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Ambassador Michael Sheehan
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, DC, June 15, 2000
As prepared for delivery
Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before your committee to discuss the National Commission on Terrorism Report, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism. This is an important report and addresses very serious issues. We welcome the report, produced by a very distinguished commission, as a thoughtful contribution to our ongoing mission, which is to seek more effective means of countering international terrorism and protecting our citizens and interests around the world. I believe our exchange of views with you today will also contribute to this mission.
Let me say at the outset that I completely support the core objective of the Commission Report: to improve the tools we have to combat terrorism, and to ensure that we use these tools as effectively as possible. As Coordinator for Counterterrorism, I have felt acutely responsible for strengthening our capabilities by making our tools more dynamic and effective. In this effort, I find myself in strong sympathy with the thrust of many of the Commission's recommendations. I would also like to take this chance to thank the Commission for the professional nature of their review, and specifically Ambassador Bremer, with whom I was in close contact as the Commission developed their conclusions.
Indeed, we are moving forward already in some of the areas discussed in the Commission report. Let me address some of the key issues and recommendations that relate directly to the work we are doing at State.
Foreign Terrorist Organizations: The Commission observes that it is necessary to sustain credibility and dynamism in the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) process, and I am committed to doing just that--not only with regard to FTOs, but with all of our counterterrorism policy tools. Congress has given us a very effective tool in the Secretary's authority to designate FTOs. Designations under the 1996 law criminalize financial support to a FTO, require U.S. financial institutions to block funds of FTOs and their agents, and render representatives and certain members of the FTO ineligible for visas and admission to the United States. State leads this work in consultation with the Departments of Justice and Treasury and with the intelligence community. In 1997, we designated 30 organizations as FTOs, allowing us to deter terrorist fundraising more effectively. As important, the FTO list has proved invaluable as a diplomatic tool to stigmatize and punish terrorist groups and their supporters around the world. [See 1997 FTO List]
In 1999, we re-designated 27 FTOs (designations expire after 2 years unless renewed), dropped three groups, and added Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qaida organization. Dropping three FTOs (the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Khmer Rouge, and the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front of Chile) from the list sent an important signal that if you are out of the terrorism business by the standards of U.S. law, you will be dropped from the list. [See 1999 FTO List]
Because of the significance of FTO designations and because they can be challenged in court, the designation process is painstaking and we are very careful about assembling the evidence that goes into making the case. A single designation consumes hundreds of hours of work carried out by my staff as well as by lawyers and analysts from Justice, Treasury, and the intelligence community. Because of the quality of this effort, we have won all court challenges (for example from the MEK and LTTE) to our designations, thereby further bolstering the credibility of the FTO process.
But sustaining credibility and dynamism in the FTO process is an ongoing challenge, constrained mainly by limited personnel resources. We constantly review and assess various potential groups for addition to the list of FTOs--this can be done at anytime, not just every 2 years. I have directed my staff to review some 10 to 12 new groups before the year is out. We have already added a new officer for 1 year to work on this and would like to bolster our capabilities by adding another fulltime lawyer. But undoubtedly there are some groups that will not be reviewed as soon as I would like. I am not satisfied with the pace of the FTO review process, and will continue to keep pushing my staff and the interagency team that processes these designations.
State Sponsors/"Terrorism List": I made a special effort in my introduction to this year's Patterns of Global Terrorism report to highlight the importance of injecting dynamism into another of our policy tools: the process of designating state sponsors. The Commission's fundamental observations on sharpening diplomatic tools such as the "Terrorism List" are on the mark, and this is part of my strategy. We need to take into account all relevant considerations in connection with moving states onto or off of the list, and we also need to explore whether it would be appropriate in any cases to identify states as "not fully cooperating" rather than as state sponsors of terrorism if doing so was warranted by the facts and would advance U.S. counterterrorism objectives.
On March 30, the Secretary decided to keep the seven state sponsors on the list, including, of course, Iran and Syria. But we pointedly noted in Patterns that designation of states is not permanent. A primary goal of our counterterrorism policy is to get states out of the terrorism business and move them off that list. We do this by engaging them on what they need to do to end support for terrorism and pressing them to take those steps. Our talks with North Korea and Sudan are a case in point. We are, at the same time, committed to maintaining sanctions on Iran and Syria--and all other state sponsors--until they have moved out of the terrorism business.
