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International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998
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ARUBA
I. Summary
Aruba is a major transit country for international narcotics trafficking organizations, which transport cocaine from South America to Europe and the United States.
Aruba, the Netherlands Antilles, and the Netherlands comprise the three parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. From 1954 to 1986, Aruba was part of the Netherlands Antilles. Since 1986, Aruba has had a separate status under which it has autonomy over its internal affairs, with the right to exercise independent decision making in a number of relevant counternarcotics areas. The Government of the Netherlands (GON) is responsible for the defense and foreign affairs of all three parts of the Kingdom, and it assists the Government of Aruba (GOA) in its efforts to counter narcotics trafficking. Aruba is a participant in a Joint Netherlands-Netherlands Antilles-Aruba Coast Guard.
Although the Kingdom of the Netherlands is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the Convention currently covers only the Netherlands. In October-November the Parliaments of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba passed the final legislation needed (an international asset seizure law) before that convention could be extended to these islands. In December, Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles requested that the Kingdom extend the 1988 UN Drug Convention to its two Caribbean parts, and such extension is expected during 1999.
In 1998, Aruba enacted important legislation consistent with the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) recommendations. It also extradited to the U.S. three Aruban nationals, two believed to be major money launderers and a third believed to be both a drug trafficker and money launderer. These extraditions were the first under a 1997 law permitting the extradition of Aruban nationals. Aruba has yet to conclude any of its own money laundering investigations or prosecutions.
Aruban law enforcement agencies, including the Aruban Police and Customs, have a good working relationship with USG law enforcement agencies. They cooperate with the DEA on investigations and with the U.S. Coast Guard on maritime law enforcement searches and interdictions. A proposed U.S.-Kingdom of the Netherlands maritime counternarcotics agreement is currently being negotiated.
The DEA reports that there were no significant improvements in law enforcement and interdiction coordination in 1998. The lack of interdiction coordination can be attributed, in part, to the complicated relationship between Aruba and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The DEA works primarily with the Aruban Police, an organization plagued by a variety of problems, including lack of resources and expertise.
II. Status of Country
Aruba is a Caribbean island in the Lesser Antilles chain and is located just twenty miles off the coast of Venezuela and eighty miles from Colombia. Cocaine enters Aruba from nearby Colombia and Venezuela (and to a lesser extent from Suriname) via ocean-going vessels, go-fast boats, and small fishing boats. The cocaine is sent onward to the United States and Europe by cruise ships, container cargo shipments, and daily commercial airline flights. Heroin is also transshipped from Colombia to the U.S. via Aruba primarily by couriers on commercial airline flights.
Drug traffickers are attracted to Aruba by its key position near the Venezuelan and Colombian coasts, its efficient infrastructure, its excellent air and sea links to South America, Europe, Puerto Rico, and other Caribbean locations, and its reputation for relatively light prison sentences and good prison conditions.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1998
Policy Initiatives. In March, the Aruban Parliament authorized the Central Bank to monitor financial transactions of local offshore banks, bringing Aruba into compliance with the recommendations of the CFATF, of which Aruba is a member. (There are only two offshore banks in Aruba, both affiliated with the same U.S. parent bank.) Monitoring of offshore banks did take place in the past but had no legal basis other than a 1952 Dutch law. Anti-money laundering activities were therefore mostly limited to the local commercial banks.
In June, Aruba participated, as part of the delegation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, in the United Nations Special General Assembly on Drugs. Also in June, the GOA financial intelligence unit (MOT) and FinCEN organized an anti-money laundering seminar in Aruba. The participants were representatives of the Aruban police, customs, central bank and intelligence authorities, as well as the MOT of the Netherlands Antilles. In November, Aruba participated in the CFATF Ministerial meeting in the Cayman Islands. In January 1999, as part of CFATF's Second Round of Mutual Evaluations, Aruba submitted its anti-money laundering regime to evaluation by FATF and CFATF examiners.
Law Enforcement Efforts. According to GOA data, Aruban law enforcement authorities seized some 794 kilograms of cocaine and 6 kilograms of heroin in 1998. This represents increases of 95 percent and 100 percent, respectively. Most of the drug seizures on Aruba are the result of seizures by Aruban Customs at the airport -- simple interceptions of low echelon couriers, particularly those bound for Holland. Although statistics are unavailable for 1998, during the prior year some 44 drug couriers were arrested, 35 going to the Netherlands, 4 to Spain, 1 to Portugal, and one to South Africa. Due to the increased number of drug arrests of outgoing passengers to Europe during the past few years, a task-force consisting of Customs officers of both the Netherlands and Aruba and Dutch military police was established and began operating at the Aruba Airport in 1998. Joint USG-GOA effort contributed to an increase in the number of arrests and convictions of drug couriers in 1998.
