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Top Ten Questions on NATO EnlargementFact Sheet released by the NATO Enlargement Ratification Office,
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"NATO can do for Europe's East what it did for Europe's West: prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy against future threats, and create the conditions for prosperity to flourish."
President Bill Clinton
1. Why are we enlarging NATO?
There are four primary reasons that the United States supports adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO.
Enlargement will make NATO stronger and better able to address Europe's security challenges. Europe has been a vital American security interest throughout this century. It remains so today. The addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the Alliance will strengthen our common security, enhance NATO's ability to fulfill its core mission of collective defense, respond to a range of security challenges, and reduce the possibility of another major conflict in Europe of the kind that has claimed so many American lives. As NATO enlarges, more states will share the responsibility to bear NATO's core missions and address new security challenges including weapons proliferation, ethnic conflict and terrorism. The Alliance enlarged three times before, and each time NATO grew stronger. Adding new states to the Alliance today will do so as well.
Enlargement will strengthen NATO. Adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO will make the Alliance stronger and better able to address Europe's security challenges. These states will add over 200,000 troops to the Alliance as well as a willingness to contribute to the security of the surrounding region, as they have demonstrated through their contribution of over 1,000 troops to the mission in Bosnia. The military and strategic assets of these states will improve NATO's ability to carry out its collective defense and other missions.
Enlargement will bolster stability and democracy in Central Europe. The process of adding new states to NATO bolsters stability and democratic trends in Central Europe. Partly to improve their prospects for membership, states in the region have settled border and ethnic disputes with neighbors, strengthened civilian control of their militaries, and broadened protections for ethnic and religious minorities. Such actions not only make this region more stable and peaceful, but also create a better long-term climate for American trade and investment.
Enlarging NATO will erase Stalin's artificial dividing line in Europe. NATO enlargement will help prevent the emergence of a gray zone of insecurity in a region that has been at the heart of this century's worst conflicts. While not every interested state was invited to join NATO at Madrid, the Alliance will keep the door open for future members. Enlargement, combined with other arrangements like the Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the NATO-Ukraine Charter will yield security benefits beyond NATO's own borders. As NATO enlarges, it is forging a more constructive relationship with Russia that will allow NATO and Russia to consult, coordinate activities, and act jointly where possible. NATO enlargement will erase the dividing line in Europe and is a tangible expression of America's commitment to remain engaged in Europe so that it can lead efforts to build a safer and more prosperous transatlantic area for the 21st century.
2. Does Russia oppose NATO enlargement?
While many Russian leaders have said they oppose enlargement, Russia has nevertheless decided to pursue a cooperative relationship with the United States and NATO as enlargement proceeds. At the March 1997 summit in Helsinki, for example, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin were still able to make progress on nuclear arms control and economic issues despite differences over NATO enlargement. Even more important, on May 27, NATO leaders and President Yeltsin signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act to help establish a new and constructive relationship between NATO and Russia. That accord created a new forum, the Permanent Joint Council, that enables NATO and Russia to discuss security issues of mutual concern. This council has now met several times at the ministerial level.
NATO is, and always has been, a strictly defensive alliance, and both before and after enlargement, it poses no threat to Russia. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has taken numerous steps that underscore it is not directed against Russia: It has reduced force levels dramatically, with a two-thirds reduction of U.S. troops in Europe; it has moved away from a massive forward deployment along the old East-West dividing line; and it has directly declared that it does not view Russia as an enemy. Ultimately, NATO enlargement will benefit Russia's security along with the rest of Europe by helping to enlarge the zone of democratic security on the continent. The United States and NATO will continue working closely with Russia to ensure that it can play an active and constructive role in building Europe's new security arrangements.
