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International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1996 Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State Washington, DC, March 1997

SOUTHWEST ASIA

I. Summary

According to USG estimates, Afghanistan is the world's second largest producer of opium poppy. The US estimates that production in 1996 was 1,230 mt of opium, down from 1,250 mt in 1995. Continued warfare, extreme poverty and the absence of a central government with effective administrative control over the entire country precluded meaningful progress on narcotics control in Afghanistan during 1996. By the end of the year, over 90 percent of Afghanistan's opium production was in lands controlled by the Taliban, a movement that started among religious students over two years ago. In November, the Taliban officially condemned use and production of drugs, but the USG received contradictory reports about Taliban intent. Taliban leaders told USG officials that they are not prepared to enforce a ban on poppy cultivation until farmers have been given the opportunity to earn an alternative income. There was no indication that major narcotics traffickers were arrested or that efforts were undertaken to interdict large shipments of narcotic drugs or precursor chemicals anywhere in Afghanistan in 1996. Afghanistan is a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

I. Status of Country.

According to USG figures, Afghanistan is still the second largest opium producer in the world, with about 30 percent of global production. Afghanistan's porous borders with Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia, combined with its rugged topography and lack of law enforcement, make it one of the least controlled narcotics trafficking areas in the world. Since little remains of Afghanistan's banking and commercial structure, its war-torn economy cannot accommodate sophisticated money laundering schemes. Numerous heroin and morphine base laboratories operate along the border with Pakistan. Major shipments of precursor chemicals reportedly enter Afghanistan from Central Asia via the borders at Termez and Torghundi; they are then shipped to heroin refineries in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Precursor chemicals in large quantities also have entered Afghanistan from Europe and India via the Persian Gulf States and Ariana Afghan Airlines flights. Although reliable figures were unavailable, abuse of hard drugs does not appear to be a significant problem.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. No national government exists in Afghanistan, so no country-wide initiatives were undertaken during the year. The Taliban movement, which at year-end controlled approximately two-thirds of the country, announced in November its willingness to recognize Afghanistan's responsibilities as a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention. The Taliban representatives condemned use and production of illicit drugs, but took few steps to limit production and trafficking of narcotics, and, in fact, rely on opium tax as a substantial source of income.

Accomplishments. There were no reliable indicators of significant drug control accomplishments anywhere in Afghanistan during 1996. Despite the modest two percent decrease in cultivation of opium poppy, cultivation remained widespread. Sporadic civil war and the absence of an effective central government, and little commitment by any government authority to strong antinarcotics action resulted in no meaningful effort to control narcotics production and trafficking. While the Taliban banned opium production in late 1996, it made no effort to enforce this ban. It also condemned cannabis cultivation. Destruction of 100 hectares of cannabis in Maywand district of Kandahar was confirmed by Mercy Corps International (MCI). There were reliable reports that the Taliban punished some hashish users.

Law Enforcement Efforts. There was no consistent narcotics law enforcement effort in Afghanistan in 1996. In two separate enforcement actions, the Taliban arrested a total of five heroin traffickers at the airport in Jalalabad (at least four of whom later were released) and claimed to have destroyed heroin laboratories in Nimroz and Nangarhar provinces and arrested the lab operators. The lab in Nangarhar, however, resumed operation. No known action was taken to interdict caravans transporting large shipments of opiates and hashish or to control shipments of precursor chemicals into Afghanistan. Law enforcement infrastructure is virtually non-existent. Punishments for narcotics offenses tried by Taliban courts are based on strict shariat (Islamic) law. Judicial authorities have wide discretion in determining punishment for crimes like drug smuggling, but were fairly consistent with penalties for drug use.

Morphine-base labs located in Afghanistan along the border with the Pakistani province of Baluchistan operate without interference. That area has been under Taliban control for over two years.

Corruption. There are persistent reports that the leaders of all the warring Afghan factions actively encourage, facilitate, or engage in the illicit production or distribution of narcotic drugs in order to obtain funds for their cause. Reports from many sources state that the Taliban and other factions tax opium poppy and other agricultural products in areas they control. Major drug traffickers reportedly associate with leaders of all Afghan factions.

Treaties and Agreements. Afghanistan is a party to the 1988 UN Convention. The UNDCP tripartite agreement with Pakistan and Iran will include Afghanistan when a central government is formed and peaceful conditions prevail.

Cultivation and Production. USG data show a 2.04 percent decrease in the area of opium cultivation from 38,740 hectares in 1995 to 37,950 hectares in 1996. It indicates a 1.6 percent decrease in opium production from 1,250 mt in 1995 to 1,230 mt in 1996. UNDCP estimates show an increase in cultivation of 5.7 percent. According to UNDCP's figures, the average estimated yield for 1995-96 was 39.56 kgs per hectare. UNDCP has been able to conduct yield studies in Afghanistan, which the USG has not been able to do for many years.

The two top opium poppy-growing provinces of Afghanistan were Helmand and Nangarhar. In 1995-96, approximately 57 percent of the total cultivated area was in Helmand and 22 percent in Nangarhar. According to USG figures, there was a 5.07 percent decrease in poppy planted in 1996 in Helmand province and a 9 percent increase in land under cultivation in Nangarhar. The increase in Nangarhar contrasts with a significant decrease in cultivation in that province during the 1994-95 season. The then governor and shura (ruling council) expected that the eradication effort would elicit funding from donors for alternative development within a few months. When funding failed to materialize, eradication ceased.

Available data show that, in 1995-96, farmgate prices for opium gum decreased, probably due to a glut in supply, and that shortages of staple food crops, such as wheat, increased prices for grains. As a result of the supply and demand situation, production leveled off in 1996 after dramatic annual increases during the early 90s.

Drug Flow/Transit. Heroin and morphine base are transported along the following routes: 1) from laboratories in southern Afghanistan to Turkey either through the Central Asian countries or through Iran; 2) from southern Afghanistan to Pakistan's Makran Coast where it is placed on ships and transported to Turkey; 3) from laboratories in eastern Afghanistan into Pakistan's North West Frontier Province; 4) from newly established laboratories in northern Afghanistan into the Central Asian countries; 5) from Nangarhar province's Jalalabad Airport to India; and 6) reportedly, via Balkh Air, a newly established airline operating from Mazar-E-Sharif to the central Asian countries.

Part IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. USG representatives made counternarcotics one of the most important areas of discussion with all Afghan faction leaders, but particularly the Taliban, stressing the need to crack down on trafficking, cultivation and production. The USG provided an additional $100,000 in support of the UNDCP Nangarhar Narcotics Control Unit and $200,000 for a continuation of crop substitution projects implemented by the American NGO, MCI, in Helmand province. The USG also earmarked $800,000 of its FY-96 contribution to UNDCP for projects in Afghanistan. The USG worked closely with UNDCP to coordinate proposed poppy control projects for 1997.

USG counternarcotics goals and objectives for Afghanistan include:

-- Decreasing poppy cultivation;
-- reducing the refining of opium through law enforcement and denial of precursor chemicals;
-- denying of safe-haven to narcotics processing laboratories;
-- arresting opium couriers and traffickers; and
-- increasing narcotics information from Afghanistan.

