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International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998 Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State Washington, DC, February 1999

ARGENTINA

I. Summary

Argentina is not a major drug producing country but it remains a transit country for cocaine flowing from neighboring Bolivia, as well as for undetermined amounts moving in transit from Peru and Colombia. In addition, the USG is concerned that increasing amounts of Colombian heroin may be transiting its territory to the U. S. Although drug use in Argentina apparently remains low, there is a growing problem with cocaine and psycho-pharmaceuticals such as "ecstasy." The smuggling of coca leaf into Argentina from Bolivia remains a problem; with possibly as much as a thousand tons of coca leaf transported illegally into Argentina's northern provinces annually for local consumption. While cognizant of its responsibilities in the interdiction area, the Argentine government focuses its counternarcotics efforts on demand reduction. A new draft law to modify existing money-laundering legislation is before the congress. Federal counternarcotics policy is coordinated by the Secretariat for the Prevention of Drug Addiction and Narcotics Trafficking (SEDRONAR). The Government of Argentina (GOA) has several national security forces involved in counternarcotics efforts, and provincial police forces also play an integral role. Argentina is a party to the 1998 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Argentina is not a major drug producing country. Drug use is estimated to be low, approximately one percent of the population. Reliable statistics on usage are scarce, however, and the GOA will soon launch a national survey in an attempt to gather better data on which to base its policies. There is very limited refining or manufacturing, with small amounts of illicit drugs being produced in different areas of the country. Most officials continue to agree that the trafficking of narcotics through Argentina is a problem, although it is impossible to quantify the flow with any degree of accuracy. Argentina has a large and well-developed chemical industry, which manufactures almost all the precursors necessary for the processing of cocaine. Buenos Aires is a regional financial center, which could be exploited by money launderers.

Private and commercial vehicles, containerized rail cargo, and foot traffic all serve as means for drugs to enter into Argentina. The thousands of uncontrolled airfields and small municipal airports in the northern and central regions of the country make it likely that drugs also enter via private planes. The lack of national radar coverage is a factor making air shipments attractive to potential traffickers, although the government has begun the process of acquiring a new radar system. Riverine traffic from Paraguay and Brazil is another probable method for moving narcotics into and through Argentina. Drug shipments out of the country are mostly via commercial aircraft or through Argentina's maritime port system. Couriers of Bolivian cocaine from Buenos Aires Ezeiza International Airport are primarily destined for Europe, including Russia. The USG is concerned that air couriers of heroin may be increasingly destined for the United States. Maritime transport of drugs from Argentina is conducted by both passengers as well as bulk and containerized cargo departing from Argentine ports such as Buenos Aires, Rosario, and other ports along Argentina's Atlantic coast. As a member of MERCOSUR, Argentina cannot open and inspect containers sealed in another member state which are passing through the country in transit. These sealed and uninspected containers are considered to be a high trafficking threat.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs

The GOA actively opposes drug trafficking and the sale and use of illegal narcotics within the country. Argentina is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In 1989, the Argentine Congress passed the laws necessary to bring the 1988 UN Drug Convention into effect. Various presidential decrees since then have targeted money laundering and allowed asset seizures. In March, President Menem signed a decree allowing for the creation of a witness protection program for key witnesses in drug-related prosecutions.

Argentina remains very active in multilateral counternarcotics organizations such as the Inter-American Drug Abuse Commission (CICAD), the International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC), and the UN Drug Control Program (UNDCP). In 1998, Argentina hosted a meeting of CICAD's money laundering experts' group as well as the annual Egmont meeting.

Demand Reduction. The GOA has traditionally focused its narcotics efforts on demand reduction. Drug use is treated as a medical problem and addicts are eligible to receive government-subsidized treatment. Buenos Aires province (the most heavily populated) has its own well-established demand reduction program.

