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International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999 Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State Washington, DC, March 2000

THE CARIBBEAN

THE BAHAMAS

I. Summary

The Bahamas is a major transit country for drugs en route to the U.S. from South America and the Caribbean. The Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas (GCOB) and the USG continue to enjoy a productive working counternarcotics relationship. The GCOB works to accomplish the goals and objectives of U.S.-Bahamas bilateral narcotics control agreements. The GCOB places a high priority on combating drug transshipments through its archipelago and works closely with the USG on Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos (OPBAT). The U.S. looks forward to assisting The Bahamas to develop its maritime end-game capability, without which sustained drug interdiction, arrest and conviction of traffickers and the forfeiting of their assets is improbable. Given the volume of commercial shipping through The Bahamas, the GCOB needs to rigorously implement its chemical control laws to prevent illegal diversion of precursor and essential chemicals.

Bahamian authorities continue monitoring bank compliance and investigating suspicious financial transactions under the 1996 money laundering law. Increased supervision of the offshore banking sector and training of all financial sector employees, however, will be necessary in order to increase the number of suspicious activity reports, which is still very small given the size of The Bahamas financial services sector. Despite several public statements of commitment, the GCOB has yet to establish a financial intelligence unit (FIU) or to seek membership in the Egmont Group. In 1999, the GCOB passed legislation which allows designation of the U.S. under Bahamian asset forfeiture laws, based on reciprocity. This will allow Bahamian courts to enforce U.S. forfeiture orders in many cases.

The GCOB took further steps in 1999 to strengthen its judicial system, with USG assistance. Despite these efforts, no major Bahamian drug trafficker has been convicted in The Bahamas and sent to prison, due largely to continuing, unnecessary delays in the courts. In addition, weak bail laws allow arrested drug traffickers to obtain bail and continue transshipping drugs while awaiting trial. Notwithstanding committed and talented judicial leadership, The Bahamas needs to improve the effectiveness of its court system and Attorney General's office in gaining convictions against major drug traffickers. The Bahamas also needs to improve its responsiveness to U.S. requests under the mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) and speed the processing of extradition cases.

In October, 1999, for the first time in recent history, a Bahamian law enforcement official was assassinated, allegedly by Bahamian drug dealers in retaliation for his standing up against a corrupt official or to prevent his testimony. The GCOB should ratify the Inter-American Convention against Corruption and assure that corrupt public officials are effectively prosecuted. Finally, the GCOB needs to move quickly to complete and adopt a comprehensive national drug strategy containing goals and objectives and measures of effectiveness. The Bahamas is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and works to meet its goals and objectives.

II. Status of Country

The Bahamas will remain a target of drug traffickers well into the future due to its geographic location. The Bahamas is a country of approximately 275,000 people located on the air and sea routes between South America and the U.S. The Bahamas has a strong anti-money laundering regime. Nonetheless, the country's bank secrecy laws, its role as a regional financial center, and the existence of a largely unregulated international business corporation (IBC) sector continue to make The Bahamas an attractive target for money laundering and other financial crimes.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1999

Policy Initiatives. In 1999, the GCOB continued its efforts to fulfill the objectives of the 1988 UN convention by: (1) passing a law which allows designation of the U.S. under its asset forfeiture laws, based on reciprocity; (2) announcing its decision to create a financial intelligence unit (FIU) to process suspicious financial sector transaction reports; (3) passing several judicial directives aimed at reducing court delays; and (4) making progress in drafting the country's first national drug strategy report. The Office of Public Prosecutions continues to work closely with the U.S. Department of Justice to seize Bahamian bank accounts identified in the large USG-led "Operation Casablanca" international money laundering case. The Central Bank of The Bahamas continues to closely scrutinize banks' compliance with suspicious transaction reporting requirements.

Accomplishments. The GCOB, working closely with the USG, is in the final stages of a court automation project. The project's purpose is to reduce delays in criminal, especially drug, cases pending in the courts. The last step in the project, to be completed by the end of 2000, will be to install a court case management software system which will make The Bahamas judiciary virtually "paperless." Once this project is completed, the Bahamian judicial system will become the most technologically advanced in the region. Parallel to the computerization project, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has announced plans to implement case flow management practices in all Bahamian courts by Spring 2000. In June 1999, the Chief Justice passed a directive giving judges full authority to set court calendars and ordered that the practice of granting unnecessary adjournments be terminated. These decisions should have a major impact in reducing the length of court cases.

