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Cuba: U.S. Policy Now and in the Future

Remarks by Michael Ranneberger, Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, before the Governor's Cuba Advisory Group, Miami, Florida, February 28, 1997

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to you today. I had the pleasure of meeting a number of members of the Governor's Cuba Advisory Group during their visit to Washington last year, and look forward to continuing our dialogue today.

I would like to start off today by recognizing Governor Chiles' leadership on Cuba. You all know first hand of the Governor's interest in this issue. He has been fully engaged in managing the crises that have occurred over the last several years, working in close cooperation with President Clinton and rest of the federal government. His familiarity with the complexities of Cuba and the potential impact on the State of Florida of developments there have allowed him to play an essential role in dealing effectively with what have been some extremely difficult circumstances. I am certain that the wise counsel the Governor has received from this group has assisted him in this regard.

This week we have marked the tragic anniversary of the most recent Cuba crisis. It was just over a year ago that four Floridians lost their lives when Cuban Government fighter planes opened fire on civilian aircraft over international waters. The President's response to Castro's aggression was swift and sure. Along with a series of other measures, the President signed into law the Libertad Act, or Helms-Burton. Through the Act, Congress and the President sent a clear signal that the Cuban Government's behavior was unacceptable. After a painstaking investigation of the incident, the International Civil Aviation Organization also strongly deplored the action, along with civilized nations around the world.

Earlier this week, members of the Miami Cuban-American community organized an effort to commemorate the victims of the shootdown. I am pleased to say that the event was conducted in a moving but responsible and restrained way that drew a stark contrast between the dignity of this community and the brutality of the Castro regime.

I think we will have time this morning for a broad-ranging discussion. I would like to speak to you for a while about the current situation in Cuba, U.S. policy toward the island and what the future may hold. I look forward to taking your questions afterward. I will try to be as clear and honest in my remarks and answers as Special Envoy Stu Eizenstat has been in his visits to Miami over the last several months.

Hand to Mouth, with an Iron Fist

What is happening in Cuba today? The Cuban Government still tries to maintain its monopoly of information on the island, but the struggle of the Cuban people for daily survival and human dignity is well known. The decision by the Cuban Government to permit CNN into the country is a welcome one, and should help increase the information available to Americans about life in Cuba. We want to see other U.S. news organizations recently licensed by the U.S. Government to open offices in Cuba allowed by the Cuban Government to do so.

The indications that we do have about the current situation in Cuba suggest that in spite of the Cuban Government's claims about surging growth and investment, the island's economy remains fundamentally stagnant. Most Cubans still do not get enough to eat from official rations and must scramble constantly to feed their families and themselves as best they can. Medical supplies are extremely scarce and hospital conditions deteriorating. Public services like water and electricity are erratic and transportation is difficult. The limited economic changes instituted by the Cuban Government in 1993-94 put the brakes on Cuba's economic freefall, but they have not been nearly enough to restore the island's standard of living to the modest level it maintained under the Soviet Union's huge subsidies. The end of those subsidies exposed the inherent disfunctionality of Cuba's economic system. It is that failed system -- and not the U.S. embargo -- that is the cause of the Cuban people's hardships.

As ordinary people live hand to mouth, the Cuban Government does too. It is trying desperately to attract foreign investment and credits, but the squeeze of the Libertad Act and the regime's own record of default on its obligations are making investors and lenders leery of new commitments. As a result, the Government sinks deeper in debt daily, and shuffles its limited resources in an endless shell game. For Cubans, there is no end in sight to "the Special Period."

While I have painted a fairly dark picture of Cuba's economic situation, it would be misleading for me to suggest that the implosion of the existing order in Havana is imminent. I do not believe that it is. Cuba's economy has already sunk well below that level at which most observers had previously believed the regime would collapse, and has rebounded slightly since then.

Why is change so slow in coming to Cuba, when it has come more quickly in the former Soviet Bloc and in our hemisphere? There are a number of possible explanations, but I find two most persuasive. One is that the Cuban Government has successfully limited and distorted the information Cubans have about the United States and about alternatives to the Cuban system. Cubans are subjected to a steady barrage of government propaganda about evil U.S. plans and designs on the island, and of negative information about free market societies. For the many Cubans who see through this smoke screen and have the courage to seek alternatives to the current system, the Cuban Government has another tool available: one of the most repressive and effective internal security systems ever created. As a result, many Cubans have lost hope, and are preoccupied solely with daily survival.