In 1998, the U.S. Embassy funded the participation of an U.S. expert to help set up the "Partnership for a Drug-Free Argentina." The program was launched by the Argentine Ad Council in September with a media blitz, including the distribution of 2.5 million "parents' guides" in the two largest daily newspapers. Electronic media carried public service announcements. The Ad Council estimates that local media has donated over $7 million in free time and space. The campaign has been very successful, bringing in thousands of calls for more information about prevention and rehabilitation programs.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Argentina has many federal and provincial police forces involved in the counternarcotics effort. The primary federal forces involved are the Federal Police (with jurisdiction for crimes committed in, or connected to, the federal capital), the Gendarmeria Nacional (border police), the National Customs Service, the National Air Police, and the National Coast Guard. The provincial police forces of Buenos Aires, Salta, and Jujuy are also involved in the counternarcotics campaign.

Many of the services involved in the counternarcotics efforts underwent serious personnel changes during 1998. The head of the Federal Police's anti-narcotics unit was replaced and many other members of the unit were shifted to new responsibilities. The Customs Service was completely reorganized, with its anti-narcotics unit seeing an almost complete turnover in personnel. The Buenos Aires provincial police underwent a dramatic house cleaning with almost the entire senior leadership being replaced. At the same time, the provincial narcotics unit was disbanded and is just now being reformed. The chief of police in the province of Salta was replaced, as was the head of the narcotics unit in Jujuy. The SEDRONAR also saw a complete change of leadership. The new secretary, Eduardo Amadeo, began his tenure by doing a bottom-up review of the secretariat's priorities and its resources. When the secretariat was founded in 1989, its budget was $22 million. Its current budget is about $16 million.

All of Argentina's security forces face continuing severe counternarcotics budget limitations which have hampered investment in training and equipment. Also, a lack of coordination between the many, and at times, competing, law enforcement organizations hampers effectiveness. The GOA recognizes this problem and some steps are being taken to try to alleviate it. The changes in personnel and the resulting lack of experience in counternarcotics units has had a negative impact on the number of investigations and the amount of drugs seized this year. Seizures by all agencies are down. For the first nine months of 1998, 1,400 kilograms of cocaine were seized, compared to 5,192 kilograms in all of 1997. Arrest statistics for both years are comparable, however, which is consistent with the fact that there have been no major loads seized this year but a number of smaller seizures. Approximately 17 kilograms of heroin were seized in Argentina in 1998, with another 17 kilograms seized in the United States from people arriving from Argentina.

Corruption. Corruption remains an important issue in Argentina and the government is taking steps to deal with it. Many of the changes in the various security forces mentioned above were related to charges of corruption or inefficiency. For example, former SEDRONAR chief Gustavo Green was charged in February with fraud for having illegally diverted millions of dollars from an anti-drug campaign to fictitious rehabilitation centers.

Argentina is a signatory to the Inter-American Anti-Corruption Convention. The GOA neither encourages nor facilitates the production or distribution of narcotics or other controlled substances, nor the laundering of the proceeds from illegal drug transactions. We have no information that any senior member of the government is involved in narcotics-related activities.

Agreements and Treaties. In 1989 the governments of the United States and Argentina signed a cooperation agreement against drug trafficking which was implemented annually until 1995 through a series of memoranda of understanding. The programs continue, using money obligated during earlier years. During that time, USG assistance totaled approximately $2.9 million. Just over $2 million was used to supply equipment, with the balance used for training programs for Argentine law enforcement personnel.

In 1990, Argentina and the United States signed a mutual legal assistance treaty, which entered into force in 1993. In 1997, the U.S. and Argentina signed an extradition treaty. The U.S. recently ratified the treaty, but the Argentine Congress still needs to ratify it. A memorandum of understanding between the U.S. Treasury and SEDRONAR dealing with the exchange of financial information relating to money laundering was signed in 1995. The USG has concluded a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement (CMAA) with the GOA.

