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International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998
Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
U.S.Department of State 
Washington, DC, February 1999

AFGHANISTAN

I. Summary

According to USG estimates, Afghanistan was the world's second largest
producer of opium poppy in 1998. An estimated 1,350 metric tons (mts) of
opium gum was produced from approximately 41,720 hectares (ha) of poppy.
Poppy cultivation and opium gum production increased by 7 percent in
1998, despite poor weather. Afghanistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug
Convention, but neither of the warring political factions (Taliban or
Northern Alliance) took steps to demonstrate that they take
Afghanistan's obligations under the Convention seriously. By the end of
the year, the Taliban faction controlled over 80 percent of Afghan
territory. Aside from burning a reported one ton of opiates in Jalalabad
in June, no action was taken to discourage poppy cultivation, destroy
morphine or heroin laboratories, seize precursor chemicals or arrest and
prosecute narcotics traffickers. Numerous reports indicated that all
faction members continued to profit from the drug trade at all levels.
Approximately 80 percent of the heroin consumed in Europe comes from
Afghanistan.

II. Status of Country

In 1998, Afghanistan maintained its world ranking as the second largest
producer of opium poppy. The Taliban and Northern Alliance military
factions continued to be preoccupied with the internal struggle for the
control of Afghanistan. By year's end, the Taliban controlled over 80
percent of the country's territory and over 95 percent of the area where
opium poppy is cultivated.

Heroin and morphine production at laboratories in Afghanistan requires
large quantities of acetic anhydride produced primarily in Europe, China
and India. Morphine and heroin exit Afghanistan along its porous borders
with Pakistan, Iran, and the Central Asian Republics of Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Apart from the corrupting influence on
Afghan officials, drug production in Afghanistan had a destabilizing
effect on its neighbors through the corruption of border guards and
increasing heroin addiction. With the exception of Badakshan Province in
the northeast, heroin addiction was not a problem in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan is not a center for money laundering; financial institutions
barely exist. There were reports, however, that private investment of
the profits from drug trafficking accounted in some measure for a surge
in building construction and other licit, commercial activity in
Kandahar City during 1998. Afghanistan has not criminalized money
laundering.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1998

Policy Initiatives. Afghanistan's lack of a national government
precluded formulation and implementation of a countrywide,
counternarcotics policy in 1998. In addition, the political will of
Afghan military factions and the capacity of their "governmental"
structures to effectively carry out drug control efforts are weak at
best.

The Taliban appear to have adopted the policy that, unless they receive
political recognition from the UN and from the international community
and/or unless alternative development assistance is supplied to rural
communities where poppy is cultivated, they will not honor international
obligations regarding drug control. In past years, the Taliban admitted
that consumption of "intoxicants," including opiates, is contrary to
Islam and that, by extension, cultivation of opium poppy, the
manufacture of morphine and heroin and trafficking in these drugs was in
violation of Sharia law.

In late 1997, during his visit to Kandahar, UNDCP Executive Director
Arlacchi left a letter addressed to Taliban leader Mullah Omar asking
the Taliban authorities to commit to 1) eliminating poppy where
alternative development assistance was provided; 2) permitting UNDCP
access to all poppy growing areas and allowing them to monitor
enforcement of a poppy ban by the Taliban in any new areas of
cultivation; 3) seizing and destroying drugs and precursor chemicals in
the presence of UNDCP and 4) destroying laboratories and arresting those
dealing in drugs. We understand the Taliban verbally agreed to UNDCP's
points on the condition that UNDCP fulfill its alternative development
commitment.

However, in 1998, poppy cultivation increased and spread to new areas.
At the time of the opium gum harvest in May, UNDCP informed the Taliban
that poppy had been cultivated in new areas in the provinces of Laghman,
Logar and Nangarhar. In response, the Taliban collected a reported ton
of opium gum and burned it on June 1 at a public ceremony near the city
of Jalalabad. They claimed that this represented the new poppy
cultivation in the project area since the previous year.

In an unverified policy statement issued by the High Commission for Drug
Control in September 1998, the Taliban indicated that they would not
support a strategy of forced eradication if farmers who benefited from
alternative development failed to comply with the requirement to abandon
poppy cultivation.

Accomplishments. No major drug control objectives were achieved in 1998.
The potential to make progress through the UNDCP program deteriorated as
the year advanced.

From August 1998 until the end of the year, implementation of UNDCP's
pilot alternative development/poppy reduction projects in Nangarhar and
Kandahar Provinces was crippled by the removal of expatriate staff for
security reasons. Also, from March 1998 to June 1998, expatriates were
removed from many projects as the result of the mistreatment of a UN
staffer by a Taliban official. Some donors criticized UNDCP for failing
to consider human rights and gender issues in its programs. Although
UNDCP's projects from the beginning had components addressing these
issues, the criticism caused delay and the redesign of the projects,
costing time and money. The Taliban grew frustrated with the slow pace
of implementation of alternative development schemes and funded the
rehabilitation of two factories in Kandahar Province themselves. They
contrasted the small amount of money being spent by UNDCP on development
schemes with what they considered inordinate sums consumed by UNDCP's
operational expenses.