With the exception of a few cases conducted by the "RST Unit" (which has as its core police officers loaned from the Netherlands to work specific cases), there are no pro-active investigations undertaken by any Aruban law enforcement agency. This is largely because of the constraints of Dutch law and because those agencies lack the necessary skills, budget, and training.
The Aruban Police have an Organized Crime Section that works cooperatively with the DEA and with the CRI, the Dutch equivalent of the FBI. In 1998 the Organized Crime Section staff was increased by six.
In 1998 the Joint Kingdom Coast Guard continued to operate in Aruban waters. Its mission is fourfold: narcotics interdiction, search and rescue, prevention of illegal fishing in Kingdom waters, and defense. Two small (20-foot) "inshore" boats are currently based in Aruba, and a new 35-40 meter cutter is scheduled to be based there beginning in March, 1999. A Kingdom Coast Guard spokesman acknowledged in April that a shortage of personnel hampers its anti-drug operations around Aruba. In August the Joint Coast Guard made a seizure of 80 kilograms of cocaine in Aruban waters.
In one 1998 seizure, Aruban Customs found 50 kilograms of cocaine hidden on the deck of a Colombian ship which had been making regular trips from Colombia to Venezuela and Aruba. Following this seizure the head of the Aruban customs officer's union commented that although Aruba is being flooded with drugs and every week drug couriers are arrested at the airport, because Customs is understaffed it cannot exercise effective control of drugs brought in by sea. According to the union official, foreign boats remain offshore until their drugs can be off-loaded into Aruban vessels which arrive very quickly. The places along the beach where drugs are brought ashore are public knowledge, he asserted. He complained that the Kingdom Coast Guard response to tips to Customs by the public are slow because local Coast Guard officials must first obtain clearance from their headquarters on Curacao.
In February, an Aruban court acquitted, on grounds of insufficient evidence, a Colombian national of attempting to transport 186 kilograms of cocaine from Aruba to Sint Maarten in wooden beams. The shipment was the largest ever confiscated in Aruba.
In 1998 a visiting drug detector dog team from Amsterdam's Schipol Airport trained members of the Aruban Customs Service at the airport of Aruba. One Aruban Customs officer also visited Schipol for anti-drug training.
Agreements and Treaties. Although the Kingdom of the Netherlands is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the Convention could not be extended to the overseas parts of the Kingdom until those autonomous parts of the kingdom passed all the necessary implementing legislation. In October and November, the parliaments of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, respectively, passed the final piece of legislation needed before the 1988 UN Drug Convention could be extended to them. In December, Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles presented their formal request for extension to the Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands. That extension is expected by March, 1999.
Aruba honors requests made under the mutual legal assistance treaty, and considerable law enforcement cooperation takes place at less formal levels as well. The bilateral USG-GON extradition treaty applies in Aruba. A U.S.-Kingdom of the Netherlands maritime counternarcotics agreement pertaining to the Caribbean is under negotiation.
Extradition. In 1998, Aruba extradited three Aruban nationals, considered to be significant traffickers and money launderers, to the U.S. These were the first ever to be extradited under a 1997 law that permits the extradition of Aruban nationals, subject to their serving in Aruba any sentences imposed abroad. Two of those extradited were Eric and Alex Mansur, members of a rich and powerful Aruban business family under investigation by authorities for involvement in laundering drug proceeds. The two are accused of belonging to a large network that laundered some $40 million for Colombian drug traffickers operating in the U.S. They are currently in Puerto Rico awaiting trial. The GOA also extradited Aruban businessman Randolph Habibe, who is believed to have been the chief of "La Costa Cartel" on the North Coast of Colombia and thought to have worked with cartel cohorts to assist in introducing more than 80 tons of cocaine and 250,000 pounds of marijuana into the U.S., and laundering some $800 million. The extradition of these politically powerful Aruban citizens demonstrated a serious Aruban commitment to combating drug trafficking and money laundering. The decision of the Governor of Aruba to extradite to the U.S. another accused money launderer, elderly Aruban businessman David Cybulkiewicz, was overturned by an Aruban judge due to the alleged ill health (high blood pressure) of the fugitive.
Demand Reduction. Aruba is not plagued by the visible signs of drug abuse. Residents and tourists (nearly 400,000 American tourists visit Aruba each year) walk the streets without significant fear of street crime. Although the police, like all Aruban government agencies, feel the pinch of severe budget cuts, they nevertheless remain optimistic about launching a community policing program that will reduce crime in general. Nevertheless, according to a report by a private foundation, the use of both drugs and alcohol is "alarmingly high" in Aruba, with some 11,000 out of a population of 83,000 being classified as regular drug users. Aruba's drug czar has requested USG assistance in gathering educational materials for an anti-drug abuse campaign. Aruba has ongoing demand reduction programs. During 1998, Cornerstone Treatment Facilities Network of New York assisted Aruban rehabilitation centers to treat drug and alcohol abusers, training Aruban personnel at its centers in New York and Connecticut.