The Road Ahead. Reducing the cultivation of opium poppy, with the resultant decrease in trafficking, remains the USG's top priority. The USG will seek ways to advance it counternarcotics interests, including working with UNDCP and reputable NGOs to provide counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan. Although no national law enforcement entity exists, the USG plans to explore initiating a small project to train and equip some individuals at the provincial level. DEA will offer to exchange narcotics-related information with Afghan officials and will offer to conduct joint operations against major narcotics refineries and trafficking organizations.

I. Summary

Bangladesh is not a major producer of narcotics. Given its border with Burma, the world's largest opium producer, Bangladesh may be used increasingly as a drug transshipment point, but seizures have decreased. Bangladesh's efforts to intercept narcotics, either crossing its borders or within the country, are largely ineffective because of resource constraints and poor intra-governmental coordination. USG assistance funded training and communication equipment purchases in 1996. Bangladesh is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotics and its 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Convention on Narcotics. It has strict laws against producing, trafficking, or using illicit drugs.

II. Status of Country

Bangladesh borders two large opium producers, Burma and India, but is not itself a producer of commercial quantities of illicit drugs. This location, and its transportation links to Pakistan, make Bangladesh a potential narcotics transshipment point of serious concern. Largely unguarded and remote borders, and poor detection and interdiction capabilities make it difficult for the GOB to combat narcotics trafficking, or to obtain useful information on the extent of the problem. The Government of Bangladesh (GOB) uncovered no evidence of money laundering in Bangladesh. Bangladesh signed protocols calling for increased bilateral narcotics cooperation and worked toward better coordination and enhancement of counternarcotics capabilities within SAARC.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. This was the third year of a five-year master plan for drug control. The plan included provisions for improving compliance with the 1988 UN Convention and the 1990 SAARC Convention and for enacting legislation on asset forfeiture, controlled delivery, extradition, and international cooperation. A UNDCP program for Bangladesh focuses on demand reduction, drug abuse treatment, and the development of a long-term strategy for narcotics control efforts. The program enjoys solid support from the GOB, but progress in implementation has been slow.

The Narcotics Control Board (NCB) is a high-level, inter-ministerial council designed to set narcotics control policy and enhance coordination. The NCB met only once in 1996 to discuss legislation on extradition and money laundering, and other matters. On that occasion it approved a national survey on drug abuse, which is expected to be available in early 1997, and the allocation of $250,000 to the DNC to construct a laboratory for drug testing.

Law Enforcement. The Department of Narcotics Control (DNC) is the chief GOB narcotics law enforcement agency. Although the DNC, since its inception, has been hampered by insufficient human and material resources, as of December it had filled more than 1,000 of the approximately 1,300 positions allotted to it, and expected to fill the rest in the near future. DNC reported serious shortcomings in transport and other logistical support during the year. The Coast Guard, formed in 1994, has yet to make any significant contribution to narcotics interdiction, since it was not fully operational in 1996.

Compounding the lack of resources is the on-going lack of coordination among the various government agencies sharing responsibility for narcotics control (Police, Coast Guard, Border Patrol Forces, Customs, DNC, and the judiciary). Information sharing is deficient, although the GOB took some steps in 1996 to improve the situation: it now holds interagency meetings. However, the information exchange is limited to past seizures, rather than coordination of upcoming operations. There is no systematic method of compiling data, and statistics may not be reliable.

DNC records indicate 1996 seizures of heroin and cannabis decreased from the previous year. However, seizures of an injectable opiate, buprenurphin, smuggled from India, were more than double 1995 levels. It is more potent per dose and cheaper than both phensidyl and heroin, and is increasingly popular. A significant portion of the GOB's interdiction effort is devoted to phensidyl, a codeine-based cough syrup. Phensidyl is easier to track and intercept than other drugs. Most seizures involved heroin, cannabis, buprenurphin, or phensidyl cough syrup. Law enforcement officials detected no major trafficking schemes during the year. According to DNC records, authorities arrested 2,601 suspects on narcotics charges from January through November 30. Since DNC does not monitor the prosecution of narcotics cases, figures on the legal status of those arrested are not available.

DNC officials say there has been no movement since 1994 on a proposal to amend the 1990 Narcotics Control Act to encompass money laundering, extradition, and controlled delivery. Provisions for court ordered examination of financial records or confiscation of assets have been largely ineffective because of detailed burden of proof requirements which discourage poorly trained law enforcement officials from pursuing that avenue during investigations.

Corruption. There is corruption among narcotics enforcement officials, but its extent is unknown. Some GOB officials believe it is widespread and not limited to border areas. The DNC reports that in 1994 one policeman was suspended, and a border guard dismissed, for heroin and phensidyl trafficking. Initial disciplinary measures proceeded under regulations of the police and Bangladesh Rifles, respectively, and both cases are now in the courts.

Demand Reduction/Domestic Programs. Drug users in Bangladesh appear to be shifting from heroin to less expensive drugs. There has not yet been a survey of actual addiction rates. The GOB's campaign to increase drug awareness and reduce demand includes public meetings, television and radio announcements against drugs, and the publication of books and pamphlets on the dangers of drug abuse.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. The USG seeks to increase awareness of the narcotics threat within Bangladesh and to strengthen GOB agencies responsible for narcotics prevention and interdiction. The USG funded training for several GOB officers in the US and at regional seminars. US Customs conducted in-country training. The US also provided communications equipment to the DNC and Coast Guard, funded under the narcotics letter of agreement.

The Road Ahead. The primary US goal is to identify key areas for improvement in cross-border interdiction. In concert with other donor countries, the US will press the BDG to improve its intra-governmental communication and coordination efforts and focus resources on airport, border, and seaport interdiction efforts.

I. Summary

India is an important producer of licit narcotics, some illicit narcotics, and a crossroads for international narcotics trafficking. It is the world's only producer of licit gum opium. The GOI continues to tighten controls to curtail diversion of licit opium to illicit markets. Nevertheless, some opium, the exact amount of which is not known, is still diverted from legal production; there is illegal poppy cultivation as well. Located between the two main sources of illicitly grown opium, Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia, India is also a transit point for heroin. The Government of India (GOI) has made significant progress in controlling the production and export of narcotics chemical precursors produced by India's large chemical industry. Nevertheless, there are unauthorized exports of essential chemicals and of clandestinely manufactured methaqualone (Mandrax), a popular drug in Africa. The GOI has a cooperative relationship with DEA, and maintains a constructive high-level dialogue with the USG. Authorities have had limited success in prosecuting major narcotics offenders because of the lack of enforcement funding and weaknesses in the intelligence infrastructure.

India is a party to the 1988 UN Convention but has not yet enacted supporting legislation on money laundering or asset seizures under civil law. This supporting legislation is scheduled to be introduced in Parliament in the spring of 1997.

