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John D. Holum, Senior Adviser for Arms Control and International Security "Meeting New Threats in a Changing World: The Role of NMD" Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, June 14, 2000

Introduction Last year, in February, I spoke to the Council's Energy Security Group about growing proliferation dangers. The comments I made then serve as a good preamble for what I want to talk about today. If you want a good definition of "long winded," I guess taking almost a year and a half to complete a speech is a pretty good one. But I do think it's worthwhile to elaborate a bit on some of the themes I introduced at that time -- in particular, on the limits of diplomacy. Meeting new threats in a changing world may require us to expand our thinking about what tools, including limited national missile defenses, can help ensure our security. A Changing World Twelve years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it's almost trite to observe that, "the world has changed." But it's still worth dwelling a bit on some of the specific changes. Many of us were hopeful that the fall of the Berlin Wall would usher in a new era of stability -- even a "new world order." That vision never materialized. Instead, we're confronting new and largely unanticipated challenges, coming from many different sources. The causes are many and the effects profound. The breakup of the Soviet Union and breakdown of economies in the new independent states has led, among other things, to a loosening of controls over destructive technologies. We no longer lose sleep worrying about a massive nuclear exchange with the Soviets; we probably should lose sleep over the potential dangers that comes from this "residue" of the Cold War -- the prospect that WMD and missile technology, materials and expertise may fall into the wrong hands. Elsewhere, capabilities are catching up to intentions. States that may have contemplated developing or acquiring nuclear devices or other weapons of mass destruction are now finding ways to do it. Trends of the past few years demonstrate the immediacy of this problem. Nuclear explosions in South Asia, less than two years after arduous negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty concluded; both Iraq and North Korea caught violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Iran trying to; projections of missile capabilities, for example in North Korea, becoming more immediate. In short, despite the best efforts of the international community, the proliferation of advanced weapons and technologies is continuing. This trend destabilizes regions of critical importance, such as South Asia, the Middle East, and the Korean Peninsula; gives leverage to those seeking to undercut our interests in those regions; and increases the number of potential adversaries with profoundly dangerous military capabilities. A Strategy of Prevention Given the amount of public attention focused on the various pieces of our approach, it may surprise you to learn that our first response to this is not national missile defense. The United States leads the world, first, on combating proliferation, to prevent threats from emerging or worsening. We will continue to place a priority on regime building. Negotiating, preserving, strengthening and effectively implementing multilateral "demand side" regimes like the NPT, the CWC, the BWC, the Comprehensive Test Ban and the Fissile Material Cut-off is important in part because most countries live up to their international obligations. And for those that don't, the treaties help on the "supply side," when they create legal obligations not to assist others in acquiring proscribed weapons. That's why we worked so hard for a successful 2000 review of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which concluded in New York just a few weeks ago. Despite the difficult environment -- the CTBT voted down, the START process stalled, ABM issues intruding -- in the end the international community was able to reach consensus on the Treaty's importance and on objectives for the future. These regimes establish international norms of behavior and expectations, provide monitoring or short-notice inspection rights, give the international community a means of responding when some states don't measure up, and help dry up sources of supply. They are indispensable. They are supplemented by the supplier arrangements -- the Australia Group for chemical and biological weapons, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee, and for missiles, where there is no "demand side" treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime. We've worked to strengthen and broaden each of those, including, for example, encouraging China to qualify for the MTCR. We're constantly fine-tuning and improving our own export controls, and helping nearly 30 countries develop or improve their national systems. For example, U.S.-provided radiation detection equipment recently helped Uzbekistan detect and return to Kazakhstan radioactive cargo on a truck bound for Iran. We seek better detection and implementation resources, from international resources as well as our own. New technological applications, including remote, unattended sensors for monitoring; highly sophisticated data fusion and analysis techniques; and more rugged, portable and user-friendly verification equipment are creating new opportunities. Our job is to harness these and other technologies to serve our non-proliferation objectives. We use sanctions, preferably multilateral, such as those against Iraq, but also unilateral, in some cases. And we use positive inducements -- the flip side of sanctions. The 1985 Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with China was activated in the context of China's efforts to phase out peaceful nuclear contacts with Iran and stop assisting unsafeguarded nuclear programs anywhere. We use novel or opportunistic approaches. The Summit agreement to dispose of U.S. and Russian weapon-grade plutonium is a good example -- serving the same ultimate ends as the U.S. purchase of blended down highly enriched uranium from Russian warheads and bombs, to burn as nuclear reactor fuel. We use hardheaded, retail diplomacy, for example, experts sifting intelligence and generating demarches aimed at interrupting specific transfers of dangerous goods to the wrong places. We pursue country and region specific strategies, combining all these tools in the appropriate mix for given situations -- the Agreed Framework and the Perry process in North Korea, UN sanctons on Iraq, relentless work with Russia and China to curtail technology transfers to Iran, the South Asia Task Force and various incentivies and disincentives