The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001.  Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date.  This site is not updated so external links may no longer function.  Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.

James P. Rubin, Assistant Secretary Press Briefing, Chesapeake College Wye Mills, Maryland October 21, 1998

MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to day seven, if I've done my mathematics correctly.

The situation is as follows. We hope and expect, during the course of the day, to be able to provide a text of what we think will help the two sides reach the agreements necessary to put the peace process back on track so that we can advance the security and the situation of both peoples.

That hasn't happened yet; but we expect to be able to share such a text with both sides during the course of the day.

There have been no meetings as of yet. There have been a series of discussions, I think, over the phone with various participants. There are some informal ad-hoc groups talking about the key subjects and how to reach closure on them.

But let me be very clear--despite the intensity of today and the intensity of yesterday, it is not at all clear that the tough choices necessary to reach an agreement can or will be made. That is an open question, and there are significant, significant gaps remaining.

Q: Does it reflect--in other words, has it been altered or updated or amended during this summit to reflect the talks going on with the two sets? It's not the original take--

MR. RUBIN: We're trying to provide something that we think reflects where we are and how we can get to yes. But that requires the tough choices to be made.

I'm not saying the paper wouldn't be discussed; obviously, it would be. But the goal today is to be able to share with both sides a text in order to reach an agreement.

Q: So this is a comprehensive treaty you're producing or--

MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't call it a treaty; it's a text designed to put the current business and the old business of the interim agreement into effect so that we can move on to the permanent status talks. I wouldn't call it a treaty by any stretch of the imagination.

Q: (Inaudible)--proposition--

MR. RUBIN: We have never approached this as a take-it-or-leave-it exercise. We've been at this for a long time. We're trying to meet the concerns, meet the needs of both sides and do so in a way that we think will advance the cause of peace.

Q: Jamie, Israeli sources that we've spoken to say that they feel that this is--there's a sense of crisis. Prime Minister Netanyahu's staff are making preliminary arrangements to ready his plane to return to the region. How would you characterize the way things are right now? And I have a follow-up question.

MR. RUBIN: The intensity is only increasing, clearly. With respect to people leaving, all I can say is that Secretary Albright has now been here for seven days and seven nights. The President has spent an enormous amount of time here. The Vice President has been here; other key players have been here. We are trying to provide all the assistance, the creativity, the persuasive powers that we can so that we can advance the security and the prospect for peace for the peoples of the region. But we can't make decisions for them. They have to make the tough decisions.

We're not holding anybody here against their will. We are here to do the work that we think is important to advance the security of the peoples of the region.

Q: Also, there seems to be a conflict of information that's coming out. The Israelis, Israeli sources are telling us that President Clinton did not deliver a detailed security plan. Palestinian sources are saying a detailed security plan was delivered last night by President Clinton to Mr. Netanyahu. What happened?

MR. RUBIN: That's a good question. Some day we'll be able to answer it in detail. But in the midst of the talks, it wouldn't be wise to get into the substance of such a sensitive matter as security. But clearly, that is a subject where a lot of work is being done.

Q: Can I follow up? Since I know you don't want to get into substance, can we talk about the way you're approaching it? I think I'm correct--but I may not be sure after these days and nights--that there's been only one real three-way. There certainly hasn't been a three-way with the President in a while. But has there been too little of getting the sides together in a room together and too much of talking to them separately with the U.S. in the middle?

MR. RUBIN: The short answer is no. There were two long three-way evenings: the first evening and Monday evening. It was after Monday evening that I think I reported to you that the intensity and the hard bargaining began in earnest.

Yesterday the President met with both leaders, and King Hussein met with both leaders. The Secretary has been meeting on and off with each of the leaders and King Hussein all day long yesterday, has been on the phone with the Prime Minister several times. On a lighter note, at 2:15 a.m. last night, she wished the Prime Minister a happy birthday and began their conversation on that note when they moved to more substantive matters.

So there's a lot of talking; there's a lot of opportunity to discuss the issues. If we thought that an additional three-way meeting was the procedural solution, we would have it. It's not a simple question of things can only be resolved procedurally. This is a combination of shuttling back and forth between them and bringing them together, depending on the circumstances that pertain in any given day or any given time.

Q: Two questions if I can. One is, has either side--I mean, given the fact that nothing's agreed until everything's agreed, is it true that one side or another seems to be making commitments and then slipping back from them later?