The GOA is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and has bilateral narcotics cooperation agreements with Russia, Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany, Turkey, Romania, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Cuba, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic. Dublin Group assistance, aside from the USG, remains limited. The United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, France, and Italy provide limited training and equipment support.

Chemical Control. Argentina has a well developed chemical industry which produces all but two of the necessary solvents, acids, and oxidizing chemicals needed for the extraction of cocaine from the coca leaf and its subsequent purification. The two exceptions being potassium permanganate and chloroform.

A presidential decree signed in 1991 placed controls on essential chemicals and precursors. The decree required that all manufacture, import or export of precursor chemicals (and certain pharmaceutical drugs) be registered with SEDRONAR. In 1996, another decree was signed to rectify problems with the earlier decree and to include the need for distributors and transporters to register. Until very recently, not much was done to verify the bona fides of chemical transfers. Due to resources constraints and deficiencies in the relevant earlier decrees, there have been very few investigations into suspicious chemical transfers.

The new SEDRONAR leadership quickly recognized long-standing problems with the old chemical register and began a bottom-up review to determine how to solve them. The GOA has introduced new and more secure import and export certificates. In November, SEDRONAR proposed certain modifications to the decrees, which could help streamline procedures. At the same time, SEDRONAR is attempting to re-build a national database of producers and distributors to gain a better understanding of the scope of the problem. Once that is in hand, it may be possible to control the flow of chemicals into and through the country. The GOA has proposed to its neighbors a closer working relationship to monitor the flows of chemicals in the region. SEDRONAR officials say they are willing and able to exchange records with USG law enforcement authorities.

U.S. Policy Initiatives. Overall, cooperation between the USG and Argentine authorities, both federal and provincial, continued to be excellent. While there has not been any bilateral memorandum of agreement since 1995, USG funding continues to be used to provide a wide variety of training programs to Argentine law enforcement officials. USG funding was also used to provide needed information technology equipment to better coordinate police counternarcotics efforts.

In 1998, much GOA attention was focused on the establishment of the "Northern Border Task Force," a major DEA initiative in the frontier region with Bolivia. The task force has 20 officers, a mix of Salta provincial police and federal Gendarmeria, and is devoted exclusively to counternarcotics work. USG funding was used to provide equipment and training for the unit. DEA continues to support development of the unit in order to improve its arrest and drug seizure record.

The U.S. also provided two week-long U.S. Customs courses designed to inspect containers at both land border crossings (held in Misiones province with the participation of Brazilian and Paraguayan authorities) and at sea ports (held in Buenos Aires). Both courses were well received by GOA authorities. In addition, three Argentine officials attended an OAS-funded Regional Port Security Seminar in Lima, Peru in October 1998.

Road Ahead. USG efforts will focus on the critical northern border area where the vast majority of cocaine enters Argentina, without neglecting other potentially important areas such as the tri-border area where Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil meet. The USG will work with the Argentine Customs Service and Air Police to target heroin trafficking to the U.S. East Coast. The GOA needs to collect more information to determine the extent of south Atlantic maritime trafficking. The U.S. Embassy will work with SEDRONAR to develop effective chemical controls and identify the illegal diversion of precursor chemicals.

I. Summary

Bolivia is the third largest potential producer of cocaine in the world. The cocaine industry in Bolivia continues to be fragmented and dominated by small to mid-level trafficking organizations which manufacture, transport and/or distribute cocaine base in hundred to multi-hundred kilogram quantities per month. Most of the chemicals utilized in processing coca leaf into cocaine base and cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) are smuggled in from neighboring countries. Law enforcement successes in chemical seizures have caused cocaine producers to streamline the production process, reducing the need for certain expensive/difficult to obtain precursor chemicals, and recycling other essential chemicals. The result of these developments is a decrease in the purity of some Bolivian cocaine products, causing some Brazilian organizations to refine Bolivian base into HCl in Brazil rather than purchasing the finished product in Bolivia.

