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Stanley O. Roth Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Statement on Situation in Cambodia Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs Washington, DC, September 4, 1997

CAMBODIA

Mr. Chairman, thank you and the other members of the Committee for the opportunity to review with you the situation in Cambodia and the Administration's response to the seizure of power by Hun Sen. I welcome this opportunity to share with you the Administration's assessment of the challenges that lie ahead, and to consult with the Committee about some of the difficult questions before us, including future disbursements of U.S. assistance.

I would like to commend the strong messages conveyed by the Congress about the events of July 5-6, messages which have sent an important signal to all key players in Cambodia that the Congress and the Executive Branch are united in their determination not to return to business as usual in Cambodia without a restoration of the Paris Peace Accords framework.

Mr. Chairman, like you and your colleagues in the Congress, the Administration was appalled by the political violence and extra-constitutional action against First Prime Minister Ranariddh on July 5-6 -- actions we condemned swiftly and vigorously. The Administration firmly opposes Hun Sen's overturning the results of the 1993 elections conducted by the United Nations with extensive contributions from the international community. Those elections were won by FUNCINPEC. That was true before July 5, and it remains true today. Until there is a restoration of the Paris Peace Accords, and free and fair elections are held, the United States will not conduct business as usual with Hun Sen.

From the beginning of this crisis, the core principles guiding our policy have remained constant:

1. The violence that overturned the results of the 1993 elections is unacceptable; fighting must stop immediately.

2. All political parties, including FUNCINPEC, must be allowed to operate freely in Cambodia.

3. There must be free and fair elections in 1998.

4. There should be no political role for the leaders of the Khmer Rouge; those responsible for crimes against humanity should be brought to justice.

5. The framework of the 1991 Paris Accords on Cambodia, which paved the way for UN-conducted elections in 1993, must be reinstated.

The Administration has focused its energies on answering the central question of how we and the international community can achieve genuine implementation of these core principles. Our strategy is based on strong support for ASEAN's Cambodia initiative as Secretary Albright emphasized during the July ASEAN meetings. In support of this initiative, the Secretary dispatched two Special Envoys, Stephen Solarz and Desaix Anderson, to begin the process of engaging all the Cambodian parties including King Sihanouk, our ASEAN partners and others in the region in an effort to identify common ground for an eventual negotiated settlement of Cambodia's crisis.

In addition, the Administration has consulted closely with signatories of the Paris Peace Accords, donor nations and prospective members of a "Friends of Cambodia" group, which the Secretary proposed in July to support ASEAN diplomatic efforts. A summary of these and additional actions is detailed in an attachment to my testimony for the record.

As a result of all this diplomatic activity, there is an emerging consensus, in principle, both among the parties in Cambodia and among key outside players, that the following elements would help to create confidence in the electoral process:

-- Cessation by all parties of the use of force to resolve disputes;

-- Renunciation of support for and links to the Khmer Rouge;

-- Cessation of acts of political intimidation within Cambodia;

-- Guaranteed freedom of the media;

-- Establishment of an independent judiciary;

-- Return and guaranteed safety of exiled political parties and personalities;

-- Depoliticization of the military, which could include separating the military from political parties, the possible cantonment of certain units during elections, abolishing the rural militia prior to elections and confiscating their weapons.

With respect to the conduct of the elections themselves, our envoys have identified a number of specific steps that could be taken to create the basis for free and fair elections in 1998 including:

-- Passage of election and political party laws;

-- Establishment of the constitutional and magistracy councils;

-- Establishment of the independent election commission;

-- Timely registration of voters;

-- Freedom for all political parties and personalities to conduct campaigns for elections; and,

-- Invitation to international observers, ensuring adequate independent observation.

Challenges Ahead: ASEAN's Initiative And Next Steps

Frankly, implementing all of the steps I have just enunciated will be difficult. There is a great deal of uncertainty over whether it will be possible to create the conditions for a free and fair election as early as May 1998. The climate of intimidation and fear ushered in by the events of July 5-6 continues to exist in Phnom Penh and throughout the country. We know this from our own embassy and from concerned NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, IRI and NDI. The U.S. government joins with those voices in urging that a full accounting of all those killed, arrested or missing be provided by the Cambodian government. The Administration remains disturbed and concerned by reports, some detailed by the Human Rights Watch, of continued killings and intimidation of FUNCINPEC officials. Administration officials have raised these concerns repeatedly with top Cambodian officials, most recently this week, and we will continue to do so.