for India and Pakistan. An Emerging Role for NMD These various steps illustrate that the first element of our strategy is diplomacy, to prevent or limit emerging threats. And prevention has, to a considerable extent, succeeded. North Korea's missile capabilities are largely confined to old Scud technology. But prevention has not succeeded entirely. The August 1998 Taepo Dong launch from North Korea demonstrated a three stage capability, and the Taepo Dong II, if tested successfully, could throw a payload of up to 300 kilograms to US territory. Iran is also moving closer to an ICBM capability. How do we resond to that? Obviously we rely on deterrence -- to keep threats from being carried out, once they do appear. We maintain credible and robust military forces to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction by anyone, by making sure they know that an attack on us would bring a catastrophic response. And in this context, it's frustrating to hear us called "defenseless" against missile attack, as if being able to promise a society-destroying blow to any aggressor is somehow being bereft of defenses. But as you know, we're also contemplating adding a "third d" -- active national missile defenses -- to our strategy, as another practical means, once WMD and ballistic missiles are acquired, to help preserve our ability to protect our interests. But, you may well ask, if we could deter the Soviet Union, with thousands and thousands of weapons pointed at us, without defenses, why can't we deter the North Koreas, which may have a few weapons at most? It's a fair question. The problem is, we do not fully know the implications of asymmetrical nuclear relationships with states that have behaved irrationally in the past. One would think that such a state would have to be crazy to put its one or two weapons up against our thousands. On the other hand, to some those weapons may be seen as a source of leverage in ways difficult for us to imagine. Without defenses, we may find it harder to act, if faced with emerging threats against our allies or perhaps even against our own forward-deployed forces. Perhaps most important, we need to take seriously the risk of miscalculation. We want to avoid a scenario in which a state with a few WMD is convinced -- erroneously -- that the U.S. would be deterred from protecting our national security interests. The DPRK, for example, might believe that a credible threat to use nuclear weapons against us would deter us from assisting South Korea against armed aggression. We want to persuade the North Koreas of the world that there is no currency in going down that path. The core function of NMD is to help protect the U.S. homeland. But defenses also provide "value added" to our efforts to deter and prevent threats from occurring. NMD might, for example, help persuade North Korea (or any potential adversary) that the cost of using force outweighs any perceived benefits. You can reinforce deterrence both both by raising the costs and by reducing the benefits -- by showing, as someone has said, that an attack would be fatal and futile. Though I have my doubts, NMD might even persuade the proliferator that acquisition itself is a loser's game. It might help us persuade an impoverished North Korea not to pursue the ICBM option if it is convinced that the first twenty or thirty missiles would provide no leverage. Strategy for NMD As you know, later this year the President is expected to decide whether to go forward with a limited NMD, designed to address the near term projected ICBM capability of North Korea. The architecture under development -- providing "hit-to-kill" interception outside the atmosphere -- is the only technology that can be deployed as soon as 2005. The President's decision has not been made. It will be based on four criteria -- anticipated cost, state of technological effectiveness, threat projections, and the impact on the strategic environment, including arms control. Does this signal that we are getting ready to abandon the 1972 ABM Treaty? The answer is, "no." Our commitment to the Treaty was made clear just ten days ago at the Moscow summit. As reflected in the June 4 Joint Statement, we and Russia reaffirmed our commitment to continuing efforts to strengthen the ABM Treaty and to enhance its viability and effectiveness in the future, taking into account any changes in the international security environment. I hope you'll all take some time to look over that joint statement, which I've had distributed. Its sixteen short paragraphs have a great deal of content. As Deputy Secretary Talbott pointed out, that document provides guidelines for the future of our strategic relationship with Russia in general, and in particular for our further work on the ABM Treaty and START III. The joint statement makes clear our mutual commitment to a strengthened ABM Treaty. It also leaves no doubt that we and Russia agree that the world has changed, and that we've got to do something about it. At the same time it is also abundantly clear that Russia does not agree with our proposed "something." So among our arms control objectives is to negotiate whatever ABM Treaty amendments are required if we decide to proceed with a limited defense. We remain committed to the ABM Treaty not out of nostalgia, but because it contributes to stability and enables continued deep reductions in the one nuclear arsenal in the world, in Russia, that today could rain down overwhelming devastation on the United States. The system we are considering, which would not undermine Russia's strategic deterrent, can be accommodated within the Treaty, just as we did in drawing a more precise line between national and theater defenses. Indeed, under these conditions, I would argue that amending the ABM Treaty as needed is a way to preserve it. It would demonstrate, again, that arms control is not the enemy of measured defenses to respond to real threats. So we are putting to the test a premise that I have long advanced -- that arms control is a national security tool, complementary to defense. Of course it has altruistic elements and budgetary motivations. But its main task is to make us more secure. We have the task now of advancing, all at once, our nonproliferation agenda, through the strategy I outlined; our arms control agenda, by pursing START and related initiatives; and our defense agenda, by considering further modernization of the ABM Treaty. Reconciling these objectives is a tall order. It is theoretically feasible. Whether it is politically attainable remains to be seen -- but we are certainly trying. Success will be in our interest, in Russia's, and in the interest of the entire international community. [end of document] Bureau of Arms Control | Department of State