Sri Lanka is a lower middle-income country with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of $3,853 and a population of approximately 22 million. The island’s strategic location off the southern coast of India along the main east-west Indian Ocean shipping lanes gives Sri Lanka a regional logistical advantage.
After 30 years of civil war, Sri Lanka is transitioning from a predominantly rural-based economy to a more urbanized economy focused on manufacturing and services. Sri Lanka’s export economy is dominated by apparel and cash-crop exports, mainly tea, but technology services exports are a significant growth sector. Prior to the April 21, 2019 Easter Sunday attacks, the tourism industry was rapidly expanding, with Lonely Planet naming Sri Lanka its top travel destination in 2019. However, the attacks led to a significant decline in tourism that continued into 2020 due to COVID-19 and the government’s related decision to close the airport for commercial passenger arrivals in March 2020. The global impact of COVID-19 on tourism and apparel exports is resulting in severe contractions to both sectors in Sri Lanka, with potential follow-on impacts in related sectors including services, construction, and agriculture. Migrant labor remittances, another significant source of foreign exchange, were approximately $6.7 billion in 2019.
President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who came to power in December 2019, has largely promoted pro-business positions, including announcing tax benefits for new investments to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). The new government’s economic goals, outlined in an election manifesto, include positioning Sri Lanka as an export-oriented economic hub at the center of the Indian Ocean (with government control of strategic assets such as Sri Lankan Airlines), improving trade logistics, attracting export-oriented FDI, and boosting firms’ abilities to compete in global markets. FDI in Sri Lanka has largely been concentrated in tourism, real estate, mixed development projects, ports, and telecommunications in recent years. With a growing middle class, investors also see opportunities in franchising, retail, information technology services, and light manufacturing for the domestic market.
The Board of Investment (BOI) is the primary government authority responsible for investment, particularly foreign investment, aiming to provide “one-stop” services for foreign investors. The BOI is committed to facilitating FDI and can offer project incentives, arrange utility services, assist in obtaining resident visas for expatriate personnel, and facilitate import and export clearances. However, Sri Lanka’s import regime is one of the most complex and protectionist in the world. Sri Lanka ranks very poorly on the World Bank’s Doing Business Indicators in a number of areas, including contract enforcement (164 out of 190); paying taxes (142/190); registering property (138/190) and obtaining credit (132/190). Sri Lanka ranks well in protecting minority investors, coming in at 28/190.
GDP fell to $84 billion in 2019. The Easter Sunday attacks, together with external shocks and political uncertainty, led to a growth of only 2.3 percent in 2019 with inflation hitting 6.2 percent. FDI, including loans, into Sri Lanka fell to approximately $1.2 billion in 2019, significantly less than the $2.3 billion in 2018, and 2020 is expected to see even lower levels of investment due to concern over Sri Lanka’s worsening financial situation and increased reliance on the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment
Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment
Sri Lanka is a constitutional multiparty republic. In 1978, Sri Lanka began moving away from socialist, protectionist policies and opening up to foreign investment, although changes in government are often accompanied by swings in economic policy. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who came to power in December 2019, has largely promoted pro-business positions, including announcing tax benefits for new investments to attract FDI.
The new government’s economic goals, outlined in an election manifesto, include positioning Sri Lanka as an export-oriented economic hub at the center of the Indian Ocean (with government control of strategic assets such as Sri Lankan Airlines), improving trade logistics, attracting export-oriented FDI, and boosting firms’ abilities to compete in global markets.
The BOI (www.investsrilanka.com), an autonomous statutory agency, is the primary government authority responsible for investment, particularly foreign investment, with BOI aiming to provide “one-stop” services for foreign investors. BOI’s Single Window Investment Facilitation Taskforce (SWIFT) helps facilitate the investment approvals process and works with other agencies in order to expedite the process. BOI can grant project incentives, arrange utility services, assist in obtaining resident visas for expatriate personnel, and facilitate import and export clearances. There are plans to establish new regulatory authorities, including a separate investment authority.
Importers to Sri Lanka face high barriers. According to a World Bank study, Sri Lanka’s import regime is one of the most complex and protectionist in the world. U.S. stakeholders have raised concerns that the government does not adequately consult with the private sector prior to implementing new taxes or regulations – citing the severe import restrictions imposed as a reaction to the COVID-19 as an example. These restrictions, quickly imposed without consulting the private sector, further complicated Sri Lanka’s import regime. Similarly, stakeholders have raised concerns that the government does not allow adequate time to implement new regulations. Additionally, importation of a number of “non-essential” items have been temporarily suspended to curtail foreign exchange outflow as the Sri Lankan Rupee (LKR) depreciated around 10 percent during 2020 and is expected to be under further pressure in the medium term.
Sri Lanka is a challenging place to do business, with high transaction costs aggravated by an unpredictable economic policy environment, inefficient delivery of government services, and opaque government procurement practices. Investors noted concerns over the potential for contract repudiation, cronyism, and de facto or de jure expropriation. Public sector corruption is a significant challenge for U.S. firms operating in Sri Lanka and a constraint on foreign investment. While the country generally has adequate laws and regulations to combat corruption, enforcement is weak, inconsistent, and selective. U.S. stakeholders and potential investors expressed particular concern about corruption in large infrastructure projects and in government procurement. The government pledged to address these issues, but the COVID-19 response remains its primary concern. Historically, the main political parties do not pursue corruption cases against each other after gaining or losing political positions.
While Sri Lanka is a challenging place for businesses to operate, investors report that starting a business in Sri Lanka is relatively simple and quick, especially when compared to other lower middle-income markets. However, scalability is a problem due to the lack of skilled labor, a relatively small talent pool and constraints on land ownership and use. Investors note that employee retention is generally good in Sri Lanka, but numerous public holidays, a reluctance of employees to work at night, a lack of labor mobility, and difficulty recruiting women decrease efficiency and increase start-up times. A leading international consulting firm claims the primary issue affecting investment is lack of policy consistency.
Limits on Foreign Control and Private Ownership
Foreign ownership is allowed in most sectors, although foreigners are prohibited from owning land with a few limited exceptions. Foreigners can invest in company shares, debt securities, government securities, and unit trusts. Many investors point to land acquisition as the biggest challenge for starting a new business. Generally, Sri Lanka prohibits the sale of public and private land to foreigners and to enterprises with foreign equity exceeding 50 percent. However, on July 30, 2018, Sri Lanka amended the Land (Restriction of Alienation) Act of 2014 to allow foreign companies listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) to acquire land. Foreign companies not listed on the CSE—but engaged in banking, financial, insurance, maritime, aviation, advanced technology, or infrastructure development projects identified and approved as strategic development projects—may also be exempted from restrictions imposed by the Land Act of 2014 on a case-by-case basis.
The government owns approximately 80 percent of the land in Sri Lanka, including the land housing most tea, rubber, and coconut plantations, which are leased out, typically on 50-year terms. Private land ownership is limited to fifty acres per person. Although state land for industrial use is usually allotted on a 50-year lease, the government may approve 99-year leases on a case-by-case basis depending on the project. Many land title records were lost or destroyed during the civil war, and significant disputes remain over land ownership, particularly in the North and East. The government has started a program to return property taken by the government during the war to residents in the North and East.
The government allows up to 100 percent foreign investment in any commercial, trading, or industrial activity except for the following heavily regulated sectors: air transportation; coastal shipping; large scale mechanized mining of gems; lotteries; manufacture of military hardware, military vehicles, and aircraft; alcohol; toxic, hazardous, or carcinogenic materials; currency; and security documents. However, select strategic sectors, such as railway freight transportation and electricity transmission and distribution, are closed to any foreign capital participation. Foreign investment is also not permitted in the following businesses: pawn brokering; retail trade with a capital investment of less than $5 million; and coastal fishing.
Foreign investments in the following areas are restricted to 40 percent ownership: a) production for export of goods subject to international quotas; b) growing and primary processing of tea, rubber, and coconut, c) cocoa, rice, sugar, and spices; d) mining and primary processing of non-renewable national resources, e) timber based industries using local timber, f) deep-sea fishing, g) mass communications, h) education, i) freight forwarding, j) travel services, k) businesses providing shipping services. Foreign ownership in excess of 40 percent can be preapproved on a case-by-case basis by the BOI.
In areas where foreign investments are permitted, Sri Lanka treats foreign investors the same as domestic investors. However, corruption reportedly may make it difficult for U.S. firms to compete against foreign bidders not subject to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act when competing for public tenders.
Business Facilitation
The Department of Registrar of Companies (www.drc.gov.lk) is responsible for business registration. Online registration (http://eroc.drc.gov.lk/) was recently introduced and registration averages four to five days. In addition to the Registrar of Companies, businesses must register with the Inland Revenue Department to obtain a taxpayer identification number (TIN) for payment of taxes and with the Department of Labor for social security payments.
Outward Investment
The government supports outward investment, and the Export Development Board offers subsidies for companies seeking to establish overseas operations, including branch offices related to exports. New outward investment regulations came into effect November 20, 2017. Sri Lankan companies, partnerships, and individuals are permitted to invest in shares, units, debt securities, and sovereign bonds overseas subject to limits specified by the new Foreign Exchange Regulations. Sri Lankan companies are also permitted to establish overseas companies. Investments over the specified limit require the Central Bank Monetary Board’s approval. All investments must be made through outward investment accounts (OIA). All income from investments overseas must be routed through the same OIA within three months of payment. Note: OIA transactions were suspended until January 21 in an attempt to ease pressure on the Sri Lankan rupee.
2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties
Sri Lanka has signed investment protection agreements with 26 countries, including the United States (which came into force in May 1993). Pursuant to the Constitution, investment protection agreements enjoy the force of law and legislative, executive, or administrative actions cannot contravene them.
Sri Lanka has signed free trade agreements (FTAs) with India, Pakistan, and Singapore, and is negotiating an FTA with China.
The FTAs with India and Pakistan only cover trade in goods. They provide for duty-free entry and duty preferences for manufactured and agricultural goods. A domestic value addition of 35 percent is required to qualify for concessions granted pursuant to the FTAs.
The Singapore-Sri Lanka FTA came into force on May 1, 2018, and covers: investment, goods, services, trade facilitation, government procurement, telecommunications, e-commerce, and dispute settlement. Sri Lanka eliminated customs duties on 50 percent of tariff lines, which will progressively increase to 80 percent over 14 years. Sri Lanka will not reduce or eliminate duties on the remaining 20 percent of tariff lines.
Sri Lanka is a member of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) and the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA).
The United States-Sri Lanka Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) is the primary forum for bilateral trade and investment discussions, including the protection of worker rights.
Sri Lanka has signed bilateral agreements with an additional 43 countries.
Sri Lanka passed an Inland Revenue Act in 2017. The law, which came into force on April 1, 2018, provides a tax framework to provide increased certainty to investors and taxpayers; modernize rules related to cross-border transactions to address tax avoidance; broaden the tax base; and expand income tax sources. A three-tier corporate tax structure was also introduced with a 40 percent rate for businesses in the liquor, tobacco, and betting and gaming industries. The law also introduced capital gains tax and fines and/or imprisonment for tax evasion and personal liability for company directors.
3. Legal Regime
Transparency of the Regulatory System
Many foreign and domestic investors view the regulatory system as unpredictable with outdated regulations, rigid administrative procedures, and excessive leeway for bureaucratic discretion. BOI is responsible for informing potential investors about laws and regulations affecting operations in Sri Lanka, including new regulations and policies that are frequently developed to protect specific sectors or stakeholders. Effective enforcement mechanisms are sometimes lacking, and investors cite coordination problems between BOI and relevant line agencies. Lack of sufficient technical capacity within the government to review financial proposals for private infrastructure projects also creates problems during the tender process.
Corporate financial reporting requirements in Sri Lanka are covered in a number of laws, and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka (ICASL) is responsible for setting and updating accounting standards to comply with current accounting and audit standards adopted by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB). Sri Lanka follows International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for financial reporting purposes set by the IASB. Sri Lankan accounting standards are applicable for all banks, companies listed on the stock exchange, and all other large and medium-sized companies in Sri Lanka. Accounts must be audited by professionally qualified auditors holding ICASL membership. ICASL also has published accounting standards for small companies. The Accounting Standards Monitoring Board (ASMB) is responsible for monitoring compliance with Sri Lankan accounting and auditing standards.
While law making authority lies with Parliament, line ministries draft bills and, together with regulatory authorities, are responsible for crafting draft regulations, which may require approval from the National Economic Council, the Cabinet, and/or Parliament. Bills are published in the government gazette http://documents.gov.lk/en/home.php at least seven days before being placed on the Order Paper of the Parliament (the first occasion the public is officially informed of proposed laws) with drafts being treated as confidential prior to this. Any member of the public can challenge a bill in the Supreme Court if they do so within one week of its placement on the Order Paper of the Parliament. If the Supreme Court orders amendments to a bill, such amendments must be incorporated before the bill can be debated and passed. Regulations are made by administrative agencies and are published in a government gazette, similar to a U.S. Federal Notice. In addition to regulations, some rules are made through internal circulars, which may be difficult to locate.
International Regulatory Considerations
Sri Lanka is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and has made WTO notifications on customs valuation, agriculture, import licensing, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Sri Lanka ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2016 and a National Trade Facilitation Committee was tasked with undertaking reforms needed to operationalize the TFA. The WTO conducted a review of the TFA in June 2019 in which Sri Lankan officials noted challenges related to accessing technical assistance and capacity building support for implementation of TFA recommendations.
Legal System and Judicial Independence
Sri Lanka’s legal system reflects diverse cultural influences. Criminal law is fundamentally British-based while civil law is Roman-Dutch. Laws on marriage, divorce, inheritance, and other issues can also vary based on religious affiliation. Sri Lankan commercial law is almost entirely statutory, reflecting British colonial law, although amendments have largely kept pace with subsequent legal changes in the United Kingdom. Several important legislative enactments regulate commercial issues: the BOI Law; the Intellectual Property Act; the Companies Act; the Securities and Exchange Commission Act; the Banking Act; the Inland Revenue Act; the Industrial Promotion Act; and the Consumer Affairs Authority Act.
Sri Lanka’s court system consists of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, provincial High Courts, and the Courts of First Instance (district courts with general civil jurisdiction) and Magistrate Courts (with criminal jurisdiction). Provincial High Courts have original, appellate, and reversionary criminal jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal is an intermediate appellate court with a limited right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court exercises final appellate jurisdiction for all criminal and civil cases. Citizens may apply directly to the Supreme Court for protection if they believe any government or administrative action has violated their fundamental human rights.
Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment
The principal law governing foreign investment is Law No. 4 (known as the BOI Act), created in 1978 and amended in 1980, 1983, 1992, 2002, 2009 and 2012. The BOI Act and implementing regulations provide for two types of investment approvals, one for concessions and one without concessions. Under Section 17 of the Act, the BOI is empowered to approve companies satisfying minimum investment criteria with such companies eligible for duty-free import concessions. Investment approval under Section 16 of the BOI Act permits companies to operate under the “normal” laws and applies to investments that do not satisfy eligibility incentive criteria. From April 1, 2017, Inland Revenue Act No. 24 of 2017 created an investment incentive regime granting a concessionary tax rate (for specific sectors) and capital allowances (depreciation) based on capital investments. Commercial Hub Regulation No 1 of 2013 applies to transshipment trade, offshore businesses, and logistic services. The Strategic Development Project Act of 2008 (SDPA) provides tax incentives for large projects that the Cabinet identifies as “strategic development projects.”
Competition and Anti-Trust Laws
Sri Lanka does not have a specific competition law. Instead, the BOI or respective regulatory authorities may review transactions for competition-related concerns. In March of 2017, Parliament approved the “Anti-Dumping and Countervailing” and “Safeguard Measures” Acts. These laws provide a framework against unfair trade practices and import surges and allow government trade agencies to initiate investigations relating to unfair business practices to impose additional and/or countervailing duties.
Expropriation and Compensation
Since economic liberalization policies began in 1978, the government has not expropriated a foreign investment with the last expropriation dispute resolved in 1998. The land acquisition law (Land Acquisition Act of 1950) empowers the government to take private land for public purposes with compensation based on a government valuation. Still, there have been reported cases of the military taking over businesses in the North and East part of the country, by claiming they were on government land, with little or no compensation.
Dispute Settlement
ICSID Convention and New York Convention
Sri Lanka is a member state to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID convention) and a signatory to the convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention) without reservations.
Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Sri Lanka signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States in 1991. Over the past ten years, according to the United Nations, two investment disputes in Sri Lanka have involved foreign investors: 1) a dispute between Deutsche Bank and Ceylon Petroleum Corporation regarding an oil hedging agreement, concluded with the proceeding being decided in favor of Deutsche Bank; and 2) an arbitration involving British and local investors (with the Attorney General as respondent) regarding a tourism development project that concluded in 2020 with the ICSID tribunal dismissing the $20 million claim for failure to prove the claim.
International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts
Sri Lanka ranks very poorly on contract enforcement (164 out of 190) on the World Bank’s Doing Business Indicators. As a result, many investors prefer arbitration over litigation. Sri Lanka has a community mediation system, which primarily handles non-commercial mediations and commercial disputes where the amount in controversy is less than $3,333.00. There is no-mediation system for commercial disputes over that threshold amount. The Institute for the Development of Commercial Law and Practice (ICLP) (www.iclparbitrationcentre.com) and the Sri Lanka National Arbitration Centre (www.slnarbcentre.com) also help settle private commercial disputes through arbitration.
Bankruptcy Regulations
The Companies Act and the Insolvency Ordinance provide for dissolution of insolvent companies, but there is no mechanism to facilitate the reorganization of financially troubled companies. Other laws make it difficult to keep a struggling company solvent. The Termination of Employment of Workmen Special Provisions Act (TEWA), for example, makes it difficult to fire or lay off workers who have been employed for more than six months for any reason other than serious, well-documented disciplinary problems. In the absence of comprehensive bankruptcy laws, extra-judicial powers granted by law to financial institutions protect the rights of creditors. A creditor may petition the court to dissolve the company if the company cannot make payments on debts in excess of LKR 50,000 ($320.00). Lenders are also empowered to foreclose on collateral without court intervention. However, loans below LKR 5 million ($32,000) are exempt, and lenders cannot foreclose on collateral provided by guarantors to a loan.
Sri Lanka ranked 94 out of 190 countries in resolving insolvency index in the World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2020. Resolving insolvency takes, on average, 1.7 years at a cost equivalent to 10 percent of the estate’s value.
4. Industrial Policies
Investment Incentives
The Inland Revenue Act of 2017, implemented April 1, 2018, includes concessionary corporate tax rates for investments in certain sectors and increased capital allowances (depreciation) on capital investments.
Corporate Taxation:
The standard rate of corporate tax is 28 percent. A concessionary rate of 14 percent applies for: a) small and medium companies (with an annual income of less than LKR 500 million, $3.2 million); b) companies exporting goods and services; and c) companies engaged in agricultural business; education services; promotion of tourism; and information technology services. A 40 percent corporate tax rate applies to companies engaged in gaming, liquor, and tobacco related businesses.
Sri Lanka has 12 free trade zones, also called “export processing zones,” which are administered by the BOI. Foreign investors have the same investment opportunities as local entities in these zones. Export-oriented companies located within and outside the zones are eligible to import project-related material and inputs free of customs import duties although such imports may be subject to other taxes.
In the past, firms preferred to locate their factories near the Colombo harbor or airport to reduce transportation time and cost. However, excessive concentration of industries around Colombo has caused heavy traffic, higher real estate prices, environmental pollution, and a scarcity of labor. The BOI and the government now encourage export-oriented factories to locate in industrial zones farther from Colombo, although Sri Lanka’s limited road network create other challenges for outlying zones.
Performance and Data Localization Requirements
Employment of foreign personnel is permitted when there is a demonstrated shortage of qualified local labor. Technical and managerial personnel are in short supply, and this shortage is likely to continue in the near future. Foreign laborers do not experience significant problems in obtaining work or residence permits. Sri Lanka has seen a rise in foreign laborers, mainly in construction sites, with some reportedly working without proper work visas. Foreign investors who remit at least $250,000 can qualify for a five-year resident visa under the Resident Guest Scheme Visa Program: (http://www.immigration.gov.lk/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=154&Itemid=200&lang=en). Sri Lanka offers dual citizenship status to Sri Lankans who have obtained foreign citizenship in seven designated countries, including the United States. Tourist and business visas are granted for one month with possible extensions.
Sri Lanka has no specific requirements for foreign information technology providers to turn over source code or provide access to surveillance. Provisions relating to interception of communications for cybercrime issues are subject to court supervision under the Computer Crimes Act (CCA) of 2007. Sri Lanka became a party to the Budapest Cybercrime Convention in 2015. As a result, safeguards based on this convention are in force. Although there is no comprehensive legislative protection of electronic data, the CCA has a provision to protect data and information. The government is currently working to formulate data protection legislation. There is no ban on the sale of electronic data for marketing purposes.
5. Protection of Property Rights
Real Property
Secured interests in real property in Sri Lanka are generally recognized and enforced, but many investors claim protection can be flimsy. A reliable registration system exists for recording private property including land, buildings, and mortgages, although problems reportedly exist due to fraud and forged documents. In the World Bank’s 2020 “Doing Business Index,” Sri Lanka ranked 138 out of 190 countries for registering a property. Property registration required, on average, completion of eight procedures lasting 39 days. Sri Lanka prohibits the sale of land to foreign nationals and to enterprises with foreign equity exceeding 50 percent.
Intellectual Property Rights
While IPR enforcement is improving, counterfeit goods, particularly imports, are still widely available, and music and software piracy are reportedly widespread. Foreign and U.S. companies in the recording, software, movie, clothing, and consumer product industries claim that inadequate IPR protection and enforcement weaken their businesses in Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka has a comprehensive IPR law, and several offenders have been charged or convicted. The government points to the new information technology (IT) policy that requires government agencies to use licensed or open source software as proof of IPR improvements (although the government has yet to put systems in place to monitor compliance with the policy) and some sectors – including apparel, software, tobacco, and electronics v have reported success in combating trademark counterfeiting through the courts. Still, judicial redress remains time-consuming and challenging. Better coordination among enforcement authorities and government institutions – such as the National Intellectual Property Office (NIPO), Sri Lanka Customs, and Sri Lanka Police as well as more trained staff and resources – is needed to strengthen Sri Lanka’s IPR regime. Although infringement of intellectual property rights is a punishable offense under the IP law with criminal and civil penalties, Sri Lanka does not track and report on seizures of counterfeit goods.
Sri Lanka is a party to major intellectual property agreements. Sri Lanka adopted an intellectual property law in 2003 intended to meet U.S.-Sri Lanka bilateral IPR agreements and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) obligations. The law governs copyrights and related rights; industrial designs; patents, trademarks, and service marks; trade names; layout designs of integrated circuits; geographical indications; unfair competition; databases; computer programs; and undisclosed information (e.g., trade secrets). All trademarks, designs, industrial designs, and patents must be registered with the Director General of Intellectual Property. No legal provisions exist for registration of copyrights and trade secrets.
For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/.
American Chamber of Commerce in Sri Lanka: www.amcham.lk
National Intellectual Property Office of Sri Lanka: www.nipo.gov.lk
6. Financial Sector
Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) governs the CSE, unit trusts, stockbrokers, listed public companies, margin traders, underwriters, investment managers, credit rating agencies, and securities depositories. Foreign portfolio investment is encouraged. Foreign investors can purchase up to 100 percent of equity in Sri Lankan companies in permitted sectors. Investors may open an Inward Investment Account (IIA) with any commercial bank in Sri Lanka to bring in investments. As of August 30, 2020, 289 companies representing 20 business sectors are listed on the CSE. As stock market liquidity is limited, investors need to manage exit strategies carefully.
In accordance with its IMF Article VIII obligations, the government and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) generally refrain from restrictions on current international transfers. When the government experiences balance of payments difficulties, it tends to impose controls on foreign exchange transactions. Due to pressures on the balance of payments caused by the COVID-19 economic crisis, Sri Lanka took several measures to restrict imports. In March 2020, CBSL suspended importation of a wide list of non-essential goods and motor vehicles. The import control department also imposed further regulations restricting certain imported food items and instituted a 3-month credit term for importation of certain essential imports. The import restrictions are currently in effect until January 1, 2021.
The state consumes over 50 percent of the country’s domestic financial resources and has a virtual monopoly on the management and use of long-term savings. This inhibits the free flow of financial resources to product and factor markets. High budget deficits have caused interest rates to rise and resulted in higher inflation. On a year-to-year basis, inflation was approximately 5.2 percent in April of 2020, and the average prime lending rate was 9.49 percent. Retained profits finance a significant portion of private investment in Sri Lanka with commercial banks as the principal source of bank finance and bank loans as the most widely used credit instrument for the private sector. Large companies also raise funds through corporate debentures. Credit ratings are mandatory for all deposit-taking institutions and all varieties of debt instruments. Local companies are allowed to borrow from foreign sources. FDI finances about 6 percent of overall investment. Foreign investors are allowed to access credit on the local market and are free to raise foreign currency loans.
Money and Banking System
Sri Lanka has a diversified banking system. There are 25 commercial banks: 13 local and 12 foreign. In addition, there are seven specialized local banks. Citibank N.A. is the only U.S. bank operating in Sri Lanka. Several domestic private commercial banks have substantial government equity acquired through investment agencies controlled by the government. Banking has expanded to rural areas, and by 2019 there were over 2,900 commercial banking outlets and over 5,100 Automated Teller Machines throughout the country. Both resident and non-resident foreign nationals can open foreign currency banking accounts. However, non-resident foreign nationals are not eligible to open Sri Lankan Rupee accounts.
CBSL is responsible for supervision of all banking institutions and has driven improvements in banking regulations, provisioning, and public disclosure of banking sector performance. Credit ratings are mandatory for all banks. CBSL introduced accounting standards corresponding to International Financial Reporting Standards for banks on January 1, 2018, and the application of the standards substantially increased impairment provisions on loans. The migration to the Basel III capital standards began in July of 2017 on a staggered basis, with full implementation was kicking in on January 1, 2019 and some banks having had to boost capital to meet full implementation of Basel III requirements. In addition, banks must increase capital to meet CBSL’s new minimum capital requirements deadline, which is set for December 31, 2022 although a staggered application of capital provisions for smaller banks unable to meet capital requirements immediately will likely be allowed
Total assets of commercial banks stood at LKR 10,944 billion ($59 billion) as of December 31, 2019. The two fully state-owned commercial banks – Bank of Ceylon and People’s Bank – are significant players, accounting for about 33 percent of all banking assets. The Bank of Ceylon currently holds a non-performing loan (NPL) ratio of 5.35 percent (up from 4.79 percent in 2019). The People’s Bank currently holds a NPL ratio of 4.79 percent (up from 3.68 percent in 2019). Both banks have significant exposure to SOEs but, these banks are implicitly guaranteed by the state.
In October 2019 Sri Lanka was removed from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) gray list after making significant changes to its Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Finance of Terrorism (AML/CFT) laws. CBSL is exploring the adoption of blockchain technologies in its financial transactions and appointed two committees to look into the possible adoption of blockchain and cryptocurrencies.
Sri Lanka has as rapidly growing alternative financial services industry which includes finance companies, leasing companies, and microfinance institutes. In response, CBSL has established an enforcement unit to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory framework of non-banking financial institutions. Credit ratings are mandatory for finance companies as of October 1, 2018. The government also directed banks to register with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to comply with the U.S. Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Almost all commercial banks have registered with the IRS.
Foreign Exchange and Remittances
Foreign Exchange
Sri Lanka generally has investor-friendly conversion and transfer policies. Companies say they can repatriate funds relatively easily. In accordance with its Article VIII obligations as a member of the IMF, Sri Lanka liberalized exchange controls on current account transactions in 1994 and, in 2010-2012, the government relaxed exchange controls on several categories of capital account transactions. A new Foreign Exchange Act, No. 12 of 2017, came into operation on November 20, 2017 and further liberalized capital account transactions to simplify current account transactions. Foreign investors are required to open Inward Investment Accounts (IIA) to transfer funds required for capital investments but there are no restrictions or limitations placed on foreign investors in converting, transferring, or repatriating funds associated with an investment through an IIA in any foreign currency designated by CBSL.
Remittance Policies
No barriers exist, legal or otherwise, to remittance of corporate profits and dividends for foreign enterprises since 2017 when Sri Lanka relaxed investment remittance policies with the new Foreign Exchange Act. Remittances are done through IIAs. There are no waiting periods for remitting investment returns, interest, and principal on private foreign debt, lease payments, royalties, and management fees provided there is sufficient evidence to prove the originally invested funds were remitted into the country through legal channels. Exporters must repatriate export proceeds within 120 days.
Sovereign Wealth Funds
Sri Lanka does not have a sovereign wealth fund. The government manages and controls large retirement funds from private sector employees and uses these funds for budgetary purposes (through investments in government securities), stock market investments, and corporate debenture investments.
7. State-Owned Enterprises
SOEs are active in transport (buses and railways, ports and airport management, airline operations); utilities such as electricity; petroleum imports and refining; water supply; retail; banking; telecommunications; television and radio broadcasting; newspaper publishing; and insurance. Following the end of the civil war in 2009, Sri Lankan armed forces began operating domestic air services, tourist resorts, and farms crowding out some private investment. In total, there are over 400 SOEs of which 55 have been identified by the Sri Lanka Treasury as strategically important, and 345 have been identified as non-commercial.
Privatization Program
The government is currently selling non-strategic SOEs. Several attempts to sell the government’s stake in the heavily indebted national carrier, Sri Lankan Airlines, were not successful. The government is also seeking to improve the efficiency of SOEs through private sector management practices and is looking to list SOEs on the Colombo Stock Exchange and partially privatize non-strategic SOEs. However, the government does not always follow an open bidding process when selling outside the stock exchange. For instance, in the case of the sale of the Hambantota Port in 2017, the government allowed a PRC company to secure the deal without an open bidding process. SOE labor unions and opposition political parties often oppose privatization and are particularly averse to foreign ownership. Privatization through the sale of shares in the stock market is likely to be less problematic.
8. Responsible Business Conduct
The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is more widely recognized among Sri Lankan companies than Responsible Business Conduct (RBC). Leading companies in Sri Lanka actively promote CSR, and some SMEs have also started to promote CSR. CSR Sri Lanka is an apex body initiated by 40 leading companies to foster CSR. The Ceylon Chamber of Commerce actively promotes CSR among its membership. The SEC, together with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka, published a Code of Best Practices on Corporate Governance in order to establish good corporate governance practices in Sri Lankan capital markets. Separate government agencies are tasked with protecting individuals from adverse business impacts in relation to labor rights, consumer protection, and environmental protections, although the effectiveness of these agencies is questioned by some. The government has not launched an initiative to promote RBC principles, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. The government also does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) although Sri Lanka has mineral resources including graphite, mineral sands, and gemstones.
9. Corruption
While Sri Lanka has adequate laws and regulations to combat corruption, enforcement is reportedly often weak and inconsistent. U.S. firms identify corruption as a major constraint on foreign investment, but generally not a major threat to operating in Sri Lanka once contracts have been established. The business community claims that corruption has the greatest effect on investors in large projects and on those pursuing government procurement contracts. Projects geared toward exports face fewer problems. A Right to Information Act came into effect in February of 2017 which increased government transparency.
The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC or Bribery Commission) is the main body responsible for investigating bribery allegations, but it is widely considered ineffective and has reportedly made little progress pursuing cases of national significance. The law states that a public official’s offer or acceptance of a bribe constitutes a criminal offense and carries a maximum sentence of seven years imprisonment and fine. Bribery laws extend to family members of public officials, but political parties are not covered. A bribe by a local company to a foreign official is also not covered by the Bribery Act and the government does not require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that prohibit bribery of public officials. Thus far, the Bribery Commission has focused on minor cases such as bribes taken by traffic police, wildlife officers, and school principals. These cases reportedly follow a pattern of targeting low-level offenses with prosecutions years after the offense followed by the imposition of sentences disproportionate to the conduct (i.e. overly strict or overly lenient).
Government procurement regulations contain provisions on conflicts-of-interest in awarding contracts or government procurement. While financial crime investigators have developed a number of cases involving the misappropriation of government funds, these cases have often not moved forward due to lack of political will, political interference, and lack of investigative capacity.
Sri Lanka signed and ratified the UN Convention against Corruption in March of 2004. Sri Lanka signed and ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in 2006. Sri Lanka is a signatory to the OECD-ADB Anti-Corruption Regional Plan but has not joined the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
Resources to Report Corruption
Contact at government agency responsible for combating corruption:
Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption
No 36, Malalasekara Mawatha, Colombo 7
T+94 112 596360 / 2595039
M+94 767011954
Email: ciaboc@eureka.lk or dgbribery@gmail.com
The government’s military campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ended in May 2009 with the defeat of the LTTE. During the civil war, the LTTE had a history of attacks against civilians, although none of the attacks were directed against U.S. citizens. On April 21, 2019, terrorist attacks targeted several churches and hotels throughout Colombo and in the eastern city of Batticaloa, killing more than 250 people, including over 40 foreigners. In the aftermath of the attacks, the government imposed nationwide curfews and a temporary ban on some social media outlets.
Following his election in November 2019, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa announced major tax cuts as part of a pro-growth strategy. The outbreak of COVID-19 shortly after the dissolution of Parliament in March delayed Parliamentary elections until August of 2020. During the August elections, President Rajapaksa’s party secured a commanding two thirds majority in parliament.
Demonstrations occasionally take place in response to world events or local developments. Demonstrations near Western embassies are not uncommon but have been well-contained with support from the Sri Lankan police and military.
Business-related Violence
Business related violence is not common and has little impact on the investment environment.
11. Labor Policies and Practices
Both local and international businesses have cited labor shortages as a major problem in Sri Lanka.In 2019, 8.5 million Sri Lankans were employed: 47 percent in services, 27 percent in industry and 25 percent in agriculture. Approximately 60 percent of the employed are in the informal sector. The government sector also employs over 1.4 million people.
Sri Lanka’s labor laws afford many employee protections. Many investors consider this legal framework somewhat rigid, making it difficult for companies to reduce their workforce even when market conditions warrant doing so. The cost of dismissing an employee in Sri Lanka is calculated based upon a percentage of wages averaged over 54 salary weeks, one of the highest in the world. There is no unemployment insurance or social safety net for laid off workers.
Labor is available at relatively low cost, though higher than in other South Asian countries. Sri Lanka’s labor force is largely literate (particularly in local languages), although weak in certain technical skills and English. The average worker has eight years of schooling, and two-thirds of the labor force is male. The government has initiated educational reforms to better prepare students for the labor market, including revamping technical and vocational education and training. While the number of students pursuing computer, accounting, business skills, and English language training programs is increasing, the demand for these skills still outpaces supply with many top graduates seeking employment outside of the country.
Youth are increasingly uninterested in labor-intensive manual jobs, and the construction, plantation, apparel, and other manufacturing industries report a severe shortage of workers. The garment industry reports up to a 40 percent staff turnover rate. Lack of labor mobility in the North and East is also a problem, with workers reluctant to leave their families and villages for employment elsewhere.
A significant proportion of the unemployed seek “white collar” employment, often preferring stable government jobs. Most sectors seeking employees offer manual or semi-skilled jobs or require technical or professional skills such as management, marketing, information technology, accountancy and finance, and English language proficiency. Investors often struggle to find employees with the requisite skills, a situation particularly noticeable as the tourism industry opens new hotels.
Many service sector companies rely on Sri Lankan engineers, researchers, technicians, and analysts to deliver high-quality, high-precision products and retention is fairly good in the information technology sector. Foreign and local companies report a strong worker commitment to excellence in Sri Lanka, with rapid adaptation to quality standards.
Migrant Workers Abroad
There were an estimated 1.8 million Sri Lankan workers abroad in 2009/10, the last year the government published the figure. Remittances from migrant workers, averaged about $6.7 billion in 2019, making up Sri Lanka’s largest source of foreign exchange. The majority of this labor force is unskilled (i.e., housemaids and factory laborers) and located primarily in the Middle East. Sri Lanka is also losing many of its skilled workers to more lucrative jobs abroad. Approximately 6,000 Sri Lankans work in Bangladeshi garment factories.
Foreign Workers in Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka has seen a gradual rise in foreign workers. The majority of foreign workers are from India, Bangladesh, and the PRC, many reportedly without proper work visas.
