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UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: I am pleased and delighted to have the opportunity to speak to this distinguished gathering at the Center for Naval Analysis. The issues you are discussing during this conference are at the heart of American national security strategy and will certainly dominate the foreign policy debate in years to come. Our discussions here underscore that in the decade since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the demise of the Soviet Union, we still see ourselves at a crossroads in international politics. We are working to define our own era of international relations. It's a difficult task because we seem pulled in so many different ways. As a nation, the United States remains at once idealistic and pragmatic. We want to be strong but we don't want military entanglements that put our men and women in jeopardy for few or no tangible benefit to the United States. We are enjoying the most prosperous economic times in our history, but we have not yet decided how to manage globalization and the emergence of a world economy in ways that take into account the needs of the poor in our own country and overseas. Do we forgive debt? Do we have trade agreements that require labor and environment clauses? Or do we "let the market decide?" We are now a decade removed from the perceived simplicity of the Cold War. Former Secretary of State Larry Eagleburger once said there would be nostalgia for the predictability of that time period. That prediction has proven true as memories fade of the dangers and existential threats of the years between 1946-1989. Since 1918 the world has not seen change on the scale of the last decade. Our present era demands clear, hardheaded traditional diplomatic and military strategies, some of which can only be achieved through non-traditional political and military means. The broad patterns of the changes abroad will shape the international policies of the next administration and possibly a number of administrations after that. Our own national security strategy states that we must prepare for an "uncertain future." But one thing that is certain about the future is that if America does not lead, America will lose the greatest opportunity in its history to secure and protect its many interests abroad. America has led in Europe, where seismic changes continue since the end of the Cold War. The European Union and the European Monetary Union have put into sharp relief the economic and political trend toward integration, even as longstanding national divisions remain. The way in which Europeans work through these two trends will dominate the story of that continent in the coming decades. But that will not change the fundamental fact that the security of the United States and the security of Europe remain inextricably linked. The history of the 20th Century made clear the need of Europe and the United States for each other in two very horrible and bloody encounters. Nothing has changed in that equation. The First World War established America's stake in European security before the Soviet Union came into being. We remain involved in Europe after the Soviet Union has ceased to be. We are now in a position to move in grand partnership with a Europe whole and free. In this partnership, the United States and its European allies, partners and friends share common values and interests in regional and global stability. It is heartening that the American public and the Congress understand the importance of the U.S. presence in Europe, manifested through our NATO membership. As long as we make certain that NATO remains the primary instrument for security in Europe -- whatever the evolution of its relationship with the EU and the OSCE -- I believe we will be able to maintain this bipartisan support for our NATO participation. At the same time, as the crises in southeastern Europe have shown, we need to improve the capabilities of all these organizations to work together. Already, NATO and the OSCE have cooperated to help organize safe and secure elections in Bosnia and Kosovo. Now, we need to work out how NATO and the EU will work together and help Europe bridge the military technological gap with the U.S. This will enable the Europe and the EU to respond to intra-European contingencies without the United States -- when we cannot or we choose not to be engaged militarily. Our European friends must understand -- as Americans have long understood -- that real military capabilities cannot be acquired at bargain-basement prices. As in the past decade, we will also need to consider admitting other countries into the Alliance, and further strengthening our cooperative programs in the Partnership for Peace. We are not past the challenges of the Balkans, but we have moved into a stage where the problems are political and economic rather than military. The killing has stopped, in large part due to the American and European cooperation to end it. But we also understand the historical forces that come into play in that difficult and divided region. Our strategy must take into account the real possibility that these historical forces will re-emerge in new and unexpected way. This is why we have employed a mix of diplomatic, military, economic and institution-building tools that will help lay us the basis for long-term stability in the Balkans. We are over the hardest tasks politically speaking, but we are in for the long haul to achieve economic stability, social advancement, and political integration as the answers to Balkans' divisions and divisiveness. We cannot talk about Europe without considering Russia. Its struggle to build a better society after 70 years of Communism remains one of the most important challenges to the United States and the international community in the coming years. Though we have moved on from the early, heady days after the fall of the Soviet Union into a more normal era of inter-state relations, we remain steadfastly committed to the evolution of Russia as a democratic, market-oriented state. We know from history that Russia will inevitably re-emerge as a major player on the international stage. If we lose the current opportunity to assure Russia's future and link it to the West because Moscow sometimes disappoints us, we may pay a big price in the future. We therefore have no choice but to continue to engage Russia, neither demonizing nor idolizing its leaders, and recognizing that our interests and theirs are not always going to intersect. At the same time, we have built a cooperative relationship with Russia that has paid dividends in reducing the nuclear threat. We work together with Russia in the Balkans and on a number of other regional and multinational issues, including on the common threat of terrorism and narcotics trafficking. These types of cooperative efforts ought to continue. The challenge for us is to ensure that the Cold War is not replaced merely by a Cold Peace -- or