Money Laundering. With its free trade zone and offshore industry, Aruba is vulnerable to being used by criminal organizations for cash smuggling and wire transfers and by money launderers, particularly through Aruba's eleven casinos and its financial institutions. Although the GOA remains vigilant in its anti-money laundering efforts, GOA officials emphasize that Aruba is too small to provide the manpower and funds needed to combat effectively a large international problem such as money laundering.
Asset Seizure/Forfeiture. The GOA passed an international asset seizure law in November 1998. It did not go into effect as expected in January, 1999, because of a defect discovered in the Aruban Penal Code. The necessary correction to the Code was drafted in February 1999 and will be presented to Parliament for passage in March 1999. When the new asset seizure law becomes effective, it will enable Aruba to use a conviction in a U.S. court as the basis for seizing assets in Aruba. The legislation permits assets to be confiscated early in the judicial process, thereby preventing traffickers and launderers from using the pretrial period to move their assets into safe havens, out of reach of confiscating legal authorities. However, an agreement to permit asset sharing, which went into effect in the Netherlands and the U.S. in 1994, was not adopted as a part of this legislation.
Precursor Chemicals. Aruba has no specific legislation controlling precursor chemicals. The lack of laws and personnel prevent Aruban authorities from monitoring chemicals transiting the Aruba Free Zone. However, Aruban pharmaceutical authorities voluntarily provide informal cooperation in reporting precursor chemical shipments. In June, Aruba participated in an OAS/CICAD meeting in Washington on the control of chemical precursors and chemical substances.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Policy Initiatives. USG agencies cooperate with their Aruban counterparts and with the Joint Kingdom Coast Guard on counternarcotics. As a matter of policy the Department of State has no INL counternarcotics assistance programs in Aruba. This is because such assistance should be primarily the obligation of Aruba's Kingdom partner, the Netherlands. While the Netherlands has provided basic police training programs in Aruba, it appears that those programs do not so far include specific counternarcotics training. GOA law enforcement officials do participate in Caribbean regional training and seminars funded by the USG, but the USG does not provide their travel expenses.
The Road Ahead. USG law enforcement agencies will continue to collaborate closely with their Aruban counterparts. Important next steps for the GOA include improving its control over its territorial waters and beaches, continuing its positive actions on extradition, extending and implementing its anti-money laundering regime, and successfully prosecuting money laundering cases. The U.S. will continue to encourage the governments of the three parts of the Kingdom need to move ahead on concluding the maritime counternarcotics interdiction agreement proposed in 1997.
The U.S. Customs Service is considering establishing a pre-clearance facility at the airport in Aruba in the near future. While this facility may facilitate tourism and thereby contribute to the financial ability of the GOA to combat drug trafficking, it should not be perceived as a quick fix for Aruba's drug smuggling problems. Those problems must be addressed by the GOA through strengthened laws and law enforcement.
I. Summary
The Bahamas is a major transit point for South American cocaine and Jamaican marijuana en route to the U.S. Very small amounts of cannabis are grown on the islands for domestic consumption. The USG and the Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas (GCOB) continue to enjoy a productive and positive counterdrug working relationship. The GCOB places a high priority on combating drug transshipments through its archipelago, and is moving decisively to combat money laundering and other drug-related crimes. The GCOB cooperates very closely with the USG on our combined law enforcement effort, Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos (OPBAT). The first country to ratify the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the GCOB continues to take steps to implement it. Following passage of strong anti-money laundering legislation in 1996, Bahamian authorities are closely monitoring bank compliance and investigating suspicious financial transactions.
U.S. and Bahamian law enforcement officials worked very closely throughout the year to respond to notable increases in air and maritime transshipment incidents. The GCOB is strongly emphasizing money laundering and asset forfeiture investigations and prosecutions. The GCOB also continued to strengthen its judicial system, with assistance from the USG. However, unreliable jury pools and weaknesses in the drug laws resulted in several major Bahamian drug dealers' evading conviction in 1998. Despite committed and talented judicial leadership, The Bahamas needs to improve the effectiveness of its court system in gaining convictions against major drug dealers and trafficking organizations by strengthening its drug trafficking laws and improving the prosecutorial capabilities of the police prosecutors. The USG will continue to work with the GCOB in this area, both bilaterally and through regional training and assistance projects.
In December 1998, the Royal Bahamas Police Force (RBPF) Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) arrested two police officers from the RBPF Drug Canine Unit at Nassau International Airport for allegedly working with a cocaine trafficking ring. The GCOB needs to continue to move decisively against corruption at Bahamian ports of entry.