Trade Unions
Approximately 9.5 percent of the workforce is unionized, and union membership is declining. There are more than 2,000 registered trade unions (many of which have 50 or fewer members), and several federations. About 18 percent of labor in the industry and service sector is unionized. Most of the major trade unions are affiliated with political parties, creating a highly politicized labor environment. This is not the case for private companies, which typically only have one union or workers’ council to represent employees. There are also some independent unions. All workers, other than police, armed forces, prison service, and those in essential services, have the right to strike. The President can designate any industry an essential service. Workers may lodge complaints to protect their rights with the Commissioner of Labor, a labor tribunal, or the Supreme Court.
Unions represent workers in many large private firms, but workers in small-scale agriculture and small businesses typically do not belong to unions. The tea industry, however, is highly unionized, and public sector employees are unionized at high rates. Labor in the export processing zone (EPZ) enterprises tend to be represented by non-union worker councils, although unions also exist within the EPZs. The International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Freedom of Association Committee observed that Sri Lankan trade unions and worker councils can co-exist but advises that there should not be any discrimination against those employees choosing to join a union. The right of worker councils to engage in collective bargaining has been recognized by the ILO.
Collective bargaining exists but is not universal. The Employers’ Federation of Ceylon, the main employers’ association in Sri Lanka, assists member companies in negotiating with unions and signing collective bargaining agreements. While about a quarter of the 660 members of the Employers’ Federation of Ceylon are unionized, approximately 90 of these companies (including a number of foreign-owned firms) are bound by collective agreements. Several other companies have signed memorandums of understanding with trade unions. However, there are only a few collective bargaining agreements signed with companies located in EPZs.
All forms of forced and compulsory labor are prohibited. In March of 2016, the government introduced a national minimum wage set at LKR 10,000 ($54) per month or LKR 400 ($2.16) per day. Forty-four “wage boards” established by the Ministry of Labor set minimum wages and working conditions by sector and industry in consultation with unions and employers. The minimum wages established by these sector-specific wage boards tend to be higher than the minimum wage.
Sri Lankan law does not require equal pay for equal work for women. The law prohibits most full-time workers from regularly working more than 45 hours per week without receiving overtime (premium pay). In addition, the law stipulates a rest period of one hour per day. Regulations limit the maximum overtime hours to 15 per week. The law provides for paid annual holidays, sick leave, and maternity leave. Occupational health and safety regulations do not fully meet international standards.
Child labor is prohibited and virtually nonexistent in the organized sectors, although child labor occurs in informal sectors. The minimum legal age for employment is set at 14, although the government is seeking to raise the legal minimum age to 16. The minimum age for employment in hazardous work is 18 years.
Sri Lanka is a member of the ILO and has ratified 31 international labor conventions, including all eight of the ILO’s core labor conventions. The ILO and the Employers’ Federation of Ceylon are working to improve awareness of core labor standards and the ILO also promotes its “Decent Work Agenda” program in Sri Lanka.
12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Other Investment Insurance Programs
Sri Lanka and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) signed an agreement in 1966 and subsequently renewed in 1993. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) succeeded OPIC in 2019 and is now party to the agreement. Sri Lanka is a founding member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) of the World Bank, which offers insurance against non-commercial risks.
Several countries provide bilateral project loans to the government, which assist firms from their countries to win projects. China has provided extensive loans, enabling Chinese companies to engage in numerous projects in Sri Lanka ranging from road and port construction to railway equipment supply.
13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics
Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
Host Country Statistical source*
USG or international statistical source
USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data
Year
Amount
Year
Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD)
* Source for Host Country Data: Central Bank of Sri Lanka
Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions)
Inward Direct Investment
Outward Direct Investment
Total Inward
Amount
100%
Total Outward
Amount
100%
China,P.R.:
2,128
16%
Singapore
300
20%
Netherlands
1,774
13%
India
205
14%
India
1,737
13%
Bangladesh
139
9%
Singapore
1,023
8%
Malaysia
134
9%
Malaysia
967
7%
Maldives
100
7%
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- $500,000.
According to CBSL, the United States is the 13th largest foreign investor in Sri Lanka in terms of stock of foreign direct investment (FDI). The United States stock of FDI in 2019 was $262 million. FDI inflows from the United States were $20 million 2019. United States FDI in Sri Lanka has remained steady over the past five years.
Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data Not Available.
14. Contact for More Information
Jacob Dietrich
Economic Officer
U.S. Embassy Colombo, Sri Lanka
Phone: +94-11-249-8500
Email: commercialcolombo@state.gov
Report to Congress on Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2021
SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE COMMITTEES ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE AND UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTIONS 207(d)(1) AND (e) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
The United States anticipates receiving more than 300,000 new asylum claimants and refugees in Fiscal Year (FY) 2021. Pursuant to Section 207(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the President proposes resettling up to 15,000 refugees under the FY 2021 refugee admissions ceiling, and anticipates receiving new asylum claims that include more than 290,000 individuals. This proposed refugee admissions ceiling reflects the continuing backlog of over 1.1 million asylum-seekers who are awaiting adjudication of their claims inside the United States, and it accounts for the arrival of refugees whose resettlement in the United States was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Who is a Refugee?
Under Section 101(a)(42) of the INA, a refugee is an alien who, generally, has experienced past persecution or has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Individuals who meet the statutory definition may be considered for either refugee status under Section 207 of the INA if they are outside the United States, or asylum status under Section 208 of the INA, if they are already in the United States or present themselves at a U.S. port of entry. Both refugee and asylum status are forms of humanitarian protection offered by the United States.
Individuals outside the United States seeking admission as a refugee under Section 207 of the INA are processed through the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), which is managed by the Department of State in cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Those admitted as refugees are eligible for U.S. government-funded resettlement assistance, which is discussed in section III. Individuals in the United States seeking asylum status under Section 208 of the INA are processed by DHS and, in certain cases, by the Department of Justice (DOJ)’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR, also known as the immigration court system). Asylum applicants are not eligible for resettlement assistance through USRAP but are eligible for certain other forms of assistance and services run by state, private, and non-profit agencies, and they may apply for discretionary employment authorization under certain conditions.
Since the passage of the Refugee Act in 1980, which incorporated this definition of refugee into the INA, the United States has accepted more than 3.8 million refugees and asylees. In FY 2020, the United States anticipates admitting approximately 11,000 refugees for resettlement and granting asylum to approximately 31,000 individuals.
Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic
Refugee resettlement in the United States decreased significantly in FY 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to travel restrictions in and out of refugee processing sites worldwide, USRAP suspended refugee arrivals from March 19 to July 29, 2020 except for emergency cases. USRAP resumed general refugee arrivals July 30, 2020 with additional health measures specified by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). However, reduced flight availability due to the general decrease in demand for international travel meant a slow pace of refugee resettlement in the United States through the rest of FY 2020. Almost 7,000 of the 18,000 refugee numbers available under the FY 2020 Presidential Determination went unused. The President’s proposed refugee admissions ceiling for FY 2021 incorporates these places that might have been used if not for the COVID-19 pandemic.
The COVID-19 pandemic also decreased the number of aliens seeking humanitarian protection at the U.S. southern border. In order to protect public health, CDC issued an order March 20, 2020 temporarily suspending the introduction of persons into the United States, subject to certain exceptions, who would otherwise be introduced into a congregate setting in a land Port of Entry or Border Patrol station at or near the U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico. Since then, credible fear[1] receipts dropped significantly, from over 4,500 per month in January and February to approximately 500 to 700 per month in April through August 2020.
The decreased number of aliens seeking humanitarian protection at the U.S. southern border due to COVID-19 pandemic has increased USCIS’s capacity to address its case backlog. However, the COVID-19 pandemic also required USCIS to close its asylum offices to in-person services for nearly three months. When they re-opened to in-person services, it was with procedural changes and administrative controls to protect the health of the public and staff. These necessary measures have reduced asylum interview capacity, which may affect the number of asylum cases that can be completed.
The COVID-19 pandemic has affected the assimilation of resettled refugees and approved asylees into American society and their progress towards self-sufficiency. Widespread hiring freezes, layoffs, and reduced hours, wages, and benefits in the hospitality and transportation industries hit many refugees, who often find their first jobs in these sectors. The closure of schools and childcare centers has also affected working refugees, who now must stay home to care for their children. In April 2020, HHS issued several policy letters and program guidelines allowing for various waiver and program flexibilities to address the impact of the pandemic. HHS also expanded the eligibility period for certain forms of assistance to refugees and provided additional funding to for emergency assistance needs.
[1] Asylum Officers of DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) conduct a credible fear of persecution or torture interview when a person who is subject to expedited removal expresses an intention to apply for asylum, expresses a fear of persecution or torture, or expresses a fear of return to his or her country. An individual will be found to have a credible fear of persecution if he or she establishes that there is a “significant possibility” that he or she could establish in a full hearing before an Immigration Judge that he or she has been persecuted or has a well-founded fear of persecution or harm on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion if returned to his or her country.
Rising Protection Claims and Backlog
Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in the number of aliens encountered along or near the U.S. southern border with Mexico. (Although the number of such encounters dipped at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, it has now returned to its pre-pandemic level.) This trend has corresponded with a sharp increase in the number and percentage of those who claim fear of persecution or torture when apprehended or encountered by DHS, as shown in the tables below.
In FY 2019, DHS received and completed more than 100,000 new credible fear cases, a record high since the credible fear process was introduced more than 20 years ago, and an increase of more than 113 percent since FY 2015. DHS also received over 148,000 new affirmative asylum[2] cases, while the immigration courts[3] received 213,320 new asylum filings. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United States led the world in the number of new asylum applications received in calendar years 2017, 2018, and 2019.
These new cases added to the lengthy backlog of pending claims, undermining the integrity of the asylum system. They delay the grant of asylum to individuals who are legitimately fleeing persecution and have valid claims. Further, such delays are a pull factor for illegal immigration. By providing protection from removal, they create an incentive for those without lawful status to enter and remain in the United States.
The increasing number of asylum claims also represents a cost to U.S. government benefits programs. While asylum applicants are not eligible for the Reception & Placement assistance offered to refugees and discussed in section III, those who have been granted asylum status under Section 208 of the INA are eligible for other assistance and services funded by the HHS Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). This is in addition to mainstream federal means-tested public benefits for which refugees and asylees are eligible, even ones otherwise unavailable to lawful permanent residents, as well as any other assistance they might receive under state law. For FY 2021, ORR predicts 45,600 asylees will be eligible.
To address this backlog, DHS has introduced efficiency measures to maximize case processing; undertaken regulatory, policy, and procedural changes to deter and screen for non-meritorious filings; and increased the USCIS Asylum Division’s adjudicative capacity by expanding its field office workforce and facilities.
DOJ continues to hire new immigration judges and support staff to reduce the case backlog in the immigration court system, which will include approximately 575,000 pending asylum cases at the end of FY 2020. It has hired 274 new immigration judges since the beginning of FY 2018, and it continues to seek additional courtroom space to increase its adjudicatory capacity. It has also implemented process improvements, such as the use of video teleconferencing, to maximize its existing adjudicatory capacity and ensure that the pending caseload does not increase at an even faster rate.
[2] Affirmative asylum applications are filed by asylum-seekers who are not in removal proceedings in the immigration court system. USCIS’s Asylum Division is responsible for processing affirmative asylum applications. [3] The DOJ/EOIR immigration court system handles asylum applications filed by aliens who are in removal proceedings and asylum applications referred by USCIS.
Security Vetting in Refugee Admissions
The December 2017 National Security Strategy says the United States “will enhance vetting of prospective immigrants, refugees, and other foreign visitors to identify individuals who might pose a risk to national security or public safety” and “will set higher security standards to ensure that we keep dangerous people out of the United States.”
Refugees admitted to the United States are similar to individuals traveling on immigrant visas insofar as they are resettling here permanently and are afforded a pathway to U.S. citizenship. Refugees may pose an additional risk to the security of the United States because, if it is determined after admission that they present a threat to national security or public safety, it is extremely difficult to remove certain refugees in immigration proceedings for lack of a country to which they can be removed without the possibility of persecution. Due to limits on the maximum amount of time such aliens can be held, it is likely that a refugee without a country to return to would be released into the interior of the United States.
Pursuant to Executive Order 13780, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, developed a model to assess national security and public-safety threats for foreign nationals seeking to enter the United States. Among the risk factors considered is “whether the country is a known or potential terrorist safe haven.” Using that model, which has been updated and refined, the Secretary of Homeland Security has recommended, and the President has taken action, to restrict the travel of nationals from a number of countries due to, among other factors, a high risk relative to other countries in the world of terrorist travel to the United States. Among the countries whose nationals are subject to travel restrictions are Somalia, Syria, and Yemen.[4]
The threat to U.S. national security and public safety posed by the admission of refugees from high-risk areas of terrorist presence or control is significant and cannot be fully mitigated at this time. As a result, the President proposes not admitting any refugees from such areas, including Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, except those refugees of special humanitarian concern listed in the proposed FY 2021 allocations, such as those who have been persecuted or have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of religion. These narrowly-tailored exceptions are appropriate in order to promote family unity and to promote U.S. humanitarian and foreign policy interests.
[4] See Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, and Presidential Proclamation 9983, Improving Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry.
[8] 1980-1989 figures exclude grants of asylum by DOJ/EOIR.
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
This Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2021 Report to the Congress is submitted in compliance with Sections 207(d)(1) and (e) of the INA. This report provides the following information required by those sections:
A description of the nature of the refugee situation;
A description of the number and allocation of the refugees to be admitted, and an analysis of conditions within the countries from which they came;
A description of the plans for their movement and resettlement and the estimated cost of their movement and resettlement;
An analysis of the anticipated social, economic, and demographic impact of their admission to the United States;
A description of the extent to which other countries will admit and assist in the resettlement of such refugees;
An analysis of the impact of the participation of the United States in the resettlement of such refugees on the foreign policy interests of the United States; and
Such additional information as may be appropriate or requested by such members.
This report also contains information as required by Section 602(d) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-292, October 27, 1998, 112 Stat. 2787) (IRFA), as amended, about religious persecution of refugee populations eligible for consideration for admission to the United States.
This report also meets the reporting requirements of Section 305(b) of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-333, October 18, 2004, 118 Stat. 1287), as amended, by providing information about specific measures taken to facilitate access to the United States refugee program for individuals who have fled “countries of particular concern” for violations of religious freedoms, identified pursuant to Section 402(b) of the IRFA.
I. Description of the Nature of the Refugee Situation
According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there were 26 million refugees around the world at the end of calendar year 2019.[9] This figure includes 5.6 million Palestinians under the mandate of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). It also includes an unknown number of individuals who qualify as refugees under UNHCR’s mandate but would not qualify as refugees under U.S. law.[10]
Africa: According to UNHCR, the refugee population in sub-Saharan Africa totaled 6.4 million at the end of 2019. South Sudanese are still the largest refugee population in the region, with more than 2.3 million. Most refugees from South Sudan were in Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Kenya. The number of Somali refugees declined from about 774,000 to about 762,000; Ethiopia, Kenya, and Yemen, were the main host countries. There were nearly 917,000 refugees and asylum seekers from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), an increase from 720,000 the previous year; Uganda hosted the vast majority, with smaller populations in Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania. Refugees from Burundi in neighboring countries totaled about 334,000, mainly in Tanzania and Rwanda. The number of refugees from the Central African Republic increased from 591,000 to over 600,000, almost all of them in neighboring Chad, Cameroon, the DRC and the Republic of Congo.
Asia: UNHCR reports there were 4.1 million refugees in Asia at the end of 2019, a decrease of almost 4,000 from the end of 2018. Refugees from Afghanistan have been a significant population since the 1980s. Despite the voluntary repatriation of millions of Afghan refugees since 2002, they are the third-largest group of refugees in the world at 2.7 million. Most were in Pakistan, about 1.4 million, while Iran hosted another 951,000. More than 1.1 million people from Burma, including more than 710,000 Rohingya fleeing violence and atrocities, have left Burma; about the same as last year. The vast majority are in Bangladesh, while India, Malaysia, and Thailand host smaller populations.
Europe: According to UNHCR, the refugee population in Europe increased by approximately 100,000 during 2019, to nearly 6.6 million. The vast majority came from outside the region, particularly Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Turkey hosted the largest refugee population in the world: approximately 3.9 million, up from 3.7 million. Most were Syrians (3.6 million), with much smaller numbers of Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians, and other nationalities.
Latin America and the Caribbean: UNHCR reports there were about 150,000 refugees in the Americas outside of the United States and Canada at the end of 2019. Over the last few years, Venezuela has gone from becoming a refuge for displaced Colombians to becoming a source of displaced people itself, as more than five million Venezuelans have fled political repression and economic decline. In addition, poor economic conditions and high levels of generalized violence, factors that are not the basis for refugee or asylum status, continued to contribute to hundreds of thousands of Central Americans leaving their home countries. At the end of 2019, the number of individuals seeking refugee or asylum status included more than 178,000 from El Salvador, more than 142,000 from Guatemala, and more than 149,000 from Honduras. The vast majority sought protection in the United States. In addition, nearly 100,000 Nicaraguans have left their home country since political unrest and economic trouble started there in April 2018.
Near East and North Africa: According to UNHCR, there were about 2.6 million refugees in the Middle East and North Africa at the end of 2019, a slight decrease from the end of 2018. Syria remained the main country of origin of refugees worldwide due to the ongoing civil war that began in 2011; the number of Syrian refugees remained around 6.7 million at end-2019. In addition to those in Turkey, Germany, and Sweden, who are counted as part of the Europe figure above, there were nearly 915,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon, nearly 655,000 in Jordan, nearly 247,000 in Iraq, and 129,200 in Egypt.
[9] Unless noted otherwise, all figures in this section come from the UNHCR Report Global Trends: Forced Displacement 2019. Note that UNHCR counts on a calendar year basis. [10] The definition of refugee at Section 101(a)(42) of the INA is consistent with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The United States is a party to the 1967 Protocol. However, UNHCR uses a broader definition, and not all of the individuals it counts would qualify as refugees under the INA. UNHCR’s figures also include individuals who are recognized under other instruments, such as the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; recognized in accordance with the UNHCR Statute; granted complementary and temporary forms of protection; and, in 15 Latin American countries, covered by the criteria in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. UNHCR’s figure also includes individuals “in refugee-like situations that includes groups of people who are outside their country or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained.”
II. Description of the Number and Allocation of the Refugees To Be Admitted and an Analysis of Conditions within the Countries from which They Came
Proposed FY 2021 Allocations
Population of special humanitarian concern
Admit up to
Refugees who:
have been persecuted or have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of religion; or
who are within a category of aliens established under subsection (b) of Section 599D of Title V, P.L. 101-167, as amended (the Lautenberg and Specter Amendments).
5,000
Refugees who are within a category of aliens listed in Section 1243(a) of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2007, Title XII, Div. A, P.L. 110-181, as amended.
4,000
Refugees who are nationals or habitual residents of El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras.
1,000
Other refugees in the following groups:
Those referred to the USRAP by a U.S. embassy in any location.
Those who will be admitted through a Form I-730 following-to-join petition or who gain access to the USRAP for family reunification through the P-3 process.
Those currently located in Australia, Nauru, or Papua New Guinea who gain access to USRAP pursuant to an arrangement between the United States and Australia.
Those who are nationals or habitual residents of Hong Kong, Venezuela, or Cuba.
Those in the USRAP who were in “Ready for Departure” status as of September 30, 2019.
5,000
Total proposed refugee admissions in FY 2021
15,000
Country Conditions
The Department of State’s annual Country Reports on Human Right Practicesand annual Report to Congress on International Religious Freedominclude information about conditions in every country in the world, including those from which the United States resettles refugees. It is important to note, however, that not all the practices described in these reports would be recognized as “persecution” under Section 101(a)(42) of the INA.
Religious Freedom
The United States is committed to advancing international religious freedom, including the protection of religious minority groups, across the globe. To this end, the Administration proposes a dedicated allocation for refugees who suffered or fear persecution on account of religion and refugees who are within the categories established through the Lautenberg and Specter amendments.
On December 18, 2019, Secretary of State Pompeo designated Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan as Countries of Particular Concern (CPCs) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for engaging in or tolerating systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom. The Secretary also placed Comoros, Cuba, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Russia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan on a Special Watch List for governments that have engaged in or tolerated severe violations of religious freedom.
The USRAP provides access in various ways to refugees who suffer religious persecution, including from CPC countries:
Priority 1, Individual Referrals: Nationals of any country, including CPCs and Special Watch List countries, may be referred to the USRAP through a Priority 1 referral for reasons of religious persecution.
Priority 2, Groups of Special Concern: Under the Lautenberg and Specter Amendments, religious minorities designated as Priority 2 category members, including from Iran, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, are considered under a reduced evidentiary standard for establishing a well-founded fear of persecution.
Priority 3, Family Reunification: Refugees from certain countries listed in Annex 1 with certain refugee or asylee family members in the United States have access to the USRAP through Priority 3.
III. Description of the Proposed Plans for Their Movement and Resettlement and the Estimated Cost of Their Movement and Resettlement
Overseas Processing
The Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) works closely with U.S. diplomatic missions, UNHCR, and other partners to identify candidates for resettlement through USRAP. When an applicant is referred to USRAP for consideration, the case is received and processed by a Resettlement Support Center (RSC). PRM funds seven RSCs around the world operated by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or international organizations.
Adjudication
Under PRM’s guidance, RSCs collect biographic and other information from the applicants to prepare cases for security screening, interview, and adjudication by DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The Secretary of Homeland Security has delegated to USCIS the authority to determine eligibility for refugee status under the INA. Refugee determinations under the INA are entirely discretionary. USCIS officers review the information that the RSC has collected and the results of security screening processes and conduct an in-person interview with each refugee applicant before deciding whether to approve him or her for classification as a refugee.
Post-Adjudication Processing
If an applicant is conditionally approved for resettlement by USCIS, RSC staff guide the refugee applicant through post-adjudication steps, including a health screening to identify medical needs and to ensure that those with a contagious disease do not enter the United States. The RSC also obtains a “sponsorship assurance” from a U.S.-based resettlement agency that receives funding from PRM for Reception and Placement (R&P) assistance. Once all required steps are completed, the RSC refers the case to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for transportation to the United States.
Transportation
The Department of State funds the international transportation of refugees resettled in the United States through a program administered by IOM. The cost of transportation is provided to refugees in the form of a no-interest loan. Refugees are responsible for repaying these loans over time through their R&P providers, beginning six months after their arrival.
Cultural Orientation
The Department of State strives to ensure that refugees admitted to the United States are prepared for the changes they will experience by providing cultural orientation programs prior to departure. Every refugee family is offered a copy of “Welcome to the United States,” a book developed with contributions from refugee resettlement workers, resettled refugees, and government officials that provides accurate information about initial resettlement. In addition, the Department of State funds one- to five-day pre-departure orientation classes for eligible refugees at sites throughout the world. Refugees may also access cultural orientation information through a website that is translated into eight languages and provides information in numerous modes to meet all literacy levels, as well as a mobile application.
In order to reach Afghan and Iraqi Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders, a population that does not routinely have access to pre-departure classroom cultural orientation, the Department of State also created a series of four videos in Dari and Arabic.
In addition, the Department of State offers a curriculum for cultural orientation after refugees’ arrival in the United States. This includes a model assessment tool for domestic orientation providers to assess refugee understanding of orientation topics during the R&P period.
Reception and Placement (R&P)
Unlike asylees, who arrive in the United States on their own, refugees selected for resettlement through USRAP are eligible for R&P assistance. Each refugee approved for admission to the United States is sponsored by a resettlement agency. Nine non-profit resettlement agencies currently participate in the R&P Program under a cooperative agreement with the Department of State.
Where Are Refugees Resettled?
Representatives from the resettlement agencies meet frequently to review the biographic information and other case records sent by the RSC, seeking to match the particular needs of each incoming refugee with the specific resources available in U.S. communities. Through this process, they determine which resettlement agency will sponsor and where each refugee will be initially resettled in the United States.
Many refugees have family or close friends already in the United States, and resettlement agencies make every effort to reunite them. Those without U.S. ties are placed where they have the best opportunity for success through employment with the assistance of strong community services. Agencies place refugees throughout the United States. Through its local affiliates, each agency monitors the resources that each community offers (e.g., interpreters who speak various languages, the size and special features of available housing, the availability of schools with special services, medical care, English classes, employment services, etc.).
Information about the states where refugees admitted to the United States in FY 2019 were initially resettled is available in section VII.
Executive Order 13888 on Enhancing State and Local Participation in Refugee Resettlement
On September 26, 2019, President Trump signed Executive Order 13888 on Enhancing State and Local Involvement in Refugee Resettlement, which provides that refugees should be resettled only in U.S. jurisdictions where both the state and local governments have provided their consent. Close cooperation with state and local governments ensures that refugees are resettled in communities that are eager and equipped to support their successful integration into American society. Implementation of Executive Order 13888 currently is enjoined due to a January 15, 2020 preliminary injunction issued by the U.S. District Court in HIAS v. Trump, PJM 19-3346. The Administration has appealed the court’s decision and, if successful on appeal, will implement Executive Order 13888 swiftly thereafter.
What Do the Resettlement Agencies Do?
The sponsoring resettlement agency is responsible for placing refugees with one of its local affiliates and for providing initial services. The Department of State’s standard cooperative agreement with each of the resettlement agencies specifies the services the agency must provide, which include housing, essential furnishings, food, necessary clothing, orientation, and assistance with access to other social, medical, and employment services. The R&P Program provides resettlement agencies a one-time payment per refugee to assist with expenses during a refugee’s first three months in the United States, but the program anticipates that sponsoring agencies will contribute significant cash or in-kind resources to supplement U.S. government funding.
What Happens When Refugees Arrive?
Upon arrival in the United States, all refugees are met by someone from the local resettlement affiliate or a family member or friend. They are taken to their housing, which has basic furnishings, appliances, climate-appropriate clothing, and some food typical of the refugee’s culture. Shortly after arrival, refugees are helped to start their lives in the United States. This includes applying for a Social Security card, registering children in school, arranging medical appointments, and connecting refugees with necessary social, employment, and language services.
Under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, refugees are eligible for public assistance when they first arrive. Nevertheless, the U.S. government seeks to promote early economic self-sufficiency through employment to speed integration into American society.[11]Refugees receive employment authorization upon arrival and are encouraged to become employed as soon as possible.
[11] Economic self-sufficiency is defined at 45 CFR 400.2 as “earning a total family income at a level that enables a family unit to support itself without receipt of a cash assistance grant.” Cash assistance includes Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), refugee cash assistance, and general assistance, but not other forms of public assistance, such as housing and medical assistance.
Beyond Reception and Placement
Beginning with arrival in the United States, and continuing after the R&P period ends, refugees, approved asylees, and other eligible groups benefit from special programs funded by the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Refugee Resettlement (HHS/ORR) and administered by the states, resettlement agencies, or community organizations.[12]
Up to eight months of Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA) is available for refugees, approved asylees, and other ORR-eligible groups who are not eligible for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Refugees not eligible for Medicaid can receive up to eight months of Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA) upon arrival. In addition, each refugee receives a medical screening within the initial resettlement period. ORR also provides health and mental health services through the Survivors of Torture and Refugee Health Promotion grant programs.
The Matching Grant Program through the R&P resettlement agencies is an alternative to public cash assistance. It aims to enable certain refugees, approved asylees, and other ORR-eligible groups to become economically self-sufficient within six months of eligibility. Participating agencies provide case management, employment services, maintenance assistance, and cash allowance.
ORR distributes Refugee Support Services (RSS) grants based on arrival numbers of ORReligible populations in each state. Refugees, approved asylees, and other ORR-eligible groups can access RSS services up to five years after arrival. These services may include employment services, on-the-job training, English language instruction, vocational training, case management, translation, social adjustment services, health-related services, childcare, and transportation. Citizenship and naturalization services provided under RSS may be provided to eligible populations who have been in the United States for more than five years.
Refugee School Impact grants are available to support regions with high concentrations of refugees and other ORR-eligible children in local schools. This program funds activities that aim to strengthen academic performance and facilitate social adjustment. Set-aside funds also support youth mentoring activities and specialized services for elderly refugees.
ORR also funds non-profit agencies to carry out special initiatives or programs for refugees, approved asylees, and other ORR-eligible groups including: case management, ethnic community development, career pathways, individual development accounts, microenterprise development, and agricultural projects.
[12] HHS/ORR refugee benefits and services are available to refugees, approved asylees, Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders and their spouses and unmarried children under the age of 21, Cuban and Haitian entrants, certain Amerasians immigrants from Vietnam, victims of a severe form of trafficking who have received certification or eligibility letters from ORR, trafficking victims family members with “T” nonimmigrant visas, and some victims of torture.
Estimated Cost for Refugee Processing and Resettlement
[13] These FY 2020 and 2021 figures include cost factors to reflect Headquarters facilities rent related to the refugee resettlement program, staffing, general expense and following-to-join refugee processing, in addition to certain International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) and Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS) costs. The figures also include personnel salary and benefits for refugee officers detailed to the Asylum Division or assigned to Asylum workloads.
[14] This FY 2020 figure includes FY 2020 Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) appropriation of $251 million, $25.3 million in MRA carryover from FY 2019, $50.7 million in projected IOM loan collections/carryover, and an estimate of $6 million in prior-year MRA recoveries. A portion of these funds will be carried over into FY 2021. This FY 2021 figure includes FY 2021 MRA budget request of $253.8 million, $41.5 million projected MRA carryover from FY 2020, $42 million in projected IOM loan collections/carryover, and an estimate of $6 million in prior-year MRA recoveries. [15] HHS/ORR refugee benefits and services are available to refugees asylees, Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders and their spouses and unmarried children under the age of 21, Cuban and Haitian entrants, certain Amerasian immigrants from Vietnam, victims of a severe form of trafficking who have received certification or eligibility letters from ORR, trafficking victims family members with “T” nonimmigrant visas, and victims of torture. The estimated funding for these groups is included here. None of these additional groups is included in the refugee admissions ceiling. This category does not include costs associated with the Unaccompanied Alien Children’s Program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs, or the Victims of Trafficking or Survivors of Torture. These estimates do not include any prior year carryover funding. The estimated FY 2021 figures above reflect the President’s FY 2021 Budget request.
IV. Analysis of the Anticipated Social, Economic, and Demographic Impact of Their Admission to the United States
In accordance with the Refugee Act of 1980, ORR produces an Annual Report to Congress that presents ORR’s activities, expenditures, policies, and information about the individuals receiving ORR benefits and services, which addresses this issue in greater detail. The Annual Report to Congress also includes data from the Annual Survey of Refugees (ASR), which tracks the progress refugees make towards integration during their first five years in the United States and thus provides insight into the social, economic, and demographic impact of refugee admissions. The ASR collects basic demographic information such as age, level of education, English language proficiency and training, job training, labor force participation, work experience, and barriers to employment. It collects other data by family unit, including information on housing, income, and public benefits use. ORR published the results of the most recent ASR in the 2017 Annual Report to Congress, covering refugee arrivals FY 2012 to FY 2016. Its findings include:
Education level: Respondents age 25 or older averaged 8.4 years of education before arrival; about half did not have a high school diploma upon arrival; and 31 percent of refugees age 25 or older listed their prior educational attainment as “none.” Among respondents age 18 and older, 17 percent were pursuing a degree of some kind, with most seeking high school equivalency.
English language proficiency: Respondents improved their English over time, but deficits remained. Among refugees age 18 or older who had lived in the United States between 4.5 and 6.5 years, 45 percent spoke English “not well” or “not at all,” based on self-assessments.
Employment: Among respondents ages 16 to 64, 66.2 percent were in the labor force, of whom 88.8 percent were employed; this is slightly lower than the comparable rates for native-born members of the U.S. population: 73.9 percent in labor force, of whom 94.1 percent were employed. However, male respondents were employed at a rate roughly on par with that of the U.S. population after being in the United States for only two years. Employed refugees age 18 or older earned $12.27 per hour on average.
Public benefits use:Two percent of respondent households reported public assistance as their only source of income; 29 percent received cash welfare of some kind, most often Supplemental
Security Income (SSI); and 56 percent received Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits. Among respondents age 18 or older, 61 percent reported having health coverage throughout the previous year, while 29 percent reported no health coverage. Among those with coverage, about half received Medicaid or Refugee Medical Assistance.
ORR is overseeing a multi-year review of the data collected through the ASR, including revisions that improved the design of the 2016 ASR, to ensure the survey offers representative data on the refugee population. ORR will release the results of the most recent Annual Survey of Refugees in its forthcoming 2018 Annual Report to Congress.
V. Description of the Extent to which Other Countries Will Admit and Assist in the Resettlement of Such Refugees
The number of individuals forcibly displaced worldwide, over 79 million, vastly exceeds the number that could be resettled or granted asylum in host countries each year. The United States and UNHCR recognize that most desire safe, voluntary return to their homes. Therefore, the United States seeks to promote this durable solution for displaced people, including refugees. When safe and voluntary return is not possible, the United States promotes self-sufficiency and local integration in countries of first asylum. Supporting refugees as close to their homes as possible facilitates their return when conditions permit. The United States encourages host governments to protect refugees and to allow them to integrate into local communities, as appropriate; in many cases, we also provide financial support, through contributions to humanitarian organizations, to support and encourage host countries in these activities.
Africa: A number of African countries were among the top ten refugee-hosting countries worldwide.[16] According to UNHCR, Uganda hosted about 1.4 million refugees as of June 2020, mostly from South Sudan, but also sizable populations from the DRC, Burundi, Somalia, and Rwanda. The refugee population in Sudan exceeded 1 million; most were South Sudanese, with an additional population of Eritreans. Ethiopia hosted over 700,000 refugees, most from South Sudan, with additional populations from Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan.
East Asia: Countries in the region traditionally have been reluctant to integrate refugees, and the vast majority do not have asylum systems, although Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Thailand host nearly 1.1 million Burmese refugees. According to UNHCR, Bangladesh hosted over 780,000 refugees at the end of 2019, most of them Rohingya fleeing violence and atrocities in Burma’s Rakhine State. Thousands more refugees of other nationalities are in the regional capitals of Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Jakarta, including Afghanis, Iranians, Iraqis, Pakistanis, Somalis, Syrians, and Yemenis. UNHCR and international partners continue to encourage Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Thailand to expand humanitarian protection and assistance for refugees and asylum seekers, and those countries have made efforts to improve refugee self-reliance and inclusion.
Europe: According to UNHCR, at the end of 2019, Turkey hosted more refugees than any other country in the world – about 3.9 million, the vast majority from Syria. Syrians in Turkey receive “Temporary Protection” status, which does not normally include a path to citizenship or permanent residence. Non-Syrian asylum-seekers receive “International Protection,” which does not provide a pathway to long-term residency, citizenship, or protection from deportation. Germany hosted 1.1 million refugees, most from Syria, while other major sources were Iraq and Afghanistan. Other European countries host hundreds of thousands of refugees, including France (408,000), Italy (208,000), the Netherlands (94,000), Spain (58,000), Sweden (254,000), and the United Kingdom (133,000).
Latin America and the Caribbean: According to UNHCR, a number of countries in the region have provided asylum and alternative legal forms of stay for over 2.4 million Venezuelans, mostly in Colombia but also in Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Argentina, Peru, Mexico, Brazil, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. Peru was the second largest recipient of asylum applications globally in 2019, with nearly all claims (almost 260,000) submitted by Venezuelans.
With support from the United States, provided through UNHCR and other partners, Mexico is improving its ability to adjudicate asylum claims and support asylum-seekers, including those from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and hosted nearly 102,000 asylum-seekers at the end of 2019. The U.S. government also has increased support through UNHCR to strengthen asylum capacity in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. Furthermore, in addition to the United States, other countries such as Canada, Australia, Uruguay, and Brazil have resettled small numbers of refugees from the Northern Triangle via the Protection Transfer Arrangement.[17]
Near East and South Asia: At the end of 2019, Lebanon hosted almost 1 million refugees overall,[18] including over 914,000 Syrians, the second-highest number after Turkey. In addition, Lebanon provided protection to thousands of non-Syrian refugees and asylum seekers, mostly from Iraq and Sudan. Jordan had the eleventh-largest refugee and asylum seeker population in the world at nearly 745,000; the vast majority of the refugees were from Syria, while more than 67,000 were from Iraq. Neither Jordan’s nor Lebanon’s laws provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and both lack a formal system for protecting refugees. By agreement with UNHCR, Jordan allows recognized refugees a maximum stay of one year, during which period UNHCR must find a durable solution. This period is renewable, however, and Jordan generally does not force refugees to return to their countries of origin. By contrast, Lebanon does not automatically grant legal stay to UNHCR-registered refugees, who generally must apply for Lebanese residency on a recurring basis under Lebanon’s immigration law. According to UNHCR, Pakistan hosted the world’s third -largest refugee population at the end of 2019: 1.4 million refugees, almost all of them Afghans. Iran ranked seventh among refugee-hosting countries worldwide, with 979,000, the vast majority of them Afghans.