Human Rights Denied

In the pursuit of fundamental freedoms and the right to exercise them, hundreds of Cubans -- dissidents, human rights activists, independent journalists, academics, and many others -- have been subjected to harassment by Cuban authorities. The terror tactics used by the government to intimidate dissidents range from constant surveillance to harassment, loss of employment and access to schools to long-term imprisonment.

During the last year we have seen glaring examples of the Castro regime's callous disregard for international standards of human rights and its dogged determination to deny fundamental freedoms to the Cuban people. It began with last February's crackdown on the "Concilio Cubano," which represented a significant effort by most of the island's human rights groups and many other independent organizations to band together and seek legal status as a non-governmental group. Concilio was clearly considered a threat by the regime.

Since the beginning of this year dozens of human rights activists, independent journalists, and dissidents have been subjected to continuous harassment by the government, including detention, threat of exile, surveillance, searches of their homes by security agents, cuts in public service such as phone service, and threats of long-term imprisonment. In the case of independent journalists, such as CubaPress founder Raul Rivero, the government has instigated "acts of repudiation" during which communist party activists demonstrate in front of the victim's home and denounce his/her activities. In the past week alone, the government has detained close to a dozen activists for their pro-democracy views and their activities in defense of human rights.

Through his words and actions, Fidel Castro has made it clear that he intends no political opening to accompany the limited economic liberalization measures implemented by his government in recent years.

The U.S. Government is committed to maintaining close contacts with human rights and dissident communities to lend our moral and political support to their legitimate aspirations.

Cuba, the U.S. and Florida

I have tried thus far to give you our sense of the situation in Cuba. I would now like to turn to U.S. policy toward Cuba.

The U.S. is often accused of being obsessed with Cuba, and of overreacting to an anachronistic little dictatorship which allegedly poses no threat to the security of a great nation. We have heard this refrain particularly often since the enactment of the Libertad Act. When people ask me about this "obsession," I tell that them the U.S.' level of concern over Cuba comes from two things: first, the regime's systematic denial of universally-recognized human rights and democratic freedoms; and second, that this is happening 90 miles from Miami to, among others, the parents, brothers and sisters of American citizens. We do not react to repression and hardship in Cuba as we would to the plight of a stranger, but rather as we would to a crisis that befalls a close family member. We want to do everything in our power to bring about a solution.

Cuba is in so many ways a matter of family for us. In the most literal sense, hundreds of thousands of Cuban families have been separated on opposite sides of the Florida straits by almost forty years of Communist rule. Cuba also stands apart as the only black sheep in our hemispheric family of democratic nations, as was so clearly demonstrated during the Summit of the Americas here almost three years ago. The people of Cuba want and deserve the same rights as other citizens of the Americas. Finally, Cuba is a natural part of the social, cultural and economic family of the Caribbean, including South Florida. We see an island of musicians and poets a stone's throw away whose work is still subject to censorship. We see 11 million potential consumers -- who also produce products we want to buy -- living hungry under a command economy. To make matters worse, many of these 11 million frustrated Cubans can take to the sea in unsafe vessels at any time, bound for U.S. shores. This is a situation that the people of Florida, and the U.S. Government, find difficult to live with.

In sum, we have an essential and deeply-rooted national interest in what happens in Cuba. Our tough policy reflects that interest. Our overarching goal is to promote a peaceful transition to democracy on the island. To that end, our policy has four essential elements: pressure on the regime for change through the comprehensive economic embargo and Libertad sanctions; outreach to the Cuban people; multilateral efforts to press for democracy; and migration accords to promote safe, orderly and legal immigration from Cuba. The basis for our policy is established in legislation with bipartisan Congressional support, including both the Libertad (or Helms-Burton) Act, and the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992. I'd like to discuss each of those four elements in turn.

Pressure for Change

A fundamental conviction underlying all of our policy toward Cuba, which I believe is amply demonstrated by the facts, is that the Cuban Government does not institute economic change unless it has to, and it will go only as far as it has to in order to maintain absolute control. It has refused to undertake any political change whatsoever. Therefore, if we want to see change in Cuba proceed, we have to apply financial pressure so that the regime has no alternative. The CDA tightened existing economic sanctions on Cuba, while the Libertad Act created a new kind of sanctions, seeking to protect U.S. property interests in Cuba while discouraging foreign investment on the island.

