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The Taliban: Engagement or Confrontation?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I greatly appreciate this opportunity to speak with you about the topic you have chosen for today's hearing on Afghanistan -- "The Taliban: Engagement or Confrontation?" It is, as my testimony will make clear, an important, timely, and difficult subject.

Afghan Update: Signs of Change?

The situation in Afghanistan continues to cause grave concern to the international community, and great suffering to that country's own population. Recently Afghanistan was described in Newsweek as "A Country in Collapse." I cannot dispute that characterization. Some of this is the legacy of the Afghans' two decades of war -- first against the Soviet occupation, and then against each other. And yet a bitter irony is that today many of the country's problems are actually aggravated by its own would-be rulers, the Taliban. One recent telling example is the case of Mary MacMakin, a U.S. citizen who has long lived in Afghanistan and has devoted over four decades of humanitarian service to its people -- only to be detained by the Taliban and then expelled from the country this very month. We hope that Ms. MacMakin will be able to return to Afghanistan, if she so wishes, to continue her important work.

Unfortunately, however, the Taliban's overall record does not inspire much confidence in this, or any other, regard. When they swept to power from Kandahar to Kabul in late 1996, they seemed to have considerable popular acceptance, based on an understandable disgust with protracted civil war and a simple desire for personal security. Since then, while the Taliban have extended their control to cover approximately 85% of Afghanistan, their popularity and legitimacy now appear to be in decline. They have failed to end the civil war, and they have failed to offer the Afghan people a better life. Instead, the Taliban continue to seek a military victory over their opponents in northern Afghanistan, but that objective continues to elude their grasp. The Taliban's two offensives north of Kabul earlier this month led to the heaviest fighting of the year and ended quickly with heavy Taliban casualties and no change in the frontlines. We believe the Taliban now have little prospect of completing their goal of gaining control over the 15% of the country held by the opposition. In short, Mr. Chairman, we believe the Taliban have reached their high-water mark.

Let me cite a few of the latest indicators of erosion in Taliban authority and effectiveness, all occurring during the past several months. In March, Ismail Khan, the anti-Taliban former governor of Herat, escaped with two senior aides from a Kandahar prison where he had been held since 1997. In April, the Taliban-appointed governor of Kunduz province was assassinated. More recently, we have reports of sabotage at Kabul airport. We also hear of Taliban difficulty conscripting new recruits for this year's spring and summer offensives, due to serious local resistance and low morale. There are equipment shortages for the Taliban war machine and serious splits within the Taliban movement itself. It is increasingly clear that many Afghans are giving up whatever hope they had for Taliban rule. Many would surely prefer a more inclusive, more effective, more tolerant and perhaps above all more peacefully inclined government, if that option were to become available.

Background of U.S. Policy

What has been the U.S. response? I must emphasize that, contrary to some false and damaging allegations, the U.S. does not now support and has never supported the Taliban. When they took over the capital of Kabul in 1996, we told them we would look at what they did, and react accordingly. Well, what they have done, in a word, is horrendous. They have chosen to prolong their country's agonizing civil war, while oppressing its numerous ethnic and religious minorities. They have trampled on the human rights of all Afghans, especially women and girls. They have condoned and indeed profited from the deadly trade in narcotics and they have condoned that other scourge of civilized society, namely terrorism, by providing among other things safe haven for Usama bin Laden and his network. This is the murderer directly responsible for the loss of a dozen American and hundreds of other innocent lives in the East Africa embassy bombings 2 years ago. We believe Usama bin Laden continues to this day to plan further acts of international terrorism.

We have consistently and categorically opposed all of these Taliban policies. This is precisely the message that we have delivered directly to the Taliban in the course of all our contacts with them. I personally have met with Taliban officials in Kabul, Islamabad, New York, and Washington. I regret to report today that they seem determined to ignore our message. If anything, the Taliban have moved even further in the wrong direction. On terrorism, not only have they refused to hand over Usama bin Laden as called for the UN Security Council, but they have aided and abetted other terrorists worldwide, including violent groups in Chechnya and Central Asia.

I want to make one thing very clear. The Taliban, and some of their supporters, continue to misrepresent our campaign against terrorism as an attack against Islam. Nothing could be further from the truth. We do not oppose Islam. We respect Islam. We do not oppose those who practice their faith in peace. We do not oppose those who have legitimate political concerns they want redressed. But we do oppose those who commit or condone criminal acts, especially those who commit murder and inflict grievous injury against civilians, in the name of any ideology, religion, or cause.