The Bolivian government (GOB) implemented its five-year counternarcotics plan early in 1998. As outlined in the plan, individual compensation for eradication was completely phased out. Most of the eradication achieved in 1998 was uncompensated and involuntary. Even so, the GOB achieved record levels of eradication, and a substantial reduction in the amount of coca under cultivation. Interdiction efforts were equally successful, with increases in arrests and in chemical seizures. Alternative development initiatives continue to provide licit alternatives to growing coca. The Bolivian legislature has passed into law three fourths of its judicial reform package, with only the code of criminal procedure awaiting action.

II. Status of Country

As of the end of 1998, there were approximately 38,000 hectares of coca under cultivation in Bolivia, a net reduction of 7,800 hectares (or 17 percent) from 1997 estimates. Of the total, there are 23,500 hectares in the Chapare, a net reduction of 25 percent in the region where the GOB has concentrated its eradication efforts. 14,200 in the Yungas, and 300 in other areas, most notably the Apolo region. Most newly planted coca in the Yungas can be attributed to coca growers planting new fields to replace those going out of production. However, as the amount of coca being produced in the Yungas exceeds the 12,000 hectares permitted by Bolivian law for legitimate consumption (and the 5,500 hectares a Bolivian Non-Government Organization (NGO) estimates are actually needed to meet legitimate uses), it is suspected by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) that much of the coca grown in the Yungas is being made into cocaine products. The GOB has not addressed the problem of excess cultivation in the Yungas. Almost all the coca grown in the Chapare goes to the illegal cocaine trade. The amount grown in Apolo and other regions is not significant, and there is no evidence it is being grown for other than traditional use by the indigenous population.

Few of the chemicals needed to process coca leaf into cocaine HCl are manufactured in Bolivia. Most are smuggled in from neighboring countries with more advanced chemical industries. It is estimated by DEA that only a small amount is being diverted by licensed importers. However, increased interdiction of chemicals, particularly in the Chapare raised the price of many smuggled chemicals. Bolivian lab operators are now using inferior substitutes (cement instead of lime, sodium bicarbonate for ammonia), recycled solvents (ether) and a streamlined production process which virtually eliminates the oxidation stage for producing cocaine base. Some laboratory operators are not using sulfuric acid during the maceration stage; consequently, less cocaine alkaloid is extracted from the leaf, producing less HCl. The lower quality of Bolivian cocaine has already begun to affect its marketability. Reportedly, some Brazilian organizations are purchasing only cocaine base from Bolivia and are refining their own cocaine HCl in Brazil.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1998

Policy Initiatives. The GOB adopted and implemented the country's first comprehensive counternarcotics strategy, the Dignity Plan, early in 1998. The plan consists of four "pillars." eradication, interdiction, alternative development and prevention. Its goal is to rid Bolivia of all excess coca by the year 2002. A combined military/police force sent to the Chapare in April to quell riots protesting implementation of the plan was converted into an eradication/security force which has since achieved record levels of eradication and has firmly established government control in the region for the first time. Even in the face of armed resistance, the GOB phased out individual compensation for eradication.

The GOB enacted three judicial reforms (the Judicial Council, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Constitutional Tribunal) which should help reduce the backlog of cases awaiting consideration by the Supreme Court, provide a less political process for the selection of judges, establish an alternative and more efficient mechanism for the investigation of judicial corruption and make the justice system more accessible. A fourth bill, a new Code of Criminal Procedure, is being debated in the Senate and may be amended to include desirable key reforms left out by the Chamber of Deputies. The use of undercover agents and informants, controlled deliveries, plea bargaining, and in rem asset seizure and forfeiture. The final bill may also include a stronger conspiracy law. Bolivia's 1996 anti-money laundering law has not been enforced, although a director for the Financial Investigations Unit of the Superintendency of Banks was named in 1998.