II. Status of the Country

India is the world's largest producer of legal opiates for pharmaceutical purposes and the only country that still produces gum opium for export rather than concentrate of poppy straw (CPS). Opium is produced legally in the states of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. At the end of 1995, the Chief Controller of the Factories estimated only 5-10 mt remained in stock until the next harvest. The opium poppy harvest from the 1995-96 crop year essentially just met pharmaceutical demand, and the opium stockpile at the end of 1996 remained minimal. While the GOI would like to rebuild the opium stockpile over the next several years to protect against crop failure, present trends in production and demand make that a difficult goal.

In its attempt to meet anticipated demand, the GOI increased licensed acreage for each of the past three years. Production in 1995-96 reached 849 mt (90 percent solids or commercial grade), and a slight rise is anticipated in the 1996-97 crop year due to the slightly greater area under cultivation. Nevertheless, supplies of licit opium in 1997 are expected to remain tight.

While criminal elements produce semi-refined heroin from both diverted legal opium and illegally-grown opium, no reliable data are available on the extent of this production. Poppies are grown illicitly in the Himalayan foothills of Kashmir and Uttar Pradesh, and in northeast India near the Bangladesh and Burmese borders in the states of Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Arunachal Pradesh. There are few current indications that such opiates find their way into the US. Heroin base ("brown sugar" heroin) is the domestic drug of choice, except in the northeast state of Manipur where injectable heroin is the most common. Needle sharing from the intravenous use of Southeast Asian heroin has spread the AIDs virus. "Brown Sugar" heroin, originating in India, is readily available in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives.

India produces acetic anhydride (AA) -- an essential chemical in the processing of heroin -- largely for the tanning industry. In 1993, the government imposed controls on the production, sale, transportation, import, and export of AA, especially near the Indo-Pak and Indo-Burma borders. These controls are reducing the illicit availability of the chemical.

India is also a transit route for illicit heroin, hashish, and morphine base from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma, and to a lesser extent, Nepal. The cannabis smuggled from Nepal is mainly consumed within India, but the other drugs mostly are destined for the West. The amount of Indian-origin heroin or other drugs that enter the US is not believed to be significant. Considerable trafficking continues in Indian-produced clandestinely manufactured methaqualone to southern and eastern Africa.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. The inter-governmental committee formed to draft money laundering legislation is now scheduled to introduce it in Parliament in the spring of 1997. The legislation is likely to take the form of an amendment to the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS) of 1985. Another amendment to the NDPS likely to be introduced at the same time includes measures to reform punishments for narcotics offenses (to make them less severe for modest offenses, thus increasing the chances of convictions). It also would allow property seizures on arrest rather than on conviction.

The list of substances covered by the drug law has been lengthened, and controls on precursor chemicals have been strengthened. To align Indian law more closely with recommendations of ECOSOC and the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the GOI brought all substances included in schedules III and IV of the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances under Indian import/export controls. In addition, the following new substances have been brought under controls: etryptamine, methcathinone, zipeprol, aminorex, brotizolam, and mesocarb. Regulations covering the precursor chemicals n-acetyl-anthranillic acid and AA have been amended to require sellers to establish the identity of buyers before sales can be completed.

The government undertook procedures to elevate the protocol rank of the Director General of the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) to the Special Secretary level, increasing the stature of the agency within the government.

To decrease the backlog of cases, the GOI again increased the number of special state courts for narcotics matters (50 percent funded by the federal government) from 75 in 1995 to 82 in 1996. Federal narcotics enforcement officials also now meet with their state government counterparts to share information on a quarterly basis.

Accomplishments. The Central Bureau of Narcotics (CBN) and the NCB, responsible respectively for coordinating licit and illicit drug control policies, actively seek to reduce trafficking. The government took further steps to discourage diversion of licit opium to the illegal market:

-- For the fifth consecutive year, the government raised the minimum yield of opium that licit farmers must deliver to the government in order to retain a license. In most cases farmers will be required to provide at least 48 kgs/ha in the 1996-97 crop year, compared with 46 kgs in the previous year. Cultivators must meet the minimum in the 1996-97 crop year or lose their licenses forever.

-- To increase control over licit opium production, offenses relating to embezzlement of opium by licensed cultivators have been put on par with the other trafficking offenses; convictions can result in ten to twenty years imprisonment and fines up to $6,000.

The NCB reports strong cooperation from industry in controlling the availability of precursor chemicals. A series of meetings by NCB with the chemical industry in 1996 produced a voluntary code of conduct among firms that is aiding the enforcement effort. NCB says that seizures of illegal precursor chemicals shipments declined in 1996, apparently because of the reduced illegal supplies available. Prices of illicit precursor chemicals have risen.

NCB opened three new offices in 1996, all along the border with Pakistan (Jammu, Chandigarh, and Ahmedabad). The NCB credits these offices, as well as increased coordination and information exchange with Pakistani authorities, with contributing to the increase in heroin seizures in this border region in 1996.

Despite these efforts, CBN and NCB officials have not always received the budgetary support needed to conduct a strong counternarcotics program. Under the auspices of the UN and with USG encouragement, counternarcotics officials of India and Pakistan continued to meet, most recently in September 1996. They agreed to speed the exchange of information and contacts and to consider joint counternarcotics operations. Narcotics representatives also participate in the quarterly meetings between the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) and the Pakistani Rangers. Some tangible results, mostly shared operational information, have come out of these meetings, but more cooperative enforcement actions are needed. There are periodic meetings with Burmese officials along the border; it is hoped will lead to more substantive future joint efforts. India maintains close liaison with other South Asian countries through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Drug Offenses Monitoring Desk (SCOMD) in Colombo.

Law Enforcement Efforts. In 1996, GOI authorities seized 1,090 kgs of heroin in 2,485 cases as compared to 1,678 kgs in 3,236 cases in 1995. Heroin from Southwest Asia has penetrated to the interiors of adjoining states: Punjabi, Rajasthan, Gujarat, and even metropolitan cities of Delhi and Mumbai. The traffickers carried reasonably large quantities of heroin. In a few significant cases the seizures were accompanied by large amounts of arms and ammunition.

Indian law enforcement agencies made 10,739 narcotics arrests in 1996 as compared with 14,673 narcotics arrests during 1995. Authorities arrested 136 foreigners in 1996 compared to 148 in 1995. In 1996, 9,569 persons were prosecuted and 1,830 persons were convicted. A further 63 suspects (usually well-known narcotics criminals) were detained without trial under special provisions of Indian law.

Authorities seized 5.8 mt of hashish in 1,501 cases during the year as compared to 3.6 mt in 2691 cases for 1995. They arrested many foreign nationals attempting to smuggle hashish to European destinations at the international airport at Delhi. During February 1996, Department of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) officials intercepted 179 bags, each containing 20 kgs of hashish, at the Tuticorin harbor.

Seizures of precursor chemicals continued to decline, apparently because of reduced illicit supplies available. Through September 1996, 3,088 liters of AA were seized in eight separate cases.

