The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001.  Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date.  This site is not updated so external links may no longer function.  Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.

Susan E. Rice Statement before the Subcommittees on Africa and on International Operations and Human Rights of the House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, July 29, 1998

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairmen. I wish to thank the members of the House Subcommittees on Africa and on International Operations and Human Rights for this opportunity to address two pressing human rights crises of serious concern for the United States--the humanitarian crisis in southern Sudan and the heinous activities of the "Lord's Resistance Army" in Uganda and southern Sudan. Although these crises are occurring in two different countries and differ substantially in scope and character, they share one thing in common: both result in large part from the callous and repressive policies of the Government of Sudan.

Sudan

Before turning to the humanitarian situations in southern Sudan and northern Uganda, I would like to review with you the key elements of our Sudan policy and the events that have shaped that policy. Traditionally, throughout Sudan's 42 years of independence, the United States has sought good relations with Africa's largest state. However, when the National Islamic Front seized power in 1989 by overthrowing the democratically elected head of state, our relations deteriorated sharply. Today, Sudan is the only state in Sub-Saharan Africa that poses a direct threat to U.S. national security interests.

During the past 9 years, we have been at odds with the Government of Sudan over four fundamental issues.

First, we condemn and strenuously oppose the Sudanese Government's active sponsorship of international terrorism. The government has allowed international terrorists such as Saudi financier Usama bin Ladin and the Hamas organization safe haven in Sudan, has established training camps for extremist militants, and was also involved in the assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

Second, the NIF regime continues to destabilize neighboring states through its assistance to a range of organizations, including the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, the Eritrean Islamic JIHAD, and Oromo Liberation Front in Ethiopia, who have consistently targeted civilians.

Third, the Government of Sudan systematically violates the human rights of its own citizens. Torture, religious persecution, slavery, and forced imposition of Sharia law on Sudanese throughout the country are pervasive and well documented.

Fourth, the Government of Sudan continues to prosecute a vicious war strategy in the south that is the direct cause of much of the starvation that is now killing so many in southern Sudan. Quite simply, the policies and practices of the NIF government directly put at risk the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent people--at home and abroad.

As a result, our policy is to isolate the Government of Sudan and to pressure it to change fundamentally its behavior. At the same time, we seek to contain the threat that it poses to U.S. interests, to neighboring states, and to the people of Sudan. Toward this end, we are working on two levels: undertaking specific bilateral measures and urging the United Nations and other concerned countries to act in concert to compel the government to change its behavior. On a bilateral basis, the United States designated Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism in August 1993, and imposed comprehensive economic sanctions in November 1997. These sanctions froze all Sudanese assets in the United States, barred the importation of Sudanese products, and prohibited American companies from selling goods and services to Sudan. We believe these sanctions are now effectively denying Sudan access to American financial institutions and markets.

On a multilateral basis, we supported the 1996 United Nations Security Council Resolution that imposed diplomatic sanctions on Sudan. In addition, we introduced resolutions at meetings of the United Nations Human Rights Commission condemning Sudan's flagrant violations of human rights. We have also worked with other countries to restrict arms sales to Sudan and to try to impose an air flight ban on Sudanese airplanes. Through our Frontline States Initiative, the United States has provided nonlethal military assistance to several of the countries bordering Sudan so that they can defend themselves against NIF-sponsored aggression.

We recognize, however, that security and democracy will come to Sudan only when the warring parties opt for a resolution of the 15-year civil war on the basis of a just and durable peace--a peace that is based on respect for fundamental human rights of all Sudanese. Thus, the United States is actively supporting, financially and diplomatically, the ongoing peace process sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development--IGAD.

The United States strongly supports IGAD. We have assisted its revitalization efforts and provided direct assistance to the Sudan peace process. Our reasons are two.

First, the IGAD peace process represents a genuine effort by the region to address its own problems. We want to support this encouraging trend;

Second, and unlike any other negotiation effort, IGAD has successfully defined a framework for resolution which tackles the central question of religion and state.

The Government of Sudan would like a proliferation of the peace process in order to delay, confuse, and undermine the IGAD process. We must not allow these efforts to succeed. We remain hopeful that additional progress will be made when the next round of talks resumes in August.

To promote viable democratic systems in post-war Sudan, we also have encouraged the various Sudanese opposition groups to strengthen their cooperation, halt human rights abuses--especially by the SPLA and splinter factions--and to develop democratic institutions in areas under their control. Secretary Albright met last year with the leaders of the National Democratic Alliance--NDA--the umbrella opposition organization, to encourage them to work together effectively to promote the rights and freedoms of Sudanese citizens. USAID is providing $4 million in development assistance to areas administered by these opposition groups in an effort to enhance the establishment of transparent and democratic systems that can, over time, ensure that Sudanese citizens control their own destinies.