Third-Country Resettlement: Third-country resettlement is an option for certain individuals who cannot return to their home countries or remain in the countries of first asylum. According to UNHCR, 26 countries admitted 107,800 refugees for resettlement during 2019. Other than the United States, the top resettlement countries were Canada (30,100 resettled) and Australia (18,200 resettled). Among European countries, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom resettled he highest number of refugees, with over 22,000 resettled to these five countries in 2019.
[16] Unless noted otherwise, all figures in this section come from the UNHCR Report Global Trends: Forced Displacement 2019. Note that UNHCR counts on a calendar year basis.
[17] In 2016, Costa Rica entered into a Protection Transfer Arrangement (PTA) with UNHCR and IOM. After pre-screening in the refugee applicant’s home countries, the PTA allows UNHCR and IOM to transfer applicants from the Northern Triangle in need of immediate protection to Costa Rica, where they undergo refugee processing before being resettled to a third country.
[18] Current numbers for Lebanon only include refugees registered prior to 2015, at which point the Government of Lebanon restricted UNHCR from registering new refugees.
VI. Analysis of the Impact of the Participation of the United States in the Resettlement of Such Refugees on the Foreign Policy Interests of the United States
The United States seeks to enable the safe and voluntary return of refugees to their home countries – the solution that most refugees prefer. This reflects our commitment to achieving the best humanitarian outcomes while advancing the foreign policy interests of the United States. To this end, the U.S. National Security Strategy says that we will continue to lead the world in humanitarian assistance, that we will continue to catalyze responses to man-made and natural disasters, and that we will support displaced people as close to their homes as possible to help meet their needs until they can safely and voluntarily return home.
By focusing on ending the conflicts that drive displacement in the first place, and by providing assistance overseas to prevent further displacement, we can help prevent the destabilizing effects of such displacement on affected countries and their neighbors. This is why we pursue diplomatic efforts around the world to find solutions to crises, like our support for the legitimate government in Venezuela against Maduro’s tyranny.
Also, the United States is the largest single provider of humanitarian assistance worldwide, funding the programs of UNHCR, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), IOM, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the World Food Programme (WFP), and a number of other international and non-governmental organizations. Total U.S. humanitarian assistance was nearly $9.3 billion in FY 2019, including funding from PRM and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
U.S. humanitarian assistance reaches tens of millions of displaced and crisis-affected people worldwide, including those who will never be considered or qualify for resettlement in a third country. It provides urgent, life-saving support and services, including food, shelter, health care, education, and access to safe drinking water. U.S. support for host countries, provided through contributions to humanitarian organizations, encourages those countries to continue sheltering those fleeing persecution and increases their access to work, education, and public services.
The U.S. approach allows us to help many more vulnerable people, and do so much more rapidly, than we could ever hope to help through resettlement in the United States. In addition, helping displaced people in areas close to their homes facilitates their return when conditions allow. This enables them to participate in rebuilding their homelands, promoting recovery and long-term stability of those countries and their neighbors – which also serves long-term U.S. foreign policy and national security interests.
Even as we remain the world’s largest humanitarian contributor, the United States expects other governments to share in the burden. We will use our diplomatic influence to expand the number of donors and increase global contributions to humanitarian appeals and responses. We will work to better target the application of our humanitarian assistance funds. Also, as part of our broader UN reform agenda, we will seek to maximize the value of U.S. contributions to humanitarian organizations by driving reforms to make such organizations more effective, efficient, transparent, and accountable.
VII. Additional Information
FY 2019 USRAP Admissions by Country of Origin
Country of Origin
Individual Arrivals
Percentage of Total Arrivals
Dem. Rep. Congo
12,958
43.19 %
Burma
4,932
16.44 %
Ukraine
4,451
14.84 %
Eritrea
1,757
5.86 %
Afghanistan
1,198
3.99 %
Syria
563
1.88 %
Iraq
465
1.55 %
Sudan
382
1.27 %
El Salvador
311
1.04 %
Colombia
298
0.99 %
Pakistan
264
0.88 %
Ethiopia
247
0.82 %
Central African Republic
244
0.81 %
Somalia
231
0.77 %
Iran
199
0.66 %
Burundi
196
0.65 %
Russia
184
0.61 %
Moldova
120
0.40 %
Guatemala
118
0.39 %
Belarus
96
0.32 %
Vietnam
94
0.31 %
Rwanda
91
0.30 %
Honduras
74
0.25 %
Ivory Coast
62
0.21 %
Kyrgyzstan
46
0.15 %
Republic of South Sudan
42
0.14 %
Liberia
37
0.12 %
Armenia
33
0.11 %
Bhutan
32
0.11 %
Palestine
30
0.10 %
Cameroon
28
0.09 %
Georgia
26
0.09 %
Uganda
24
0.08 %
Turkmenistan
18
0.06 %
Kenya
17
0.06 %
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)
17
0.06 %
Senegal
14
0.05 %
Nepal
13
0.04 %
Uzbekistan
12
0.04 %
Guinea
10
0.03 %
Chad
8
0.03 %
Kazakhstan
8
0.03 %
Jamaica
6
0.02 %
Jordan
5
0.02 %
Egypt
4
0.01 %
Bangladesh
3
0.01 %
Benin
3
0.01 %
Congo
3
0.01 %
Mali
3
0.01 %
Yemen
3
0.01 %
Cuba
2
0.01 %
Ghana
2
0.01 %
Sierra Leone
2
0.01 %
Zimbabwe
2
0.01 %
Cambodia
1
0.00 %
China
1
0.00 %
Gambia
1
0.00 %
Indonesia
1
0.00 %
Israel
1
0.00 %
Korea, North
1
0.00 %
Kuwait
1
0.00 %
Lebanon
1
0.00 %
Malawi
1
0.00 %
Togo
1
0.00 %
Turkey
1
0.00 %
United Arab Emirates
1
0.00 %
Totals
30,000
100.00%
FY 2019 USRAP Arrivals by State of Initial Resettlement
State
Total Refugees Arrivals
Percentage of Total Arrivals
Texas
2,456
8.19%
Washington
1,947
6.49%
New York
1,845
6.15%
California
1,841
6.14%
Ohio
1,426
4.75%
Kentucky
1,421
4.74%
North Carolina
1,256
4.19%
Arizona
1,216
4.05%
Georgia
1,189
3.96%
Michigan
1,146
3.82%
Pennsylvania
1,092
3.64%
Illinois
1,005
3.35%
Indiana
865
2.88%
Minnesota
848
2.83%
Maryland
764
2.55%
Iowa
747
2.49%
Missouri
680
2.27%
Florida
666
2.22%
Tennessee
653
2.18%
Colorado
635
2.12%
Wisconsin
596
1.99%
Oregon
556
1.85%
Virginia
548
1.83%
Idaho
523
1.74%
Massachusetts
515
1.72%
Utah
463
1.54%
Nebraska
443
1.48%
Kansas
407
1.36%
New Jersey
250
0.83%
New Hampshire
248
0.83%
Nevada
224
0.75%
Oklahoma
223
0.74%
South Carolina
189
0.63%
Connecticut
142
0.47%
Maine
140
0.47%
New Mexico
132
0.44%
South Dakota
129
0.43%
North Dakota
127
0.42%
Vermont
114
0.38%
Montana
97
0.32%
Rhode Island
89
0.30%
Alaska
47
0.16%
Arkansas
46
0.15%
Alabama
22
0.07%
Louisiana
12
0.04%
Mississippi
10
0.03%
Delaware
4
0.01%
District of Columbia
4
0.01%
West Virginia
2
0.01%
Totals
30,000
100.00 %
ANNEX 1: USRAP Access Categories
Section 207(a)(3) of the INA says that USRAP shall allocate admissions among refugees “of special humanitarian concern to the United States in accordance with a determination made by the President after appropriate consultation.” There are three categories of individuals eligible to enter USRAP, known as “priorities”[19]:
Priority 1: Individual cases referred by designated entities to the program by virtue of their circumstances and apparent need for resettlement.
Priority 2: Groups of special concern designated by the Department of State as having access to the program by virtue of their circumstances and apparent need for resettlement.
Priority 3: Individual cases from designated nationalities granted access for purposes of reunification with family members already in the United States.
[19] Entering USRAP under a certain “priority” does not establish precedence in the order in which cases will be processed. Once cases are established as eligible for access under one of the three processing priorities, they all undergo the same processing steps.
Priority 1 (P-1): Individual Referrals
P-1 allows consideration of refugee claims from persons of any nationality, usually with compelling protection needs, for whom resettlement appears to be the appropriate durable solution. P-1 cases are identified and referred to the USRAP by a U.S. embassy, UNHCR, or a designated non-governmental organization (NGO). UNHCR has historically referred the vast majority of P-1 cases; however, USRAP will no longer request or accept referrals from UNHCR except in the categories listed in this year’s Presidential Determination. Some NGOs providing humanitarian assistance in locations where there are large concentrations of refugees are eligible to provide P-1 referrals. A U.S. ambassador may make a P-1 referral for persons still in their country of origin if the ambassador determines that such cases are in need of exceptional treatment, and the Department of State and DHS concur.
Priority 2 (P-2): Group Referrals
P-2 includes specific groups identified by U.S. law. The open-access model allows individuals to access the program directly, on the basis of certain criteria. The Resettlement Support Centers (RSCs) responsible for handling open-access P-2 applications, working under the direction of PRM, make a preliminary determination as to whether individual applicants qualify for access and should be presented to DHS for interview. Applicants who clearly do not meet the access requirements are “screened out” before the DHS interview.
Once an individual gains access to USRAP processing via a P-2 designation, all other processing steps are the same as for those referred by P-1, including individual pre-screening and DHS interviews, and all security and medical checks.
Open-access P-2s inside their country of origin:
Certain Members of Religious Minority Groups in Eurasia and the Baltics: Jews, Evangelical Christians, and Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox religious adherents identified in the Lautenberg Amendment, Section 599D of Title V, P. L. 101-167, as amended (the Lautenberg Amendment), with close family in the United States. Based on the annual statutory renewal of the Lautenberg Amendment, these individuals are considered under a reduced evidentiary standard for establishing a well-founded fear of persecution.
Certain Iraqis Associated with the United States: Employees of the U.S. government, U.S. government-funded contractors or grantees, U.S. media, or U.S. NGOs working in Iraq, and certain family members of such employees eligible under Section 1243(a) of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2007, Title XII, Div. A, P. L. 110-181, as amended.
Open-access P-2s outside their country of origin:
Certain Members of Religious Minority Groups in Iran: Jews, Christians, Baha’is, Sabaean-Mandaeans, and Zoroastrians are considered under a reduced evidentiary standard for establishing a well-founded fear of persecution pursuant to the annual renewal of the Lautenberg Amendment, as amended in 2004 by Section 213 of Title II, Division E, of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, P. L. 108-199 (the Specter Amendment).
Certain Iraqis Associated with the United States: Employees of the U.S. government, U.S. government-funded contractors or grantees, U.S. media, or U.S. NGOs working in
Iraq, and certain family members of such employees eligible under Section 1243(a) of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2007, Title XII, Div. A, P. L. 110-181, as amended. This program operates in Jordan and Egypt in addition to the in-country program in Iraq.
Priority 3 (P-3): Family Reunification
P-3 provides USRAP access to members of designated nationalities who have immediate family members in the United States who entered as refugees or were granted asylum (even if they subsequently gained LPR status or naturalized as U.S. citizens). Parents, spouses, and unmarried children under the age of 21 of the U.S.-based asylee or refugee can participate. For FY 2021, P3 processing is available to individuals of the following nationalities:
Afghanistan
Burundi
Central African Republic
Cuba
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
El Salvador
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Guatemala
Honduras
Iran
Iraq
Mali
Somalia
South Sudan
Sudan
Syria
Following-to-Join Family Reunification Petitions
A refugee admitted to the United States may request “following-to-join benefits” for his or her spouse and/or unmarried children under the age of 21 who were not previously granted refugee status. Within two years of admission, the refugee may file a Form I-730 Refugee/Asylee Relative Petition with DHS for each eligible family member.
Individuals who gain access to the USRAP through the Form I-730 petition process are interviewed by DHS or Department of State consular officers to verify the relationships claimed in the petition, as well as to examine any applicable bars to status and admissibility.
Beneficiaries of I-730 petitions are not required to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution, as they derive their status from the petitioner. Beneficiaries of I-730 petitions may be processed within their country of origin or in other locations.
Certain relatives in the United States may file an I-730 petition and simultaneously seek Priority 3 access for their qualifying family members (if eligible). In some cases, the I-730 petition will be the only option as the family members are still in their country of origin. Unlike the P-3 process, the I-730 process does not allow the relative in the United States to petition for parents.
Togo’s strong economic growth in 2019 was driven by major reforms that improved the business climate and increased investment. In the last two years, Togo rose by more than 50 places in the World Bank’s Doing Business report and now ranks 97th – the highest ranking in West Africa. Agriculture remains one of the engines of economic growth in Togo. In 2019, Togo became the top exporter of organic products to Europe in the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) and the second in Africa after Egypt. The export volume of these organic products (mainly soybeans and pineapples) more than doubled, from 22,000 tons in 2018 to 45,000 tons in 2019.
The government of Togo implemented various business reforms and completed several large infrastructure projects over the last five years to attract investment. In 2018, the government launched its five-year National Development Plan (PND) with three major axes. The plan’s first goal is to leverage the country’s geographic position by transforming Lome into a regional trading center and transport hub. Togo has already completed hundreds of kilometers of refurbished roadways, expanded and modernized the Port of Lome, and inaugurated in 2016 the new Lome international airport that conforms to international standards. The second goal is to increase agricultural production through agricultural centers (Agropoles) and increase manufacturing. The third goal is improving social development, including electrification of the country. The government is searching for private sector investment to fulfill these PND goals.
In September 2017, the government established the Business Climate Unit (CCA). Since its establishment, the CCA has coordinated economic reforms and played a key role in improving the business climate for the private sector. The CCA is composed of a national coordination body and three committees dedicated to the public and private sectors and civil society. The CCA has improved the ease of doing business in Togo and starting a company in Togo is straightforward.
Nevertheless, Togo must face a number of challenges to maintain this momentum. Challenges include a weak and opaque legal system, lack of clear land titles, and government interference in various sectors. Corruption remains a common problem in Togo, especially for businesses. Often “donations” or “gratuities” result in shorter delays for obtaining registrations, permits, and licenses, thus resulting in an unfair advantage for companies that engage in such practices. Although Togo has government bodies charged with combatting corruption, corruption-related charges are rarely brought or prosecuted.
The 2019 Investment Code provided a legal framework to attract more investment and promote the economic and social development policy of Togo. With an improving investment climate and modern transportation infrastructure, Togo’s steadily improving economic outlook offers opportunities for U.S. firms interested in doing business locally and in the sub-region.
1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment
Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment
Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is a priority for Togo, and the government hosted high-profile international events in 2019 like the EU-Togo Forum to showcase the economic reforms and infrastructure investments the county has taken over the last several years. Investment opportunities are available in transportation, logistics, agribusiness, energy, banking, and mining. FDI decreased to $102 million in 2018 (UNCTAD Report 2019 on world investment). The implementation of the National Development Plan and ongoing reforms focused on improving the business environment should facilitate an increase in FDI in the coming years.
Togo doesn’t have any laws or practices that discriminate against foreign investors. The Investment Code, adopted in June 2019 prescribes equal treatment for Togolese and foreign businesses and investors; free management and circulation of capital for foreign investors; respect of private property; protection of private investment against expropriation; and investment dispute resolution regulation. The code meets West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) standards.
Togo’s investment promotion agency, Togo Invest Corporation, focuses on investments involving the government through Public-Private-Partnerships. Although Togo prioritizes investment retention, the government does not maintain a formal dialogue channel with investors.
Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment
There is a right for foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activities. The foreign investor can also create a wholly owned subsidiary. It has no obligation to associate itself with a local investor. This right is contained in the Investment Code “le Code des Investissements” adopted June 17 2019 and there are no general limits on foreign ownership or control. Section 3 of the Investment Code states that any company established in the Togolese Republic freely determines its production and marketing policy, in compliance with the laws and regulations in force in the Togolese Republic. Additionally, there are no formal investment approval mechanisms in place for inbound foreign investment nor rules, restrictions, limitations, or requirements applied to private investments.
Over the last decade, Togo has significantly reduced the costs and procedures required to establish a business. In 2013, Togo established a center for starting new businesses – the “Centre de Formalité des Entreprises” that manages new business registration with an online business registration process. It only takes seven hours to register a company: https://www.cfetogo.org/eentreprise. In 2014, Togo made starting a business easier by permitting the Centre de Formalité des Entreprises to publish notices of incorporation, as well as eliminating the requirement to obtain an economic operator card. The World Bank Doing Business Report 2020 places Togo at 15 of 190 for the “Starting a Business” indicator, in comparison to 74 of 190 in 2019.
Togo has enacted reforms to improve the process for obtaining construction permits. First, Togo removed a cumbersome and costly bureaucratic hurdle by eliminating the requirement of providing a certificate of registration from the National Association of Architects as a condition precedent to receiving a construction permit. Second, Togo has streamlined the entire procedure by establishing the Guichet Unique Foncier at OTR where applicants may drop off their applications and retrieve their permits, thus eliminating the need to visit multiple administrative offices in order to process paperwork.
The government created a Business Climate Unit in the Presidency in late 2017. The unit is committed to improving operating conditions for business, especially young entrepreneurs and women.
The creation of two commercial courts in Lomé and Kara favors private investors as these legal authorities allow for greater transparency in the treatment of commercial disputes.
Outward Investment
Togo does not promote outward investment, nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad.
2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties
The United States and Togo signed the U.S. – Togo Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations in 1966, which entered into force a year later in 1967. This Treaty provides for protections of U.S. and Togolese investors. Togo has signed many economic, commercial, cooperation, and cultural agreements with its foreign aid donor countries, including France, Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Japan, and more recently with China, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.
Togo does not have a bilateral investment or taxation treaty with the United States.
3. Legal Regime
Transparency of the Regulatory System
In June 2019, the National Assembly adopted a new investment code, which is in line with the objectives of the National Development Plan (PND) and embraces the government’s desire to make the private sector the engine of economic growth.
The Investment Code seeks to make Togo an attractive place for international companies, supporting the development of logistics hubs by offering tax incentives. The incentives are proportional to the size of the investments made and the number of jobs created. At a time when Togo is committed to decentralization, the new investment code provides additional advantages to investments that create jobs outside of major urban centers. The code operationalizes the National Agency for the Promotion of Investments and the Free Zone (API-ZF) which simplifies formalities. The deadline for adjudicating files is now set at 30 days maximum.
As a member of West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), Togo participates in zone-wide plans to harmonize and rationalize regulations governing economic activity within the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA – Organisation pour L’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires). OHADA includes sixteen African countries, including Togo, and one of the principal goals is a common charter on investment. Togo directly implements WAEMU and OHADA regulations without requiring an internal ratification process by the National Assembly.
Although the government does not make draft bills and proposed regulations available for public comment, ministries and regulatory agencies in Togo generally give notice of and distribute the text of proposed regulations to relevant stakeholders. Ministries and regulatory agencies also generally request and receive comments on proposed regulations through targeted outreach to business associations and other stakeholders.
Togo is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures http://togo.eregulations.org. Foreign and national investors can find detailed information on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations including the number of steps, name and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time and legal bases justifying the procedures. The site is generally up-to-date and useful.
The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP) ensures compliance and transparency with respect to government procurements. Each responsible ministry ensures compliance with its regulations which are developed in conformity with international standards and agreements such as WTO or WAEMU norms. Regulations are not reviewed on the basis of scientific or data-driven assessments. The government has not announced any upcoming changes to the regulatory enforcement system.
International Regulatory Considerations
Togo is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is not known if the government notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).
For the most part, in economic terms, the Togolese legal and administrative framework is aligned with the community texts of UEMOA, ECOWAS or larger groups.
On the financial side, Togo depends on sub-regional institutions, notably the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) whose head office is in Dakar. The Regional Council for Public Savings and Financial Markets (CREPMF), headquartered in Abidjan, regulates financial markets.
The Togolese insurance market is subject to the rules of the CIMA zone (Inter African Conference of Insurance Markets).
With regard to intellectual property, Togo relies on OAPI (African Intellectual Property Organization).
The main laws and directives of these different legal and administrative areas are available, among others, on the website www.droit-afrique.com under the heading Togo.
More broadly, Togo is a member of the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).
At the African level, the country is also party to the Council of the Agreement, the Benin Electric Community (CEB), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the Alliance Zone and the Co-operation Zone for Prosperity (ZACOP), and the African Union.
Legal System and Judicial Independence
Togo practices a code-based legal system inherited from the French system. The judiciary is recognized as the third power after the executive and the legislative (the press being the 4th) and thus remains independent of the executive branch. Togo, as a member of the OHADA, has a judicial process that is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable like any other civil actions and are adjudicated in the national court system.
A Court of Arbitration and Mediation created in 2011 legally enforces contracts. The main law covering commercial issues is the Investment Code adopted in 2012. In 2013, Togo created three commercial Chambers within the Lomé tribunal with specialized magistrates who have exclusive trial court level jurisdiction over contract enforcement and business disputes.
Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment
The Investment Code allows the resolution of investment disputes involving foreigners through: (a) bilateral agreements between Togo and the investor’s government; (b) arbitration procedures agreed to between the interested parties; or (c) through the offices of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. The OHADA also provides a forum and legal process for resolving legal disputes in 16 African countries.
Investment dispute are managed by SEGUCE Togo (Societe d’Exploitation du Guichet Unique pour le Commerce Exterieur), and can be accessed at www.segucetogo.tg
Togo is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures http://togo.eregulations.org. Foreign and national investors can find detailed information on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations including the number of steps, name and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time and legal bases justifying the procedures.
Competition and Anti-Trust Laws
The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP) ensures compliance and transparency for competition-related concerns.
Expropriation and Compensation
The government can legally expropriate property through a Presidential decree submitted by the cabinet of ministers and signed by the President.
Only two major expropriations of property have taken place in Togo’s history. The first was the February 1974 nationalization of the then French-owned phosphate mines. The second was the November 2014 nationalization of the Hôtel du 2 Février after it had ceased operations for several years. Shortly after the nationalization of the hotel, Togo announced that it was establishing a commission to determine the fair market amount owed as compensation to the hotel’s Libyan owners/investors. Setting aside the case of the Hôtel du 2 Février as an isolated example, there is little evidence to suggest a trend towards expropriation or “creeping expropriation.” The government designed the 2012 Investment Code to protect against government expropriations. There are some claimants from lands expropriated for recent road construction, however, and the procedure to investigate and resolve those claims is slow.
Dispute Settlement
ICSID Convention and New York Convention
Togo is not a party to the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Togo is, however, a party to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention – also known as the Washington Convention), which it ratified in 1967.
Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Togo does not have Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) or Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with an investment chapter with the United States.
Togo does not have a history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors, notwithstanding the two historical examples above. There do not appear to be any investment disputes involving U.S. persons from the past ten years. Local courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards issued against the government.
International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts
The dispute resolution alternative is the Court of Arbitration of Togo (CATO), which conforms to standards as established by the Investment Climate Facility for Africa (ICF). Local courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards and there are no known State Owned Enterprise investment disputes that have gone to the domestic court system.
The World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) worked with the Government of Togo to improve commercial justice through the strengthening of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. The aim of the project was to increase the speed and efficiency of settlement of commercial disputes through the procedures used by the CATO.
As a result of the project, 30 new arbitrators and 100 magistrates and professionals received training in mediation/arbitration techniques. Further, the new CATO procedure manual is explicit that the time between filing and judgment shall be a maximum of 6 months as per article 36 of the ruling procedures.
Bankruptcy Regulations
Togo uses the standards set forth under the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA). That law states that if bankruptcy occurs, the competent jurisdiction designates an expert that concludes an agreement with creditors and stakeholders (preventive arrangement). The Manager (or managers) can be put under “patrimonial sanctions”, meaning they can be personally liable for the debts of the company. The manager is then forbidden to do business, to manage, administer, or control an enterprise, or hold political or administrative office, for three to ten years. Bankruptcy is criminalized, but generally as a last resort.
According to data collected by the World Bank, insolvency proceedings take three years on average and cost approximately 15 percent of the debtor’s estate, with the most likely outcome being that the company will be sold off in pieces. The average recovery rate is 27.9 cents on the dollar. The World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 places Togo at 88 of 190 for the “Resolving Insolvency” indicator, well above the Sub-Saharan Africa regional average.
4. Industrial Policies
Investment Incentives
Investment incentives are available to foreign investors that invest more than $100,000. Incentives include exemption from VAT and Customs Duties on new imported plant and materials, reduced income taxes for up to five years, and depending on the number of permanent jobs created for nationals, reduction on salary taxes during an approved period of time. Incentives are also available in the Export Processing Zone (EPZ).
Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation
The 2011 law modifying the 1989 law creating the Export Processing Zone (EPZ) provides an advantageous taxation scheme for companies based in the EPZ with a reduced tax bill on their profits for their first 20 years of operation, including a five percent tax on profits for the first five years. The law also exempts companies from customs duties and VAT on imported equipment and inputs, as well as an exemption from VAT on goods and services purchased locally. It also provides EPZ companies the freedom to repatriate capital, including dividends and other income. The law also exempts companies within the EPZ from providing workers with many legal protections, including protection against anti-union discrimination with regard to hiring and firing.
Performance and Data Localization Requirements
Firms are required by law to employ Togolese nationals on a priority basis, and after five years foreign workers cannot account for more than 20 percent of the total workforce or of any professional category. In practice, the Togolese government strongly encourages large foreign employers outside of the EPZ to hire as many Togolese nationals as practical. These encouragement schemes do not typically apply to senior management level employees.
There are reports that foreigners seeking to legalize their status for long-term work and residence purposes have encountered significant administrative obstacles and delays, although the steps for receiving residence permits are well defined. Issuance of such permits is the responsibility of the National Police.
There are no government-imposed conditions on permission to invest and there is no policy on “forced localization.” Foreign IT providers are not required to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption and there are no measures that prevent or unduly impede companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the economy/country’s territory.
5. Protection of Property Rights
Real Property
Property rights and interests are enforced, although nearly 80% of court cases are reported to involve land title disputes. Mortgages and liens exist but land titles are precarious and often subject to litigation. Most land does not have a clear title, especially outside of urban areas. The government is attempting to fix this issue through various commissions that will issue recommendations, but it will take years to resolve.
Property transfer has been simplified with the creation of the Guichet Unique Foncier and by reducing registration fee to a flat 35,000 FCFA as opposed to the previous 4% of the market value. Since October 2019, the time for issuing permits averages 5 hours, down from 48 hours a year ago.
An independent complaints mechanism in the Togolese Revenue Office (OTR). OTR has been set up to deal with land complaints. The office gives itself 48 hours to respond to requests.
Since December 10, 2019, all cadastral maps of greater Lomé (2,568 in total) were digitized and are made available in a database. This makes it possible to update the targeted plans; and to carry out studies and validation of files at the “Guichet Foncier Unique”.
In Togo, only Togolese citizens, French citizens, foreign governments, and those granted citizenship by the judiciary are allowed to possess real property. Other foreigners must request permission from the Prime Minister, which is usually granted for investors who will develop the land. Land speculation is discouraged by the government. Property legally purchased that remains unoccupied will not be reverted to other owners under the law; however, in practice, unused land that is not protected will likely be occupied or used by others and potentially subject to lengthy court battles to prove ownership.
Intellectual Property Rights
The regional African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI) and National Institute for Industrial Property and Technology (INPIT) are the two agencies that protect IP in Togo. No new IP related laws or regulations have been enacted in the past year. There are no official figures available on how the country tracks and reports on seizures of counterfeit goods. The country may prosecute IPR violations, but there are no known cases.
Togo is not listed in USTR’s Special 301 report or in the notorious market report. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/.
6. Financial Sector
Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment
Togo and the other West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) member countries are working toward greater regional integration with unified external tariffs. Togo relies on the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) Regional Stock Exchange in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire to trade equities for Togolese public companies.
WAEMU has established a common accounting system, periodic reviews of member countries’ macroeconomic policies based on convergence criteria, a regional stock exchange, and the legal and regulatory framework for a regional banking system. The government and central bank respect IMF Article VIII and refrain from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is generally allocated on market terms. With sufficient collateral, foreign investors are generally able to get credit on the local market. The private sector in general has access to a variety of credit instruments when and if collateral is available.
Money and Banking System
The penetration of banking services in the country is low and generally only available in major cities.
The government and the banking sector have worked to restore Togo’s reputation as a regional banking center, which was weakened by political upheavals from 1991 to 2005, and several regional and sub-regional banks now operate in Togo, including Orabank, Banque Atlantique, Bank of Africa, Diamond Bank, International Bank of Africa in Togo (BIAT), and Coris Bank.
Additionally, Togo is home to the headquarters of the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), the West African Development Bank (BOAD – the development bank of the West African Economic and Monetary Union), Oragroup, and Ecobank Transnational Inc. (ETI), the largest independent regional banking group in West Africa and Central Africa, with operations in 36 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The banking sector is generally healthy and the total assets of Togo’s largest banks are approximately $25-30 billion, including Ecobank, a very large regional bank headquartered in Lomé.
Togo’s monetary policy and banking regulations are managed by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). No known correspondent relationships were lost in the past three years. No known correspondent banking relationships are in jeopardy.
Foreign Exchange and Remittances
Foreign Exchange
There are no restrictions on the transfer of funds to other FCFA-zone countries or to France. The transfer of more than FCFA 500,000 (about $1,000) outside the FCFA-zone requires justification documents (e.g. pro forma invoice) to be presented to bank authorities.
The exchange system is free of restrictions for payments and transfers for international transactions. Some American investors in Togo have reported long delays (30 – 40 days) in transferring funds from U.S. banks to banks located in Togo. This is reportedly because banks in Togo have limited contacts with U.S. banks to facilitate the transfer of funds.
Togo uses the CFA franc (FCFA), which is the common currency of the eight (8) West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries. The currency is fixed to the Euro at a rate of 656 FCFA to 1 Euro.
Remittance Policies
The 2012 Investment Code provides for the free transfer of revenues derived from investments, including the liquidation of investments, by non-residents.
Sovereign Wealth Funds
Togo does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) or other similar entity.
7. State-Owned Enterprises
The government does not publish a list of State-owned enterprises (SOEs), but there are approximately 16 wholly or majority owned SOEs, and the government owns shares in approximately 25 other large domestic companies. These SOEs may enjoy non-market based advantages received from the host government, such as the government delaying private enterprise investment in infrastructure that could disadvantage the market share of the SOE.
All SOEs have a Board of Directors and Supervisory Board, although the Togolese government has not specified how it exercises ownership in the form of an ownership policy or governance code. The SOEs also have auditors who certify their accounts. Once certified by these auditors, the accounts of these companies are sent to the Court of Auditors, Togo’s supreme audit institution, which verifies and passes judgment on these financial statements and reports to the National Assembly. The Court publishes the results of its audits annually, including at http://courdescomptestogo.org.
SOEs control or compete in the fuel, cotton, telecommunications, banking, utilities, phosphate, and grain-purchasing markets. The government monopolizes phosphate via the state-owned New Phosphate Company of Togo (SNPT).
In June 2020, the New Cotton Company of Togo (NSCT) which produces cotton domestically was sold to the Singaporean Company OLAM Group (51%) with 40% to Cotton Producers Consortium (FNGPC) (40%), while the Government of Togo maintained a 9% stake. Through this privatization, the Government hopes to further develop the textile industry. Before this privatization, NSCT was 60% state-controlled after the bankruptcy and dissolution of the 100% state-owned Togolese Cotton Company (SOTOCO) in 2009.
In September 2012, Togo sold the formerly state-owned Togolese Development Bank to Orabank Group. Likewise, in March 2013, Togo sold the formerly state-owned Banque Internationale pour l’Afrique au Togo to the Attijariwafa Bank Group of Morocco.
Following these sales, Union Togolaise de Banque (UTB) and Banque Togolaise pour le Commerce et l’Industrie (BTCI) are now the only two state-owned banks. Togo’s first call for tenders for these two banks, completed in 2011, was unsuccessful. Togolese authorities are working in consultation with the IMF to either merge the two banks into a single entity, or try to privatize one or both. These two remaining state-owned banks hold weak loan portfolios characterized by high exposure (about one-third of total bank credit) to the government, as well as to the cotton and phosphate industries.
In the telecommunications sector, the government combined in 2017 the two state-owned entities Togo Telecom and TogoCell into a holding company, TogoCom. In November 2019, Agou Holding consortium, made up of the Madagascan conglomerate Axian (majority) and the capital-investor Emerging Capital Partners (ECP) bought a 51% stake in TogoCom. The Togolese Government maintains a 49% stake. Agou Holding plans to invest $271 million in TogoCom over seven years to improve international connectivity and expand its high-speed fiber-optic and mobile networks. However, during its first year such investment was not apparent, with 4G restricted to a small area in Lomé.
The new entity stills directly competes with a private cell phone company, Moov Togo. Atlantique Telecom, a subsidiary of Emirates Telecommunications Corporation (Etisalat), owns and controls Moov Togo. The Government of Togo has licensed Togocom and Moov for 4G. Private company CAFÉ Informatique also offers satellite-based internet access and other services, mainly to the business sector. Two new internet service providers, Teolis and Vivendi Africa Group (GVA-Togo), entered the market in 2018 and the government is installing new fiber optic cable in the country.
Public utilities such as the Post Office, Lomé Port Authority, Togo Water, and the Togolese Electric Energy Company (CEET) hold monopolies in their sectors.
The National Agency for Food Security (ANSAT) is a government agency that purchases cereals on the market during the harvest for storage. When cereal prices increase during the dry season, it is ANSAT’s task to release cereals into the markets to maintain affordable cereal prices. When supplies permit, ANSAT also sells cereals on international markets, including Ghana, Niger, and Gabon.
The price of petroleum products is strongly controlled by the Togolese government. The CSFPPP (Petroleum Product Price Fluctuation Monitoring Committee) orders and sets the prices of petroleum products, launches calls for tenders, and monitors the execution of tender contracts. Togo imports 30 million liters of refined petroleum products per quarter.
Previous privatization in Togo covered many sectors, such as hotels, banking, and mining. Foreign investors are encouraged to compete in new privatization programs via a public bidding processes. The government publishes all notifications in the French language, but unfortunately, a relevant government website is not available.
8. Responsible Business Conduct
Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) is not officially addressed in Togo by the government, other than as it relates to corruption and criminal activity. RBC and its variants such as “Fair Trade” is known by independent NGOs and businesses which promote these practices and are able to do their work freely.
Some American-owned companies follow generally-accepted RBC principles, and participate in outreach programs to local villages where they supply, among other things, school buildings, water, electricity, and flood abatement resources. In accordance with a law passed in March 2011, new construction projects must now address environmental and social impacts.
Togo joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2009 and has been officially recognized as EITI-compliant since 2013. Togo’s EITI Secretariat carries out a yearly verification of financial statements relating to the extractive industry.
The Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, Administrative Reform, and Social Protection sets workplace health and safety standards and is responsible for enforcement of all labor laws. There have been no high-profile, controversial instances of private sector impact on human rights or resolution of such cases in the recent past.
Togolese law provides workers, except security forces (including firefighters and police), the right to form and join unions and bargain collectively. There are supporting regulations that allow workers to form and join unions of their choosing. Workers have the right to strike, although striking healthcare workers may be ordered back to work as necessary for the security and well-being of the population. While no provisions in the law protect strikers against employer retaliation, the law requires employers to get a judgment from the labor inspectorate before it may fire workers. If workers are fired illegally, including for union activity, they must be reinstated and compensated for lost salary.
The law recognizes the right to collective bargaining; representatives of the government, labor unions, and employers negotiate and endorse a nationwide agreement. This collective bargaining agreement sets nationwide wage standards for all formal sector workers. For sectors where the government is not an employer, the government participates in this process as a labor-management mediator. For sectors with a large government presence, including the state-owned companies, the government acts solely as an employer and does not mediate.
The government follows OHADA recommended rules and regulations on corporate governance, accounting, and executive compensation.
9. Corruption
The Togolese government has established several important institutions designed in part to reduce corruption by eliminating opportunities for bribery and fraud: the Togolese Revenue Authority, the One-Stop Shop to create new businesses, and the Single Window for import/export formalities.
In 2015, the Togolese government created the High Authority for the Prevention and Fight against Corruption and Related Offenses (HAPLUCIA), which the government designed to be an independent institution dedicated to fighting corruption. The government appointed members in 2017. HAPLUCIA encourages private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that, among other things, prohibit bribery of public officials. HAPLUCIA presented on February 7, 2019 its strategic plan for the period 2019-2023; it set up a toll-free number, the “8277” to receive complaints and denunciations.
