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Great Seal

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999
Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC, March 2000

Blue Bar

Continuation of South America

COLOMBIA

I. Summary

Colombia produces and distributes more cocaine than any other country in the world and is also an important supplier of heroin. Colombia bolstered its counternarcotics efforts in 1999 by extraditing a Colombian citizen to the United States on narcotics charges for the first time in nine years. The Colombian armed forces activated its elite, U.S.-trained, 931-man strong counternarcotics battalion. Additionally, the Colombian anti-narcotics police (DIRAN) formed an air-mobile interdiction unit, which received United States training, to conduct operations with the Colombian military.

After over a year in office, the Pastrana Administration remains committed to its peace dialogue with the largest insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The government's talks with the FARC, which earns substantial funds from the drug trade, particularly from protection and taxation, have shown few gains thus far. Like the guerrillas, the paramilitaries are involved in the drug trade and are competing for an ever-greater share.

The combined U.S./GOC aerial eradication program had a successful year in 1999. The program sprayed over 42,000 hectares of coca and more than 8,000 hectares of opium poppy in 1999.

The "Antinarcotics Directorate" (DIRAN) of the Colombian National Police has continued its record of investigations and operations against narcotics trafficking. A cooperative effort between the Colombian National Police, the Prosecutor General's office (Fiscalia) and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) led to the arrest of 30 significant Colombian drug traffickers in "Operation Millennium." The United States requested the extradition of all 30 suspects and awaits the GOC's decision on those requests.

As in 1998, guerrillas protecting the drug trade ratcheted up their attacks on Colombian security forces and hampered counternarcotics operations, particularly in the coca growing regions of southern and southeastern Colombia. As Colombia struggles to climb out of its worst economic crisis since the 1930s, the GOC is hard pressed to commit the resources necessary to combat the powerful combined threat of drug traffickers and guerrilla elements involved in the drug trade.

Colombia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Colombia remains the world's largest cocaine producer: up to three-quarters of the world's cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) is processed in Colombia from cocaine base imported from Peru and Bolivia and, increasingly, from locally grown coca. Coca cultivation in Colombia increased by 20 percent in 1999. Most of the increase occurred outside of the eradication areas. Although opinions differ over statistical baselines, it is generally agreed that despite efforts by the Government of Colombia to limit increases, cultivation expanded dramatically over the past three years. Estimated coca cultivation increased 36 percent in 1996, 18 percent in 1997 and 28 percent in 1998. Colombia is also a significant supplier of heroin to the United States, potentially producing, according to U.S. estimates, up to eight metric tons (mt) yearly, virtually all of which is destined for the U.S. market.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1999

Policy Initiatives. In November 1999, Colombia extradited a Colombian citizen to the United States for the first time in nine years, fulfilling one of the USG's most sought-after, but elusive, counternarcotics goals with the GOC. Despite narcotics traffickers' attempts to throw up legal roadblocks, and bombings possibly linked to the extraditions, the Colombian Supreme Court and Pastrana Administration demonstrated their willingness to send narcotics traffickers to justice in the United States regardless of citizenship.

In a cooperative anti-narcotics operation with the USG, the GOC arrested 30 suspected narcotics traffickers in October 1999 as a result of "Operation Millennium." This joint operation, involved the Colombian National Police, the Colombian prosecutor general's office and the DEA. The United States requested the extradition of all 30 suspects.

The GOC succeeded in preserving some, but not all, key elements of its "faceless" justice system when congress approved the new "specialized" justice system in June 1999. The specialized system no longer protects the identity of judges, leading some judges to feel exposed to attempts at intimidation. However, the system still protects the identity of witnesses and prosecutors in a limited set of crimes such as narcotics trafficking, kidnapping and terrorism.

The asset forfeiture process in Colombia remains stalled. Although the GOC has seized millions of dollars worth of narcotics trafficker assets, including land, homes, automobiles and airplanes, the government has been unable to conclude the process and take legal ownership of or auction-off the assets.

The Colombian Air Force (FAC) is improving its monitoring and interdiction abilities. Over the last three years, the percentage of successful FAC interdiction attempts has increased from 25 percent in 1997 to nearly 40 percent in 1999. At the same time, the number of suspicious aircraft which radar has detected flying to or from Colombia has fallen dramatically, from 231 in 1997 to less than 100 in 1999.

The Colombian National Police successfully implemented a civil aviation registration program to curb the use of aircraft for drug trafficking. This program inspected 343 aircraft in 1999, seizing 50 of these for violation of protective seals that prevent tampering with cargoes.

In mid-1999, for the first time, the GOC permitted its eradication campaign to begin edging into coca-rich Putumayo department. The GOC had previously prohibited eradication in Putumayo; the mere threat of spraying there in 1996 ignited vehement public demonstrations against the government by residents of the coca growing areas. The eradication program has been careful to enter Putumayo slowly and without fanfare to avoid causing a backlash by farmers dependent on the coca trade. By November 1999, planes were eradicating fields 20 miles into the department, allowing them to reach approximately 30,000 hectares of coca. This has permitted the eradication program to enter the fastest growing coca cultivation area in the country.

The eradication program was hindered in 1999 by the diversion of escort helicopters for interdiction missions, civic unrest in poppy-growing areas that forced the evacuation of spray teams, and frequent ground-fire attacks on spray planes (resulting, in part, from too few escort aircraft). In 1999 spray planes suffered 67 hits from ground fire. Nonetheless, the program still managed to eradicate more than 50,000 hectares in 1999.