II. Status of Country
The Bahamas will likely remain a target of narcotics traffickers well into the future due to its geographic location. The Bahamas is a country of approximately 275,000 people scattered over an area the size of California, strategically located on the air and sea routes between Colombia and the U.S. The Bahamian archipelago contains hundreds of small, deserted islands used for transshipment and temporary drug storage, and is only 40 miles from south Florida at its closest point. The Bahamas has a strong anti-money laundering regime and is committed to vigorous oversight of its financial sector. Nonetheless, the country's bank secrecy laws, its role as a regional financial center, and the existence of a largely unregulated international business corporation (IBC) sector make The Bahamas an attractive potential target for money laundering and other financial crimes.
III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1998
Policy Initiatives. During 1998, the GCOB continued its efforts to fulfill the objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention by: (1) establishing an intergovernmental committee to monitor financial sector compliance with the 1997 money laundering implementing regulations; (2) formally committing to designate the U.S. under Bahamian asset forfeiture legislation, based on reciprocity, although legislation will be required to so designate the U.S.; (3) committing to create a financial intelligence unit (FIU) to investigate suspicious transaction reports emanating from the financial sector; (4) committing to applying for membership in the Egmont Group in 1999; (5) establishing a money laundering/asset forfeiture investigative unit within the RBPF DEU; and (6) creating a high-level, intergovernmental committee to draft the country's first national drug strategy report. The GCOB's Office of Public Prosecutions is working closely with the U.S. Department of Justice to seize bank accounts in The Bahamas identified as part of the large USG "Operation Casablanca" international money laundering case. The GCOB's office of Legal Affairs continues to work with the U.S. Department of Justice to improve cooperation on U.S. requests for mutual legal assistance. The Central Bank of The Bahamas continues to closely scrutinize banks' compliance with suspicious transaction reporting requirements, and is working closely with the Bankers' Association to undertake self-monitoring, including conducting money laundering seminars for bank personnel.
Accomplishments. The GCOB, working closely with the USG, has completed a project to link, via fiber optics, all of the courts, the offices of public and police prosecutions, and the automated court reporters' section. The project's purpose is to reduce delays in criminal, especially drug, cases pending in the courts. The last step in the project, to be completed in 1999-2000, will be to install a court case management software system which will make The Bahamas' judiciary virtually "paperless." Once this project is completed, the Bahamian judicial system will become the most technologically advanced in the region. Parallel to the computerization project, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has implemented a project to identify outdated court procedures which cause backlogs in the system. In April 1998, the Chief Justice led a USG-supported court delay reduction workshop involving judges, registrars, prosecutors, and members of the private bar. At that time, the Prime Minister, the Attorney General and the Chief Justice publicly committed to reforming court procedures. The Chief Justice tasked criminal and civil committees to present her with recommendations for court reforms by the end of 1998. The Chief Justice is committed to acting on these recommendations in 1999.
The RBPF DEU works very closely with U.S. law enforcement agencies, through OPBAT, in interdicting drug transshipments and investigating and arresting local drug traffickers. The DEU moved decisively in 1998 to pursue money launderers by establishing a separate money laundering and asset forfeiture investigative unit. With USG support, the money laundering unit has participated in U.S.-sponsored money laundering seminars, including one U.S.-funded seminar conducted by experts from several U.S. agencies in The Bahamas for 55 GCOB and bank officials, and has attended intensive financial investigations training programs in the U.S. As a result of their increased financial investigative capacity, the money laundering unit is undertaking several local asset forfeiture investigations and is cooperating with U.S. and third country law enforcement agencies on several major transnational money laundering cases, including Operation Casablanca.
The Attorney General's Office of Public Prosecutions has likewise made a strong commitment to drug-related money laundering prosecutions. The Director of Public Prosecutions, a highly committed and regionally-respected prosecutor, has designated an experienced public prosecutor in her office to work solely on money laundering and asset forfeiture cases. The Office of Public Prosecutions, working closely with the DEU money laundering unit and the U.S. Department of Justice, has successfully restrained U.S.$1.5 million in Operation Casablanca-related bank accounts in The Bahamas. The office has also restrained over U.S.$l0 million in other, third-country laundered deposits held in Bahamian banks. The Office of Public Prosecutions does a very professional job of prosecuting local drug dealers and trafficking organizations. Their admirable efforts at conviction are often thwarted by suspected jury corruption and weak drug laws.
The GCOB's decision to designate the U.S. under its asset forfeiture laws, based on reciprocity, shows a serious commitment at the highest levels to resolve a longstanding bilateral irritant. Once the scope of reciprocity is resolved and the designation becomes official, the U.S. and the Bahamas will be able to work more closely on transnational money laundering cases.
The GCOB continues to cooperate with the U.S. on extradition requests, based on the 1994 U.S.-Bahamas Extradition Treaty, but with mixed results. There are several drug-related extradition requests pending in the Bahamian court system.
The USG has donated computer equipment to assist the GCOB in improving its response time to MLAT requests. The U.S. Department of Justice continues to work with the Office of Legal Affairs to improve GCOB responsiveness to U.S. mutual legal assistance requests. A delegation from the Office of Legal Affairs traveled to Washington in August 1998, to review pending U.S. MLAT requests.