The Royal Bahamas Police Force (RBPF) Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) works very closely with U.S. law enforcement agencies through OPBAT in interdicting drug transshipments. The DEU continues to maintain a separate money laundering and asset forfeiture investigative unit. In 1999, this unit prepared a strong asset forfeiture case against a major drug trafficker and asked the Attorney General's office to prosecute the case. Unfortunately, for nearly one year the Attorney General's office has not proceeded with this case, claiming that they have too few prosecutors to handle their caseload. The money laundering unit continues to pursue several local asset forfeiture investigations and is cooperating with U.S. and third country law enforcement agencies on several major transnational money laundering cases.

The Attorney General's Office of Public Prosecutions has successfully gained restraining orders in Bahamian courts over several million dollars in international money laundering cases involving Bahamian banks. The Office of Public Prosecutions is very committed to prosecuting local drug dealers and trafficking organizations. Their efforts at conviction are often thwarted by suspected jury corruption and weak drug and bail laws. In 1999, the GCOB amended its asset forfeiture legislation, allowing designation of the U.S. under its asset forfeiture laws upon assurances of reciprocity, thus resolving a longstanding bilateral irritant. This will allow Bahamian courts to enforce U.S. forfeiture orders in many cases.

Law Enforcement. The RBPF continued its active participation with USG agencies and Turks and Caicos police in OPBAT, a joint program designed to intercept drug shipments and arrest traffickers in the Turks and Caicos Islands and in The Bahamas. USG helicopters operating from three bases in The Bahamas facilitate these operations. The GCOB continued to demonstrate its strong commitment to OPBAT by funding its large police counternarcotics unit.

Cocaine seizures for 1999 were considerably lower than the 1997 and 1998 levels. Marijuana seizures in 1999, however, rose significantly over 1998.

The DEU, a special force within the RBPF composed of 80 officers, works closely with DEA on drug investigations. As of November 1999, the GCOB had arrested 1,785 persons on drug charges and seized 1.86 metric tons of cocaine and 3.5 metric tons of marijuana. The DEU is presently conducting several money laundering and asset forfeiture investigations.

Under Bahamian law, the assets of a convicted drug offender are subject to forfeiture. Unfortunately, defense attorneys for drug traffickers are often able to delay their cases many years. As a result, by the time the drug cases are adjudicated, the assets have lost much of their value. Funds from the sale of forfeited assets are deposited in the government's general fund. The Attorney General's office continues to experience little success in forfeiting the proceeds of crime.

Corruption. As a matter of policy, the GCOB does not encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of drugs, or the laundering of illicit proceeds therefrom. The USG is not aware of senior officials of the GCOB engaging in, encouraging, or facilitating the illicit production or distribution of drugs, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. Over the past several years, however, a growing number of mid- and low-level law enforcement and Defence Force officials have been arrested for narcotics-related corruption. Several of these cases have been unduly delayed in the court system. Despite GCOB willingness to prosecute, the judicial system's weaknesses reduce the possibility that narcotics traffickers and corrupt officials who assist them will serve appropriately lengthy prison sentences. The GCOB has signed but not yet ratified the Inter-American Convention against Corruption.

Agreements and Treaties. The Bahamas is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The GCOB works to accomplish the goals and objectives of U.S.- Bahamas bilateral narcotics control agreements, which facilitate cooperative action on a wide range of narcotics-control measures, such as improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the judicial system, impeding money laundering, reducing local demand for drugs, and preventing the transshipment of drugs through Bahamian waters via OPBAT and other bilateral law enforcement efforts.

The U.S.-Bahamas mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) is intended to facilitate the bilateral exchange of information and evidence for use in criminal proceedings. The MLAT can be used to pierce Bahamian bank secrecy laws where credible evidence exists of narcotics crimes, money laundering, or other serious offenses. The GCOB Office of Legal Affairs, however, is too slow in responding to MLAT requests. In addition, the burden of proof placed by Bahamian courts on MLAT requests exceeds the treaty standard of "reasonable grounds for believing." The GCOB has been receptive to U.S. extradition requests, based on the 1994 U.S.-Bahamas extradition treaty. Actual extraditions, however, continue to be slowed by procedural delays in the Bahamian courts. One important drug-related extradition request has been held up in the Bahamian court system for several years. A U.S. Department of Justice delegation traveled to The Bahamas in November 1999 to encourage better GCOB cooperation on extradition and MLAT requests.