The February 1997 shipboarding agreement between the GOC and USG streamlined the process for approving the boarding of Colombian ships in international waters by U.S. officials and has enhanced cooperation with the Colombian Navy. Following talks between JIATF-East (USG inter-agency counternarcotics task force) and the Colombian Navy, a standing interdiction operations plan was signed in September 1999. This plan augments the maritime agreement and has led to three U.S.-Colombian combined maritime interdiction patrols since May 1999. The Colombian Navy's counternarcotics efforts, however, are limited by a lack of adequate resources for patrolling, including fuel.

The USG and GOC have worked to resolve differences regarding evidence preparation and delivery in cases where the USG is the interdicting authority. In September 1999, U.S. and Colombian authorities reached an accommodation concerning the evidence required by Colombian prosecutors and other evidentiary questions.

Prison security remains a serious problem in Colombia. Overcrowding, lack of administrative acumen and corruption among guards plague the system. Almost two percent of inmates escape each year. There are 50,000 prisoners in a system with capacity for 33,000 and only 1 guard for every 10 prisoners (compared with 1 guard for 4 in the U.S.). Violence among prisoners is rampant. Due to lax security and permissive conditions for prisoners, many convicted traffickers remain directly involved in their operations from within prison.

The Minister of Justice and his director of prisons appear committed to reforms. But thus far, the GOC has been more inclined to build additional prisons rather than to reform prison administration.

The "carrot and stick" approach that couples alternative development with aerial eradication is key to Colombia's national drug control strategy and to "Plan Colombia," unveiled by the GOC in September 1999. The National Alternative Development Plan (PLANTE) is the agency charged with implementing the GOC's alternative development strategy. Targeting approximately 35,000 small farmers nationwide, who each produce less than three hectares of coca or opium poppy, PLANTE focused on linking illicit crop abandonment or substitution to markets for the resulting new products or services. PLANTE organized strategic alliances with the private sector, which provide farmer organizations with risk capital and technical assistance in production, product processing and marketing.

As a matter of policy, the GOC does not encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. The Pastrana government has made clear, on many occasions, its opposition to official corruption.

Accomplishments. Law enforcement operations by the counternarcotics police and others continue to be the most successful element of the GOC counternarcotics program. According to the CNP, GOC counternarcotics operations in 1999 included the seizure of: almost 30 metric tons (mt) of cocaine HCl and cocaine base; nearly 140 mt of coca leaves; 61 mt of marijuana; and 644 kilos of heroin, morphine and opium; the destruction of 96 cocaine base labs; 53 cocaine HCl labs and 10 heroin labs; the capture of over 760 mt of solid precursor chemicals and over 890,000 gallons of liquid precursors; the seizure of 540 vehicles, 189 boats, 51 aircraft and 422 weapons; the destruction of 44 clandestine airstrips, and the arrest of over 2,200 persons.

Elite investigative units within the CNP are developing long term investigations of trafficker organizations and are moving forward on asset forfeiture. The GOC heroin task force provided intelligence to effect drug seizures in Colombia and assist in U.S.-based investigations. Overall, GOC seizures of cocaine and heroin were higher in 1999 than in 1998.

The level of cooperation between the Colombian military and police, and between the services within the military, continued to improve in 1999. As in 1998, all of the armed forces conducted unilateral and joint counternarcotics operations with the police. Cooperation took the form of deployments in areas where police face a significant guerrilla threat. The air force, army, navy and marines coordinated with the CNP in multi-week, joint counternarcotics operations along the Pacific coast near the port of Buenaventura. These coordinated forces destroyed drug labs, confiscated narcotics and arrested individuals involved.

Furthermore, the Colombian police and army have participated in intensive joint training to prepare the army's new counternarcotics battalion, which is intended to assist the CNP during counternarcotics operations in the coca growing regions. The police and army have also agreed to work together on tactical operations that involve the new battalion. The co-located Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) includes personnel from the CNP.

CNP cooperation, including intelligence sharing, with international law enforcement entities continued this year. The CNP also provided information that led directly to the seizure of 30 mt of cocaine HCl outside of Colombian territory in 1999.

Agreements and Treaties. Colombia ratified the 1988 UN Drug Convention in September 1994 and the GOC's National Anti-Narcotics Plan of 1998 meets the strategic plan requirements of the Convention. Recent reforms have generally brought the government into line with the requirements of the Convention.

In February 1997, the GOC signed a maritime shipboarding agreement with the United States. The agreement, which allows for faster approval for shipboardings in international waters and sets guidelines for improved counternarcotics cooperation with the Colombian navy, has been credited with the seizure of 22 metric tons of cocaine since its signing. In February 1999, the Colombian justice system obtained the first convictions of individuals prosecuted for seizures related to the maritime agreement. However, reduced budgets and demands on resources for riverine programs south of the Andes limited the navy's counternarcotics operations.

1999 saw substantial improvement in the maritime agreement's intelligence and communications exchange process. JIATF-East has established direct communication links with Colombian navy operations centers in Bogota and Cartagena to speed the transfer of tactical interdiction information. The navy has also improved its own ship-to-shore communications. Unfortunately, implementation procedures for article 16 of the agreement have not been developed. Article 16 permits the prosecution of high-seas seizures by U.S. authorities without referral to Colombia's legal system and extradition process.

In September, U.S. and Colombian customs officials signed a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement (CMAA). The CMAA will enhance the countries' ability to share information and investigate cases jointly.

Cultivation and Production. Coca and opium poppy remain the principal illicit crops grown in Colombia. In 1998, these crops were estimated to be 101,800 hectares and 6,100 hectares respectively. In 1999 there were estimated to be 122,500 hectares of coca and 7,500 hectares of poppy.