Anti-corruption laws extend to family members of officials, and to political parties and the government does not interfere in the work of anti-corruption NGOs.
In 2011, the government effectively implemented procurement reforms to increase transparency and reduce corruption. The government announces procurements weekly in a government publication. Once contracts are awarded, all bids and the winner are published in the weekly government procurement publication. Other measurable steps toward controlling corruption include joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and establishing public finance control structures and a National Financial Information Processing Unit.
Togo signed the UN Anticorruption Convention in 2003 and ratified it on July 6, 2005.
Resources to Report Corruption
Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption:
Essohana Wiyao
President of HAPLUCIA, the High Authority for the Prevention and Fight against Corruption and Related Offenses
Tel. +228 90 21 28 46 / 90 25 77 40
Email: essohanawiyao@yahoo.fr
Lomé, Togo
Directeur, Anti-Corruption
Office Togolais des Recettes (OTR)
41 Rue des Impôts
02 BP 20823
Lomé, Togo
+228 – 22 53 14 00 otr@otr.tg
Contact at a “watchdog” organization:
Samuel Kaninda
Regional Coordinator, West Africa
Transparency International
Alt-Moabit 96
10559 Berlin
Germany
+49 30 3438 20 773 skaninda@transparency.org
10. Political and Security Environment
After a period of sustained political instability and economic stagnation from 1990 to 2007, the government started the country along a gradual path to political reconciliation and democratic reform. Togo has held multiple presidential and legislative elections that were deemed generally free and fair by international observers, though the most recent legislative elections were boycotted by the majority of the opposition. Political reconciliation has moved slowly. A political crisis erupted in 2017 regarding the failure of the government to implement political measures, such as presidential term limits. After international facilitation between the government and opposition parties, in May 2019 the government implemented non-retroactive term limits and a two-round election system. The government held local elections in 2019, the first since 1986. President Faure Gnassingbe was elected for a fourth term on February 22, 2020 in a peaceful election.
Political protests still occur on occasion and can often lead to tire burning, stone throwing, and government responses include the use of tear gas and other crowd control techniques. There are no known examples over the past ten years of damage to projects and/or installations pertaining to foreign investment due to political violence.
11. Labor Policies and Practices
The labor market is predominately unskilled and there is a shortage of skilled labor and English speaking employees. There are some migrant farm workers from Ghana and Benin based on familial ties. There is widespread underemployment and large portions of the non-agricultural workforce participate in the informal economy.
In general, government labor policy favors employment of nationals.
Workers are hired with time specific contracts that include severance requirements. The labor code, and regulations called the “Convention Collective” differentiate between layoffs and firings, but both require severance payments. Free Trade zones offer different labor law provisions to encourage investment.
Public employees unions (school teacher, judicial clerks, etc) use collective bargaining, and are willing to take to the streets in non-violent protest to raise the profile of their demands. Labor disputes appear to be resolved on an ad-hoc basis, usually with the intervention of parliamentarians.
12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Other Investment Insurance Programs
The U.S. and Togo have a DFC agreement in place. DFC provides political risk insurance and financing for ContourGlobal’s 100-megawatt power plant in Togo. The plant began operation in the fall of 2010 providing base-load electricity for the country. DFC also provides insurance for the West African Gas Pipeline Company Limited through Steadfast Insurance Co. The French government agency COFACE provides investment insurance in Togo under programs similar to those offered by DFC. Investment insurance through the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) is also an option to explore.
13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics
Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
Host Country Statistical source
USG or international statistical source
USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data
Year
Amount
Year
Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD)
In general, Bolivia is open to foreign direct investment (FDI). In November 2019, a transitional government came to power that indicated an interest in taking additional steps to attract more FDI. However, no legislative nor constitutional changes have taken place. New elections are scheduled for late 2020. A 2014 investment promotion law guarantees equal treatment for national and foreign firms, however, it also stipulates that public investment has priority over private investment (both national and foreign) and that the Bolivian Government will determine which sectors require private investment. Gross FDI into Bolivia was approximately USD 781 million in 2018 (a decrease of approximately USD 420 million compared to 2017), primarily concentrated in the hydrocarbons and mining sectors.
U.S. companies interested in investing in Bolivia should note that in 2012 Bolivia abrogated the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) it signed with the U.S. and a number of other countries. The Bolivian Government claimed the abrogation was necessary for Bolivia to comply with the 2009 Constitution. Companies that invested under the U.S.–Bolivia BIT will be covered until June 10, 2022, but investments made after June 10, 2012 are not covered.
Notwithstanding the uncertain political situation, Bolivia’s investment climate has remained relatively steady over the past several years. Lack of legal security, corruption allegations, and unclear investment incentives are all impediments to investment in Bolivia. At the moment, there is no significant foreign direct investment from the United States in Bolivia, and there are no initiatives designed specifically to encourage U.S. investment. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Planning are leading efforts to attract more foreign investment (including the launching of a new website, http://www.investbolivia.gob.bo/), but it is not clear if they will be successful, given upcoming re-run elections currently scheduled for October 2020. But Bolivia’s current macroeconomic stability, abundant natural resources, and strategic location in the heart of South America make it a country to watch.
In 2019, the investment rate as percentage of GDP (19 percent) was in line with regional averages. There has also been a shift from private to public investment. In recent years private investment was particularly low because of the deterioration of the business environment. From 2006 to 2019, private investment, including local and foreign investment, averaged 8 percent of GDP. In contrast, from 2006 to the present, public investment grew significantly, reaching an annual average of 11 percent of GDP through 2019.
FDI is highly concentrated in natural resources, especially hydrocarbons and mining, which account for nearly two-thirds of FDI. Since 2006 the net flow of FDI averaged 2.4 percent of GDP. Before 2006 it averaged around 6.7 percent of GDP.
1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment
Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment
In general, Bolivia remains open to FDI. The 2014 investment law guarantees equal treatment for national and foreign firms, however it also stipulates that public investment has priority over private investment (both national and foreign) and that the Bolivian Government will determine which sectors require private investment.
U.S. companies interested in investing in Bolivia should note that in 2012 Bolivia abrogated the BIT it signed with the United States and a number of other countries. The Bolivian Government of former President Evo Morales claimed the abrogation was necessary for Bolivia to comply with the 2009 Constitution. Companies that invested under the U.S.–Bolivia BIT will be covered until June 10, 2022, but investments made after June 10, 2012 are not covered.
Pursuant to Article 320 of the 2009 Constitution, Bolivia no longer recognizes international arbitration forums for disputes involving the government. The parties also cannot settle the dispute in an international court. However, the implementation of this article is still uncertain.
Specifically, Article 320 of the Bolivian Constitution states:
Bolivian investment takes priority over foreign investment.
Every foreign investment will be subject to Bolivian jurisdiction, laws, and authorities, and no one may invoke a situation for exception, nor appeal to diplomatic claims to obtain more favorable treatment.
III. Economic relations with foreign states or enterprises shall be conducted under conditions of independence, mutual respect and equity. More favorable conditions may not be granted to foreign states or enterprises than those established for Bolivians.
The state makes all decisions on internal economic policy independently and will not accept demands or conditions imposed on this policy by states, banks or Bolivian or foreign financial institutions, multilateral entities or transnational enterprises.
Public policies will promote internal consumption of products made in Bolivia.
Article 262 of the Constitution states:
“The fifty kilometers from the border constitute the zone of border security. No foreign person, individual, or company may acquire property in this space, directly or indirectly, nor possess any property right in the waters, soil or subsoil, except in the case of state necessity declared by express law approved by two thirds of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly. The property or the possession affected in case of non-compliance with this prohibition will pass to the benefit of the state, without any indemnity.”
The judicial system faces a huge backlog of cases, is short staffed, lacks resources, has problems with corruption, and is believed to be influenced by political actors. Swift resolution of cases, either initiated by investors or against them, is unlikely. The Marcelo Quiroga Anti-Corruption law of 2010 makes companies and their signatories criminally liable for breach of contract with the government, and the law can be applied retroactively. Authorities can use this threat of criminal prosecution to force settlement of disputes. Commercial disputes can often lead to criminal charges and cases are often processed slowly. See our Human Rights Report as background on the judicial system, labor rights and other important issues.
Article 129 of the Bolivian Arbitration Law No. 708, established that all controversies and disputes that arise regarding investment in Bolivia will have to be addressed inside Bolivia under Bolivian Laws. Consequently, international arbitration is not allowed for disputes involving the Bolivian Government or state-owned enterprises.
Bolivia does not currently have an investment promotion agency to facilitate foreign investment. However, the transitional government is working to create such an agency in order to attract investment in the non-traditional and industrial sectors. The former government also launched an investment promotion website (www.investbolivia.gob.bo) in order to provide information about investment opportunities in Bolivia.
Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment
There is a right for foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in remunerative activity.
There are some areas where investors may judge that preferential treatment is being given to their Bolivian competitors, for example in key sectors where private companies compete with state owned enterprises. Additionally, foreign investment is not allowed in matters relating directly to national security. And only the government can own most natural resources.
The Constitution specifies that all hydrocarbon resources are the property of the Bolivian people and that the state will assume control over their exploration, exploitation, industrialization, transport, and marketing (Articles 348 and 351). The state-owned and operated company, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) manages hydrocarbons transport and sales and is responsible for ensuring that the domestic market demand is satisfied at prices set by the hydrocarbons regulator before allowing any hydrocarbon exports. YPFB benefitted from government action in 2006 that required operators to turn over their production to YPFB and to sign new contracts that gave YPFB control over the distribution of gasoline, diesel, and liquid petroleum gas (LPG) to gas stations. The law allows YPFB to enter into joint venture contracts for limited periods with national or foreign individuals or companies wishing to exploit or trade hydrocarbons or their derivatives. For companies working in the industry, contracts are negotiated on a service contract basis and there are no restrictions on ownership percentages of the companies providing the services.
The Constitution (Article 366) specifies that every foreign enterprise that conducts activities in the hydrocarbons production chain will submit to the sovereignty of the state, and to the laws and authority of the state. No foreign court case or foreign jurisdiction will be recognized, and foreign investors may not invoke any exceptional situation for international arbitration, nor appeal to diplomatic claims.
According to the Constitution, no concessions or contracts may transfer the ownership of natural resources or other strategic industries to private interests. Instead temporary authorizations to use these resources may be requested at the pertinent ministry (Mining, Water and Environment, Public Works, etc.). The Bolivian Government needs to renegotiate commercial agreements related to forestry, mining, telecommunications, electricity, and water services, in order to comply with these regulations.
The Telecommunications, Technology and Communications General Law (Law 164, Article 28) stipulates that the licenses for radio broadcasts will not be given to foreign persons or entities. Further, in the case of broadcasting associations, the share of foreign investors cannot exceed 25 percent of the total investment, except in those cases approved by the state or by international treaties.
The Central Bank of Bolivia is responsible for registering all foreign investments. According to the 2014 investment law, any investment will be monitored by the ministry related to the particular sector. For example, the Mining Ministry is in charge of overseeing all public and private mining investments. Each Ministry assesses industry compliance with the incentive objectives. To date, only the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy has enacted a Law (N 767) to incentivize the exploration and production of hydrocarbons.
Other Investment Policy Reviews
Bolivia underwent a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review in 2017. In concluding remarks by the Chairperson, the Chairperson noted that several WTO members raised challenges impacting investor confidence in Bolivia, due primarily to Bolivia’s abrogation of 22 BITs following the passage of its 2009 constitution. However, some WTO members also commended Bolivia for enacting a new investment promotion law in 2014 and a law on conciliation and arbitration, both of which increased legal certainty for investors, according to those members.
Business Facilitation
According to the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 rankings, Bolivia ranks 150 out of 190 countries on the ease of doing business, much lower than most countries in the region. Bolivia ranks 175 out of 190 on the ease of starting a business.
FUNDEMPRESA is a mixed public/private organization authorized by the central government to register and certify new businesses. Its website is www.fundempresa.org.bo and the business registration process is laid out clearly within the tab labeled “processes, requirements and forms,” however the registration cannot be completed entirely online. A user can download the required forms from the site and can fill them out online, but then has to mail the completed forms or deliver them to the relevant offices. A foreign applicant would be able to use the registration forms. The forms do ask for a “cedula de identidad,” which is a national identification document; however, foreign users usually enter their passport numbers instead. Once a company submits all documents required to FUNDEMPRESA, the process takes between 2-4 working days.
The steps to register a business are: (1) register and receive a certificate from Fundempresa; (2) register with the Bolivian Internal Revenue Service (Servicio de Impuestos Nacionales) and receive a tax identification number; (3) register and receive authorization to operate from the municipal government in which the company will be established; (4) if the company has employees, it must register with the national health insurance service and the national retirement pension agency in order to contribute on the employees’ behalf; and (5) if the company has employees, it must register with the Ministry of Labor. According to Fundempresa, the process should take 30 days from start to finish. All steps are required and there is no simplified business creation regime.
Outward Investment
The Bolivian Government does not promote or incentivize outward investment. Nor does the government restrict domestic investors from investing abroad.
2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties
As mentioned earlier, potential investors should note that Bolivia has abrogated the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) it signed with the United States and 22 other countries. The Bolivian Government claimed the abrogation was necessary for Bolivia to comply with the 2009 Constitution. Companies that invested under the U.S.–Bolivia BIT will be covered until June 10, 2022, but investments made after June 10, 2012 are not covered.
The BIT with Bolivia was the first to be terminated by a U.S. treaty partner. In a related action, in October 2007, Bolivia became the first country to withdraw from the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Bolivia has had a signed BIT with Peru since 1993.
Bolivia does not have a bilateral taxation treaty with the U.S. However, Bolivia has several agreements with other countries aimed at avoiding double taxation. Those countries include: Argentina, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Andean Community countries. The Bolivian Government is currently assessing the possibility of agreements with several additional countries.
3. Legal Regime
Transparency of the Regulatory System
Bolivia has no laws or policies that directly foster competition on a non-discriminatory basis. However, Article 66 of the Commercial Code (Law 14379, 1977) states that unfair competition, such as maintaining an import, production, or distribution monopoly, should be penalized according to criminal law. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations.
Regulatory authority regarding investment exists at the national level in Bolivia. There are no informal regulatory procedures.
The Commercial Code requires that all companies keep adequate accounting records and legal records for transparency. However, there is a large informal sector that does not follow these practices. Most accounting regulations follow international principles, but the regulations do not always conform to international standards. Large private companies and some government institutions, such as the Central Bank and the Banking Supervision Authority, have transparent and consistent accounting systems.
Formal bureaucratic procedures have been reported to be lengthy, difficult to manage and navigate, and sometimes debilitating. Many firms complain that a lack of administrative infrastructure, corruption, and political motives impede their ability to perform. The one exception is when registering a new company in Bolivia. Once a company submits all documents required to the FUNDEMPRESA, the process usually takes less than one week.
There is no established public comment process allowing social, political, and economic interests to provide advice and comment on new laws and decrees. However, the government generally — but not always — discusses proposed laws with the relevant sector. The lack of laws to implement the 2009 Constitution creates legal discrepancies between constitutional guarantees and the dated policies currently enforced, and thus an uncertain investment climate. Draft text or summaries are usually published on the National Assembly’s website.
Supreme Decree 71 in 2009 created a Business Auditing Authority (AEMP), which is tasked with regulating the business activities of public, private, mixed, or cooperative entities across all business sectors. AEMP’s decisions are legally reviewable through appeal. However, should an entity wish to file a second appeal, the ultimate decision-making responsibility rests with the Bolivian Government ministry with jurisdiction over the economic sector in question. This has led to a perception that enforcement mechanisms are neither transparent nor independent.
Environmental regulations can slow projects due to the constitutional requirement of “prior consultation” for any projects that could affect local and indigenous communities. This has affected projects related to the exploitation of natural resources, both renewable and nonrenewable, as well as public works projects. Issuance of environmental licenses has been slow and subject to political influence and corruption.
In 2010, the new pension fund was enacted; it increased the contributions that companies have to pay from 1.71 percent of payroll to 4.71 percent.
International Regulatory Considerations
Bolivia is a full member of the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), comprised of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Bolivia is also in the process of joining the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) as a full member. The CAN’s norms are considered supranational in character and have automatic application in the regional economic block’s member countries. The government does notify the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade regarding draft technical regulations.
Legal System and Judicial Independence
Property and contractual rights are enforced in Bolivian courts under a civil law system, but some have complained that the legal process is time consuming and has been subject to political influence and corruption. Although many of its provisions have been modified and supplanted by more specific legislation, Bolivia’s Commercial Code continues to provide general guidance for commercial activities. The constitution has precedence over international law and treaties (Article 410), and stipulates that the state will be directly involved in resolving conflicts between employers and employees (Article 50). There have been allegations of corruption within the judiciary in high profile cases. Regulatory and enforcement actions are appealable.
Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment
No major laws, regulations, or judicial decisions impacting foreign investment came out in the past year. There is no primary central point-of-contact for investment that provides all the relevant information to investors.
Competition and Anti-Trust Laws
Bolivia does not have a competition law, but cases related to unfair competition can be presented to AEMP. Article 314 of the 2009 Constitution prohibits private monopolies. Based on this article, in 2009 the Bolivian Government created an office to supervise and control private companies (http://www.autoridadempresas.gob.bo/). Among its most important goals are: regulating, promoting, and protecting free competition; trade relations between traders; implementing control mechanisms and social projects, and voluntary corporate responsibility; corporate restructuring, supervising, verifying and monitoring companies with economic activities in the country in the field of commercial registration and seeking compliance with legal and financial development of its activities; and qualifying institutional management efficiency, timeliness, transparency and social commitment to contribute to the achievement of corporate goals.
Expropriation and Compensation
The Bolivian Constitution allows the central government or local governments to expropriate property for the public good or when the property does not fulfill a “social purpose” (Article 57). In the case of land, this Economic Social Purpose (known as FES for its acronym in Spanish) is understood as “sustainable land use to develop productive activities, according to its best use capacity, for the benefit of society, the collective interest and its owner.” In all other cases where this article has been applied, the Bolivian Government has no official definition of “collective interest” and makes decisions on a case-by-case basis. Noncompliance with the social function of land, tax evasion, or the holding of large acreage is cause for reversion, at which point the land passes to “the Bolivian people” (Article 401). In cases where the expropriation of land is deemed a necessity of the state or for the public good, such as when building roads or laying electricity lines, payment of just indemnification is required, and the Bolivian Government has paid for the land taken in such cases. However, in cases where there is non-compliance, or accusations of such, the Bolivian Government is not required to pay for the land and the land title reverts to the state.
The constitution also gives workers the right to reactivate and reorganize companies that are in the process of bankruptcy, insolvency, or liquidation, or those closed in an unjust manner, into employee-owned cooperatives (Article 54). The mining code of 1997 (last updated in 2007) and hydrocarbons law of 2005 both outline procedures for expropriating land to develop underlying concessions.
Between 2006 and 2014, the former Bolivian Government nationalized companies that were previously privatized in the 1990s. The former government nationalized the hydrocarbons sector, the majority of the electricity sector, some mining companies (including mines and a tin smelting plant), and a cement plant. To take control of these companies, the former government forced private entities to sell shares to the government, often at below market prices. Some of the affected companies have cases pending with international arbitration bodies. All outsourcing private contracts were canceled and assigned to public companies (such as airport administration and water provision).
There are still some former state companies that are under private control, including the railroad, and some electricity transport and distribution companies. The first non-former state company was nationalized in December of 2012. The nationalizations have not discriminated by country; some of the countries affected were the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Argentina, and Chile. In numerous cases, the former Bolivian Government has nationalized private interests in order to appease social groups protesting within Bolivia.
Dispute Settlement
ICSID Convention and New York Convention
In November 2007, Bolivia became the first country ever to withdraw from ICSID. In August 2010, the Bolivian Minister of Legal Defense of the State said that the former Bolivian Government would not accept ICSID rulings in the cases brought against them by a Chilean company and an Italian telecoms company. However, the Bolivian Government agreed to pay USD 100 million to the Italian company for its nationalization; this agreement was ratified by a Supreme Decree 692 on November 3, 2010. Additionally, in 2014, a British company that owned the biggest electric generation plant in Bolivia (Guaracachi) won an arbitration case against Bolivia for USD 41 million. In 2014, an Indian company won a USD 22.5 million international arbitration award in a dispute over the development of an iron ore project. The Bolivian Government has appealed that award.
In another case, a Canadian mining company with significant U.S. interests failed to complete an investment required by its contract with the state-owned mining company. The foreign company asserts it could not complete the project because the state mining company did not deliver the required property rights. The foreign company entered into national arbitration (their contract does not allow for international arbitration) and in January 2011, the parties announced a settlement of USD 750,000, which the company says will be used to pay taxes, employee benefits, and pending debts — essentially leaving them without compensation for the USD 5 million investment they had made. They also retained responsibility for future liabilities.
Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Conflicting Bolivian law has made international arbitration in some cases effectively impossible. Previous investment contracts between the Bolivian Government and the international companies granted the right to pursue international arbitration in all sectors and stated that international agreements, such as the ICSID and the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, must be honored. However, the government claims these rights conflict with the 2009 Constitution, which states (Articles 320 and 366) that international arbitration is not recognized in any case and cannot proceed under any diplomatic claim, and specifically limits foreign companies’ access to international arbitration in the case of conflicts with the government. The 2009 Constitution also states that all bilateral investment treaties must be renegotiated to incorporate relevant provisions of the new constitution. The Investment Law of 2014 was enacted in late 2015. Under the 2015 Arbitration Law (Law 708), international arbitration is not permitted when the dispute is against the government or a state-owned company.
A variety of companies of varying nationality were affected by the former government’s nationalization policy between 2006 and 2014. In 2014, President Morales announced there would be no more nationalizations. The same year, one Brazilian company was nationalized, but that had been previously agreed to with the owner under the previous nationalization policy.
International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts
In Bolivia, two institutions have arbitration bodies, including the National Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Industry and Commerce of Santa Cruz (CAINCO). In order to utilize these domestic arbitration bodies, the private parties must include arbitration within their contracts. Depending on the contract between the parties, UNCITRAL or Bolivia’s Arbitration Law (No. 708) may be used. Local courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards and judgments. There are no statistics available regarding SOE involvement in investment disputes.
Bankruptcy Regulations
Bolivia ranks above regional averages for resolving insolvency according to the World Bank’s Doing Business Report. The average time to complete bankruptcy procedures to close a business in Bolivia is 20 months. The Bolivian Commercial Code includes (Article 1654) three different categories of bankruptcy:
No Fault Bankruptcy– when the owner of the company is not directly responsible for its inability to pay its obligations.
At- Fault Bankruptcy– when the owner is guilty or liable due to the lack of due diligence to avoid harm to the company.
Bankruptcy due to Fraud– when the owner intentionally tries to cause harm to the company.
In general, the application of laws related to commercial disputes and bankruptcy has been perceived as inconsistent, and charges of corruption are common. Foreign creditors often have little redress beyond Bolivian courts, and judgments are generally more favorable to local claimants than international ones. If a company declares bankruptcy, the company must pay employee benefits before other obligations. Workers have broad-ranging rights to recover pay and benefits from foreign firms in bankruptcy, and criminal actions can be taken against individuals the Bolivian Government deems responsible for failure to pay in these matters.
No credit bureaus or credit monitoring authorities serve the Bolivian market.
In 2018, the Bolivian Government enacted a new law (No. 1055) called the Creation of Social Enterprises. The law allows for employees of a company to assert ownership rights over companies under financial distress heading into bankruptcy. Passage of the law was controversial, with numerous business chambers asserting that the law could incentivize employees and labor unions to undermine the performance of companies in order to force bankruptcy and gain control of company assets.
4. Industrial Policies
Investment Incentives
In an effort to attract more investment, the government enacted an investment law in 2014, which says that each Ministry will provide incentives for sector-specific investment.
Article 14 of the 2014 investment law requires technology transfer from foreign companies operating in Bolivia to Bolivian workers and institutions. The law also specifies that Bolivians should work in operational, administrative, and executive offices of foreign companies. Also, companies investing in Bolivia should donate equipment and machinery to universities and technical schools in the same area as the investment, and conduct research activities that will find solutions that contribute to public welfare.
Article 21 of the investment law stipulates that the government can incentivize investment in certain sectors that contribute to the economic and social development of the country.
Law 767 from 2015 aims to promote investments in the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons. However, many companies considered this regulation as skewed to production and insufficient to incentivize new exploration. In 2016, Supreme Decree 2830 was issued, providing a 12 percent reduction in the payment of the direct tax on hydrocarbons and other incentives in order to better incentive exploration.
Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation
In 2016, Supreme Decree 2779 was enacted, approving regulations for a new system of free trade zones in Bolivia. The decree establishes a period of one year for existing free trade zones to transform into free industrial zones, which allow for industrial operations and assembly. Free industrial zones exist in El Alto, Patacamaya, Oruro, Puerto Suarez, and Warnes. Cobija is the only remaining free trade zone under this new system, with operations approved until 2038. Concessions within free industrial zones are 15 years in duration and renewable. The decree also eased customs procedures for goods entering the zones and established stronger government support for the promotion of productive investments in the zones.
Performance and Data Localization Requirements
Bolivian labor law requires businesses to limit foreign employees to 15 percent of their total work force and requires that such foreign hires be part of the technical staff. These workers require a work visa that can be obtained in any Bolivian consulate, and in the case that they work for a Bolivian company, both the company and the workers should also contribute to the Bolivian Pension System (Pension Law Article 104.1)
Supreme Decree 27328 regulates national and local level government procurement, which give priority to national sourcing. If an item required is not produced in Bolivia, buying decisions are made based on price. Supreme Decree 28271 (Article 10), establishes the following preference margins for sourcing with Bolivian products:
Except for national tenders, 10 percent preference margin for Bolivian products regardless of the origin of materials.
For national public tenders, if the cost of Bolivian materials represents more than 50 percent of the total cost of the product, the producers receive a 10 percent preference margin over other sellers.
In national and international public tenders, if Bolivian inputs and labor represent more than the 50 percent of the total cost of the product, the seller receives a 25 percent preference margin over other sellers. If the Bolivian inputs and labor represent between 30 percent and 50 percent of the total cost of the product, the seller receives a 15 percent preference margin over other sellers.
Under the Bolivian Criminal Code (Article 226), it is a crime to raise or lower the price of a product based on false information, interests, or actions. For those caught doing so, punishment is six months to three years in prison. It is also a crime to hoard or conceal products in order to raise prices. The Bolivian Government has aggressively applied these provisions in a number of cases, applying regulations that allow them to request accounting records and audit companies’ financial actions looking for evidence of speculation.
5. Protection of Property Rights
Real Property
Property rights are legally protected and registered in the Real Estate Office, where titles or deeds are recorded and mortgages/liens are registered. The recording system is reliable, although there have been complaints regarding the amount of time required to register a property.
The Office of Property Registry oversees the acquisition and disposition of land, real estate, and mortgages. Mortgages usually take no more than 60 days to obtain a standard loan. However, challenges to land titles are common due to bureaucratic delays encountered while registering properties, especially in rural areas. Competing claims to land titles and the absence of a reliable dispute resolution process create risk and uncertainty in real property acquisition. Nevertheless, illegal occupation of rural private property is decreasing since the passage of Law 477 combatting land seizures.
The Bolivian Constitution grants citizens and foreigners the right to private property but stipulates that the property must serve a social or economic function. If the government determines that a given property is not sufficiently useful (according to its own unclear criteria), the constitution allows the government to expropriate. The agricultural sector has been most hard hit by this policy due to uncertainty from year to year about whether farmland would be productive. In 2015, the former government agreed to do away with the annual productivity inspections and reduce their frequency from every two to every five years, though the Legislative Assembly has not yet passed these modifications. There are other laws that limit access to land, forest, water and other natural resources by foreigners in Bolivia.
The constitution also grants formal, collective land titles to indigenous communities, in order to restore their former territories (Article 394.3), stating that public land will be granted to indigenous farmers, migrant indigenous communities, Afro-Bolivians, and small farmer communities that do not possess or who have insufficient land (Article 395). Foreigners cannot acquire land from the Bolivian Government (Article 396). Under law 3545, passed in 2006, the government will not grant public lands to non-indigenous people or agriculture companies. The Mother Earth Integral Development Law to Live Well (Mother Earth Law, or Law #300) passed in October 2012 specifies that the state controls access to natural resources, particularly when foreign use is involved. In action, the law limits access to land, forest, water and other natural resources by foreigners in Bolivia.
According to Bolivia’s Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA), approximately 25 percent of all land in Bolivia lacks clear title, and as a result, squatting is a problem. In some cases, squatters may be able to make a legal claim to the land. While the Criminal Code criminalizes illegal occupation, the judicial system is slow and ineffective in its enforcement of the law. Financial mechanisms are available for securitization of properties for lending purposes, although the threat of reversion for properties failing to fulfill a social function discourages the use of land as collateral.
Intellectual Property Rights
The Bolivian Intellectual Property Service (SENAPI) leads the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) within Bolivia. SENAPI maintains and regularly updates a complete set of IPR regulations currently in force within Bolivia. The list is available on SENAPI’s website: http://www.senapi.gob.bo/MarcoLegal.asp?lang=EN
SENAPI reviews patent registrations for form and substance and publishes notices of proposed registrations in the Official Gazette. If there are no objections within 30 working days, the organization grants patents for a period of 20 years. The registration of trademarks parallels that of patents. Once obtained, a trademark is valid for a 10-year renewable period. It can be cancelled if not used within three years of the date of grant.
The existing copyright law recognizes copyright infringement as a public offense and the 2001 Bolivian Criminal Procedures Code provides for the criminal prosecution of IPR violations. However, it is not common for prosecutors to file criminal charges, and civil suits, if pursued, face long delays. Criminal penalties carry a maximum of five years in jail, and civil penalties are restricted to the recovery of direct economic damages. SENAPI has established a conciliation process to solve IPR controversies in order to prevent parties from going to trial.
Bolivia does not have an area of civil law specifically related to industrial property, but has a century-old industrial privileges law still in force. Bolivia is a signatory of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). SENAPI is aware of Bolivia’s obligations under the TRIPS Agreement and it sets out the minimum standards of IPR protection in compliance with this agreement. SENAPI sustains its position that Bolivia complies with the substantive obligations of the main conventions of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention), and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention) in their most recent versions. According to SENAPI, Bolivia complies with WTO’s dispute settlement procedures in accordance with its TRIPS obligations. However, Bolivia falls short on the implementation of domestic procedures and providing legal remedies for the enforcement of intellectual property rights.
Bolivia is a signatory country of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty; however, it did not ratify any of those treaties domestically. Bolivia is not a member of the Madrid Protocol on Trademarks, the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs, or the Patent Law Treaty.
Bolivia is a signatory of Andean Community (CAN) Decision 486, which deals with industrial property and trade secrets and is legally binding in Bolivia. Decision 486 states that each member country shall accord the Andean Community countries, the World Trade Organization, and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, treatment no less favorable than it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property. Besides its international obligations, Bolivia has not passed any domestic laws protecting trade secrets.
On December 20, 2018, Bolivia’s National Assembly passed Law 1134, the “Bolivian Cinema and Audiovisual Arts Law.” The law creates a fund to promote Bolivian cinema by charging foreign movie distributors and exhibitors three percent of their total monthly revenue. Contacts contend that the law could help the Bolivian Government target piracy networks that currently operate with impunity. Article 27 of the new law strengthens IPR protections for visual works and allows Bolivian Customs to pursue criminal prosecution, but it is unlikely that foreign works would be protected in practice.
Bolivian Customs lacks the human and financial resources needed to intercept counterfeit goods shipments at international borders effectively. Customs authorities act only when industries trying to protect their brands file complaints. Moreover, there is a sense of unregulated capitalism with regard to the sale of goods in the informal sector. Many importers believe the payment of customs fees will “legalize” the sale of counterfeit products. Sellers either do not know about or do not take into consideration intellectual property rights, particularly in the textile, electrical appliances, and entertainment markets. Large quantities of counterfeit electrical appliances imported from China with labels denoting “Sony,” “Panasonic,” and “General Electric” are available for purchase in local markets. There is also a flourishing market of textile products made in Bolivia marketed using counterfeit labels of major U.S. brands. While most counterfeit items come with the illegal brand already attached, brands and logos are available for purchase on the street and can easily be affixed to goods.
Although court actions against those infringing upon IPR are infrequent, there have been some significant cases. The Industrial Property Director at SENAPI reported that the number of indictments related to counterfeit products increased steadily over the years. In 2010 there were only 20 such cases. In 2011, they increased to 27. In 2012, 48 cases were reported. In 2013, cases dipped slightly to 43, sharply rose to 60 in 2014, to 65 in 2015, and then to 109 in 2016. SENAPI has not made this data public since then. According to SENAPI, this does not necessarily represent an increase in the total volume of counterfeit products. Rather, the increase in indictments is due to SENAPI’s emphasis on enforcement efforts and the public’s greater awareness of IPR rights. In April 2018, a Bolivian Police task force launched several raids to counter an international group of counterfeit medicine smugglers who were rebranding generic marks, forging medicines using flour, sugar, and dyes, and changing expiration dates. This group was smuggling these products from Peru through the border. Bolivian Police estimated that they seized more than USD1 million in counterfeit medicines. The Bolivian Pharmaceutical Association estimates that they experience losses of approximately USD80 million per year due to contraband.
Bolivia is listed on the Watch List of 2020 USTR’s Special 301 Report. Bolivia is not named in the 2020 Notorious Market Report.
For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/
6. Financial Sector
Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment
The government’s general attitude toward foreign portfolio investment is neutral. Established Bolivian firms may issue short or medium-term debt in local capital markets, which act primarily as secondary markets for fixed-return securities. Bolivian capital markets have sought to expand their handling of local corporate bond issues and equity instruments. Over the last few years, several Bolivian companies and some foreign firms have been able to raise funds through local capital markets. However, the stock exchange is small and is highly concentrated in bonds and debt instruments (more than 95 percent of transactions). The amount of total transactions in 2019 was around 29 percent of GDP.
Since 2008, the financial markets have experienced high liquidity, which has led to historically low interest rates. However, liquidity has been returning to normal levels in recent years and there are some pressures to increase interest rates. The Bolivian financial system is not well integrated with the international system and there is only one foreign bank among the top ten banks of Bolivia.
In October 2012, Bolivia returned to global credit markets for the first time in nearly a century, selling USD 500 million worth of 10-year bonds at the New York Stock Exchange. The sovereign bonds were offered with an interest rate of 4.875 percent and demand for the bonds well surpassed the offer, reaching USD 1.5 billion. U.S. financial companies Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, and Goldman Sachs were the lead managers of the deal. In 2013, Bolivia sold another USD 500 million at 5.95 percent for ten years. HSBC, Bank of America, and Merrill Lynch were the lead managers of the deal. In 2017, Bolivia sold another USD 1 billion at 4.5 percent for ten years, with Bank of America and JP Morgan managing the deal. According to the Ministry of Economy, the resources gained from the sales will be used to finance infrastructure projects.
The government and central bank respect their obligations under IMF Article VIII, as the exchange system is free of restrictions on payments and transfers for international transactions.
Foreign investors legally established in Bolivia are able to get credits on the local market. However, due to the size of the market, large credits are rare and may require operations involving several banks. Credit access through other financial instruments is limited to bond issuances in the capital market. A recent financial services law directs credit towards the productive sectors and caps interest rates.
Money and Banking System
The Bolivian banking system is small, composed of 16 banks, 6 banks specialized in mortgage lending, 3 private financial funds, 30 savings and credit cooperatives, and 8 institutions specialized in microcredit. Of the total number of personal deposits made in Bolivia through December 2019 (USD 26.5 billion), the banking sector accounted for 80 percent of the total financial system. Similarly, of the total loans and credits made to private individuals (USD 26.8 billion) through December 2018, 80 percent were made by the banking sector, while private financial funds and the savings and credit cooperatives accounted for the other 20 percent.
Bolivian banks have developed the capacity to adjudicate credit risk and evaluate expected rates of return in line with international norms. The banking sector was stable and healthy with delinquency rates at less than 1.9 percent in 2019. In 2020, delinquency rates rose after the interim government permitted clients to defer bank loan payments until the end of 2020 without penalty as a mitigating measure for the COVID-19 pandemic. While delinquency rates still remain relatively low, there are concerns this measure could potentially harm the banking sector’s stability.
