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Special briefing by Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs John Kornblum , Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Frank Kramer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements Ted Warner, and Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Central and Eastern Europe of the NSC Daniel Fried on the Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of NATO: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications, introduced by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Glyn Davies, Washington, DC, February 24, 1997.
Mr. Davies. Welcome to the Department of State Briefing. Mr. Arshad, welcome back. It's been a long time.
As advertised, we're going to start off today with about 30-35 minutes worth of introduction for you to the Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of NATO: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications. Speaking to you will be John Kornblum, who is the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, Mr. Frank Kramer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; and Ted Warner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements. They will each in turn have something to say; then we'll take your questions. Once we finish that up, I think we'll go right into my briefing and try to get out of here as soon as we can. John.
Assistant Secretary Kornblum. Thank you very much. We're going to sort of appear in seriatim as a group, if that's appropriate, because there are various aspects of this report, and our colleagues from the Defense Department are particular on the cost figures and, if you will, the strategic analysis are much better prepared to answer than I am. So we will sort of do it as a tag team.
What is being released today is, as Glyn said -- he in fact read the title of it -- "Report to Congress on the Enlargement of NATO: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications." This is the report which was authorized in the Defense Appropriations Act of last year, and it is meant to in fact be a comprehensive statement about the reasons for the aspects of and the costs of the enlargement of NATO.
When you see the report, which will be available for you after the briefing, you will see that it discusses both the historical and strategic implications of this step. It talks about the methodology used to determine what the military implications are. It attaches some costs to the military implications, which my colleagues will talk about in a moment, and it gives some judgments -- in fact, in some detail -- some judgments on what the process is going to be like.
Many of us have put a lot of work into this report, and I would say that it is important for a number of reasons, in addition to the fact that it was mandated by the Congress. It is a very comprehensive statement of our strategy -- the goals of the strategy -- and I think probably -- others can correct me, but I think I'm right on this -- probably for the first time a really carefully thought-out discussion of the military implications and the costs of doing so. As you see when Frank and Ted Warner talk, a great deal of work has gone into coming up with the strategic and cost implications of this, and I think that this will give you a very good picture of how we -- the United States -- believes that this process is going to go forward.
This is an American report, so it is not the conclusions of NATO, although it is, I think, much in line with much of the analysis in NATO. Secondly, maybe to anticipate a question, this report does not prejudge any of the issues which have not been decided yet. In particular, it does not state who we believe the new members are going to be.
The military and cost analysis are based on a generic package, if you will, of new entrants. This is since there are very clear requirements in NATO procedures, and there is a relatively clear understanding of what some of the tasks are for new member, it was possible to put together both proposals and cost estimates for a generic package of new entrants which does not in any way prejudge who is going to join the alliance. I think it's very important for us to state this right up front, so that there aren't a lot of questions about implications which aren't there.
Secondly, I would say as you see the costs -- and you will certainly, some of you, probably compare them with other reports of this kind which have come out -- that these costs are based on the environment that we expect will be there. In other words, there aren't great implications of "what if there's a war," or "what if there's this or what is that." The environment that we are living in now is certainly not a perfect environment, but it is an environment which is absent a strong and overt threat. Building up NATO right now is not a question -- or enlarging NATO is a better word -- is not a question of building up either the alliance or new members against some immediate and perceived threat, rather it is establishing a broader structure of cooperation which, if anything, will be a conflict prevention mechanism. One of the clear implications of this report is that building NATO as a broader conflict prevention mechanism, both by taking in new members but also through things such as the P for P, NATO's peacekeeping role and other things, is first a method of avoiding the dangers of threat in the future but also ultimately, we would argue, of making rational investments now to build a strong foundation for conflict prevention, so that you don't have to make rapid and perhaps dramatic investments in the future.
So the report is very much in the framework of the strategy which you've heard from us a number of times: that is, the United States' strategy is not to enlarge NATO for the sake of enlarging NATO, but rather to have NATO evolve, to have it adapt in a number of ways, including internal adaptation, including new roles and missions, and including a projection outward which includes enlargement, but also includes the goal of using NATO -- and you'll be hearing this more in this 50th year of the Marshall Plan -- to really realize the goals of a truly open and democratic Europe, which the Marshall Plan said 50 years ago.
I will stop there and introduce Frank and Ted, who will talk to you more about the cost aspects, and then we will all be available for questions afterward.
Assistant Secretary Kramer. Ted [Warner] in his office did the substantial work on the cost elements. I'm going to let him cover that. I want to go over some of the aspects of the report that led to those estimates. First of all, this is the President's report but the DoD is completely behind it. It's been reviewed at all levels. It's not just an OSD input; it's a joint staff input, and we all share in this.