Coca, the predominant illicit crop, is primarily grown in two regions: on the eastern plains in Guaviare and neighboring departments, and along the Ecuadorian and Peruvian borders in the departments of Putumayo and Caqueta. Additionally, increasing amounts of coca are appearing in the northern departments of Bolivar and Norte de Santander. Most opium is grown on the eastern slopes of the Central Cordillera Mountains in Tolima, Huila and Cauca departments. Limited amounts are also found in Norte de Santander, southern Bolivar and Antioquia departments.

Larger and ever more complex cocaine HCl laboratories are replacing the less sophisticated labs previously encountered. HCl laboratories can be found in all regions of the country, but are primarily located in the plains and jungle regions, near the coca-growing zones under de facto guerrilla control. Numerous laboratories have been identified in extremely remote areas that are difficult to reach even by helicopter.

Most opiate laboratories are small, producing small quantities of drugs and using simple equipment and limited quantities of precursor chemicals. Colombia accounts for an estimated two percent of the world's opium poppy. Nearly all of the resulting heroin, however, is destined for the United States.

Marijuana cultivation remained active in 1999, but is not believed to have increased significantly. Colombian marijuana seizures in the United States are believed to be minimal.

Drug Flow/Transit. Colombia is the center of the international cocaine trade, with drugs flowing out of the country at a stable and constant rate. In addition to producing large quantities of cocaine base domestically, Colombian traffickers import cocaine base, by air and by river, from Peru and, to a lesser extent, from Bolivia. The base is converted into cocaine HCl at clandestine laboratories in the Colombian source zone. Cocaine HCl shipments move out of Colombia primarily by commercial maritime vessels (multi-ton loads) and general aviation aircraft (400-800 kgs shipments) to Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, typically en route to the United States. Cocaine is also concealed in legitimate air and sea cargo destined for European ports.

Recent statistics indicate that approximately 85 percent of the heroin seized by federal authorities in the northeastern United States is of Colombian origin. DEA believes that almost all of the heroin produced in Colombia goes to the United States and is generally smuggled by human couriers on commercial airline flights in quantities of one to five kilograms.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). The National Directorate for Narcotics Control administers cost sharing drug abuse prevention and education projects with the UNDCP. The annual UNDCP budget for Colombia programs is USD five to seven million.

The DNE coordinates GOC demand reduction programs through governmental and non-governmental organizations. Demand reduction efforts in Colombia faced an uphill battle in 1999 as domestic drug consumption continued to rise. Increasing drug abuse by Colombians has spurred greater efforts by the DNE to publicize the dangers of drug abuse and convince the public that local consumption is a problem for Colombia now, not in the future. The U.S. Embassy hopes that one result of this active media campaign will be that counternarcotics programs in general will be more palatable to the Colombian public.

The priority target group for programs to prevent the use of psychoactive substances is male students, ages 12-17, with high school level education. New users are located in the geographic areas with the highest population densities and greater economic development, such as the coffee producing region and cities such as Bogota, Medellin and Cali.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs.

Policy Initiatives. The USG continues to place its focus on institution building, especially within the law enforcement and judicial systems. The counternarcotics legislation passed in 1997 is an indirect result of advice and studies funded by the USG.

Bilateral Cooperation. Judicial reform in Colombia moves forward, albeit at an extremely slow pace. USAID coordinates the USG's justice sector reform program in cooperation with the Department of Justice (OPDAT and ICITAP). This long-term effort is aimed at strengthening the administration of justice in Colombia through support and training for judges, prosecutors, and investigators. Since 1991, several thousand law enforcement officials have received training in basic investigative techniques and planning. Recently, OPDAT and ICITAP have focused on the development of task force units (teams of prosecutors and police) that are charged with investigating money laundering, corruption, narcotics and human rights violations. Human rights training is an important element of the program and has been provided in the United States to some program participants. USAID and OPDAT continue to support the judicial branch in a challenging effort to establish oral trials in a country that has traditionally relied on written evidence and the inquisitorial system to resolve cases.

To reduce the amount of cocaine HCl reaching the U.S., many USG programs focus on the Colombian source zone to stop air transportation and drug production in this targeted area. This focus aims at improving not only bilateral and joint CNP-military operations, but multilateral cooperation, as well.

USG entities, including DEA, FBI, USAID, and training elements of the Department of Justice (OPDAT and ICITAP), work with GOC law enforcement and judicial entities to increase the effectiveness of the Colombian judicial system, developing and refining law enforcement capabilities, training host nation counterparts, and improving access, fairness and public perceptions of the justice system. Thousands of judges, prosecutors and investigators have been trained since 1991.

The U.S. Embassy in Bogota provided the impetus to establish a port cargo security program that is now in place at all five of Colombia's seaports. The private ports agreed to provide $ 1.5 million per year for the foreseeable future to fund 100 specially trained narcotics police who carry out inspection and interdiction operations at the ports. This private funding complements nominal USG sponsorship. The USG monitors performance and provides U.S. Customs Service trainers. As a result of this program, the ports have seized more than 16 mt of cocaine and 40 mt of marijuana, all at very little cost to the USG. Additionally, Colombia is one of seven countries participating in the U.S. Customs' Americas Counter Smuggling Initiative (ACSI), a program designed to deter narcotics smuggling in commercial shipments by enhancing private sector security programs at manufacturing and export facilities while also seeking to assist law enforcement agencies to improve their counternarcotics effectiveness and develop private sector partnerships.

