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In May 1998, 24 years after its first nuclear test, India tested nuclear weapons at Pokhran in the Rajastan desert. These tests, along with Pakistan's subsequent ones, dramatically highlighted the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and threatened to undermine global momentum toward nonproliferation. Both India and Pakistan have the capability to deliver nuclear weapons. Both continue to develop and expand their ballistic missile programs. The U.S. believes that the acquisition of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by India and Pakistan has weakened the overall security of both countries, and carries the risk both of destabilizing and ruinously expensive arms race and of nuclear war. KEY U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES The U.S., joined by the P-5 and G-8, and the UN Security Council, has identified a number of steps India and Pakistan should take to address the proliferation dangers in South Asia. These include:
Indian and Pakistan adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states remains a long-term U.S. goal, but neither country is prepared to take that step today. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has held a series of meetings with high level officials of both countries in the nearly two years since the nuclear tests aimed at encouraging their acceptance of nonproliferation steps. As a result of this intensive diplomacy, India and Pakistan, having already declared and observed nuclear testing moratoria, have also given commitments to consider adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to seek national consensus to that end, agreed to participate constructively in negotiations on a Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT) in Geneva, and pledged to examine ways to strengthen and update their controls on sensitive exports to international standards. But neither has yet taken major concrete steps to address our concerns. U.S. SANCTIONS As mandated by the Glenn Amendment, in response to India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests, the U.S. terminated or suspended foreign assistance, with some exceptions provided by law. The exceptions include humanitarian assistance, food and other agricultural commodities, cooperation in combating illegal narcotics and crime, and disaster relief. The DOD Appropriations Act of 2000, signed into law October 25, 1999, provides authority for the President to waive Glenn Amendment sanctions. On October 27, the President exercised the waiver authority for certain activities prohibited by the Glenn Amendment and other restrictions. With regard to India, the President waived all Glenn Amendment sanctions he had waived during FY99, under the previous Brownback Amendment. The waiver specifically covers Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Trade Development Agency (TDA), EXIM Bank, International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, U.S. commercial bank lending to the Indian government, and USDA agricultural credit guarantees. The waiver also covered three environmental and conservation programs -- Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Fund, Asian Elephant Conservation Fund, and the Indo-American Environmental Leadership Program. With regard to Pakistan, the President decided to waive for now only the Glenn Amendment restrictions on USDA agricultural credit programs and the ban on U.S. commercial bank lending to the Pakistani government. THE DRAFT INDIAN NUCLEAR DOCTRINE In August 1999, India released a "draft"nuclear doctrine written by its non-governmental National Security Advisory Board (NSAB). The draft recommended that India construct a nuclear "triad" of land-, sea-, and air-launched nuclear weapons systems, as well as a satellite early warning system and an extensive command and control system. It proposed a "no first use" policy. The Government of India has not indicated whether it endorsed or would implement the draft's recommendations. Decisions on these issues are for India to make, but we hope that the country will pursue security requirements without contributing to a destabilizing and expensive nuclear arms race. INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS Relations between India and Pakistan have deteriorated significantly during the past year despite the promising development in February 1999 of Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's bus trip to Pakistan to meet Prime Minister Sharif and the subsequent Lahore Declaration. India judges that the Kargil incursion of last summer and subsequent increased militant action in Indian Kashmir, the October 1999 military coup in Pakistan, and the December 1999 hijacking of an Indian airliner from Nepal to Afghanistan have all pointed to Pakistan as an unreliable interlocutor and worse. India and Pakistan now seem to place little hope in attaining their divergent objectives through dialogue and have increased military and militant pressure on each other. * The U.S. encourages bilateral dialogue to resolve Kashmir and other issues between India and Pakistan. Our judgment is that other parties can help India and Pakistan only if both are prepared to make difficult, forward-looking decisions based upon ground realities and if both seek the assistance of other parties. INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS India-China relations have been strained since 1962 when the two countries fought a border war over long-standing territorial claims by each against the other. India has also criticized China for its support of Pakistan's missile and nuclear technology programs. Although bilateral relations have warmed gradually over the past decade, India cited in part the threat from China in justifying its nuclear testing in 1998. The two governments have established regular channels of dialogue on economic, territorial, and, most recently, strategic issues. China has, in recent years, urged a Kashmir solution through Indo-Pakistani dialogue, viewed in India as an even-handed approach. Jiang Zemin visited India in December 1996, and President Narayanan plans to visit Beijing in May 2000. Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh visited Beijing in 1999.
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