Second, as John said, this is an American report. It's not an American prescription for precisely what will happen. It's an American estimate as to what reasonably will happen. We will all go through the NATO process. NATO will have its involvement. So will these countries.
The figures are very well thought through. They're analytic and Ted will put them out for you, but they are estimates, and they are to be understood as such, and then we can all compare them with the reality as enlargement carries on.
We are quite confident about the alliance's ability to do this in a productive way. We're confident that this will both contribute to the security and stability of Europe and also that we can meet the requirements of any mission. We are certain that if we did not go forward with this, that the cost of not enlarging would be significantly greater than any costs that are involved in enlarging. The monetary costs are far less than the concerns that instability and insecurity might bring.
John said that the environment in some sense is the current environment, and that is an environment that is not free from concern, but it's certainly not one that presents the traditional kinds of risks that we had a number of years ago, facing a different situation with the Warsaw Pact. So the costs are done in that setting and carrying forward today's environment. As Ted will tell you, if that changed, then we would have some different views.
Let me stop there and let Ted go to the actual costing, and then the three of us can take your questions.
Assistant Secretary Warner. The task that was undertaken by my office and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, working with the Joint Staff and Program Analysis and Evaluation, was to try to ferret out the military implications of expansion, particularly with regard to collective defense, and therefore to give a sense of the, I guess, order of magnitude with some precision a bit better than that of the costs that would be incurred over the next 13 years or so.
First, let me note that NATO and European defense planning and defense preparations are in transition. NATO has been changing its approach to defense since the collapse first of the Warsaw Pact and then of the Soviet Union itself in the late 80s or 1990s. In 1991, NATO adopted a new strategic concept -- a concept with emphasis on power projection, on meeting a range of challenges to European security in an era where there was no clear-cut confrontation with the former communist foe.
In that context, NATO enlargement will continue in that tradition, and we are going away from the old layer cake in the middle of Germany, which is long gone, to a capability to honor Article V, collective defense, commitments, should that be necessary, but also to prepare to project power in other ways, for instance, as NATO is doing in its NATO-led peacekeeping implementation in Bosnia.
As we look to Article V types of questions -- that is, collective defense -- there are really three different roles or three different dimensions of such a process we ought to think of. Any nation that were to need to be the recipient of the collective defense effort will itself, as the potential victim of aggression, have to make certain contributions. So potential threatened nations must be capable of assisting in their own initial defense -- their ground and air defense,-- and they should also be prepared to accept the reinforcements from the rest of the alliance in order to be able to help to be the beneficiary of the collective defense effort.
The rest of NATO, then -- those not threatened -- have a responsibility to try to structure their forces in a manner in which they can project power to honor commitments and do it in a timely and effective manner.
Finally, the nexus between these two activities is the ability of the would-be threatened nation's forces to operate and inter-operate effectively with the incoming reinforcements. So the problem of reinforcement reception and inter-operability and training and exercises to help enhance that inter-operability are all part of the equation.
As we've sought to break out the cost of enlargement over a time period out to 2009, we identified a couple of phases, and we identified three different dimensions, as you'll see in the report.
Initially, at the time of accession, NATO will already have a de facto capability to project power to new members in order to assist in their defense, were that to prove necessary. Within a couple years after formal accession, currently envisioned to be about mid-1999, NATO would be able to reach a capability called an initial minimum standardization or inter-operability capability between the current members and the new members. So, that third valuable element of having the military forces operate effectively together will at least at a minimum standard, in our view will be achieved around the year 2001.
We then projected a gradual slope of continued improvement of the capability to project the collective defense capability further to the east, and we took it for representative purposes out to the year 2009 -- a decade after formal accession.
We then identified the type of improvements that would need to be made in three dimensions: (1) the exertions to be undertaken by the new members to downsize and restructure and at least partially modernize their forces. Virtually all of the candidates for NATO expansion are currently in the process -- and they have been in the process here throughout much of the 90s -- in a process of downsizing and restructuring their forces as they departed in many cases from the Warsaw Pact and undertook independent defense exertions in the new environment of post-Cold War Europe.
Their efforts will include, then, restructuring and, to some extent, modernizing their forces over the next several years.
As far as current members are concerned, the new strategic concept that NATO adopted in November 1991 committed NATO to develop deployable force projection forces to honor a variety of potential commitments. In this sense, we build up the allied command Europe Reaction Corps for ground force elements as well as air and naval components.
NATO's current members are already embarked on a process of improving the deployability and sustainability of their forces for power-projection tasks. It will be necessary for them to continue this work in order to make good on the potential comments for collective defense further to the East.
And, finally, there are costs to be borne in what we call the "direct enlargement" category. The first two categories are issues or activities already underway -- the new member restructuring, the current NATO members power projection improvements. The third category -- direct enlargement -- are those activities that will be undertaken specifically to make it possible to implement NATO collective defense for new members. They would include a lot of interoperability activity, reception reinforcement assistance and, finally, the question of appropriate training and exercises.
