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The Origins of
NATO
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Isolationism, the UN Charter, and Postwar U.S. Foreign Policy

The Greek crisis of 1947 was the catalyst for active U.S. involvement in the European crisis. From the beginning, U.S. leaders recognized that the response they gave to Greece's problems had to be presented to the American people in the broadest possible context.

President Truman's March 12, 1947, speech to Congress, prepared by the State Department in consultation with the American military, outlined a specific rationale for providing economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey. It also set the crisis in a larger context:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressure. . . . It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neigh- boring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence.

By calling for U.S. economic and military assistance for Greece and Turkey, the President had confronted European communism and committed the United States to a massive effort to support European democracies in which it would deploy its economic, political and military resources. 12

Many Americans attached high hopes to the United Nations in the first years after the end of the war. The new international organization, located in New York and providing a vivid primer on the emerging new world order in which the United States held great promise and responsibility, seemed to offer a guarantee of lasting peace worthy of the great sacrifices of the war. For most Americans, the United Nations promised to be the embodiment of a powerful and humane internationalism that would overcome their long-held fears of dangerous foreign entanglements--fears that had engendered prewar isolationism.

President Roosevelt and his advisers designed the United Nations and its Security Council mechanisms to respond to these public concerns about long-term international commitments that could lead to new conflict. And it was a vision embraced by Congress, the traditional stronghold of isolationism, which approved U.S. participation in the United Nations with little of the rancorous suspicion and opposition that marked Senate rejection of U.S. membership in the old League of Nations.

The State Department led the campaign to secure congressional approval of the UN Charter, and it envisaged a role for the United Nations in U.S. foreign policy. U.S. policymakers, however, did not believe that the United Nations could deal effectively with the major issues of the early Cold War, U.S. confrontations with the dangers of communism, and the Soviet Union. As President Truman explained to Congress in his March 1947 address:

We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this [Greek-Turkish] crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action, and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required. 13

The address paid lip service to the UN Charter but, in effect, dismissed the new international body as unable on its own to resist violations of the status quo and the Charter by force and violence.

Much to the dismay of the Truman administration and Congress, the American public, while accepting the need to assist Greece and Turkey, reacted strongly against bypassing the United Nations. The administration nevertheless continued to insist that the United Nations should be excluded from calculations about Greek policy. When Secretary of War Patterson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal explored the possibility of a public acknowledgement of the role of the United Nations in the proposed provision of aid to Greece and Turkey, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson reiterated State's position "that we might as well face the fact that the UN will not settle problems of this type and that it is impossible for the UN to intervene in cases involving subversive movements." 14

First session of the UN General Assembly, Flushing Meadows, Long Island, New York, 1946. (Department of State photo)

Acheson deleted a reference to the United Nations from the draft Greek-Turkish aid legislation forwarded by the State Department to Congress in March 1947. Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who had become a zealous advocate for an interventionist role for American foreign policy and favored assistance to Greece and Turkey, viewed the omission of a role for the United Nations as a "colossal blunder," and he made his support for the aid package conditional upon bringing the UN into the legislation. In place of the vanishing spirit of isolationism, the Senate now embraced the United Nations as the principal vehicle for discussing and resolving foreign policy issues. Despite State Department misgivings, in May 1947, a large bipartisan majority in the Senate passed the Greek-Turkish Assistance Act, which included a "Vandenberg amendment" calling for the United Nations to take over the Greek-Turkish assistance program from the United States should U.S. assistance no longer be necessary. Enabling legislation for the Truman program of aid to Greece and Turkey assigned the responsibility for the long-term reconstruction of Greece to the UN. 15 Senator Vandenberg would have more to say about the role of the United Nations in forging the postwar world order.

The Western European Union and the Origin of the Atlantic Alliance

The internal unrest created by national communist parties and increased East-West tensions, as well as the immediate or direct military threat posed by the Soviet Union, were the driving force behind the decision to create a military security pact between the United States and its West European allies. Also critical to European thinking, albeit unstated, was the belief that both the Marshall Plan and the nascent Western European Union were crucial steps toward linking Europe and the United States in a common defense pact. Only the United States possessed the finances and equipment necessary to support effective West European rearmament. Moreover, the overwhelming military power of the United States, at that point the sole state possessing nuclear weapons, was essential to the effective deterrence of both immediate internal and longer term external threats to Western Europe.

