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Great Seal

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998
Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC, February 1999

Blue Bar

THE CARIBBEAN

JAMAICA

I. Summary

Jamaica is a major transit point for South American cocaine en route to the U.S. and is also the largest Caribbean producer and exporter of marijuana. During 1998, the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) made some progress toward meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention, to which it became a party in 1995. At regional meetings, GOJ officials actively supported counterdrug initiatives. Bilateral counterdrug cooperation is good and improving, especially in the area of maritime law enforcement. The Jamaica-U.S bilateral maritime agreement, proposed by the USG in July 1995, came into force when Jamaica passed enabling legislation in February 1998. Jamaican forces participated in several combined operations under the new agreement.

During 1998, the GOJ removed four persons to the U.S., three by extradition and one under a waiver of extradition, compared to three removals in 1997. The USG and GOJ worked together to remove from the list of pending extradition requests all non-active cases, leaving 17 pending requests for which the U.S. seeks early resolution. Jamaica's cannabis eradication during 1998 was down only slightly from 1997, despite a virtual lack of helicopter and fixed wing air support. Marijuana and cocaine seizures and drug-related arrests increased significantly over 1997; hash oil seizures were down. The GOJ made a valuable contribution to regional anti-drug efforts by assuming funding of operating costs of the Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement Training Center, located near Kingston and built with USG funding under a UNDCP project.

Three years after its accession to the 1988 UN Drug Convention in 1995, the GOJ continues its efforts to comply with the Convention's goals and objectives. In 1998, the lower house of parliament passed amendments to the existing anti-money laundering legislation; Senate action is pending. If passed by the Senate, the proposed amendments would require suspicious transaction reporting and also raise the threshold for mandatory transaction reporting from $10,000 equivalent to $50,000 equivalent. Further GOJ action is required, however, to bring its anti-money laundering law in line with international standards, especially extending the law to cover the laundering of the proceeds of all serious crime. Current Jamaican law requires the conviction of a criminal drug defendant prior to commencing a forfeiture action. The GOJ forfeited the house of a convicted drug trafficker in 1998. Jamaica's current asset forfeiture regime does not permit the GOJ to take full advantage of the forfeiture mechanism to augment the resources of its anti-drug agencies and deprive criminals of the proceeds of their crime. In 1998, the GOJ did not table in parliament a precursor and essential chemical control law, despite stated commitments to do so for the last several years. However, the GOJ has budgeted for implementation of chemical controls, and the USG has already provided training to Jamaican precursor chemical control personnel. The GOJ did table in parliament anti-corruption legislation, which is currently under debate. Corruption, especially among members of the security and law enforcement forces, however, remains a serious problem in Jamaica, and the GOJ has not taken strong action to prosecute corrupt individuals. UNDCP's Caribbean Regional Office, in its April 1998 newsletter "Focus on Drugs," quoted a report by the NGO Transparency International which noted corruption is a grave problem in Jamaica and that drug trafficking adds to the problem.

We believe the GOJ should now pass needed anti-drug and anti-money laundering legislation and take additional actions that will have a profound impact on the level of drug trafficking in Jamaica. In 1998, the GOJ arrested 7,352 drug offenders in 1998, and the Supreme Court reported 10,290 convictions of drug offenders. However, even though GOJ counterdrug cooperation with DEA continued to be good, no Jamaican drug kingpins were arrested or convicted during 1998 and continue to operate with apparent impunity. The GOJ has agreed to develop in the coming year, with USG assistance, special units to target drug kingpins and apprehend fugitives from justice. Illegal drugs continue to transit Jamaica's borders, and the USG will continue to assist the GOJ to address port security problems identified in a 1997 comprehensive assessment by USG agencies. The GOJ has in place a comprehensive national drug control strategy which covers both supply and demand reduction; the GOJ should add to its strategy specific goals and objectives and measures of effectiveness. The GOJ also should ratify the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, and, as it mandates, put in place legislation that requires financial disclosure by public officials. The GOJ also needs to take stronger steps to strengthen internal controls and investigate and prosecute corrupt members of the security and law enforcement forces. The USG will continue to provide technical assistance, training, and equipment to the GOJ to help strengthen its anti-drug, anti-money laundering and anti-corruption laws and enforcement capabilities.

II. Status of Country

Jamaica, the foremost producer and exporter of marijuana in the Caribbean, is also a major transit country for illegal drugs destined for the U.S. Jamaica's central Caribbean location, halfway between Colombia and Florida, makes it an attractive location for cocaine transshipment operations. The transshipment of multi-kilogram loads of cocaine through Jamaica to North America and Europe is a significant problem, as is that of Jamaica-based traffickers who use couriers who board commercial airlines attempting to smuggle cocaine that they have ingested or concealed in their clothing or luggage. Jamaica is not an offshore banking center, and the local criminal element distrusts Jamaican financial institutions. Thus, locally laundered money is used to acquire real assets, such as houses or cars, rather than financial instruments. The USG and OAS/CICAD share a growing concern over the vulnerability of Caribbean ports, including those in Jamaica, to illegal diversion of precursor and essential chemicals. In Jamaica, illicitly obtained isopropyl alcohol is utilized to distill hash oil.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1998

Jamaica's counterdrug efforts have taken place against a backdrop of severe resource constraints caused by a recession that is now in its third year; 1998 could be Jamaica's third straight year of negative economic growth. Between 1987 and 1998, the U.S Department of State has provided more counterdrug assistance to Jamaica than to any other Caribbean country.

