestic production of synthetic drugs, particularly ecstasy.

The Government of the Netherlands (GON) has strong programs to meet the threat of chemical diversion. A party to the 1988 UN Convention, it has laws and regulations based on the European Community regulations meeting the chemical control provisions of the Convention. The GON is placing special emphasis on stemming the production of synthetic drugs, including expanding the staff of the Economic Control Service which investigates the flow of regulated chemicals.

Cooperation between US and Dutch enforcement agencies in chemical control is good. It is informal and based on normal law enforcement liaison, and includes procedures for sharing of records of transactions in regulated chemicals.

Argentina. The chemical control situation changed little in 1996. Argentina produces virtually all the chemicals required for cocaine manufacture, and has limited control over them.

Argentina is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, and a 1989 law meets the Convention's requirements for record keeping and reporting, import and export licensing, and the authority to suspend shipments. A 1991 Presidential Decree requires all manufacturers, importers and exporters of regulated chemicals to be registered with the Secretariat for the Prevention of Drug Abuse and Narcotics Trafficking.

The Decree, however, has no similar requirement or procedure for the registration of hundreds of chemical distributors, and chemicals are sold locally on the open market without restrictions. The size of the Argentine chemical industry, the open domestic markets, and a largely unpatrolled border with Bolivia make diversion and supply to Bolivian traffickers a relatively easy and hazard­free operation.

Argentine authorities do share chemicals records they have with U.S. law enforcement authorities in the course of normal law enforcement cooperation. However, DEA reassigned its chemical diversion investigator from Argentina in 1996 because the opportunities for cooperation were better elsewhere.

Brazil, South America's largest producer of chemicals, took a number of steps in 1996 to better control commerce in drug­essential chemicals. The principal chemicals subject to diversion have been ether and acetone. These have been diverted from domestic commerce and smuggled into neighboring Bolivia, Colombia and Peru for illicit cocaine manufacture. Brazilian precursor and essential chemicals have also been, to a lesser extent, diverted to illicit drug manufacture in Brazil.

Brazil is a party to the 1988 UN Convention. In 1996, regulations were promulgated to implement a chemical control law, passed in 1995. The law places 11 chemicals under control, sets minimum thresholds of half a liter or 400 grams for reporting and record keeping on transactions, provides for import and export licensing, and fixes substantial administrative penalties, including seizure and fines, for non­compliance. Manufacturers, distributors, importers, exporters, recyclers, and pharmacies are subject to these provisions. They pay a registration fee, eighty percent of which is available to the police for chemical control and drug enforcement activities.

US and Brazilian authorities cooperate on chemical control within the context of the US/Brazil counternarcotics agreement. Information sharing is part of this cooperation. Brazil also hosted, in January 1996, a DEA­sponsored meeting on chemical controls in Rio De Janeiro attended by six South American countries and European Union representatives. Agreement was reached to expand cooperation in monitoring chemical movements in the Amazon Basin, particularly the strategic Brazil/Colombia/Peru tri­border area.

Mexico manufactures and imports precursor and essential chemicals used in the production of heroin, cocaine and synthetic drugs. It is a primary entry point for European and Asian ephedrine and pseudoephedrine used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Mexico is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, and has laws and regulations that implement partially the Convention's chemical control provisions. In May 1996, the government modified the criminal code to criminalize trafficking in and profiting from the sale of chemicals used for drug manufacture. The legislation mandates the forfeiture of assets and profits derived from trafficking in these chemicals. In 1996, the Government of Mexico (GOM) signed a chemical control agreement with the European Community.

The Secretariat of Health is responsible for the control of imports and exports of some of the precursor chemicals (i.e. those used for the manufacture of synthetic drugs) included in the Annex to the 1988 UN Convention. There is no specific record keeping and reporting requirement for all 22 chemicals in the 1988 UN Convention, nor authority for officials to suspend or seize shipments of all the listed chemicals. A system of permits or declarations exists for some but not all chemical exports.

In May 1996, the USG and the GOM formally established a Bilateral Chemical Control Working Group. Chemical control cooperation increased during the year, particularly with regard to ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and phenylpropanolamine (not a 1988 UN Convention chemical but one used as a substitute), the primary precursors for methamphetamine manufacture. There are procedures for sharing of information.

China stepped up monitoring and control of precursor and essential chemicals in 1996 to counter increased trafficker attempts to acquire chemicals for illicit drug manufacture. The two major problem areas have been diversion from precursor chemical exports, particularly ephedrine, and smuggling of heroin­essential chemicals into Burma.

