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Rand Beers Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Statement before the Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources Subcommittee House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Washington, DC, August 6, 1999

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the situation in Colombia and our joint counternarcotics efforts there. Colombia stands at a critical crossroads now and there are considerable dangers for U.S. interests, but also significant opportunities. The policy choices we make in the next several months, and the assistance we provide, could have a significant impact on Colombia's future, helping to determine whether it continues its long, slow descent toward chaos or begins to recover.

The Current Situation

It is difficult to describe the current situation in Colombia without sounding alarmist. Colombia's national sovereignty is increasingly threatened by a resurgent guerrilla movement, a violent illegal paramilitary movement, and wealthy narcotrafficker interests. Although the central government in Bogota is not directly threatened at this time, control over large swaths of the countryside is limited to non-existent. It is in these very areas where the guerrilla groups, paramilitaries, and narcotics traffickers flourish.

The links between narcotics trafficking and the guerrilla and paramilitary movements are well documented. We estimate that two-thirds of the FARC fronts and one-half of the ELN fronts are involved in narcotics trafficking to one degree or another. By involvement, we mean not just that the guerrilla groups collect "taxes" as they do with all legitimate businesses in areas they control, but that they actively participate in other ways. We have reporting to indicate that guerrilla groups protect narcotrafficker fields and labs, transport drugs and precursor chemicals within Colombia, run labs, encourage or intimidate peasants to grow coca, accept drugs as payment from narcotics traffickers and resell those drugs for profit, trade drugs for weapons, and have even begun to ship drugs out of the country -- to Brazil and Venezuela. Estimates of guerrilla profits from narcotics trafficking and other illicit activities such as kidnapping and extortion are undependable, but may exceed $100 million a year, and could be far greater. Paramilitary groups also have clear ties to important narcotics traffickers and obtain much of their funding from traffickers. Carlos Castano, the paramilitary leader, has been previously identified as a significant narcotics trafficker in his own right. Profits from illegal activities, combined with a weakening economy and high unemployment, have enabled the FARC in particular to grow rapidly in strength.

Colombia's security forces, despite valiant efforts, have not fared well in confrontations with the guerrillas. Over the last few years, guerrilla forces have racked up a string of significant successes: Las Delicias, El Billar, Miraflores, and Mitu. Only during the recent summer FARC offensive have the Colombian military and police been able to inflict significant defeats on the guerrillas. While these recent engagements give reason for optimism and are a sign of increasing commitment and aggressiveness by the Colombian armed forces, they should not be permitted to obscure the fact that the Colombian military still needs to address severe deficiencies in training, doctrine, organization, and equipment to be able to deal effectively with the guerrilla and paramilitary threat.

The strength of Colombia's armed insurgent groups has, in turn, limited the effectiveness of joint U.S./Colombian counternarcotics efforts. While aggressive eradication has largely controlled the coca crop in the Guaviare region and is beginning to make inroads in Caqueta, any gains made there have been more than offset by explosive growth in the coca crop in Putumayo, an area which has been off-limits for spray operations because the Colombian National Police has been unable to establish a secure base there due to heavy guerrilla presence. Interdiction operations are similarly limited, and we are unable to carry out any meaningful alternative development programs in most of the coca-growing region because the Colombian Government lacks the ability to conduct the monitoring and enforcement necessary for the success of such programs. In order for our counternarcotics programs to be successful, it is untenable for certain areas of the country like Putumayo to be off-limits for counternarcotics operations.