In 2013, a new Financial Services Law entered into force. This new law enacted major changes to the banking sector, including deposit rate floors and lending rate ceilings, mandatory lending allocations to certain sectors of the economy and an upgrade of banks’ solvency requirements in line with the international Basel standards. The law also requires banks to spend more on improving consumer protection, as well as providing increased access to financing in rural parts of the country.
Credit is now allocated on government-established rates for productive activities, but foreign investors may find it difficult to qualify for loans from local banks due to the requirement that domestic loans be issued exclusively against domestic collateral. Since commercial credit is generally extended on a short-term basis, most foreign investors prefer to obtain credit abroad. Most Bolivian borrowers are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
In 2007, the government created a Productive Development Bank to boost the production of small, medium-sized and family-run businesses. The bank was created to provide loans to credit institutions which meet specific development conditions and goals, for example by giving out loans to farmers, small businesses, and other development focused investors. The loans are long term and have lower interest rates than private banks can offer in order to allow for growth of investments and poverty reduction.
In September 2010, the Bolivian Government bought the local private bank Banco Union as part of a plan to gain control of part of the financial market. Banco Union is one of the largest banks, with a share of 10.8 percent of total national credits and 12.7 percent of the total deposits; one of its principal activities is managing public sector accounts. Bolivian Government ownership of Banco Union was illegal until December 2012, when the government enacted the State Bank Law, allowing for state participation in the banking sector.
There is no strong evidence of “cross-shareholding” and “stable-shareholding” arrangements used by private firms to restrict foreign investment, and the 2009 Constitution forbids monopolies and supports antitrust measures. In addition, there is no evidence of hostile takeovers (other than government nationalizations that took place from 2006-14).
The Financial sector is regulated by ASFI (Supervising Authority of Financial Institutions), a decentralized institution that is under the Ministry of Economy. The Central Bank of Bolivia (BCB) oversees all financial institutions, provides liquidity when necessary, and acts as lender of last resort. The BCB is the only monetary authority and is in charge of managing the payment system, international reserves, and the exchange rate.
Foreigners are able to establish bank accounts only with residency status in Bolivia.
Blockchain technologies in Bolivia are still in the early stages. Currently, the banking sector is analyzing blockchain technologies and the sector intends to propose a regulatory framework in coordination with ASFI in the future.
Three different settlement mechanisms are available in Bolivia: (1) the high-value payment system administered by the Central Bank for inter-bank operations; (2) a system of low value payments utilizing checks and credit and debit cards administered by the local association of private banks (ASOBAN); and (3) the deferred settlement payment system designed for small financial institutions such as credit cooperatives. This mechanism is also administered by the Central Bank.
Foreign Exchange and Remittances
Foreign Exchange
The Banking Law (#393, 2013) establishes regulations for foreign currency hedging and authorizes banks to maintain accounts in foreign currencies. A significant, but dropping, percentage of deposits are denominated in U.S. dollars (currently less than 14 percent of total deposits). Bolivian law currently allows repatriation of profits, with a 12.5 percent withholding tax. However, a provision of the 2009 Constitution (Article 351.2) requires reinvestment within Bolivia of private profits from natural resources. Until specific implementing legislation is passed, it is unclear how this provision will be applied. In addition, all bank transfers in U.S. dollars within the financial system and leaving the country must pay a Financial Transaction Tax (ITF) of .03 percent. This tax applies to foreign transactions for U.S. dollars leaving Bolivia, not to money transferred internally.
Any banking transaction above USD 10,000 (in one operation or over three consecutive days) requires a form stating the source of funds. In addition, any hard currency cash transfer from or to Bolivia equal to or greater than USD 10,000 must be registered with the customs office. Amounts between USD 50,000 and USD 500,000 require authorization by the Central Bank and quantities above USD 500,000 require authorization by the Ministry of the Economy and Public Finance. The fine for underreporting any cash transaction is equal to 30 percent of the difference between the declared amount and the quantity of money found. The reporting standard is international, but many private companies in Bolivia find the application cumbersome due to the government requirement for detailed transaction breakdowns rather than allowing for blanket transaction reporting.
Administrative Resolution 398/10 approved in June 2010 forces Bolivian banks to reduce their investments and/or assets outside the country to an amount that does not exceed 50 percent of the value of their net equity.
The Central Bank charges a fee for different kinds of international transactions related to banking and trade. The current list of fees and the details can be found at:
Law 843 on tax reform directly affects the transfer of all money to foreign countries. All companies are charged 25 percent tax, except for banks which can be charged 37.5 percent, on profits under the Tax Reform Law, but when a company sends money abroad, the presumption of the Bolivian Tax Authority is that 50 percent of all money transmitted is profit. Under this presumption, the 25 percent tax is applied to half of all money transferred abroad, whether actual or only presumed profit. In practical terms, it means there is a payment of 12.5 percent as a transfer tax.
Currency is freely convertible at Bolivian banks and exchange houses. The Bolivian Government describes its official exchange system as an “incomplete crawling peg.” Under this system, the exchange rate is fixed, but undergoes micro-readjustments that are not pre-announced to the public. There is a spread of 10 basis points between the exchange rate for buying and selling U.S. dollars. The Peso Boliviano (Bs) has remained fixed at 6.96 Bs/USD 1 for selling and 6.86 Bs/USD 1 for buying since October 2011. The parallel rate closely tracks the official rate, suggesting the market finds the Central Bank’s policy acceptable. In order to avoid distortions in the exchange rate market, the Central Bank requires all currency exchange to occur at the official rate ±1 basis point.
Remittance Policies
Each remittance transaction from Bolivia to other countries has a USD 2,500 limit per transaction, but there is no limit to the number of transactions that an individual can remit. The volume of remittances sent to and from Bolivia has increased considerably in the past five years, and the central bank and banking regulator are currently analyzing whether to impose more regulations sometime in the future. Foreign investors are theoretically able to remit through a legal parallel market utilizing convertible, negotiable instruments, but, in practice, the availability of these financial instruments is limited in Bolivia. For example, the Bolivian Government mainly issues bonds in Bolivianos and the majority of corporate bonds are also issued in Bolivianos.
The official exchange rate between Bolivianos and dollars is the same as the informal rate. The government allows account holders to maintain bank accounts in Bolivianos or dollars and make transfers freely between them. Business travelers may bring up to USD 10,000 in cash into the country. For amounts greater than USD 10,000, government permission is needed through sworn declaration.
Sovereign Wealth Funds
Neither the Bolivian Government nor any government-affiliated entity maintains a sovereign wealth fund.
7. State-Owned Enterprises
The Bolivian Government has set up companies in sectors it considers strategic to the national interest and social well-being, and has stated that it plans to do so in every sector it considers strategic or where there is either a monopoly or oligopoly.
The Bolivian Government owns and operates more than 60 businesses including energy and mining companies, a telecommunications company, a satellite company, a bank, a sugar factory, an airline, a packaging plant, paper and cardboard factories, and milk and Brazil nut processing factories, among others. In 2005, income from state-owned business in Bolivia other than gas exports represented only a fraction of a percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As of 2015, public sector contribution to GDP (including SOEs, investments, and consumption of goods and services) has risen to over 40 percent of GDP.
The largest SOEs are able to acquire credit from the Central Bank at very low interest rates and convenient terms. Some private companies complain that it is impossible for them to compete with this financial subsidy. Moreover, SOEs appear to benefit from easier access to licenses, supplies, materials and land; however, there is no law specifically providing SOEs with preferential treatment in this regard. In many cases, government entities are directed to do business with SOEs, placing other private companies and investors at a competitive disadvantage.
The government registered budget surpluses from 2006 until 2013, but began experiencing budget deficits in 2014. Close to 50 percent of the deficit was explained by the performance of SOEs, such as Bolivia’s state-owned oil and gas company. According to the 2009 Constitution, all SOEs are required to publish an annual report and are subject to financial audits. Additionally, SOEs are required to present an annual testimony in front of civil society and social movements, a practice known as social control.
Privatization Program
There are currently no privatization programs in Bolivia.
8. Responsible Business Conduct
Bolivia has laws that regulate aspects related to corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices. Both producers and consumers in Bolivia are generally aware of CSR, but consumer decisions are ultimately based on price and quality. Because the Bolivian Constitution stipulates that economic activity cannot damage the collective good (Article 47.
Though Bolivia is not part of the OECD, it has participated in several Latin American Corporate Governance Roundtables since 2000. Neither the Bolivian Government nor its organizations use the OECD Guidelines for CSR. Instead, Bolivian companies and organizations are focused on trying to accomplish the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, and they use the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) methodology in order to show economic, social and environmental results. While the Bolivian Government, private companies, and non-profits are focused on the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, only a few private companies and NGOs focus on following the UN standard ISO 26000 guidelines and methodologies. Another methodology widely accepted in Bolivia is the one developed by the ETHOS Institute, which provides measurable indicators accepted by PLARSE (Programa Latinoamericano de Responsabilidad Social Corporativa, the Latin American Program for CSR).The Bolivian Government issued a 2013 supreme decree that requires financial entities to allocate 6 percent of profits to CSR-related projects.
The 1942 General Labor Law is the basis for employment rights in Bolivia, but this law has been modified more than 2,000 times via 60 supreme decrees since 1942. As a result of these modifications, the General Labor Law has become a complex web of regulations that is difficult to enforce or understand. An example of the lack of enforcement is the Comprehensive System for Protection of the Disabled (Law 25689) which stipulates that at least 4 percent of the total work force in public institutions, state owned enterprises, and private companies should be disabled. Neither the public nor private sectors are close to fulfilling this requirement, and most buildings lack even basic access modifications to allow for disabled workers.
In support of consumer protection rights, the Vice Ministry of Defense of User and Consumer Rights was created in 2009 (Supreme Decree 29894) under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice (which became the Ministry of Justice and Transparency in 2017). This same year the Consumer Protection Law (Supreme Decree 0065) was enacted, which gave the newly created Vice Ministry the authority to request information, verify and follow up on consumer complaints.
The Mother Earth Law (Law 071) approved in October 2012 promotes CSR elements as part of its principles (Article 2), such as collective good, harmony, respect and defense of rights. The Ministry of Environment and Water is in charge of overseeing the implementation of this law, but the implementing regulations and new institutions needed to enforce this law are still incomplete.
Even though Bolivia promotes the development of CSR practices in its laws, the government gives no advantage to businesses that implement these practices. Instead, businesses implement CSRs in order to gain the public support necessary to pass the prior consultation requirements or strengthen their support when mounting a legal defense against claims that they are not using land to fulfill a socially valuable purpose, as defined in the Community Land Reform laws (# 1775 and #3545).
In April 2009 the former Bolivian Government reorganized the supervisory agencies of the government (formerly Superintendencias) to include social groups, thus creating the “Authorities of Supervision and Social Control” (Supreme Decree 0071). This authority controls and supervises the following sectors: telecommunications and transportation, water and sanitation, forests and land, pensions, electricity, and enterprises. Each sector has an Authority of Supervision and Social Control assigned to its oversight, and each Authority has the right to audit the activities in the aforementioned sectors and the right to request the public disclosure of information, ranging from financial disclosures to investigation of management decisions.
9. Corruption
Resources to Report Corruption
Contact at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption:
Vice Minister of Justice and the Fight Against Corruption
Ministry of Justice
Calle Capitan Ravelo 2101, La Paz
+591-2-115773 http://www.transparencia.gob.bo/
Bolivian law stipulates criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the laws are not often implemented properly. Governmental lack of transparency, and police and judicial corruption, remain significant problems. The Ministry of Justice and Transparency and the Prosecutor’s Office are both responsible for combating corruption. In September 2014, the former Transparency Minister reported that the Ministry was investigating 388 complaints against public servants. The Ministry has obtained 100 convictions since 2006. Cases involving allegations of corruption against the president and vice president require congressional approval before prosecutors may initiate legal proceedings, and cases against pro-government public officials are rarely allowed to proceed. Despite the fact that the courts found that the awarding of immunity for corruption charges is unconstitutional, their rulings were ignored by the government.
Police corruption remains a significant problem. There are also reports of widespread corruption in the country’s judiciary.
There is an Ombudsman appointed by Congress and charged with protecting human rights and guarding against government abuse. In his 2014 annual report, the Ombudsman cited the judicial system, the attorney general’s office, and the police as the most persistent violators of human rights due to widespread inefficiencies and corruption. Public opinion reflected the Ombudsman’s statements. The 2017 Transparency International corruption perception index ranked Bolivia as 112 of 180 countries and found that Bolivian citizens believe the most corrupt institutions in Bolivia are the judiciary, the police, and executive branch institutions
Bolivia has laws in place which govern public sector-related contracts (Law 1178 and Supreme Decree 181), including contracts for the acquisition of goods, services, and consulting jobs. Bribery of public officials is also a criminal offense under Articles 145 and 158 of Bolivia’s Criminal Code. Laws also exist that provide protection for citizens filing complaints against corruption.
Bolivia signed the UN Anticorruption Convention in December 2003 and ratified it in December 2005. Bolivia is also party to the OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption. Bolivia is not a signatory of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials.
10. Political and Security Environment
Bolivia is prone to social unrest, which can include violence. Given the country’s reliance on a few key thoroughfares, conflict often disrupts transportation and distribution networks. The majority of civil disturbances are related to domestic issues, usually workers pressuring the government for concessions by marching or closing major transportation arteries. Protests in late 2019 surrounding fraudulent elections and the subsequent resignation of long-serving president Evo Morales did get violent, but none of the political violence targeted foreigners. Outside of the volatile months of October and November 2019, while protests and blockades are frequent, they only periodically affect commerce. In November 2019, however, election-related conflicts and protests led to two weeks of significant interruption to commerce in La Paz and elsewhere, directly affecting distribution of essential services or travel in and out of the city. In 2020, strict quarantine and lockdown measures severely affected commerce economy-wide and caused numerous businesses to close or otherwise impeded business operations. In addition, during approximately ten days in August 2020 during the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, protestors blocked key highways, denying resident access to foodstuffs, fuel, and badly needed oxygen supplies.
11. Labor Policies and Practices
Approximately two-thirds of Bolivia’s population is considered “economically active.” Between 70 and 75 percent of workers participate in the informal economy, where no contractual employer-employee relationship exists. Relatively low education and literacy levels limit labor productivity, a fact reflected in wage rates. Unskilled labor is readily available, but skilled workers are often harder to find.
Article 3 of the Labor Code limits to 15 percent the number of foreign nationals that can be employed by any business. Due to the limited number of labor inspectors, enforcement of the law is uneven.
The 2009 Constitution specifies that unjustified firing from jobs is forbidden and that the state will resolve conflicts between employers and employees (Articles 49.3 and 50). Bolivian labor law guarantees workers the right of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively. Most companies are unionized, and nearly all unions belong to the Confederation of Bolivian Workers (COB).
Labor laws, including related regulations and statutory instruments, provide for the freedom of association, the right to strike, and the right to organize and bargain collectively. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination and requires reinstatement of workers fired for union activity. The law does not require government approval for strikes and allows peaceful strikers to occupy business or government offices. General and solidarity strikes are protected by the constitution, as is the right of any working individual to join a union.
Workers may form a union in any private company of 20 or more employees, but the law requires that at least 50 percent of the workforce be in favor of forming a union. The law requires prior government authorization to establish a union and confirm its elected leadership, permits only one union per enterprise, and allows the government to dissolve unions by administrative fiat. The law also requires that members of union executive boards be Bolivian by birth. The labor code prohibits most public employees from forming unions, but some public-sector workers (including teachers, transportation workers, and health-care workers) were legally unionized and actively participated as members of the Bolivian Workers’ Union without penalty.
Freedom of association is limited by the government and under-resourced labor courts. Moreover, the 20-worker threshold for forming a union proved an onerous restriction, as an estimated 72 percent of enterprises had fewer than 20 employees. Labor inspectors may attend union meetings and monitor union activities. Collective bargaining and voluntary direct negotiations between employers and workers without government participation was limited. Most collective bargaining agreements were restricted to addressing wages.
Originally passed in 1942, Bolivia’s labor law has changed frequently due to new regulations. Labor attorneys estimate that the law has been amended over two thousand times, with many amendments directly contradicting others. Attorneys comment that it is virtually impossible to understand the rules clearly, creating significant uncertainty for both employers and employees.
Bolivia has no unemployment insurance or employment-related social safety net programs. However, if an employee is laid off due to economic or technical reasons, employers are required to pay three months of salary as compensation. Nevertheless, employees generally have more negotiating leverage in Bolivia than employers, and many employers choose to pay the compensation in order to avoid retaliation.
The Ministry of Labor has labor-related conflict resolution mechanisms, but in reality these processes are skewed towards employees. If parties cannot reach an agreement, employees are able to initiate legal proceedings, with appeals to Bolivia’s Supreme Court possible.
The National Labor Court handles complaints of antiunion discrimination, but rulings generally take a year or more. In some cases, the court rules in favor of discharged workers and requires their reinstatement. Union leaders state that problems are often resolved or are no longer relevant by the time the court rules. For this reason, government remedies and penalties are often ineffective and insufficient to deter violations.
Violence during labor demonstrations continues to be a serious problem. In August 2016, striking miners kidnapped and murdered Vice Minister Rodolfo Illanes during a conflict between miners and the government on the La Paz-Oruro highway. Several miners were also shot and killed. The case is still under investigation.
12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Other Investment Insurance Programs
DFC’s programs are not currently available in Bolivia.
13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics
Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
Host Country Statistical Source
USG or International Statistical Source
USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data
Year
Amount
Year
Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD)
Luxembourg, the only Grand Duchy in the world, is a landlocked country in northwestern Europe surrounded by Belgium, France, and Germany. Despite its small landmass and small population (626,000), Luxembourg is the second-wealthiest country in the world when measured on a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita basis.
Since 2002, the Luxembourg Government has proactively implemented policies and programs to support economic diversification and to attract foreign direct investment. The Government focused on key innovative industries that showed promise for supporting economic growth: logistics, information, and communications technology (ICT), health technologies including biotechnology and biomedical research; clean energy technologies, and most recently, space technology and financial services technologies.
Prior to COVID pandemic, the economy had posted a GDP growth rate of 2.3%, higher than the EU average of 1.7%. Given the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Luxembourg government projects GDP to contract by 6% in 2020, with a projected rebound of 7% in 2021. Credit rating agencies Fitch and DBRS Morningstar confirmed Luxembourg’s “AAA” rating in September, with a stable outlook. Both agencies highlighted Luxembourg’s favorable position at the start of the crisis, made possible by implementing a prudent fiscal policy in recent years, thus enabling the government to react quickly to implement generous measures to support the economy.
Beyond COVID, other factors that could impact growth include the possible introduction of a wealth tax and an inheritance tax. Although far from adopted, various officials have expressed support for the idea and it appears the Government will debate and consider the proposal.
Luxembourg continues to offer a diverse and stable platform and outsized growth potential for a wide variety of U.S. investments and trade within the EU and beyond. Although the full impact of COVID-19 has yet to be determined, Luxembourg remains a financial powerhouse as a result of the past exponential growth of the investment fund sector through the launch and development of cross-border funds (UCITS) in the 1990s. Luxembourg is the world’s second-largest investment fund asset domicile, after only the United States, with approximately $5 trillion of assets in custody in financial institutions. This has been both an asset and a vulnerability. Foreign investors have taken full advantage. China has also.
Other factors enhancing Luxembourg’s investment climate include:
Luxembourg is consistently ranked as one of the world’s most open and transparent economies and has no restrictions on foreign ownership. Luxembourg is also consistently ranked as one of the world’s most competitive and least-corrupt economies.
Luxembourg ranks as the world’s safest city in the Mercer city index.
Over the past decade, Luxembourg has adopted major fiscal reforms to counter money-laundering, terrorist-financing, and tax evasion.
Luxembourg has not yet adopted national security screening of investments or meaningful cyber protections to meet the emerging risks of the digital economy. However, as an EU member, it is expected to conform to the EU Framework on National Security Screening.
The Government of Luxembourg has actively supported the development of new sectors to diversify the country’s economy, given the dominance of the financial sector. Target sectors include space, logistics, and information technology, including financial technology and biomedicine.
Luxembourg launched its SpaceResources.lu initiative in 2016 and in 2017 announced a fund offering financial support for the space resources industry. More than 50 companies dedicated to space initiatives are now active in Luxembourg. Luxembourg added an additional space fund in early 2020 to further bolster its status as a space startup nation.
Luxembourg has positioned itself as “the gateway to Europe” to establish European company headquarter operations by virtue of its central European location and advanced road, railway, and air connectivity. Due to uncertainties related to Brexit and COVID-19, 50 insurers, asset managers and banking institutions decided pre-COVID-19 to re-locate their EU headquarters to Luxembourg or transfer a significant part of their activity to Luxembourg.
Luxembourg is actively seeking logistics companies to expand the new logistics hub at Luxembourg Airport, home to Cargolux, Europe’s largest all cargo airline. Inaugurated in 2017, the Luxembourg Intermodal Terminal (LIT) is ideally positioned as an international hub for the consolidation of multimodal transport flows across Europe and beyond. Renovations and expansion at the airport are underway
Luxembourg is also seeking ICT companies to use the existing high-security, state-of-the-art datacenters, affording high-speed internet connectivity to major international data hubs. Through various initiatives, Luxembourg has initiatives to attract financial technology and biomedical start-ups and small companies to make Luxembourg home.
1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment
Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment
Luxembourg offers a public policy framework and political stability, which remain highly attractive for foreign investors, particularly for U.S. investors, given the focus on growth sectors and the historically strong bilateral relationship between the two countries. The government has increased its outreach toward companies looking to expand in Europe. Luxembourg has been in the process of implementing the EU standards for the screening of foreign investment according to national security risk, to enter into force in the Fall of 2020. Unfortunately, high-risk Chinese investors have taken full advantage of the absence of national security screening, having established or purchased 8-9 banks including the International Bank of Luxembourg (BIL). In recent months, there are indications that the Chinese investors appear to be moving toward purchasing a number of sensitive space and technology companies .
In 2017, pre-COVID, Luxembourg’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Economy and Foreign Trade unveiled a strategy to promote economic growth focusing on attracting FDI and supporting companies’ moving into other markets. The Luxembourg “Let’s Make It Happen” campaign, developed by the state Trade and Investment Board, focuses on five key objectives:
Improving Luxembourg-based companies’ access to international markets
Attracting FDI in a “targeted, service-oriented” way
Strengthening the country’s international “economic-promotion network”
Improving Luxembourg’s image as a “smart location” for high-performance business and industry
Ensuring the coherence of economic promotion efforts
There is no overall economic or industrial strategy that has discriminatory effects on foreign investors, either at a market-access or post-establishment phase of investment. In fact, the opposite is true. Although legislation has been offered to address screening of national security risks, inadequate measures currently exist to protect existing and new investments from predatory Chinese infiltration efforts to mine sensitive data and technologies. Luxembourg strives to attract and retain foreign investors with its unique model of “easy-access to decision-makers” and its known ability to “act swiftly.”
The Trade and Investment Board has taken the lead in investment promotion and includes representatives from the ministries of Economy, Higher Education and Research, Finance, Foreign and European Affairs, and State. Public-private trade associations such as FEDIL (Business Federation of Luxembourg, the main employers’ trade association), the Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce, and the Chamber of Skilled Trades and Crafts, as well as Luxinnovation, are also represented.
The Board is working in cooperation with Luxembourg embassies and trade and investment offices worldwide, as well as economic and commercial attachés, honorary consuls, and foreign trade advisers, to attract FDI and retain investors. In 2016, the Ministry of the Economy expanded the role of Luxinnovation to incorporate promotion of Luxembourg abroad and to attract FDI into the country.
In February 2020, DPM Schneider departed the government. The new Minister of the Economy, Franz Fayot, will share his priorities in the fall as shaped by the limitations imposed by the Coronavirus and the government’s broader priorities.
Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment
There is a right for foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. There are no limits on foreign ownership or control, and there are no sector-specific restrictions.
General screening of foreign investment does exist in line with that of domestic investment, with routine and non-discriminatory screening mechanisms. However, as noted above, inadequate screening devices exist to protect Luxembourg from Chinese predatory investment. There are no major sectors/matters in Luxembourg in which foreign investors are denied national (domestic) treatment.
Other Investment Policy Reviews
The World Bank’s Doing Business 2019 Economy Profile provides additional detail on Luxembourg’s investment climate.
Luxembourg is included in Trade Policy Reviews (TPRs) of the EU/EC; see the TPR gateway for explanations and background.
Business Facilitation
In terms of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Global Action Menu for Investment Facilitation, Luxembourg’s business facilitation efforts are aligned with most of the recommended action points. Over the past decade, Luxembourg has been furthering accessibility and transparency in investment policies and regulations, as well as procedures relevant to investors.
The Government has improved the efficiency of investment administrative procedures, notably in the context of the overall “Digitization” movement to offer a multitude of government services online or electronically. Pre-COVID, it took 2-3 months to register a business, depending on the complexity of the business itself. On a scale of 1 to 10, Luxembourg rates 6.5 in website registration clarity and completeness of instructions to register a limited liability company, according to the Global Enterprise Registration portal of the Global Entrepreneurship Network of UNCTAD.
The Government provides a website in multiple languages, including English, that explains the business registration process: http://www.guichet.public.lu/en. A new business must register with the Registry of Commerce (Registre du Commerce:https://www.rcsl.lu/.) Foreign companies can use the site (after translating from the original French language), but it is best to consult with a local lawyer or fiduciary to complete the overall process. It is necessary to engage a notary to submit the company’s by-laws for registration.
In 2017, the Government reduced the required minimum capitalization of a new company from 12,500 euro to just 1 euro (symbolic), to encourage start-up creation. Between January 2017 and January 2018, over 680 such simplified limited liability companies (Société à responsabilité limitée simplifiée SARL-S) have registered. According to the Luxembourgish Chamber of Commerce, one client out of three has requested information on SARL-S.
After receiving a certificate from the Registry of Commerce, companies are required by law to register with and pay annual dues to the Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce (i.e. compulsory membership) , as well as the Social Security Administration, the Tax Administration (Administration des Contributions Directes) and the Value-Added-Tax Authority (TVA = taxe à la valeur ajoutée). The company will receive an official registration number reflecting the date of inception of the entity, and this number will be used in all business transactions and correspondence with administrative authorities.
The House of Entrepreneurship, opened in 2016 within the Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce, also provides guidance on the entire registration and creation process of a business. In 2019, the House of Entrepreneurship was contacted 12,000 times.
The Ministry of Economy continues to support networks and associations acting in favor of female entrepreneurship. The Law of December 15, 2016 incorporated the principle of equal salaries in the Grand Duchy’s legislation, which makes illegal any difference in the salaries paid to men and women carrying out the same task or work of equal value. Notably, this has not yet translated into equality/parity of female ownership of businesses or the existence of females in leadership positions in major companies or employers.
In general, the most promising instruments, while outside the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economy, are critical. For example, there has been an increase in the number of childcare centers close to business districts which is helping dual career families better manage. And there have been major efforts on improving education and housing opportunities.
Outward Investment
The same government services website listed above, http://www.guichet.public.lu/en, includes an “International Trade” tab which provides guidance on outward investment by Luxembourgish companies on various topics including intra-EU trade and services; import, export, and transit; licensing; and transport. The Luxembourg Government promotes outward investment via the Trade and Investment Board, which functions as a promotion entity for both inward and outward investment.
The “Let’s Make It Happen” initiative, among its many missions, is working to facilitate access to international markets for Luxembourgish companies and to strengthen Luxembourg’s international economic promotion network. Luxembourg does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad.
2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties
The United States and Luxembourg have shared a Friendship, Establishment, and Navigation Treaty since 1963, which assures national treatment and other investor protections. Luxembourg and the United States also have an aviation treaty. In 2019 the U.S. Senate ratified the Convention between the United States and the Grand Duchy for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital.
In addition to its open trade with other member states of the European Union, and free-trade agreements between the EU and other countries, Luxembourg also signed bilateral agreements with the following countries:
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Georgia, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Korea (Republic of), Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zambia.
Luxembourg has a bilateral taxation agreement with the United States, which was amended to upgrade to OECD information exchange standards on bank accounts in 2009. This update to the Treaty was ratified in 2019 by both countries and came into effect in September 2019. In 2014, the bilateral agreement on the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) allowed Luxembourg to comply with the U.S. reporting requirements to the IRS by financial institutions with U.S. citizen clients or “U.S. Person” clients. The law came into effect in 2015.
3. Legal Regime
Transparency of the Regulatory System
The Government of Luxembourg uses transparent policies and effective laws to foster competition and establish clear ground rules on a non-discriminatory basis. The legal system is quite welcoming with respect to FDI, and legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. With the exception of the mandatory membership in the Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce, there are no informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. In addition to the Government, the Luxembourg Institute of Regulation, a public agency, proposes regulatory policies.
As confirmed by the World Bank report on Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance, the Luxembourg Government develops anticipated and publishes forward-leaning regulatory plans – a public list of anticipated regulatory changes and proposals intended to be adopted and implemented. These plans are available to the public, as the texts of proposed legislation are published before Parliamentary debate and voting. In addition, plans and proposed legislation is subject to review by the State Council and the Grand Duke.
Draft texts are published on a unified website where all proposed regulations are directly distributed to interested stakeholders. While the ministries do not have a legal obligation to publish the text of proposed regulations before their enactment, the entire text of the proposed draft law is published. (www.legilux.lu)
In addition, the Government solicits comments on proposed laws and regulations from the public. The comments are received on the same website (www.legilux.lu); through public meetings; and through targeted outreach to stakeholders, such as business associations.
The law requires that the rulemaking body solicit comments on proposed regulations. The consultation period is typically three months, and the Government reports on the results of the consultation in the form of a consolidated response on the same website. The official journal Mémorial publishes the final text of laws, both online and in print.
Proposed legislation also includes a factsheet on the impact on public finances. The Luxembourg Government is transparent with its public finances and debt obligations through the annual budget procedure that requires Parliamentary approval. The Government also communicates on issuances of new State borrowing.
International Regulatory Considerations
Luxembourg is a member state of the EU and routinely transposes EU directives and regulations into domestic law. Luxembourg has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 1995 and notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Luxembourg ratified the TFA on October 5, 2015 and has an implementation rate of 100 percent.
Legal System and Judicial Independence
Luxembourg is a parliamentaryrepresentative democracy headed by a constitutional monarch. The Constitution of 1868 provides for a flexible separation of powers between the executive and the parliament, with the judiciary watching over proper application of laws.
The Grand Duchy has a written commercial/contractual law. Magistrates’ courts deal with cases of lesser importance in civil and commercial matters, and under the urgent procedure in the field of law enforcement.
The district courts, of which there are three, adjudicate civil and commercial matters for all cases not specifically attributed by law to any other court. The current judicial process is considered procedurally competent, fair, and reliable, albeit notably slow (The judicial sector observes all public-school holiday periods). Regulation and enforcement actions are appealable, and they are adjudicated in the national court system.
Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment
Luxembourg has assimilated the laws of neighboring countries according to the nature of the laws: German tax law, French civil law, and Belgian commercial law (written and consistently applied). As previously mentioned, the website for doing business is: www.guichet.public.lu, and the new one-stop-shop for setting up a business is the House of Entrepreneurship within the Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce (www.houseofentrepreneurship.lu).
Competition and Anti-Trust Laws
The Competition Inspectorate, a department within the Ministry of the Economy, oversees investigating competition cases.
Expropriation and Compensation
The laws governing expropriation of property are quite complex, and the process can be arduous and lengthy, depending on the property. The Ministry of the Interior, along with the Ministry of Justice, sets forth the specific regulations according to each type of case.
There have been no known expropriations in the recent past or policy shifts which would indicate such actions soon. There are no tendencies by the Luxembourg Government to discriminate against U.S. investments, companies, or representatives in expropriation.
There are no known instances of indirect expropriation or governmental action tantamount to expropriation, such as confiscatory tax regimes, that might warrant special investigation.
Dispute Settlement
ICSID Convention and New York Convention
Luxembourg is a member state to the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention). Luxembourg is a signatory of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention).
Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Investment disputes involving U.S. or other foreign investors in Luxembourg are extremely uncommon. There are no known claims by or disputes with a U.S. person or foreign investors.
The Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce and the Mediation Center offer the services of domestic dispute settlement and, on an international level, with the International Chamber of Commerce. There have been no known investment disputes over the past few years involving U.S. or other foreign investors or contractors in Luxembourg.
Within the WTO, there are no known dispute settlement cases involving Luxembourg either as a complainant, respondent, or third-party entity.
International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts
The Government accepts international arbitration of investment disputes between foreign investors and the state, and the courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards. International arbitration is accepted as a means for settling investment disputes among private parties, and there is a domestic arbitration body within the host economy, the Centre de Médiation (Mediation Center).
As investment disputes are practically non-existent, there is no information available concerning the duration of a resolution in the local courts.
Bankruptcy Regulations
Luxembourg has assimilated the laws of neighboring countries according to the nature of the laws: German tax law, French civil law, and Belgian commercial law (written and consistently applied). Judgments of foreign courts are accepted and enforced by the local courts, and Luxembourg does have a written and consistently applied bankruptcy law, which is based on European Union-wide legislation. Monetary settlements are usually made in local currency (euro).
Bankruptcy is not criminalized. Luxembourg ranks 34 in “Resolving Insolvency” in the World Bank’s 2019 Doing Business Index.
For three (3) years, under the sponsorship of now Economy Minister Franz Fayot, Luxembourg has been engaged in an effort to overhaul its bankruptcy and creditors laws. Covid has delayed that process, however, the combination of the number of business failures due to Covid with some of the outdated debtor/creditor laws have increased pressure on reform.
At the end of 2019, the Luxembourg banking sector comprised 127 credit institutions, from 29 different countries. Under Luxembourg law, two types of licenses are possible for the credit institutions, the Universal Banking License, and the Mortgage Bonds Banking License.
The Ministry of Finance grants credit institutions operating out of the Grand Duchy an operating license. Since the entry into force of the Single Supervisory Mechanism on November 4, 2014, credit institutions are subjected to the control of the European Central Bank, either directly or indirectly through Luxembourg’s financial sector supervisory authority, the CSSF. The supervision by the ECB/CSSF extends equally to activities performed by these undertakings in another Member State of the EU, whether by means of the establishment of a branch or by free provision of services. The CSSF has made major strides in oversight and enforcement of the financial sector rules, regulations and laws. Indeed, its size has grown to 1,000 staff, making it larger than the entire Luxembourg army.
4. Industrial Policies
Investment Incentives
Luxembourg is considered to have a very attractive tax profile for conducting business: low effective corporate tax rates of 18 percent (with an adjusted rate of 15 percent for entities with annual taxable income less than 25,000 euro); the lowest VAT (value-added tax) rate in Europe (at 17 percent); and a variety of tax incentives, including investment tax credits, new business tax credit, subsidies for film productions, venture capital investment certificates, small business incentives, regional and national incentives, research and development incentives, and environmental incentives. The investment incentives are provided within the limitations of the EU rules on State aid. Until recently, the European Court of Justice has been increasingly stringent on individual tax treatment including a ruling specific to Luxembourg and its tax treatment of Apple. During 2020, the ECJ deemed to relax its approach in a case involving Amazon. The full impact of these decisions and their impact on judicial review of these arrangements has yet to be fully determined.
U.S. and foreign firms can participate in government/authority-financed and subsidized research and development programs.
Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation
Luxembourg opened a free-trade zone called Le Freeport in 2014, which was built and integrated into the cargo logistics center at Luxembourg Airport. This zone, modeled after other successful customs warehousing in premier trade regions such as Geneva and Singapore, allows the warehousing and handling of high-value merchandise (art, cars, wines) in a secure location free of fiscal obligations (no Value-Added-Tax (VAT) or import duties to be paid as long as the goods remain on the premises). Taxation only occurs when the articles leave the zone as imports into the country of consumption (or if a bottle of wine is opened at Le Freeport, it is also subject to taxation).
Performance and Data Localization Requirements
The host Government does not mandate local employment. The Government has attempted to improve the work visa process in past years, in response to input from companies, embassies, and visa applicants. If the application is in order, a work visa should normally take only two months to clear. The difficulty in obtaining a Residence permit is on par with other western European countries once the applicant has provided all pertinent information to the authorities and the local district of residence.
These incentives are applied uniformly to both domestic and foreign investors.
Data storage has been greatly enhanced via new state-of-the-art data centers, built by the government as part of the long-term massive ICT infrastructure development plan which includes replacing old transmission lines with fiber-optic cable across the country. The data centers have served to optimize international connectivity to large hubs such as Paris, Amsterdam, and Frankfurt, and have attracted major ICT and e-commerce players, such as Amazon and PayPal, which located their EU headquarters in Luxembourg. The centers are rated at the highest security level for data storage.