The USG continues to work with the GCOB to assure that the large container port facility in Freeport, Grand Bahama, does not become a transshipment point to drug traffickers. Three Bahamian officials attended an OAS-funded regional port security seminar in Barbados in November 1998.
Law Enforcement. The RBPF continued its decade-long, active participation with USG agencies and Turks and Caicos police in OPBAT, a combined program designed to intercept narcotics shipments and arrest traffickers in the Turks and Caicos Islands and in The Bahamas. USG helicopters operating from three bases in the Bahamas facilitate these operations. The GCOB continued to demonstrate its strong commitment to OPBAT by continuing to fund its large counternarcotics strike force unit.
Cocaine seizures in 1998 increased markedly over 1997 levels, which were the highest since 1992. Marijuana seizures were down somewhat after the near record year in 1997. Air activity increased again in 1998 and overtook maritime transportation as the mode of preference in terms of quantities of drugs moved through the Bahamas. Maritime incidents involving go-fast boats, pleasure crafts, and fishing vessels have remained somewhat stable from last year, but the use of coastal freighters to transport drugs has risen. Law enforcement has increasingly uncovered large loads (two metric tons or more) of cocaine hidden in secret compartments of coastal freighters transiting through Bahamian waters. Currently there are more coastal freighter vessels on lookout than at any time in the past. USG agencies concur that there is an upward trend by narcotraffickers in their use of Bahamian territory for cocaine and marijuana transshipment into the southeastern United States. This upward trend has been largely attributed to the USG crackdown on counternarcotics trafficking through Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Mexico and across the southeastern U.S. border.
Traffickers are increasingly using tactics that make it difficult for U.S. and Bahamian law enforcement to intercept their shipments. Among these are the ever-increasing use of Cuban airspace and territorial sea to evade OPBAT assets, the use of very high speed, low profile boats, and the use of well-hidden compartments on large coastal freighters.
In February 1998, Bahamian and U.S. law enforcement officials boarded a coastal freighter in Grand Bahama and seized 2,236 kilograms of cocaine. Seizures from airdrops with loads ranging from 300 kilograms to 600 kilograms of cocaine occurred in March, May, September, and October 1998. U.S. and Bahamian law enforcement officials continue to discover small marijuana patches on some of the remote Bahamian islands, though no marijuana is known to be grown in sufficient quantities for export.
The Bahamian DEU works closely with DEA on drug investigations. It is a special force within the RBPF composed of 84 officers (including the counternarcotics strike force). During 1998, the GCOB had arrested 1,982 persons on drug charges and seized 3.68 metric tons of cocaine and 2.86 metric tons of marijuana. The DEU is presently conducting several money laundering investigations based on the recently-passed anti-money laundering law.
Under Bahamian law, the assets of a convicted drug offender are subject to forfeiture. Unfortunately, defense attorneys for drug traffickers are often able to delay their cases for many years. As a result, by the time the drug traffickers' cases are adjudicated, the assets have lost much of their value. Funds from the sale of forfeited assets are deposited in the government's general fund. The Attorney General's office continues to experience little success in forfeiting trafficking proceeds.
Corruption. As a matter of policy, the GCOB does not encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of drugs, or the laundering of illicit proceeds therefrom. The USG is not aware of senior officials of the GCOB engaging in, encouraging, or facilitating the illicit production or distribution of drugs, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. Over the past several years, some mid- and low-level officials who engaged in narcotics-related corruption were prosecuted successfully. On December 16, the RBPF DEU arrested two police officers from the RBPF Drug Canine Unit at Nassau International Airport. The two handlers were allegedly working with a drug trafficking ring to move cocaine through the airport via U.S. and Bahamian air carriers to the southeastern U.S. Although the DEU has conducted several operations against RBPF and RBDF corruption, the GCOB needs to continue to move decisively against corruption at Bahamian ports of entry. Delays and backlogs in the judicial system reduce the possibility that corrupt officials or drug traffickers will serve lengthy sentences. Reducing these delays and backlogs is the focus of the court delay reduction initiative of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Agreements and Treaties. The Bahamas is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The GCOB works to accomplish the goals and objectives of U.S.-Bahamas bilateral narcotics control agreements, which facilitate cooperative action on a wide range of narcotics-control measures, such as improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the judicial system, impeding money laundering, reducing local demand for drugs, and preventing the transshipment of drugs through Bahamian waters via OPBAT and other bilateral law enforcement efforts.
The U.S.-Bahamas Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) facilitates the bilateral exchange of information and evidence for use in criminal proceedings. The MLAT can be used to pierce Bahamian bank secrecy laws where credible evidence exists of narcotics crimes, money laundering, or other serious offenses. The GCOB is generally responsive to MLAT requests, although in some instances the USG has not been able to obtain a satisfactory response.