As you will see in the report, we then looked at the capability -- let me say for a minute on the rapid reinforcement of the power projection, we used an illustrative force package, using the Ace Rapid Reaction Corps of four divisions and six wings of deployable NATO capability to give real meaning by the end of the 10 year period by 2009 to this process of having, in fact, the ability to strongly implement a collective defense commitment to new members.
Let me then close by mentioning, then, the costs along the three dimensions. For the new members, they will bear costs in two categories: one, for their own modernization and restructuring efforts; and, two, to bear some of the costs associated with direct enlargement. Between those two, in combination, the new members' costs, by themselves for restructuring, are $10 to $13 billion. They also share some of the direct enlargement costs to the tune of to $3 to $4.5 billion for a total of $13 to $17.5 billion over the time period, all the way -- 13 years out to 2009.
For the current members, for the power projection enhancements, the estimate if $8 to $10 billion, and an additional $4.5 to $5.5 billion associated with the direct enlargement efforts. I'm sorry. The additional is $2.5 to $5.5, for a total of $12.5 to $15.5 billion.
Finally, direct enlargement itself was $9 to $12 billion. I've already assigned some of the costs of that to new members and old members, not including the United States. Let me now expressly note the U.S. commitment here.
The U.S. will not have a significant involvement in paying the restructuring and modernization of the new members. As far as the enhancement of power projection for NATO is concerned, our contributions to the Ace Rapid Reaction capabilities are already highly deployable and sustainable given our wider global posture of our forces that are committed in Europe. Therefore, we need to make no improvements to our contributions to the Ace Rapid Reaction Corps because we already spend for those capabilities and have made those investments in the past.
Finally, in the area of direct enlargements costs -- the $9 to $12 billion -- we will bear a fair share of the portion of those costs which are common-funded. We estimate about 60 percent of those costs would qualify for NATO common funding, and we would pay our share within that. When all is said and done, that comes out to a net American commitment of about $1.5 to $2 billion over the 13-year period, with the lion's share of that really being from the time of accession out to 2009.
So, basically, over a 10-year period, from the year 2000 out to 2009, inclusive, we would be committed to spend about $1.5 to $2 billion total, or about $150 - $200 million each year.
Those are considerable costs. When you add them up, they come up -- on the cost of all three elements -- between $27 and $35 billion over the 13-year period. But when you calculate any of these costs against the anticipated defense spending over those periods by the prospective new members, by NATO's current members -- other than the United States -- by the United States, they are -- in the case of the new members, they are a significant burden but they're associated, in their case, with a significant new set of responsibilities and benefits.
In the case of the current NATO members, including the United States, they are in the neighborhood of one percent and less of the overall defense spending that is anticipated for this time period.
Thank you.
Mr. Davies. Before we go to questions, let me introduce a fourth individual who is available to answer questions along with Messrs. Kornblum, Kramer, and Warner, and that is, of course, Dan Fried of the National Security Council staff, who is Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Central and Eastern Europe of the NSC.
Your questions, please.
QUESTION: Did I understand you correctly, concerning the costs of improving the new members' ability to project with the current members, to protect power, the U.S. would not -- excuse me, it's actually the power projection capabilities of the current European members, the U.S. wouldn't share any of that cost?
ANSWER: In our view, mostly that is to follow through on commitments already made to improve the power projection capability of existing members.
In a sense, the U.S. already shares that burden by sustaining the capabilities that we currently deploy. There are no new expenses to provide new sustainability, for instance, to our air or ground forces stationed in Europe. But, in another sense, the fact that we continue to bear the costs for those forces means that we will most certainly bear our fair share of the Ace Rapid Reaction capability.
QUESTION: The figure you used in that category, that figure would not be --
ANSWER: That figure for additional new capabilities will all be borne by other non-U.S. current NATO members to bring their divisions and air wings up to this standard of deployability.
QUESTION: This is not strictly directly relevant. After your trip to Moscow, do you now see the shape of an agreement with the Russians that could be worked out?
ANSWER: First, I wasn't in Moscow. I think I would refer you to what the Secretary herself has said and what Glyn has said. I think there were hopeful signs, and we intend to work hard on it. I certainly would not be the one who would want to give you a prognosis right now.
QUESTION: I'm just curious. In coming up with this study -- I know you're not prepared to say what nations might be -- you don't know the answer to that. Did you assume three nations, or does it matter?
ANSWER: We assumed a small group. We're not prepared to give the exact number. It's a reasonable projection of those that might enter.
QUESTION: The usual number is presumed to be three, but certain European countries are pushing other members as well. How much would that change the costs?