MR. RUBIN: I am not here to try to point fingers; I'm here to try to report where we are. That would fall into the finger-pointing category.

Q: Second question, if I may, how do you interpret the Israeli threat to walk out? Is this just another kind of tedious posturing, now that we're in the end-game? Is it designed for domestic consumption or is this something that you're all taking very seriously?

MR. RUBIN: We've been here for seven days and seven nights. The President has spent tens of hours working the issues. We want to do all we reasonably can do to provide constructive solutions to real problems. But we can't hold people here against their will and we can't make them make the tough choices.

This is their security interests that are at stake, for both the Palestinians and the Israelis--their future that is at stake. And they have to make those decisions.

So we're not holding anyone against their will, and we're here to do the work if others want to do it.

Q: The text that you spoke about that's being prepared, does that sort of document, fulfill US expectations for this summit?

MR. RUBIN: If we could reach agreement along the lines of the document that we're hoping and expecting to share with them today, yes.

Q: So--(inaudible)--a success?

MR. RUBIN: Well, success will come in its implementation. The peace process is one that has been marked by 18, 19 months of being off track. If we can get agreement on the ideas and the initiatives and the solutions that we've proposed, we believe the peace process will go back on track; security cooperation will ensue immediately across the board with the relevant steps necessary to constitute 100% effort in the fight against terrorism.

Meanwhile, and in a parallel way, territory will be transferred. That is the essence of the American initiative, and that's what would happen if it were implemented. So an agreement is only one step in this excruciating process.

Q: (Inaudible)--the other interim issues--the airport, the seaport--

MR. RUBIN: Right, I wouldn't draw that conclusion.

Q: (Inaudible)--the text, whatever you want to call it--would that also address the third redeployment? Like, would you say with this text, everything except final status issues would be complete or would be under the umbrella of this text?

MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't assume that every issue that one side or the other has concerns about will be in the text.

What we're trying to do is, through a combination of the text and assurances that may occur bilaterally or otherwise, put behind us the current business of the Oslo accords and the old business of the Oslo accords so that we can move on to the permanent status talks.

I am not going to tell you what is specifically in the memorandum at this time. I'm just trying to tell you what procedurally it is that we are doing.

Q: Jamie, can you tell us the President's whereabouts, when you're expecting him back? Is King Hussein taking part in the meetings also?

MR. RUBIN: I don't believe King Hussein is currently scheduled to be here today. I spoke to Joe Lockhart a few minutes ago, who expects to have an announcement about the President's activities in Washington this afternoon.

The plan is as follows. After some discussions the Secretary has, she will call the President and they will consult about whether it's appropriate and constructive for him to return.

Q: Can you suggest what the criteria are for his return to the talks?

MR. RUBIN: Whether we think we can make a difference in overcoming the obstacles and moving this process forward.

Q: So if it doesn't seem that you can move the process forward, then you would not expect to see him back here?

MR. RUBIN: If he doesn't think that it's worth trying to move the process forward.

Q: The CIA is heavily involved in the talks. I mean, the Director has been here for the last seven days and seven nights. Are the two sides accepting the proposal presented by the CIA--or one side is not accepting it? And the second question, is partial agreement an option if there is still a crisis?

MR. RUBIN: No comment and no.

Q: Does the U.S. Government still consider the letter delivered, I think it was last year, by Chairman Arafat to Secretary Albright sufficient to cover the issue of the PLO covenant?

MR. RUBIN: Without misstating the terms of art that are very important and the specific words that are very important, this is something we've spoken to for some time; and our view hasn't changed. That is that steps were taken under the previous government; steps were taken by Chairman Arafat during the last year that we think went a long way to resolve concerns of Israelis in part about issues related to the Palestinian National Covenant.

To the extent that there are additional concerns on the Israeli part, we've encouraged them and the Palestinians to work together to resolve them.

Q: One more question, if I may. Is there an implied deadline or a time limit in the U.S. side delivering this document?

MR. RUBIN: If it were implied, I certainly wouldn't want to be explicit.

Q: Well, yes or no--is there an implied deadline or time limit?