Enforcement on the respect of data storage rules, such as the EU GDPR, rests with the Luxembourg data protection regulator CNPD.
5. Protection of Property Rights
Real Property
Secured interests in property in Luxembourg, both movable and real, are recognized and enforced through intangible property and commercial laws. The legal system that protects and facilitates acquisition and disposition of all property rights, such as land and buildings, is based on a land register called cadastre in French, where each parcel of property is documented in terms of ownership and duration.
Luxembourg ranks 31 out of 190 countries in the World Bank’s 2019 Doing Business Report for ease of Registering Property.
Luxembourg law allows the securitization through enforceable intangible debtor/creditor instruments of many types of assets, risks, revenues and activities It makes securitization accessible to all types of investors (institutional or individual), which means that securitization can easily facilitate the financing of a company or the management of personal or family wealth. An extremely wide range of assets can be securitized: securities, loans, subordinated or non-subordinated bonds), risks linked to debt (commercial and other), moveable and immovable property (whether tangible or not).
Under Luxembourg law, a securitization vehicle can be constituted either as a company, a fund, or an individual person. Securitization companies can benefit from EU directives and double tax avoidance treaties. Securitization organizations that continually issue transferable assets for the public must be approved and supervised by the financial sector supervisory authority, the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF).
Intellectual Property Rights
Trademarks, designs, patents, trade secrets, and copyrights are the principal forms of intellectual property rights (IPR) for which protection and enforcement are available in Luxembourg to companies, funds, and individuals. Luxembourg has been proactive in developing its IPR standards and participates in all the major IPR treaties and conventions, including:
Berne Convention
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)
Paris Convention
Patent Law Treaty (PLT)
Madrid Agreement and Protocol
The country is a signatory of the European Patent Convention, created by the European Patent Office (EPO), and a member state of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
Adequate steps have also been taken to implement and enforce the WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement.
In Luxembourg, the Litigation and Research Department (Division des Contentieux et Recherches) of the Directorate of Customs and Excise (Direction des Douanes et Accises) regulates and oversees applications to prohibit the release of counterfeit and pirated goods for free circulation, export, re-export, or entry into the country. Customs officers have ex-officio powers to seize (but not necessarily destroy) goods. Most cases are related to customs declaration abuses by the owner (importing products above the maximum allowable amount for tax-free treatment within the EU), and not to counterfeit goods. The Luxembourg customs authorities may impose measures, such as seizures or import bans, for a period of six months, which may be renewed at the request of the rights-holder. The customs office tracks the seizures of counterfeit goods, notably at Luxembourg Airport and the train station (Gare), but this is a small part of customs work. There are no public statistics on such seizures.
The main rules of civil procedure are contained in the Luxembourg Code of Civil Procedure and in the Administration of Justice Act. In the absence of specific rules concerning material and local jurisdiction for certain IPR, ordinary law applies. The merits of a counterfeit goods case are decided by judicial proceedings; thus, the ordinary law courts are responsible for deciding whether there are valid and sufficient grounds for a case.
In an effort to become the prime location for Europe’s knowledge-based and digital economy, Luxembourg implemented a new IPR tax regime in 2008 that provides a very competitive tax rate (first 8%, then down to 3%) applicable to a broad range of IPR income generated by taxpayers.
The level of IPR protections and enforcements is excellent, and an update to the 2008 law was made in 2013. However, due to pressure from the EU Commission to disallow fiscal advantages to specific Member States, the IPR fiscal regime in Luxembourg is no longer offered as of 2016, and assets are now subject to the standard VAT rate of 17 percent.
In March 2018, the Luxembourg Government voted to approve the legislative measures necessary to bring Luxembourg’s new IIPR regime into force, which retroactively came into effect starting January 1, 2018. The new regime is fully consistent with all recommendations made by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation (OECD) Forum on Harmful Tax Practices, including those set out in the OECD/G20 BEPS Project Action 5 Final Report published in October 2015. Under the regime, eligible net income from qualifying IPR assets benefits from an 80% exemption on income taxes. Consequently, a corporate taxpayer based in Luxembourg City with eligible net income would be taxed on such income at an overall (i.e. corporate income taxes plus municipal business tax) effective tax rate of 5.202 percent. Qualifying IPR assets also benefit from a full exemption from Luxembourg’s net wealth tax.
Luxembourg is not included in USTR’s 2020 Special 301 Report or 2019 Notorious Markets List.
For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IPR offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/.
6. Financial Sector
Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment
Luxembourg government policies, which reflect the European Union’s free movement of capital framework, facilitate the free flow of financial resources to support the product and factor markets. Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors can get credit on the local market, thanks to the sophisticated and extremely developed international financial sector, depending on the banks’ individual lending policies.
Since the financial crisis and tighter regulation through EU central banking authority and stability mechanisms, banks had become more selective in their lending practices pre-COVID. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments, including those issued by the National Public Investment Agency (SNCI), and there is an effective regulatory system established to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment.
Luxembourg continues to be recognized as a model for fighting money-laundering activities within its banking system through the enactment of strict regulations and monitoring of fund sources. Indeed, the number of enforcements reflects the degree to which the government remains committed to fighting money-laundering. The country has its own stock market, a sub-set of which was rebranded in 2016 as a “green exchange” to promote securities (primarily bonds in Luxembourg) reflecting ecologically sound investments.
Money and Banking System
Luxembourg’s banking system is sound and strong, having been shored up following the world financial crisis by emergency investments by the Government of Luxembourg in BGL BNP Paribas (formerly Banque Generale du Luxembourg and then Fortis) and in Banque Internationale a Luxembourg (BIL), formerly Dexia, in 2008. Now, in response to COVID, the government has adopted initiatives to assure both liquidity and solvency of banks.
At the end of 2018, 127 credit institutions were operating, with total assets of EUR 900 billion during the first quarter of 2020 (USD 1,060 billion), and approximately 26,000 employees.
Luxembourg has a central bank, Banque Centrale de Luxembourg. Foreign banks can establish operations, subject to the same regulations as Luxembourgish banks.
Due to the U.S. FATCA reporting requirements, local retail bank Raiffeisen refuses U.S. citizens as clients. However, two banks have offered to serve U.S. citizen customers despite the additional reporting requirements: BIL and the State Bank and Savings Bank (Banque et Caisse d’Epargne de l’Etat).
On February 21, 2018, the Luxembourg House of Financial Technology (LHoFT) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the European FinTech platform, B-Hive, based in Brussels, and the Dutch Blockchain Coalition, that will favor collaboration in the field of distributed ledger technology, otherwise known as blockchain. The MoU confirms mutual interest and defines the fields of collaboration, among other things, on how blockchain technology can benefit society and business in general or on how they can help define international and/or European standards for distributed ledger technology.
The Ministry of Finance is tracking developments very closely in the field of virtual currencies and has said it will adapt its legislation in accordance with the results of ongoing European and international studies. Luxembourg places virtual currencies under the legal regime of payment companies. The CSSF continues close supervision and oversight of virtual currencies.
Foreign Exchange and Remittances
Foreign Exchange
There are no restrictions on converting or transferring funds associated with an investment (including remittances of investment capital, earnings, loan repayments, lease payments) into a freely usable currency and at a legal market-clearing rate. Luxembourg was an original proponent of the euro currency and adopted it immediately at inception as part of the 1999 “Eurozone” that replaced their former domestic currencies. The European Central Bank is the authority in charge of the euro currency. Pre-COVID, Luxembourg had taken steps to move toward a “cashless” economy.
Remittance Policies
There have not been any recent changes to remittance policies with respect to access to foreign exchange for investment remittances. There is no difficulty in obtaining foreign exchange, which has been freely traded since the 1960s, and the Luxembourg stock market trades in forty different currencies, is truly international and expanding rapidly.
An average 24-hour delay period is currently in effect for remitting investment returns such as dividends, return of capital, interest and principal on private foreign debt, lease payments, royalties and management fees through normal, legal channels. Investors can remit through a legal parallel market including one utilizing cash and convertible negotiable instruments (such as dollar-denominated host government bonds issued in lieu of immediate payments in dollars). There is no limitation on the inflow or outflow of funds for remittances of profits, debt service, capital, capital gains, returns on intellectual property, or imported inputs.
Sovereign Wealth Funds
Luxembourg created a sovereign wealth fund in 2014. The fund is under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance and operates with 234 million euros of assets. Until the fund reaches 250 million euros of assets, it operates a conservative investment policy, with a portfolio of 57% of bonds, 40% of stocks and 3% of liquidities. The sovereign wealth fund only invests outside of Luxembourg and is audited by an independent audit company.
7. State-Owned Enterprises
The most prominent state-owned enterprise (SOE) in Luxembourg is POST (formerly P&T, postal and telecommunications), whose sole shareholder is the government of Luxembourg and whose board of directors is composed of civil servants. POST responded to the competition created by private players in the market (Orange, Proximus) by transforming itself from a passive utility company into a commercial enterprise, recruiting from the corporate sector, and improving consumer products and services. POST also publishes an annual report and communicates in a similar manner to a private company.
Another sector in which SOEs have been very active is the energy sector (electric and gas utilities), which is now liberalized as well. Anyone can become a provider or distributor (via networks) of electricity and gas. The former state electricity utility, Cegedel, was absorbed into a private company, Encevo, along with a nearby German utility and the former state gas utility, with an independent board of directors. Creos, the new distribution network for energy, is jointly held by the government and private shareholders.
Finally, an important market which does retain barriers to entry is freight air transport, due to the dominance of the majority state-owned Cargolux. It is the largest consumer of U.S. production in Luxembourg in terms of value, owing to its all-Boeing fleet of 27 747-freighter aircraft (including 14 of the new-generation 747-8F, of which Cargolux was a launch customer). It received a capital increase from the Luxembourg government in return for a larger state ownership share of the company.
China has invested in Cargolux, with a Chinese regional fund currently holding approximately one-third of the shares. Cargolux has aggressively expanded in China.
Private enterprises can compete with public enterprises in Luxembourg under the same terms and conditions in all respects. All markets are now open or have been liberalized via EU directives to encourage market competition over monopolistic entities. There is a national regulator (National Institute of Regulation), which sets forth regulations and standards for economic sectors, mostly derived from EU directives transposed into local law. While markets continue to open, the government has maintained a large enough stake in critical sectors such as energy, to ensure national security.
OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs
Luxembourg is an OECD member with established practices consistent with OECD guidelines as far as SOEs are concerned. There is no centralized ownership entity that exercises ownership rights for each of the SOEs.
In general, if the government has a share in an enterprise, government officials will receive board of directors’ seats on a comparable basis to other shareholders and in proportion to their share, with no formal management reporting directly to a line minister.
Court processes with regard to SOEs are transparent and non-discriminatory.
Privatization Program
Foreign investors can participate equally in ongoing privatization programs, and the bidding process is transparent with no barriers erected against foreign investors at the time of the initial investment or after the investment is made. Moreover, there are no laws or regulations specifically authorizing private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association, which limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control, and there are no other practices by private firms to force local ownership or restrict foreign investment, participation in, or control of domestic enterprises. There has been no evidence to suggest that potential conflicts of interest. Government officials sitting on boards of directors do not appear to have impacted freedom of investment in the private sector.
8. Responsible Business Conduct
There is a heightened awareness of responsible business conduct in Luxembourg, whether it is in the corporate sector or among the consuming public. In financial matters, a desire to avoid inclusion on the OECD’s tax haven grey list has driven a push for greater transparency. While Luxembourg has always taken a lead role in ecological matters including stringent trash sorting and mandatory recycling procedures, the global discussion on climate change, pushed to the forefront by the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (COP 21) and pressure from the EU in terms of concrete goals and directives, has made green finance a high priority.
In 2016, Luxembourg Stock Exchange (LuxSE) created the Luxembourg Green Exchange (LGX), the world’s first stock exchange to deal with securities related to climate change. It currently lists over $320 billion of green bonds. LGX is a dedicated platform for issuers and investors focused on green instruments. With over 750 securities, denominated in 32 countries, this represents a 50% global market share for green bonds. In its offer, LuxSE helps issuers market their green securities by generating awareness for their green projects.
There have been no controversial instances of corporate impact on human rights in Luxembourg.
There are also independent NGOs, worker organizations/unions, and business trade associations promoting and monitoring RBC. These organizations can do their work freely and often directly integrated into the review, oversight and supervisory process.
Luxembourg has not only implemented EU directives concerning emissions reduction, but also set forth major new energy policies to promote clean energies and energy conservation in consumer households.
In 2010, the energy pass became compulsory for existing dwellings (houses and residences) that change owners or tenants and for accommodations that undergo substantial installation transformation (www.myenergy.lu).
Starting in 2017, the government offered subsidies for zero-emissions vehicles as part of the tax reform. Starting in 2018, the government offered subsidies for hybrid plug-in electric vehicles (PHEV) owned by private customers, and zero emission (100 percent electric) vehicles owned by companies, as part of the tax reform. The government also adopted measures to make all public transportation free.
In 2018, Luxembourg also presented an action plan for the implementation of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
As an OECD member, Luxembourg adheres to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Its national contact point promoting these guidelines for responsible business conduct is in the Ministry of Economy and composed of representatives from several ministries, business associations and trade unions. Contact information is here: http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ncps/luxembourg.htm
9. Corruption
Regulations are enforced by the strong but flexible Financial Sector Surveillance Commission (CSSF, which is equivalent to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). U.S. firms have not identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI in Luxembourg. There are no known areas or sectors where corruption is pervasive, whether in Government procurement, transfers, performance requirements, dispute settlement, regulatory system, or taxation.
Giving or accepting a bribe, including between a local company and a public official, is a criminal act subject to the penal code. Recently, a mayor was implicated in abusing his office for personal purposes. Senior Government officials take anti-corruption efforts seriously. International, regional, or local nongovernmental watchdog organizations do not operate in the country, given the low risk.
Luxembourg has laws, regulations, and penalties to combat corruption effectively, and they are enforced impartially with no disproportionate attention to foreign investors or any other group. The country ranks very favorably on the World Bank’s corruption index.
Luxembourg has made anti-money laundering and suppression of terrorism financing a priority, given its status as a leading world financial center. The government has taken the lead in freezing bank accounts suspected of being connected to terrorist networks, and since 2004 extended the law against money-laundering and terrorist financing to additional professional groups (including auditors, accountants, attorneys, and notaries).
On February 14, 2018, a new law implementing a substantial part of the fourth anti-money laundering (AML) directive was published in the Official Journal of Luxembourg. Local police, responsible for combating corruption, also work closely with neighboring countries’ law enforcement officials, as well as with Interpol and Europol.
UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery
Luxembourg signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention (signed December 2003 and ratified in November 2007).
Luxembourg is a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
Resources to Report Corruption
The Contacts at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption are:
Director of Criminal and Judicial Affairs
Ministry of Justice
13 rue Erasme
L-1468 Luxembourg
Telephone: +352 247 84537
info@mj.etat.lu
Luxembourg has consistently ranked among the most politically stable and overall safest countries in the world. There have been no recent incidents involving politically motivated damage to projects or installations. The environment is not growing more politicized such that civil disturbances would be likely.
Of note, many of the demonstrations which do occur in Luxembourg are not aimed at the Grand Duchy, but rather at the EU offices located within Luxembourg (for example, the European Court of Justice and periodic European ministerial meetings). There are no known nascent insurrections, belligerent neighbors, or other politically motivated activities.
In response to the May 25, 2020 death of George Floyd in the United States, there was a protest of approximately 1,500 people outside the U.S. Embassy. It was peaceful and without incident.
11. Labor Policies and Practices
Luxembourg boasts a very stable, diverse, multilingual, and qualified labor market, benefiting from the approximately 192,000 industrial and service employees (known as “cross-border” workers) who come to work in Luxembourg on a daily basis from neighboring Belgium, France and Germany. Foreign (non-Luxembourger) workers are treated by Luxembourg the same as nationals, including free COVID testing. Work permit constraints have been somewhat relaxed for non-EU applicants (including Americans), particularly for qualified persons for skilled positions.
Foreign investors often cite Luxembourg’s labor relations as a primary reason for locating in the Grand Duchy. Unemployment in Luxembourg has risen from 5 percent to 7.2 percent because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Most industrial workers are organized by unions, linked to one of the major political parties. Luxembourg is proud of the system of representatives of business, unions, and Government participating in a tripartite process in the conduct of major labor negotiations, which serves to avoid strikes, common in neighboring France and Germany.
Luxembourg has a strong trade relationship with the United States. Every employee working in Luxembourg, whether a resident, European, or a third-country national, is subject to the provisions of labor law. Most active laws and regulations regarding work and employment in Luxembourg are incorporated in the Labor Code. The Inspectorate of Labor and Mines has responsibility for working conditions and protection of workers in the exercise of their professional activity (apart from civil servants).
Collective bargaining agreements are common in the public and private sectors. The country has a labor dispute resolution mechanism in place called office de la conciliation (conciliation office).
12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Other Investment Insurance Programs
The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) does not currently work in Luxembourg. Luxembourg is a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).
13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics
Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
Host Country Statistical source*
USG or international statistical source
USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data
Year
Amount
Year
Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD)
The Egyptian government continues to make progress on economic reforms, and while many challenges remain, Egypt’s investment climate is improving. The country has undertaken a number of structural reforms since the flotation of the Egyptian Pound (EGP) in November 2016, and after a strong track record of successfully completing a three-year, $12 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF)-backed economic reform program, Egypt was one of the fastest growing emerging markets prior to the COVID-19 outbreak. Increased investor confidence and the reactivation of Egypt’s interbank foreign exchange (FX) market have attracted foreign portfolio investment and grown foreign reserves. The Government of Egypt (GoE) also understands that attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is key to addressing many of its economic challenges and has stated its intention to create a more conducive environment for FDI. FDI inflows grew 11 percent between 2018 and 2019, from $8.1 to $9 billion, according to data from the Central Bank of Egypt. The United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has ranked Egypt as the top FDI destination in Africa between 2015 and 2019.
Egypt has implemented a number of regulatory reforms, including a new investment law in 2017; a new companies law and a bankruptcy law in 2018; and a new customs law in 2020. These laws aim to improve Egypt’s investment and business climate and help the economy realize its full potential. The 2017 Investment Law is designed to attract new investment and provides a framework for the government to offer investors more incentives, consolidate investment-related rules, and streamline procedures. The 2020 Customs Law is likewise meant to streamline aspects of import and export procedures, including a single window system, electronic payments, and expedited clearances for authorized companies.
The government also hopes to attract investment in several “mega projects,” including the construction of a new national administrative capital, and to promote mineral extraction opportunities. Egypt intends to capitalize on its location bridging the Middle East, Africa, and Europe to become a regional trade and investment gateway and energy hub, and hopes to attract information and communications technology (ICT) sector investments for its digital transformation program.
Egypt is a party to more than 100 bilateral investment treaties, including with the United States. It is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), and the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA). In many sectors, there is no legal difference between foreign and domestic investors. Special requirements exist for foreign investment in certain sectors, such as upstream oil and gas as well as real estate, where joint ventures are required.
Several challenges persist for investors. Dispute resolution is slow, with the time to adjudicate a case to completion averaging three to five years. Other obstacles to investment include excessive bureaucracy, regulatory complexity, a mismatch between job skills and labor market demand, slow and cumbersome customs procedures, and various non-tariff trade barriers. Inadequate protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) remains a significant hurdle in certain sectors and Egypt remains on the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 Watch List. Nevertheless, Egypt’s reform story is noteworthy, and if the steady pace of implementation for structural reforms continues, and excessive bureaucracy reduces over time, then the investment climate should continue to look more favorable to U.S. investors.
1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment
Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment
Egypt’s completion of the most recent three-year, $13 billion IMF Extended Fund Facility and its associated reform package helped stabilize Egypt’s macroeconomy, introduced important subsidy and social spending reforms, and helped restore investor confidence in the Egyptian economy. The flotation of the Egyptian Pound (EGP) in November 2016 and the restart of Egypt’s interbank foreign exchange (FX) market as part of this program was the first major step in restoring investor confidence that immediately led to increased portfolio investment and should lead to increased FDI over the long term. Other important reforms have included a new investment law and an industrial licensing law in 2017, a new bankruptcy law in 2018, and other reforms aimed at reducing regulatory overhang and improving the ease of doing business. Egypt’s government has announced plans to further improve its business climate through investment promotion, facilitation, more efficient business services, and the implementation of investor-friendly policies.
With a few exceptions, Egypt does not legally discriminate between Egyptian nationals and foreigners in the formation and operation of private companies. The 1997 Investment Incentives Law was designed to encourage domestic and foreign investment in targeted economic sectors and to promote decentralization of industry away from the Nile Valley. The law allows 100 percent foreign ownership of investment projects and guarantees the right to remit income earned in Egypt and to repatriate capital.
The Tenders Law (Law 89 of 1998) requires the government to consider both price and best value in awarding contracts and to issue an explanation for refusal of a bid. However, the law contains preferences for Egyptian domestic contractors, who are accorded priority if their bids do not exceed the lowest foreign bid by more than 15 percent.
The Capital Markets Law (Law 95 of 1992) and its amendments, including the most recent in February 2018, and regulations govern Egypt’s capital markets. Foreign investors are able to buy shares on the Egyptian Stock Exchange on the same basis as local investors.
The General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI, http://gafi.gov.eg) is the principal government body that regulates and facilitates foreign investment in Egypt, and reports directly to the Prime Minister. Prior to December 2019, GAFI had been a component of the Ministry of Investment and International Cooperation.
”The Investor Service Center (ISC)” is an administrative unit established within GAFI that provides ”one-stop-shop” services, easing the way for global investors looking for opportunities presented by Egypt’s domestic economy and the nation’s competitive advantages as an export hub for Europe, the Arab world and Africa. This is in addition to promoting Egypt’s investment opportunities in various sectors.
ISC provides a full start-to-end service to the investor, including assistance related to company incorporation, establishment of company branches, approval of minutes of Board of Directors and General Assemblies, increase of capital, change of activity, liquidation procedures, and other corporate-related matters. The Center also aims to issue licenses, approvals, and permits required for investment activities, within 60 days from the date of request submissions. Other services GAFI provides include:
Advice and support to help in the evaluation of Egypt as a potential investment location;
Identification of suitable locations and site selection options within Egypt;
Assistance in identifying suitable Egyptian partners;
Aftercare and dispute settlement services.
ISC Branches are expected to be established in all Egypt’s Governorates. Egypt maintains ongoing communication with investors through formal business roundtables, investment promotion events (conferences and seminars), and one-on-one investment meetings.
Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment
The Egyptian Companies Law does not set any limitation on the number of foreigners, neither as shareholders nor as managers/board members, except for Limited Liability Companies where the only restriction is that one of the managers should be an Egyptian national. In addition, companies are required to obtain a commercial and tax license, and pass a security clearance process. Companies are able to operate while undergoing the often lengthy security screening process. However, if the firm is rejected, it must cease operations and undergo a lengthy appeals process. Businesses have cited instances where Egyptian clients were hesitant to conclude long term business contracts with foreign businesses that have yet to receive a security clearance. They have also expressed concern about seemingly arbitrary refusals, a lack of explanation when a security clearance is not issued, and the lengthy appeals process. Although the Government of Egypt has made progress streamlining the business registration process at GAFI, inconsistent treatment by banks and other government officials has in some cases led to registration delays.
Sector-specific limitations to investment include restrictions on foreign shareholding of companies owning lands in the Sinai Peninsula. Likewise, the Import-Export Law requires companies wishing to register in the Import Registry to be 51 percent owned and managed by Egyptians. In 2016, the Ministry of Trade prepared an amendment to the law allowing the registration of importing companies owned by foreign shareholders, but the law has not yet been submitted to Parliament. Nevertheless, the new Investment Law does allow wholly foreign companies which are invested in Egypt to import goods and materials.
Land/Real Estate Law 15 of 1963 explicitly prohibits foreign individual or corporation ownership of agricultural land (defined as traditional agricultural land in the Nile Valley, Delta and Oases). The ownership of land by foreigners is governed by three laws: Law No. 15 of 1963, Law No. 143 of 1981, and Law No. 230 of 1996. Law No. 15 stipulates that no foreigners, whether natural or juristic persons, may acquire agricultural land. Law No. 143 governs the acquisition and ownership of desert land. Certain limits are placed on the number of feddans (one feddan is equal to approximately one hectare) that may be owned by individuals, families, cooperatives, partnerships and corporations. Partnerships are permitted to own 10,000 feddans. Joint stock companies are permitted to own 50,000 feddans.
Under Law No. 230 non-Egyptians are allowed to own real estate (vacant or built) only under the following conditions:
Ownership is limited to two real estate properties in Egypt that serve as accommodation for the owner and his family (spouses and minors) in addition to the right to own real estate needed for activities licensed by the Egyptian Government.
The area of each real estate property does not exceed 4,000 m².
The real estate is not considered a historical site.
Exemption from the first and second conditions is subject to the approval of the Prime Minister. Ownership in tourist areas and new communities is subject to conditions established by the Cabinet of Ministers. Non-Egyptians owning vacant real estate in Egypt must build within a period of five years from the date their ownership is registered by a notary public. Non-Egyptians cannot sell their real estate for five years after registration of ownership, unless the consent of the Prime Minister for an exemption is obtained.
Other Investment Policy Reviews
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) signed a declaration with Egypt on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises on July 11, 2007, at which time Egypt became the first Arab and African country to sign the OECD Declaration, marking a new stage in Egypt’s drive to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI). On July 8, 2020, the OECD released an Investment Policy Review for Egypt which highlighted the government’s progress implementing a proactive reform agenda to improve the business climate, attract more foreign and domestic investment, and reap the benefits of openness to FDI and participation in global value chains.
In January 2018 the World Trade Organization (WTO) published a comprehensive review of the Egyptian Government’s trade policies, including details of the 2017 Investment Law’s main provisions.
The United Nations Conference on Trade Development (UNCTAD) published an Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Policy Review for Egypt in 2017, in which it highlighted the potential for investments in the ICT sector to help drive economic growth and recommended specific reforms aimed at strengthening Egypt’s performance in key ICT policy areas. https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtlstict2017d3_en.pdf UNCTAD published its last comprehensive Investment Policy Review for Egypt in 1999, and an implementation report in 2006.
Business Facilitation
GAFI’s new ISC (https://gafi.gov.eg/English/Howcanwehelp/OneStopShop/Pages/default.aspx) was launched in February 2018 and provides a full start-to-end service to the investor as described above. The new Investment Law also introduces ”Ratification Offices” to facilitate obtaining necessary approvals, permits, and licenses within 10 days of issuing a Ratification Certificate.
Investors may fulfill the technical requirements of obtaining the required licenses through these Ratification Offices, directly through the concerned authority, or through its representatives at the Investment Window at GAFI. The Investor Service Center is required to issue licenses within 60 days from submission. Companies can also register online. GAFI has also launched e-establishment, e-signature, and e-payment services to facilitate establishing companies.
Outward Investment
Egypt promotes and incentivizes outward investment. According to the Egyptian government’s FDI Markets database for the period from January 2003 to May 2020, outward investment featured the following:
Egyptian companies implemented 270 Egyptian FDI projects. Estimated total value of the projects, which employed about 50,000 workers, was $25.6 billion.
The following countries respectively received the largest amount of Egyptian outward investment in terms of total project value: UAE, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Kenya, Jordan, Ethiopia, Germany, Libya, Morocco and Sudan. The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Algeria accounted for about 28 percent of the total amount.
Elsewedy Electric was the largest Egyptian company investing abroad, implementing 20 projects with a total investment estimated to be $2.1 billion.
Egypt does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad.
2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties
Egypt has signed 115 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), out of which 74 BITs have entered into force. The full list can be found at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA.
The U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty provides for fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory treatment for investors of both nations. The treaty includes provisions for international legal standards on expropriation and compensation; free financial transfers; and procedures for the settlement of investment disputes, including international arbitration.
In addition to BITs, Egypt is also a signatory to a wide variety of other agreements covering trade issues. Egypt joined the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in June 1998, and in 2019 deposited its instrument of ratification for the 2018 African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). In July 1999, Egypt and the United States signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). In June 2001, Egypt signed an Association Agreement with the European Union (EU), which entered into force on June 1, 2004. The agreement provided immediate duty free access of Egyptian products into EU markets, while duty free access for EU products into the Egyptian market was phased in over a 12-year period ending in 2016. In 2010, Egypt and the EU completed an agricultural annex to their agreement, liberalizing trade in over 90 percent of agricultural goods.
Egypt is also a member of the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA), and a member of the Agadir Agreement with Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, which relaxes rules of origin requirements on products jointly manufactured by the countries for export to Europe. Egypt also has an FTA with Turkey, in force since March 2007, and an FTA with the Mercosur bloc of Latin American nations.
In 2004, Egypt and Israel signed an agreement to take advantage of the U.S. Government’s Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ) program. The purpose of the QIZ program is to promote stronger ties between the region’s peace partners, as well as to generate employment and higher incomes, by granting duty-free access to goods produced in QIZs in Egypt using a specified percentage of Israeli and local input. Under Egypt’s QIZ agreement, Egypt’s exports to the United States produced in certain industrial areas are eligible for duty-free treatment if they contain a minimum 10.5 percent Israeli content.
The industrial areas currently included in the QIZ program are Alexandria, areas in Greater Cairo such as Sixth of October, Tenth of Ramadan, Fifteenth of May, South of Giza, Shobra El-Khema, Nasr City, and Obour, areas in the Delta governorates such as Dakahleya, Damietta, Monofeya and Gharbeya, and areas in the Suez Canal such as Suez, Ismailia, Port Said, and other specified areas in Upper Egypt. Egyptian exports to the United States through the QIZ program have mostly been ready-made garments and processed foods. The value of the Egyptian QIZ exports to the United States was approximately $752 million in 2017.
Egypt has a bilateral tax treaty with the United States. Egypt also has tax agreements with 59 other countries, including UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Mauritius, Bahrain, and Morocco.
The Egyptian Parliament passed and the government implemented a value added tax (VAT) in late 2016, which took the place of the General Sales Tax, as part of the IMF loan and economic reform program. However, the government decided to postpone the “Stock Market Capital Gains Tax” for three years as of early 2017. In 2016, there were a number of tax disputes between foreign investors and the government, but most of them were resolved through the Tax Department and the Economic Court.
3. Legal Regime
Transparency of the Regulatory System
The Egyptian government has made efforts to improve the transparency of government policy and to support a fair, competitive marketplace. Nevertheless, improving government transparency and consistency has proven difficult and reformers have faced strong resistance from entrenched bureaucratic and private interests. Significant obstacles continue to hinder private investment, including the reportedly arbitrary imposition of bureaucratic impediments and the length of time needed to resolve them. Nevertheless, the impetus for positive change driven by the government reform agenda augurs well for improvement in policy implementation and transparency.
Enactment of laws is the purview of the Parliament, while executive regulations are the domain of line ministries. Under the Constitution, draft legislation can be presented by the president, the cabinet, and any member of parliament. After submission, parliamentary committees review and approve, including any amendments. Upon parliamentary approval, a judicial body reviews the constitutionality of any legislation before referring it to the president for his approval. Although notice and full drafts of legislation are typically printed in the Official Gazette (similar to the Federal Register in the United States), in practice consultation with the public is limited. In recent years, the Ministry of Trade and other government bodies have circulated draft legislation among concerned parties, including business associations and labor unions. This has been a welcome change from previous practice, but is not yet institutionalized across the government.
While Egyptian parliaments have historically held “social dialogue” sessions with concerned parties and private or civic organizations to discuss proposed legislation, it is unclear to what degree the current Parliament will adopt a more inclusive approach to social dialogue. Many aspects of the 2016 IMF program and related economic reforms stimulated parliament to engage more broadly with the public, marking some progress in this respect.
Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and consistent with international norms. The Financial Regulatory Authority (FRA) supervises and regulates all non-banking financial markets and instruments, including capital markets, futures exchanges, insurance activities, mortgage finance, financial leasing, factoring, securitization, and microfinance. It issues rules that facilitate market efficiency and transparency. FRA has issued legislation and regulatory decisions on non-banking financial laws which govern FRA’s work and the entities under its supervision. (http://www.fra.gov.eg/jtags/efsa_en/index_en.jsp)
The criteria for awarding government contracts and licenses are made available when bid rounds are announced. The process actually used to award contracts is broadly consistent with the procedural requirements set forth by law. Further, set-aside requirements for small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) participation in GoE procurement are increasingly highlighted. FRA maintains a centralized website where key regulations and laws are published: http://www.fra.gov.eg/content/efsa_en/efsa_pages_en/laws_efsa_en.htm
The Parliament and the independent “Administrative Control Authority” both ensure the government’s commitment to follow administrative processes at all levels of government. Egypt does not have an online equivalent of the U.S. Federal Register and there is no centralized online location for key regulatory actions or their summaries.
The cabinet develops and submits proposed regulations to the president following discussion and consultation with the relevant ministry and informal consultation with other interest groups. Based on the recommendations provided in the proposal, including recommendations by the presidential advisors, the president issues “Presidential Decrees” that function as implementing regulations. Presidential decrees are published in the “Official Gazette” for enforcement.
The specific government agency or entity responsible for enforcing the regulation works with other departments for implementation across the government. Not all issued regulations are announced online. Theoretically, the enforcement process is legally reviewable.
Before a government regulation is implemented, there is an attempt to properly analyze and thoroughly debate proposed legislation and rules using appropriate available data. But there are no laws requiring scientific studies or quantitative analysis of impacts of regulations. Not all public comments received by regulators are made public.
The government made its budget documents widely and easily accessible to the general public, including online. Budget documents did not include allocations to military state-owned enterprises, nor allocations to and earnings from state-owned enterprises. Information on government debt obligations was publicly available online, but up-to-date and clear information on state-owned enterprise debt guaranteed by the government was not available. According to information the Central Bank has provided to the World Bank, the lack of information available about publicly guaranteed private sector debt meant that this debt was generally recorded as private sector non-guaranteed debt thus potentially obscuring some contingent debt liabilities.
International Regulatory Considerations
In general, international standards are the main reference for Egyptian standards. According to the Egyptian Organization for Standardization and Quality Control, approximately 7,000 national standards are aligned with international standards in various sectors. In the absence of international standards, Egypt uses other references which are referred to in Ministerial decrees No. 180//1996 and No. 291//2003, which stipulate that in the absence of Egyptian standards, the producers and importers may use the following:
European standards (EN)
U.S. standards (ANSI)
Japanese standards (JIS)
Egypt is a member of the WTO, participates actively in various committees, and notifies technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Egypt ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) on June 22, 2017 by a vote of Parliament and issuance of presidential decree No. 149/2017, and deposited its formal notification to the WTO on June 24, 2019. Egypt notified indicative and definitive dates for implementing Category B and C commitments on June 20, 2019, but to date has not notified dates for implementing Category A commitments. In August 2020 the Egyptian Parliament passed a new Customs Law that includes provisions for key TFA reforms, including advance rulings, separation of release, a Single Window system, expedited customs procedures for authorized economic operators, post-clearance audits, and e-payments.
Legal System and Judicial Independence
Egypt’s legal system is a civil codified law system based on the French model. If contractual disputes arise, claimants can sue for remedies through the court system or seek resolution through arbitration. Egypt has written commercial and contractual laws. The country has a system of economic courts, specializing in private sector disputes, which have jurisdiction over cases related to economic and commercial matters, including intellectual property disputes. The judiciary is set up as an independent branch of the government.
Regulations and enforcement actions can be appealed through Egypt’s courts, though appellants often complain about the very lengthy judicial process, which can often take years. To enforce judgments of foreign courts in Egypt, the party seeking to enforce the judgment must obtain an exequatur (a legal document issued by governments allowing judgements to be enforced). To apply for an exequatur, the normal procedures for initiating a lawsuit in Egypt must be satisfied. Moreover, several other conditions must be satisfied, including ensuring reciprocity between the Egyptian and foreign country’s courts, and verifying the competence of the court rendering the judgment.
Judges in Egypt are said to enjoy a high degree of public trust and are the designated monitors for general elections. The Judiciary is proud of its independence and can point to a number of cases where a judge has made surprising decisions that run counter to the desires of the regime. The judge’s ability to loosely interpret the law can sometimes lead to an uneven application of justice. The system’s slowness and dependence on paper processes hurts its overall competence and reliability. The executive branch claims to have no influence over the judiciary, but in practice political pressures seem to influence the courts on a case by case basis. In the experience of the Embassy, judicial decisions are highly appealable at the national level and this appeal process is regularly used by litigants.
Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment
No specialized court exists for foreign investments.