Indian authorities maintain close cooperation with the DEA, resulting in a number of identifications and significant seizures during the year. The DEA also assisted in the training of Indian enforcement officials by arranging training courses in both enforcement techniques and chemical analysis paid for by INL. The USG, however, would like to see a greater emphasis on investigation and prosecution of important figures in major trafficking organizations.

The GOI accords enforcement authority coordination a high priority. A senior inter-agency group meets quarterly, chaired by the Director General of the NCB. The GOI made considerable efforts to educate state and local law enforcement personnel about narcotics during the year.

The NCB reports that India participated in six controlled delivery operations in cooperation with enforcement officials outside India. In most of these operations India was only a transit point; both the sources of the narcotics and their ultimate destinations were outside India. The cooperation of Indian enforcement officials in pursuing leads in India ultimately led to the arrests of traffickers and the seizures of drugs in Germany, Austria, The Netherlands, the UK, and one of the former Soviet republics, according to the NCB.

While the number of regular NCB employees are small compared to the size of the country and the level of trafficking, there are several other enforcement agencies that contribute to the narcotics control effort in India, including the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI---the federal police force), the DRI (tax and customs revenue investigators), the BSF, the Customs and Central Excise Service, state excise tax authorities, and state police agencies. In fact, of the 7,155 drugs seizures made through September 1996, 6,828 were made by state agencies. Through September, the NCB and DRI made 40 and 5 seizures respectively, while the Customs and Central Excise made 81. BSF made 142 seizures in the same time period.

Corruption. The GOI does not, as a matter of policy, encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. The USG knows of no senior Indian official involved in such actions. Authorities filed numerous high-profile corruption charges against politicians, and the courts and investigators have been energized to address corruption. To date, none of the cases about which the USG is aware involves allegations of a narcotics-related aspect.

Media reports allege widespread corruption among police, government officials, and local politicians in a wide range of governmental activities, but successful prosecutions are rare. Criminal courts release some drug defendants without explanation or on weak legal grounds. The USG receives reports of narcotics-related corruption, but cannot independently verify its extent.

Agreement and Treaties. India is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, its 1972 Protocol, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, as well as the 1988 UN Convention. Most of the provisions in these conventions were implemented in India through the NDPS of 1985, amended in 1989.

India is a member of the regional convention of the member countries of SAARC on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. A conference on drug control under the auspices of the SAARC was held in May. India has bilateral agreements on drug trafficking with Pakistan, Mauritius, Afghanistan, and Burma. In addition, India has a bilateral agreement with the UK for mutual assistance in narcotics enforcement.

Pursuant to the US-India Narcotics Agreement of 1990, India and the US signed letters of agreement in 1992 and 1993 to improve India's interdiction capabilities and to tighten security at its opium production facilities. A 1931 extradition treaty between the US and UK, made applicable to India in 1942, still governs extradition of fugitives. However, the US and India have initialed the text of a new extradition treaty.

Cultivation and Production. India is the world's only export source of opium gum--as opposed to CPS--for legitimate pharmaceutical use; it produced 833 mt in 1995 and 849 mt in 1996 (at ten percent moisture/90 percent solids). Indian opium gum contains a high content of thebaine and other alkaloids essential to certain pharmaceuticals. Conversion to CPS processing is not economically viable.

Opium in India is cultivated and harvested under strict licensing and control, and the government tries to extract every gram from the cultivators. The area under licit poppy cultivation has been substantially reduced over the years (from 66,000 hectares in 1978 to 29,777 hectares for the 1996-97 crop year) but has recovered from its lowest levels in the early '90s due to exhaustion of the opium stock. Over the years, there has been some diversion into illicit channels from licensed poppy fields. Prices per kilo for illicit opium are perhaps 20-25 times the official price. Illicit opium finds a ready market, especially in the states of Punjabi, Orissa, West Bengal, Rajasthan, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra. Through September, authorities seized two mt of illegal opium.

Indian scientists have worked with US Department of agriculture scientists on the design of a survey to provide accurate data on crop yields. The USG offered to participate in a joint opium crop yield survey, but the GOI has not taken up the offer.

In addition to the diversion of licit opium, there is a problem of illicit poppy cultivation. The USG estimates that illicit cultivation declined to 3,100 ha in 1996 from 4,750 in 1995. Illicit opium production is estimated to have declined from 71 mt to 47 mt in the same period. Illicit opium is usually converted rapidly into morphine or heroin base, which is easier to sell and to smuggle than is opium; it also brings much higher profits. The USG supplied coordinates of suspected areas of illicit poppy cultivation, and the GOI carried out extensive field surveys and some random aerial surveys. Some of the surveys were carried out with the assistance of DEA representatives in India. These surveys, however, have located only a few examples of illicit cultivation.

Drug Flow and Transit. India is an important transshipment point for heroin from Southwest Asia and Southeast Asia. Heroin is smuggled from Pakistan and Burma, with some transshipped through Nepal. There were increased seizures by the Border Security Forces of heroin of Pakistani origin during the year. Most heroin shipped from India apparently is destined for Europe, and most seizures of heroin at the New Delhi airport are on flights bound for Europe. The amount of Indian-origin heroin bound for the US does not appear significant. The export of clandestinely manufactured methaqualone (Mandrax), particularly to South Africa, remains a serious problem. Bombay has been the preferred point of origin for shipments to Africa by both air and sea. The GOI notifies the DEA of any significant export shipment of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine and does not allow any shipment unless DEA issues a letter of non-objection.

Demand Reduction/Domestic Programs. GOI estimates of from one to five million domestic opium users, and about one million heroin addicts, were unchanged in 1996. The Health and Welfare Ministries, UNDCP, and police groups support treatment and rehabilitation centers. Voluntary agencies conduct demand reduction and public awareness programs under grants from the Indian Government but lack both funding and staff. The USG funded demand reduction training seminars in major Indian cities and training in the US for Indian drug education activists.

US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. The USG worked with the GOI to focus more high-level attention on and allocate more resources to narcotics control programs. It also urged the GOI to update its domestic laws to comply with the obligations of the 1988 UN Convention, particularly those related to asset forfeiture and money laundering.

Bilateral Cooperation. The USG funds training for enforcement personnel including the Indian Coast Guard. Relations between DEA and NCB are good, with emphasis on exchange of narcotics enforcement and intelligence information.

The Road Ahead. In the coming years, the US plans to encourage the GOI to intensify its efforts to combat illicit cultivation and trafficking; improve its extradition practices; identify, prosecute and convict corrupt officials; and pass enabling legislation in support of the 1988 UN Convention, particularly the money laundering and asset seizure legislation.

I. Summary

Iran is a major transshipment country in the transportation of Southwest Asian opiates, primarily opium and morphine base, from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Europe. Although most of the opiates are still destined for Turkey, newer routes through the Central Asian states bordering Iran on the north are becoming important. The USG has not conducted a survey of illicit opium cultivation since 1993, but there are some indications that it has decreased, possibly as a result of an influx of lower cost Afghan opium.