The U.S. and The Bahamas entered into a maritime counternarcotics cooperation agreement in May 1996. The agreement permits The Bahamas to embark Defence Force or Police officers to act as shipriders on U.S. vessels operating in Bahamian waters. The agreement permits the U.S. vessels to support these shipriders in Bahamian territorial seas to board, search, and, if evidence warrants, seize U.S., stateless, or third nation vessels; to enter Bahamian territorial seas to assist Bahamian law enforcement personnel in the enforcement of Bahamian laws; and to board, search, and seize Bahamian vessels on the high seas suspected of involvement in criminal activity. This agreement also authorizes USG law enforcement aircraft to overfly Bahamian territory.

Drug Flow and Transit. Detected air activity involving air drops of cocaine to The Bahamas dropped to less than half the 1998 level and all but ceased during the second half of 1999. This decline was probably due to several law enforcement operations that resulted in numerous arrests and the seizure of large quantities of drugs as well as smugglers' vessels and aircraft. Maritime activity involving go-fast boats, pleasure craft, and fishing vessels has remained somewhat stable compared to 1998. Coastal freighters with drugs concealed in hidden compartments or mixed with legitimate cargo remain a major smuggling threat. Currently there are more coastal freighter vessels on lookout than at any time in the past. U.S. counternarcotics agencies concur that drug traffickers continue to use Bahamian territory for cocaine and marijuana transshipments into the southeastern United States. While cocaine has traditionally been transported directly from Colombia to The Bahamas, it now appears to be moving through Jamaica and Haiti en route to and through The Bahamas.

Demand Reduction Programs. The GCOB makes modest budgetary contributions to demand reduction programs, especially in education and prevention. In 1999, the USG funded the second annual Certificate in Addiction Studies program in the history of The Bahamas. As a result of this program, fifty Bahamians working on drug demand reduction and abuse are now professionally trained. The USG provides modest assistance to the government's National Drug Council. The number of new drug users has declined in the past ten years. Drug usage among young Bahamians is restricted largely to marijuana, but there is a rising trend towards cocaine and crack abuse.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. The goals of USG assistance to The Bahamas are to dismantle trafficking organizations, stem the flow of drugs through The Bahamas to the U.S., and strengthen Bahamian law enforcement and judicial institutions to make them more effective and self-sufficient in combating drug trafficking and money laundering.

Bilateral Cooperation. The GCOB continues to allocate significant budgetary resources to its counternarcotics efforts-approximately 14 percent of its annual budget-and to bilateral cooperation with the U.S. The GCOB commitment to OPBAT, through its funding of the RBPF strike force unit, has led to close bilateral cooperation resulting in numerous drug arrests and seizures. A U.S. Customs Service canine team traveled to The Bahamas during February 1999 to assess and assist the Bahamian canine program at the Freeport international airport. Despite a high rate of arrest by the police, however, convictions of drug dealers remain very low due to weaknesses in local drug and bail laws and suspect juries. The Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF)-a potentially important player in drug interdiction-has yet to clearly define its counternarcotics role, and its response on bilateral counternarcotics operations has, with rare exceptions, been inadequate.

The Road Ahead. The Bahamas' proximity to the U.S. and expansive archipelagic geography guarantees it will be a target for drug transshipment and other criminal activity for the foreseeable future. Its niche as a financial center, its bank secrecy laws, and its liberal international business corporation (IBC) regime make it vulnerable to drug money laundering and other financial crimes. The Bahamians maintain a strong commitment to bilateral counternarcotics efforts. Because of the country's relatively small budget and growing drug transshipment problem, the GCOB will continue to depend upon significant USG assistance to fight international drug trafficking and crime. The principal short- and medium-term objective of U.S. counternarcotics assistance in The Bahamas is the strengthening of the country's institutions to allow the GCOB to assume a greater share of the burden of combating drug trafficking, money laundering, and other criminal activity.

