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Great Seal Karl F. Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary
for South Asian Affairs
Testimony before the Subcommittee on Near East and South Asia of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, DC, June 3, 1998

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Mr. Chairman, since I last testified before this Committee only 21 days ago, events in South Asia have continued to proceed in a dangerous direction. In addition to the series of nuclear tests conducted by India, Pakistan tested nuclear devices on May 28 and 30. India and Pakistan have declared themselves nuclear powers and made statements--from which they have since backed away--that they intend to fit their ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Indian leaders have expressed their intention to conduct a national security review to include plans for the development and possible deployment of nuclear weapons, a threshold that if crossed could cock the nuclear trigger.
In Kashmir, there has been continuing worrisome activity along the line of control, including exchanges of fire and troop movements. Such events have been common in the past, and it is difficult to determine the level of threat these most recent incidents pose. Neither side appear intent on provoking a military confrontation, though we cannot rule out the possibility for further provocative steps by either side and remain concerned about the potential for miscalculation and escalation. We have informed both New Delhi and Islamabad about our concerns in this regard in the strongest possible terms.
U.S. Response
As you know, Mr. Chairman, Pakistan's decision to test was not entirely unexpected, and the Administration and, in particular, the President worked diligently to try to persuade the Pakistani Government to capture the political and moral highground. The President said it best. Pakistan missed a "priceless opportunity" to gain the world's support, appreciation, and assistance. I am very grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for all that you did in the 2-week period after India tested, including your introduction of legislation to repeal the Pressler amendment. While we did not succeed in our ultimate objective, I believe we did the right thing, and in the process established a benchmark for how the Executive Branch and Congress can and should cooperate when important national interests are at stake.
The back-to-back tests by India and Pakistan unquestionably represent a setback for the search for peace and stability in the South Asian subcontinent and, indeed, for the cause of global non-proliferation and moving toward a world where fewer states are relying on nuclear weapons for their greatness or for their defense.
But that cause, if anything, is even more important today than it was a few short weeks ago, before the Indian tests. The United States is going to stay at it, and we are working very hard to come up with the most promising and appropriate next steps.
Just as we responded to the Indian tests, the United States has moved swiftly to invoke sanctions and to condemn Pakistan's reciprocal tests. This type of behavior, Mr. Chairman, we find especially troubling as it threatens to spiral out of control. Both India and Pakistan have taken pains to assure us that they do not wish to start a conflict; yet, when each has found itself the object of international outrage, it has acted provocatively in an effort to get the other to respond, thereby shifting blame. We can only hope that the two countries realize where such behavior can lead, and that they cease and desist immediately lest the tit-for-tat cycle lead to military confrontation, with potentially devastating consequences.
In the short term, Mr. Chairman, we are focussing our efforts on ways to prevent further provocative acts, to get both sides to end further tests, and to prevent related escalation such as missile testing and deployment. We are encouraging the immediate resumption of direct dialogue between India and Pakistan, and are working to shore up the international non-proliferation regime. In the end, Mr. Chairman, no effort to restore regional stability or resolve Indo-Pakistani tensions can be effective unless the brunt of the work is borne by India and Pakistan themselves. Now is the time for them to demonstrate to the world that they are responsible nations, capable of talking to one another, and willing to address seriously the issues between them. These are sovereign nations, democracies both, and they must find ways to communicate as they have in the past--particularly in view of the gravity of the current state of affairs. We and the rest of the international community urge them to do so.
Looking Ahead
Now and for the foreseeable future, we will enforce sanctions firmly, correctly, and promptly in full compliance with the Glenn amendment and other legislative authorities. We will continue working to ensure the widest possible multilateral support for the steps we have taken. A vigorous enforcement regime will be necessary for India and Pakistan: to perceive that their actions have seriously eroded their status in the international arena, that this will have a substantial negative impact on their economies, and that they have compromised, rather than enhanced, their security. We will firmly reject any proposal for India or Pakistan to join the NPT as a nuclear weapon state. We do not believe that nations should be rewarded for behavior that flies in the face of internationally accepted norms.
At the same time, we do not wish to make international pariahs out of either India or Pakistan. We believe the purpose of these sanctions should be to influence behavior, not to punish simply for the sake of punishment. They should not be used to cause the economic collapse of either state or prevent the meeting of basic humanitarian needs. Wherever possible, and as the law permits, we should work to reduce adverse effects on the competitiveness or operations of U.S. businesses.
In the longer term, Mr. Chairman, we will seek international support for our goals, including the need to secure active and responsible adherence to international non-proliferation norms and a qualitative improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations. We will be looking for both parties to take such steps as:
In order to do this, we will need to work cooperatively with the international community and will seek to establish a common approach. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we are in the process of organizing a meeting of the foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council tomorrow, which will bring the full force of the P-5 behind the search for effective ways to ensure no more tests or escalation in the region. The meeting will also allow the P-5 to reaffirm its commitment to global non-proliferation through such mechanisms as the NPT, CTBT, and negotiations toward a fissile material cut-off treaty. We will urge signing and ratification of CTBT by India and Pakistan under the terms I just mentioned, and explore ways to de-escalate tensions between India and Pakistan and provide them the means to air their legitimate concerns. We will work to keep the international community engaged, and will follow up with a meeting of the G-8 in London next week.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, we believe that the approach we have laid out is sound and that the P-5 conference will help us achieve, over time, the objectives we have established. We will work very hard to see that these significant steps will be taken, and that they will result in a more stable region and help to repair the damage done to the international non-proliferation regime. That said, Mr. Chairman, I regret that I must conclude on a somber note. Even if we succeed in meeting these difficult challenges, it will be some time before the world looks at India and Pakistan through the same eyes as it did before May 11 when India tested. Then, we were making serious progress in establishing that the United States wanted to enhance its relationship with both countries, on a full range of issues, as together we approached the 21st century. We saw great promise in a region where democracy had a solid foundation; where U.S. trade and commercial interests were firmly established and beginning to flourish; where significant opportunities existed for expanding cooperation on such matters as health, education, and the environment; and finally, where we were working with the two main protagonists on establishing areas of restraint on our key concerns about non-proliferation.
Today that view of the region has been dealt an enormous setback. In the past three weeks, India and Pakistan have conjured up all of the old and regrettable images of two nations hostage to 50 years of bitter enmity, and of the region as a place where only one issue--non-proliferation--matters. I would not want to leave you with the impression that we have foregone our desire to resume productive, cooperative, indeed, warm relations with either India or Pakistan, or that we have lost faith in either government to do the right thing. We have not. But one of the legacies of recent events will be the resurrection in world opinion of the old, narrow view of the subcontinent: India vs. Pakistan, the zero sum game. That legacy will probably endure for a long time. Speaking as one who has worked to change attitudes, perceptions, and old prejudices about the region, I am both saddened and deeply concerned by the recent turn of events.
Recently, one alarmed Indian politician asked a very simple question: "Where does all this lead?" The leaders of India and Pakistan have the immediate responsibility to answer that question--for the people of their countries and for the international community.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[end document]

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