3. What does the NATO-Russia Council mean? Did the NATO-Russia Founding Act give too many concessions to Russia?
No. The Alliance has made no concessions to Russia, but rather has pursued steps that advance the interests of the Alliance and its members. The NATO-Russia Founding Act, signed May 27, 1997 in Paris, lays the foundation for a new and constructive relationship between the Alliance and Russia. At the same time, it provides a new basis for the Alliance and Russia to pursue mutual security concerns in a manner that can improve the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area. NATO retains its full prerogatives. While Russia will work closely with NATO, it will not work within NATO. The Act makes clear that Russia has no veto over Alliance decisions or decision-making, and NATO retains the right to act independently when it so chooses
NATO's decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), is and will remain the Alliance's sole decision-making authority, as defined in the Washington Treaty. Only NATO members will take part in NAC deliberations and policy decision-making. The Permanent Joint Council established under the Founding Act, while a potentially important new contribution to European security, has no power over NAC decisions.
4. How will NATO adapt to new members? Doesn't enlargement risk turning NATO into a "hollow alliance"?
No. Adding new members to the Alliance will make it stronger and better able to address new security challenges. When Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952, when West Germany joined in 1955, and when Spain joined the Alliance in 1982, their addition made NATO stronger, not weaker.
The three states the United States supports inviting to join the Alliance have over 300,000 thousand troops in their armed forces. They are modernizing their militaries, including upgrades to their communications, air traffic control systems, and overall interoperability with NATO, to work more effectively with NATO forces.
Further, the new members of NATO will enter an Alliance that has proven its ability to address the post-Cold War security environment, including through cooperation with other states. In Bosnia, NATO allies and many Partner countries have gained considerable experience working together. Since 1994, the Partnership for Peace program also has contributed significantly to preparing potential new members' militaries to join NATO.
The United States is committed to guaranteeing that NATO remains fully prepared militarily to meet all possible Article V or other security responsibilities after enlargement occurs. The United States is working with its existing and future allies to ensure their budgets and programs are sufficient to fulfill these requirements. The improvements that must take place in the militaries of Central and Eastern Europe will not take place overnight, but NATO will not create separate standards for new members. The reduced threat in Europe gives us the opportunity to bring new members along without jeopardizing their fledgling economies. Over time they will be expected to contribute fully to NATO's security.
5. After NATO enlarges, will its top commander still be an American?
Yes. The top commander of NATO--the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, known as SACEUR--has always been an American. The current SACEUR is Gen. Wesley Clark. America is the largest and most powerful of the democracies that make up NATO. Because of America's leading role in Europe, there has been no discussion at NATO about changing this arrangement. Moreover, while NATO's strength derives in great part from its integrated military structure, in which troops from all allied countries plan, train, and operate together, American troops in NATO always remain under the ultimate command of American officers and of the President and Commander in Chief.
6. What kind of security commitments will be extended to the new members?
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will enjoy the same security commitments that all current NATO allies extend to one another. Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 holds that "the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." The Treaty does not dictate what response each member will take in such a case and specifically provides that each government will take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force." Article XI of the Treaty says that Article V and other provisions will be "carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes." This provision was added in 1949, partly at the insistence of the U.S. Senate, to ensure the constitutional role of Congress would be preserved for any use of armed force under the Treaty.
Thus the Treaty does not bind the United States to specific or automatic response in case of an attack on a NATO ally. The Treaty does, however, provide a strong political commitment to respond in an appropriate manner to ensure the security of the North Atlantic area. Over the decades, the United States and the other allies have given this commitment practical meaning through their substantial conventional and nuclear planning, training, and other preparations and deployments.
7. What will happen to Central European states that aren't invited into NATO?
Enlargement is a process, not a one-time event. Those states that were not invited to join NATO in Madrid in July were not denied membership for all time. Rather, NATO made a commitment that the door to future NATO membership for such states remains open, and that the first states admitted shall not be the last.