The Bahamas Statistics

(1991-1999)

	1999	1998	1997	1996	1995	1994	1993	1992	1991
Seizures (1)
Cocaine (mt)	1.86	4.39	2.58	0.12	0.39	0.49	1.80	4.80	5.26
Heroin (mt)	-	-	-	-	-	0.001	-	-	-
Marijuana (harvested) (mt)	3.50	2.30	3.76	2.61	3.53	1.42	0.65	1.00	1.18
Arrests	1,785	1,650	1,894	1,576	1,565	1,025	1,023	1,135	1,085

(1) Data for 1999 is through October. Marijuana seizure statistics for 1991-93 have been revised.

 

CUBA

I. Summary

Cuba's location between the United States and the Western Hemisphere's drug-exporting countries makes Cuba a logical transshipment point for traffickers. Although Cuba is not a major transit country for drugs coming to the United States, it remains a country of concern to USG counternarcotics agencies.

The lack of authoritative information from the Government of Cuba (GOC) about the illegal narcotics situation makes it difficult to assess the severity of Cuba's drug use and smuggling problems. Cuban officials cited Cuba's proximity to the U.S. and the growing number of tourists coming to the island as the cause of its growing, but still relatively low-level, drug use and trafficking problems. Resource constraints have led Cuban authorities to focus their law enforcement efforts on interdiction at Cuba's airports rather than at drop sites at sea.

During 1999, Cuba and the United States continued to exchange drug-related law enforcement information on a case-by-case basis. USG and GOC officials also discussed the possibility of more systematic cooperation. The U.S. Coast Guard and Cuba's Border Guard cooperated several times to apprehend boats and crews involved in drug trafficking. Cuba adopted new laws to stiffen penalties for those found guilty of producing, transporting, trafficking, or smuggling narcotics, but not consuming them. The GOC also enacted anti-money laundering laws as part of an effort to prevent money laundering from taking root in Cuba. Cuba is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Cuba does not appear to be a significant site for cultivation or production. There were no reports of money laundering in Cuba in 1999. The GOC continued to attribute drug use in Cuba to the significant tourist population and to drugs that wash ashore from apparently failed rendezvous between smugglers or when rattled traffickers decide to jettison drugs at sea rather than risk being caught with them. Cuban officials blame their lack of resources for the GOC's inability to patrol adequately its territorial waters.

The lead law enforcement agency on drugs in Cuba is the Ministry of the Interior's National Anti-Drug Department. The National Drug Commission is an interagency coordinating body headed by the Minister of Justice. The Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Relations, Pubic Health, and Customs, and the Border Guard are also represented on the Commission.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1999

Policy Initiatives. In 1999, Cuba adopted new legislation to stem narcotics trafficking and money laundering. Cuba enhanced anti- narcotics cooperation with several countries including Colombia, Spain, France, the UK, and Canada. Spain, the UK, and France worked with Cuban authorities on interdiction; Canada focused on case development and investigations.

Law Enforcement Efforts. In February 1999, the National Assembly adopted legislation to stiffen penalties for those found guilty of producing, transporting, trafficking, or smuggling narcotics. Possible sentences include the death penalty and life without parole. The new laws did not deal specifically with consumption. The GOC did not publish statistics for 1999 for arrests or prosecutions of Cuban or foreign citizens on drug charges. The GOC continued to maintain that it had no serious domestic consumption or trafficking problem, but it indicated that domestic trafficking rose due to the increased number of tourists who visited Cuba in 1999 and from missed airdrops that wash up on Cuban shores. Domestic demand for drugs such as cocaine is believed to be low.

Cuban Customs and the Anti-Drug Police in the Ministry of Interior continued their cooperation and training with Canada and European governments. Training took place at numerous venues, including the international airports in Havana and the tourist haven of Varadero.

GOC officials admit that the country has inadequate naval resources to compete with the "go-fast" boats used by traffickers throughout the country's extensive territorial waters. 1999 saw an increase in the amount of information supplied by Cuban authorities to the U.S. Coast Guard for use in maritime interdictions. Some information was also exchanged for use in aerial interdictions.

Cuba exchanged prisoners with several countries in 1999, including Italy and Spain. Nevertheless, several countries reported some difficulty implementing these agreements fully. The exchanges include offenders found guilty of drug charges.

Drug Seizures/Arrests. The GOC made no information available on the total amount and type of drugs seized in 1999. In a speech on July 26, President Fidel Castro stated that 4,539 kilograms of drugs washed up on Cuba's northern coast during the first half of 1999, compared to 4,484 kilograms of drugs during the whole of 1998. He observed that this evidence of increased trafficking activity indicated that drug smugglers had chosen the waters between Cuba and the Bahamas as one of their favorite areas of operation in the Caribbean.