Policy Initiatives. The master drug plan, passed by Jamaica's parliament in 1997, involves all relevant ministries in an integrated strategy focusing on supply and demand reduction. The strategy also seeks to minimize the profits from marijuana cultivation and trafficking. The plan complies with the OAS/CICAD model. Jamaica made a regionally important policy determination to fund the operating costs of the Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement Training Center (REDTRAC) when UNDCP funding expired earlier this year. This center, built with U.S. funds under a UNDCP project, has provided specialized training for hundreds of regional law enforcement officers since its inception in 1996.

Accomplishments. In February 1998, Jamaica passed implementing legislation to bring the bilateral maritime law enforcement cooperation agreement, signed in May 1997, into force. In April, Jamaica undertook its first combined operation with the U.S. under the new agreement. Jamaica participated, along with the U.S. and the Cayman Islands, in three additional combined operations in 1998. The JDF presently lacks adequate fixed wing aircraft and ships, which seriously hampers their maritime reconnaissance and interdiction efforts, but did purchase seven helicopters at the end of the year.

In September 1998, Jamaica signed a Letter of Agreement (LOA) with the U.S., amending the International Narcotics Control Project Agreement signed in August 1988 and amended annually since 1988. The LOA reflects a tradition of cooperation between the U.S. and Jamaica in drug control operations.

The Jamaica Customs Service has also implemented some measures to improve security at Kingston's seaport and international airport, including USG-supported training in a number of areas and the acquisition of additional x-ray machines. Nevertheless, Jamaica's air and sea ports continue to be utilized by traffickers of contraband, including illegal drugs and firearms.

Money Laundering. Jamaica is not considered an important regional financial center, tax haven, or offshore banking center. However, money laundering does occur. DEA reports that drug money is laundered primarily through the acquisition of real assets such as cars and real estate. In consultation with the U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the GOJ prepared further amendments to Jamaica's money laundering statute designed to bring it more into compliance with the recommendations of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) by adding a "suspicious transactions" reporting requirement. The amendments were passed by the lower house of parliament in December 1998; passage by the Senate is pending. Further GOJ action is required, however, to bring its anti-money laundering law in line with international standards, especially extending the law to cover the laundering of the proceeds of all serious crime, especially firearms trafficking. The GOJ is coordinating with FinCEN with respect to hiring the personnel and acquiring the computer hardware, software and training necessary to analyze the currency transaction reports required by the money laundering statute. The GOJ participates very actively in the activities of CFATF, which has scheduled its mutual evaluation of Jamaica's anti-money laundering regime for 1999.

Asset Seizure. Unlike the U.S., Jamaica does not have a civil forfeiture statute. The relevant Jamaican statute, the 1995 Forfeiture of Assets Act, requires a criminal drug-trafficking conviction as a prerequisite to the forfeiture of assets associated with drug trafficking. This year, a Jamaican court ordered the first forfeiture of assets under this statute, a home belonging to a convicted drug dealer. The Public Prosecutor's office is currently reviewing the cases of other convicted drug traffickers to ascertain if they have traceable assets subject to forfeiture. During 1998, Jamaican authorities seized ten vessels involved in drug smuggling, of which two have been forfeited to the Crown and the remaining eight are in various stages of the forfeiture procedure.

Operation Prop Lock, a combined effort of the DEA and Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) to seize suspected trafficking aircraft of U.S. registry and return them to the U.S. for forfeiture, was not successful during 1998, due largely to a shift in favor of seaborne transport.

Jamaica's current asset forfeiture regime does not permit the GOJ to take full advantage of the forfeiture mechanism to augment the resources of its anti-drug agencies and deprive criminals of the proceeds of their crime.

Extradition. During 1998, four persons were removed to the U.S., three by extradition and one under a waiver of extradition, compared to three removals in 1997 and eight in 1996. The GOJ and USG consulted on the list of pending extradition requests and removed from it all non-active cases, leaving 17 pending requests, of which three are currently in custody. The USG seeks early resolution of these 17 cases. Jamaican authorities are generally receptive to and cooperative with U.S. requests for extradition. Delays in extradition cases result mainly from the due process protections afforded Jamaican criminal defendants. Combined with an overburdened court system, this means that contested extradition requests can take from four to five years (and possibly longer) to fully litigate. The GOJ has agreed to develop in the coming year, with USG assistance, a special unit to apprehend fugitives from justice.

Precursor Chemical Control. Jamaica is not a source of precursor or essential chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics. The OAS/CICAD, however, views chemical diversion as an issue of concern affecting all countries in the Western Hemisphere, especially Caribbean countries, including Jamaica. The Caribbean transit zone countries are particularly vulnerable to chemical diversion because of their location between North American and European chemical producing countries and Central and South American drug-producing consumers of those chemicals, just as they are affected by the flow of illegal drugs from producing countries to markets in the U.S. and Europe. Also in Jamaica, illicitly acquired isopropyl alcohol is used to distill hash oil. In 1998, the GOJ drafted but has not yet introduced in parliament a precursor and essential chemical control law. However, the GOJ fully expects this legislation to be enacted during 1999 and has budgeted for implementation of chemical controls for the current fiscal year (April 1, 1998 to March 31, 1999). Moreover, the USG has already provided training to Jamaican precursor chemical control personnel. In addition, Jamaica is a beneficiary country of the Caribbean Chemical Control Project funded by the OAS/CICAD and the European Union, which will begin shortly with individual country needs assessments followed by technical assistance and training.