While the Cuban Government initially dismissed the impact of the Act, even they have now acknowledged that it has slowed foreign investment in Cuba. We have implemented the Act in a way that maximizes pressure on the Cuban Government while minimizing disputes with our allies and trading partners. While there have not been a large number of determinations of "trafficking" under Title IV, I think the impact of the law in Cuba has been very significant indeed.

As part of this effort, we have consulted informally with foreign companies which have been concerns about the Act. A number of companies have withdrawn or altered their plans in Cuba in order to avoid determinations of trafficking. We view this as a win-win scenario. Companies avoid sanctions and negative publicity, and we accomplish the intended purpose of the law. We know of around a dozen companies which have either pulled out of Cuba as a direct result of Libertad, or refrained from investments they were planning to make. We suspect that the number of companies which have avoided investments in Cuba out of concern about the Act is actually much larger.

In addition to deterring foreign investment in Cuba, we have also seen that the Act has increased the cost to the Cuban Government of obtaining financing for imports and other transactions. All this adds up to a greater financial squeeze on the Castro regime. It is too early to tell whether any of this will help to bring about change on the island. One year is too short a time to evaluate the law's impact. There are various indications, however, including the Cuban Government's own comments, that the regime is facing an increasingly serious financial crunch.

Focusing more on the Libertad Act's second purpose for a moment, I think that the Act has certainly raised the profile of U.S. concerns about expropriated property in Cuba. Even companies that are proceeding with plans to invest in Cuba are taking far greater care in researching whether there are U.S. claims to the properties in which they are planning to invest. We are hearing this from a number of sources, including the companies themselves. Of course, our goal ultimately is to gain compensation for or return of confiscated U.S. properties for claimants. While prospects for this appear dim in the near term, we can not lose sight of this objective.

Finally, it cannot be ignored that our recent efforts to increase sanctions on Cuba are coming at some cost. The European Union is pressing forward with a case against the Libertad Act in the World Trade Organization, and our NAFTA partners may at some point choose to do likewise. We have made clear that we do not regard our political disagreements over the Act to be an appropriate topic for a trade panel to examine, and that we consider the law consistent with our obligations. These cases raise some difficult issues, however, and defending the law could well place serious strains on the WTO and NAFTA.

Support for the Cuban People

While we believe that tough economic sanctions are necessary to promote peaceful democratic change in Cuba, the Administration also believes that they alone are not enough. Change in Cuba must come from within, led by Cubans on the island who recognize the problems and injustices of the current system and challenge them. Increasing the flow of information to, from and within Cuba is essential to fostering this dynamic, as is outside support and advice to independent groups trying to carve out space for their activities. President Clinton has made this a priority, initiating measures in October 1995 to permit groups in the U.S. to begin developing new kinds of contacts on the island. He also approved a $500,000 grant to Freedom House to increase the flow of books and other information to the Cuban people. These steps complemented earlier efforts to improve telecommunications service between the U.S. and Cuba, and to encourage private humanitarian donations to NGOs in Cuba.

Since the October 1995 measures were announced, the Administration has licensed dozens of trips, programs and other activities by NGOs and institutions in the U.S. aimed at establishing positive working relationships with counterparts in Cuba. Several U.S. NGOs have begun sharing expertise and modest resources with Cuban partners, American students and teachers are meeting with their peers, and of U.S. professionals and researchers are establishing contacts and cooperation with colleagues on the island. These new ties are not government-to-government, but people-to-people, and convey to ordinary Cubans that Americans are poised not to invade or annex Cuba, but rather to help it rejoin our family of democracies and realize its true potential.

Over the past four years, we have authorized almost $150 million in private humanitarian aid from U.S. NGOs to the people of Cuba.

Helping Cuba realize its potential is also the theme of an important new report that the Administration recently released under the mandate of the Libertad Act's Title II. The report describes potential international assistance to future transition and democratic governments in Cuba, and it is available on the internet for anyone interested. The report estimates that the U.S. and other international donors would be prepared to provide Cuba with between $4-8 billion in assistance and investment to support the island's transition to democracy and a prosperous, free market economy. It draws lessons from cooperation between national leaders and international donors in other transitions in Eastern Europe and our hemisphere.

The report is not a blueprint for Cuba's future, since only the Cuban people and its democratically elected leaders can chart the country's future course. And it is not a bribe, as the Cuban Government has alleged. It is an assurance that the U.S. and other members of the international community will be there to help Cuba through the initial difficulties of regaining freedom and prosperity, as we have been in Haiti, El Salvador, Poland, the Czech Republic and elsewhere. The Title II Report simply provides the Cuban people with an alternative vision of their future which contrasts sharply with the prospect of further repression and decay which they face under the current regime. The report is receiving extensive coverage on Radio Marti and is being distributed on the island.