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairmen, the humanitarian situation throughout southern Sudan remains dire despite massive U.S. assistance. Due to 3 years of drought, a dozen-plus years of internal strife, and the decision by the Government of Sudan to ban relief flights for the most severely affected areas in February and March, an estimated 2.6 million people are facing starvation or malnutrition. Through direct pressure galvanized by the United States, the international community finally managed to persuade the Government of Sudan to grant access to relief flights on April 1. Without the direct intervention of the United States Government, I do not believe the flight ban would have been lifted. The United Nations umbrella agency for NGO operations in Sudan, Operation Lifeline Sudan-OLS--provides the bulk of the relief to the most affected areas.

Largely due to swift U.S. support, OLS should be able to provide the 15,000 metric tons of food per month needed by the most desperate people in the south beginning in August. OLS is using our most recent assistance to lease additional heavy-lift aircraft and will soon have 13 such aircraft, including C-130s, operating out of Lokichoggio, Kenya, and three newly opened regional bases. The current food delivery program will be the largest of its kind in history, surpassing the Berlin Airlift.

Members of Congress have urged that the United States also provide assistance to civilians living in areas that the OLS cannot reach. Let me assure you that we are already doing that. We feel that support for OLS is critical, both because it can deliver to needy civilians but also because the operation was agreed to, through negotiations, by both parties to the conflict. We cannot abandon that precedent, either for Sudan or for the many other hot spots in Africa where conflict has impeded our efforts to assist innocent civilians. That being said, we recognize that OLS faces serious constraints, and so continue to provide assistance to non-governmental organizations working in non-OLS areas.

The United States has been the largest bilateral donor--specifically targeting efforts to alleviate the suffering and end the humanitarian crisis in the south of the country. Since 1989, the United States has provided more than $700 million in humanitarian assistance to Sudan. This year alone, we have already pledged more than $78 million. The $78 million includes 60,000 metric tons of food--plus transportation costs--emergency healthcare, and tools and seeds for farming. More is likely to be provided. Already, the United States accounts for over one-third of the total relief being provided by the international community. We've also decided to allocate up to 100,000 additional metric tons of wheat being purchased from U.S. farmers for Sudanese relief efforts.

Today, Roy Williams, the Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance at USAID, is in Sudan assessing the magnitude of the current problem and the international effort being mounted to bring it under control. After his return, we will pursue appropriate next steps to expand efforts and capacities.

As we look ahead, we must work in concert--the Congress, the Administration, and the international community--to end the current crisis in the south of Sudan. But we must bear in mind the root cause of this crisis. Too many Sudanese are going hungry largely because of indefensible government policies. Thus, we must continue our broader policy of pressuring the Khartoum regime to change fundamentally its behavior.
Indeed, we must also note that the Sudanese Government's destructive policies are not limited to the south. In the northeast, for example, the GOS has taken reprisals against growing dissent from the nomadic Beja peoples who, notably, are deeply religious Muslims. Young men dependent on temporary labor in Kassala town have been fired from their jobs as punishment for rising Beja opposition. Thousands of the Beja people have been displaced and are now dependent.

We will continue to support actively the IGAD peace process, which is the only viable route to ending the civil war. And we will continue to back the British-led initiative to convince all sides in the southern Sudan conflict to allow open international relief corridors to end the current crisis in south of Sudan and across the entire country.

Uganda
The situation in Uganda is stark evidence that Sudan's disregard for human rights extends well beyond its own borders. The Sudan-sponsored "Lord's Resistance Army" murders, tortures, rapes, kidnaps, and forcibly conscripts the civilian population of northern Uganda. Its favorite targets for kidnapping are children. Kidnapped girls are forced to become sexual slaves to LRA commanders, while the boys are forced to fight. All can be subject to vicious corporal punishment and murder on the whim of a commander. Those who escape or are freed carry with them tragic psychological scars.

Although the LRA and its commander, Joseph Kony, have their origins in Uganda's own history of domestic conflict, it is Sudanese support for the LRA that has given it resources and the sanctuary necessary to terrorize the populations of the Gulu and Kitgum districts in northern Uganda. Sudan provides the LRA with safe-havens deep within its territory and supplies it with military equipment, food, and other materials. After Sudan's support to the LRA increased significantly in 1994, the atrocities suffered by the people in northern Uganda rose exponentially. That suffering continues today.

During the first half of 1998, the number of incidents and the geographic spread of LRA depredations increased. Abductions appear to be down, but children continue to be victimized. In our embassy's assessment, no areas of Gulu or Kitgum Districts can be considered safe. My colleague from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Valerie Newsom-Guarnieri, here today, can answer questions about the 400,000 people living in Internally Displaced Persons camps in the north. I want to emphasize, however, that the situation in the north is of concern to all of us. Our Ambassador, Nancy Powell, visited one of the camps as recently as early July, and Secretary Albright visited Gulu during her December 1997 trip to Africa. We were all deeply moved by the experience of meeting the child victims of LRA atrocities. It left us even more committed to helping Uganda address this ongoing conflict.