In 2017 the Parliament also passed the Industrial Permits Act, which reduced the time it takes to license a new factory by mandating that the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) respond to a request for a license within 30 days of the request being filed. As of February 2020, new regulations allow IDA regional branch directors or their designees to grant conditional licenses to industrial investors until other registration requirements are complete.
In 2016, the Import-Export Law was revised to allow companies wishing to register in the Import Registry to be 51 percent owned and managed by Egyptians; formerly the law required 100 percent Egyptian ownership and management. In November 2016, the inter-ministerial Supreme Investment Council also announced seventeen presidential decrees designed to spur investment or resolve longstanding issues. These include:
Forming a “National Payments Council” that will work to restrict the handling of FX outside the banking sector;
A decision to postpone for three years the capital gains taxon stock market transactions;
Producers of agricultural crops that Egypt imports or exports will get tax exemptions;
Five-year tax exemptions for manufacturers of “strategic” goodsthat Egypt imports or exports;
Five-year tax exemptionsfor agriculture and industrial investments in Upper Egypt;
Begin tendering land with utilities for industry in Upper Egypt for free as outlined by the Industrial Development Authority.
Competition and Anti-Trust Laws
The Investment Incentives Law provides guarantees against nationalization or confiscation of investment projects under the law’s domain. The law also provides guarantees against seizure, requisition, blocking, and placing of assets under custody or sequestration. It offers guarantees against full or partial expropriation of real estate and investment project property. The U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty also provides protection against expropriation. Private firms are able to take cases of alleged expropriation to court, but the judicial system can take several years to resolve a case.
Expropriation and Compensation
Egypt’s Investment Incentives Law provides guarantees against nationalization or confiscation of investment projects under the law’s domain. The law also provides guarantees against seizure, requisition, blocking, and placing of assets under custody or sequestration. It offers guarantees against full or partial expropriation of real estate and investment project property. The U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty also provides protection against expropriation. Private firms are able to take cases of alleged expropriation to court, but the judicial system can take several years to resolve a case.
Dispute Settlement
ICSID Convention and New York Convention
Egypt acceded to the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 1971 and is a member of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, which provides a framework for the arbitration of investment disputes between the government and foreign investors from another member state, provided the parties agree to such arbitration. Without prejudice to Egyptian courts, the Investment Incentives Law recognizes the right of investors to settle disputes within the framework of bilateral agreements, the ICSID or through arbitration before the Regional Center for International Commercial Arbitration in Cairo, which applies the rules of the United Nations Commissions on International Trade Law.
Egypt adheres to the 1958 New York Convention on the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards; the 1965 Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and the Nationals of Other States; and the 1974 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between the Arab States and Nationals of Other States. An award issued pursuant to arbitration that took place outside Egypt may be enforced in Egypt if it is either covered by one of the international conventions to which Egypt is party or it satisfies the conditions set out in Egypt’s Dispute Settlement Law 27 of 1994, which provides for the arbitration of domestic and international commercial disputes and limited challenges of arbitration awards in the Egyptian judicial system. The Dispute Settlement Law was amended in 1997 to include disputes between public enterprises and the private sector.
To enforce judgments of foreign courts in Egypt, the party seeking to enforce the judgment must obtain an exequatur. To apply for an exequatur, the normal procedures for initiating a lawsuit in Egypt, and several other conditions must be satisfied, including ensuring reciprocity between the Egyptian and foreign country’s courts and verifying the competence of the court rendering the judgment.
Egypt has a system of economic courts specializing in private sector disputes that have jurisdiction over cases related to economic and commercial matters, including intellectual property disputes. Despite these provisions, business and investors in Egypt’s renewable energy projects have reported significant problems resolving disputes with the Government of Egypt.
Investor-State Dispute Settlement
The U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty allows an investor to take a dispute directly to binding third-party arbitration. The Egyptian courts generally endorse international arbitration clauses in commercial contracts. For example, the Court of Cassation has, on a number of occasions, confirmed the validity of arbitration clauses included in contracts between Egyptian and foreign parties.
A new mechanism for simplified settlement of investment disputes aimed at avoiding the court system altogether has been established. In particular, the law established a Ministerial Committee on Investment Contract Disputes, responsible for the settlement of disputes arising from investment contracts to which the State, or a public or private body affiliated therewith, is a party. This is in addition to establishing a Complaint Committee to consider challenges connected to the implementation of Egypt’s Investment Law. Finally, the decree established a Committee for Resolution of Investment Disputes, which will review complaints or disputes between investors and the government related to the implementation of the Investment Law. In practice, Egypt’s dispute resolution mechanisms are time-consuming but broadly effective. Businesses have, however, reported difficulty collecting payment from the government when awarded a monetary settlement.
Over the past 10 years, there have been several investment disputes involving both U.S. persons and foreign investors. Most of the cases have been settled, though no definitive number is available. Local courts in Egypt recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards issued against the government. There are no known extrajudicial actions against foreign investors in Egypt during the period of this report.
International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts
Egypt allows mediation as a mechanism for alternative dispute resolution (ADR), a structured negotiation process in which an independent person known as a mediator assists the parties to identify and assess options, and negotiate an agreement to resolve their dispute. GAFI has an Investment Disputes Settlement Center, which uses mediation as an ADR.
The Economic Court recognizes and enforces arbitral awards. Judgments of foreign courts may be recognized and enforceable under local courts under limited conditions.
In most cases, domestic courts have found in favor of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in investment disputes. In such disputes, non-government parties have often complained about the delays and discrimination in court processes.
It is recommended that U.S. companies employ contractual clauses that specify binding international (not local) arbitration of disputes in their commercial agreements.
Bankruptcy Regulations
Egypt passed a new bankruptcy law in January 2018, which should speed up the restructuring and settlement of troubled companies. It also replaces the threat of imprisonment with fines in cases of bankruptcy. As of July, 2020, the Egyptian government was considering but had not yet implemented amendments to the 2018 law that would allow debtors to file for bankruptcy protection, and would give creditors the ability to determine whether debtors could continue operating, be placed under administrative control, or forced to liquidate their assets.
In practice, the paperwork involved in liquidating a business remains convoluted and extremely protracted; starting a business is much easier than shutting one down. Bankruptcy is frowned upon in Egyptian culture and many businesspeople still believe they may be found criminally liable if they declare bankruptcy.
4. Industrial Policies
Investment Incentives
The Investment Law 72/2017 gives multiple incentives to investors as described below. In August 2019, President Sisi ratified amendments to the Investment Law that allow its incentives programs to apply to expansions of existing investment projects in addition to new investments.
General Incentives:
All investment projects subject to the provisions of the new law enjoy the general incentives provided by it.
Investors are exempted from the stamp tax, fees of the notarization, registration of the Memorandum of Incorporation of the companies, credit facilities, and mortgage contracts associated with their business for five years from the date of registration in the Commercial Registry, in addition to the registration contracts of the lands required for a company’s establishment.
If the establishment is under the provisions of the new investment law, it will benefit from a two percent unified custom tax over all imported machinery, equipment, and devices required for the set-up of such a company.
Special Incentive Programs:
Investment projects established within three years of the date of the issuance of the Investment Law will enjoy a deduction from their net profit, subject to the income tax:
50 percent of the investment costs for geographical region (A) (the regions the most in need of development as well as designated projects in Suez Canal Special Economic Zone and the “Golden Triangle” along the Red Sea between the cities of Safaga, Qena and El Quseer);
30 percent of the investment costs to geographical region (B) (which represents the rest of the republic).
Provided that such deduction shall not exceed 80 percent of the paid-up capital of the company, the incentive could be utilized over a maximum of seven years.
Additional Incentive Program:
The Cabinet of Ministers may decide to grant additional incentives for investment projects in accordance with specific rules and regulations as follows:
The establishment of special customs ports for exports and imports of the investment projects.
The state may incur part of the costs of the technical training for workers.
Free allocation of land for a few strategic activities may apply.
The government may bear in full or in part the costs incurred by the investor to invest in utility connections for the investment project.
The government may refund half the price of the land allocated to industrial projects in the event of starting production within two years from receiving the land.
Other Incentives related to Free Zones according to Investment Law 72/2017:
Exemption from all taxes and customs duties.
Exemption from all import/export regulations.
The option to sell a certain percentage of production domestically if customs duties are paid.
Limited exemptions from labor provisions.
All equipment, machinery, and essential means of transport (excluding sedan cars) necessary for business operations are exempted from all customs, import duties, and sales taxes.
All licensing procedures are handled by GAFI. To remain eligible for benefits, investors operating inside the free zones must export more than 50 percent of their total production.
Manufacturing or assembly projects pay an annual charge of one percent of the total value of their products
Excluding all raw materials. Storage facilities are to pay one percent of the value of goods entering the free zones while service projects pay one percent of total annual revenue.
Goods in transit to specific destinations are exempt from any charges.
Other Incentives related to the Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCZone):
100 percent foreign ownership of companies.
100 percent foreign control of import/export activities.
Imports are exempted from customs duties and sales tax.
Customs duties on exports to Egypt imposed on imported components only, not the final product.
Fast-track visa services.
A full service one-stop shop for registration and licensing.
Allowing enterprises access to the domestic market; duties on sales to domestic market will be assessed on the value of imported inputs only.
The Tenders Law (Law 89/1998) requires the government to consider both price and best value in awarding contracts and to issue an explanation for refusal of a bid. However, the law contains preferences for Egyptian domestic contractors, who are accorded priority if their bids do not exceed the lowest foreign bid by more than 15 percent.
The Ministry of Industry & Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Finance’s Decree No. 719/2007 provides incentives for industrial projects in the governorates of Upper Egypt (Upper Egypt refers to governorates in southern Egypt). The decree provides an incentive of LE 15,000 (approx. $850) for each job opportunity created by the project, on the condition that the investment costs of the project exceed LE 15 million (approx. $850,000). The decree can be implemented on both new and ongoing projects.
Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation
Public and private free trade zones are authorized under GAFI’s Investment Incentive Law. Free zones are located within the national territory, but are considered to be outside Egypt’s customs boundaries, granting firms doing business within them more freedom on transactions and exchanges. Companies producing largely for export (normally 80 percent or more of total production) may be established in free trade zones and operate using foreign currency. Free trade zones are open to investment by foreign or domestic investors. Companies operating in free trade zones are exempted from sales taxes or taxes and fees on capital assets and intermediate goods. The Legislative Package for the Stimulation of Investment, issued in 2015, stipulated a one percent duty paid on the value of commodities upon entry for storage projects and a one percent duty upon exit for manufacturing and assembly projects.
There are currently 9 public free trade zones in operation in the following locations: Alexandria, Damietta Ismailia, Qeft, Media Production City, Nasr City, Port Said, Shebin el Kom, and Suez. Private free trade zones may also be established with a decree by GAFI but are usually limited to a single project. Export-oriented industrial projects are given priority. There is no restriction on foreign ownership of capital in private free zones.
The Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Law 83/2002 allows establishment of special zones for industrial, agricultural, or service activities designed specifically with the export market in mind. The law allows firms operating in these zones to import capital equipment, raw materials, and intermediate goods duty free. Companies established in the SEZs are also exempt from sales and indirect taxes and can operate under more flexible labor regulations. The first SEZ was established in the northwest Gulf of Suez.
Law 19/2007 authorized creation of investment zones, which require Prime Ministerial approval for establishment. The government regulates these zones through a board of directors, but the zones are established, built, and operated by the private sector. The government does not provide any infrastructure or utilities in these zones. Investment zones enjoy the same benefits as free zones in terms of facilitation of license-issuance, ease of dealing with other agencies, etc., but are not granted the incentives and tax/custom exemptions enjoyed in free zones. Projects in investment zones pay the same tax/customs duties applied throughout Egypt. The aim of the law is to assist the private sector in diversifying its economic activities.
The Suez Canal Economic Zone, a major industrial and logistics services hub announced in 2014, includes upgrades and renovations to ports located along the Suez Canal corridor, including West and East Port Said, Ismailia, Suez, Adabiya, and Ain Sokhna. The Egyptian government has invited foreign investors to take part in the projects, which are expected to be built in several stages, the first of which was scheduled to be completed by mid-2020. Reported areas for investment include maritime services like ship repair services, bunkering, vessel scrapping and recycling; industrial projects, including pharmaceuticals, food processing, automotive production, consumer electronics, textiles, and petrochemicals; IT services such as research and development and software development; renewable energy; and mixed use, residential, logistics, and commercial developments. Website for the Suez Canal Development Project: http://www.sczone.com.eg/English/Pages/default.aspx
Performance and Data Localization Requirements
Egypt has rules on national percentages of employment and difficult visa and work permit procedures. The application of these provisions that restrict access to foreign worker visas has been inconsistent. The government plans to phase out visas for unskilled workers, but as yet has not done so. For most other jobs, employers may hire foreign workers on a temporary six-month basis, but must also hire two Egyptians to be trained to do the job during that period. Only jobs where it is not possible for Egyptians to acquire the requisite skills will remain open to foreign workers. The application of these regulations is inconsistent. The Labor Law allows Ministers to set the maximum percentage of foreign workers that may work in companies in a given sector. There are no such sector-wide maximums for the oil and gas industry, but individual concession agreements may contain language establishing limits or procedures regarding the proportion of foreign and local employees.
No performance requirements are specified in the Investment Incentives Law, and the ability to fulfill local content requirements is not a prerequisite for approval to set up assembly projects. In many cases, however, assembly industries still must meet a minimum local content requirement in order to benefit from customs tariff reductions on imported industrial inputs.
Decree 184/2013 allows for the reduction of customs tariffs on intermediate goods if the final product has a certain percentage of input from local manufacturers, beginning at 30 percent local content. As the percentage of local content rises, so does the tariff reduction, reaching up to 90 percent if the amount of local input is 60 percent or above. In certain cases, a minister can grant tariff reductions of up to 40 percent in advance to certain companies without waiting to reach a corresponding percentage of local content. In 2010, Egypt revised its export rebate system to provide exporters with additional subsidies if they used a greater portion of local raw materials.
Manufacturers wishing to export under trade agreements between Egypt and other countries must complete certificates of origin and local content requirements contained therein. Oil and gas exploration concessions, which do not fall under the Investment Incentives Law, do have performance standards, which are specified in each individual agreement and which generally include the drilling of a specific number of wells in each phase of the exploration period stipulated in the agreement.
Egypt does not impose localization barriers on ICT firms. Egypt’s Data Protection Act, signed into law in July, 2020, will require licenses for cross-border data transfers but does not impose any data localization requirements. Similarly, Egypt does not make local production a requirement for market access, does not have local content requirements, and does not impose forced technology or intellectual property transfers as a condition of market access. But there are exceptions where the government has attempted to impose controls by requesting access to a company’s servers located offshore, or request servers to be located in Egypt and thus under the government’s control.
5. Protection of Property Rights
Real Property
The Egyptian legal system provides protection for real and personal property. Laws on real estate ownership are complex and titles to real property may be difficult to establish and trace. According to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, Egypt ranks 130 of 190 for ease of registering property.
The National Title Registration Program introduced by the Ministry of State for Administrative Development has been implemented in nine areas within Cairo. This program is intended to simplify property registration and facilitate easier mortgage financing. Real estate registration fees, long considered a major impediment to development of the real estate sector, are capped at no more than EGP 2000 (USD 110), irrespective of the property value. In November 2012, the government postponed implementation of an enacted overhaul to the real estate tax and as of April 2017 no action has been taken.
Foreigners are limited to ownership of two residences in Egypt and specific procedures are required for purchasing real estate in certain geographical areas.
The mortgage market is still undeveloped in Egypt, and in practice most purchases are still conducted in cash. Real Estate Finance Law 148//2001 authorized both banks and non-bank mortgage companies to issue mortgages. The law provides procedures for foreclosure on property of defaulting debtors, and amendments passed in 2004 allow for the issuance of mortgage-backed securities. According to the regulations, banks can offer financing in foreign currency of up to 80 percent of the value of a property.
Presidential Decree 17//2015 permitted the government to provide land free of charge, in certain regions only, to investors meeting certain technical and financial requirements. This provision expires on April 1, 2020 and the company must provide cash collateral for five years following commencement of either production (for industrial projects) or operation (for all other projects).
The ownership of land by foreigners is governed by three laws: Law 15//1963, Law 143//1981, and Law 230//1996. Law 15//1963 stipulates that no foreigners, whether natural or juristic persons, may acquire agricultural land. Law 143//1981 governs the acquisition and ownership of desert land. Certain limits are placed on the number of feddans (one feddan is equal to approximately one hectare) that may be owned by individuals, families, cooperatives, partnerships and corporations. Partnerships are permitted to own up to 10,000 feddans. Joint stock companies are permitted to own up to 50,000 feddans.
Partnerships and joint stock companies may own desert land within these limits, even if foreign partners or shareholders are involved, provided that at least 51 percent of the capital is owned by Egyptians. Upon liquidation of the company, however, the land must revert to Egyptian ownership. Law 143 defines desert land as the land lying two kilometers outside city borders. Furthermore, non-Egyptians owning non-improved real estate in Egypt must build within a period of five years from the date their ownership is registered by a notary public. Non-Egyptians may only sell their real estate five years after registration of ownership, unless the consent of the Prime Minister for an exemption is obtained.
Intellectual Property Rights
Egypt remains on the Special 301 Watch List in 2020. Egypt’s IPR legislation generally meets international standards, and the government has made progress enforcing those laws, reducing patent application backlogs, and in 2019 shut down a number of online illegal streaming websites. It has also made progress establishing protection against the unfair commercial use, as well as unauthorized disclosure, of undisclosed test or other data generated to obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical products. Stakeholders note continued challenges with widespread counterfeiting and piracy, biotechnology patentability criteria, patent and trademark examination criteria, and pharmaceutical-related IP issues.
Multinational pharmaceutical companies complain that local generic drug-producing companies infringe on their patents. Delays and inefficiencies in processing patent applications by the Egyptian Patent Office compound the difficulties pharmaceutical companies face in introducing new drugs to the local market. The government views patent linkage as “a legal violation” against the concept of separation of authorities between institutions such as the Egyptian Drug Authority, the Ministry of Health, and the Egyptian Patent Office. As a result, permits for the sale of pharmaceuticals are generally issued without first cross-checking patent filings.
Decree 251/2020, issued in January, 2020, established a ministerial committee to address compulsory patent licensing. According to Egypt’s 2002 IPR Law, which allows for compulsory patent licenses in some cases, the committee will have the power to issue compulsory patent licenses according to a number of criteria set forth in the law; to determine financial renumeration for the original patent owners; and to approve the expropriation of the patents.
Book, music, and entertainment software piracy is prevalent in Egypt, and a significant portion of the piracy takes place online. American film studios represented by the Motion Pictures Association of America are concerned about the illegal distribution of American movies on regional satellite channels.
Eight GoE ministries have the responsibility to oversee IPR concerns: Supply and Internal Trade for trademarks, Higher Education and Research for patents, Culture for copyrights, Agriculture for plants, Communications and Information Technology for copyright of computer programs, Interior for combatting IPR violations, Customs for border enforcement, and Trade and Industry for standards and technical regulations. Article 69 of Egypt’s 2014 Constitution mandates the establishment of a “specialized agency to uphold [IPR] rights and their legal protection.” A National Committee on IPR was established to address IPR matters until a permanent body is established. All IPR stakeholders are represented in the committee, and members meet every two months to discuss issues. The National Committee on IPR is chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and reports directly to the Prime Minister.
The Egyptian Customs Authority (ECA) handles IPR enforcement at the national border and the Ministry of Interior’s Department of Investigation handles domestic cases of illegal production. The ECA cannot act unless the trademark owner files a complaint. Moreover, Egypt’s Economic Courts often take years to reach a decision on IPR infringement cases.
ECA’s customs enforcement also tends to focus on protecting Egyptian goods and trademarks. The ECA is taking steps to adopt the World Customs Organization’s (WCO) Interface Public-Members platform, which allows customs officers to detect counterfeit goods by scanning a product’s barcode and checking the WCO trademark database system.
For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://wipo.int/directory/en/
IPR Contact at Embassy Cairo:
Christopher Leslie
Trade & Investment Officer
20-2-2797-2735 LeslieCG@state.gov
6. Financial Sector
Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment
To date, high returns on Egyptian government debt have crowded out Egyptian investment in productive capacity. Consistently positive and relatively high real interest rates have attracted large foreign capital inflows since 2017, most of which has been volatile portfolio capital. Returns on Egyptian government debt have begun to come down, which could presage investment by Egyptian capital in the real economy.
The Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX) is Egypt’s registered securities exchange. About 246 companies were listed on the EGX, including Nilex, as of April 2020. There were more than 500,000 investors registered to trade on the exchange in 2019 as the Egyptian market attracted 32,000 new investors. Stock ownership is open to foreign and domestic individuals and entities. The Government of Egypt issues dollar-denominated and Egyptian pound-denominated debt instruments. Ownership is open to foreign and domestic individuals and entities. The government has developed a positive outlook toward foreign portfolio investment, recognizing the need to attract foreign capital to help develop the Egyptian economy. During 2019 foreign investors’ percentage of total transactions on the EGX reached 33 percent versus Egyptian investors’ percentage of 67 percent.
The Capital Market Law 95/1992, along with the Banking Law 88/2003, constitutes the primary regulatory frameworks for the financial sector. The law grants foreigners full access to capital markets, and authorizes establishment of Egyptian and foreign companies to provide underwriting of subscriptions, brokerage services, securities and mutual funds management, clearance and settlement of security transactions, and venture capital activities. The law specifies mechanisms for arbitration and legal dispute resolution and prohibits unfair market practices. Law 10//2009 created the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) and brought the regulation of all non-banking financial services under its authority. In 2017, EFSA became the Financial Regulatory Authority (FRA).
Settlement of transactions takes one day for treasury bonds and two days for stocks. Although Egyptian law and regulations allow companies to adopt bylaws limiting or prohibiting foreign ownership of shares, virtually no listed stocks have such restrictions. A significant number of the companies listed on the exchange are family-owned or dominated conglomerates, and free trading of shares in many of these ventures, while increasing, remains limited. Companies are de-listed from the exchange if not traded for six months.
The Higher Investment Council extended the suspension of capital gains tax for three years, until 2020 as part of efforts to draw investors back. In March 2017, the government announced plans to impose a stamp duty on all stock transactions with a duty of 0.125 percent on all buyers and sellers starting in May 2017, followed by an increase to 0.150 percent in the second year and 0.175 percent thereafter. Egypt’s provisional stamp duty on stock exchange transactions includes for the first time a 0.3 percent levy for investors acquiring more than a third of a company’s stocks. I n May 2019 the government decided to keep the stamp duty at 0.15% without further increase, then in March 2020 the government decided to reduce the stamp tax to 0.125% for non-residents and to 0.05% for non-residents and to push back the introduction of the capital gain tax till January 2022. Foreign investors will be exempted from the tax.
Foreign investors can access Egypt’s banking system by opening accounts with local banks and buying and selling all marketable securities with brokerages. The government has repeatedly emphasized its commitment to maintaining the profit repatriation system to encourage foreign investment in Egypt, especially since the pound floatation and implementation of the IMF loan program in November 2016. The current system for profit repatriation by foreign firms requires sub-custodian banks to open foreign and local currency accounts for foreign investors (global custodians), which are exclusively maintained for stock exchange transactions. The two accounts serve as a channel through which foreign investors process their sales, purchases, dividend collections, and profit repatriation transactions using the bank’s posted daily exchange rates. The system is designed to allow for settlement of transactions in fewer than two days, though in practice some firms have reported significant delays in repatriating profits due to problems with availability. Foreign firms and individuals continue to report delays in repatriating funds and problems accessing hard currency for the purpose of repatriating profits.
The Egyptian credit market, open to foreigners, is vibrant and active. Repatriation of investment profits has become much easier, as there is enough available hard currency to execute FX trades. Since the floatation of the Pound in November 2016 FX trading is considered straightforward, given the re-establishment of the interbank foreign currency trading system.
Money and Banking System
Benefitting from the nation’s increasing economic stability over the past two years, Egypt’s banks have enjoyed both ratings upgrades and continued profitability. Thanks to economic reforms, a new floating exchange system, and a new Investment Law passed in 2017, the project finance pipeline is increasing after a period of lower activity. Banking competition is improving to serve a largely untapped retail segment and the nation’s challenging, but potentially rewarding, small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) segment. The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) has mandated that 20 percent of bank loans go to SMEs within the next three years (four years from 2016). In December 2019, the Central Bank launched a 100 billion initiative to spur domestic manufacturing through subsidized loans. Also, with only about a quarter of Egypt’s adult population owning or sharing an account at a formal financial institution (according press and comments from contacts), the banking sector has potential for growth and higher inclusion, which the government and banks discuss frequently. A low median income plays a part in modest banking penetration. But the CBE has taken steps to work with banks and technology companies to expand financial inclusion. The employees of the government, one of the largest employers, must now have bank accounts because salary payment is through direct deposit.
Egypt’s banking sector is generally regarded as healthy and well-capitalized, due in part to its deposit-based funding structure and ample liquidity, especially since the floatation and restoration of the interbank market. The CBE declared that 4.1 percent of the banking sector’s loans were non-performing in June 2020. However, since 2011, a high level of exposure to government debt, accounting for over 40 percent of banking system assets, at the expense of private sector lending, has reduced the diversity of bank balance sheets and crowded out domestic investment. Given the floatation of the Egyptian Pound and restart of the interbank trading system, Moody’s and S&P have upgraded the outlook of Egypt’s banking system to stable from negative to reflect improving macroeconomic conditions and ongoing commitment to reform. In April 2019 Moody’s upgraded Egypt’s government issuer rating to B2 with stable outlook from B3 positive and affirmed this rating in April 2020 while also changing Egypt’s Macro Profile to “weak-” from “very weak”.
Thirty-eight banks operate in Egypt, including several foreign banks. The CBE has not issued a new commercial banking license since 1979. The only way for a new commercial bank, whether foreign or domestic, to enter the market (except as a representative office) is to purchase an existing bank. To this end, in 2013, QNB Group acquired National Société Générale Bank Egypt (NSGB). That same year, Emirates NBD, Dubai’s largest bank, bought the Egypt unit of BNP Paribas. In 2015, Citibank sold its retail banking division to CIB Bank. In 2017, Barclays Bank PLC transferred its entire shareholding to Attijariwafa Bank Group. In 2016 and 2017, Egypt indicated a desire to partially (less than 35 percent) privatize at least one state-owned banks and a total of 23 firms through either expanded or new listings on the Egypt Stock Exchange. As of April 2020 the only steps towards implementing this privatization program were offering 4.5 percent of the shares of state-owned Eastern Tobacco Company on the stock market. The state owned Banque De Caire was planning to IPO some of its shares on the EGX in April but postponed due to the novel coronavirus.
According to the CBE, banks operating in Egypt held nearly EGP 6 trillion ($379 billion) in total assets as of February 2020, with the five largest banks holding EGP 3.9 trillion ($247 billion) at the end of 2019. Egypt’s three state-owned banks (Banque Misr, Banque du Caire, and National Bank of Egypt) control nearly 40 percent of banking sector assets.
The chairman of the EGX recently stated that Egypt is allowing exploration of the use of blockchain technologies across the banking community. The FRA will review the development and most likely regulate how the banking system adopts the fast-developing blockchain systems into banks’ back-end and customer-facing processing and transactions. Seminars and discussions are beginning around Cairo, including visitors from Silicon Valley, in which leaders and experts are still forming a path forward. While not outright banning cryptocurrencies, which is distinguished from blockchain technologies, authorities caution against speculation in unknown asset classes.
Alternative financial services in Egypt are extensive, given the large informal economy, estimated to be from 30 to 50 percent of the GDP. Informal lending is prevalent, but the total capitalization, number of loans, and types of terms in private finance is less well known.
Foreign Exchange and Remittances
Foreign Exchange
There had been significant progress in accessing hard currency since the floatation of the Pound and re-establishment of the interbank currency trading system in November 2016. While the immediate aftermath saw some lingering difficulty of accessing currency, as of 2017 most businesses operating in Egypt reported having little difficulty obtaining hard currency for business purposes, such as importing inputs and repatriating profits. In 2016 the Central Bank lifted dollar deposit limits on households and firms importing priority goods which had been in place since early 2015. Into 2016, businesses, including foreign-owned firms, which were not operating in priority sectors, encountered difficulty accessing currency, including importers. But 2017 has seen an elimination of the backlog for demand for foreign currency. With net foreign reserves of $37 billion as of April 2020, Egypt’s foreign reserves appeared to be well capitalized.
Funds associated with investment can be freely converted into any world currency, depending on the availability of that currency in the local market. Some firms and individuals report the process taking some time. But the interbank trading system works in general and currency is available as the foreign exchange markets continue to react positively to the government’s commitment to macro and structural reform.
The stabilized exchange rate operates on the principle of market supply and demand: the exchange rate is dictated by availability of currency and demand by firms and individuals. While there is some reported informal Central Bank window guidance, the rate generally fluctuates depending on market conditions, without direct market intervention by authorities. In general, the EGP has stabilized within an acceptable exchange rate range, which has increased the foreign exchange market’s liquidity. Since the early days following the floatation, there has been very low exchange rate volatility.
Remittance Policies
The 1992 U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty provides for free transfer of dividends, royalties, compensation for expropriation, payments arising out of an investment dispute, contract payments, and proceeds from sales. Prior to reform implementation throughout 2016 and 2017, large corporations had been unable to repatriate local earnings for months at a time, but given the current record net foreign reserves, repatriation is no longer an issue that companies complain about.
The Investment Incentives Law stipulates that non-Egyptian employees hired by projects established under the law are entitled to transfer their earnings abroad. Conversion and transfer of royalty payments are permitted when a patent, trademark, or other licensing agreement has been approved under the Investment Incentives Law.
Banking Law 88//2003 regulates the repatriation of profits and capital. The current system for profit repatriation by foreign firms requires sub-custodian banks to open foreign and local currency accounts for foreign investors (global custodians), which are exclusively maintained for stock exchange transactions. The two accounts serve as a channel through which foreign investors process their sales, purchases, dividend collections, and profit repatriation transactions using the bank’s posted daily exchange rates. The system is designed to allow for settlement of transactions in fewer than two days, though in practice some firms have reported short delays in repatriating profits, no longer due to availability but more due to processing steps.
Sovereign Wealth Funds
Egypt’s sovereign wealth fund (SWF), approved by the Cabinet and launched in late 2018, holds 200 billion EGP ($12.7 billion) in authorized capital. The SWF aims to invest state funds locally and abroad across asset classes and manage underutilized government assets. The SWF focuses on sectors considered vital to the Egyptian economy, particularly industry, energy, and tourism. The SWF participates in the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. The government is currently in talks with regional and European institutions to take part in forming the fund’s sector-specific units.
7. State-Owned Enterprises
State and military-owned companies compete directly with private companies in many sectors of the Egyptian economy. According to Public Sector Law 203/1991, state-owned enterprises should not receive preferential treatment from the government, nor should they be accorded any exemption from legal requirements applicable to private companies. In addition to the state-owned enterprises groups above, 40 percent of the banking sector’s assets are controlled by three state-owned banks (Banque Misr, Banque du Caire, and National Bank of Egypt). The 226 SOEs in Egypt subject to Law 203/1991 are affiliated with 10 ministries and employ 450,000 workers. The Ministry of Public Sector Enterprises controls 118 companies operating under eight holding companies that employ 209,000 workers. The most profitable sectors include tourism, real estate, and transportation. The ministry publishes a list of its SOEs on its website, http://www.mpbs.gov.eg/Arabic/Affiliates/HoldingCompanies/Pages/default.aspx and http://www.mpbs.gov.eg/Arabic/Affiliates/AffiliateCompanies/Pages/default.aspx.
In an attempt to encourage growth of the private sector, privatization of state-owned enterprises and state-owned banks accelerated under an economic reform program that took place from 1991 to 2008. Following the 2011 revolution, third parties have brought cases in court to reverse privatization deals, and in a number of these cases, Egyptian courts have ruled to reverse the privatization of several former public companies. Most of these cases are still under appeal.
The state-owned telephone company, Telecom Egypt, lost its legal monopoly on the local, long-distance, and international telecommunication sectors in 2005. Nevertheless, Telecom Egypt held a de facto monopoly until late 2016 because the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA) had not issued additional licenses to compete in these sectors. In October 2016, NTRA, however, implemented a unified license regime that allows companies to offer both fixed line and mobile networks. The agreement allows Telecom Egypt to enter the mobile market and the three existing mobile companies to enter the fixed line market. The introduction of Telecom Egypt as a new mobile operator in the Egyptian market will increase competition among operators, which will benefit users by raising the bar on quality of services as well as improving prices. Egypt is not a party to the World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement Agreement.
OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs
SOEs in Egypt are structured as individual companies controlled by boards of directors and grouped under government holding companies that are arranged by industry, including Petroleum Products & Gas, Spinning & Weaving; Metallurgical Industries; Chemical Industries; Pharmaceuticals; Food Industries; Building & Construction; Tourism, Hotels & Cinema; Maritime & Inland Transport; Aviation; and Insurance. The holding companies are headed by boards of directors appointed by the Prime Minister with input from the relevant Minister.
Privatization Program
The Egyptian government’s most recent plans to privatize stakes in SOEs began in March 2018 with the successful public offering of a minority stake in the Eastern Tobacco Company. Since then plans for privatizing stakes in 22 other SOEs, including up to 30 percent of the shares of Banque du Caire, have been delayed due to adverse market conditions and increased global volatility. Egypt’s privatization program is based on Public Enterprise Law 203//1991, which permits the sale of SOEs to foreign entities. In 1991, Egypt began a privatization program for the sale of several hundred wholly or partially SOEs and all public shares of at least 660 joint venture companies (joint venture is defined as mixed state and private ownership, whether foreign or domestic). Bidding criteria for privatizations were generally clear and transparent.
In 2014, President Sisi signed a law limiting appeal rights on state-concluded contracts to reduce third-party challenges to prior government privatization deals. The law was intended to reassure investors concerned by legal challenges brought against privatization deals and land sales dating back to the pre-2008 period. Ongoing court cases had put many of these now-private firms, many of which are foreign-owned, in legal limbo over concerns that they may be returned to state ownership. In early 2018, the Egyptian government announced that it would begin selling off stakes in some of its state-owned enterprises over the next few years through Egypt’s stock exchange.
8. Responsible Business Conduct
Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) programs have grown in popularity in Egypt over the last ten years. Most programs are limited to multinational and larger domestic companies as well as the banking sector and take the form of funding and sponsorship for initiatives supporting entrepreneurship and education and other social activities. Environmental and technology programs are also garnering greater participation. The Ministry of Trade has engaged constructively with corporations promoting RBC programs, supporting corporate social responsibility conferences and providing Cabinet-level representation as a sign of support to businesses promoting RBC programming.
A number of organizations and corporations work to foster the development of RBC in Egypt. The American Chamber of Commerce has an active corporate social responsibility committee. Several U.S. pharmaceutical companies are actively engaged in RBC programs related to Egypt’s hepatitis-C epidemic. The Egyptian Corporate Responsibility Center, which is the UN Global Compact local network focal point in Egypt, aims to empower businesses to develop sustainable business models as well as improve the national capacity to design, apply, and monitor sustainable responsible business conduct policies. In March 2010, Egypt launched an environmental, social, and governance (ESG) index, the second of its kind in the world after India’s, with training and technical assistance from Standard and Poor’s. Egypt does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Public information about Egypt’s extractive industry remains limited to the government’s annual budget.
9. Corruption
Egypt has a set of laws to combat corruption by public officials, including an Anti-Bribery Law (which is contained within the Penal Code), an Illicit Gains Law, and a Governmental Accounting Law, among others. Countering corruption remains a long-term focus. There have been cases involving public figures and entities, including the arrests of Alexandria’s deputy governor and the secretary general of Suez on several corruption charges and the investigation into five members of parliament alleged to have sold Hajj visas. However, corruption laws have not been consistently enforced. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Egypt 117 out of 180 in its 2017 survey, a drop of 9 places from its rank of 108 in 2016. Transparency International also found that approximately 50 percent of Egyptians reported paying a bribe in order to obtain a public service.
Some private companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. There is no government requirement for private companies to establish internal codes of conduct to prohibit bribery.
Egypt ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in February 2005. It has not acceded to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery or any other regional anti-corruption conventions.
While NGOs are active in encouraging anti-corruption activities, dialogue between the government and civil society on this issue is almost non-existent, the OECD found in 2009 and a trend that continues today. While government officials publicly asserted they shared civil society organizations’ goals, they rarely cooperated with NGOs, and applied relevant laws in a highly restrictive manner against NGOs critical of government practices. Media was also limited in its ability to report on corruption, with Article 188 of the Penal Code mandating heavy fines and penalties for unsubstantiated corruption allegations.