MR. RUBIN: I know you can ask the questions; I hope you can't also dictate how I answer the question. All I can tell you is what we're doing each day and that we're taking it meeting by meeting and day by day. Beyond that, in terms of deadlines, I haven't commented before; I don't intend to start now.

Q: I trust by the way you introduced the question that you won't, fortunately, have to comment. But you can explain--there's a great debate over this piece of paper already--whether that piece of paper is a joint piece of paper in some way; so that's the premise. Let me ask you, this piece of paper--number one, is it entirely or mostly on security? And number two, is it a joint statement with one or two of the parties or is it an American document reflecting what you've taken in from what you've heard over the last week?

MR. RUBIN: The first question, the essential and necessary element for our initiative has always been security; that is, a comprehensive, systematic approach to fighting terrorism. That is the idea that we had that we put forward that we put into a way that we think will achieve the objectives of the parties.

So security has been perhaps if--has been a crucial component to our approach all along. That means that this document will obviously address that.

With respect to whose document it is, obviously it's our document. But it's a document that is the result of hundreds of hours of phone calls by Secretary Albright; meetings in London, in Paris, Geneva, in the Middle East, in Washington, in New York, all over the world with the two leaders to try to ascertain what is the most practical problem-solving way to deal with the needs of both sides.

Whether they can agree to it--and exactly how they would agree to it if they were to--is a procedural question; and I'd love to have to handle the procedural question of how to codify their agreement. I'm just not prepared to do so as of yet.

Q: What the two sides say publicly is one thing; what they say privately is obviously another. Have the Israelis told the Secretary that they plan to walk out?

MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say this--I've certainly heard the fact that some were asking what preparations would be necessary. But we do not have information at this time that any of the relevant parties are leaving. I mean, there are logistical issues.

Q: Are preparations being made for the parties to leave?

MR. RUBIN: No. I said that we've been asked about that, and certainly we would provide whatever logistical preparations were necessary. But we're prepared to stay to advance the security and political interests of the peoples of the Middle East as long as the others are willing to.

Q: Has the Secretary spoken to Netanyahu and asked him to stay?

MR. RUBIN: No.

Q: Can I just clarify something? Did you mean to say that the whole notion of any kind of partial agreement--even if it brings them into partial status talks is off the table? It was said with a "no," but I just--

MR. RUBIN: Maybe I didn't understand the question. Here's my understanding of the situation--the objective here was to complete enough of the current and old business of the Oslo accords to permit the parties to go to permanent status talks. How much of that will be enough is obviously a judgment call. Certainly, a critical component would be this parallel transfer of land and systematic approach to fighting security. What else is an open question.

Q: But I mean, what you are ruling out is some sort of partial something here that would depend on more talks down the road before you get to final status talks.

MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't want to rule it out for all time; I'm trying to give you a snapshot of--some days I've heard--

Q: But what you're concentrating on is, clearly, the former and you're not--

MR. RUBIN: Right now we're concentrating on completing the steps necessary to complete the old business and the current business to move on to permanent status.

Q: Jamie, have the American mediators concluded that there is no longer a useful mediating role for them to perform--back and forth between the Palestinians and the Israelis?

MR. RUBIN: No.

Q: Could I follow up? Is this a pressure tactic on the part of the Americans--presenting this document?

MR. RUBIN: It's funny you would say that; I mean, considering all the other questions about departures and all.

The objective here is, we think we've reached a moment where the next procedural step is to lay down a text to both parties to try to codify agreements. That is our judgment of what the best way to advance the cause of peace and security is; and that's why we've done it. I wouldn't assign any other motivation to it.

Q: Jamie,--(inaudible)--if this text is acceptable to both parties.

MR. RUBIN: Sorry?

Q: From what I hear you say, it doesn't seem that you know if the text is acceptable to both parties. (Inaudible)--final push to achieve success?

MR. RUBIN: The day has not been completed. What I said was that we hope and expect that during the course of the day that a text will be provided for both parties. So I can't draw conclusions about their reactions to it prior to that occurring. I don't want to speculate on what we would do after that.

Q: Jamie, the fact that you're providing a text, should that be construed as a sign of a deadlock or, conversely, a sign that you just need to write these things down, that they're getting close to agreed upon and it's time to put it out for both the parties--

MR. RUBIN: I think it should be seen as a sign of the criticality of the moment.