China is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has regulations meeting the Convention's provisions for record keeping and reporting, import/export controls, and seizures, for the 22 chemicals listed in the Convention. However, the political decentralization that China has undergone devolved greater authority to the provinces for chemical control. The provinces, including the important Yunnan Province on the Burmese border, are considering legislation to tighten provincial­level controls.

The US/Chinese dialogue on chemical control increased in 1996. Senior DEA diversion control officials had a successful visit to Beijing for talks with their counterparts. The PRC reciprocated by sending officials from the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry for Trade and Economic Cooperation, and the State Pharmaceutical Administration to the United States for briefings and demonstrations of US chemical control techniques. One result of the exchanges was tentative agreement to establish direct communications for information exchange. At present, there is no formal procedure for sharing of information and records.

India. In 1996, the Government of India (GOI) made significant progress in controlling precursor and essential chemicals produced by the country's large chemical industry. However, India, although a party to the 1988 UN Convention does not have legislation meeting all the Convention's chemical control provisions, or covering all 22 chemicals listed in its annex.

The chemicals most subject to diversion in India are acetic anhydride, N­acetylantranilic acid, ephedrine, and pseudoephedrine. Acetic anhydride, a key heroin essential chemical, is smuggled into neighboring Pakistan and Burma for heroin manufacture and used domestically in the processing of the limited quantities of opium diverted from licit cultivation. N­acetylantranilic acid is a key precursor chemical for the manufacture of the synthetic drug methaqualone, significant quantities of which continue to be manufactured in India and smuggled to overseas markets, primarily in Africa. Ephedrine is a key precursor chemical for the synthetic drug methamphetamine, a drug of growing concern for the United States.

The GOI has had controls on the manufacture, sale, transport, import, and export of acetic anhydride particularly in the sensitive Indo­Pakistan and Indo­Burma border areas. The GOI, in 1996, imposed the same controls on N­acetylanthranilic acid. In 1996, seizures of diverted acetic anhydride were down to 4,052 liters from 7,962 liters in 1995, continuing a downward trend that began in 1994. Indian authorities attribute the decline to better controls, and industry cooperation, that are stemming diversion of the chemical from legitimate commerce to illicit uses. Figures are not available on seizures of N­acetylantranilic acid, much smaller quantities of which are needed to manufacture methaqualone.

Indian authorities cooperate closely with DEA in controlling ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. They notify DEA of significant exports shipments, and have agreed not to allow any shipment to the U.S. until DEA issues a letter of non­objection. This allows DEA to review its information data bases to identify suspect consignees. Cooperation and information sharing with Indian authorities on controlling other chemicals is also good.

MAJOR COCAINE AND HEROIN PRODUCING COUNTRIES WITH SIGNIFICANT CHEMICAL DIVERSION

Bolivia must import almost all chemicals used in that country in the processing of coca leaf into cocaine base and cocaine hydrochloride. The principal exceptions are fuel and sulfuric acid used in maceration pits.

The primary source countries for chemicals are Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Peru. Bolivia has developed a close working relationship with Chile in chemical control and, in 1996, law enforcement agencies of the two countries, working together, dismantled the two largest chemical smuggling organizations identified to date as supplying Bolivia. Bolivia has also begun discussions with Argentina to strengthen chemical control cooperation.

Bolivia is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has the legal basis for implementing its chemical control provisions. It has been most effective in the law enforcement aspects of chemical control. Bolivia's chemical police (GISUQ) has made tremendous progress. It has fully staffed offices in four cities, each of which has seized multi­ton shipments of chemicals intended for Bolivian drug labs. GISUQ was instrumental in shutting down the smuggling operations noted above.

The Bolivian agency charged with registering and licensing trade in controlled chemicals has been less effective. However, its current leadership is now cooperating with the USG in the design and implementation of an inter­connected computer database that will permit more effective monitoring and audits of trade in controlled chemicals, with real time access available to law enforcement agencies.

Colombia is the world's largest producer of cocaine and a significant producer of heroin. The annual chemical requirements for this illicit trade may exceed 12,000 metric tons. The primary source is illegal diversion from chemical imports. Chemicals smuggled across the Colombia/Venezuela border and through the western Amazon River Basin are also used.

Colombia has chemical control laws and regulations meeting or exceeding the requirements of the 1988 UN Convention, to which it is a party. Implementation is split among various agencies. A regulatory mechanism was established through the Colombian National Drug Directorate (DNE) which continues to improve and refine its law enforcement mandate. However, the DNE's effectiveness was curtailed in late 1995 when import permits were placed outside its jurisdiction. In 1996, it was able to gain some control over the permit process.