Fortunately, however, there are reasons for optimism. In the Pastrana Administration, the U.S. finally has a full and trustworthy partner that shares our counternarcotics goals in Colombia and is committed to full cooperation on the full range of counternarcotics efforts. After the extreme difficulty of working with the narco-tainted Samper regime, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of this. The Colombian National Police, under the direction of General Serrano, has continued its superb record of counternarcotics activity, reinforcing its image as one of the premier counternarcotics forces in the world. Now, for the first time, the CNP's commitment to counternarcotics is being matched by the Colombian armed forces. Under new leadership, the Colombian military is undergoing a transformation which, if sustained, bodes well for Colombia. The Colombian military, under the civilian leadership of Defense Minister Ramirez and Armed Forces Commander Tapias, is taking dramatic steps to deal with the legacy of human rights abuses and impunity that has clouded relations in the past. Specifically, we refer to the forced retirements of Generals Millan and del Rio because of ties to illegal paramilitary organizations and the arrests of Gen. Uscategui and Lt. Col. Sanchez Oviedo for alleged involvement in the 1997 Mapiripan massacre conducted by paramilitaries. Our human rights report has also documented a steadily declining number of reported human rights violations by the Colombian military. Clearly much work remains to be done to address the problem of human rights in the Colombian military, but we now believe that the will exists to do so.

Concurrent with this effort to clean up the military is a renewed Colombian military commitment to counternarcotics. The new leadership realizes that one of the best ways to attack the guerrillas is to attack their financing, in the form of narcotics profits. The Colombian Army has greatly expanded cooperation with and support for the Colombian National Police, and is forming a brand new counternarcotics battalion, specifically designed for the counternarcotics mission and to work directly with the CNP. The Colombian Air Force has undertaken an aggressive program to regain control of their airspace and deny its use to traffickers. They have registered some significant successes and demonstrated considerable competence and will, but are still limited by outdated equipment, limited operating funds, and inadequate training. The Colombian Navy is working closely with U.S. forces on maritime interdiction and has participated in many significant seizures, despite limits on equipment and operating funds. Overall, cooperation with Colombian military on counternarcotics operations has never been better.

Peace Process

One of the top priorities of the Pastrana Government is the peace process it has begun with the FARC. The USG supports Pastrana's efforts to negotiate an end to Colombia's long-running internal conflict. We believe that the cessation of hostilities and the severance of insurgent-trafficker links would be of great benefit to U.S. interests in Colombia. It would stabilize the nation, remove some of the narcotics traffickers' protection, permit the government to restore its authority in the coca-growing region, help Colombia's economy to recover, and allow for further improvement in respect for human rights.

We have made it very clear to the Pastrana Government, however, that we cannot accept "peace at any price." We have consistently asked the Colombian Government to press the guerrillas to cease their practice of kidnapping, provide an accounting of the fate of the missing New Tribes missionaries who were kidnapped by the FARC in 1993, and turn over to legitimate authorities those responsible for the murder earlier this year of three U.S. citizen indigenous rights activists. We have made clear to all parties that the peace process must not impede counternarcotics cooperation and that any agreement must permit continued expansion of all aspects of this cooperation, including aerial eradication. The Pastrana Government understands our priorities and fully agrees with them.

The peace process is currently stalled, primarily because of FARC intransigence. During the course of the negotiations to date, the Pastrana regime has offered several unilateral concessions, the most important of which was the establishment of a large "despeje" or demilitarized zone for the FARC, as gestures of good faith and to induce the FARC to negotiate. The FARC has failed to reciprocate. Now, in the face of this intransigence and in reaction to reliable reports of human rights abuses committed by the FARC within the despeje, as well as evidence that some of the attacks in the recent FARC offensive were launched from within the despeje, the Pastrana Administration has hardened its negotiating position. The Government of Colombia is insisting on immediate establishment of an international verification commission to monitor the despeje, ensuring that the rights of those citizens within it are protected and ensuring that it is not used as either a haven for narcotics traffickers or a base for offensive operations. The FARC is resisting such a commission, despite having agreed to it in principle previously. We strongly support the Pastrana Government's stand on this issue. If the FARC is unwilling to allow its actions in the despeje to be monitored by an independent commission, its commitment to a meaningful peace process must be questioned. It is time for the FARC to demonstrate its seriousness by taking at least this small step toward peace.