The U.S. and NATO are taking a range of steps to ensure that states not initially invited to join the Alliance are not left in a "gray zone" of uncertain security:
8. What is the cost of NATO enlargement and why is the U.S. Government estimate lower than the others?
In December 1997, NATO completed a study of the military requirements of enlargement and developed an estimate of the cost of funding those requirements. It concluded that the additional cost to the Alliance's own common-funded budgets caused by the addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic would be about $1.5 billion over the next 10 years. The U.S. pays about one-quarter of NATO's budgets. Thus, the additional cost to the U.S. is expected to be less than $400 million over this ten year period. This is the only direct cost to the U.S. as a result of the addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
An earlier study by the Pentagon, completed in February 1997, noted that there also will be costs related to NATO's enlargement that will be borne by the national military budgets of our current and new allies. These include the costs to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic of continuing to modernize their militaries and the costs to current allies of continuing to improve their military capability to carry out the strategy NATO adopted after the Cold War. These two categories of costs would be incurred whether or not the Alliance was adding new members. Using this broader definition of enlargement-related costs, the Pentagon estimated that the total cost to the U.S., current allies, and new allies would be about $27 billion to $35 billion over the period 1997-2009. While this notional analysis was useful, NATO's subsequent study, described above, provides a more detailed and accurate estimate of the likely costs of enlargement that will be borne by the United States.
Two other organizations, the RAND Corporation and the Congressional Budget Office, also developed cost estimates for NATO enlargement. Like the Pentagon's February 1997 study, the RAND Corporation also used a capabilities-based approach to develop notional cost estimates based on two categories: improving self-defense capabilities of new members and NATO power projection. RAND's analysis resulted in an estimate of approximately $42 billion in total costs over an unspecified 10-15 year period. In broad terms, the RAND methodology and cost estimates are compatible with the Administration's study.
In contrast, the Congressional Budget Office study used a threat-based approach to NATO enlargement, which for most of its cost options estimated the cost to launch a conventional defense for Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia against an aggressive and militarily resurgent Russia. This approach resulted in defense upgrades that in every major category exceeded those of the Administration estimate. The CBO methodology is thus quite different from that of both the Administration and RAND, and is reflected in the CBO's maximum cost estimate of $124.7 billion over the 15-year period from 1996 to 2010. In the current security environment, however, the Administration does not believe that the threat assumptions leading to the CBO's higher cost estimate are likely to develop.
9. Why not invite these countries into the European Union instead?
We do not have to make an either/or choice concerning how best to preserve European security. Both NATO and the European Union (EU) are adapting to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era. Both organizations can help build a broader, undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe. Indeed, the integration of the Central European nations into the EU over time is a goal that the EU has set for itself.
The Administration fully supports EU enlargement. Extending the EU will help integrate the entire European continent, but EU enlargement also requires current and new members to make vast and complex adjustments in their regulatory regimes. If NATO enlargement can proceed more quickly, why wait to further integrate Europe until tomato farmers in Central Europe start using the right kind of pesticide?
Expanding the EU instead of enlarging NATO, moreover, will not secure the gains of democracy in Europe and ensure stability on the continent for two reasons. First, unlike the EU, NATO is a transatlantic organization and therefore can ensure that a united Europe maintains its strongest link to North America. Second, unlike the EU, NATO has a highly developed military structure that remains important for European security. The security that NATO provides has always been and will continue to be essential to the prosperity that the EU promises.
10. What is the process of enlargement and of ratification of enlargement?
At NATO's Madrid Summit in July 1997, the Alliance invited Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to begin the process of becoming members. During the fall, NATO conducted detailed talks with each of these states about their political and military readiness to join the Alliance and share its responsibilities. On the basis of these talks, on December 16, Secretary of State Albright and the other NATO foreign ministers signed the protocols of accession that will add these three states to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949. All 16 current allied states must ratify the addition of the new members. Ratification procedures vary among the 16 members, and some may require a year or so to complete. We expect the entire ratification process to be completed, and the new allies to take their place in NATO, by 1999--the Alliance's 50th anniversary.
In the United States, ratification requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate in the form of an amendment to the Washington Treaty of 1949 that created NATO. The Senate NATO Observer Group, formed by Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS), will help ensure a vigorous and comprehensive debate of enlargement in the Senate. NATO enlargement can only proceed with the bipartisan support of the American public and their representatives in Congress. The Administration will work closely with the public, the Congress, and with interested organizations to ensure this important national security initiative succeeds.
[End of Document]
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