worse. This will require time, stamina, patience and continued engagement. Now dramatic change has also come to Northeast Asia as North Korea emerges from 50 years of almost-complete isolation. One of the greatest challenges before the next Administration will be finding appropriate ways to make sure that change on the Korean peninsula continues to be positive and peaceful. We will want to ensure that weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery vehicles are contained and eliminated, while food production, economic reform and peaceful reunification on a democratic basis are promoted. Here again, American leadership is critical. Successful navigation of change on the peninsula will benefit our political relations across Northeast Asia and beyond. First, eliminating the DPRK's weapons of mass destruction is a direct benefit to East Asia and even to our own homeland, and an indirect benefit in all those regions where North Korean sales of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery vehicles threaten peace and stability. Second, a successful transition to a peaceful and stable, and prosperous Korean Peninsula would lead to new roles and missions for U.S. forces stationed there. But we believe they will still make an important, and as in Europe, widely-welcomed, contribution to regional stability after change. Third is our relationship with Japan. Our alliance there is the lynchpin of our security in Northeast Asia. Our defense relationship remains strong and solid. Japan is undergoing its own political and economic changes. Its ability to restructure and revitalize its economy will have a major impact on East Asia. The Japanese are also very much aware that changes on the Korean peninsula will directly affect Japan's role in the region and the world beyond. In that regard, it is significant to note the deep, continuing and mutually beneficial dialogue among Japan, South Korea and the U.S., as our three countries work through the delicate process of improving our ties with the North Koreans. Fourth, the next administration will need to develop and maintain a constructive relationship with China. That will include preservation of our commitment to the three communiqués that govern our ties, as well as the Taiwan Relations Act. It will mean finding ways to encourage creativity and flexibility on the part of both sides with a view to revive direct cross-Strait dialogue between the PRC and Taiwan at the earliest possible opportunity. Our interest is in a China that is stable domestically and acts as a responsible political and economic influence in its own region, and in the world at large. And we'll have to manage a relationship with China while it is seeking to surmount huge domestic challenges in its drive to modernize economically and socially. I am confident that we will continue to confront our differences with China, as we have over the past eight years, and I am hopeful that the authorities in the People's Republic of China will find ways to bridge some of the gaps that separate us. Leaders in both countries have an obligation to make every effort to build a relationship between us that contributes to greater security and prosperity throughout the world. In Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, change, conflict and economic challenge pose important issues for our growing relationships. Indonesia, in particular, must remain a priority. We will want to encourage and support political and economic reforms, as well as the country's stability and territorial integrity so that we can enjoy mutually respectful and productive relations. As all parts of Asia undergo tremendous change, our forward presence in East Asia remains critical to stability. American diplomacy and military leadership are crucial to our interests there. In the Middle East, the recent violence is of great concern. From my experience in the region, it is imperative not to give up hope even as we face the complexities of bringing about a successful peace. Too much time, too much progress, too much hope are attached to the search for peace to permit it to die. The positive atmosphere of a few months ago was the result of a long, difficult process that began with the Madrid summit of 1991 and continued through Oslo and Washington in 1993, through Wye last year and Camp David in 2000. The process weathered many changes, including the assassination of Yitzak Rabin, and the deaths of King Hussein and King Hassan. But in the face of each difficulty, we worked to restore belief that peace -- however difficult -- is far preferable than war. Though the task is daunting today, we are committed to working with the parties to end the violence and return to the negotiating table. Now more than ever, the United States must be prepared to continue its role as intermediary and peacemaker. The alternative to American leadership is either a vacuum or a cacaphony -- something that would be so inimical to our long-term interests in the Middle East, in both the Arab-Israeli conflict and in the Gulf, as to be fully unacceptable. In the Gulf, our policy will have to adopt and adapt to changing circumstances. Some people look on the evolution of our Iraq policy and call it a failure. I look on it a different way. For some ten years, we have followed a very effective course of action, in which an international coalition involving Western, Arab, East Asian and East European nations held firm both militarily and politically in full support of the UN Security Council. This is a landmark in contemporary international politics. It is inevitable that time marches on and that circumstances force us to adapt. It is HOW we adapt, and under what principles, that will make the difference. We all agree that Iraq can never be allowed to develop weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery vehicles. We all agree that we cannot allow Iraq to threaten its neighbors. We all agree that Iraq must comply with UN Security Council resolutions. All Americans agree that the future of Iraq would be a much better one without Saddam Hussein. This set of ideas guided our work over the past decade and remains appropriate as we look to the future as a series of guideposts for policy. Furthermore, our Iraq policy cannot be seen in isolation in the region. The evolution of any relationship that might develop between Iran and the West will have an impact, as will the current situation in the Arab-Israeli dispute. We are also focusing our broader attention on developing a viable regional approach to weapons of mass destruction and missiles for the long-term. A regional solution on WMD and missiles will also be vital to the future of South Asia. The need for resolution of the confrontation between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is essential to regional stability. The U.S. will need to find ways to exercise influence in the region. We can build upon our work in producing modest progress toward containment of the nuclear genie that India and