In 1999, the total operating budget for the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) of the U.S. Embassy in Bogota was $38 million, with the largest sums going to support CNP air operations ($15.3 million) and the crop eradication program ($7.7 million). The CNP air wing consists of 47 helicopters and 20 fixed wing aircraft. The USG-funded private contractor that manages the CNP's eradication program operates an additional 12 helicopters, 9 spray planes, two intelligence-gathering planes and several transport planes. In addition to this assistance, the USG provided $96 million for the acquisition of six BlackHawk helicopters to enhance the CNP's counternarcotics capacity. The first three were delivered in November 1999 with the remaining three scheduled to arrive in the first quarter of 2000. The crews and technicians for these new helicopters were trained in the United States. The USG is also upgrading the CNP's Huey helicopter fleet. The first ten of 25 upgrades were performed in 1999 at a cost of $1.4 million each.

The CNP agreed to an audit of the CNP air services program, which receives substantial U.S. assistance. Unfortunately, in December 1999, the accounting firm contracted to perform the audit backed out, citing security concerns. Nonetheless, the CNP's agreement to have the audit performed is a positive step and the USG is working to contract another accounting firm for the project.

The GOC also worked with the U.S. Embassy's consular section to deny U.S. visas to persons involved or suspected of trafficking in drugs or related activities such as money laundering.

In 1999, ICITAP assisted the GOC in developing a unified training curriculum for Colombian investigators. In August 1999 the National Judicial Police Council formally adopted the curriculum and made it mandatory for all Colombian investigators after January 2000. For the first time, all Colombian law enforcement investigators will receive the same training.

The Colombian army's new counternarcotics battalion became operational late in 1999. The United States provided training and equipment to the 931-man battalion and will assist the GOC with the costs of maintaining the elite unit. In 1999, total USG assistance relating to the battalion was approximately $7.5 million. The battalion is expected to commence field operations in early 2000.

The USG also provided 18 UH-1N helicopters to the Colombian army to support the new counternarcotics battalion. Helicopter operations should begin in early 2000 with full operational capability shortly thereafter.

Using $6 million in supplemental USG funding, the DIRAN, with U.S. Embassy assistance, embarked on an ambitious program to upgrade security at 16 base sites throughout Colombia. Following recommendations by USG security experts, the DIRAN enhanced security at all 16 bases. As the program continues, the DIRAN will install electronic sensor systems at a number of bases.

In 1999, NAS/INL provided substantial training for CNP personnel, including 12 pilots, 37 technicians, 57 ground troops and 95 agents of the CNP's new air-mobile unit.

The Road Ahead. The GOC's "Plan Colombia" recognizes the interrelated nature of Colombia's counternarcotics efforts and its peace process. In 2000, the foremost obstacle to curbing narcotics trafficking in Colombia will still be guerrillas who depend heavily on the drug trade for their substantial annual income. These well-armed rebels violently oppose police eradication operations and CNP/military interdiction efforts. Some paramilitaries are also involved in the drug trade and likewise pose a threat to law enforcement efforts.

In the year 2000, PLANTE will fund many of these ongoing projects from the $ 15 million alternative development agreement signed with the USG in August 1999. Although the number of small farmers who have abandoned their illegal trade thus far is small, it is hoped that, as PLANTE's market-oriented projects take root and spray planes take to the air, an increasing number of farmers will see the benefit of getting out of coca or poppy cultivation.

USG programs will continue working with the GOC to solidify reforms in the DIRAN and support Colombia's efforts to sustain and improve the capability and efficiency of the judicial system, which remains one of the weakest links in the counternarcotics chain. The USG fully expects that the cooperation between U.S. and Colombian law enforcement agencies that produced Operation Millennium will continue to show results in 2000. The U.S. Embassy is confident that after extraditing a Colombian citizen to the United States for the first time in 9 years, the GOC will respond favorably on the merits to U.S. extradition requests for Colombian nationals and others involved in narcotics trafficking. The Colombian military's counternarcotics role may broaden in 2000, as its first counternarcotics battalion comes on line and as the GOC implements plans for additional specialized battalions.

Resources will be devoted to firming up the Colombian armed forces' and police's ability to institutionalize and carry forward the training they have received from the United States. Priorities will include enhancing the armed forces' capacity to conduct field medic training, as well as ground and small units training in counternarcotics operations. As Colombia's first counternarcotics battalion commences operations, plans continue to train and equip additional battalions to strengthen the army's counternarcotics capability and expertise.

Colombia Statistics

(1991-1999)
  1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991
Coca                  

Potential Harvest (ha)

122,500

101,800

79,500

67,200

50,900

44,700

39,700

37,100

37,500

Eradication (ha)

43,246

-

19,000

5,600

8,750

4,910

793

959

972

Estimated Cultivation (ha)

-

-

98,500

72,800

59,650

49,610

40,493

38,059

38,472

HCl: Potential(1) (mt)

520

435

350

300

230

70

65

60

60

Opium                  

Potential Harvest (ha)

7,500

6,100

6,600

6,300

6,540

20,000

20,000

20,000

1,344

Eradication (ha)

-

-

6,972

6,028

3,760

3,906

9,821

12,858

1,156

Estimated Cultivation (ha)

-

-

13,572

12,328

10,300

23,906

29,821

32,858

2,500

Potential Opium Gum (mt)

75

61

66

63

65

-

-

-

-

Cannabis(2)                  

Potential Harvest (ha)

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

4,980

4,986

5,000

2,000

2,000

Eradication (ha)

-

-

-

-

20

14

50

49

0

Estimated Cultivation (ha)

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,050

2,049

2,000

Potential Yield (mt)

4,150

4,150

4,150

4,150

4,133

4,138

4,125

1,650

1,650

Labs Destroyed                  

Cocaine/Base

156

311

213

861

396

560

401

224

239

Morphine/Heroin

10

10

9

9

11

9

10

7

5

Seizures(3)                  

Heroin/Morphine (mt)

0.504

0.317

0.261

0.183

0.419

0.181

0.261

0.05

-

Opium (mt)

0.183

0.100

0.120

0.036

0.078

0.128

0.261

0.43

-

Colombia Statistics (Cont.)