Iran has ratified the 1988 UN Convention, but we know of no legislation bringing domestic law and regulations into compliance with the requirements of that Convention. The Government of Iran (GOI) states it has an active counternarcotics campaign, and the UNDCP acknowledged Iran's efforts in its 1996 report. Iran participates in a tripartite counternarcotics agreement with UNDCP and Pakistan, and is contributing resources to the project.

II. Status of Country

The USG most recently estimated (1993) that illicit cultivation of opium poppy in Iran persisted on about 3,500 hectares. A report prepared for a meeting in 1996 of the Dublin Group of donor nations by the regional chair, the UK, indicates that cultivation has declined, probably due to the influx of cheaper opium from Afghanistan.

Transportation of opiates from Afghanistan and Pakistan is still a major problem. Iran is one of three principle routes for Afghan opiates en route to Turkey; and large quantities are involved.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. The USG knows of no policy initiatives taken by Iran during the year.

Law Enforcement Efforts. As the USG has had no representation in Iran for many years, we are dependent on information from other sources. According to the Dublin Group report prepared by the UK, which has representation in Iran, the first line of defense against traffickers is the fortification of the border by deep ditches, dams in passes and patrol towers; the second is through vehicular inspections within Iran. The Anti-Narcotics Headquarters (ANHQ) coordinates drug-related activity from all involved law enforcement agencies, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); the police, known as Law Enforcement Forces (LEF); and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). IRGC and LEF patrols are armed, are prepared to do battle with traffickers and reportedly often do. Iran claims to have lost more than 1,000 men in combat with traffickers. Iran reported it seized 126 mt of opium, 2 mt of heroin, 11 mt of morphine and 16 mt of cannabis in 1995, the most recent data available. No data on arrests are available but Iranian punishment for trafficking is very severe; the British report states the penalty for possession of more than 30 grams of heroin or 5 kgs of opium is death. More than 1,000 people have been executed for narcotics trafficking since 1989.

Corruption. The USG continues to receive periodic reports of corruption, including some involving individuals close to the centers of power; however, these cannot be verified. Corruption among low-level law enforcement officers is reportedly a problem. No information is available on efforts to identify and punish corrupt officials.

Agreements and Treaties. Iran ratified the 1988 UN Convention but does not appear to have enacted implementing legislation to bring it into compliance with all provisions. Counternarcotics agreements are in place with several countries.

Cultivation and Production. In 1993, the last USG official estimate of Iranian opium poppy cultivation, the survey indicated 3,500 hectares of opium poppy cultivation and production of between 35 and 70 mt of opium. The UK report substantially agrees with Iranian statements that cultivation is negligible. The overwhelming availability of Afghan opium no doubt is depressing local production, as also appears to be the case in Pakistan.

Drug Flow and Transit. Ethnic Baluchis from both sides of the Pak-Iranian border help arrange transportation from Afghanistan and Pakistan into Iran. Heavily armed caravans crossing the border may split into smaller, less noticeable groups once inside Iran. In addition to the traditional route for traffic directly into southwest Turkey, which has been disrupted by the Turkish military and police, some quantities of opiates are said to be flowing north into Central Asian states, particularly Turkmenistan.

Demand Reduction. At an AIDs seminar in Tehran in 1996, the Iranians admitted that there might be as many as one million addicts in country, out of a total population of 60 million. Treatment involves immediate withdrawal from drugs, according to reports received; follow-up therapy is virtually non-existent.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

In the absence of USG diplomatic relations with Iran, no narcotics initiatives are planned. The USG continues to encourage regional cooperation against narcotics trafficking.

The Republic of Maldives is an archipelago of 1,100 islands in the Indian Ocean with, at this time, a small drug problem. The government of the Republic of Maldives (GORM) fears, however, that narcotics traffickers may begin to increase transshipment. To help counter this possibility, the GORM, with USG assistance, computerized its immigration record-keeping system in 1995/1996. USG support for demand reduction programs sponsored by the Colombo Plan, of which the GORM is a member, helps contribute to promoting public awareness of the dangers of narcotics addiction.

Although the GORM has no formal extradition treaty with the US, it has cooperated in removing an expatriate detained in Maldives to the US to face narcotics trafficking charges. The GORM signed the 1988 UN Convention on December 5, 1989, but has not yet ratified it. The government signed the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1990; it entered into force September 15, 1993. USG officials are not aware of any accusations of narcotics-related corruption.

I. Summary

While not a significant producer or consumer of narcotic drugs, Nepal has a rising population of heroin and over-the-counter drug abusers. We have no evidence to indicate it has become a major transit route, despite its proximity to heroin source countries. During 1996, the Narcotic Drug Control Law Enforcement Unit (NDCLEU) continued to implement the Master Plan for Drug Abuse Control. Nepal is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, as well as to the 1961 UN Single Convention and the 1972 Protocol thereto. Nepal does not have adequate money laundering, criminal conspiracy or asset-seizure legislation as called for by the 1988 UN Convention. Nepal has not yet acceded to the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, but the Government of Nepal (GON) has accorded high priority to ratification. The USG knows of no high-level Nepalese officials accused of narcotics- related corruption.

II. Status of Country

Southwest and Southeast Asian heroin is smuggled into Nepal across the open border with India and through Kathmandu's international airport. While use of semi-refined "brown" (No.3) heroin is rising, abuse of locally grown cannabis and hashish, marketed in freelance operations, is more widespread. Recently, there also has been an increase in the abuse of licit codeine-based cough syrups.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. While the GON worked with the UNDCP on drafts to amend legislation on money laundering, asset seizure and criminal conspiracy to bring legislation in compliance with the standards of the 1988 UN Convention, development of the drafts has been delayed by the closing of the UNDCP office. The GON was unable to mobilize resources to open the three regional NDCLEU offices announced in 1995.

Law Enforcement. Drug-related seizures of heroin and opium increased slightly in 1996, but those of hashish and cannabis fell. All seizure levels are low. Authorities seize most heroin and hashish in Kathmandu at the Tribhuvan international airport. A continuing weakness in the GON's law enforcement effort has been the lack of coordination and cooperation between the NDCLEU and Nepal's Customs, Immigration, and National Police services, although it has improved slightly. There are also problems because of the lack of an NDCLEU intelligence wing to analyze narcotics intelligence on drug flows and poor coordination with the national forensic laboratory.

Cultivation and Production. Detection of the small quantities of illicit opium poppies is complicated by small plantings amid licit crops. Authorities believe all heroin seized in Nepal originates elsewhere. The extent of cannabis cultivation is believed to be substantial, particularly in the Terai area. Nepalese cannabis does not have an impact in the US.

Drug Flow and Transit. The GON is aware of inadequate narcotics security at Kathmandu's airport and hopes, eventually, to station NDCLEU at the airport. Narcotics transiting Nepal move both east and west, in approximately equal proportions.

Demand Reduction. During 1996, UNDCP sponsored several workshops and training sessions for government officials and NGO representatives. The UNDCP and the USG sponsored the production of several popular media products (e.g. audio tapes) to discourage narcotics use.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. The USG works closely with representatives of all relevant institutions and GON agencies to further progress under the UNDCP Narcotics Master Plan and to implement the narcotics control law. The USG also collaborates with other donor nations, primarily via the Kathmandu Mini-Dublin Group. In 1996, the US signed a bilateral narcotics agreement with Nepal, contributed $11,200 in transport and communications equipment to NDCLEU and sponsored the production and distribution of two demand-reduction audio tapes.