Pakistan unleashed in 1998, and our role in helping to avert escalation of a low-intensity conflict in 1999. Our new and qualitatively improved relationship with India can provide a positive tool for the next Administration to build with. One region that has embodied the opportunities and challenges of the current era is sub-Saharan Africa. There we have seen much change that has been for the good: the end of apartheid in Southern Africa, the creation of an independent state in Namibia, and the spread of democracy to nearly half the countries in the region, including sub-Saharan Africa's most populous country -- Nigeria -- and its wealthiest -- South Africa. And yet, as we all know, many serious problems remain. These issues are exacerbated by a host of transnational difficulties, such as the spread of ancient and new diseases, environmental degradation, ethnic competition, population growth, and natural disasters, many of which can only be abated through a concerted effort at multinational cooperation. The need for American leadership to help the international community respond to the crises in Africa is critical, and it is in our interest to provide that leadership and the resources to support it. It is also in our interest for a number of reasons: Africa has now become a major supplier of oil and other essential resources to the U.S. Conflicts put at risk the lives, security and economic interests of America and its friends and allies. And they also create a breeding ground for terrorism, international crime and disease. Moreover, millions of American citizens have their heritage and their cultural background in the various countries of Africa. We cannot and should not turn our backs on that important continent. In our own hemisphere we face the contrasting "non-traditional" challenge of Colombia, which involves both insurgency, drugs, and the threat of regional spillover, along with the "traditional" challenge of Cuba, where a Communist dictator -- certainly an anachronism in this era -- remains in power. In between, we use a mix of traditional and non-traditional diplomatic and military engagement activities to work the problems. We work closely with our Latin American and Caribbean colleagues to help shore up democracy and assist militaries to assume their proper role in their societies. Our effort with the OAS in the Peruvian elections, for example, shows how regional cooperation is a powerful force in strengthening the institutions of democracy in this hemisphere. As we examine how best to pursue American interests abroad, it is useful to look at fundamental assumptions about international political behavior. This will illuminate the debate that has emerged in recent years over how and under what circumstances the United States should employ the military. I raise this subject because I know that this is a subject keenly debated at this conference and elsewhere and is likely to remain on center stage. Some have characterized this as a debate between the Department of State on the one hand and DOD and the military on the other. My view is that that kind of analysis is much too simplistic and based in large part on stereotypical thinking rather than hard reality. In fact, of course, there are those at State who would use the military only in the rarest of occasions and others who might be more profligate in the use of the powerful tool of the military. At the same time, there are senior military officers who believe that U.S. military power can be put to good use in what some call "non-traditional" ways. Yet, we know that a fundamental principle of the debate is not a negotiable one: America must be able to maintain its superiority in the full range of operations and to deter, or if deterrence fails, fight and win, wars against the American homeland, those of its Allies and friends, and in regard to our most significant interests abroad. As we are discussing our role, I want to pay tribute to our men and women in uniform, as well as to the men and women in the Foreign Service and Civil Service, who serve our country so well at here at home and overseas. They put their very lives on the line for their country -- and the tragedy on the USS Cole last month and the Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 remind us all well. We should make good our commitment to those who have given their lives for their country. The American people and the Congress need to provide our military and civilian cadre with the resources to enable them to do their jobs, take care of their families and to be protected as they travel, and work and live abroad on behalf of the United States and its people. For this reason, Secretary Albright and I and our colleagues at State join in supporting a strong defense budget. Without a strong defense, America cannot protect its interests abroad. Likewise, I support a much stronger foreign affairs budget than currently exists in order to provide the same for Americans serving their country as diplomats at home and overseas. Both budgets should be considered under the "National Security" rubric, as both provide the means for the kind of international leadership that is critical for our national security and prosperity. The foreign affairs account, as some of you know, the 150 function, is now set at about one penny of every budget dollar we spend. That covers all of our non-military and non-intelligence national security spending. To enable us to avert conflict and build strong relationships, that budget needs to increase to at least a penny and a half. Making that a reality will need to be one of the primary security and foreign policy tasks of the next Administration. Failure to fund the foreign affairs apparatus, which has undergone a 45 percent reduction in the past 10 years, and which is in the front lines of averting war and stemming instability, may prove very costly if we have to intervene with force to resolve disputes and restore peace when our interests are threatened and diplomacy can no longer contend with or cope with the task. Despite all of the challenges ahead, I want to leave you with a sense of optimism and seriousness of purpose. In almost every area of the world we have discussed today, America can see a way forward, despite the hardships and setbacks -- and the complexities. In almost every case, American leadership is critical to securing major strategic goals for our country and the world. Working together with a sense of purpose and mission, our diplomats and our military have achieved enormous success in advancing liberty, prosperity and security for this country, especially over the past decade. They are taking us along a clear path of strong leadership and commitment, for the benefit of all Americans and our allies and friends throughout the world. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you and to sum up a number of important issues before the U.S. at such a critical moment for the United States. I look forward to your questions. [end of document] |