  1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991

Cannabis (mt)

65

69

136

235

166

2000

549

206

329

Base/Basuco (mt)

9.00

29.30

10.00

17.50

19.50

32.00

10.40

5.81

9.28

Cocaine HCl (mt)

22.73

54.70

34.00

23.50

21.50

30.00

21.76

31.92

77.07

Total HCl/Base (mt)

31.73

84.00

44.00

41.00

41.00

62.00

32.16

37.73

86.35

Domestic Consumption

Cocaine (mt)

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

Marijuana (mt)

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

Arrests                  

Nationals

-

1,879

1,478

1,482

1,646

-

-

-

-

Foreigners

-

82

68

79

99

-

-

-

-

Total Arrests

-

1,961

1,546

1,561

1,745

2,154

2,562

1,700

1,170

(1)Newly acquired data from field surveys has resulted in revised leaf yield and HCl production estimates from 1995 on.
(2)Reported cannabis cultivation has not been confirmed by USG survey.
(3)Seizure data show combined CNP and military figures.

Cocaine Base and HCL Seizures in Colombia (Chart)

 

ECUADOR

I. Summary.

Ecuador continues to be a major transit area for drugs destined for the U.S. and elsewhere, and for precursor chemicals destined for drug processing labs in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Traffickers exploit Ecuador's porous border with Colombia and Peru to consolidate smuggled cocaine and heroin into larger loads for bulk shipment to the U.S. and Europe hidden in containers of legitimate cargo. Despite the country's severe economic crisis, the Ecuadorian National Police (ENP) had a record year, seizing more than 10 tons of cocaine and coca base and 81 kg of heroin, dismantling cocaine laboratories and intercepting precursor chemicals. The Government of Ecuador (GOE) fully cooperates with the United States Government (USG) in the fight against narcotics trafficking. A solid example of this close cooperation was the completion in November 1999 of a ten-year agreement permitting the U.S. to operate regional counternarcotics detection and monitoring missions from an Ecuadorian air force base in the city of Manta. The Ecuadorian National Drug Council (CONSEP) published a new five-year counternarcotics strategy. The customs service was privatized to maximize efficiency and bolster interdiction efforts. In addition, the ENP established a unified anti-drug division to strengthen the management of counternarcotics law enforcement. However, Ecuador's depressed economy and lack of interagency cooperation continue to hamper counternarcotics efforts. Ecuador is a party to, and has enacted legislation to implement the provisions of, the 1988 United Nations Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country.

Ecuador is one of the primary transit routes for cocaine and heroin from Colombia and Peru. The country serves as a major staging area for smuggled cocaine and heroin, which are then shipped to the U.S. and Europe in bulk quantities. Some small fields of poppies and coca have been found within Ecuador, particularly near the border with Colombia, but have been eradicated by the ENP. A few small cocaine processing laboratories were also discovered and dismantled by the police.

Cocaine is smuggled into Ecuador primarily by truck in shipments of legitimate products via the Pan American Highway, and then loaded onto export shipments in the ports of Guayaquil, Esmeraldas, and Manta. Cocaine shipments are hidden in compartments in ocean-going vessels or concealed within containerized perishable (seafood, bananas, flowers) or bulk cargo. Heroin and cocaine are also smuggled by human couriers boarding international flights at the Quito and Guayaquil airports. Ecuador's northern border area with Colombia is of concern for movement of both drugs and chemicals, but insurgency and criminal activity in the region hinders effective police control.

Ecuador endured a major financial and economic crisis in 1999, with most of its major banks collapsing and requiring government intervention. By the end of 1999, the Ecuadorian government controlled 75 percent of the country's banking sector. Widespread capital flight and a 180 percent devaluation of the national currency have reduced the attractiveness of Ecuador as a site for money laundering, although some narcotics profits from Colombia may have been invested in Ecuadorian real estate. Drug money laundering is illegal under the 1990 narcotics law. However, the Ecuadorian government presently has no effective means to investigate or prosecute such crimes.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1999

Policy Initiatives. The administration of President Jamil Mahuad, which took office in August 1998, made significant progress in strengthening bilateral counternarcotics cooperation with the U.S. The Ecuadorian National Drug Council published a new national drug strategy in 1999 which clearly identifies the roles and responsibilities of GOE agencies, including the armed forces, in combating drug trafficking and consumption.

The Ecuadorian National Police has primary responsibility for counternarcotics law enforcement in Ecuador. As part of a reorganization intended to strengthen the management of counternarcotics efforts, the National Police established a unified anti-drug division in 1999. This new division will consolidate the various specialized units (such as the mobile road interdiction group, the canine teams at airports and seaports, and various counternarcotics intelligence units) into a coherent organization. The police completed construction of the Joint Information Coordination Center (JICC) in Guayaquil, and plan to integrate this center with the national anti-drug division headquarters.

In an effort to clean up widespread corruption in Ecuador's customs service, the GOE first militarized the institution, then privatized the service in May 1999. The new managers of Ecuadorian customs come from the private sector and hope to streamline clearance procedures while working closely with the police to inspect suspicious cargoes. The U.S. Government, through the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), is funding a full time U.S. Customs advisor position to work with both the Ecuadorian police and customs service at the ports.

In November 1999, the Ecuadorian Congress passed a new criminal procedural code, which is intended to fundamentally change the country's criminal justice system from an inquisitorial to an accusatorial system. The new code empowers prosecutors with authority to investigate and prosecute crimes, and alters the role of judges to neutral arbiters presiding over oral trials. Although the bill as drafted contains serious flaws which inhibit the authority of the police and prosecutors during the investigative phase of a case, top GOE officials are attempting to rectify these problems in the new code. President Mahuad partially vetoed the draft code in response to those concerns.