One of the key limitations confronting the Pastrana Administration during the negotiations is that the guerrillas currently are feeling little pressure to negotiate. They do not perceive the Colombian armed forces as a threat, and the profits generated by involvement in narcotics trafficking and other illegal activities will allow them to continue building their strength through recruiting and arms purchases for the conceivable future. Essentially, the guerrillas have little incentive to negotiate other than a desire to "go legitimate." Although we do not believe it is feasible for Colombia to end the insurgency militarily, we do believe Colombia's armed forces must improve their performance and become a more serious threat to the FARC, before the FARC can be expected to make the real concessions which are necessary to breathe life into the peace process.

The road to peace is often a rocky one and there could be many advances and setbacks before the process ends, whether it is successful or not. Throughout the process, however, we will continue to emphasize vital U.S. interests, including the protection of our citizens and continued counternarcotics cooperation.

Joint Counternarcotics Programs

The USG in general, and INL in particular, is involved with the Government of Colombia on a wide range of programs in support of our Colombia counternarcotics strategy, which is, in turn, an integral part of the President's Source Zone Strategy, as described in Presidential Decision Directive 14. Our strategy for Colombia calls for an integrated program of support for interdiction and eradication efforts, justice sector reform, alternative development, and institutional strengthening. Colombia is the largest single recipient of U.S. counternarcotics assistance, almost $200 million in FY 1999 alone, much of it from the emergency supplemental passed by Congress last year, which many of the members of this committee played vital roles in crafting and supporting.

In 1998, the joint CNP/INL eradication campaign sprayed record amounts of coca -- over 65,000 hectares. In the Guaviare region, where most of the spray effort has been concentrated and which used to be the center of the Colombian cocaine industry, the crop has decreased more than 30% in the last 2 years, and very little new cultivation is reported. Similar inroads are being made in the Caqueta region now. Unfortunately, this success has been undermined by the inability of spray aircraft to penetrate the Putumayo region, where the crop has increased an astounding 330% over the last 2 years. The center of gravity of the coca industry in Colombia has clearly shifted.

On the opium poppy front, spray activity has prevented the expansion of the opium poppy crop, which has remained essentially stable for several years. During this time, however, Colombian-origin heroin dramatically increased its market share in the United States and now increasingly dominates that market, particularly in the eastern U.S. For that reason, we kicked off an intensive opium poppy eradication campaign with the CNP in December 1998. To date, the CNP has sprayed over 7,000 hectares of opium poppy, a record total. They have essentially sprayed the entire poppy crop in the Huila growing area and have now shifted operations to Cauca. Unfortunately, spray operations have slowed since the tragic death of a Colombian spray pilot in an accident high in the mountains during spray operations and an unrelated accident, also resulting in loss of life, involving a helicopter which struck a cable while in hot pursuit of suspected traffickers in northern Colombia.

We continue to provide support for the interdiction operations of the Colombian National Police, which have progressed at a high rate throughout this year. We are also working closely with the Colombian Air Force to improve the effectiveness of its aerial interdiction program, providing funds for the upgrade of A-37 interceptor aircraft, and working with the interagency community to provide better detection and monitoring support not just in Colombia but throughout the source zone.

We also support an administration of justice program in Colombia, working with AID, OPDAT, and ICITAP to provide technical assistance and training to the beleaguered Colombian justice system, which continues to be a weak link in the Colombian counternarcotics effort, is incapable of ensuring justice will be done, and has lost the public's confidence. We are pressing actively for continued reforms, including development of an effective criminal investigation and prosecution capability, improved asset forfeiture procedures, tighter money-laundering enforcement, stiffer penalties for narcotics trafficking offenses, and better prison security to keep drug lords from escaping or continuing to operate their illicit enterprises from prison.

We have just begun to provide support for a nascent alternative development program in Colombia, $5 million in FY 1999. We are, however, limiting our program to areas in which the government can exercise reasonable control. Experience has taught us that without government control, alternative development cannot succeed because compliance cannot be monitored and enforced. As a practical matter, this has limited our assistance to programs in the opium poppy region, where the government has a better presence and the necessary infrastructure already exists. The program is being integrated with aggressive opium poppy eradication. Combined, the programs aim to eliminate the majority of Colombia's opium poppy crop within 3 years.