Law Enforcement Efforts. DEA reports that counternarcotics cooperation with the JCF is very good and continues to improve. JCF drug-related arrests more than doubled from 3,364 in 1997 to 7,352 in 1998. DEA-initiated cases resulted in 73 arrests in 1998, versus 66 arrests in 1997; however, none of those arrested is a drug kingpin. DEA has been working closely with the JCF to improve targeting of Jamaican drug kingpins and their organizations. The GOJ has agreed to develop in the coming year, with USG assistance, a special unit to target drug kingpins.

Both the JDF and the JCF assign a high priority to counterdrug missions. This has resulted, with U.S. funding support, in a continuous marijuana eradication effort and the elimination of a number of hash oil processing labs. The USG is working closely with the JCF Narcotics Division to maximize its coverage by providing used mobile homes and shipping containers to be utilized as temporary office space at strategic points around the island.

Corruption. The GOJ does not as a matter of government policy encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. The GOJ has not prosecuted any senior Jamaican government official for engaging in, encouraging, or in any way facilitating the illicit production or distribution of such drugs or substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. UNDCP's Caribbean Regional Office, in its April 1998 newsletter "Focus on Drugs," however, quoted a report by the NGO Transparency International which noted corruption is a grave problem in Jamaica and that drug trafficking adds to the problem. The GOJ has tabled in parliament legislation that will enact relevant provisions of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. This legislation has been referred to a bipartisan joint select committee for review, a standard procedure for complex or controversial legislation. The committee has now completed its review. The GOJ expects the bill should come to a vote in parliament early in 1999.

As a matter of policy, the GOJ prosecutes individuals who by reliable evidence are linked to drug-related activity. The case of a resident magistrate charged in 1997 with malfeasance in a prominent drug case is still in the pre-trial phase.

The GOJ likewise has a policy of investigating credible reports of police corruption, including those related to drugs. The JCF is investigating allegations that police officers had diverted cocaine and marijuana that was seized during a December 7, 1998, bust in the Montego Bay area. In 1997 (1998 statistics are not yet available), 45 police officers were arrested for criminal offenses; eight of those were arrested for corruption charges. In 1998, the JCF instituted a program of random drug testing for police officers. In January 1999, the Police Commissioner ordered the transfer of 56 of the 127 policemen assigned to the Parish of Portland. The Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) has a "zero tolerance" policy on drug involvement by its members. In May 1998, a JDF Coast Guard lieutenant was arrested on four marijuana charges. He was summarily dismissed from the JDF and was convicted in the resident magistrate's court, where he was fined approximately U.S.$1,700 and given a six-month suspended sentence.

Mutual Legal Assistance. Jamaica has a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) and an extradition treaty with the U.S. Both countries have utilized the MLAT in combating illegal narcotics trafficking and other crimes. Jamaica is also a party to the MLAT among the Commonwealth states.

Illicit Cultivation and Production. The consumption of marijuana is illegal in Jamaica, and the GOJ has consistently rejected calls for its legalization. The JDF and JCF continue to cooperate on U.S.-funded eradication operations utilizing their limited resources, despite this year's lack of helicopter support. Although the 1998 LOA set a tentative cannabis eradication goal of 800 hectares, lack of a good estimate of hectarage under cannabis cultivation and agreement on the number of harvests per year leaves that figure only as a rough estimate. In 1998, eradication operations (by two cutter teams of 14 personnel each) resulted in the destruction of 692 hectares of cannabis, down slightly from the (revised) 1997 level of 743 hectares. The eradication operational tempo was maintained throughout 1998, notwithstanding the lack of U.S.-provided helicopter support (helicopters were grounded due to engine vibration and general aging problems) once considered fundamental to the success of this program.

After cutting, the amount of cannabis eradicated is tallied by the JDF and JCF field officers. Eradication data are analyzed and compiled by parish (district) into a monthly report. Crops are usually planted in swamps and along the hills and valleys of remote areas that have limited road access. Farmers continually devise ingenious ways of concealing cannabis. Its current street value is U.S.$800-1000 per pound, which makes cannabis much more profitable than other crops. In addition to cannabis eradicated, GOJ authorities seized and destroyed 36 metric tons of marijuana, compared with 24 metric tons seized in 1997. In 1998, cocaine seizures totaled 1,144 kilograms, compared with 414 kilograms in 1997; hash oil seizures totaled 144 kilograms, down from 383 kilograms in 1997; and hashish seizures totaled 41 kilograms, down from 67 kilograms in 1997.

As a matter of public policy and reflecting popular opinion, Jamaica is opposed to aerially applied herbicide as a means of eradicating cannabis. Manual cutting is the method utilized. Growers routinely interplant cannabis among legitimate crops. The GOJ and the environmental community believe that aerial spraying of herbicide would cause long-term ill effects to individuals and the environment.

At Jamaica's request, the USG provided assistance in conducting an aerial survey to more precisely target areas under cannabis cultivation. To date, the USG has been unable to complete its analysis of the survey results, so there is till no reliable estimate of annual cannabis cultivation in Jamaica.