Corruption. Cuban authorities maintain that there is no narcotics-related corruption by government officials. While it is probable that some degree of corruption, at least at the lower levels of the Cuban police, is present, there is no evidence of high level involvement.

Agreements and Treaties. During 1999, the GOC signed anti-narcotics agreements with Spain, Colombia, and Guatemala. The GOC states that it maintains bilateral agreements on narcotics with 25 countries and less formal working arrangements with 25 others. Spain and France have posted counternarcotics police personnel to Havana to lead cooperative efforts with the GOC. A team of French customs officials conducted a canine technique training course for their Cuban counterparts at Havana's Jose Marti International Airport in August. British customs officers trained Cuban counterparts at the Jose Marti airport in January-February and at Varadero International Airport in October-November. Cuba and the United States do not have a bilateral anti-narcotics treaty or agreements, but continued to work together on a case-by-case basis. In June, USG and GOC officials discussed making bilateral cooperation more systematic, but there was no agreement by year-end.

Cuba is a party to the World Customs Organization's International Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance for the Prevention, Investigation, and Repression of Customs Offenses (Nairobi Convention), Annex X on Assistance in Narcotics Cases.

Cultivation/Production. There is no evidence that Cuba is a significant drug- producing country. Small quantities of marijuana are reportedly grown around Havana and in eastern Cuba. The GOC published no reports regarding crop size estimates, crop yields, or eradication efforts.

Drug Flow/Transit. Transshipment of illegal narcotics took place in Cuba's jurisdictional waters and airspace and through Cuban international airports in 1999. In the cases at sea, narcotics were either transported by boat through Cuban waters or dropped by aircraft and picked up by "go-fast" boats waiting nearby. On numerous occasions, the U.S. Coast Guard reported in real-time to the Cuban Border Guard incidents of suspicious aircraft over-flying Cuban airspace, dropping something, and returning south. None of the planes involved was apprehended. Detected overflights of Cuba in 1999 were down substantially from 1998. The U.S. Coast Guard and its counterpart, Cuba's Border Guard, collaborated on several occasions to locate and apprehend boats and crew suspected of narcotics trafficking.

In December 1998, Colombian authorities seized a shipment of 7.254 metric tons of cocaine hidden in compartments within maritime shipping containers at the Port of Cartagena. These drugs were apparently destined to transit Cuba. During 1999, the DEA aggressively investigated this shipment in cooperation with authorities in Colombia and Spain and found no information to indicate that this shipment was ultimately destined for the United States. Information-as yet uncorroborated by the DEA-provided by the Cuban Police to the Colombian National Police suggests that the shipment was bound for Spain.

Domestic Programs. Senior Cuban officials, most conspicuously President Fidel Castro, regularly warn the public of the peril of narcotics. However, their remarks almost always blame foreigners for the introduction of narcotics into Cuba. GOC officials say that drugs are being brought to Cuba by tourists, traffickers, or by missed airdrops washing up on the nation's shores. In December 1999, the official press reported that the National Assembly was drafting a new narcotics law that is expected to consolidate and strengthen existing laws to "prevent the island from being turned into a drug market."

IV. U.S. Policy initiatives

Bilateral Cooperation. The U.S. and Cuba do not share a bilateral narcotics agreement and there is no INL program in Cuba. The U.S. and Cuba continued, on a case-by-case basis, to share information, including non-sensitive real-time data regarding aircraft and vessels suspected of trafficking. Various high-level Cuban officials, including Fidel Castro, have repeated Cuba's willingness to sign a bilateral narcotics agreement with the United States. Discussions aimed at expanding bilateral cooperation on counternarcotics matters were held in 1999. By year-end, consideration was still being given to how this cooperation might proceed.

The Road Ahead. The U.S. and Cuba will continue to cooperate in anti-narcotics efforts on a case-by-case basis. These efforts are carried out by U.S. diplomats in Havana, as well as the relevant U.S.-based aviation and Coast Guard authorities, and consist of exchanges of information with Cuban officials about persons, aircraft, and vessels suspected of drug trafficking. Cooperation between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Cuban Border Guard is expected to continue.

Caribbean Continued

[end of document]

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