Building International Pressure for Change

In his never-ending ideological battle with the United States, Fidel Castro has always sought the support of the international community, particularly from U.S. allies. In spite of the Cuban Government's longstanding violations of universally-recognized human rights, Castro has often been successful in winning the sympathy of other countries by playing David to our Goliath. Castro has used this international sympathy to try and convince the Cuban people that his regime and social experiments enjoyed widespread support and admiration in the world.

Even die-hard proponents of the Libertad Act would probably admit that, initially, the Act strengthened the Cuban Government's ability to distract international attention from the real problems in Cuba and focus them on disputes between the U.S. and its allies. The President's approach to Title III, however, along with a lot of hard work by Stu Eizenstat, has turned that around. We have achieved unprecedented progress in the last six months in building international will to promote democracy on the island.

By indicating that he would suspend the right to file suit under Title III, the Act's most contentious provision, if U.S. allies would take a more active approach to advancing reform in Cuba, the President was able to spark more vigorous action toward the goals the European Union and other U.S. allies were already pursuing in Cuba. Right now, Fidel Castro is hearing a more resounding and diverse chorus of voices than ever before -- from the EU's historic Common Position to the declarations of key Latin leaders at the Ibero-American Summit -- calling for fundamental changes in the Cuban system. Over time, that is bound to have an impact.

And not only governments are acting. Non-governmental groups are increasingly sensitive to the importance of encouraging truly independent NGOs in Cuba, and the foreign private sector is beginning to look seriously at the question of how to apply best business practices in Cuba.

We have also kept up the pressure on Cuba in international human rights fora. In the United Nations we co-sponsor annually a resolution condemning the human rights situation in Cuba and calling on the Castro regime to abide by its obligations as a UN member and signatory to the Universal Charter on Human Rights as well as other international human rights instruments. In December of 1996, the resolution on the human rights situation in Cuba passed with a record 36 co-sponsors, including for the first time all of the EU and two Latin American states. The U.S. is currently working with potential co-sponsors and supporters on the text of a resolution to be submitted at this year's meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission, March 10 - April 18. We hope to build on the success of the previous resolutions and to press the Cuban government to abide by its obligations as a member of the Commission.

Migration Issues

I'd like now to turn to our Cuban migration policy, which I know is of great interest to a number of you. The phenomenon of Cuban migration is rooted fundamentally in the inability of the Cuban government to satisfy the basic material needs and democratic longings of the Cuban people. Let me assure you that the U.S. government is committed to responding to these migration pressures in a firm, yet humane way, fully consistent with both U.S. law and international refugee protection principles.

Our Cuban migration policy seeks to deter irregular migration from the island, to save lives that might otherwise be lost at sea and to prevent the chaotic, uncontrolled arrival of undocumented migrants. Our main tools in this effort are the September 9, 1994 U.S.-Cuba Migration Agreement and the May 2, 1995 Joint Statement on Migration Issues. Respectively, these accords: 1) expand legal migration opportunities for Cubans in Cuba, including those without relatives in the United States, and 2) establish a mechanism for the vigorous enforcement of U.S. law against undocumented entry. Together, they form a coherent strategy to promote, in the language of the September agreement: "safe, legal, and orderly" migration, as an alternative to the dangerous raft voyages that have brought such suffering to families on both sides of the Florida Straits.

We have successfully expanded legal migration opportunities for Cubans. In the first year of the September 1994 agreement, more than 26,000 travel documents were issued by our Interests Section in Havana, six times more than in any previous twelve-month period. We met our commitment again during the second year of the accord and are well on the way to fulfilling this year's commitment as well. The mix of travel documents being issued include immigrant visas, refugee admissions, and lottery paroles. As you know, the lottery is an especially important component of our strategy since it opens the possibility of migration for all Cubans, including those without relatives in the U.S.

It is against the backdrop of our success in expanding legal migration opportunities that our efforts to discourage risky sea voyages is best understood. The return policy outlined in the May 1995 Joint Statement has had a powerful dissuasive effect in discouraging attempts at undocumented entry. In the 22 months since May 1995, the Coast Guard has interdicted fewer than 700 such migrants, an average of 31 per month, the lowest level since the late 1980's. Cubans clearly know that the legal way is the best and only way to come to the United States.