Accomplishments. By signing a ten-year agreement to permit U.S. aircraft to utilize Manta as a forward operating location (FOL) in November 1999, the GOE demonstrated its strong commitment to bilateral counternarcotics cooperation with the United States Government (USG). This agreement will permit Ecuador and the U.S. to work even closer together in the detection and monitoring of clandestine aircraft transporting narcotics to Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean.

The Ecuadorian military also played a major role in tightening up control over Ecuador's border with Colombia. Following the 1998 signing of a peace treaty with Peru, the Ecuadorian armed forces shifted their attention to the northern border. The army placed additional forces in Sucumbios province, bordering Colombia's Putumayo department, which is the site of large-scale coca cultivation.

Despite some improvements, interagency cooperation between the military and police in Ecuador remains a serious problem. The Ecuadorian Navy controls the country's ports, but naval cooperation with the police varies widely from port to port. Additional efforts must be taken in 2000 to increase police presence in all commercial ports of Ecuador, particularly Manta and Machala.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The Ecuadorian National Police had a banner year in drug seizures and arrests in 1999. The police seized about 10 metric tons of cocaine and coca base (compared to only about 4 Mt in 1998) and about 81 kg of heroin (compared to 58 kg during the previous year). The police also seized record amounts of methyl ethyl ketone(MEK) and other precursor chemicals. The reasons for the improved interdiction performance this year were better use of intelligence, more aggressive leadership, and effective use of canine interdiction teams at Ecuador's seaports and airports.

The GOE has adopted a new criminal justice code to convert its judiciary from an inquisitorial to an accusatorial system. In order to facilitate the working relationships of police and prosecutors under the new code, the National Police signed an agreement with the nation's prosecutors in 1999 to permit joint training programs for criminal case investigations. The U.S. Department of Justice has also provided several training courses to help prepare Ecuadorian police and prosecutors for their new roles in an adversarial system.

With U.S. Southern Command financial support, the ENP has completed construction of a highway inspection checkpoint at a strategic road junction in Baeza, east of Quito. The police plan to deploy the NAS-supported mobile highway inspection unit (GEMA) to this location, assisting police interdiction of precursor chemicals entering the Sucumbios-Putumayo border region with Colombia.

The JICC in Guayaquil is in operation, although additional efforts must be taken by the police to ensure that it provides timely information to interdiction units at airports and seaports. Greater military participation is also needed to increase the effectiveness of the JICC. Intelligence-sharing between the Ecuadorian military and National Police also needs significant improvement.

Due to Ecuador's severe economic crisis, the Superintendency of Banks has focused its attention on the collapsing banking sector. Consequently, almost no investigations of money laundering were conducted in Ecuador during 1999.

Corruption. The 1990 narcotics law contains a provision for prosecuting any government official, including judges, who deliberately impedes the prosecution of anyone charged under that law. As a matter of government policy, the GOE does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of drugs, other controlled substances or the laundering of drug money.

In November 1999, the Judicial Council announced that it had fired two judges involved in the premature release from custody of two suspected drug traffickers. In addition, the Council began a criminal investigation of these judges and other court employees involved in the case.

While narcotics-related corruption is a problem in Ecuador, in 1999 no senior Ecuadorian government official was identified as engaged in the production or distribution of drugs or in the laundering of illicit proceeds.

In collaboration with the U.S. Embassy and the Department of Justice, the chief prosecutor's office has agreed to set up a special task force that will work in close coordination with the ENP in pursuit of corruption crimes.

Arrests and/or Prosecutions. The USG and the GOE are working to strengthen law enforcement relationships, develop information sharing conduits, and bolster interdiction cooperation. Cooperation between the USG and GOE has resulted in several successful law enforcement operations as well as the expulsions of third country nationals indicted for drug-crimes in the U.S.

Agreements and Treaties. Although the USG and the GOE have an extradition treaty in force, the treaty is outdated. Ecuador has cooperated with the USG to deport or extradite non-Ecuadorian nationals. Ecuador does not extradite its own nationals, but participated in preliminary talks on revising the extradition treaty. The negotiation of a new treaty depends on whether Ecuador is ready to amend its constitution to permit extradition of Ecuadorian citizens.

Ecuador is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and has a narcotics law (Law 108) that incorporates the provisions of that treaty.

The GOE is a strong supporter of regional cooperation, and has signed bilateral counternarcotics agreements with Colombia, Cuba and the United States, as well as the Summit of the Americas money laundering initiative and the Organization of American States/Anti-Drug Abuse Council (OAS/CICAD) document on an hemispheric counternarcotics strategy.

In 1991, the GOE and the USG entered into an agreement on measures to prevent the diversion of chemical substances. In 1992, the two governments concluded an agreement to share information on currency transactions over $10,000.

The GOE has made progress in a number of important areas covered by the 1988 UN Drug Convention and OAS-CICAD model legislation, including upgrading its interdiction efforts, reducing the diversion of essential chemicals and beginning implementation of a program to reduce money laundering.

Cultivation/Production. The GOE continues to be vigilant about preventing illicit drug cultivation and processing activities. There is no evidence of large scale, commercial coca or opium poppy cultivation in Ecuador. However, the police have discovered and dismantled several small cocaine refineries processing coca paste imported from Peru and Colombia.