The Commission's report offers recommendations that could be useful in making our work more effective. I have been considering what intermediate steps could be taken to give state sponsors a clearer look at how they might "graduate" off the list. It may be possible that in appropriate cases state sponsors could step off the state sponsor list and be left only on the "not fully cooperating" list, with an eye toward stepping off of that list when they fully cooperate with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. There are many technical legal issues of how the laws on state sponsorship and "not fully cooperating" are structured, but I agree that we should be able to use these tools more effectively, including reviewing whether Afghanistan should be designated a state sponsor.
Pakistan and Greece: The Commission suggests that the Administration consider Greece and Pakistan as candidates for the "not cooperating fully" designation, under the 1996 law. Let me first take up the case of Pakistan, which has not been designated under this law. However, it continues to be under serious and constant review--as it must be for our process to be truly dynamic and effective.
As the Commission's report notes, and as we have noted in Patterns, Pakistan's record on terrorism remains mixed. I have no illusions about what is negative in the record, and I emphasized this in Patterns when describing the shift in the locus of terrorism to South Asia. Despite significant and material cooperation in some areas--particularly arrests and extraditions--Pakistan also has tolerated terrorists living and moving freely within its territory. But the areas of cooperation are real, and we are still in the game to make more progress. Pakistan is also a victim of terrorism and understands that this threat undermines its own security. It is in our interest that they move in the right direction, and we want to use the right tools to help them to keep the pressure on terrorists.
We are looking hard at current developments and continue to be intensively engaged with Pakistan on improving cooperation, most recently with the President's and Under Secretary Pickering's travel to Pakistan to reinforce tough messages on terrorism and other key concerns. We have a lot more to do, but we see that our engagement is beginning to yield progress. If that changes, we of course would respond using the tool most appropriate to the situation. But at the moment we do not believe that designating Pakistan as "not cooperating fully" is appropriate.
On Greece, Secretary Albright has made it clear that we are not considering sanctions against the Greek Government. The situation of Greece is difficult, and we have offered our perspective in Patterns in sharp detail. The Commission's report concludes that Greece--a friend and NATO ally--must do better in the fight against terrorism. Our embassy in Athens is working closely and cooperatively with the Greek Government to bring to justice the killers of five U.S. Mission employees since 1975.
I visited Athens last summer for extended discussions on terrorism with a number of Greek officials. Since that time, they have taken several initiatives, including reorganizing their counterterrorism unit with more money and resources, and initiating a public dialogue on the problem of terrorism. We have also signed a mutual legal assistance treaty, which the Greeks have already ratified. We hope our Senate will approve this treaty later this year. Additionally, we have agreed on the text of a police cooperation memorandum. The latter document will facilitate increased cooperation between our FBI investigators in Athens and Greek law enforcement officers.
The murder of British Military Attaché Stephen Saunders in Athens on June 8 is one more sad entry on a long list of unsolved acts of terrorism. This tragic event demonstrates that much work remains to be done if Greece is going to achieve success against the deadly "17 November" group and other terrorists. We are determined to continue our close cooperation with Greek law enforcement authorities on this issue. As Secretary Albright said earlier this week, we want to work with the Greek Government and be assured by the Greek Government that they are doing what they should be doing.
European officials and private interests have also become victims of 17 November. We are encouraging them to work with us and the Greek Government in combating this terrorist group. I note that in the past year or so, the German ambassador's residence was rocketed, and the Dutch ambassador's residence was bombed. In addition, French and British banks were bombed and of course, last week Brigadier Saunders was murdered. These events are a grim illustration that the Europeans are, like us, targets and victims of terrorism in Greece, as are Greek citizens themselves.
In addition, a safe and secure Olympics in Greece is a goal we and the Greek Government share. Prior Olympic hosts have spent up to 6 years planning for the security implications of hosting the games, and they needed every minute of it. We must consider the ramifications of unchecked terrorism for Greek plans to host the next Olympics.