Demand Reduction. Jamaica has several active demand reduction projects in place. The UNDCP is active in Jamaica and works directly with the GOJ and NGOs to improve demand reduction efforts. The European Union will be funding a large, three-year demand reduction project. Two of the most highly visible projects are those of the National Council on Drug Abuse (NCDA) and the NGO Addiction Alert. The UNDCP has funded an integrated demand reduction program managed by the NCDA. Addiction alert has received U.S. funding for its adolescent drug prevention program. The GOJ has used extensively the audiovisual, print media and other materials produced by U.S. Military Information Support Teams (MIST) deployed in country. The MIST teams have worked closely with national demand reduction agencies to develop and distribute materials reinforcing an anti-drug message.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Bilateral Cooperation. The GOJ publicly states its commitment to combating illegal drugs. The USG has provided funding for GOJ counterdrug efforts continuously since 1987. U.S. Department of State counterdrug funding for Jamaica, 1987-1998, exceeds that provided to any other Caribbean nation. Nevertheless, Jamaica operates under severe resource constraints, with half of its national budget going for debt repayment alone. Despite limited resources, 1998 saw some improvement in GOJ counterdrug activity. The passage of legislation implementing the bilateral maritime agreement and the commencement of combined U.S./Jamaican operations under that agreement, as well as GOJ commitments made in the 1998 LOA were positive steps against drugs. The acquisition of seven helicopters, refurbishing of a coast guard cutter and the assumption of operating expenses for the Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement Training Center represent a substantial outlay of money and are indicative of a level of commitment to counterdrug efforts. The JDF coast guard regularly patrols Jamaican coastal waters, with drug interdiction as one of its tasks. At the police operational level, Jamaican cooperation with DEA and FBI remained positive. Nevertheless, the GOJ has experienced difficulties in making cases against drug kingpins. Jamaican borders continue to be vulnerable to traffickers moving contraband, especially drugs and firearms. Development of the requisite legal framework and enforcement capability is our biggest challenge in the road ahead.

Road Ahead. The general challenge for any Caribbean state is to avoid becoming a "weak link" in the fight against transnational organized crime. Jamaica has taken some steps to protect itself against drug trafficking and other types of organized crime, but the GOJ needs to act aggressively if it is to achieve the bilateral goal of a fully integrated institutional structure capable of investigating and prosecuting cases against major drug and crime figures. Additional legislation pertaining to public corruption, money laundering, asset forfeiture, precursor chemical control, and modern crime control tools such as wiretap legislation would create a more effective legal framework. To make further progress against drug trafficking, it will be necessary to augment Jamaica's drug interdiction and marijuana eradication capabilities. We will also have to continue to provide training and to work closely with the police and public prosecutors to enhance their abilities to investigate, successfully prosecute, and forfeit the assets of drug kingpins.

Jamaica Statistical Tables [Excel file 30.5]

 

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

I. Summary

The islands of the Netherlands Antilles continue to serve as transshipment points for cocaine and heroin coming from South America (mainly Colombia, Venezuela, and Suriname) and bound for the U.S. and Europe, primarily the Netherlands. There is insufficient evidence to establish that the amount of narcotics coming to the U.S. through the Netherlands Antilles has a significant effect on the U.S.

In 1998, the Netherlands Antilles refused to extradite a significant drug trafficker/money launderer to the U.S.

Although the Kingdom of the Netherlands is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the Convention currently covers only the Netherlands. In December, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba requested that the Kingdom extend the 1988 UN Drug Convention to the other two parts of the Kingdom. Extension is expected during 1999.

II. Status of Country

The Netherlands Antilles consists of two geographically separated groups of Caribbean islands: Curacao and Bonaire, located some 50 miles off the northwest coast of Venezuela; and Saba, Sint Eustatius, and Sint Maarten, located in the Leeward Islands, some 170 miles east of Puerto Rico.

The Netherlands Antilles, Aruba (an island 50 miles west of Curacao), and the Netherlands (Holland) comprise the three parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Since 1954 the Netherlands Antilles has been a separate entity with autonomy over its internal affairs and the right to exercise independent decision making in a number of relevant counternarcotics areas. The Government of the Netherlands (GON) is responsible for the defense and foreign affairs of all three parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and it assists the Government of the Netherlands Antilles (GONA) in its efforts to counter narcotics trafficking. The Netherlands Antilles is a participant in a Joint Netherlands-Netherlands Antilles-Aruba Coast Guard.

The islands of the Netherlands Antilles continue to serve as transshipment points for cocaine coming from South America, mainly Colombia, Venezuela, and Suriname. Most of the drug enters the islands via ocean-going vessels originating in Colombia, small fishing vessels from Venezuela, and through small unattended airstrips. On Curacao alone, there are some 54 beaches used by go-fast boats to off-load cocaine. The cocaine is then collected by couriers who arrive on the islands as tourists on cruise ships or commercial airliners, or transferred to commercial shipments (airfreight and container cargo vessels). Heroin enters c via couriers from Colombia and is transshipped to the U.S. and Europe by "mules" (small-time and usually non-professional drug couriers).

Most of the cocaine transiting Curacao and Bonaire is believed to be destined for Europe. There are daily flights from Curacao (and weekly flights from Bonaire) to Amsterdam, where the price of cocaine is twice what it is in Miami, and where sentences for drug trafficking are much lighter than in the U.S. The vast majority of arrests, chiefly arrests by customs of "mules" boarding flights, intercept cocaine destined for the Netherlands. However, it would be inaccurate to suggest that flights to other destinations are not used to carry drugs. In February alone, some 89 kilos of cocaine were seized in Haiti on flights originating in Curacao. Dutch Sint Maarten, with its free port and proximity to U.S. territory, is generally considered to be a staging ground for moving cocaine into the U.S. market through Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Elected officials and all elements of the law enforcement and judicial community know that the Netherlands Antilles, largely by reason of its geography, faces a very serious threat from drug trafficking. During 1998, there was a sharp increase in the number of residents of the Netherlands Antilles engaged in drug trafficking. This disturbing trend may stem at least in part from the economic contraction Curacao is undergoing.