We are also working directly with the Colombian military in two important areas. First, we are working closely with SOUTHCOM and DoD to provide training and equipment for the Colombian army's new counternarcotics battalion. This battalion is a 950-man unit, comprised entirely of personnel who have been vetted by both the embassy and the Department to ensure that none of them have been involved in any human rights violations. The USG is providing training and some equipment to the unit. The first company and several of the support elements of the battalion have already completed most of their training, and training of the remaining two companies has just begun. The Colombian Government believes the full battalion will be operational by January 2000. The mission of this unit is to conduct counternarcotics missions and support the CNP. For example, the battalion will be used to secure areas in which the CNP is about to operate, clearing insurgents and other armed actors from the area so the operations -- be it interdiction or eradication -- can proceed with greater confidence of security. The CNP has agreed to assign a regular liaison team to work with the battalion and ensure close coordination.

We are also working to improve the Colombian security forces' ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence on counternarcotics activity and on insurgent activity which could threaten counternarcotics forces to those units which need the information. A key element in this is helping the CNP and the military to share the information they do have, so that all relevant forces have access to the best available information on activity in their area. This is a force protection issue for us as well, and we are taking steps to ensure that we get all information necessary to ensure the safety of U.S. personnel in the region, including State Department contractors helping with the eradication effort and DoD personnel conducting training.

Where We Go from Here

While we will continue to support the Colombian peace process and carry out ongoing counternarcotics programs, we believe it is imperative that we support Colombia's counternarcotics strategy as it moves in new directions to stay on top of a very dynamic narcotics trade. Director McCaffrey and I traveled to Colombia just a week and a half ago to discuss with the Colombian Government how best we can support their efforts and we have come back with some clear ideas as to what kind of support is needed. We are currently involved in discussions within the Administration over how we can use existing authorities and funds to support counternarcotics operations. Undersecretary Pickering and I will be traveling to Colombia next week to assess these requirements and re-emphasize our support for both Colombia's counternarcotics efforts and the peace process.

Of primary importance to us is starting counternarcotics operations in Putumayo. As long as this region remains a sanctuary for traffickers, progress we make elsewhere will be undermined. In order to operate effectively in this area, which is heavily dominated by the FARC, the CNP will need the support of the Colombian military. The CNP cannot operate there alone. Therefore, we must begin working with the Colombian military to bring their capabilities up to a level where they can successfully operate alongside the CNP and contribute to the counternarcotics effort. We are currently examining the needs of the Colombian military forces involved in counternarcotics and searching for ways to steer the appropriate resources toward them. Given the extensive links between Colombia's guerrilla groups and the narcotics trade, counternarcotics forces will come into contact with the guerillas, and must be provided with the means to defend themselves and carry out their mission. Beyond force protection, however, we have no intention of becoming involved in Colombia's counterinsurgency.

We also believe an active aerial interdiction program is absolutely necessary. In Peru, we have seen the dramatic effect such a program can have on the economics of the drug trade, and we would like to recreate that effect in Colombia. The Colombian Air Force is willing, but requires considerable assistance to carry out the mission.

We will continue our strong support of the Colombian National Police, who maintain primary responsibility for counternarcotics operations in Colombia and who still have some outstanding equipment needs, as well as an ongoing need for operational support.

We need to continue working to guide the Colombians in the reform of their justice system and provide alternative crops or employment for coca farmers so that they do not continue to replant after their crops are eradicated.

I appreciate the support that members of this committee and the Congress as a whole have shown for Colombian counternarcotics efforts and our partnership role. I hope that continued bipartisan support will enable us to turn the tide in this important endeavor and begin to substantially reduce the amount of illegal drugs on the streets of the United States.

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