The GCOB has been receptive to U.S. extradition requests, based on the 1994 U.S.-Bahamas Extradition Treaty, but with mixed results. Actual extraditions continue to be slowed by procedural delays in the Bahamian courts.
The U.S. and The Bahamas entered into a maritime counternarcotics cooperation agreement in May 1996. The agreement permits the Bahamas to embark Defence Force or Police officers to act as shipriders on U.S. vessels operating in Bahamian waters. The agreement permits the U.S. vessels to support these shipriders in Bahamian territorial seas to board, search, and, if evidence warrants, seize U.S., stateless, or third nation vessels; to enter Bahamian territorial seas to assist Bahamian law enforcement personnel in the enforcement of Bahamian laws; and to board, search, and seize Bahamian vessels on the high seas suspected of involvement in criminal activity. This agreement also authorizes USG law enforcement aircraft to overfly Bahamian territory. Bahamian forces have participated in several combined maritime law enforcement operations with the U.S. Coast Guard.
Drug Flow and Transit. During 1998, drug flow estimates for cocaine rose considerably. Flow estimates for marijuana remained constant.
Demand Reduction Programs. The GCOB makes modest budgetary contributions to demand reduction programs, especially in education and prevention. In 1998, the USG funded the first chemical dependency professional certificate program in the history of The Bahamas. As a result of this program, 30 Bahamians working in the areas of drug demand reduction and abuse are now professionally trained. The USG provides some assistance to the government's National Drug Council. The number of new drug users has declined in the past ten years, but there are indications that cocaine and crack abuse is on the rise. Most usage among young Bahamians is largely restricted to marijuana.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives
Policy Initiatives. The goals of USG assistance to and presence in The Bahamas are to dismantle trafficking organizations, stem the flow of drugs through The Bahamas to the U.S., and strengthen Bahamian law enforcement and judicial institutions to make them more effective and self-sufficient in dealing with narcotics trafficking and money laundering.
Bilateral Cooperation. The GCOB continues to allocate significant budgetary resources to its counternarcotics efforts--approximately 14 percent of its annual budget--and to bilateral cooperation with the U.S. Despite a high arrest success rate by the police, convictions of drug dealers remain low due to weaknesses in local drug laws and suspect juries. The GCOB commitment to OPBAT, through its funding of the RBPF strike force unit, has led to close bilateral cooperation producing numerous drug arrests and seizures. However, the Royal Bahamas Defense Force (RBDF)--a potentially important player in counternarcotics interdiction--has yet to clearly define its role in this effort.
The Road Ahead. The Bahamas' expansive archipelagic geography and proximity to the U.S. guarantees it will be a target for drug transshipment and other criminal activity for the foreseeable future. Its niche as a financial center, its bank secrecy laws, and its liberal international business corporation (IBC) regime make it vulnerable to drug money laundering and other financial crimes. The Bahamians have long maintained a strong track record of commitment to bilateral counternarcotics efforts. The GCOB is now firmly supporting anti-money laundering efforts as well. Because of the country's relatively small budget and growing drug transshipment problem, the GCOB will continue to depend upon significant USG assistance to fight international narcotics trafficking and crime. The principal short- and medium-term objective of U.S. counternarcotics assistance in The Bahamas is the strengthening of the country's institutions to allow the GCOB to assume a greater share of the burden of combating drug trafficking, money laundering, and other criminal activity. A second key objective is to continue to deepen U.S.-Bahamian counternarcotics, crime, and money laundering cooperation to serve as a model in the hemisphere.
Bahamas Statistical Tables [Excel file 20.0KB]
I. Summary
The lack of authoritative information about the illegal narcotics situation in Cuba makes it difficult to assess the severity of Cuba's drug use and smuggling problems. Cuba's location between the United States and the hemisphere's principal drug-exporting countries makes it a logical transshipment point for traffickers. In 1998, traffickers' use of Cuba's airports, airspace, and vast territorial waters for transshipment appears to have increased. The Cuban authorities seem to have focused their apparently limited capability on law enforcement efforts at Cuban airports, not at drop sites at sea. Cuban officials repeatedly cited Cuba's proximity to the U.S. and the growing number of tourists coming to the island as the cause of the increasing, though still low-level, drug use and trafficking problems. Cuba and the United States continued to exchange drug-related law enforcement information on a case-by-case basis. Cuba is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
II. Status of Country
The Government of Cuba (GOC) does not publish comprehensive information on its drug problem. The island does not appear to be a significant site for cultivation or production. There are indications, however, that drug trafficking, particularly transshipment via "mules" transiting Cuban airports and drugs dropped from planes over waters off Cuba's northeast coast, is on the rise. There were no reports of money laundering in Cuba in 1998.