The Road Ahead. The USG plans to improve operational and training programs with the NDCLEU, support activities related to demand reduction and rehabilitation, and encourage Nepal to pass money laundering and asset seizure legislation as called for by the 1988 UN Convention.

I. Summary

Pakistan is an important producer and a major transit country for opiates and cannabis destined for international markets. According to USG estimates for the 1995-1996 crop year, Pakistan produced approximately 75 mt of opium from about 3,400 hectares of poppy, a reduction of about 50 percent from the previous year. The poppy enforcement plan for the current crop year continues to expand the area where poppy cultivation is banned. However, Pakistan had a poor record of law enforcement action against major traffickers and interdiction of significant shipments of heroin and morphine base. The Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) reported substantial decreases in the amounts of narcotics and chemicals seized in 1996. There was progress on freezing the assets of known drug traffickers. Pakistan extradited two alleged criminals to the US to stand trial on drug charges. In December, after a 21-month lull, there were two raids against heroin laboratories located in the Northwest Frontier Provinces (NWFP), resulting in the destruction of eight labs. Pakistan is a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention.

II. Status of Country

Pakistan is a significant source and transit country for opiates and cannabis, producing about 75 mt of opium in the 1995-96 crop year. According to USG estimates, the area of opium poppy cultivation declined by 51 percent from the previous crop year. A less dramatic reduction in cultivation is expected in the 1996-1997 crop year, although the GOP once again expanded the poppy cultivation ban in NWFP, the only area of large scale cultivation. In addition to Pakistani production, considerable amounts of Afghan opiates and cannabis products are consumed in Pakistan by its large addict population, and some passes through Pakistan en route to world markets. Morphine base is produced in the tribal areas of the NWFP for refining abroad, and heroin is produced there for both domestic use and export. Historically, the GOP has claimed that legal constraints and instability in the tribal areas of NWFP severely limit its ability to take action against narcotics producers and refiners in the NWFP.

Although it is assumed that there is money laundering as a result of illicit narcotics activity in Pakistan, little information is available with which to assess the magnitude of this problem.

Essential chemicals for heroin production, such as acetic anhydride (AA), enter Pakistan in relatively small shipments from India via train and desert caravans. Chemicals also enter from Europe through the port of Karachi. Large quantities of AA are regularly smuggled from India to Jalalabad, Afghanistan on Ariana (Afghan airline) flights. Some of the AA makes its way to the NWFP for use in laboratories. In December, authorities in NWFP seized approximately 1,650 liters of suspected AA that reportedly originated in China. Pakistan's control over its single licit AA factory is good, but it has trouble identifying illegal shipments passing through the port of Karachi.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives. Before its dismissal in November, the Bhutto Government failed to endorse the five-year Drug Abuse Control Master Plan (DACMP) for Pakistan, prepared in 1995 by the Narcotics Control Division (NCD). The DACMP provides a strategy to stop opium poppy cultivation and production and make Pakistan drug free by the year 2000. The Comprehensive Anti-Narcotics Ordinance, first promulgated in January 1995, has not yet been passed into law. The Bhutto government led the local Dublin Group members to believe it would incorporate into the Ordinance UNDCP recommendations for strengthening Pakistan's legal framework for counternarcotics. However, the suggestions were not incorporated prior to the first reading (three are required) in September. Before the bill was passed, the Bhutto government was dismissed. The subsequent caretaker government amended the Ordinance in December, incorporating the UNDCP suggestions. It is anticipated that the newly elected government will enact the Ordinance into a permanent law.

The poppy ban was once again expanded for the 1996-97 poppy growing season in NWFP prior to the planting season in October-November. The only large scale poppy cultivation in Pakistan is in the NWFP.

Accomplishments. The government reduced the area of opium poppy cultivation by 51 percent during the 1995-96 crop year, resulting in a 52 percent decrease in production. The GOP extradited two fugitives to the US to face drug charges in 1996. In addition, the GOP froze an estimated $3.5 million in assets belonging to twenty-one major drug traffickers. The caretaker government arrested one major trafficker, Nasir Ali Khan, who is wanted on drug charges in the US.

The amendments to the Narcotics Ordinance promulgated in December strengthen some anti-narcotics money laundering provisions but the USG has advised the GOP that separate money laundering legislation is needed to cover other types of money laundering. The Ordinance included no legal requirement to show how or from where a person's income was derived.

In July, the USG proposed a long-term lease of six UH-1H helicopters to the GOP in order to help the ANF carry out operations against major drug caravans along its borders with Afghanistan and Iran. When the US had not received a response to the offer on specific terms by November, the helicopters were dispatched to another country where there was an urgent need for them.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The caretaker government rearrested Nasir Ali Khan, against whom a US extradition request was pending, after his release by the courts on the grounds of double jeopardy. The ANF pressed for the recission of medical bail for both a member of the National Assembly and a former member of a provincial assembly, arrested in 1995 on drug charges.

According to the Narcotics Control Division (NCD), in the first nine months of 1996, when the Bhutto government was in office, Pakistani law enforcement agencies seized 5.4 mt of opium, 2 mt of heroin, and 158.8 mt of hashish. These figures show substantial decreases over the January-September figures for 1995. Opium seizures decreased by 97 percent, heroin by 87 percent, and hashish by 66 percent. NCD figures for the first nine months of 1996 show 35,612 drug arrests, compared to 39,919 during the first nine months of 1995. By December, authorities had seized 1,901 liters of AA, compared to 5,496 liters in 1995. The GOP attributes the reduction to previous, effective law enforcement actions that forced drug traffickers out of business. Given Afghanistan's continued high production, however, the US believes that the absolute volume of trafficking remains the same or has increased.

For the first time in 21 months, the government of the NWFP conducted a raid against drug processing facilities at Tauda Mela in Khyber Agency on December 7. On December 26, tribesmen in NWFP raided heroin laboratories in the Chura Valley of Khyber Agency. Unfortunately, only one of the eight labs destroyed was operational at the time of raids. News of the raid probably leaked to the lab operators during negotiations with tribal elders. The GOP expressed the hope that a tribal crackdown against heroin refineries will supplement official pressure on them.

Authorities instigated no major interdiction operations instigated against the large shipments of opiates entering Pakistan from Afghanistan. A two-mt seizure of alleged heroin by the ANF in Baluchistan proved to be a hoax.

The judicial structure provides many opportunities for traffickers to appeal. As a result, prosecution is time-consuming and expensive. The case against major drug trafficker Sakhi Dost Jan Notezai, for example, has been in process for several years. It should also be noted that the slow pace of the judicial process often prevented timely responses to US extradition requests.