A fixed and roving checkpoint program, special intelligence/operations units focusing on both narcotics and essential chemicals and other investigative efforts have resulted in increases from FY1997 totals in all quantitative categories. Arrests are up by 42 percent, chemical seizures by 13 percent, and drug seizures by one percent.

Accomplishments. Agreements and Treaties. Bolivia is a party to 1988 UN Convention against Trafficking in Illicit Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

Cultivation and Production. Total cultivation of coca in Bolivia was 38,000 hectares at the end of 1998, 7,800 less than a year earlier. Of the total, 28,600 hectares were of mature, harvestable coca, an 18 percent reduction from the previous year. During 1998, 11,621 hectares were eradicated, while only 3,820 hectares of new coca were planted.

One hectare of Chapare coca yields an average of 2.7 metric tons of sun-dried coca leaf, which produces about 7.44 kilograms of cocaine. The eradication of 11,621 hectares of Chapare coca during this year prevented approximately 85 metric tons of cocaine from being produced and exported to the United States and other destinations. This represents a fifth consecutive year of decline in potential cocaine production and a decrease from 200 metric tons in 1997 to 150 metric tons in 1998. Moreover, the decline of new coca planted and the destruction of some 68,578 square meters of seedbeds ensures this trend will continue if the GOB's aggressive eradication effort is sustained in 1999.

Interdiction. Seizures of HCl (down by 21 percent) and cocaine base (up by 11 percent) resulted in an overall increase in drug seizures from last fiscal year's levels. Coca leaf seizures were three times last year's low levels. The increased effectiveness of the chemical interdiction program forced Bolivian lab operators to use less efficient processing techniques, and, surprisingly, to begin using cutting agents such as mannitol, or milk sugar (more typically associated with the retail sale of cocaine), to increase the bulk and weight of their shipments.

Alternative Development. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provides core support for the GOB's alternative development activities--consolidating the agriculture and infrastructure network, enabling farmers to support themselves and their families without the need to cultivate coca. INL-funded, USAID-supported organizations are contributing to net coca reduction by providing alternative development assistance to those communities and farmer organizations that are willing to eliminate all of their coca or had all of their coca forcibly eradicated. The success of the GOB's alternative development program has enabled 73 Chapare communities and producer associations to sign coca eradication agreements with Bolivia's eradication agency (DIREC0) from July 1997 to October 1998.

Licit production of commercially viable crops in the Chapare has increased from about 40,613 hectares in 1986 to approximately 105,000 hectares in 1998 (a 159 percent improvement)--three times greater than Chapare coca cultivation. Total farmgate sales of the five priority crops promoted by USAID (bananas, pineapples, palm hearts, black pepper and passion fruit) increased by 55 percent in the third quarter of CY98 compared with the same quarter in CY97, while farmers' net income from those crops increased by 52 percent over the same period. More than ever, these results show that alternative development is increasingly enabling the GOB to undertake aggressive eradication campaigns while maintaining public support for those efforts.

However, the demand for alternative development exceeds the ability of the GOB to meet it. With the elimination of individual compensation for eradication, the GOB has not developed a comprehensive plan for addressing community-based needs. Considerable resources have already been provided for infrastructure improvements; therefore, these types of projects will be increasingly difficult to offer as compensation packages for voluntary eradication. Furthermore, upwards of 20,000 miners-turned-coca growers do not want to become traditional farmers, so job training and possible resettlement into areas of Bolivia where employment is available may be necessary.

Asset Seizure. The sale of seized property has been consistently stalled by recalcitrant judges--a problem the government has not been able to overcome. Moreover, the Directorate of Seized Assets has still not accounted for a large portion of the property listed in its inventories. As a consequence, the USG has suspended its assistance to the Directorate, and the GOB is considering privatizing the control and sale phases of the Directorate's operations.

Extradition. Only one extradition was carried out in 1998, that of a U.S. citizen who had completed his sentence for narcotics offenses in Bolivia. There are currently seven USG extradition requests pending before the Supreme Court of Bolivia.