Sources indicate a moderate overall rise in drug use in Cuba, by Cubans as well as foreigners. 1998 marked the first time Cubans reported the presence of crack cocaine on the island. The GOC continued to attribute drug use in Cuba to the foreign influences associated with Cuba's opening up to business and tourism from abroad. During 1998 Cuban officials continued to deny publicly that drug addiction and drug trafficking were a serious problem in Cuba. In a January 1999 public address, however, Fidel Castro acknowledged that Cuba was increasingly being used as transit point for regional drug traffickers, leading to the birth of a domestic market for drugs, which he described as a "mortal venom for our youth and people." Castro attributed part of the consumption problem to the availability of U.S. dollars following the 1993 legalization of the possession of U.S. currency by Cubans.
Cuban officials blame their lack of resources for the GOC's inability to patrol its territorial waters. As U.S. Coast Guard reports attest, drug traffickers appear to be taking advantage of that inability to an increasing extent.
Article 190 of the Cuban Penal Code provides for three to eight years imprisonment for the production, transport, trafficking, possession with intent to traffic, or procurement for others of toxic drugs, hallucinogens, or hypnotic or narcotic substances. For "relatively large" amounts, sentences can range from seven to fifteen years. Simple possession is punishable by sentences of six months to three years.
The lead law enforcement agency on drugs in Cuba is the Ministry of the Interior's National Anti-Drug Department. The National Drug Commission is an interagency coordinating body nominally under the Ministry of Justice. The Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Public Health, Customs and Border Guards are also represented on the Commission.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1998
Policy Initiatives. In 1998, Cuba enhanced anti-narcotics cooperation with several countries, including the United Kingdom, Italy, The Bahamas, and France. In May, the Cuban press reported that Cuba had received more than $500,000 in counternarcotics assistance (equipment, assistance and training) from the UNDCP. In October, the United Kingdom announced it would provide $265,000 for the training of Cuban customs officials. A team of French customs officials began a 10-week canine technique training course for their Cuban counterparts at Havana's Jose Marti International Airport in December.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Cuba's anti-narcotics efforts in 1998 were most noticeable at Havana's Jose Marti International Airport, where British-trained customs officials used drug-sniffing dogs to detect illegal narcotics as well as explosives.
While sources indicated an increase in drug arrests, particularly of foreigners, in 1998, the Cuban media reported specific instances of drug enforcement only on an infrequent basis.
The GOC did not publish complete statistics for domestic arrests or prosecutions. The GOC continued to maintain that it had no serious domestic consumption or trafficking problem, but in June, state media sources indicated that domestic trafficking had risen due to the increased number of tourists--over a million--who visited Cuba. Domestic demand for drugs, such as cocaine, is believed to be low, but anecdotal evidence indicates a rise in cocaine use, as well as the first reports of crack cocaine use in Cuba. Several "drug houses" reportedly sell much of the cocaine available in Havana, using prostitutes to market the drug to foreign tourists.
While Cuba discussed the idea of exchanging prisoners with some countries, the exchange does not appear to be directed at drug offenders. There were no reports of GOC extradition of drug offenders (or receipt of extradited drug offenders), but neither were there reports of potentially extraditable offenders.
Drug Seizures/Arrests. Reports of the transit of drugs through Cuban airports and via airdrops rose in 1998. Several European and Colombian drug traffickers were arrested in 1998 attempting to transit from Central America through Cuba to Europe. Most reportedly believed that law enforcement authorities would not suspect travelers of carrying drugs into Cuba, a country with a small consumer market, or from Cuba, a country not known to be a drug-producing country and therefore, they presumed, less closely watched by European customs officials.
Cuban authorities arrested 18 foreign "tourists" (7 Canadians, 7 Jamaicans, and 4 Britons) in November for attempting to transport 53.5 kilograms of cocaine and 1.3 kilograms of hashish from Jamaica, through Cuba, to the United Kingdom, according to press reports. Cuban authorities called this the largest seizure ever made at a Cuban airport. In 1998, there was a much more visible presence of transit cooperation with European governments, particularly in the areas of customs training and drug-sniffing dogs, visible at Havana's international airport.
The GOC notes that it does not have the "naval means" necessary to patrol its extensive coastline and many keys. In June, a Justice Ministry official said that some of the boats the Cuban government used to chase smugglers at sea dated from World War II. Drug seizures made in Cuban waters were reported by Cuban authorities to have been the result of drug traffickers' failed "drops." In September, a Cuban press report indicated that in 1994 thirty-four "bundles" of drugs were found in Cuban waters, the apparent results of abandoned or failed drops. In the first six months of 1998, said the report, 220 such seizures were made. Cuban authorities reportedly seized "95 million doses" of pure cocaine between 1994 and 1997. A March press report said 53 Colombians were being held in Cuban jails after trying to transport cocaine from Colombia through Cuba to Europe.