As I have indicated earlier in my testimony, the Administration's strategy for implementing the goals which we share with the Congress -- restoring the principles of the Paris Peace Accords and creating the conditions for free and fair elections in 1998 -- is closely tied to ASEAN's initiative. It is important to highlight the positive and unprecedented high-profile engagement of ASEAN in helping to restore political stability to Cambodia.

For example, despite the hopes ASEAN had for moving toward an "Southeast Asia Ten" with the planned admission of Cambodia (along with Burma and Laos) in July, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers took the difficult step of putting off Cambodia's entry in response to Hun Sen's actions on July 5-6. We continue to believe that the leverage of eventual membership in ASEAN is a powerful incentive for restoration of political stability in Cambodia.

The Administration strongly supports ASEAN's decision-- reflected in its statement on August 11 -- to remain engaged in Cambodia. The Administration issued a strong public statement of support the following day and encouraged other nations to do so as well. The ASEAN Ministers' statement stressed the importance of holding free and fair elections in Cambodia as scheduled in May 1998 and reaffirmed the necessity for all political parties in Cambodia to participate fully in the elections.

We have made clear that a climate free of fear for personal safety and fear of political intimidation is a critical component of democratic elections. Exiled parliamentarians, ideally including Prince Ranariddh, should be allowed to return to Cambodia safely and participate freely in the upcoming electoral campaign. It is hard to imagine a free and fair election taking place without open participation.

Exiled opposition politicians rightly demand concrete steps by the Cambodian government to guarantee their safety and security so that they can return to participate in the elections. The Administration fully supports this basic position. We repeatedly have urged the Cambodian government to restore security in order to permit the safe return of the exiled opposition leaders. As one concrete step to help achieve this objective, the Administration is now exploring ways to strengthen the capability of the UN Center for Human Rights in Phnom Penh to assist in this area. The Administration believes that the Center's staff should be increased to enable it to monitor security guarantees and promote a return to a climate of political confidence and security in the period leading up to the elections.

What More Can We Do?

In further support of ASEAN's efforts to negotiate an overall political settlement, Secretary Albright has taken the lead in proposing the establishment of a "Friends of Cambodia" group bringing together a wide range of interested countries, including but not limited to aid donors. Efforts are underway now to prepare for consultations between ASEAN and the Friends of Cambodia both before and during the upcoming UNGA sessions.

During these meetings, the Administration hopes to reach a common view on both the political elements and technical steps needed to create a free and fair electoral process in Cambodia. An important issue for discussion is the extent to which international aid in support of Cambodia's elections preparations should be provided. International aid for elections preparations provides considerable leverage for the international community to press the Cambodian government to permit genuinely free and fair elections.

In addition to action by ASEAN and the Friends of Cambodia, there are several other important developments that hopefully will contribute to a political resolution of the conflict. In particular, King Sihanouk has returned to Cambodia and has offered to mediate talks as he explores ways to help restore political stability to his country. While it remains to be seen if the King's initiative will be embraced by the parties and lead to actual negotiations, it is certainly a welcome step. I will be discussing the King's role in the current situation in some detail, when I travel to Indonesia, the Philippines and Japan later this week, to see how his efforts can be coordinated with ASEAN and with the Friends of Cambodia.

It is also worth noting that China has issued positive statements in support of Cambodian elections and the Paris Peace Accords framework, and Vietnam has joined in the ASEAN initiative to mediate a settlement. The U.S. encourages positive engagement of this kind from the many nations that share a stake in Cambodian stability, whether because of geographic proximity or by virtue of their support for the Paris Accords and UNTAC.

U.S. Assistance Policy

The Administration has stopped all direct assistance to the Cambodian government. We continue to provide humanitarian assistance and are providing human rights and limited amounts of democracy assistance through Cambodian NGOs. Based on our FY 97 obligations, our total assistance for Cambodia remains cut by two-thirds from what it was before the events of July 5-6. There may be some adjustments for obligated funds currently in the pipeline, and the Administration will consult closely with the Congress on any changes in our overall assistance levels.