Since May 2, 1995, 547 Cuban migrants interdicted at sea or entering the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base have been returned to Cuba. All migrants have an opportunity to speak with a specially-trained Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Asylum Prescreening Officer (APSO) prior to their return about any concerns they may have. Migrants found to have a "well-founded fear of persecution" are not returned to Cuba. In developing the Cuban migrant program, careful consideration was given to the views of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and interested non-governmental organizations. The resulting procedures are fully consistent with internationally-accepted refugee status determination principles. All APSO decisions are carefully reviewed at INS headquarters in consultation with other agencies. All returned migrants are informed of the Cuban government's commitment under the May 2, 1995 Joint Statement not to take action against them for their attempt to immigrate illegally. All returned migrants are also provided detailed information about legal migration opportunities and given a pass to visit USINT Havana.

Our Interests Section actively monitors the treatment of returned migrants. We have made considerable additional personnel and material resources available to USINT to enable them to conduct a comprehensive monitoring program. USINT monitors, supplemented by temporary officers sent from the Department and other overseas posts, have travelled extensively throughout the island.

From May 2, 1995 through January 31, 1997, USINT monitors have made 1,483 visits to the homes of returned migrants in all parts of Cuba. Additionally, returned migrants utilized their passes to make 347 visits to USINT. As a result of information gathered through this extensive monitoring program, we have concluded that the Cuban government has substantially complied with its commitment not to take action against returned migrants. Some returned migrants have alleged varying degrees of harassment from Cuban authorities. We take all such allegations seriously and organize special monitoring trips to investigate individual claims. The Interests Section is currently questioning the Cuban government about several returnees who claim to have lost their jobs.

We have had inquiries from time to time about Cuban rafters who have been detained upon their return. Let me explain here that the May 1995 accord does not convey any immunity to returned migrants from punishment for other offenses -- including other migration-related offenses -- committed either before or after the attempt which resulted in their return. In all, approximately 30 of the 547 migrants returned to Cuba are under detention. We are satisfied that none of these arrests is related to the attempt to enter the United States which led to the migrants' return.

I recognize that these are difficult issues. However, I want to emphasize our conviction that, because of our success in directing migration pressures from Cuba in a "safe, legal, and orderly" direction, many lives have been saved that might otherwise have been lost at sea. I want to emphasize that we are committed to implementing our Cuban migration policy in as transparent a manner as possible. As you know, we provide monthly reports to Congress and to other groups such as the Governor's Advisory Board on the status of our monitoring program. We are committed to maintaining a fluid dialogue with all parties interested in these issues.

What Next?

What now? What can we expect to see in the next year or two? Are there other things we should be doing?

When looking into the future, I think we need to be sober and realistic about the short run, and optimistic about the longer term. Fidel Castro and his associates remain firmly in charge and there appears to be no immediate threat to their dominance. It is possible, perhaps even likely, that the Cuban Government will have to continue making small changes to adapt to shifting political and economic currents. The visit of Pope John Paul II next year, for example, will probably occasion at least some alterations in regime behavior. Other international actors, including governments and businesses may be able to move the Government along on certain issues. We must insist, however, on systemic changes to improve respect for human rights and to move towards a transition to democracy. We will continue to urge our friends and allies to condition relations with Cuba on such change. Castro has made clear he does not intend to allow a real opening on his watch.

Over the longer run, however, there is reason to be more hopeful. With Castro, having just turned seventy, members of the leadership around him must grapple with their own futures and that of their institutions. We must send a message to that leadership that they too may have a role to play in a future democratic Cuba if they help to bring that about and if they submit to democratic processes. Popular pressures for a better way of life are inexorably growing. There is no guarantee that the new era will come without a wrenching period of adjustment, and no one has an interest in seeing violent change. Other leaders in Cuba know that the regime's recalcitrance now increases the risks of confrontations within the island later, and have, I think, a strong self-interest in avoiding that scenario.

We plan to continue efforts with our allies in Europe, Canada, and Latin America in the government, private and NGO sectors to build international pressure for change in Cuba. I believe we should also be looking for ways to increase contacts between ordinary Cubans and their family members in exile, and between professional Cubans -- the island's future leaders -- and their counterparts in all sectors. The more Cubans become aware of what they are missing in the world outside, and of how successful they and their country could be, the harder it will be to contain their desire for real change.

We have the essential policy elements in place to promote peaceful democratic change. The bipartisan support for that policy, which we will work to maintain, sends a strong message to the Cuban leadership and to the Cuban people.

[end of document]

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