The ANF's performance this year was hampered by insufficient funding, staffing below approved levels and a turnover in leadership. The ANF's efforts to restructure inched forward. By December, the GOP approved the transfer of 70 civilian employees whose performance had been substandard. The transfer should be implemented by early 1997. The Pakistani Army continued to supply the ANF with the officers who fill the ANF's most responsible positions. In an effort to expand, the ANF plans to obtain the transfer of a complement of 673 personnel from the Army. Officers are seconded from the army normally for three years. This was a transitional year, three years after the formation of the ANF, and most of the top positions are held by newly arrived officers, inexperienced in law enforcement. During 1996 the ANF staff numbered less than 1,000. Implementation of a major recruitment drive should be completed by 1998, bringing ANF total staffing to 2,500.

Apart from the ANF, other law enforcement agencies made a significant contribution to the seizure of narcotics in Pakistan. Particularly noteworthy was the performance this year by the Customs and Excise Services. Customs seized far more heroin than the ANF in the first nine months of the year, 633 kgs versus 159 kgs. Excise, the Frontier Corps of Baluchistan and the Police also seized significant amounts.

Corruption. To the USG's knowledge, neither the GOP nor any senior official of the government encourages or facilitates the illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. There is sufficient legislation to control and punish public corruption, but these laws are seldom enforced. The case against Munawar Hussain Manj, former member of the National Assembly, whose car was found to contain heroin in 1995, is still pending. The ANF is investigating possible corruption by its personnel in Quetta who were involved in the heroin seizure hoax. General corruption is perceived to be endemic. The interim government, however, established procedures to investigate corruption on the part of government officials.

Treaties and Agreements. Pakistan is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which it ratified in 1965, but not to its 1972 Protocol. It is also party to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Convention, which it ratified in October 1991. Extradition between the US and Pakistan takes place under a treaty signed between the US and the UK in 1931, made applicable to India in 1942 and the terms of which Pakistan accepted at independence. In 1996, the US and Pakistan began to explore the possibility of entering into a modern bilateral extradition treaty.

Pakistan continued to meet with India on drug trafficking and chemical control, but achieved no concrete results. The fourth semiannual secretary-level meeting and third director general-level meeting to combat drug trafficking and smuggling were held in September in Pakistan. This marked the first such meetings since December 1995.

The GOP concluded agreements with the United Arab Emirates, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and China for cooperation and control of drug trafficking and abuse. In addition, a memorandum of understanding on counternarcotics cooperation was under negotiation with Nigeria. High level trilateral talks between Pakistan, Iran and UNDCP were held in Islamabad in September to review and expand the UNDCP-sponsored Pak-Iran electronic border monitoring project.

Cultivation and Production. As noted, during the 1995-96 poppy cultivation season (September-May), opium poppy production in the NWFP dropped by 51 percent, to 3,400 hectares, according to USG estimates. This dramatic, one-year reduction was believed to be the product of several factors, including the advanced stage of alternative development programs (which began in 1989), unfavorable weather and less attractive farmgate prices for opium gum. Lower opium gum prices resulted from increased cultivation of opium poppy in neighboring Afghanistan.

The 1996-97 poppy enforcement plan further expands the poppy ban. The ban on poppy cultivation now applies to 95 percent of Mohmand Agency, 80 percent of Bajaur Agency and 100 percent of Dir District. The Pakistani government and the USG provide resources to local enforcement officials to initiate involuntary poppy eradication where cultivation is discovered in areas covered by the ban. Recurrence of poppy cultivation in previously cleared districts of Mohmand and Bajaur, where the USG has road and crop substitution projects, has not been noted. There are unconfirmed reports that poppy is being planted in areas of Dir where it was banned. From October through December, authorities took poppy enforcement measures in Mohmand and Bajaur, in areas to which the ban newly applied and in areas not yet designated as part of the enforced zone. In Bajaur, several farmers were jailed in November for planting poppy in banned areas. They were released after agreeing to eradicate their crop.

The US Embassy verified destruction of 94 acres of poppy in Bajaur during December. The USG does not expect as large a decrease in production this year. Early rain in September raised concern that farmers would backslide by planting poppy where it had been previously banned.

Drug Flow/Transit. There are three basic smuggling routes. Heroin processed in northern Afghanistan is smuggled through Pakistan's tribal areas into the city of Peshawar. The drugs then pass through the provinces of Punjab and Sind and on to the Arabian Sea. Karachi airport and seaport are conduits for heroin and morphine base destined for Turkey, Western Europe and North America. Drugs also are smuggled from southern Afghanistan through Baluchistan and to the Arabian Sea. In addition, drugs travel from south/central Afghanistan through Baluchistan to Iran, Turkey, Western Europe and North America. Drugs smuggled through Pakistan are primarily refined in Afghanistan and, to a lesser degree, in NWFP. Statistics on arrested drug couriers in 1996 show that 32 percent were Nigerian, 24 percent Tanzanian (probably couriers for West Africans as the USG is unaware of any major Tanzanian trafficking organizations), 22 percent Pakistani and about 22 percent other nationalities. Approximately 17 percent of the heroin seized in the US in 1995-96 was of Pakistani/Afghan origin. The local press reports regularly that Pakistanis have been arrested in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States for narcotics trafficking.

Demand Reduction/Domestic Programs. Pakistan has a substantial drug abuse problem. A 1993 UN study indicated that Pakistan, with a total population of 120 million, at that time had about 3 million addicts of all kinds, 1.5 million of whom were heroin addicts. Most heroin addicts smoke the drug, but follow up studies have identified growing numbers of intravenous users in large cities. The GOP had planned to conduct a new drug abuse study in 1996, to obtain more recent data, but it was not carried out. The UN's Integrated Drug Demand Reduction Program (IDDRP) indicated a willingness to conduct this study in 1997; however, the GOP said that it would rather have the study conducted in 1998 so that it could conduct the studies on a five years schedule.

Public efforts against drug addiction are limited to detoxification, without follow up treatment. Private clinics use a variety of treatment methods against addiction, but relapse rates are high for all treatment methods.

The ANF's Drug Abuse Prevention and Resource Center (DAPRC) is active in demand reduction activities, particularly in the public awareness area. Pakistan's religious leaders continue to be educated about drug abuse and are included in demand reduction efforts. DAPRC has agreements with all four Pakistani provinces permitting provincial demand reduction programs, coordinated by the DAPRC. Demand reduction is an integral part of Pakistan's five-year master plan for drug control. It does not appear that the IDDRP programs will continue in 1997. In addition to proposing the drug abuse study mentioned earlier, IDDRP suggested a project to consolidate demand reduction activities in Pakistan and to help the GOP prepare for the implementation of the master plan. The GOP failed to make a decision and funds were returned to UNDCP.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. USG narcotics control policy objectives for Pakistan are encouraging extraditions of fugitives wanted for narcotics crimes in the US; urging the GOP to give increased attention to interdiction of significant heroin or morphine base shipments; urging the GOP to amend the narcotics control ordinance by incorporating UNDCP suggestions for strengthening it, to convert the revised ordinance into a permanent law and to draft money laundering legislation; supporting the ANF's effort to obtain adequate resources to carry out its mission; reducing opium production in Pakistan; encouraging the destruction of narcotics refineries in NWFP; assisting the GOP to expand narcotics enforcement operations in NWFP and other border areas; and supporting Pakistan's demand reduction efforts.