The Administration is mindful that in our policy approach we must do our utmost to ensure that the Cambodian people do not pay the price for the acts of their government leaders. Our decision to suspend aid to the Royal Cambodian Government explicitly permits continued support to Cambodian NGOs engaged in humanitarian and democracy building programs. While most of our pre-July 5 aid remains suspended, important work in support of Cambodian civil society has not ceased. Humanitarian programs -- such as Doctors Without Borders and several others in support of child health care, basic rural health services, aid for war and mine victims, and rule of law -- continue as well.

We believe it is important at this time to maintain our suspension of assistance that benefits directly the Cambodian government. At the same time, we have made every effort to maintain key humanitarian programs that benefit directly the Cambodian people.

We will apply the same policy principle in voting for any loans by international financial institutions for Cambodia. We will not support any loans, for example, for large infrastructure projects, the benefits of which flow primarily to the Cambodian government. We will also urge other major donors to adopt a similar approach.

In the context of our support for the ASEAN initiative, we will be looking carefully at the possibility of providing election assistance above and beyond the modest programs currently in place. Carefully calibrated technical assistance can be an important confidence-building mechanism as Cambodia prepares for free and fair elections. We do not intend, however, to provide support for an undemocratic process.

Actions To Protect Amcits and Cambodians

The protection of American citizens is our first priority in situations of crisis. Our embassies also stand ready to assist individuals -- in this case, Cambodians --who find themselves at risk in such crises. The Administration was very concerned, therefore, about allegations that the embassy in Phnom Penh had not taken these responsibilities seriously. We have looked into these allegations carefully. So far, they appear to be unfounded.

To date, all of the evidence we have clearly shows that Ambassador Quinn and his embassy officers took quick and decisive action to safeguard the lives of U.S. citizens and to provide assistance to all Cambodians who requested our help. Under difficult and dangerous conditions, our embassy helped over 600 American citizens leave the country and then proceeded with an ordered drawdown of its own staff. The Ambassador and his staff personally provided safe escort to numerous Cambodians seeking to leave the country. The summary of U.S. government actions attached to this statement includes details of measures taken by the Ambassador personally and by his embassy to assure the safety of Cambodians who asked for help.

To date, the Administration has not received any information which corroborates specific allegations that the embassy turned away individuals seeking safehaven. Throughout the violence, beginning on the evening of July 5 and for ten days thereafter, the State Department monitored events in Cambodia on a 24-hour basis through a special task force that kept in constant telephone contact with the embassy. There was never any mention of turning Cambodians away; to the contrary, the embassy kept us informed of their energetic efforts to help.

Our embassy immediately set up a command center and safehaven at the Cambodiana Hotel, which was accessible and afforded more protection than the embassy compound itself which was cut off by roadblocks and violence. All those seeking the embassy's help received it, either at the compound or at the Cambodiana. On several occasions, the Ambassador ventured out into the city at great personal risk in search of fearful FUNCINPEC members, and made high-level representations to the government authorities on their behalf. To the best of my knowledge, no one who sought the embassy's help -- American or Cambodian -- suffered any harm.

The State Department has tried to track down the sources of the allegations against the embassy. In one case, an opposition politician who left the country on his own and came to the United States on special parole with our help was quoted as saying that the embassy in Phnom Penh had failed to help him. When this individual, who is safe, was subsequently asked whether he had made such statements, he acknowledged to us that he had never asked the U.S. Embassy for assistance.

Ambassador Quinn will be available to brief Members in more detail when he returns to Washington later this month. In the meantime, the State Department will continue to work with the Committee to clarify any additional questions that Committee members may have on this subject.

Conclusion

We have initiated a robust approach that signals to Hun Sen, in our direct contacts with him and through our friends in the region, that he has destroyed the framework of the international settlement we all agreed to in Paris six years ago. Until that framework is restored, we will not agree to business as usual with Cambodia. We will maintain pressure in the coming months to obtain assurances that exiles can return, election preparations can go forward, and free and fair elections can take place.

I leave tomorrow for a number of countries in Asia, where I will discuss these objectives and a common strategy with these countries. Cambodian issues will also be a major topic during our meetings at the UN General Assembly. The entire international community has a stake in Cambodia, and we intend to do our best to reach a satisfactory outcome.