The Anti­Narcotics Division (DANTI) of the Colombian National Police (CNP) works closely with the DNE in the enforcement aspects of chemical control. In 1996, the CNP, using the state­of­emergency declaration, succeeded in stopping the shipment of gasoline and cement to Colombia's principal coca growing/coca processing regions. (These are not regulated chemicals, but they are used in processing coca leaf to coca paste.) Also in 1996, joint CNP/military interdiction units seized over 73 metric tons of solid chemical precursors and 800,000 gallons of liquid chemical precursors.

The Government of Colombia (GOC) cooperates closely with international law enforcement agencies and United Nations organizations in chemical control issues, including interdiction, regulatory inspections, destruction of clandestine labs, and training. Legislation passed in 1996 strengthened the DNE and CNP's enforcement capabilities with regard to licensing and control of companies that import chemicals. However, no official record­keeping mechanism has been developed.

Peru. The Government of Peru (GOP) has made a major commitment to chemical control. Peru is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has laws and regulations meeting or exceeding its chemical control provisions. Peruvian authorities work closely with US law enforcement agencies in chemical control, including information sharing.

The GOP is responding to a genuine threat. Cocaine base has been Peru's principal drug export, but increased seizures of cocaine hydrochloride and the existence of labs to manufacture it indicate that Peruvian traffickers are refining the cocaine base, increasing traffickers' chemical requirements.

Among the recent GOP initiatives to meet the threat is a joint police, customs and Ministry of Industry Task Force to exchange information and share a computer network to track chemicals. The GOP is moving to establish a riverine drug and essential chemical interdiction system with participation from the police and armed forces, and at a January 1996 chemical control conference organized by DEA, Peruvian, Brazilian, and Colombian authorities agreed to expand cooperation in monitoring chemical shipments in the critical tri­border area of the western Amazon basin.

Burma is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has laws and regulations implementing the Convention's major chemical control provisions. In 1996, seizures of the key heroin­essential chemical, acetic anhydride, more than doubled to 2,668 gallons from 1,159 gallons in 1995. Burma remains, however, the world's largest source of illicit heroin, indicating that traffickers continue to obtain the chemicals they require.

Authorities also seized, for the first time, ephedrine ­­ more than three tons of it. Ephedrine is a key precursor chemical for amphetamine and methamphetamine. The seizure of the ephedrine and more than five million amphetamine tablets is ringing alarm bells about future stimulants and chemical diversion problems.

Weak implementation of chemical control laws and geography combine to facilitate chemical diversion. China and India produce significant quantities of acetic anhydride which can be moved across remote and porous borders into equally remote areas of Burma where drugs are manufactured. Thailand is a lesser source of acetic anhydride. The three tons of ephedrine seized apparently originated in China.

Pakistan is a major manufacturer of heroin. There is one licit producer of acetic anhydride, a key heroin essential chemical, in Pakistan, and controls over its production are adequate. It produces about one quarter of the country's total legitimate requirements.

The bulk of the chemicals used in the manufacture of heroin are smuggled in via traditional smuggling routes through porous borders, or through the port of Karachi. Relatively small quantities of chemicals enter from India via train and desert caravans. In December 1996, authorities seized approximately 1650 liters of acetic anhydride that reportedly originated in China.

Pakistan is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but it does not have a chemical control regime meeting all the chemical control provisions of the Convention. The "Control of Narcotic Substances Ordinance" which includes language listing chemicals as equal to illicit drugs for purposes of arrest, seizure and prosecution has been approved by the Senate and will be considered by the National Assembly when an elected government is in place.

In 1996, seizures of smuggled and diverted acetic anhydride dropped significantly to 1,901 liters from 5,496 liters in 1995. There were no concrete advances in improving cooperation with India to stem cross­border chemical smuggling, although counternarcotics discussions continue.

Turkey is not a major precursor and essential chemical source country, but it has an increasingly significant role in processing opiate raw material into heroin. The chemicals for this processing are smuggled into the country or diverted after being legally imported.

Although a party to the 1988 UN Convention, Turkey does not have controls on all 22 chemicals included in the Convention's Annex. The most strictly controlled chemical is the heroin­essential chemical acetic anhydride. Turkish authorities intercepted 65 tons of the chemical from January through October 1996. In all of 1995, 52.8 tons of acetic anhydride were seized.

US/Turkish cooperation in chemical control, including information sharing, continued to be good in 1996.

[end of document]

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