In June, relations between the Taliban and UNDCP were severely strained
because the Taliban were not invited to participate in the UN General
Assembly's Special Session on Drugs. Afghanistan was represented at that
meeting by the former Rabbani Government (now a member of the Northern
Alliance) which had been ousted from Afghanistan's capital in September
1996 by the Taliban. By the end of November, however, there were signs
that relations with UNDCP were mending.

A USG-sponsored poppy eradication/alternative development program in
Helmand Province through Mercy Corps International (MCI), an American
NGO, continued this year. It is the only poppy reduction project being
implemented by an NGO in Afghanistan. MCI accomplished all but one of
its objectives during the year. The one objective not accomplished - to
distribute a certain quantity of fruit trees to farmers - was not met
due to rainy weather. The trees were held for the next planting season.

The USG strongly supports the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan and its
efforts to achieve peace and facilitate the development of a broad-based
government that respects international norms of behavior on narcotics,
human rights and terrorism. The Afghan Support Group (ASG) of major
donors met twice during the year. At the meeting in Tokyo in December,
it endorsed the principle that drugs are a cross-cutting issue and
should be integrated wherever possible with other programs in
Afghanistan. UNDCP agreed to include gender and human rights components
in its counter-narcotics programs wherever appropriate.

Law Enforcement. Apart from the destruction of a reported ton of opium,
there were no verified instances in which narcotics or precursor
chemicals were seized or destroyed. There were no reports that drug
traffickers or local drug dealers were arrested or prosecuted. And,
there was no verified destruction of morphine or heroin laboratories.
The Governor of Helmand claimed, however, to have destroyed laboratories
in southern Helmand Province in May. He was encouraged to permit outside
verification of such activity in the future. According to UNDCP, in
November, the head of the Taliban's State High Commission for Drug
Control responded to a request from the International Narcotics Control
Board to investigate the authenticity of consignees in Afghanistan for
an acetic anhydride shipment seized in India. The official investigated
and advised that the addressees were fictitious. This is believed to be
the first instance in which the Taliban have cooperated with an
international narcotics investigation.

As a result of UNDCP's efforts, Drug Control and Coordination Units
(DCCUs) remained functional in Kandahar City, Jalalabad and Kabul. The
DCCUs served as a liaison between Taliban authorities and the
international community on drug control issues and assisted with
implementation of UNDCP projects. The DCCUs operate under the High
Commission for Drug Control, which is headquartered in Kabul and is
responsible for planning, coordinating and implementing Taliban drug
control policies. In August, the High Commission began publishing an
English-language newsletter, entitled "Mukhaddarat" (narcotics). It
provided policy statements and discussed narcotics issues. The
publication was distributed to other embassies by the Afghan "Embassy"
in Islamabad.

Corruption. Numerous reports indicated that both Taliban and Northern
Alliance officials received payments from drug traffickers to facilitate
the shipment of heroin and morphine through Afghanistan. As a matter of
policy, the Taliban continued to condemn drug cultivation, production,
trafficking and consumption. However, the drug business probably
represents the largest sector of the economy. Opium poppy is
Afghanistan's principal cash crop. Drug activities also provide a
significant source of revenue for the Taliban movement. The practice of
collecting a road tax at checkposts on the value of goods being
transported is believed to be widespread. That tax is applied to drugs,
just as it is for any other goods being shipped. There were also
credible reports that Taliban officials collected fees to permit the
unhindered operation of laboratories. In late 1997, a fairly
high-ranking Taliban official acknowledged that local Mullahs (religious
leaders) collect a 10 percent religious tax called "usher" on the opium
crop produced by farmers. It was explained that this tax has always been
collected on all agricultural products. In 1998, it was further learned
that local Mullahs collect the tax in opium gum which is then sold by
them to the same drug traders who buy the opium from the farmers.

Agreements and Treaties. Afghanistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug
Convention. Neither of the warring factions in Afghanistan have
demonstrated a commitment to implement the Convention, however.

Cultivation/Production. Afghanistan is a major producer of both opium
and hashish. Figures for cannabis cultivation are unavailable. By USG
estimates, Afghanistan produced 1,350 MT of opium gum in 1998, compared
to 1,265 MT in 1997. Opium poppy cultivation increased from 39,150 HA in
1997, to 41,720 HA in 1998, representing a seven percent increase.
Helmand province continued to dominate cultivation with 22,970 HA,
compared to the next largest producer, Nangarhar Province, with 8,860
HA. According to USG data, cultivation increased in 1998 in
Helmand,--although it decreased in the Mercy Corps project
area--Nangarhar and Oruzgan Provinces and fell slightly in Kandahar
Province. According to UNDCP, Laghman and Logar provinces began
cultivating poppies in 1998 for the first time. In both Nangarhar and
Badakshan provinces, poppy cultivation emerged in one additional
district.

