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| Pacific Salmon
Report to the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States By David W. Strangway and William D. Ruckelshaus Washington, DC, January 12, 1998 As released by the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs |
In late August of this year we were appointed respectively by the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States to suggest ways to reinvigorate the stakeholder process established last winter to resolve the Pacific Salmon controversy dividing our two countries.
Stakeholders, primarily fishers, were first convened by Canada and the U.S. in January of 1997 in the North and South. They met several times until late May and were unable to come to an agreement on how to allocate salmon between the two countries. Since being appointed, we have met individually and jointly with the southern and northern stakeholders from both countries, government officials at all levels, tribal leaders, commercial fishing groups, sports fishing representatives, scientists, academics and many others with insights into the salmon dispute. (The approach we have taken is attached hereto, Attachment A.)
What follows is a summary of what we have learned and our joint recommendations.
We have operated from the outset on the premise that it was important for us to make a joint report. The dispute over Pacific salmon has divided Canada and the U.S. for too long. The relevant issues, if not resolved, threaten to deteriorate further the relations between our two countries, as well as the stocks of fish whose preservation is our joint national responsibility. We hope this report clarifies the nature of the issues and starts us on a path toward peace on the water.
WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?
There are 5 or 7 species (depending on whether you count steelhead and cutthroat trout) of Pacific Salmon. They originate in the rivers of one of our countries and often migrate and mature in the waters of the other. Upon maturing, the vast majority or these fish return to the river of origin, spawn and die. (Steelhead and cutthroat do not always die after spawning.) The migration patterns of salmon in the Pacific Northwest take most fish north where they mature. They then begin their spawning runs by retracing their journey southward. For example, one run of Chinook salmon that spawns 1,500 kilometers up the Columbia River will have left this river as smolts years earlier and passed through Canadian waters into Alaska, the open ocean and back again. Early Stuart sockeye spawn in the headwaters of the Upper Fraser River nearly 3,000 kilometers from salt water. As returning adults they come from the North Pacific, pass through Alaskan fisheries, British Columbia fisheries and Washington State fisheries before they begin the long return trip back up the Fraser River. Likewise, all species - chum, pink, sockeye, coho and chinook - move freely back and forth across territorial boundaries.
At the crux of the dispute between Canada and the U.S. is the age old practice of fishers catching fish where they find them, regardless of the river where the fish originate. Regulating interceptions (catching a fish that originates in one country in the waters of another) was assigned to the Pacific Salmon Commission, established by the Pacific Salmon Treaty agreed to by the U.S. and Canada in 1985. When the treaty was first signed, annexes attached to the treaty allocated the fish between the two countries. As the annexes expired, our two countries have not always been able to agree how the fish should be shared between us.
In our opinion, agreeing on fish-sharing arrangements is essential to preserving our shared resource. Everyone with whom we have talked agrees that a sound salmon management system involves conserving and enhancing the fish, allocating the fish to be harvested according to agreed principles between the two countries and managing the fisheries so that the actual catch is consistent with the conservation and allocation decisions made.
The fish-sharing or allocation arrangements between Canada and the U.S. have been incomplete and inadequate since 1993. As a result, the many dedicated Canadian and U.S. professionals involved in scientific assessment and fish management find their ability to work together seriously jeopardized. From fishers to professional fishery managers to scientists to politicians - all are experiencing at best, frayed relationships and at worst, outright hostility. In some cases this has resulted in emotional, even self-destructive, activity aimed at countries, fish and people. The dispute has rendered the Pacific Salmon Commission largely inoperative, particularly with respect to its key role in making annual fishing arrangements and in guiding the scientific studies needed for effective management in both countries.
This situation has soured fisheries relations at all levels, has seriously constrained fisheries management and has resulted in inappropriate fisheries actions in both countries. We point all this out not to cast blame but to suggest that unless the root cause of this behavior is corrected it will continue and likely escalate. The root cause is the absence of agreed upon fish-sharing arrangements.
Our two countries do not agree on the meaning of Article III of the Treaty. (Article III and relevant extracts from the Memorandum of Understanding are attached hereto, Attachment B.) Referring to the statement in the Treaty that each country should receive benefits equivalent to the production of salmon from its own waters, Canada contends that such benefits are fully quantifiable and that currently, there is a substantial imbalance in the United States favor that should be rectified. In its implementation, Canada states it is willing to be flexible and to ensure that an agreement is reached in a manner that contemplates the other factors listed in the treaty.
The U.S. contends that all the principles in Article III must be read together, and that whether an "equity" imbalance exists or interceptions need to be reduced in any particular situation, require consideration of a number of factors, including annual variations in the abundance of stocks, conservation and avoiding undue disruption of existing fisheries.