Q: There were great expectations at State for King Hussein. Were those expectations manifested?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we didn't set expectations on King Hussein. We don't do the expectation-setting; you guys do that.

Clearly, we thought he could play a constructive role. We do think he played a constructive role. How constructive will be determined by the outcome of these discussions.

Q: Is the presentation of this document--will that be the effective conclusion of the Wye portion of this exercise? I mean, do you expect it to end with that for now?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't know how long that will be--that period of discussion of the text. It's hard to know what would come after a text, though.

Q: The Palestinians say--I don't know if they've seen this text in particular--but they say that they've already agreed to a series of texts or compromises with the American side. And this morning, most of the senior Palestinian delegates are bicycling or riding around in golf carts and saying that it's kind of now up to the Americans to get an agreement from the Israelis. Is that--I mean, there have been--Netanyahu met with Albright or was meeting with Albright.

MR. RUBIN: I would be very pleased to learn that the Palestinians have pre-approved our text prior to receiving it.

Q: Two issues that have been raised today in Israel--tomorrow night an Israeli opposition group is naming the President of the United States as the chairman of their organization. I'm referring to the Peace Now ceremony. The question has been raised as to whether this will affect Clinton's judgment as an honest broker.

MR. RUBIN: No.

Q: The second issue that's been raised concerns the personal and professional commitment made by Clinton to the Weston* family when he came to the grave of--(inaudible)--Weston* and said, "The peace process shall not go on until the killer of--(inaudible)--Weston, Mohammad *, is handed over." He said he was going to turn to Arafat in that issue. I'd like your comment.

MR. RUBIN: I don't know how to begin to comment on that.

Q: Have both sides asked for this document that you're about to give him; or have they said they would welcome it at this stage?

MR. RUBIN: I think they're expecting it.

Q: I have two questions. My first question is, in this last phase in the past couple of days of intensive bargaining, are there any topics that were agreed upon, but in the context of the hard bargaining are now no longer agreed upon?

MR. RUBIN: I haven't found that. But I mean, we've overcome some obstacles, there are significant gaps. I haven't sensed a walking away from agreements. I mean, sometimes there's a dispute on what constitutes an agreement. But where we think agreements have existed, people haven't walked away.

Q: How exasperating is this for the Secretary?

MR. RUBIN: The Secretary is someone who's been through a lot of difficult discussions and negotiations on questions of war and peace before. I think she has spent a lot of time here. She's got a staff that enables her to work on the other issues that are out there. She tries to find time each day to work on those other issues.

But clearly, I think all of us--and the Secretary first and foremost--feel we've been here quite some time and want to be able to continue work if that work can advance the security and prospects for peace--and only then.

Q: Is the question of the further redeployment, the third redeployment still a key obstacle? Are you still waiting for an answer from Mr. Netanyahu on this? And has there been some progress on this Mr. Dennis Ross' supposed work on the text?

MR. RUBIN: The question of the third redeployment is something I've been asked each day, and I've tried to give the same answer each day. So if you could consider me having answered it today the way I did yesterday, I will avoid getting myself in the dog house.

Q: (Inaudible)--you mean?

MR. RUBIN: That's not what I said yesterday.

Q: You said you're not holding anyone against their will, but inevitably will the U.S. be angry at whichever party chooses to leave first?

MR. RUBIN: I don't think our feelings are particularly important at this juncture. What's important is that we're prepared to work, that the Secretary has committed enormous energy and creativity to this effort in the last seven days. The President has brought to bear his unique role and influence. We're prepared to do the work; we're prepared to try to be creative; but it's up to others to respond to that work.

Q: There was a crisis in the talks and then the United States came with an initiative of January. Today it's a critical moment and you're talking about a new document. Is it a new American initiative that is coming on paper today?

MR. RUBIN: No. The initiative has, to my knowledge, never been shared with both parties prior to now in full.

What's happened is that during the course of these ten months, nine months, since it began, that there was an effort to discuss each of the components of it in great detail, at great length. Occasionally, I think both sides were aware of specific language designed to achieve resolution of a particular issue.

So I don't think any of the subject matter or any of the essential components will surprise either side. But whether they can agree to the language is always the important thing.

Let's remember, in every negotiation of this kind of intensity and this kind of importance, the devil is in the details for both sides; and that's why the details have to be laid down in order to resolve the problem.