The poppy growing season for most of Afghanistan begins in
October/November and ends by May/June. In order for alternative
development/poppy reduction projects to induce farmers not to sow poppy,
farmers must be convinced by the beginning of the sowing season that
sufficient resources are being made available for them to be able to
substitute a licit crop. By October/November 1997, poppy reduction
projects had not been sufficiently implemented to achieve a positive
reaction from farmers. However, implementation of UNDCP and Mercy Corps
International (MCI) projects advanced sufficiently in certain districts
of Nangarhar and Helmand Provinces during 1998 to permit the expectation
that farmers will respond by substantially reducing poppy sown in those
areas during October/November 1998. For the 1998/1999 growing year,
UNDCP expects a 25 percent reduction in poppy cultivation in Shinwar
District of Nangarhar, and MCI anticipates a 50 to 80 percent reduction
along the Boghra Canal in central Helmand. UNDCP's poppy reduction
projects in three districts of Kandahar Province are unlikely to produce
results until the 1999 - 2000 poppy growing season. But, by the 1999 -
2000 poppy growing season, Shinwar District should be free of poppy.

Drug Flow/Transit. Heroin and morphine base are trafficked across
Afghanistan's borders to Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,
and Iran. Although opiates from Afghanistan are consumed in these
neighboring countries and in India, the primary destination is Europe
(approximately 80 percent), followed by North America. During 1998, a
strong Iranian interdiction campaign and border tensions between Iran
and Afghanistan probably meant an increased volume of trafficking via
Pakistan and the Central Asian republics. Large quantities of precursor
chemicals, particularly acetic anhydride (AA), reportedly enter
Afghanistan from Central Asia, Europe and India.

Demand Reduction. Addiction to opiates is a serious problem only in
Badakshan Province, which is under the control of the Northern Alliance.
In 1998, provincial authorities there indicated that they planned to
strengthen the capacity of drug treatment facilities, but that a
shortage of funds would limit this activity. UNDCP initiated several
public education campaigns during the year in Afghanistan.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The USG continued to urge the Afghan factions to demonstrate that they
take international drug control obligations seriously. Taliban officials
were told repeatedly that, if they wanted to be recognized as a member
of the international community, they needed to show that they could
conduct themselves in a responsible manner with respect to drug control,
human rights and terrorism.

The U.S. strongly supported UNDCP's efforts to engage the Taliban and
local communities in counternarcotics activities. USG contributions to
UNDCP in FY-98 totaled $500,000. Unfortunately, UNDCP's ability to make
a sustained effort this year was undermined by events which were largely
beyond its control. Intense fighting in northern Afghanistan precluded
UNDCP from undertaking projects there. From August until the end of the
year, all UN expatriate staff were prohibited from entering Afghanistan
due to the deteriorated security situation.

The USG agreed to provide $1 million in additional funding for the MCI
poppy reduction program in Helmand Province in FY 1999. The focus of the
program is rehabilitation of the Boghra Canal, repair of underground
irrigation channels and crop substitution. In 1998, farmers committed to
abandoning poppy cultivation when they can off-set the loss in poppy
income by being able to grow or expand summer crops or grow higher value
crops which require a year-round water supply. Currently, in most areas
of the MCI program, farmers must rely on a winter crop which is
rain-fed. These crops are principally poppy and wheat. To the extent
that poppy continues to displace wheat in the country as a whole,
Afghanistan suffers from an increasing food shortage since wheat
produces the flat bread that is the staple of the Afghan diet.

In early May, a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officer from
Peshawar visited Kabul and met with officials from the State High
Commission for Drug Control and officers from a variety of other law
enforcement entities in Afghanistan. During the meeting, DEA discussed
counter-drug operations and exposed the Afghans to some new approaches
to the problem which could be effective in Afghanistan. The visit
received widespread support and publicity in Kabul.

Road Ahead. The USG will continue to impress upon Taliban officials the
importance we attach to unconditional counter-drug measures by them. The
USG will also continue to support UNDCP's efforts in Afghanistan
provided they are tied to measurable counternarcotics objectives, are
community based and aid women. We expect the ASG process to result in
the introduction of anti-narcotics requirements in all appropriate
development aid projects in Afghanistan. In 1999, the MCI program and
UNDCP's poppy reduction projects will be viewed as a test to determine
future viability of this type of funding activity. DEA does not
recommend further international training seminars at this time.

[end of document]

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