It is not our assignment to make conclusive judgments about the various interpretations of the Treaty. Suffice it to say, there are strongly-held views on both sides.
Attempts to break the deadlock have included federal government/ federal government negotiations (1993-95), similar efforts enlisting the help of a mediator (1995-96) and last year's stakeholder process. The stakeholder process resulted in imaginative proposals from both sides regarding regulatory approaches. Despite major efforts and some progress, the stakeholders, both in the North and the South, simply could not close the substantial gap posed by the dispute over sharing. The breakdown once more focused on the differences in the expectations of the two sides regarding how the sharing provisions of the Treaty were to be used in crafting fishing arrangements. The bridging of such differences is further complicated by the added difficulty of stakeholders being viewed as representative of local constituencies.
We have concluded that to make long term, durable fish-sharing arrangements, both countries must arrive at a practical framework for the implementation of Article III. We are fully aware of the difficulty in making these arrangements. We are united on the need to make fishing arrangements if we are to preserve the salmon for the benefit of all Canadians and Americans.
We have examined the stakeholder process as thoroughly as possible (see Appendix A). We went to the extraordinary step in late December of reconvening the Co-Chairs of the earlier stakeholder process plus governmental representatives from both countries. We asked them to spend a day together, with us observing, and to assist us in determining whether the reconvening of the stakeholders might result in acceptable fish-sharing arrangements. We told them their assignment, if reconvened, would be to make fish-sharing arrangements between the two countries for all relevant fish in the North and South for as extended a period as they believed appropriate.
We fuirther told them, if reconvened, they would be guided in making these arrangements by Article III of the Treaty and they should do the best they could to accommodate to the differing interpretations of Article III by the two countries and to make fish-sharing arrangements that would provide a mutually acceptable balance of interceptions. We noted that if an agreement was to be reached for the term of the agreement it would necessarily involve a compromise in the form of movement of fish to Canada and a willingness on the part of Canada to agree that not all the fish they deemed to be theirs would be returned. We told those present that their governments would accept the fish-sharing arrangements as recommended by the stakeholders. In addition, other changes in the earlier process were discussed that we felt would make it easier for the stakeholders to reach an agreement
We promised, as several stakeholders had requested, that we, as special representatives, would stay involved in the process to help in its successful conclusion.
At the end of our work, we have concluded that the stakeholders process cannot achieve the necessary fishing arrangements.
The problem of the Pacific salmon and its multiple claimants is a classic "tragedy of the commons" as popularized by University of California at Santa Barbara Professor Garrett Hardin. The immediate users (the fishermen) of the commons (the fish) in pursuit of their unregulated self interest, risk harvesting the commons at an unsustainable rate. There are other threats to the Pacific salmon ranging from habitat destruction, to inadequate science to inconsistent fish management, but rules for their harvest must be set and enforced if the fish are to have a chance of survival.
We should note that the fishing industry is independently undergoing massive changes that are not related to the Treaty. It has been documented by many authors around the world that salmon fish farming is causing deep reductions in the price of these fish and that larger, more technologically equipped fleets are massively increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of fishing.
To be sure, many of the disputes between our two countries involve the harvesting of abundant stocks. For example, the Fraser River sockeye in the south and that same species spawning in the Skeena River in the north have recently been quite healthy. At the same time, other stocks and individual runs are severely threatened or near extinction. Several of the Chinook runs in the Columbia River are nearly extinct and some of the Coho runs up and down the Pacific Coast are under extreme stress.
Rules need to be made for all these fish and others to save and enhance those runs we can preserve and enhance the currently healthy stocks. These rules need to be scientifically sound, clear, fair and enforceable.
It is the responsibility of both countries to see these rules are made to apply to the coming fishing season and all the seasons that follow. The risks to the fish are too great not to make this happen.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Our recommendations need to be put in context. In the last several months, we have been extremely impressed with the caliber of fishers and professionals on all sides of this dispute. There are a lot of very good people trying to work in a system for managing salmon that has become dysfunctional. This system needs to be repaired so these well meaning people can do their work. We believe the recommendations that follow can put us on the road to system repair but if recovery is to occur both sides need to look for solutions not for reasons to continue the impasse. Solutions require genuine accommodation. It is our view that an accommodation is possible under the terms of the existing Treaty. What must be present is the political will to achieve the necessary accommodation by those responsible for the management of the fish - this means the governors of the states of Alaska, Washington and Oregon, the tribal leaders in Washington and Oregon, the Minister of Fisheries & Oceans for Canada in consultation with the government of British Columbia and ultimately, the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States.
Therefore we recommend:
1.) The stakeholder process should not be reconvened.