Drug Flow/Transit. Ecuador remains a major transit route for unrefined cocaine base shipped by air and land from northern Peru to southern Colombia for processing, and for refined cocaine hydrochloride moved from Colombia through Ecuador's seaports to U.S. and European markets. Colombian traffickers also export heroin through Ecuador using body carriers through the country's airports. Ecuador is also a major transit country for precursor and essential chemicals which are smuggled into Colombia and Peru for cocaine processing. A recent change to this pattern has been the discovery of several small cocaine refineries within Ecuador. The GOE is combating the spread of drug production into Ecuador by beefing up highway interdiction efforts and continuing to monitor the import of chemicals by legitimate companies to prevent their diversion to illicit markets.

Demand Reduction. The most recent national survey by the National Drug Council (CONSEP) showed drug use in Ecuador to be relatively low, with four percent of the respondents admitting to having used illicit drugs once in their lifetime. Ecuador's new national drug strategy made demand reduction a high national priority. CONSEP has a very ambitious drug prevention program, the police have instituted a D.A.R.E.-type program in classrooms, and the Ministry of Education has provided orientation seminars for the country's public school teachers. In addition, all public institutions, including the military, are required to establish drug prevention programs in the workplace.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

U.S. counternarcotics policy in Ecuador seeks to strengthen the technical capability of Ecuadorian police, military and justice sector agencies to attack the narcotics trafficking problem in Ecuador, including improved border and port control, investigation and prosecution of narcotics trafficking organizations, and reduction of domestic drug consumption. USG-provided training courses were held in the areas of asset forfeiture, communications, intelligence, chemical diversion and seaport control.

All initiatives and strategies were planned and coordinated with the GOE via counternarcotics bilateral agreements with the National Police and the National Drug Council.

The U.S. Embassy has chaired meetings of a Mini-Dublin group for Ecuador, a mechanism for improving the coordination of narcotics and law enforcement assistance programs among donor countries. The U.S., British, French, Spanish and German embassies are active in this group.

The Road Ahead. The establishment of the forward operating location at Manta has significantly increased the potential for counternarcotics cooperation between the U.S. and Ecuador. Information generated from Manta-based monitoring flights should greatly abet the detection and interdiction of illegal drugs. We will continue to seek enhanced cooperation on control of chemical diversion, vigorous interdiction efforts on both sea and land, and improved interagency coordination between the Ecuadorian military and police. The reform of the Ecuadorian criminal justice system offers the prospects for improvements in the investigation and prosecution of drug trafficking cases

Ecuador Statistics

(1991-1999)

  1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991
Coca                  

Leaf (Potential Harvest) (ha)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

40

Eradication (ha)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

80

Cultivation (ha)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

120

Seizures(1)                  

Cocaine (mt)

9.240

10.770

2.160

9.800

4.400

2.186

1.039

3.750

0.858

Base, paste (mt)

0.900

0.690

1.605

0.530

0.250

0.192

0.335

0.505

0.305

Total Cocaine Products (mt)

10.140

11.460

3.765

10.330

4.650

2.378

1.374

4.255

1.190

Cannabis (mt)

3.030

17.730

0.022

0.200

0.200

0.131

0.183

0.631

0.171

Heroin (mt)

0.081

0.053

0.034

0.070

0.053

0.024

0.027

0.003

0.000

Labs Destroyed                  

Cocaine

2

2

0

1

0

0

0

0

4

Arrests/Detentions                  

Nationals

3,500

3,596

3,346

2,075

1,858

2,872

2,775

1,810

2,794

Foreigners

250

292

346

204

2,214

201

213

165

198

Total Arrests 3,750 3,888 3,692 2,279 4,072 3,073 2,988 1,975 2,992

(1)Data for 1999 is through October.

 

PARAGUAY

I. Summary

The Government of Paraguay's (GOP) counternarcotics cooperation in 1999 included some notable actions, such as the ratification of a new bilateral extradition treaty with the U.S. which includes the extradition of nationals, the extradition to Brazil of a major cocaine trafficker, the enactment of conspiracy legislation, and the submission to congress of a draft law authorizing controlled deliveries and undercover operations. Following the assassination of Vice President Argana in March, however, political instability that led to the collapse of the Cubas government, judicial and other public corruption, and scarce resources were obstacles to more effective counternarcotics efforts. No action was taken against major trafficking organizations, and there were no seizures of large quantities of cocaine.

Paraguay is a transit country for significant amounts of mostly Bolivian cocaine en route to Argentina, Brazil, the U.S, Europe and Africa. It is also a source country for high-quality marijuana, none of which enters the U.S. Paraguay is a haven for money launderers, but it is unclear what portion is drug-related. Paraguay is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of the Country

Paraguay is a transit country for significant amounts of cocaine from Bolivia en route to Argentina, Brazil, the U.S., Europe and Africa. Reasons the cocaine trade continues include Paraguay's central location in the heart of South America, its extensive river network, its lengthy and uncontrolled land borders, numerous unpoliced airstrips (both registered and unregistered), and persistent official corruption. Already fledgling counternarcotics operations were virtually paralyzed in the wake of the murder of the vice president and the collapse of the Cubas government in March.

Paraguay is also a large money-laundering center. Although promulgation of a strong anti-money laundering law in 1997 provided the GOP with the legal tools necessary to move against this criminal activity, the GOP has not fully implemented the law by funding the offices created by the law to control money laundering or by arresting/prosecuting violators. Banking sources confirm that significant money laundering occurs, but claim it is fueled primarily by the regional contraband trade, tax evasion and capital flight, more so than by narcotics trafficking.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1999

Policy Initiatives. Both houses of the GOP congress approved the new bilateral extradition treaty with the U.S., which includes extradition of nationals. The treaty is pending before the U.S. Senate. The GOP also put into effect the new penal code, which includes conspiracy provisions; and submitted to congress draft legislation explicitly authorizing undercover operations and controlled deliveries. A major Brazilian narcotics trafficker, arrested by the GOP in October 1997 for weapons violations, was extradited to Brazil. Although not a USG priority because it is not trafficked to the U.S., the GOP seized record amounts of marijuana in 1999.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The GOP provided counternarcotics cooperation to DEA investigations, but was ineffective in carrying out its own investigations of major traffickers operating out of Paraguay. In 1999 the counternarcotics secretariat (SENAD) seized 95 kilos of cocaine and arrested 211 suspected low level narcotics traffickers (including 50 for cocaine trafficking). However, most of this activity was accomplished during the Cubas Grau administration. Asset seizures-a new frontier for Paraguayan justice, complicated by prior conviction requirements-were minimal.

