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Stanley O. Roth Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs U.S. Department of State Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs Washington, DC, October 2, 1998

Situation in Cambodia

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to address the subcommittee on the situation in Cambodia. That troubled country is once again at a critical juncture, so I appreciate this opportunity to update the subcommittee on recent developments and consult with you on how best to move forward.

When I last testified on Cambodia before this subcommittee in June, progress had been made in moving Cambodia towards July elections. Opposition leaders were back in-country and operating freely; all political parties had been granted freedom to campaign; election and party laws had been passed; an election commission had been established; the requisite constitutional and magistracy councils had been set up; international observers had been invited to monitor the election process; and voter registration was in full swing. In short, a framework -- albeit an imperfect one -- was in place in Cambodia in which meaningful elections could be held.

The United States, in concert with ASEAN and other partners, had worked hard to bring Cambodia to that point, pressing all parties to take steps to create the conditions for free, fair and credible elections. Despite progress achieved, however, two questions remained unanswered as Cambodia moved into the official campaign period. First, would opposition figures be granted media access for their campaigns? And second, would the climate of fear and intimidation which had prevailed since the bloody factional fighting of June 1997 persist?

Despite the intense efforts of the international community, neither of these issues was ever adequately resolved. While the opposition had substantial access to print media for the purpose of their campaigns, TV and radio were essentially monopolized by the ruling CPP. And while the climate of political intimidation had eased from earlier months, the UN documented dozens of human rights abuses in the run-up to the vote, including beatings, arrests, and worst of all, extrajudicial killings.

As the July 26 election date drew near, these flaws threatened to invalidate the entire process. Many observers essentially wrote off the possibility of a free and fair election, and the international community braced for a worst-case scenario of violence and chaos on election day. Despite the widespread pessimism, however, Cambodians turned out in record numbers to cast their ballots, demonstrating both a deep desire for a voice in their future and their continued faith in the electoral process. Moreover, almost 16,000 domestic and international poll monitors on the ground concurred that barring one deadly attack by Khmer Rouge terrorists on poll officials, Cambodians cast their votes in an environment that was peaceful, orderly, and free from intimidation.

The election results indicate that Cambodians indeed voted freely: some six out of ten voters chose a party other than the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP). It may be useful to note, Mr. Chairman, that had the opposition unified prior to the elections, they, and not Hun Sen's CPP, would have primary responsibility for forming a new government. Still, while in the end Hun Sen's CPP won a plurality of the vote, the fact that almost 60% of votes were cast for the opposition clearly demonstrates that efforts aimed at intimidating the Cambodian electorate failed.

This was the good news of this election. Unfortunately, a conflict-ridden post-election period has threatened to overshadow this achievement. After the July 26 vote, opposition figures raised charges of vote fraud and manipulation of the formula for apportioning parliamentary seats. While the NEC and the constitutional councils adjudicated some of the opposition's initial claims, these bodies summarily dismissed a substantial number of recount requests and refused to address the seat allotment controversy. It is true that initial recounts carried out by the NEC substantiated the original vote and proved many opposition allegations frivolous; still, wholesale rejection of the opposition's claims of irregularities is not a credible position, particularly in light of support for some of those claims by independent NGOs and observers.

In abdicating their responsibility to resolve all post-election disputes, the Cambodian electoral authorities lost a major opportunity to strengthen the credibility of the election process and renew the Cambodian people's faith in their national institutions. Nonetheless, we must recognize that in the judgment of most international observers, proper completion of the recounts would not have significantly altered the outcome or deprived the CPP of its plurality. The limited recounts thus far conducted showed no substantial change in numbers, and a parallel vote conducted by the independent Cambodian NGO (COMFREL) which fielded over 15,000 poll watchers also tallied a clear CPP plurality.

Whither Cambodia?