The "not cooperating fully" designation/VWP Program: In addition to the above recommendations, the Commission makes the general recommendation to use the "not cooperating fully" designation more effectively. Whether countries should be designated as "not cooperating fully" with U.S. antiterrorism efforts is a judgment involving a review of a country's overall level of cooperation in our efforts to fight terrorism, taking into account our counterterrorism policy objectives with that particular country. I do not disagree that there may be ways to improve these processes and apply them more effectively, including by considering the use in appropriate cases of the "not cooperating fully" category as a "half-way house" for states that have reduced support for terrorism enough to justify some change in their status as state sponsors, or for states that may be moving in the wrong direction. In this respect, I note that the statutes relating to state sponsorship and full cooperation with the United States obviously raise differing issues and the appropriateness of putting countries in one regime or the other depend entirely on the facts.
The Commission has also addressed a key issue regarding the "not cooperating fully" designation: whether the additional sanctions that are imposed by this designation--banning arms sales--make sense or would be effective.
In fact, this raises the larger, most important question: whether the tools we have, in the context of ongoing engagement, are adequate or appropriate for the task of improving our position in the global effort against terrorism. One could argue that we currently have limited options at our disposal when we seek to pressure nations to address terrorist threats within and across their borders.
The National Commission's report recognizes this, as illustrated by its recommendation to ban countries "not cooperating fully" with the U.S. from participation in the Visa Waiver Pilot Program. At the moment it is not clear to us that the Visa Waiver Pilot Program is an appropriate vehicle for pursuing our counterterrorism objectives; it may not be a sufficiently flexible or well-targeted tool.
The Commission's idea is useful in that it provokes discussion on how Congress and the Administration could work together in developing more flexible, calibrated counterterrorist policy tools--tools that give us more options than we have now. All nations are not alike, and thus the mix of diplomatic tools used need not be alike. There are a number of other sanctions that could be useful in exerting pressure on various nations to counter terrorist threats more effectively. A preferred approach is to authorize the President to choose from a menu of sanctions, such as denial of Export-Import bank assistance or U.S. Government procurement opportunities.
Whether or not these types of sanctions would be effective in countering terrorism is unclear. But the point is that this is a discussion we should be having, and the Commission's report is a good start. In the meantime though, we will continue to move forward on many fronts.
Disruption of Financing: State concurs with the Commission's assessment that one of the most important ways to combat terrorism is to disrupt the financing of terrorist groups and activities. We have already made this a priority and are working hard through various means to disrupt the financing of terrorism. I have already outlined for you how we actively employ the legal tool of designating Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
Another step the Administration has taken to disrupt the financing of terrorists is to levy sanctions through executive action. In 1995 the President issued Executive Order 12947, which blocked not just financial but also material assets of twelve Middle Eastern terrorist organizations, as well as senior officials of these groups. These sanctions are administered by the Treasury Department. In addition, just last year the President issued Executive Order 13129, imposing sanctions on the Afghan Taliban. This action deepened the international isolation of the Taliban and limited its ability to support terrorist groups and activities.
We are also disrupting the financing of terrorism through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. I held numerous bilateral consultations last year, especially in the Gulf states, to address the threat posed by Usama Bin Laden and other terrorists. In addition, State participated in interagency team visits to the Middle East for the purposes of discussing money laundering and other financial issues. We will continue to encourage countries to examine their own laws and counterterrorist tools to ensure that they are doing all they can. We have also urged nations to be more aware of the possibility that terrorists are using NGOs (nongovernmental organizations)as ways to conceal their fundraising and other activities.
With regard to multilateral fora, last year the U.S. worked with the G-8 and UN member states to achieve consensus in the General Assembly on the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. This landmark convention provides for extensive international cooperation on disrupting the financing of terrorists. The U.S. was one of the first countries to sign the convention, and we are currently working through the G-8, under Japan's leadership, to obtain more signatures. The Administration anticipates submitting the Convention for advice and consent to ratification in the near future.