Q: Will you allow me a follow-up question? There was a lot of time--(inaudible)--from the United States.

MR. RUBIN: I'm sorry, what?

Q: Threats from the United States that the initiative will be on the table and the United States might come out and say, this side said no or this side said no. Do you feel that today is a critical moment that you put the initiative on the table, you are waiting for a yes or a no from both sides?

MR. RUBIN: Ideally we want to get two yeses. We think that's possible or we wouldn't have put this down. But it's by no means certain; on the contrary, there are significant and important gaps.

I don't want to speculate for you on what we will do after the discussions ensue on this text.

Q: I'm not sure of the mechanics once this document is handed over. Does each side then take it over and mark it up and return it to you, or do they go to each other and say--

MR. RUBIN: Both. I mean, the idea is to get both sides to agree to a document. We're putting down what we think is the best way to achieve the result. If they together could resolve some problem, that would be great; and that's easy to--we have a computer and one can type those words right in.

So it will, ideally, be a combination of them meeting with each other on a particular issue or us shuttling back and forth and incorporating the results--ideally, successful ones.

Q: Can you say if you all have been planning all along to, at some point during this conference, present this document; or was there a precipitating event or set of events that led you to?

MR. RUBIN: The assumption all along was that if you are going to reach an agreement, you have to put down a document at some point.

Q: Just a point of clarification--is this an American idea of what an ideal settlement would look like; or is it what you consider the issues the two parties have been talking about, with brackets where they disagree?

MR. RUBIN: I don't think that any document of this kind at this phase can be put down without brackets. But the bulk of it is what we think is the best way to incorporate and codify the understandings that have been previously reached and that we hope can be reached here.

Q: Jamie, I have two questions. The first one is, you had said that there had been some logistic questions asked about departures. Would those have maybe included the departures of some of they key players or some of the players, while leaving others behind?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know.

Q: Okay, and my second question is, you had spoken about getting a lot of things in this text and then possibly moving on to final status talks. I don't remember ever hearing- the Israelis have always claimed that when this is over, they should start final status talks--

MR. RUBIN: It's always been our position as well.

Q: It's always been the U.S. position?

MR. RUBIN: For ten months, yes.

Q: Jamie, you spoke about a text and assurances. Are these assurances for issues in the text to guarantee implementation, or are these assurances for issues that are to be left for further negotiations?

MR. RUBIN: The assurances are what we think are designed to be helpful in resolving the cases. I don't want to be more specific on specific assurances.

Q: Exactly which side inquired how they might go home?

MR. RUBIN: Sorry?

Q: Which side inquired how they might go home?

MR. RUBIN: I think they've spoken for themselves.

Q: When did you inform the two sides--was it this morning or last night? And what was the reaction; how would you characterize their reaction? Did they agree to stay?

MR. RUBIN: Inform the two sides of what?

Q: That you were working on a text.

MR. RUBIN: I think that this will come as no surprise to them. I don't know when the exact call went out to expect it at this time.

Q: At what level were they informed? Do you have any idea?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know whether--

Q: Was it Netanyahu or--

MR. RUBIN: I think that during the course of yesterday it became clear that the next appropriate step was to deal with the text. I suspect it was discussed at all levels.

Q: Jamie, either as part of the text or separate from it, will there be a component of American aid to either or both parties?

MR. RUBIN: As I said several days ago, the question of assistance and implementation is a problem we would love to be able to deal with if we got an agreement on implementation. So I don't expect it to be in this area.

Q: Can you give us some idea as to the size of this document--number of pages, thickness--anything like that?

MR. RUBIN: It's not one page, it's not 100.

Q: Are the obstacles that have been overcome qualitatively more or less significant than the gaps that remain?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know how to answer that, but it was a very well-formulated question.

Q: Two questions--and I'm sorry if you've answered this--if you get an agreement, can you tell us what role the CIA would play in security arrangements?

MR. RUBIN: And the second question?

(Laughter.)

Q: I just asked that question.

Q: The second question would be, it seems like the Americans are willing to act as an overseer in this agreement if it is reached. Would this come down to the Palestinians have said they've agreed with the Americans, a possible disagreement with the Israelis saying we do not trust the Americans to help implement this agreement?