2.) The governments (states, tribes and federal government on the U.S. side and Federal and Provincial Governments on the Canadian side) should cause to be adopted interim fishing arrangements for all relevant species of salmon for up to two years. The development of these arrangements should be led by the fish managers supported by the fishers and fish scientists but the arrangements must be made and the governments must ensure that they are.
3.) During this two year period, governments from both sides should develop a practical framework for implementing Article III leading to the establishment of longer term fishing arrangements.
4.) At the same time, governments should undertake a comprehensive review of the Pacific Salmon Commission (PSC) and dedicate themselves to making it a functional institution for the preservation and management of the Pacific Salmon. The assignment to the PSC should be clear. The Commission should be fully funded and empowered to carry out its work and all governments need to closely monitor its performance.
We are well aware that if recommendations 2 and 3 are to be carried out, meaningful compromises of positions strongly held will be necessary. However, we must not forget the stakes are high. If the tragedy of the Commons is to be averted, rules must be established for the preservation of the fish and time is not on their side.
For the implementation of these recommendations, we are willing to render such further process related assistance as the President and Prime Minister deem appropriate.
CONCLUSION
This report could be much longer and more descriptive of everything we have found. For instance, we have strong views on the need to institute a science-based comprehensive conservation system to insure the preservation of our shared resource. This need and others can be addressed if we can agree on interim fish-sharing arrangements, commit to longer-term arrangements within the framework of Article III of the Treaty, and fix the Pacific Salmon Commission. In our judgment the salmon will remain in jeopardy if we do not take these steps. For too long, good faith and trust have been missing elements in our dealings with the salmon and one another. It is time to go to work on preserving the fish and restoring our centuries-old friendship and cooperation.
Respectfully submitted.
David W. Strangway
William D. Ruckelshaus
Attachments:
A) Review of steps taken by Strangway/Ruckelshaus
B) Article III and relevant extracts from the Memorandum of Understanding of the Pacific Salmon Treaty
ATTACHMENT A
REVIEW OF STEPS TAKEN BY
STRANGWAY/RUCKELSHAUSCanada and the United States agreed, on July 23, 1997, to appoint Dr. David Strangway of Canada and Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus of the United States as Special Representatives of the President and Prime Minister in an effort to reinvigorate the Pacific salmon stakeholders process.
Recognizing that the organization of fisheries is unique in each country, the first phase of their effort started with the two representatives receiving extensive briefings in their respective countries to gain an understanding of the issues, the problems and the prospects. This long-standing dispute between Canada and the United States is complex, involving different species, various fisheries, many different groups of fishermen and a multitude of legal jurisdictions related to the management of the resource and responsibility for the Pacific Salmon Treaty. Consequently, extensive consultations were required to gain a broadly based appreciation of the interests and concerns.
In Canada, Dr. Strangway consulted with stakeholders from throughout British Columbia, those directly involved in the fishery and the resource. He met with Canadian members of the Pacific Salmon Commission and the two stakeholder groups, as well as representatives from First Nations, recreational fisheries, commercial fisheries, processors, the union and coastal communities. He met with Federal Government Ministers Axworthy for Foreign Affairs and Anderson for Fisheries and Oceans who have direct responsibility related to the Pacific Salmon Treaty and its implementation. Dr. Strangway was also briefed in Ottawa by senior officials from Privy Council Office, and the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Fisheries & Oceans, to hear the perspective of the Canadian Federal Government regarding the dispute. He met with regional officials and scientists from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and to learn about fisheries management as it relates to the Pacific Salmon Treaty. Dr. Strangway met with Canada's ambassador to the United States and with Foreign Affairs officials in Washington, D.C. and Seattle. He also met with the members of the B.C. Government, including Premier Clark, Minister Evans, the Deputy Premier and senior advisors involved in the issue.
Mr. Ruckelshaus met with the Governors of Oregon, Washington and Alaska, senior U.S. Federal Government officials on the west coast and in Washington, D.C., and tribal leaders, all of whom have legal responsibilities related to the Pacific Salmon Treaty and the management of the salmon resource. He consulted with scientists to gain an understanding of the technical aspects of the fishery. He held meetings with the participants in the numerous salmon fisheries and those directly affected by the state of the resource, including leaders in the various fisheries sectors, members of tribal communities in Washington and Oregon, stakeholder representatives from the process last spring, environmentalists and concerned fishing community members in Alaska, Washington and Oregon. He also met on several occasions with members of their respective congressional delegations, both in the states and in Washington, D.C. Ruckelshaus consulted with senior White House officials, Deputy Secretary of State Talbot, Interior Secretary Babbitt, and senior officials at the Department of State, Commerce and the Interior.