ATTACHMENT: SUMMARY OF U.S. ACTIONS

Immediate U.S. Policy Response

On July 7, the first working day after the violent ouster of Prince Ranariddh from the coalition government, senior Department officials called in diplomats from the ASEAN members, Perm-Five nations, and ambassadors from all Paris Peace Accords signatories, including Japan and Australia to convey core U.S. principles and our determination to see the framework of the Paris Peace Accords reinstated.

On July 9 we announced the suspension of all aid to the Cambodian government for an initial 30-day review period; during that time we ensured that some assistance for essential humanitarian and democracy programs could continue through NGOs working directly with the Cambodian people. In the absence of effective steps by the government to alleviate the continuing atmosphere of fear and intimidation in Cambodia, the Secretary on August 9 extended indefinitely the suspension of aid to the government, while allowing for continued assistance for humanitarian and democracy building programs.

During the first week after the violence we twice called in Cambodia's Ambassador to Washington (a member of Hun Sen's party) to voice our strong condemnation of the violence of July 5-6, and of the continued killing.

Prior to ASEAN's decision on July 10 to delay Cambodia's admission to that organization, we consulted intensively with our ASEAN colleagues to convey our strong support for such a delay. That decision turned out to be the first of many positive steps ASEAN has taken to seek a return to political stability in Cambodia, and we have strongly supported ASEAN's engagement.

Ambassador Quinn met with Hun Sen on July 12 and delivered a strong message deploring the violence and emphasizing our grave concern over human rights abuses and the challenge to the Paris Accords. He emphasized that we would stand by our core principles, including the right of the opposition parties to operate freely in Cambodia. He has had numerous follow-up conversations with other senior Cambodian officials to reinforce this message.

Solarz Mission

To support the ASEAN initiative and to try to coordinate policies with other regional players on Cambodia issues, Secretary Albright dispatched Special Envoy Steve Solarz to the region for urgent consultations with key Cambodian leaders. He met with King Sihanouk, Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh, as well as with Cambodian human rights representatives and opposition politicians who were forced to flee the country. He also met with key ASEAN ministers and senior officials in Japan and China to solicit views, ideas and support for an effort to achieve a political settlement.

Secretary Albright at ASEAN/ARF

The Secretary made Cambodia a high priority in her meetings with her counterparts in Kuala Lumpur, July 27-28, during the ARF/PMC. She voiced the U.S. government's strong support for the ASEAN initiative led by three of its foreign ministers in search of a negotiated political settlement. She proposed -- and received several expressions of support for -- the formation of a "Friends of Cambodia" group to work cooperatively in support of ASEAN's lead role in mediating a political settlement that would permit free and fair elections in 1998.

Special Envoy Anderson Mission

Following these productive consultations with us, and despite Hun Sen's initial rebuff of ASEAN engagement, the ASEAN "troika" (the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines) met with Hun Sen twice in July and August. To keep that process moving, and to demonstrate our strong backing for the ASEAN initiative, the State Department sent Special Envoy Desaix Anderson back to the region August 7-13 for another round of intensive discussions with Cambodian leaders, Cambodian human rights groups, and exiled opposition politicians. He met also with senior Japanese officials to exchange views. Mr. Anderson conveyed a letter of support from the Secretary to the ASEAN ministers when they met in special session in Singapore on August 11 to announce their next steps on Cambodia.

Protection Of U.S. Citizens

When the violence broke out in Cambodia on July 5, the first priority of our Embassy in Phnom Penh was ensuring the safety of the approximately 1,200 U.S. citizens in that country.

On July 5, as explosions rocked the city, Ambassador Quinn was in contact with both sides urging a ceasefire and restraint. On July 6, he met again with senior officials of the CPP and spoke with FUNCINPEC ministers to advocate forcefully a halt to the violence.

On July 5, our embassy immediately set up a command center and established a safehaven at the Cambodiana Hotel for American citizens and Cambodians in danger. The hotel was accessible and afforded more protection than the embassy compound which was cut off by roadblocks and fighting. Over 650 Americans, and many Cambodians, sought shelter at that facility.

Over the course of the following week, embassy employees, supported by colleagues from other posts as well as by a task force established for this purpose at the Department of State in Washington, worked around the clock assisting U.S. citizens in their exodus from Cambodia.