MR. RUBIN: What I can tell you in response to your excellent questions is that we have made two points that I would be prepared to reiterate to you. One is that the security experts who need to be here and to be part of this process have been part of the process and will continue to be.

Number two, we have indicated that we would be prepared to play a role in assisting in implementation.

Q: (Inaudible)--by the CIA, presented in last December--

MR. RUBIN: I think you're veering into a land that is very difficult to discuss in this forum.

Q: Everybody knows that the CIA is involved in the security talks.

MR. RUBIN: So what's your question?

Q: Well, is the text presented--the working paper presented by the CIA--accepted by the two sides? That's my question.

MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't be able to comment on that.

Q: Does the text deal with the time-out issue?

MR. RUBIN: We have tried to put down on paper or through discussions a set of understandings that will allow us to move forward into the permanent status talks.

With respect to the time-out, you know what our position has been--that we want to avoid a situation where unilateral acts or statements undermine the climate that is necessary to achieve progress in the permanent status talks or allow continued implementation of this agreement if it were struck.

Beyond saying that goal, I don't care to comment on the specifics.

Q: As you can well imagine, for those of us who are on the outside trying to ferret out what's actually happening behind closed doors, it's difficult to tell if what we're hearing is a negotiating ploy by the parties to get final concessions or if, in fact, the talks are unraveling. As someone who is either inside or close to people who are on the inside, how would you characterize what has happened within the last 12 hours and what the two principals are telling us?

MR. RUBIN: We are at a critical moment and a moment of intensity and importance. What the result of this will be is up to the leaders. The United States can only do so much to try to create the climate, the solutions, the ideas and the creativity to advance the security and the interests of both peoples.

We can't answer the question of which way this will go. We are working and expecting to work today to try to work on a text. And at some point today, the President and the Secretary will speak to decide what role, if any, the President will play.

Beyond that, as I've told you in recent days, it's very hard to know. This is a rollercoaster.

Q: Since your goal is to get to final status talks, is it your expectation that the United States will have as pivotal and sort of intense a role in final status talks as it has had in these?

MR. RUBIN: I would first put that in the category of problems we'd love to deal with; because that would mean that we've put all this current and old business of Oslo behind us. But speculating for you, hypothetically, on what people are thinking, I think we'd be prepared to play a role.

How extensive, whether it would be in the same level of intensity and specificity as we have for the last 18 months, we would hope not. The goal is to be able to get the parties to work together. But if our good offices, our assistance, our creativity is necessary--the Middle East peace process is something that is extremely important to the President and the Secretary--and therefore, we would help out.

Q: Two questions--we're into words here. The Israelis are telling us it's crisis; the Palestinians are saying they don't know the crisis. What would be an American characterization of where we are right now in a word?

MR. RUBIN: We're at an intensive moment.

Q: Secondly, you said earlier--someone asked you about U.S. pressure on Israel, and you made a comment about someone who said we're getting rumors of people preparing to leave. Are you implying in that answer that the Israelis are putting pressure on you?

MR. RUBIN: I really don't want to characterize these talks in the terms of pressure.

We are here to offer our help. But there's a limit to what we can do if the leaders aren't prepared to make the tough choices. We're prepared to stay here, to do the work necessary to advance the interests of peace, to advance the security of the peoples; but we're not holding anyone here against our will.

Q: I have a question on another subject.

MR. RUBIN: Do you want to finish the Middle East back there?

Q: First, when exactly will this document be presented to the two sides? And is this a take-it-all-or-leave-it-all, or can it be changed? (Inaudible)--Israelis come back and say, we will accept it if we change this, this and this; and the Palestinians would like to change this, this, this?

MR. RUBIN: I don't want to characterize what will happen after this document is presented. When it is presented, I will call you and let you know to whom and by whom it was done.

Q: Is Mrs. Albright worried that the summit is on the verge of collapse today if there is no progress made?

MR. RUBIN: Well, what we're worried about is that the peace process is off track; that the interests of the people are suffering. In the absence of tough choices on the part of their leaders, we can't put the process back on track; that's what we're worried about.

Q: Can you just tell us what meetings are scheduled for the rest of today as of now? The Palestinians have talked of an important meeting at 4:00 p.m. Can you just tell us who's going to take part in this meeting?