Phase two of the process involved another series of meetings during which the Special Representatives together met with the full array of interests in both countries focused on obtaining recommendations regarding how best to reinvigorate the stakeholder process. They met with each of the stakeholder delegations. The Canadian and U.S. sections of the northern and southern stakeholder groups each provided their views on the spring 1997 stakeholder negotiations, the outstanding issues and the prospects for progress. Dr. Strangway and Mr. Ruckelshaus were briefed by U.S. stakeholders and senior government officials in Washington, D.C. They met with Deputy Secretary of State Talbot and White House staff member McLarty. In Ottawa, the Special Representatives met with Foreign Affairs Minister Axworthy and Fisheries Minister Anderson, and were briefed by their senior officials. In Vancouver, they met with Canadian Pacific Salmon Commissioners, the stakeholder co-chairs and regional officials of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. They also met with Premier Clark, several senior B.C. officials and non-government advisors. They attended a summit of the State Governors and Minister Anderson in Seattle. Throughout this process they held extensive internal consultations to evaluate the information and recommendations provided. The Special Representatives maintained constant liaison with their respective sides throughout both phases of their effort to encourage flexibility on problem issues and obtain reaction to different ideas.
In November and early December, the Special Representatives focused their inquiries on whether or not sufficient flexibility existed on each side to indicate any chance for successful talks and to urge the stakeholders to consult closely among themselves and with government officials on the relevant issues. They asked the stakeholders to consider how far they were capable of moving toward an agreement on fishery allocations and to consider as well the possible use of professional facilitators. On December 19, the Special Representatives convened a meeting in Seattle of the respective chairs of the northern and southern stakeholder groups and asked them, with the help of professional facilitators, to discuss among themselves the results of those internal considerations. The stakeholder chairs requested that government officials be present and that the Special Representatives observe the meetings. Following this day of meetings, the Special Representatives undertook follow-up consultations with state, provincial and federal officials and arranged for some discussions among several of the parties necessary to clarify certain points raised on December 19, 1997.
ATTACHMENT B
ARTICLE III
PRINCIPLES1. With respect to stocks subject to this Treaty, each Party shall conduct its fisheries and its salmon enhancement programs so as to:
a) prevent over fishing and provide for optimum production; and
b) provide for each Party to receive benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its waters.
2. In fulfilling their obligations pursuant to paragraph 1, the Parties shall cooperate in management, research and enhancement.
3. In fulfilling their obligations pursuant to paragraph 2, the Parties shall take into account:
a) the desirability in most cases of reducing interceptions;
b) the desirability in most cases of avoiding undue disruptions of existing fisheries; and
c) annual variations in abundances of the stocks.
The Governments of Canada and the United States of America have agreed to record the following in connection with the Treaty Concerning Pacific Salmon. In order to set out the intention of the Parties with respect to implementation of Article III, paragraph 1(b) of the said Treaty, Data Sharing and the Yukon River, Transboundary Rivers and the Northern Boundary-Southeastern Alaska fisheries:
A. Implementation of Article III, paragraph 1(b)
The principal goals of the Treaty are to enable both countries, through better conservation and enhancement, to increase production of salmon and to ensure that the benefits resulting from each country's efforts accrue to that country. In this regard, the research on the migratory movements of stocks subject to interception must be continued for several years. Such research is required not only to determine with more precision the extent of interceptions by both sides, but also to provide an improved basis for conservation and enhancement. The resultant long-term increases in production of salmon should fully justify the short-term expenditures on research.
With respect to the obligation to provide each Party with benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its rivers (contained in Article III, paragraph 1(b) of the Treaty), it is recognized that data on the extent of interceptions in some areas are imprecise and that it is therefore not possible to determine with certainty the total production of salmon from each country's rivers. It is also recognized that methods of evaluating benefits accruing within each country may differ. For these reasons, it is anticipated that it will be some time before the Commission can develop programs to implement the provisions of Article III, paragraph 1(b) in a complete and comprehensive manner. Nevertheless, in the short term, the Commission shall ensure that the annual fishery regimes and understandings regarding enhancement are developed in an equitable manner taking into account the principle outlined in Article III 1(b). In particular, the Commission's decisions should take into account changes in the benefits flowing to each of the Parties through alteration in fishing patterns, conservation actions, or as the result of changes in the abundance of the runs.
In the longer term, if it is determined that one country or the other is deriving substantially greater benefits than those provided from its rivers, it would be expected that the Parties would develop a phased program to eliminate the inequity within a specified time period taking into account the provisions of Article III, paragraph 3. Since correction of imbalances is a national responsibility and may involve differential fishery adjustments or enhancement projects on a regional basis within either country, the Party with the advantage shall submit appropriate proposals to the Commission for consideration. Such proposals shall be discussed within the Commission and be reflected in the agreed fishery regimes and coordinated enhancement planning in ensuing years.
[End of Document]