Bilateral Cooperation. The USG provided $2.5 million in narcotics control assistance to Pakistan in 1996 under the annual letters of agreement that amend the original bilateral agreement on narcotics. Funding was sustained at the same level as it was during the two previous years and helped to support three fundamental counternarcotics activities in Pakistan -- reduction of opium poppy cultivation, narcotics law enforcement and demand reduction. US assistance was effectively used to extend the GOP's ability to enforce the poppy ban in NWFP through construction of roads and to provide alternative means of livelihood for farmers through crop substitution and developmental schemes in Mohmand and Bajaur agencies. UNDCP funds a similar project, to which the USG contributes, in Dir District. Concomitant eradication efforts and negotiations with farmers and tribal leaders were in keeping with Pakistan's bilateral commitment and the 1988 UN Convention.

The US continued to provide equipment, supplies and training to Pakistani law enforcement agencies engaged in counterdrug operations. The support went primarily to the ANF, but also to Customs, Coast Guard and the Frontier Corps. US funds also supported public awareness programs. Bilateral cooperation on narcotics law enforcement, and Pakistan's record of enforcement activity during 1996 were poor.

The USG was disappointed that the GOP never responded to a draft agreement providing six UH-1H helicopters on a no-cost lease to the ANF. However, the tremendous funding cut taken by the ANF early in the year would probably have made it impossible for the helicopters to be properly maintained. The interim government has now restored some funds.

Cooperation greatly increased under the caretaker government. The caretaker government agreed to pursue most of the key counternarcotics objectives, which the Bhutto government had ignored.

Road Ahead. The USG will work with Pakistan to eliminate poppy cultivation by the year 2000 and to greatly augment the effectiveness of drug enforcement activities, particularly with regard to opiates. Remaining areas of large-scale poppy cultivation in Bajaur and Mohmand agencies of NWFP will be targeted for crop substitution/developmental schemes, and the ban on cultivation will be enforced in areas which have benefitted from assistance. The USG will urge Pakistan to adopt the five-year, drug abuse master plan and enact into law the revised narcotics control ordinance, as well as promulgate a comprehensive money laundering law. In addition, the US will encourage Pakistan to focus enforcement efforts against major trafficking organizations (with the objective of dismantling them and prosecuting their leaders); large shipments of opiates and precursor chemicals; and heroin and morphine base laboratories in NWFP. Finally, the US will seek cooperation on more timely processing of US requests for extradition of fugitives, as well as energetic prosecution by the GOP of the court cases against major narcotics traffickers.

I. Summary

Sri Lanka's successful nationwide demand reduction campaign and the strong regional role played by the country in counternarcotics cooperation continued in 1996. Cannabis eradication and seizure notably increased. There was, however, a decline in the number of drug-related arrests. The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) adopted a strong leadership role in counternarcotics activities within the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), in part through a USG-funded computer database made available to all SAARC countries. Sri Lanka is a party to the 1988 UN Convention. Enabling legislation for the Convention was reviewed, and its presentation to Parliament has been re-scheduled for 1997.

II. Status of Country

Sri Lanka's role as a transshipment point for narcotics from South and Southeast Asia seems to be growing, judging by rising heroin seizures; however, there is no evidence that these narcotics are shipped to the US. Sri Lanka has 1,100 miles of coastline, which cannot be adequately patrolled. The problem is especially serious because naval resources are fully engaged by the Tamil insurgency. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) has the overall responsibility for all counternarcotics and demand reduction activities. However, the insurgency by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) drains much of the Ministry's resources. Police officials in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu reported in the previous year an increase in drug smuggling activities among Sri Lankan Tamil refugees living there. It is widely believed, moreover, that the LTTE insurgents help finance their campaign through drug trafficking, although neither the USG nor the Police Narcotics Bureau (PNB) have any firm evidence to support this suspicion.

Cannabis, the only illicit drug grown in Sri Lanka, is cultivated in heavy jungle in the southeastern part of the island. Cannabis from Sri Lanka does not significantly impact the US.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1996

Illicit Cultivation and Production. Cannabis eradication efforts increased yet again during the year to 20 hectares, notwithstanding limited government resources because of the ethnic insurgency.

Law Enforcement Efforts. There was an increase in the volume of narcotics interdicted through November 1996 -- authorities seized 16 mt of cannabis, compared to 13.5 mt in 1995. Heroin seizures totaled 38.6 kgs, but on January 1, 1997, 18 kgs of heroin, the largest single seizure of heroin recorded in Sri Lanka, was found north of Colombo. An estimated 9,762 suspects were arrested for narcotics-related offenses during the year. This compares with 13,487 arrested in 1995 and 12,352 detained in 1994. Through November, almost all of the 9,762 individuals arrested on narcotics charges had been prosecuted.

Demand Reduction. Sri Lanka has a comparatively modest drug problem with an estimated 50,000 heroin addicts, but the number has shown a slight, but steady, increase in recent years. The National Dangerous Drugs Control Board (NDDCB) continued its aggressive national public education campaign with: a "drug free" cultural program; hundreds of drug awareness seminars attended by students, teachers and parents; training programs on drug abuse prevention; youth camps for youth leaders; counseling programs at the state detention home; and treatment programs at residential treatment centers.

Corruption. There was no evidence that public officials were involved in narcotics-related criminal activities in 1996. A permanent commission established to investigate charges of bribery and corruption against public officials reported no cases of drug-related corruption.

Agreements and Treaties. Sri Lanka is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, as well as to the 1990 SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. A comprehensive counternarcotics legislative package that includes new legislation to comply with the UN Convention and the 1990 SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, including provisions for extradition and mutual legal assistance, was reviewed and will be presented to Parliament in 1997. Extradition matters between the GSL and USG are currently covered by the extradition treaty between the US and Great Britain signed in 1931.

Drug Flow/Transit. Heroin has been seized transiting Sri Lanka in increasing quantities. Most is detected at Katunayake International Airport near Colombo, but PNB believes that there is a substantial number of transshipments -- mostly heroin from India -- along the Sri Lankan coast. Since Sri Lanka has no coast guard and its naval vessels are fully engaged in operations against the LTTE insurgents, there is no reliable information on maritime transshipments of drugs. There is no evidence of heroin transiting Sri Lanka arriving in the US.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Bilateral Cooperation. With the help of USG-provided laboratory equipment, the National Narcotics Laboratory (NNL) carried out its functions more comprehensively and effectively. Arrangements were completed to provide the GSL with more equipment to support its public education campaign in 1997, as well as with a computerized accounting/stock system, an electricity generator for a treatment center and an absorbance detector for the narcotics laboratory.

The Road Ahead. The USG focuses on training programs and the provision of equipment which maximize scarce resources and promote the self-sufficiency of Sri Lankan officials responsible for counternarcotics activities.

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