ANSWER: First, we have no presumptions on the number. We say that all the time but we really mean it.
Secondly, these costs are, after all, as both Frank and Ted said, estimates. The actual cost will come once the names and number of countries, etc. I think what they were saying to you was that this is a very good, representative, if you will, generic example of what NATO enlargement could cost. It should be taken as something which is very realistic for what the real costs are going to be.
QUESTION: The new members are to be drawn from the Partnership for Peace participating states. There are at least 25 of those, if not more. That would considerably change all the figures in your report. So could you give us a slightly better idea? Is it 3-to-5, 5-to-7?
ANSWER: Can I interrupt you there, because you're not correct. The new members are going to be drawn from those countries who identified themselves at the end of 1995 as countries who wish to enter the intensified dialogue in order to prepare for membership. That was not 26. It was about 12 -- 11. So the names of those countries is well known to every one. This is a package which is a realistic assumption of what the enlargement would cost.
QUESTION: Eleven countries?
ANSWER: We don't expect that there will be 11 countries taken in. What you have to do is, take this as an estimate. For you to now to try and specify is simply not a useful exercise.
QUESTION: I'm just trying to get an idea whether it's more than three.
QUESTION: Do you agree with the (inaudible) that expansion of NATO should go hand in hand with the extension of the European Union, specifically that all current NATO members should become members of the European Union first before any further expansion?
ANSWER: We have always said, and you can see it in many of the things that we have published, that the building of new security structures in Europe is an integrated exercise. It includes the strengthening of NATO, the deepening and widening of the European Union, the strengthening of the OSCE, etc., etc.
What we have not said is that there is any sort of lock-step comparison between them. NATO and the European Union are two very different kinds of organization and each will go on its own timetable.
QUESTION: The difference between the Congressional Budget Office of a figure of $125 billion and the $27 -- or whatever -- $35 of this, is that all just because of different assumptions about threats that NATO will --
ANSWER: Yes. That's the basic reason. There are two major studies out there on the street. One by individuals from the Rand Corporation -- former colleagues from the Rand Corporation -- and another from the Congressional Budget Office.
Rand had a power projection estimate in many ways in the same general contours as ours. Their estimate was about $42 billion. There were some differences in the character of the reinforcement force package and so forth that explained those differences.
As far as the Congressional Budget Office, they projected a very, very different environment. They projected an environment of clear-cut, strong hostility directed toward NATO. I don't remember if they fingered them specifically. They, therefore, built a force package that was over twice as large, and they just put a whole set of exertions, including the forward-stationing of forces, the forward pre-positioning of equipment, basically reconstructing defense preparations akin to those we saw in Western Germany throughout the Cold War.
Now, under that set of assumptions, they came up with a set of activities that they had arranged themselves but their version of power projection versus those pre-positioning was between $100 and $120 billion. But it was because it had this very, very different kind of environment that was projected, therefore it increased the nature of the preparations in all of the categories that I spoke of.
QUESTION: So your estimates do not include, for example, a direct assault by Russia on NATO? Rather, they look more towards quelling regional conflicts like Bosnia. If so, could you give an example or two?
ANSWER: Our capabilities would include the capabilities to provide common defense, or collective defense, for new members of a substantial character -- that is an Ace Rapid Reaction Corps of four divisions and six wings. It's not because we anticipate that, but because we think that is a responsible posture. That same posture will be available to all NATO members as a more effective power projection.
We also believe, in light of NATO's change in strategy, that NATO should be prepared to contribute to security throughout Europe in a variety of ways, including the potential for peacekeeping along the lines of the implementation, and now stabilization force, in Bosnia.
QUESTION: In direct answer to the question, your plan does not presuppose a direct war with Russia?
ANSWER: It does not. It presupposes that, nevertheless, there should be a significant military capability to back up the new commitment, and it would provide that.
QUESTION: Just to be very clear; we said it before: The current environment.
Mr. Davies. Before we leave the subject, Mr. Fried has point to make.
Mr. Fried. I want to just emphasize a point about the exertions expected from new members in NATO. Ted made the point that these countries will have to bear two categories of costs. You remember, modernization, restructuring and downsizing of their own forces, and their fair share of direct enlargement costs. It's important to keep in mind their own modernization/restructuring/downsizing expenses are expenses that will have to be borne, in any event, with or without NATO, are already being borne by each of these countries and, in many ways, will be greater in the absence of NATO membership.
The figure for the unspecified group of new members has to be seen in two parts. One is the extra costs required for NATO membership; the other -- quite a bit greater -- are the costs which will have to borne, in any event in one form or another. So that's important. It also parallels the thinking of some central European countries who are undergoing their own similar analysis. So this is something which many countries are arriving at independently.
Mr. Davies. Thank you.
[end of document]
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