Offshore banking facilities, casino/resort complexes, high volume American and Dutch tourism, and a stable currency continue to make the Netherlands Antilles attractive to money laundering organizations.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1998

Policy Actions. According to the new government that took office in 1998, its top priorities are first to improve the economy and reduce unemployment by attracting investment, and second to tackle Curacao's rising street crime problem. The GONA acknowledged the link between the international drug trade and rising crime and indicated it is most interested in finding out where illicit drugs are coming from and stopping them before they arrive in the Netherlands Antilles.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Curacao Customs is responsible for most of the cocaine seizures at the airport. There are not many pro-active narcotics investigations conducted by the police on Curacao. The police, who are understaffed (with only one police officer for every 350 citizens on an island with a population of 130,000) and not adequately trained, feel they do not have the necessary resources to mount much of a counternarcotics effort. The police are significantly constrained in their effectiveness by the high legal standards they must meet to prosecute a case in court. Rather than overcome the many legal obstacles needed to get approval from a prosecutor to aggressively investigate a case, most police tackle only blatant, open and shut cases. Thus, resource constraints and the high standards of the Dutch legal system mean very few police can make a serious attempt at pursuing the kind of complex, long-term investigations that would be necessary to arrest a major organizer of drug trafficking through the Antilles.

The principal Dutch investigative effort in the Netherlands Antilles is a specialized unit called the RST, comprised of some 27 Dutch and 6 Antillean officers.

The only successful operation directed against upper echelon traffickers in the Netherlands Antilles in 1998 was the investigation involving the July seizure in the Netherlands of some 355 kilos of cocaine from Curacao transported aboard a Dutch military aircraft.

In 1998, the Joint Kingdom Coast Guard continued to operate in Netherlands Antillean waters. Its missions include narcotics interdiction, search and rescue, prevention of illegal fishing in Kingdom waters, and defense. Its headquarters are in Curacao, and a cutter is based there, as well as small "inshore" boats. In February, the Coast Guard confiscated 350 kilos of marijuana near Saba, and in June it seized 115 kilos of marijuana from a go-fast boat near Sint Maarten.

On Sint Maarten, an energetic and committed prosecutor's office is working to make itself the engine behind sophisticated investigations into international organized crime.

Asset Seizure. An asset seizure law is set to go into effect early 1999. The law would enable Antillean officials to use a conviction in a U.S. court as the basis for seizing assets in the Antilles. Prosecutors also highlight the point that the legislation permits assets to be confiscated early in the judicial process, thereby preventing traffickers/launderers from using the pretrial period to move their assets into safe havens, out of reach of confiscating legal authorities. However, an agreement to permit asset sharing, which went into effect in the Netherlands and the U. S. in 1994, was not adopted as part of this legislation.

Agreements and Treaties. Although the Kingdom of the Netherlands, of which both the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba are parts, is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the convention could not be extended to the overseas parts of the Kingdom until they passed all the necessary implementing legislation. In late 1998, the parliaments of both the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba passed the final piece of legislation needed before the 1988 UN Drug Convention could be extended to these islands. After an exception to the criminal code is enacted, this final piece of legislation, an international asset seizure law, will enter into effect in March 1999. The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba requested in December 1998, that the Kingdom extend the Convention to the islands. That extension will likely occur in March 1999.

The Netherlands Antilles honors requests made under the mutual legal assistance treaty, and considerable law enforcement cooperation takes place at less formal levels as well. The bilateral U.S.-Netherlands extradition treaty applies in the Netherlands Antilles and provides for the extradition of nationals. However, in the past, domestic GONA legislation prohibited the extradition of its nationals. In 1997, a law allowing nationals of the Netherlands Antilles to be extradited from their country of origin went into effect.

A U.S.-Kingdom of the Netherlands maritime counternarcotics interdiction agreement pertaining to the Caribbean is under negotiation.

Extradition. In 1998, the Governor of the Netherlands Antilles declined a U.S. request to extradite accused money launderer Alberto Arends, an Aruban national then in the Netherlands Antilles, on the grounds that he was dangerously depressed at the prospect of serving a prison sentence in the U.S. Arends returned to Aruba.

Demand Reduction. Fears about drug abuse, and the homelessness and crime that go with it, are key concerns. People on the street talk endlessly about the changes drug abuse has brought to their formerly harmonious island, and locally-elected politicians give top priority to restoring citizens' sense of safety and security. The rise in drug abuse is widely attributed to payment for drug trafficking services being made in cocaine rather than in cash. The Netherlands Antilles has ongoing demand reduction programs. It has sought U.S. support to obtain demand reduction materials.

Precursor Chemicals. While the Netherlands Antilles does not have specific legislation controlling precursor chemicals, DEA reports excellent informal cooperation from the relevant pharmaceutical authorities. The reporting of chemicals transiting the islands is strictly on a volunteer basis.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. USG agencies cooperate with their GONA counterparts. As a matter of policy the Department of State has no INL counternarcotics assistance programs in the Netherlands Antilles. This is because such assistance should be primarily the obligation of the Netherlands Antilles' Kingdom partner, the Netherlands. While the Netherlands has provided basic police training in the Netherlands Antilles, it appears that those programs do not so far include specific counternarcotics training. GONA law enforcement officials do participate in Caribbean regional training and seminars funded by the USG, but the USG does not provide their travel expenses.