MR. RUBIN: I know that several of the committees met last night on several of the interim issues. I do not have a schedule for today at this time. I think there is a lot of phone conversations going on and there's a lot of informal contact. But I do expect, during the course of the day, the text to be discussed by the parties. I don't have an additional schedule. As soon as I have on, I'd be happy to provide that.

Q: Being discussed that you mentioned--would that be Albright with each leader or--

MR. RUBIN: I'll have to get you a detail of the calls that have been made; but certainly there have been a lot of discussions.

Q: So, Jamie, are you saying this is going to go into tomorrow?

MR. RUBIN: Don't know; one day at a time.

Q: You're not releasing the text until later this afternoon. And given the way these things normally go, there are brackets, they get changed, they're haggling, yadda, yadda.

MR. RUBIN: Maybe they'll just accept it.

(Laughter.)

Q: Jamie, when you refer to just getting enough of an agreement to move to permanent status issues, you are saying there's a possibility that any agreement might not reflect a complete decision on such issues, say, as the seaport, the third redeployment, safe passage roads--that not everything has to be fully wrapped up and fully specified.

MR. RUBIN: Well, we want to do enough old business and enough current business so that we can move directly to the permanent status talks. How much is enough will be determined during the course of the discussions.

But let me make sure that I haven't left you with the wrong impression by informing you of a procedural development. We do not have any way of knowing whether the significant and important gaps that exist can be overcome with or without a text. So anyone who thinks that this presentation of a text is a signal that we're about to reach an agreement I think doesn't understand the history of this process.

It's a procedural precondition, but it is by no means a sufficient condition.

Q: (Inaudible)--logistics and if those people--

MR. RUBIN: Maybe we can do that afterwards. One more.

Q: If the parties should reject this--one or the other--will you publish the text?

MR. RUBIN: I don't want to speculate on what will happen after today.

Q: What is the status of the nomination of the Ambassador to Luxembourg? Has there been any change?

MR. RUBIN: I know that some action was taken in the Senate. I know that we are a very strong proponent of him being confirmed. What options the President has in the aftermath of this action by the Senate I can't offer you. But I know the President and the Secretary felt strongly that this was someone who deserved an up or down vote.

Q: On the Pinochet, can you give us any better guidance as to the U.S. view of the Spanish prosecutor's attempt to get him extradited?

MR. RUBIN: This is a legal matter between the governments of the United Kingdom, Spain and Chile. The United States is not involved. The Spanish court's actions concerning General Pinochet are a matter for the UK, Spain and Chile to resolve. We have taken no position on this issue, and have not been approached by any of the governments involved to do so.

Q: (Inaudible)--then that you have not given an informal view to the Spanish Government of how you would like to see this resolved?

MR. RUBIN: I've said we've taken no position. I'll have to check whether somebody has made a comment here or there.

Q: No, there's British press reporting--I think the BBC--regarding they're saying that the U.S. Government is encouraging Spain to drop the issue.

MR. RUBIN: We are not involved, and this is a legal matter between the three governments.

Q: (Inaudible.)

MR. RUBIN: If the question is, have we made overtures to the British Government not to extradite Pinochet, the answer to that question is no.

Q: (Inaudible.)

MR. RUBIN: I'm giving you the information that's been provided to me.

Q: Do you have any reaction to the new government in Italy--the former communists coming to power as Prime Minister?

MR. RUBIN: Italy is a thriving democracy and the Italian people are the final arbiters of who should govern them. The new center left government in Italy will be led by ** Dalema*. We look forward to working closely and cooperatively with the new Prime Minister and his government on the full range of issues.

Q: The Taliban's representative to the United Nations--I don't know if he is at the State Department yet, but he is expected to arrive at the State Department today. Can you tell us about those talks--who he'll be meeting with and what they plan to discuss?

MR. RUBIN: Our Assistant Secretary, Rick Inderfurth, will meet here this afternoon with the Taliban's New York-based representative--here being Washington. They've met before, most recently in September.

The Taliban requested this meeting. Assistant Secretary Inderfurth and others routinely meet with representatives of all major Afghan groups.

We don't know what is on his agenda; our agenda is well-known, and includes concerns over the Taliban's disregard for international human rights norms and practices, the harboring of terrorists--including Osama bin Laden, and the refusal to implement a cease-fire and engage in discussions toward a political settlement in Afghanistan.

Q: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:20 P.M.)

[end document]