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Democracy in Africa

Remarks by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs George E. Moose at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, April 19, 1996.

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Good evening. I am delighted to be here to discuss democracy in Africa. It is always a distinct pleasure to visit your beautiful campus here in Bloomington and I am deeply honored to have been asked to participate in the Hans Wolff lecture series. Indiana University has developed a world reputation among centers of African studies. Dr. Wolff's pioneering work in the field of African linguistics paved the way for generations of students to follow. His work and that of other dedicated scholars here at IU have encouraged countless students to embark upon the fascinating adventure that we call the study of Africa and its people.

I will try to paint you a picture of the events we have witnessed (and on which we hope we have exerted a positive influence) in the nations of Africa in recent years. It has been a period of promise and fulfillment, disappointment and frustration. But such unique challenges are not surprising on such a diverse and complex continent as Africa. That said, I wish to emphasize at the outset that what we are seeing in Africa today represents no less than a quiet revolution in the attitudes and aspirations of people across the continent.

Six years have now passed since Namibia led the vanguard of 19 African nations onto a new path of democracy. The United States can be proud of its contribution to democratic reform, but we should be mindful that it is Africans themselves who have chosen democracy. Today, I would like to talk about why we believe they have done so, what results their efforts have produced, and why it is in the self-interest of the United States to continue its support.

People tend to see the Cold War as a watershed. But the fact is that the people of Africa began to abandon old political ideologies and experiments in centralized economic systems well before the end of the Cold War. They saw democracy and free market economies as hopeful alternatives to the failed policies that had left them less well off than their parents. They looked to transparent and accountable government as a cure to corruption. They saw the possibility of participation as a way to end conflict. They hoped that democracy would allow them greater control over the political and economic systems that governed their lives. Africans have sought democracy for the same reasons Americans promote it--because it provides the greatest hope for prosperity, peace, and a better tomorrow.

What has Africa's experiment with democracy produced? The results are frankly mixed. Each country has had to find its own way, one compatible with its unique history, culture, and challenges. When we look at the Sub-Saharan continent today, we see strong democratic successes, like Namibia, Benin, South Africa, and Mali; we see countries which began well and stumbled, like Niger; and we see countries that have taken steps backward--The Gambia, Sudan, and Nigeria. Africa's progress has been neither linear nor monolithic, but there has been progress: In 1989, there were only five African countries that could be described as democracies; today there are 23.

Most countries have introduced democracy through elections. A common myth associated with elections in Africa is that most have been flawed. The reality is that, counting last month's elections in Sierra Leone, 22--or two-thirds--of Africa's "first time" elections have been judged free and fair by outside observers. Thirteen incumbents were unseated through those elections. Already, Namibia, Cape Verde, Comoros, and Benin have conducted their second round of free and fair national elections. These achievements receive little public notice, but they are critical to laying the foundation for greater political change.

Even in countries where we have witnessed flawed elections, we see political openings that foment continued pressure for change. Newly elected parliaments in Togo and Kenya, for example, have demanded greater accountability from the executive branch in its handling of public resources.

There are those who believe elections are insignificant unless they result in instant democracy. Democracy does not emerge instantly, as we in the United States know well; and elections represent only one important element in the democratic process. Strong institutions, like impartial judiciaries, independent legislatures, a free press, vibrant civic associations, and a culture of respect for human rights and citizen participation are just as important to a strong democracy as elections. These take time to develop. Power sharing and equal political and civil rights did not come easily to us; we should understand that they may not come easily to Africa. We can expect resistance, and we find it.

Yet despite decades of authoritarian rule, severe economic problems, and, in some cases, great resistance to change, Africans are developing and strengthening their democratic institutions. In Benin, for example, the Constitutional court declared the former ruler winner of the recent presidential elections, and the incumbent, President Soglo, stepped down. In the Central African Republic, a nascent parliamentary opposition group forced the resignation of a prime minister on a motion of censure for mismanagement. In Kenya, the legislature turned back a bill proposed by the executive that would have restricted freedom of the press. And in 11 countries as diverse as Ghana, Sierra Leone, and South Africa, independent election commissions have become part of the political landscape. The United States has been instrumental in the establishment of all of these institutions.

Perhaps the most dramatic change in Africa has taken place in its civil society. In the early 1990s, new and vibrant civic groups and independent newspapers sprung up across the continent. We are now seeing the effects of private radio and television stations, and we are witnessing an increase in the participation of women in public life. I am proud that the United States has been at the forefront in support of African civil society and African women.

Africans have taken the lead in bringing democracy to their countries, and the United States has supported them. That is because it is in our national interest to do so. Democratic values are fundamental to our system of political beliefs, and promoting policies that support democracy reinforces virtually all of our other policy objectives.