The obvious question, Mr. Chairman, is where do we go from here? Two things clearly need to happen if this electoral process is to be brought to closure and Cambodia is to get on with the urgent task of national reconstruction: legitimate electoral disputes must be appropriately adjudicated, and the parties must, pursuant to the provisions of the Cambodian constitution, negotiate a coalition government which reflects the will of the people as expressed through their vote. Hun Sen's initial attempts to form a government with the opposition were simply not acceptable, having offered only token appointments to the opposition while retaining all major ministries for the CPP. At the same time, the opposition's efforts to provoke a constitutional crisis by refusing to seat the Parliament by the September 24 deadline were counterproductive, serving only to escalate tensions and threaten instability.

U.S. policy throughout this tumultuous post-election period has been clear and consistent: we have called for a thorough vetting of all legitimate electoral disputes by the bodies charged with such duties; negotiations toward a genuine power sharing arrangement; and restraint on the part of all parties lest Cambodia once again explode in chaos. Ambassador Quinn repeatedly stressed these points to both the government and the opposition in Phnom Penh and made numerous interventions with key government leaders in a largely successful effort to minimize violence and encourage restraint.

Indeed, against a backdrop of escalating protests and increasingly provocative actions from all sides, Ambassador Quinn played a key role in averting even greater bloodshed, providing assistance to political leaders at risk and defusing explosive confrontations between the opposition and the police -- many of which took place right in front of the American Embassy in Phnom Penh.

The international community has also gotten involved. As it became clear that the electoral process was in danger of disintegrating into a violent, undemocratic outcome, various friends of Cambodia abandoned their initial reluctance to intervene and joined the United States in reengaging Cambodia. Japan, the UN and Thailand made multiple interventions with the King and other players -- interventions which ultimately led to the successful meeting of the opposition and the CPP with King Sihanouk on September 22 and the convening of the National Assembly on September 24. These meetings helped to initiate a negotiating process that at least offers the possibility that a coalition government may be formed that reflects the election results.

While the situation appears more hopeful than just a few weeks ago, Mr. Chairman, events are moving quickly and the future remains uncertain. We are thus working on a day-to-day basis to deal with threats -- including those to the personal safety of opposition politicians -- as they arise, while continuing to push our overall objective of a genuine power-sharing arrangement. Can the parties work out such an arrangement? And if they do, will it work?

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, it's too early to tell. The relevant parties sat down together on September 29 and will meet again in the next few days to continue negotiations. Hun Sen, moreover, lifted the travel ban on most politicians, a fact evidenced by the recent arrival in Washington of opposition leader Sam Rainsy. Still, despite these encouraging signs, we simply don't know what lies ahead.

Ultimately, only the Cambodians themselves can determine their own fate and future. Nonetheless, together with our like-minded international partners, we are making every effort to move this process forward. Last week, Secretary Albright used the occasion of the UN General Assembly to organize a meeting of interested parties to discuss the situation in Cambodia. I am pleased to report that this meeting produced an overwhelming consensus to both stay engaged in Cambodia and withhold UN credentials until a credible government is formed. In a separate meeting, the ASEAN foreign ministers affirmed their commitment to this approach, adding that ASEAN membership will be postponed until Cambodia's domestic situation is resolved.

The next few days and weeks will be crucial. When and if a new government acceptable to the Cambodian people is formed, we will want to consult with the subcommittee on our long-term Cambodia policy, particularly as to what more we can do to address Cambodia's pressing humanitarian needs and strengthen its civil society. Let me conclude by saying, Mr. Chairman, that we appreciate the leadership the Congress and the Senate in particular have demonstrated on Cambodia throughout this tumultuous period. The recent letter to Hun Sen by Senators McCain and Kerry, urging Hun Sen to take responsible steps that will move the process of national reconciliation in Cambodia forward, is just one example of the many constructive efforts you and your colleagues have made. We thank you for your engagement and your leadership, and look forward to close and cooperative consultation with the subcommittee as events unfold.

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