From July 5-8, the embassy consular section remained open and staffed to assist American citizens either in person or through the embassy's warden system. During this time, the embassy also assisted in emergency processing for over twenty orphans who were being adopted by American citizens.

On July 7, two Cambodian-American FUNCINPEC officials who had been in hiding came to the embassy after speaking with the Ambassador. They were admitted to the embassy and subsequently driven to the safehaven at the Cambodiana Hotel in an embassy vehicle.

Also on July 7, after receiving a call about eight American citizens and one senior FUNCINPEC official trapped in an area of heavy fighting, the Ambassador drove to the area despite personal risk to assist these individuals.

Every American who wished to do so was able to leave the country safely. The great majority did so with some assistance from the embassy, which, in addition to the provision of a safehaven at the Cambodiana Hotel, also provided 24-hour travel information, travel assistance, free shuttle bus service to the airport (using several buses chartered by the Ambassador), and teams stationed at the airports in Phnom Penh and Bangkok to help with problems.

More than 100 U.S. citizens and contract workers of USAID stranded in the Cambodian provinces were safely evacuated to the capital as a result of a two-day airlift operation.

In summary, as a result of the efforts by Ambassador Quinn and his staff, every single American citizen remained safe during the fighting and every American who wished to leave Cambodia was able to do so safely.

Protection of Endangered Cambodians

Based on information currently available to the Department, reports that the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh did not do everything it could to ensure the safety of Cambodians in danger are both inaccurate and unfair.

Ambassador Quinn and his staff faced two types of situations in Phnom Penh during the period of fighting: first, individuals who were in imminent danger of being killed or injured; and second, persons who, while not in imminent danger, needed protection or other assistance to remain safe or to leave the country.

To assist those who were in imminent danger, Ambassador Quinn and the embassy undertook the following actions:

-- On July 6, after receiving urgent calls requesting protection, Ambassador Quinn and staff, at some considerable risk, went to a battle area just as fighting ended to offer personal protection to senior FUNCINPEC officials.

-- On July 7, in response to pleas from other FUNCINPEC officials in hiding, Ambassador Quinn urgently sought and received assurances from the government of safe passage and protection for these officials. All today are safe, and several have expressed their deep personal gratitude to the Ambassador for this assistance.

-- In response to the Ambassador's direct instruction, all persons who came to the embassy and asked to be admitted because of fear, were admitted, including two FUNCINPEC officials, two members of the royal family, and a police official close to Internal Affairs State Secretary Ho Sok.

For those persons not in imminent danger of death or injury, the embassy provided assistance and protection as well. A number of Cambodians took refuge at the Cambodiana Hotel, where embassy officers were stationed 24 hours a day. Any time there was a rumor or concern about a possible arrest or search for political opponents, the Ambassador or another senior officer went to the hotel.

The embassy also assisted Cambodians with travel arrangements and transportation. Every Cambodian political figure (including ministers and generals) who requested help was escorted to the airport by an embassy representative with an embassy vehicle. The Ambassador also stationed embassy officers at the airport to deal with every flight and ensure that at-risk persons were able to board their flights.

The embassy at all times acted in accordance with worldwide U.S. policy and practice, which is to offer asylum within the chancery only as a last resort and in cases of imminent danger. (In cases other than imminent danger, persons could not be given sanctuary without the State Department's authorization on a case-by-case basis.) No such specific request for sanctuary was received during the fighting.

According to one account, a Cambodian Member of Parliament reportedly said that he had been turned away by the embassy. However, that MP informed Department officials last month that he had never directly contacted the embassy in Phnom Penh. We are working with the INS to arrange for some of his family members to come to the U.S. Our embassy in Phnom Penh has been in touch with his relatives on several occasions since the violence to ensure that they are safe and to reiterate our offers of assistance.

In mid-August, the Embassy also assisted in the departure of Pen Sovann, a former CPP official and ex-Prime Minister who felt threatened. Ambassador Quinn personally approached Cambodian government authorities to seek assurances of safe passage for Pen Sovann. Pen Sovann was taken to the airport in an embassy vehicle, and Ambassador Quinn was present to ensure he departed the country safely.

In conclusion, no person who came to the embassy seeking assistance or protection from danger was turned away or denied assistance.

[end of document]

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