Encouraging free market economic reforms and developing markets for U.S. trade and investment are also important policy priorities. With 10% of the world's population and one-quarter of its land mass, Africa's potential is important to us. Promoting democratic governance, accountability, and the rule of law fosters the kind of enabling environment the U.S. private sector requires to do business.

We are also active in conflict resolution and prevention activities. Strong, democratic institutions offer the means to resolve social and economic problems peacefully; supporting them is far more cost-effective than paying the bill for the results of war.

The United States has already made an impact on economic development. Population growth has slowed where the United States has supported family planning. Rising literacy rates, the emergence of new entrepreneurs in the private sector, and higher export earnings are partially the result of development programs that we support bilaterally and through international institutions. The democracy programs we assist, particularly those that develop civil society, complement and enrich these development activities because they focus on civic participation and citizen responsibility.

We who have worked to promote democracy in Africa have learned many lessons. Promoting democracy is not just one discrete activity; it is accomplished in a variety of ways and is linked to other objectives. It is a long-term proposition, and we are likely to witness both success and setbacks along the way. Democracy is more than just an election: it is a culture that cannot be imposed but must be developed from within. For that reason, we must be patient. We must take advantage of opportunities that arise and be ready to work with different groups--governments, legislatures, parliaments, civic associations, judiciary, press, and the private sector.

In helping Africans hold free and fair elections, the United States combines diplomatic pressure, often with donor partners, and direct assistance. Our aim is to promote transparency, participation, and a level playing field. Our programs emphasize technical assistance over expensive commodities and include such things as help in formulating electoral laws and procedures, training for political parties and poll watchers, education for voters and civic associations, and providing international election observers.

Although we are encouraged by the trend toward democracy and away from repressive forms of government in Africa, we do not naively believe that the path ahead will be easy. Indeed, we have had our share of disappointments and frustrations. But we have tried to learn from our setbacks as well as our successes over the years, and have tried to adapt and refine the ways we promote and support democracy.

We will obviously continue to support elections because they are the key to the democratic process. But in addition, we will continue to look for ways to strengthen the underpinnings of democratic societies--adequate representative parliament systems, independent judiciaries, and robust media, among others.

Because we recognize that democracy and development go hand in hand--indeed they have a synergistic effect on each other--we target our development efforts on countries which have demonstrated a commitment to democracy. These are our focus countries. But we will not turn our backs on those yearning for justice and development in countries that are lagging or failing to adapt. We will support sincere democrats where we find them and seek to sustain their efforts in often hostile environments.

But we cannot carry out our policies on the strength of our words alone. We cannot do it on the cheap. But we can realize our policy objectives with reasonable, yet modest levels of resources. We seek to ensure that there is a balance between our objectives and the programs we have in place to support them. This balance has become ever more difficult to achieve as the pressures of our own budgetary crisis become greater. In the last fiscal year, we achieved notable results with the expenditure of only some $80 million in direct foreign assistance for democracy. In the current fiscal year, we will be lucky to secure as much as $60 million to support our efforts.

It would be unfortunate if, as Africa begins to listen, we are unable to sustain the dialogue. In a world which keeps getting smaller, we ignore Africa at our own peril. Our assistance to Africa is not a handout; it is an investment. And if that investment is properly managed, both we and the Africans stand to reap substantial benefits.

Democracy in many countries is fragile and can be easily undermined by overinflated expectations, fear of the cost of losing power, and corporate military interests. We need to look at the underlying causes of the coups or coup attempts in Gambia, Niger, Guinea, and Burundi. We need to understand what needs to take place--along with elections and political and economic reform--to ensure that gains are not lost through conflict, fear, intimidation, or repression.

We, and the citizens of the new democracies, must take a farsighted view about democracy, even as we help address immediate expectations through innovative and cost-effective strategies. We must continue to work in concert with other governments and institutions to influence reluctant leaders to open their governments to popular participation and scrutiny. We must encourage civil society's watchdog role and remain vigilant to human rights. And we must do a better job at engaging the African private sector to assume its responsibility. We must stay engaged when the going gets tough, as it surely has in Liberia, Rwanda, and Burundi; see our efforts through in Angola and Mozambique; and maintain the pressure on Nigeria and Zaire to make good on commitments to elections.

Ultimately, the success of democracy in Africa depends on Africans themselves. But at this moment in history, the United States has a unique opportunity to help Africa's people form the institutions and leaders they need to create the change they--and we--are seeking on the continent. In the past two years, we have seen countries like South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Benin, Mali, Angola, and Senegal adopt a "good neighbor policy" to counter coups and help restore democracy in African countries. We, too, need to be a "good neighbor" to Africans seeking democracy. Failure to commit is in no one's interest. Democracy in Africa is in all of our interests.

[end of document]

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