On human rights, though we have publicly recognized occasional local improvements, the central authorities in Kabul have regressed; witness the fate of Mary MacMakin that I referred to earlier, or the new edict forbidding females from working even in international humanitarian activities. On narcotics, the Taliban have allowed Afghanistan to acquire, almost overnight, the distinction of the world's largest producer of illicit opium, thereby contributing to the destruction of countless additional lives every year. To borrow an expression from you, Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan has become a gateway country -- a gateway for some of the worst evils of drugs and violence -- which daily pass through it enroute to other parts of the globe.

Finally, on the prospects for Afghan peace and reconciliation, the Taliban have not wavered from their commitment to a military solution. They talk of peace, even as they launch new military actions. They agree to exchange prisoners with the Northern Alliance under Islamic auspices, and then renege. Independent political figures and political opponents of the Taliban are shot down, including just a year ago the esteemed tribal elder Mr. Ahmed Karzai, whose son Hamad is here with us today to carry on his part of the traditional leadership and consensus-building role so sorely needed in Afghanistan today.

Mr. Chairman, my strong criticism of the Taliban should not be read to imply U.S. recognition for the opposition Northern Alliance led by Ahmed Shah Masood. The Alliance incorporates representatives of many of Afghanistan's minority ethnic populations, and appears to come closer to meeting international standards of human rights. Nevertheless, accurate information about conditions, including respect for human rights, in the northern areas under its control is scarce. We call on all those who are prolonging the needless fighting in Afghanistan to shift their focus instead to bringing peace and a broad-based representative government to the people of Afghanistan.

All of this raises the obvious question: What more can be done to deal with Afghanistan's ongoing tragedy, and with the risks it poses to others? While we have worked hard to develop a united front on Afghanistan with a number of key countries, multilateral diplomacy has had only a limited effect to date. The Six-Plus-Two group of Afghanistan's neighbors plus the United States and Russia has been unable to agree on concerted political action, and is now focusing on the narrower practical issue of counter-narcotics cooperation.

The UN Secretary General's previous representative on Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, resigned last year with little to show for his lengthy and tireless efforts, thanks largely to Taliban intransigence and the lack of commitment from external parties to use their influence with the warring factions to bring them to the negotiating table. His successor as of the beginning of this year, Francesc Vendrell, is making an admirable effort to address this acute tangle of problems, but wisely acknowledges the limitations of his mission's mandate and capabilities in light of Afghan realities. We are and will stay in close touch with him, and with others concerned about Afghanistan. We are planning a new series of meetings with Ambassador Vendrell and others at the UN this coming fall. At the same time, we need to consider what U.S. strategy is most appropriate in this situation.

U.S. Strategy Today: A Two-Pronged Approach

Mr. Chairman, the strategy that we are pursuing today is two-pronged.

First, firm pressure on the Taliban on the issues of greatest concern: terrorism, narcotics, and human rights. On terrorism, President Clinton took the lead last year by issuing Executive Order 13129, imposing unilateral sanctions on the Taliban designed to stop them from deriving any revenue or benefit from economic interaction with the United States. The UN Security Council followed up in October 1999 by unanimously adopting Resolution 1267, which puts in place mandatory sanctions against Taliban-controlled assets and international airline flights until Bin Laden is brought to justice. These sanctions, I want to stress, target only the regime, while providing unimpeded humanitarian access for all the people of Afghanistan. In April of this year, the Security Council agreed that further action might be required. We are actively exploring those options, which could include imposition of an arms embargo against the Taliban. We have also let them know, in no uncertain terms, that we will hold them responsible for any terrorist acts undertaken by Bin Laden from Afghanistan. We reserve the right to use military force in self-defense if required.

As we apply such pressure, we have also tried to engage the Taliban in a serious dialogue. Some members of the Taliban have told us they would like to improve their relations with us. They have even taken a few measures to demonstrate a willingness to work with us, such as restricting Bin Laden's access to foreign media. But we have seen no indication that the Taliban are ready to take the serious actions -- on Bin Laden or on other issues -- that would be necessary for any real improvement in our relations.