We will continue to move forward on these fronts. As part of our Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, we have developed a training program for foreign financial and banking officials. We hope that this program will result in stronger oversight and integrity of foreign financial systems. Furthermore, we are working with the G-8 on developing practical ways to implement the new UN convention drawing upon relevant experience in countering money laundering.
Student Monitoring: The Commission recommends that the Administration monitor the status of foreign students in the U.S. Let me first stress that our educational facilities are some of the finest in the world, and it is mutually beneficial for the U.S. and foreign students when they come to study here.
The Commission suggests using the Coordinated Interagency Partnership Regulating International Students (CIPRIS) as a model for a more effective monitoring system. CIPRIS is a program under the jurisdiction of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. State has supported the INS as they have developed this program, and we will continue to provide assistance as requested by the INS. We look forward to exploring this idea further with Congress and the inter-agency community.
Cyber crime convention: The Commission recommends that the Administration help create an international convention on cyber crime. The U.S. is already engaged with other nations on this subject. The Council of Europe has been the forum in which discussions and drafting of language have taken place, and the U.S. is playing an integral role. The aim of these discussions is to formulate a convention that will harmonize national legislation on cyber crime, facilitate investigations, and allow effective cooperation among the authorities of different states. A draft text is being developed, and it is our hope that an international convention with language acceptable to the U.S. can be open for signature by next year.
I should note, though, that as the Commission's report suggests, this issue is larger than terrorism and should be addressed in a broader context. After all, terrorism is just one type of international criminal activity that can be perpetrated using the Internet. Presidential Decision Directive 63 addressed various aspects of protecting our national information infrastructure. State will continue to support the efforts of both the inter-agency community, especially the Department of Justice, and the international community in fighting the proliferation of cyber crime.
Resources: Let me close by saying a few words about resources, and more specifically the need for full funding of all of our counterterrorist programs. For example, the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, which helps friendly governments acquire counterterrorist skills, is a pillar of our counterterrorism efforts. Obtaining full funding, however, is always a struggle. The Administration requested $38 million for the ATA program in FY 2001. However, the Senate Appropriations Committee's markup of the Foreign Operations bill recommends only $30 million. That's a cut of 22%. It is even $3 million below the amount Congress appropriated in FY 2000, which also was a "tight" year. We cannot counter the terrorist threat alone--it depends on cooperation with other nations, and ATA is a vital tool that gives us access and improves these countries' capacity.
Also troubling is the difficulty in securing funding for a Center for Antiterrorism and Security Training (CAST). The Administration has requested funding for such a center in order to consolidate ATA and other security training at a location near Washington, where foreign officials could work more effectively with U.S. Government officials and security specialists. As most training recipients are foreign officials taking part in the ATA program, we requested funding in the ATA part of Foreign Operations. But the Senate's Foreign Operations bill does not include the funding. Moreover, the accompanying report says that because the money goes for bricks and mortar, it should be funded in the Commerce, Justice, and State (CJS) bill. Not surprisingly, the House CJS Appropriations Subcommittee did not include any funding for CAST in its markup last week. We need your support to make sure funding is added back when the Foreign Operations bill reaches the Senate floor for action.
I have spoken to many Members and staffers about CAST and have found broad support for the center. I understand the difficulties and concerns involved, but the bottom line is that CAST should be funded. It is critical to future counterterrorism cooperation with other countries.
International cooperation, antiterrorism training, action to counter terrorist fundraising, designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations--these and other counterterrorism initiatives are not handouts or wasteful government programs. On the contrary, we believe they are crucial to the safety and security of our country's citizens and assets.
Mr. Chairman, as we have seen in the past, whenever there is a major terrorist incident, everyone demands that we "do something". But when the images and fear fade away, it becomes frustratingly difficult in the next year to get the funding for programs that protect our citizens in tangible ways.
The National Commission has made a valuable contribution to the discourse on counterterrorism. But any reevaluation or restructuring of our policies and practices will have to be sustained by sufficient resources. The bottom line is that, to fight terrorism effectively, the State Department needs the resources to do so. It is my hope that Congress will keep this in mind when considering appropriations legislation in the coming weeks and months.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before your committee today. I look forward to answering any questions members of the committee may have.
[end of document]
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