The United States Government is engaged on many levels to promote a resolution to the conflict in northern Uganda and to meet the immediate needs of the population there. The Northern Uganda Initiative, announced by the First Lady in Kampala in March, is now a $10 million,
3-year program designed to provide targeted relief and promote development in the areas most affected by the war in the north. The program will focus on food security, trauma counseling for children, employment generation, and reconstruction of the infrastructure, particularly roads, necessary to regenerate economic activity. Although security is the prerequisite for sustainable growth and development in northern Uganda, it is our belief that progress can be made even before the conflict there is ended. Improved economic prospects, moreover, may generate additional support among the local population for the Government of Uganda's efforts to defeat the LRA insurgency.

In addition to our relief and development work, we are promoting other avenues of conflict prevention and resolution. We are delivering non-lethal, defensive military assistance to the Government of Uganda to help improve the effectiveness of its military response to Sudanese-sponsored aggression, in particular that of the LRA. We provided $3.85 million in equipment in FY 1997, and are considering a similar amount for FY 1998. With Congress' help, we can maintain this if our requested FY 1999 budget is considered favorable. In addition, a $400,000 International Military Education and Training-IMET--program is aimed at improving professionalism in the Ugandan Army to help it better protect the population in the north.

The Ugandan People's Defense Force--UPDF--has improved dramatically in the last 10 years. Still, the UPDF has not been as efficient as it could be in combating the LRA and protecting civilian populations. Our IMET program and efforts by other like-minded donors are designed in part to redress this problem, but ultimately the Government of Uganda needs to enhance its own efforts in this regard. We recognize the very difficult challenges associated with fighting an insurgency that operates in a large and remote area and resorts to such brutal tactics, but this is all the more reason for the government to make sure its own military has every advantage possible.

The UPDF as well as government-sponsored local defense forces must guard against human rights abuses. We believe that the Government of Uganda is working to implement a military campaign that respects the human rights of non-combatants and deals as humanely as possible with the insurgents, many of them forcibly conscripted by the LRA. But, the government must do more and better in this regard. At the same time, it is critical that we understand the sharp difference between LRA and UPDF behavior. Abusive tactics are an aberration for the UPDF. For the LRA, they are the standard operating procedure.

At the same time, we are concerned that the government's military response may not be enough. To date, it has not succeeded in eliminating the LRA. Thus, we have encouraged the Government of Uganda to pursue in parallel a political track to resolve the conflict. It is, frankly, difficult to imagine a negotiated settlement with a group like the LRA. Nonetheless, in the interest of arresting the serious costs of this conflict, we believe the Government of Uganda should consider seriously this option. To some degree, at least, we understand that communication has been established.

Perhaps more important for long-term stability in the region, we encourage the Government of Uganda to enhance its dialogue with community leaders in northern Uganda. Members of the principal ethnic group in the area, the Acholi, have been the principal victims of the LRA and the rebellions that preceded the LRA. At the same time, the rebellions have been the work primarily of Acholis. For lasting stability to be achieved, Acholi leaders must recognize the government in Kampala as a legitimate partner seeking to protect their interests, and they must work with local and national governments to build the foundation for peace.

Finally, we must return to the question of Sudan. The LRA would be a much less significant problem were it not for Sudanese support. I have outlined this Administration's policy that seeks to isolate and deny sustenance to the Khartoum regime until it changes its behavior on a number of fronts, including its destabilizing activities in neighboring countries. We continue to draw the attention of friends and allies to the crimes of the LRA in an effort to create the multilateral approach necessary to pressure Khartoum most effectively.

The human costs of the LRA insurgency in northern Uganda are immense. Because it requires the government to sustain high military spending, and because it keeps a large part of the country outside of the productive economy, the war in the north is also detracting from what has been one of Africa's strongest economic success stories in recent years. Sudan's regional aggression, in short, is costing Uganda and many others a great deal, and we must continue to work to contain it.

Mr. Chairmen, I believe the humanitarian crises in northern Uganda and southern Sudan threaten the substantial strides Africa has taken over the past decade toward stability, free market economies, and democracy. Today, many Africans can dare hope that their children and their children's children will actually study and work in peace and security, and freely and regularly elect just and accountable leaders. We look forward to working with both the Africa Subcommittee and the International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee to help all Africans enjoy the same opportunities as the continent approaches the 21^st century.
Thank you.

[end of document]

Return to Africa Home Page
Return to the DOSFAN Home Page
This is an official U.S. Government source for information on the WWW. Inclusion of non-U.S. Government links does not imply endorsement of contents.