Corruption. The GOP recognizes corruption as a public policy challenge, but has not taken sufficient measures to prevent or punish public corruption in general, or specifically with respect to narcotics trafficking. Measures against traffickers often take place only after pressure from the USG. Judicial corruption was suspected in the release of significant cocaine trafficker Nestor Baez in March, 1999. In November, the GOP got the Supreme Court to overturn Baez's release and he was re-arrested. A new penal code, promulgated in 1997, went into effect in July 1999. Law 1340 of 1988 subjects public officials that engage in narcotics-related offenses to the maximum applicable penalties. No public officials were tried under this law in 1999.

As a matter of government policy, Paraguay does not encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. Reports from a variety of sources indicate that some senior provincial, municipal, military, police and customs officials, as well as some congressmen and judges, are suspected of engaging in, encouraging, or facilitating the illicit production or distribution of such drugs or substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. However, law enforcement officials did not initiate or bring to the courts any cases against such officials in 1999.

Agreements and Treaties. Paraguay ratified the 1988 UN Drug Convention in 1990 and is a party to the 1961 Single Convention and its 1972 protocol. It has ratified the OAS Convention on Corruption, signed the OAS/CICAD hemispheric drug strategy, and agreed to the declaration of principles and plan of action adopted at the Summit of the Americas and at the 1995 money laundering ministerial. It entered into a bilateral assistance agreement with the U.S. in 1987, which was extended in 1999, meeting the requirements of the Chiles and Leahy amendments. Paraguay ratified a new bilateral extradition treaty with the U.S., including the extradition of nationals, in July. The treaty is pending before the U.S. Senate. Paraguay has entered into multipartite law enforcement agreements with Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia, and has similar bilateral agreements with Chile and Venezuela.

Cultivation and Production. Cannabis is the only illicit crop cultivated in Paraguay, and is harvested throughout the year. The GOP estimates that roughly 2,500 hectares are under cultivation. According to SENAD, marijuana production is up in Paraguay over previous years, and has spread from the traditional growing areas in San Pedro and Amabay provinces to the neighboring provinces of Canindeyu and Caaguazu. During 1999, the GOP eradicated 944 hectares of marijuana fields.

Drug Flow/Transit. Although there are no precise figures for the amount of cocaine, which transits Paraguay, USG experts have estimated in recent studies that between 15 and 30 metric tons may originate in Bolivia each year. Colombian cocaine is also penetrating Paraguay.

Demand Reduction Programs. Paraguay has a relatively small but growing substance abuse problem. SENAD has the chief coordinating role under the national program against drug abuse, and works with the Ministries of Health and Education, as well as with local non-governmental organizations.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives and Bilateral Cooperation. DEA provided aerial survey teams that identified suspicious activity and sites, including new airfields, along Paraguay's riverine system and elsewhere, and sent SENAD special agents to Argentina for training in airport interdiction and to Fort Bragg, N.C. for counternarcotics operations training. DEA also provided training, intelligence and guidance on operations and investigations. The Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) continued supporting the detector dog program, and provided equipment support to SENAD. INL funded, and U.S. Customs provided border interdiction and instructor training for 41 Paraguayan customs and police officials, and sent a Paraguayan participant to advanced canine unit training in Bolivia. INL also provided money laundering investigation training to SEPRELAD through FinCEN, and equipped SEPRELAD with computers. USIS sent three IVP grantees funded by INL to the U.S. to participate in counternarcotics journalism and international narcotics matters training programs.

The Road Ahead. The GOP's task remains that of translating its often stated political will to reduce narcotics trafficking and money laundering into concrete enforcement successes against narcotics traffickers, money launderers, and corrupt public officials. This means investigating major cocaine traffickers, making significant seizures and arrests, carrying out successful prosecutions, preventing the escape of arrested drug traffickers or their release by corrupt judges, and implementing the anti-money laundering law and provisions of the anti-drug law aimed at punishing and preventing official corruption.

During 2000 the USG will seek to continue strengthening SENAD's anti-narcotics, tactical interdiction and financial investigation units, as well as SEPRELAD's financial analysis unit, through training, technical assistance and equipment donations. The USG will also work with the executive and legislative branches on passage of tougher anti-narcotics law enforcement legislation that explicitly authorizes controlled deliveries and undercover operations. INL will sponsor a training program for prosecutors and judges in the application of new conspiracy statutes.

Paraguay Statistics

(1991-1999)
  1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991
Seizures(1)                  

Cocaine (mt)

0.095

0.231

0.077

0.056

0.059

0.806

0.043

0.067

0.041

Marijuana (pressed) (mt)

13.98

4.36

2.28

3.24

-

3.08

4.64

20.35

0.97

Marijuana (harvested) (mt)

96.76

75.06

14.94

-

-

-

-

-

-

Arrests/Detentions

211

212

209

220

237

58

333

337

300

(1)Data for 1999 is through October. Marijuana seizure statistics for 1991-93 have been revised.

South America Continued

[end of document]

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