The Road Ahead. USG law enforcement agencies will continue to collaborate closely with their Netherlands Antillean counterparts and with the Joint Kingdom Coast Guard. Important next steps for the GONA include improving control over its territorial waters and beaches, taking a more aggressive approach to extraditions, extending and implementing its money laundering regime, and successfully prosecuting money laundering cases. The U.S. will continue to encourage the governments of the three parts of the Kingdom to move ahead on concluding the maritime counternarcotics interdiction agreement proposed in 1997.

 

SURINAME

I. Summary

Suriname is a transshipment point for South American cocaine to Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States. There is a growing domestic consumption problem. The lack of infrastructure in the interior, which comprises 90 percent of the country, and inadequate border controls are the major obstacles in the detection of drug shipments in and out of the country.

Suriname is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but has yet to implement legislation bringing the country into conformity with the Convention. Suriname also saw an increase in the number of arms-for-drugs exchanges in 1998.

The United States has provided training and material support to elements of the police, military and judicial branch in an effort to promote greater bilateral cooperation. The Government of Suriname (GOS) and the USG signed a bilateral maritime counternarcotics interdiction agreement in 1998, and both governments are working to ratify and implement the agreement in 1999.

II. Status of Country

Suriname is a conduit for cocaine transshipment from South America to Europe and the United States. Law enforcement authorities face difficulties combating drug smuggling because of dense jungles, lack of infrastructure and insufficient personnel and equipment. Drugs are transported out of Suriname by couriers on international flights, in commercial air and maritime shipments, and in concealed storage areas on cargo ships.

The GOS is working to expand both its addict treatment capabilities and its anti-drug education programs in response to an estimated two-to three-fold increase in domestic consumption.

Although the legislature passed laws in 1997 to bring Suriname into partial compliance with the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the laws have not yet been implemented because they conflict with Surinamese legal precedents in areas such as police powers and asset forfeiture. The principle obstacles to effective counterdrug law enforcement are inadequate legislation, lack of law enforcement resources and drug-related corruption. The police have received reports that precursor chemicals are stored in Suriname and may have been used in clandestine laboratories in the past.

Money laundering occurs in Suriname, reportedly through over-valuation of purchase prices, the sale of gold purchased with illicit funds and sold in Suriname, and manipulation of accounts in commercial and state controlled banks. In 1998 the GOS awarded a number of casino licenses, and the Police are concerned that some of the casinos will be used to launder money. As yet, Suriname has not instituted asset forfeiture laws.

Police officials report an increase from 1997 in the number of arms-for-drugs swaps, with a going "exchange rate" of one kilo of cocaine for one automatic weapon. Although a number of guns did go "missing" from military barracks and a police training facility, there were no significant weapon seizures in 1998.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1998

Policy Initiatives. The Wijdenbosch administration and key officials in the GOS have denounced drug trafficking, identifying it as a threat to national security and public health. The GOS intends to host a sub-regional drug conference in 1999, postponed from 1998. In 1998, Suriname signed a maritime counternarcotics interdiction agreement with the U.S. The National Anti-Drug Council held a workshop in October and produced an action plan to coordinate the country's anti-drug efforts. Representatives of Suriname's police force and prosecutor's office continue to participate in regional anti-drug and money laundering conferences.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Drug seizures by Suriname's police force dropped from an estimated 25 tons of cocaine in 1996 to 10 tons in 1997 to less than 3 tons in 1998. Police attribute the drop to the fact that most of the seizures have been small amounts from couriers with no large drug seizures in 1998. One U.S. citizen was among the increasing number of drug couriers arrested in 1998. The Police arrested a guerrilla member of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) in 1998 in connection with an attempted arms-for-drugs exchange. In 1998 the GOS purchased some Spanish surveillance aircraft and patrol boats which will arrive in 1999.

Cultivation and Production. There is anecdotal evidence that cannabis is cultivated and used in Suriname's tribal-influenced interior, but there is no specific data on the number of hectares involved, and there is no evidence that cannabis is exported in significant quantities. However, Suriname's domestic consumption of narcotics such as cocaine and ecstasy continues to grow.

Domestic Programs/Demand Reduction. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the police and the National Anti-Drug Council have placed an increasing emphasis on drug education and rehabilitation in response to Suriname's growing domestic drug consumption. Police and NGO demand reduction and drug treatment programs have received considerable attention and praise from community leaders. Suriname's demand reduction effort is inspired by the D.A.R.E. program in the United States, which was observed by a Surinamese police commissioner while he was in the United States under the International Visitors Program.

Corruption. There are disturbing reports of money laundering, drug trafficking and associated criminal activity involving current and former government and military officials. Although President Jules Wijdenbosch has condemned drug trafficking, a convicted drug trafficker serves as the Chief of Staff to the Defense Minister. First State Advisor Desi Bouterse, the former military dictator of Suriname (1980-1987 and 1990-1991), is under investigation in the Netherlands for cocaine trafficking and money laundering. He is suspected of involvement in arranging five cocaine shipments during 1989-1991, four to the Netherlands and one to Belgium, a total of 1,336 kilograms. In 1998, the GOS refused Dutch requests to extradite Bouterse or to allow court officers to travel to Suriname to interview Bouterse, others under investigation, and witnesses against them. The Netherlands intends to try Bouterse in absentia during the spring of 1999. Suriname has yet to come to terms with the question of public corruption in an effective, legal manner.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Bilateral Cooperation. Bilateral discussions between the United States and Suriname have focused on strengthening cooperation and especially on implementing the maritime counternarcotics interdiction agreement. The DEA has gradually strengthened its cooperation with elements of the police force, which maintains a cadre of dedicated officers. A new narcotics investigative unit receives advice, logistical support, and funding from the DEA and the Department of State. The DEA is considering establishing an office in Suriname in FY 2000.