Enforcement Efforts. Under the previous administration, the Minister of Government was responsible for all aspects of the counternarcotics effort. While this arrangement was convenient, the separation of responsibilities effected by the present government has been more productive. The Secretariat for Social Defense has been granted Vice-Ministerial status, and, while still part of the Ministry of Government, it now enjoys a greater degree of autonomy and is in charge of all interdiction forces in Bolivia, including the special military task forces. Responsibility for eradication and alternative development has been transferred to the Minister of Agriculture, and both programs have flourished under a minister who can dedicate more attention to these inextricably linked aspects of the counternarcotics effort.

The Bolivian Air Force (FAB) has established fixed tours of duty for all its personnel who serve in the Red Devil Task Force, a USG-funded helicopter unit, and also agreed to give full credit toward promotion for training received while a member of that organization. These changes will ensure continuity and help retain skilled pilots and maintenance personnel. The FAB has also agreed to create a special unit dedicated to flying only USG-supported C-130 aircraft, which will lend further assurance that the pilots of these aircraft will respond correctly in an emergency.

The USG-funded Blue Devil Task Force of the Bolivian Navy, a riverine unit, was granted limited law enforcement authority last year. Substantial retraining has been necessary to prepare members of the organization to carry out their new responsibilities; however, the Blue Devil Intelligence Operations Unit has already produced impressive results.

Corruption. The current government neither condones, encourages nor facilitates any aspect of narco-trafficking, and there have been no major cases of public corruption during 1998. Bolivia's small to mid-sized trafficking organizations do not seem to exercise a corruptive influence at the higher levels of the Bolivian government. Nonetheless, judicial corruption continues to be a problem, and there is substantial evidence that some police and military personnel are actively involved in narcotics trafficking. The newly appointed Judicial Council appears to be taking its mandate seriously, and has reviewed the performance of 30 judges and suspended one of them.

Demand Reduction Programs. The GOB has created a Vice-Ministry for Prevention within the Ministry of Government, which is responsible for implementing the prevention pillar of the dignity plan. Although the GOB plan emphasizes prevention, it also contains a rehabilitation component. The Vice-Ministry is cooperating closely with USG-supported NGOs, but plans to implement its own programs after the GOB's new budget is approved in early 1999.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. Key elements of the USG counternarcotics strategy, originally developed in 1995, have been incorporated into the GOB's Dignity Plan, which stresses the need for an aggressive interdiction effort, a systematic eradication program and a viable alternative development program which provides credible alternatives to the cultivation of coca. The government understands it must have broad public support to achieve its counternarcotics goals, but continues to rely heavily on USG-funded public diplomacy programs rather than on its own initiatives.

Bilateral Cooperation. A Binational Commission meets regularly to monitor progress toward the goals set out in the 1998-1999 USG-GOB counternarcotics agreements and to consider new programs and initiatives. Its membership includes the Bolivian Ministers of Government, National Defense and Agriculture, other relevant Bolivian officials and key counternarcotics officers of the U.S. Embassy in La Paz

The Road Ahead. Since 1994, Bolivia's capacity to produce cocaine has been reduced from 255 tons per year to 170 metric tons. The GOB's eradication plan for 1999 was reviewed at the December meeting of the Binational Commission, and will be implemented early in January. If successful, the eradication program should produce further dramatic reductions in the amount of coca under cultivation and in Bolivia's capacity to produce cocaine. Without adequate emphasis on the alternative development program, an interdiction/eradication initiative in the Yungas, and the enforcement of Public Law 1008 provisions permitting the arrest of those who plant new coca fields, the GOB will not meet its goals next year. This year's interdiction successes will not be equaled, much less exceeded, if the new Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide law enforcement agencies with the modern tools they need to investigate and prosecute narcotics offenders. The GOB also needs to focus increased attention on official corruption.

Bolivia Statistical Tables [Excel file 24.0KB]

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