Another important concern were French fears about the effect on the European balance of power, and on France's position in Europe, of the economic and political revitalization of Germany, which was essential to facilitate West European recovery. West Europeans, whose main postwar goal continued to be the reconstruction of their economies, were convinced that economic rehabilitation could not occur without military security.

Between January and March 1948 Britain, France, and the Low Countries completed negotiations for a military alliance of West European countries and the establishment of the Western European Union. The Brussels Treaty, under which the allies promised to come to each other's military assistance in case of attack, was signed on March 17. 16

The United States encouraged European unity and self-defense measures and welcomed the Brussels Pact. President Truman went further in an address to Congress on March 17 when he acknowledged the historic nature of the Union and expressed confidence that "the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires." The President stressed the gravity and urgency of the situation when he went on to say:

There are times in world history when it is far wiser to act than to hesitate. There is some risk involved in action--there always is. But there is far more risk in failure to act. 17

The President's encouragement and call for action demonstrated a sympathy for the idea of collective defense, but a great deal of negotiation within the U.S. Government and with the European allies remained before an agreement ensuring collective action became a reality. Early initiative again came from Britain. In early March, even before the signing of the Brussels Treaty, Foreign Secretary Bevin asked the United States and Canada to agree to immediate military staff discussions regarding collective security measures for the defense of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean areas. Secretary Marshall at once agreed. 18

Despite the President's concerns about the necessity for quick action, some U.S. policymakers were hesitant to accept the British call for military staff conversations. The JCS was reluctant to move forward with such talks, fearing they would lead to a transfer to Europe of arms that American forces needed. George Kennan, chief of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, argued against the militarization of an alliance before economic and political unification issues had been addressed. State Department European expert John D. Hickerson and Under Secretary Robert A. Lovett took the lead in advocating negotiations for a defense pact. The Truman administration eventually reached a consensus to proceed with discussions, and the secret Pentagon Talks among U.S., British, and Canadian staffs were held in Washington from March 23 to April 1, 1948. At the final meeting, the U.S. representatives circulated the so-called "Pentagon Paper" outlining next steps the United States was prepared to take aimed at the conclusion of a "collective defense agreement for the North Atlantic Area" in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and applying the experience gained in drafting the Rio Treaty in 1947. 19

While the composition of an alliance was not yet defined, the United States made clear the need for a commitment that an attack on one country would require a prompt, collective response by the entire alliance. 20

While the Pentagon Talks had defined a future North Atlantic alliance, American policy had not yet coalesced in support of U.S. participation. A State Department policy paper of late March on the U.S. relationship to the Brussels Pact evolved into the interagency paper NSC 9 of April 13, "Position of the United States With Respect to Support for the Western Union and Other Related Free Countries." NSC 9 provided that the United States would support but not join the Brussels Pact. Instead the United States would explore a larger mutual defense undertaking--one that would include the United States--embracing not only the Western European Union but the entire Atlantic area, including Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Iceland, Ireland, and Canada. The basis for an eventual mutual defense treaty would be Article 51 of the UN Charter, which recognized the right of nations to self-defense. The United States would, in any case, have to provide Western Europe with military as well as economic assistance if it was to ward off communist expansion. 21

U.S. military leaders continued to be reluctant to endorse undertakings originating in the State Department that would involve U.S. armed forces in major military commitments. They feared that U.S. military strength would be compromised at the expense of Europe which was not doing all that it could for self-defense and was probably not defensible against a determined Soviet attack in any case. President Truman and Secretary Marshall informed the National Security Council of Foreign Secretary Bevin's warning that the United States would have to be willing to assume certain obligations and should initiate Western negotiations for a security treaty. The JCS resisted a commitment to an undefined defense pact and recommended limiting U.S. participation in the proposed Brussels Pact military staff talks scheduled for July in London. 22

State Department policymakers pressed on, nevertheless, with a revised paper that moved the alliance-making process forward. The new paper, NSC 9/2 of May 11, emphasized the need for Senate consultation on a possible alliance and included a draft resolution endorsing negotiations aimed at an Atlantic alliance. The paper called for exploratory diplomatic talks with interested European nations and military staff talks during the remainder of the year pending the outcome of the 1948 U.S. national elections. NSC 9/2 also asked the West European nations to do a better job of preparing their own defense efforts and advocated the standardization of their arms. 23

Next: The Vandenberg Resolution: The UN Charter And the Future Alliance

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