Road Ahead. The USG will continue encouraging the GOS to complete its effort to enact laws to implement the 1988 UN Convention, including asset forfeiture and money laundering laws, and to apply forcefully the provisions already in effect. The USG also will work with the GOS to ratify and implement the bilateral maritime counternarcotics interdiction agreement

 

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

I. Summary

Although Trinidad and Tobago is increasingly used as a transit country for cocaine and, to a lesser extent, heroin, evidence is insufficient to establish that the quantity of drugs coming into the U.S. from Trinidad and Tobago has a significant effect on the U.S. The country produces and exports marijuana to other countries in the region, although there is no information available to indicate production reaches the threshold for Trinidad and Tobago to be considered a major producer of marijuana. There is also evidence that higher quality marijuana is imported from St. Vincent. Narcotics-related violence, money laundering, and drug abuse have increased. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago (GOTT) continued to improve its counternarcotics capabilities and cooperated fully with U.S. Government (USG) law enforcement agencies. To improve surveillance of its sea and air lanes, the two-island country is refurbishing its coast guard vessels and soon will augment its fleets with USG-donated planes and patrol boats. It created an interagency center that gathers narcotics-related information from multiple sources for dissemination to military and enforcement agencies. For the first time, the GOTT used a narcotics law to charge four people with money laundering. The GOTT allowed the extradition to the U.S. of a suspected cocaine trafficker and a suspect in a drug-related murder, bringing to four the number of such extraditions since 1995. The GOTT became a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention in 1995 and continues to work vigorously toward meeting the Convention's objectives.

II. Status of Country

Trinidad and Tobago's location--just seven miles off the Venezuelan coast--makes it an attractive transshipment point for South American cocaine destined for the U.S. and other international markets. Small, but relatively fast, fishing boats are the primary conveyance for cocaine brought to Trinidad and Tobago. It also arrives in cargo vessels and pleasure craft. Cocaine also has been found on commercial airline flights that stopped in Trinidad en route from Guyana to North America. Small landing strips have been discovered near marijuana fields.

Illicit cargo can be easily shipped in and out by air and sea because of the country's small airports and harbors, high volume of cargo traffic, large number of tourists and highly mobile population. The country's maritime and air surveillance is limited, though improving. Cargo from Trinidad and Tobago is less vigorously scrutinized at North American and European ports than cargo originating from cocaine-producing countries.

A significant amount of marijuana is grown year-round in Trinidad and Tobago. However, we do not have evidence establishing that Trinidad and Tobago is a major drug producing country. Recent discoveries of marijuana arriving on both commercial and private aircraft indicate that the drug also is being imported. Eradication efforts destroyed more than 4.2 million marijuana plants and seedlings in 1998. Trinidad and Tobago is not a producer of coca or opium.

Although Trinidad and Tobago is not an important regional financial center and has historically taken a strong regulatory approach to its banking sector, there is cause for concern about money laundering. The nation's oil-based and growing economy, with well-developed communications and transportation systems, produces a large number of sizable transactions that could obscure laundering of illicitly obtained monies.

Intimidation of witnesses in narcotics cases is a serious problem. At least 15 witnesses were killed in the last four years in the country.

III. Country Actions against Drugs

Policy Initiatives. The GOTT in October 1997 approved and began implementing the first half of a master plan for counternarcotics. This effort aims to cut the supply of illicit drugs by prosecuting traffickers, strengthening the criminal justice system, and reducing the opportunities for money laundering, among other goals. A proposed addition to the master plan would set up job-training programs as alternatives to the cultivation of marijuana. The plan's second half would aim to cut narcotics demand by establishing anti-drug coalitions in every political constituency. The entire master plan was submitted to the cabinet but at the end of 1998 had not been approved.

The GOTT has proposed to amend its 1991 Dangerous Drugs Act to make trafficking an offense for which bail would not be allowed and to increase penalties for conviction. The amendment would extend the government's power to confiscate the proceeds of drug deals by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. The GOTT also has proposed criminalizing additional actions related to money laundering and requiring that financial institutions report all suspicious transactions.

Accomplishments. Cocaine seizures increased by more than 60 percent and the number of narcotics-related arrests more than tripled compared to the previous year, indicating a rise in trafficking and/or improved law enforcement. (See Law Enforcement section.)

An investigation by an inter-ministerial counternarcotics and money laundering task force, formed in 1997, enabled the GOTT for the first time to charge four people--including a lawyer--with money-laundering under the 1991 Dangerous Drugs Act.

Two ministries, those of social development and education, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) handle most programs to reduce the demand for illicit drugs. The USG and a local NGO sponsor project Excel (XL), which is designed to increase awareness of the negative effects of drug use while promoting healthy lifestyles among teens and children.

Law Enforcement Efforts. In 1998, the GOTT seized 88.5 kilograms of cocaine and arrested 1,388 people on cocaine-trafficking or possession charges. In the largest single seizure of cocaine in the country, three citizens of Antigua were convicted in October 1998, and received sentences of life in prison for trying in 1994 to ship 226 kilograms of cocaine out of Trinidad and Tobago.