In early January 1999, Fidel Castro publicly announced that 216 foreigners had been arrested during the three-year period 1996-1998, of whom 165 were still in jail. He placed the number of drug seizures during the first eleven months of 1998 at 269, nearly double the previous year. According to Castro, total seizures (marijuana, cocaine, and hashish combined) amounted to 3.52 metric tons.
In December, in the Port of Cartagena, Colombia, the Colombian National Police (CNP) seized over 7 metric tons of cocaine hidden in shipping containers which, according to the cargo manifest, were bound for Havana, Cuba. Information developed by the CNP in cooperation with the Cuban authorities thus far has not revealed who in Cuba was destined to receive the shipment. However, the CNP investigation indicates that the shipment was ultimately intended for Europe, and that investigation is currently targeting certain key European drug traffickers.
Corruption. Since the 1989 show trial and subsequent execution of Defense Ministry official Division General Arnoldo Ochoa, Interior Ministry official Colonel Antonio de la Guardia, and two of his subordinates, Cuban authorities have maintained that there is no evidence of narcotics-related corruption by government officials. The USG has no credible evidence of recent high level official drug-related corruption. No reports of narcotics-related corruption appeared in Cuba's state-controlled media in 1998. However, it is probable that some degree of corruption is present among low level Cuban police officers and other officials best placed to facilitate smuggling.
Amendments adopted in 1994 to Article 190 and 192 of the Cuban Penal Code provide for increased penalties for public officials who engage in or assist illicit narcotic activities. An amendment to Article 192 punishes persons who use their employment to facilitate narcotics trafficking.
Agreements and Treaties. Cuba has no counternarcotics agreement or treaty with the U.S. The U.S. and Cuba signed a treaty in 1904 providing for the mutual extradition of fugitives from justice. That treaty entered into force in 1905 and was supplemented by an additional extradition treaty in 1926. These treaties have not been used in many decades. Cuba is a party to the World Customs Organization's International Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance for the Prevention, Investigation, and Repression of Customs Offenses (Nairobi Convention), Annex X on Assistance in Narcotics Cases. Cuba is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
During 1998, the GOC signed bilateral counternarcotics agreements with Portugal, Spain, Colombia, Italy, and France. The GOC states that it maintains bilateral agreements on narcotics with 18 countries, including the United Kingdom, Russia, Canada, Mexico, Jamaica, The Bahamas, Guyana, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador. According to the GOC, it is negotiating agreements with 25 other countries. Cuba and the United States share no bilateral counternarcotics treaties or agreements, but have worked together on a case by case basis on law enforcement matters.
Cultivation/Production. There is no evidence that Cuba is a significant drug-producing country. According to the GOC, small quantities of marijuana are grown around Havana and in eastern Cuba, but are unsuitable for export because of the low THC content of the crop. The GOC published no reports regarding crop size estimates, crop yields, or eradication efforts.
Drug Flow/Transit. According to GOC officials and press reports, transshipment of illegal narcotics in 1998 took place in the waters off of Cuba's northeastern coast and at Cuban international airports. In the cases at sea, the narcotics were reportedly dropped by aircraft crossing over east-central Cuba, and picked up by "go-fast" boats waiting nearby. On numerous occasions, the U.S. Coast Guard reported in real-time to the Cuban Border Guards incidents of suspicious aircraft over-flying Cuban airspace, dropping something, and returning south. None of the planes involved was apprehended. Cuban authorities did, in one known instance, recover 22 airdropped bales of marijuana.
Domestic Programs. The head of Cuba's National Drug Commission noted in July that a "national prevention program" was underway to deter drug use in Cuba. The head of the Commission said that the program employed the education and public health sectors to detect and prevent drug use, particularly among Cuban youth. He also said that the Cuban criminal code did not penalize drug consumption in Cuba.
Asset Seizure. The GOC retains all property seized or suspected of being linked to narcotics trafficking. Privately-held land used to cultivate cannabis or other illegal crops is subject to confiscation. There were no published reports of asset forfeitures in 1998.
Precursor Chemical Control. Cuba is not believed to be a source of precursor chemicals. No incidents involving precursor chemicals were published during 1998.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives
Bilateral Cooperation. The USG and the GOC have no bilateral narcotics agreements, and there is no INL program in Cuba. In 1998, the U.S. and Cuba continued to cooperate on law enforcement matters on a case-by-case basis. Via telex link, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Federal Aviation Administration routinely provide to the Border Guard and the Havana Air Traffic Control Center non-sensitive, real-time information on suspicious vessels and aircraft in or near Cuban waters or airspace.
The GOC continued to claim willingness to cooperate with the United States to combat drug trafficking. At the same time, Cuba has reportedly noted its inability to devote the resources necessary to combat trafficking within its own territory.
The Road Ahead. The U.S. and Cuba will continue to cooperate in counternarcotics efforts on a case-by-case basis.
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