The police reported the destruction of 4.23 million fully-grown marijuana plants and seedlings during 1998. Security forces regularly conduct eradication efforts.

In 1998, the GOTT extradited to the United States a suspected narcotrafficker and a suspect in a drug-related murder. The GOTT estimates that 60 percent of the country's crime is related to narcotics.

Corruption. There were no cases of drug-related corruption filed against high-level or senior officials during 1998. As a matter of policy, the GOTT does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of narcotics or the laundering of drug money.

Agreements and Treaties. Trinidad and Tobago's ratification of the 1988 UN Drug Convention became effective on 18 May 1995. It also is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol and the 197l UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

Trinidad and Tobago also signed mutual legal assistance and extradition treaties and a maritime counternarcotics cooperation agreement with the United States, as well as mutual legal assistance treaties with the United Kingdom and Canada. In November, the U.S. Senate approved the extradition treaty and MLAT, and both were recently ratified by the U.S. The GOTT has passed legislation required to implement the extradition treaty and MLAT. Administrative action is required to bring both into force.

Cultivation and Production. Marijuana, the principal locally produced drug, is cultivated extensively year-round in the forest and jungle areas of northern, eastern, and southern Trinidad and, to a minor extent, in Tobago. Due to the way marijuana is cultivated in small, quarter-acre lots situated in remote, difficult-to-access areas, the total amount cultivated cannot be determined. Thus, we do not have evidence establishing that Trinidad and Tobago is a major drug producing country. Marijuana is eradicated by manually cutting and burning plants. Aerially applied herbicides have never been used.

Drug Flow/Transit. As an easy jumping-off point a short distance from the South American mainland, Trinidad and Tobago is increasingly targeted as a transshipment point for cocaine bound for North America and Europe. Cocaine arrives on small fishing boats, as well as on container vessels and pleasure craft. It then is smuggled out in cargo vessels, air cargo and by couriers. The recent discoveries of cocaine on commercial aircraft during layovers in Port of Spain en route from Guyana to North America indicates increased use of this route. Cocaine seizures and arrests increased markedly in 1998 compared to 1997, indicating a rise in trafficking and/or improved law enforcement.

The seizure of several shipments of incoming marijuana at Trinidad's airport indicates that local supply may not be meeting demand, possibly as a result of the GOTT's eradication efforts. The imported marijuana--from St. Vincent--also appeared to be of higher quality than the domestically grown drug.

Domestic Programs/Demand Reduction. The GOTT funds the National Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention Program (NADAPP), which coordinates activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to reduce demand. The UNDCP also participates in this program. Several NGOs, one of which receives USG funding, run rehabilitation centers for addicts. NGOs also provide drug-prevention educational materials, some acquired from the U.S., to local schools and maintain community prevention programs.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. One of the USG's key policy objectives in Trinidad and Tobago is to help the government staunch the flow of narcotics through the country to the U.S. The USG has focused on the GOTT's ability to interdict cocaine shipments, strengthen anti-drug trafficking laws, bring traffickers to trial, seize the proceeds of drug trafficking, attack money laundering, and protect witnesses from intimidation and murder.

Bilateral Cooperation (Accomplishments). At the GOTT's request, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) opened an office in Port of Spain in March 1998. This move already has enhanced bilateral cooperation, as exemplified by the successful joint effort of the GOTT, DEA and the Government of Venezuela to apprehend a convicted Trinidadian drug trafficker who had escaped and taken refuge in Venezuela's Orinoco delta.

The GOTT and USG participated in four bilateral maritime exercises, under the countries' maritime counternarcotics cooperation agreement. During the operations, personnel from the Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force, the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy participated as observers on each other's vessels.

The USG continues to support a six-installation radar system to detect aircraft and boats engaged in trafficking. The system became operational in mid- 1998 and is undergoing further improvements. The USG is also donating two C-26 aircraft and two Piper Navajo aircraft for counterdrug surveillance and two 82-foot patrol boats for maritime interdiction. The planes and boats are due to be delivered in early 1999.

The GOTT funds a permanent three-person U.S Customs advisory team which works closely with the Customs and Excise Division to improve its passenger and cargo processing effectiveness and enforcement posture. In addition, four Trinidad Customs officers attended an INL-funded U.S. Customs Regional Narcotics Interdiction Course and Train-the-Trainer Workshop conducted in Barbados during July 1998. Three Trinidad officials attended an OAS-funded Regional Port Security Seminar in Barbados during November 1998.

U.S. Customs and the GOTT are setting up a computer system to track small pleasure craft. U.S. Customs also helped Trinidad and Tobago's Customs Department establish a narcotics-detection canine program, which began in February with three dogs. Within the first six months, the program uncovered 19.8 kilograms of cocaine in one seizure.

The USG also supports the anti-money laundering activities of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), which is based in Port of Spain.

The Road Ahead. The USG soon will deliver two USG-donated C-26 aircraft, two Piper Navajo aircraft and two 82-foot patrol boats for the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard. The USG also continues to support the GOTT's efforts to implement a regional witness security program and is providing assistance to update the Trinidad and Tobago legal system. Relevant U.S. agency representatives stationed in Port of Spain will continue to participate actively in the Eastern Caribbean Working Group, which addresses counternarcotics issues from a subregional viewpoint. The USG will continue to work closely with the GOTT's counter-narcotics task force on implementation of asset forfeiture and money laundering laws.

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1998 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report

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