U.S. firms have identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI in Egypt. Companies might encounter corruption in the public sector in the form of requests for bribes, using bribes to facilitate required government approvals or licenses, embezzlement, and tampering with official documents. Corruption and bribery are reported in dealing with public services, customs (import license and import duties), public utilities (water and electrical connection), construction permits, and procurement, as well as in the private sector. Businesses have described a dual system of payment for services, with one formal payment and a secondary, unofficial payment required for services to be rendered.
Resources to Report Corruption
Several agencies within the Egyptian government share responsibility for addressing corruption. Egypt’s primary anticorruption body is the Administrative Control Authority (ACA), which has jurisdiction over state administrative bodies, state-owned enterprises, public associations and institutions, private companies undertaking public work, and organizations to which the state contributes in any form. In October 2017, Parliament approved and passed amendments to the ACA law, which grants the organization full technical, financial, and administrative authority to investigate corruption within the public sector (with the exception of military personnel/entities). The law is viewed as strengthening an institution which was established in 1964. The ACA appears well funded and well trained when compared with other Egyptian law enforcement organizations. Strong funding and the current ACA leadership’s close relationship with President Sisi reflect the importance of this organization and its mission. It is too small for its mission (roughly 300 agents) and is routinely over-tasked with work that would not normally be conducted by a law enforcement agency.
The ACA periodically engages with civil society. For example, it has met with the American Chamber of Commerce and other organizations to encourage them to seek it out when corruption issues arise.
In addition to the ACA, the Central Auditing Authority (CAA) acts as an anti-corruption body, stationing monitors at state-owned companies to report corrupt practices. The Ministry of Justice’s Illicit Gains Authority is charged with referring cases in which public officials have used their office for private gain. The Public Prosecution Office’s Public Funds Prosecution Department and the Ministry of Interior’s Public Funds Investigations Office likewise share responsibility for addressing corruption in public expenditures.
Resources to Report Corruption
Minister of Interior
General Directorate of Investigation of Public Funds
Telephone: 02-2792-1395 / 02-2792 1396
Fax: 02-2792-2389
10. Political and Security Environment
Stability and economic development remain Egypt’s priorities. The Egyptian government has taken measures to eliminate politically motivated violence while also limiting peaceful protests and political expression. Political protests are rare, with the last known demonstrations occurring on September 20, 2019. Egypt’s presidential elections in March 2018 and senatorial elections in August 2020 proceeded without incident. A number of small-scale terrorist attacks against security and civilian targets in Cairo and elsewhere in the Nile Valley occurred in 2019. An attack against a tourist bus in May 2019 injured over a dozen people, and a car bombing outside the National Cancer Institute in Cairo in August 2019 killed 22 people. Militant groups also committed attacks in the Western Desert and Sinai. The government has been conducting a comprehensive counterterrorism offensive in the Sinai since early 2018 in response to terrorist attacks against military installations and personnel by ISIS-affiliated militant groups. In February 2020, ISIS-affiliated militants claimed responsibility for an attack against a domestic gas pipeline in the northern Sinai. Although the group claimed that the attack targeted the recently-opened natural gas pipeline connecting Egypt and Israel, the pipeline itself was undamaged and the flow of natural gas was not interrupted.
11. Labor Policies and Practices
Official statistics put Egypt’s labor force at approximately 29 million, with an official unemployment rate of 9.6 percent as of July 2020. Prior to the onset of the novel coronavirus pandemic, Egypt’s official unemployment rate had been steadily decreasing, reaching a low of 7.5 percent in July 2019. Women accounted for 25 percent of those unemployed as of May 2020, according to statistics from Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). Accurate figures are difficult to determine and verify given Egypt’s large informal economy in which some 62 percent of the non-agricultural workforce is engaged, according to ILO estimates.
The government bureaucracy and public sector enterprises are substantially over-staffed compared to the private sector and other international norms. According to the World Bank, Egypt has the highest number of government workers per capita in the world. Businesses highlight a mismatch between labor skills and market demand, despite high numbers of university graduates in a variety of fields. Foreign companies frequently pay internationally competitive salaries to attract workers with valuable skills.
The Unified Labor Law 12//2003 provides comprehensive guidelines on labor relations, including hiring, working hours, termination of employees, training, health, and safety. The law grants a qualified right for employees to strike, as well as rules and guidelines governing mediation, arbitration, and collective bargaining between employees and employers. Non-discrimination clauses are included, and the law complies with labor-related International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions regulating the employment and training of women and eligible children. Egypt ratified ILO Convention 182 on combating the Worst Forms of Child Labor in April 2002. On July 2018, Egypt launched the first National Action Plan on combating the Worst Forms of Child Labor. The law also created a national committee to formulate general labor policies and the National Council of Wages, whose mandate is to discuss wage-related issues and national minimum-wage policy, but it has rarely convened and a minimum wage has rarely been enforced in the private sector. .
Parliament adopted a new Trade Unions Law in late 2017, replacing a 1976 law, which experts said was out of compliance with Egypt’s commitments to ILO conventions. After a March 2016 Ministry of Manpower and Migration (MOMM) directive not to recognize documentation from any trade union without a stamp from the government-affiliated Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), the new law established procedures for registering independent trade unions, but some of the unions noted that the directorates of the Ministry of Manpower didn’t implement the law and placed restrictions on freedoms of association and organizing for trade union elections. Executive regulations for trade union elections stipulate a very tight deadline of three months for trade union organizations to legalize their status, and one month to hold elections, which, critics said, restricted the ability of unions to legalize their status or to campaign. On April 3, 2018, the government registered its first independent trade union in more than two years.
In July 2019 the Egyptian Parliament passed a series of amendments to the Trade Unions Law that reduced the minimum membership required to form a trade union and abolished prison sentences for violations of the law. The amendments reduced the minimum number of workers required to form a trade union committee from 150 to 50, the number of trade union committees to form a general union from 15 to 10 committees, and the number of workers in a general union from 20,000 to 15,000. The amendments also decreased the number of unions necessary to establish a trade union federation from 10 to 7 and the number of workers in a trade union from 200,000 to 150,000. Under the new law, a trade union or workers’ committee may be formed if 150 employees in an entity express a desire to organize.
Based on the new amendments to the Trade Unions Law and a request from the Egyptian government for assistance implementing them and meeting international labor standards, the International Labor Organization’s and International Finance Corporation’s joint Better Work Program launched in Egypt in March 2020.
The Trade Unions law explicitly bans compulsory membership or the collection of union dues without written consent of the worker and allows members to quit unions. Each union, general union, or federation is registered as an independent legal entity, thereby enabling any such entity to exit any higher-level entity.
The 2014 Constitution stipulated in Article 76 that “establishing unions and federations is a right that is guaranteed by the law.” Only courts are allowed to dissolve unions. The 2014 Constitution maintained past practice in stipulating that “one syndicate is allowed per profession.” The Egyptian constitutional legislation differentiates between white-collar syndicates (e.g. doctors, lawyers, journalists) and blue-collar workers (e.g. transportation, food, mining workers). Workers in Egypt have the right to strike peacefully, but strikers are legally obliged to notify the employer and concerned administrative officials of the reasons and time frame of the strike 10 days in advance. In addition, strike actions are not permitted to take place outside the property of businesses. The law prohibits strikes in strategic or vital establishments in which the interruption of work could result in disturbing national security or basic services provided to citizens. In practice, however, workers strike in all sectors, without following these procedures, but at risk of prosecution by the government.
Collective negotiation is allowed between trade union organizations and private sector employers or their organizations. Agreements reached through negotiations are recorded in collective agreements regulated by the Unified Labor law and usually registered at MOMM. Collective bargaining is technically not permitted in the public sector, though it exists in practice. The government often intervenes to limit or manage collective bargaining negotiations in all sectors.
MOMM sets worker health and safety standards, which also apply in public and private free zones and the Special Economic Zones (see below). Enforcement and inspection, however, are uneven. The Unified Labor Law prohibits employers from maintaining hazardous working conditions, and workers have the right to remove themselves from hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment.
Egyptian labor laws allow employers to close or downsize operations for economic reasons. The government, however, has taken steps to halt downsizing in specific cases. The Unemployment Insurance Law, also known as the Emergency Subsidy Fund Law 156//2002, sets a fund to compensate employees whose wages are suspended due to partial or complete closure of their firm or due to its downsizing. The Fund allocates financial resources that will come from a 1 percent deduction from the base salaries of public and private sector employees. According to foreign investors, certain aspects of Egypt’s labor laws and policies are significant business impediments, particularly the difficulty of dismissing employees. To overcome these difficulties, companies often hire workers on temporary contracts; some employees remain on a series of one-year contracts for more than 10 years. Employers sometimes also require applicants to sign a “Form 6,” an undated voluntary resignation form which the employer can use at any time, as a condition of their employment. Negotiations on drafting a new Labor Law, which has been under consideration in the Parliament for two years, have included discussion of requiring employers to offer permanent employee status after a certain number of years with the company and declaring Form 6 or any letter of resignation null and void if signed prior to the date of termination.
Egypt has a dispute resolution mechanism for workers. If a dispute concerning work conditions, terms, or employment provisions arises, both the employer and the worker have the right to ask the competent administrative authorities to initiate informal negotiations to settle the dispute. This right can be exercised only within seven days of the beginning of the dispute. If a solution is not found within 10 days from the time administrative authorities were requested, both the employer and the worker can resort to a judicial committee within 45 days of the dispute. This committee is comprised of two judges, a representative of MOMM and representatives from the trade union, and one of the employers’ associations. The decision of this committee is provided within 60 days. If the decision of the judicial committee concerns discharging a permanent employee, the sentence is delivered within 15 days. When the committee decides against an employer’s decision to fire, the employer must reintegrate the latter in his/her job and pay all due salaries. If the employer does not respect the sentence, the employee is entitled to receive compensation for unlawful dismissal.
Labor Law 12//2003 sought to make it easier to terminate an employment contract in the event of “difficult economic conditions.” The Law allows an employer to close his establishment totally or partially or to reduce its size of activity for economic reasons, following approval from a committee designated by the Prime Minister. In addition, the employer must pay former employees a sum equal to one month of the employee’s total salary for each of his first five years of service and one and a half months of salary for each year of service over and above the first five years. Workers who have been dismissed have the right to appeal. Workers in the public sector enjoy lifelong job security as contracts cannot be terminated in this fashion; however, government salaries have eroded as inflation has outpaced increases.
Egypt has regulations restricting access for foreigners to Egyptian worker visas, though application of these provisions has been inconsistent. The government plans to phase out visas for unskilled workers, but as yet has not done so. For most other jobs, employers may hire foreign workers on a temporary six-month basis, but must also hire two Egyptians to be trained to do the job during that period. Only jobs where it is not possible for Egyptians to acquire the requisite skills will remain open to foreign workers. Application of these regulations is inconsistent.
12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Other Investment Insurance Programs
The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) is operating in Egypt to provide the capital and risk mitigation tools that investors need to overcome the barriers faced in this region. In 2012, DFC’s predecessor, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), launched the USD 250 million Egypt Loan Guaranty Facility (ELGF), in partnership with USAID, to support bank lending and stimulate job creation. The ELGF’s main objective is to help SMEs access finance for growth and development, by providing creditors the needed guarantees to help them mitigate loan risks. This objective goes hand-in-hand with the Central Bank of Egypt’s initiative to support SMEs. The ELGF expands lending to SMEs by supporting local partner banks as they lend to the target segment and increase access to credit for SMEs. The result is the promotion of jobs and private sector development in Egypt. The ELGF and partner banks sign a Guarantee Facility Agreement (GFA) to outline main terms and conditions of credit guarantee. The two bank partners are Commercial International Bank (CIB) and the National Bank of Kuwait (NBK). USAID has collaborated with OPIC/ELGF and the CIB to provide training to SME owners and managers on the basics of accounting and finance, banking and loan processes, business registration, and other topics that will help SMEs access financing for business growth.
As of March, 2020, the DFC’s financing tools provide $1.25 billion in financial and insurance support to 12 renewable energy, oil and gas, water supply, and health sector projects in Egypt in addition to the ELGF. Apache Corporation, the largest U.S. investor in Egypt, has supported its natural gas investment with OPIC and DFC risk insurance since 2004. In December 2018, the OPIC Board approved a project to provide $430 million in political risk insurance to Noble Energy, Inc. to support the restoration, operation, and maintenance of a natural gas pipeline in Egypt and the supply of natural gas through a pipeline from Israel. In June 2019, OPIC’s Board approved an $87 million loan guarantee for the development, construction, and operation of the 252 megawatt Lekela Egypt Wind Power project.
13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics
Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
Host Country Statistical source*
USG or international statistical source
USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data
Year
Amount
Year
Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD)
2020 Investment Climate Statements: Democratic Republic of the Congo
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the second largest country in Africa and one of the richest in the world in terms of natural resources. With 80 million hectares (197 million acres) of arable land and 1,100 minerals and precious metals, the DRC has the resources to achieve prosperity for its people. Despite its potential, the DRC often cannot provide adequate security, infrastructure and health care to its estimated 84 million inhabitants, of which 75 percent live on less than two dollars a day.
The accession of Felix Tshisekedi to the presidency in 2019 and his government’s commitment to attracting international and particularly U.S. investment have raised the hopes of the business community for greater openness and transparency. The DRC government is currently working with USTR to regain preferential trade preferences under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Tshisekedi created a presidential unit to lead business reform and improve DRC’s standing of 183rd out of 190 countries in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2019 report.
The natural resource and telecommunications sectors have attracted the most foreign investment in the past. The primary minerals sector is the country’s main source of revenue, as exports of copper, cobalt, gold, coltan, diamond, tin and tungsten provide over 95 percent of the DRC’s export revenue. Several breweries and bottlers, a number of large construction firms, and limited textiles production are active. The highly competitive telecommunications industry is expanding into electronic banking. Given the vast needs, there are significant commercial opportunities in aviation, road, rail, water transport, and ports. The agricultural and forestry sectors present opportunities for economic diversification in the DRC.
In 2019 economic growth remained sluggish, with only the extractives sector exhibiting significant growth. After reaching 5.8 percent in 2018, economic growth slowed to 4.4 percent in 2019 owing to the drop in commodity prices. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic sent growth negative as global demand for DRC’s exports dropped.
Overall, businesses in the DRC face numerous challenges, including poor infrastructure and a weak and corrupt bureaucracy. Armed groups remain active in the eastern part of the country, making for a fragile security situation that negatively affects the business environment. Reform of a non-transparent and often corrupt legal system is underway. While laws protecting investors are in effect, the court system is often very slow to make decisions or follow the law, allowing numerous investment disputes to last for years.
1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment
The DRC remains a challenging environment in which to conduct business. The accession of Felix Tshisekdi to the Presidency in January 2019 and his announcement of his interest in attracting more international investment, particularly from the United States, have raised hopes the DRC government (GDRC) can impose and follow through on policies more favorable to foreign direct investment. To encourage U.S. visitors, in January 2020 the GDRC lowered the price of a single-entry visa to USD 100 and a three month multiple-entry visa to USD 160. The DRC’s rich endowment of natural resources, large population and generally open trading system provide significant potential opportunities for U.S. investors.
Current investment regulations prohibit foreign investors from engaging in informal small retail commerce and ban foreign majority-ownership of agricultural concerns. Investors have expressed concern that the ban on foreign agricultural ownership will stifle any attempts to kick-start the agrarian sector.
The official investment agency, the National Agency for Investment Promotion (ANAPI), provides investment facilitation services for initial investments over USD 200,000, and is mandated to simplify the investment process, make procedures more transparent, assist new foreign investors, and improve the image of the DRC as an investment destination.
There are several public and private sector forums which speak to the government on the investment climate in specific sectors. In December 2019 President Tshisekedi created the business climate cell (CCA) to listen and develop ways to improve the business climate. The CCA in June 2020 presented a roadmap for reform. The public-private Financial and Technical Partners (PTF) mining group represents the different countries with significant mining investments in the DRC. The Federation of Congolese Enterprises (FEC) has a dialogue on business interests with the government.
Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment
In general, there are no limits on foreigners owning a business or engaging in all forms of remunerative activity, with the exceptions of small commerce and owning more than 49 percent of an agribusiness. Many investors note that in practice the GDRC requires foreign investors to hire local agents and participate in a joint venture with the government or local partners.
In response to private sector complaints, in June 2020 the GDRC repealed a law on subcontracting in the private sector that restricted using foreign entities.
The government promulgated a new mining code in 2018 which increased royalty rates from two to ten percent, raised tax rates on “strategic” metals, and imposed a surcharge on “super profits” of mining companies. The government unilaterally removed a stability clause contained in the previous mining code protecting investors from any new fees or taxes for ten years. Removal of the stability clause may deter future investment in the mining sector. The Tshisekedi government has indicated that it is willing to reopen discussions on the new mining code.
The government does not maintain an organization to screen inbound investment. The Presidency and the ministries serve this purpose de facto.
Other Investment Policy Reviews
The DRC has not undergone a World Trade Organization (WTO), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), or a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Investment Policy Review in the last three years. Cities with high custom clearance traffic use Sydonia, which is an advanced software system for custom administrations in compliance with ASYCUDA. (ASYCUDA is a large technical assistance software program recommended by UNCTAD for custom clearance management.)
Business Facilitation
Since 2013, the GDRC has operated a “one-stop shop” (https://www.guichetunique.cd/) that brings together all the government entities involved in the registration of a company in the DRC. The registration process now officially takes three days, but in practice it can take much longer. Some businesses have reported that the Guichet Unique has considerably shortened and simplified the overall process of business registration.
Outward Investment
The GDRC does not prohibit outward investment, nor does it particularly promote it. There are no current government restrictions preventing domestic investors from investing abroad, and there are no current blacklisted countries with which domestic investors are precluded from doing business.
2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties
The U.S.-DRC Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) was signed in 1984 and entered into force in 1989. The BIT guarantees reciprocal rights and privileges to each country’s investors and provides that, should a claim arise under the treaty, it can be submitted to a dispute resolution mechanism through international arbitration. U.S. companies have at times reported difficulties with the tax authorities from arbitrary enforcement of the taxation code.
Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, South Korea, and China have also signed bilateral investment treaties with the DRC, while South Africa and Kenya are currently negotiating BITs. Lebanon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso have negotiated, but not signed, BITs with the DRC. In October 2016, the DRC and Rwanda signed an agreement on a simplified trade regime covering only small-scale commerce between the countries.
There is no bilateral taxation treaty between the United States and the DRC. In August 2015, Zambia and the DRC signed a bilateral taxation treaty that abolished customs taxes across their common border.
3. Legal Regime
The DRC does not have a legal system to address the issue of competition. By joining the regional legal body OHADA and the regional Central and Southern African trade group COMESA, the DRC plans to implement the standards and regulations of these structures in order to create a more transparent and effective policy to promote competition.
There are no informal regulations run by private or nongovernmental organizations that discriminate against foreign investors. However, some investors perceive the regulations in the mining code as discriminatory against foreign investment.
The GDRC authority on business standards, the Congolese Office of Control (OCC), oversees foreign businesses engaged in the DRC.
There are no formal or informal provisions systematically employed by the GDRC to impede foreign investment. Companies most often complain of facing administrative hurdles as laws and regulations are often poorly or unevenly applied.
Proposed laws and regulations are rarely published in draft format for public discussion and comment; discussion is typically limited to the governmental entity that proposes the draft law and Parliament prior to enactment. Sometimes the government will hold a public hearing after public appeals.
By implementing the OHADA system, the GDRC strengthened its legal framework in the areas of contract, company, and bankruptcy law and set up an accounting system better aligned to international standards. For this purpose, a Coordination Committee was established internally in the GDRC to monitor OHADA implementation.
The government announced the creation of a business unit (CCA) in December 2019 to enact needed regulatory reforms.
The DRC is a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a multi-stakeholder initiative to increase transparency in transactions between governments and companies in the extractive industries. The DRC’s validation process for compliance with the EITI Standard commenced in November 2018, with an assessment due in 2020. The initial report published by the International EITI Secretariat in April 2019 stated that the DRC EITI failed to adequately address 13 of the requirements of the EITI Standard, with two of these assessed as unmet with inadequate progress. The report also stressed the need to clarify the financial flows of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the DRC’s extractive sector.
In 2019 the DRC failed to meet the minimum requirements of fiscal transparency according to the State Department’s Fiscal Transparency report. While the DRC publishes budgets that are publicly available and timely, the published budgets were not reliable indicators of actual government spending.
International Regulatory Considerations
The DRC is a member of several regional economic blocs, including the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC).
According to the Congolese National Standardization Committee, the DRC has adopted 470 harmonized COMESA standards.
The DRC is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and seeks to comply with Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIM) requirements, including notifying regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).
Legal System and Judicial Independence
The DRC is a civil law country, and the main provisions of its private law can be traced to the Napoleonic Civil Code. The general characteristics of the Congolese legal system are similar to those of the Belgian system. Various local customary laws regulate both personal status laws and property rights, especially the inheritance and land tenure systems in traditional communities throughout the country. The Congolese legal system is divided into three branches: public law, private law and economic law. Public law regulates legal relationships involving the state or state authority; private law regulates relationships between private persons; and economic law regulates interactions in areas such as labor, trade, mining and investment.
In 2018 the DRC established thirteen commercial courts located in DRC’s main business cities, including Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Matadi, Boma, Kisangani, and Mbuji-Mayi. These courts are designed to be led by professional judges specializing in commercial matters and exist in parallel to an otherwise inadequate judicial system. A lack of qualified personnel and a reluctance by some DRC jurisdictions to fully recognize OHADA law and institutions have hindered the development of commercial courts.
The current judicial process is not procedurally reliable and its rulings are not always respected. The current executive branch has generally not interfered with the proceedings. The national court system provides an appeals mechanism under the OHADA framework. Legal documents in the DRC can be found at: http://www.leganet.cd/index.htm.
Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment
The 2002 Investment Code governs most foreign direct investment (FDI), providing for the protection of investments. In practice, an inadequate legal system has insufficiently protected foreign investors in the event of a dispute. Mining, hydrocarbons, finance, and other sectors have sector-specific investment laws.
ANAPI is the DRC agency with the mandate to simplify the investment process, make procedures more transparent, assist new foreign investors, and improve the image of the country as an investment destination (www.investindrc.cd).
The GDRC has a “Guichet Unique,” which is a one-stop shop to simplify business creation, cutting processing time from five months to three days, and reducing incorporation fees from USD 3,000 to USD 120. (www.guichetunique.cd). A “one-stop-shop” also exists for import-export business, covering aspects such as the collection of taxes and transshipment operations. (https://segucerdc.cd/).
Competition and Anti-Trust Laws
There is no national agency that reviews transactions for competition or antitrust-related concerns. As a member of COMESA the DRC follows the COMESA Competition Regulations and rules, and the COMESA competition body regulates competition.
Expropriation and Compensation
The GDRC may proceed with an expropriation when it benefits the public interest, and the person or entity subject to an expropriation should receive fair compensation. The U.S. Embassy is unaware of any new expropriation activities by the GDRC against U.S. citizens in the past three years, but there are a number of existing and long-standing claims made against the GDRC. Some claims have been taken to arbitration, though many arbitral judgments against the GDRC are not paid in a timely manner, if at all.
Dispute Settlement
ICSID Convention and New York Convention
The DRC is a member of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention and a Contracting State to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention). It is important to note that the New York Convention does not apply toward disputes relating to immovable property, which includes mining rights.
Investor-State Dispute Settlement
The DRC is subject to international arbitration. A U.S. mining company sued under the BIT to recover losses suffered when FARDC troops sacked its mine in Kasai Central Province in 1995. The arbitration courts ruled the GDRC liable for damages totaling USD 13 million, and the GDRC started paying back the awarded amount plus interest to the U.S. company.
International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts
The DRC adopted the OHADA Uniform Act on Arbitration (the UAA). The UAA sets out the basic rules applicable to any arbitration where the seat of arbitration is located in an OHADA member state. The requirements set out under Article 5 of the New York Convention for the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards applies where the seat of any arbitration is outside an OHADA member state, or where the parties choose arbitration rules outside the UAA.
OHADA‘s UAA offers an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for settling disputes between two parties where the place of arbitration is situated in a Member State. Disputes must be submitted to the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA) in Abidjan in accordance with the provisions of the OHADA Treaty and the OHADA Arbitration Rules.
The UAA, while not directly based on the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law, is similar in that it provides for the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards and supersedes the national laws on arbitration to the extent that any conflict arises. Arbitral awards with a connection to an OHADA member state are given final and binding status in all OHADA member states, on par with a national court judgment. Support is provided by the CCJA which can rule on the application and interpretation of the UAA.
Arbitral awards rendered in any OHADA Member State are enforceable in any other OHADA member state, subject to obtaining an exequatur (a legal document issued by a sovereign authority allowing a right to be enforced in the authority’s domain of competence) of the competent court of the State in which the award is to be made. Exequaturs are granted unless the award clearly affects public order in that State. Decisions granting or refusing to grant an exequatur may be appealed to the CCJA.
Bankruptcy Regulations
The OHADA Uniform Act on Insolvency Proceedings provides a comprehensive framework not only for companies encountering financial difficulties and seeking relief from the pressing demands of creditors, but also for creditors to file their claims. The GDRC judiciary system has agreed to enforce the OHADA Insolvency Act. Bankruptcy is not criminalized.
According to the World Bank’s Doing Business Report, there were no foreclosure, liquidation or reorganization proceedings filed in the country in 2019, making it impossible to assess the time, cost or outcome for an insolvency proceeding.
4. Industrial Policies
Investment Incentives
Investment incentives can range from tax breaks to duty exemptions, and are dependent upon the location and type of enterprise, the number of jobs created, the degree of training and promotion of local staff, and the export-producing potential of the operation. Investors who wish to take advantage of customs and tax incentives in the 2002 Investment Code must apply to the National Agency for Investment Promotion (ANAPI), which submits applications to the Ministries of Finance and Planning for final approval. The government does not have a history of providing guarantees or jointly financing FDI projects.
Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation
The DRC does not have any designated free trade areas or free port zones. President Tshisekedi has signaled that he will revive stalled efforts to join the East African Community (EAC). In November 2019, the Presidency submitted a law authorizing the ratification of the agreement of the African continental free-zone (ZLEC). The law is still pending approval by the Parliament.
Performance and Data Localization Requirements
Foreign investors must negotiate many of the conditions of their investments with ANAPI. Performance requirements agreed upon with ANAPI typically include a timeframe for the investment, use of OHADA accounting procedures and periodic authorized GDRC audits, protection of the environment, periodic progress reports to ANAPI, and the maintenance of international and local norms for the provision of goods and services. The investor must also agree that all imported equipment and capital will remain in-country for at least five years.
The Ministry of Labor controls expatriate residence and work permits. For U.S. companies, the BIT assures the right to hire staff of their choice to fill some management positions, but companies agree to pay a special tax on expatriate salaries. Visa, residence or work permit requirements are not discriminatory or excessively onerous, and are not designed to prevent or discourage foreigners from investing in the DRC.
The DRC does not have specific legislation on data storage or limits on the transmission of data.
5. Protection of Property Rights
Real Property
The DRC’s Constitution protects private property ownership without discriminating between foreign and domestic investors. Despite this provision, the GDRC has acknowledged the absence of enforcement protecting property rights. Congolese law related to real property rights enumerates provisions for mortgages and liens. Real property (buildings and land) is protected and registered through the Ministry of Land’s Office of the Mortgage Registrar. Land registration may not fully protect property owners, as records can be incomplete and legal disputes over land deals are common. Many owners lack a clear registered title to the land. In addition, there is no specific regulation of real property lease or acquisition.
Ownership interest in personal property (e.g. equipment, vehicles, etc.) is protected and registered through the Ministry of the Interior’s Office of the Notary.
Intellectual Property Rights
Intellectual property rights (IPR) are legally protected in the DRC, but enforcement of IPR regulations is limited. The DRC’s intellectual property laws date from the 1980s and remain in force. However, enforcement is weak, and IPR theft is common. The country is a signatory to a number of relevant agreements with international organizations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) and is subject to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The government does not keep a record of IPR violations.
The DRC is not included in the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or Notorious Markets List.
For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IPR offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/.
6. Financial Sector
Capital Market and Portfolio Investment
Portfolio investment is nonexistent in the DRC and there is no domestic stock market. A small number of private equity firms are actively investing in the mining industry. The institutional investor base is not well developed, with only an insurance company and a state pension fund as participants. There is no market for derivatives in the country. Cross-shareholding and stable shareholding arrangements are also not common. Credit is allocated on market terms, but there are occasional complaints about unfair privileges extended to certain investors in profitable sectors such as mining and telecommunications.
Although reforms have been initiated, the Congolese financial system remains small, heavily dollarized, characterized by fragile balance sheets, and cumbersome to use. Further reforms are needed to strengthen the financial system, support its expansion, and spur economic growth. Inadequate risk-based controls, weak enforcement of regulations, low profitability, and excessive reliance on demand deposit undermine the shock resilience of the financial system.
The Central Bank of Congo (BCC) refrains from payments and transfers on current international transactions. The DRC’s capital market remains underdeveloped and consists mainly of the issuance of treasury bonds. In 2019, the BCC issued its first domestic bond in 24 years, which was oversubscribed. Most of the buyers were local Congolese banks.
It is possible for foreign firms to borrow from local banks, but their options are limited. Maturities for loans are usually limited to 3-6 months, and interest rates are typically around 16-21 percent. The inconsistency of the legal system, the often-cumbersome business climate, and the difficulty in obtaining inter-bank financing discourages banks from providing long-term loans. There are limited possibilities to finance major projects in the domestic currency, the Congolese franc (CDF).
Money and Banking system
The Congolese financial system is improving but it remains fragile. The BCC controls monetary policy and regulates the banking system. Banks are concentrated primarily in Kinshasa, Kongo Central, North and South Kivu, and Haut Katanga provinces. Banking rate penetration is roughly 7 percent or about 4.1 million accounts, which places the country among the most under-banked nations in the world. Mobile banking has the potential to greatly increase banking customers as an estimated 35 million Congolese use mobile phones.
There is no debt market. The financial health of DRC banks is fragile, reflecting high operating costs and exchange rates. The situation improved in 2019 as deposits have increased. Fees charged by banks are a major source of revenue.
The financial system is mostly banking-based with aggregate asset holdings estimated at USD 5.1 billion. Among the five largest banks, four are local and one is controlled by foreign holdings. The five largest banks hold almost 65 percent of bank deposits and more than 60 percent of total banks assets, about USD 3.1 billion. There are no statistics on non-performing loans, as many banks only record the balance due instead of the total amount of their non-performing loans.
There is one correspondent bank, Citigroup. All foreign banks accredited by the BCC are considered Congolese banks with foreign capital and fall under the provisions and regulations covering the credit institutions’ activities in the DRC There are no restrictions on foreigners establishing an account in a DRC bank.
Foreign Exchange and Remittance
Foreign Exchange
The international transfer of funds is permitted when channeled through local commercial banks. On average, bank declaration requirements and payments for international transfers take less than one week to complete. The Central Bank is responsible for regulating foreign exchange and trade. The only currency restriction imposed on travelers is a USD 10,000 limit on the amount an individual can carry when entering or leaving the DRC.
The GDRC requires the BCC to license exporters and importers. The DRC’s informal foreign exchange market is large and unregulated and offers exchange rates slightly more favorable than the official rate. BCC regulations set the Congolese franc (CDF) as the main currency in all transactions within the DRC, required for the payment of fees in education, medical care, water and electricity consumption, residential rents, and national taxes. Exceptions to this rule occur where both parties involved and the appropriate monetary officials agree to use another currency.
Remittance Policies
There are no legal restrictions on converting or transferring funds. Exchange regulations require a 60 day waiting period for in-country foreigners to remit income. Foreign investors may remit through parallel markets when they are legally established and recognized by the Central Bank.
Sovereign Wealth Funds
The DRC does not have any reported Sovereign Wealth Funds, though the 2018 Mining Code discusses a Future Fund that is to be capitalized by a percentage of mining revenues.
7. State-Owned Enterprises
There are 20 DRC state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operating in the mining, transportation, energy, telecommunications, finance, and hospitality sectors. In the past, Congolese SOEs have stifled competition and have been unable to provide reliable electricity, transportation, and other important services over which they have monopolies. Some SOEs and other Congolese parastatal organizations are in poor financial and operational state due to indebtedness and the mismanagement of resources and employees. The list of SOEs can be found at: http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit percent20Public/EPub/d.09.12.24.04.09.htm.
There is limited reporting on the assets of SOEs and other parastatal enterprises, making valuation difficult. DRC law does not grant SOEs an advantage over private companies in bidding for government contracts or obtaining preferential access to land and raw materials. The government is often accused of favoring SOEs over private companies in contracting and bidding.
The DRC is not a party to the WTO’s procurement agreement (GPA), but nominally adheres to the OECD guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. The DRC is a Participating Country in the Southern Africa SOE network, with the Ministry of Portfolio and the Steering Committee for SOE reforms designated as Regularly Participating Institutions.
Privatization Program
The DRC has no official privatization program.
8. Responsible Business Conduct
The GDRC has taken actions of limited impact to support responsible business conduct (RBC), by encouraging companies to develop and adhere to a code of ethics and respect for the environment. The DRC Labor Code includes provisions to protect employees, and there are legal provisions that require businesses to protect the environment. However, the DRC does not possess a legal framework to protect the rights of consumers, and there are no existing domestic laws to protect individuals from adverse business impact.
The Global Compact Network DRC, a public-private consortium affiliated with the United Nations, encourages locally operating businesses to adopt sustainable and socially responsible policies. In 2016, the DRC issued the Guide on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR Guide) for the mining sector in Haut Katanga.
The DRC has adopted the OECD due diligence guidelines on responsible mineral supply chains as defined by the United Nations Group of Experts, as well as various resolutions of the UN Security Council related to business and human rights in the Congolese mining sector. The DRC participates in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and publishes reports on its revenue from natural resources, although in recent years the reports have been late or incomplete.
The 2018 Mining Code provides domestic transparency measures requiring the disclosure of payments made to government entities. Promines, a technical parastatal body financed by the GDRC and the World Bank, works to improve transparency in the artisanal mining sector. Amnesty International, Pact Inc., Global Witness, and the Carter Center have published reports on RBC in the DRC mining sector. The Dodd-Frank Act mandated companies publicly listed in the United States to declare their supply chains for DRC-sourced “3Ts” (tin, tungsten, and tantalum) and gold. Although the Securities and Exchange Commission is no longer actively enforcing the act, many U.S. multinationals appear to be complying voluntarily to avoid possible reputational damage.
9. Corruption
The Tshisekedi government has used public prosecutions of high-level officials and the creation of an anti-corruption unit to improve the DRC’s reputation on corruption. DRC’s 2018 Corruption Perception Index score—161 out of 180—underlines the endemic and deep roots of corruption in the country. The DRC constitution includes laws intended to fight corruption and bribery by all citizens, including public officials. Anti-corruption laws extend to family members and political parties. Private companies have applied their own controls to limit corruption, and have in the past been more effective at controlling it.
In March 2020, President Tshisekedi created the National Agency to Fight Corruption. In June 2020, the National Assembly began discussing the law on the creation, organization, and function of the Agency. The National Assembly forwarded the proposal to the Political, Administrative, and Judiciary Commission for analysis prior to a vote. Currently corruption investigations are ongoing for three Managing Directors of SOEs. In June, the court convicted Tshisekedi’s former Chief of Staff of embezzlement and public corruption, and sentenced him to 20 years in prison.
The DRC is a signatory to the UN Anticorruption Convention, but not to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. The DRC ratified a protocol agreement with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on Fighting Corruption. NGOs such as the group “The Congo is Not for Sale,” have an important role in revealing corrupt practices, and the law protects NGOs in a whistleblower role.
U.S. firms see corruption as one of the main hurdles to investment in the DRC, particularly in the awarding of concessions, government procurement, and taxation treatment.
The Agency in charge of fighting corruption in the DRC is:
Cellule Technique de Lutte contre l’Impunité
Falanga Mawete Coordinateur
Tel: 00243815189341
Email: nmbayo2002@yahoo.fr
Palais de Justice, Place de l’Indépendance
Kinshasa/Gombe, DRC
Special Advisor for Good Governance
Position vacant
Email: jedenonce2015@gmail.com
10. Political and Security Environment
In January 2019, Felix Tshisekedi became President in the DRC’s first peaceful transition of power, ushering a period of relative political stability. The December 2018 elections were the result of international, including U.S pressure, as well as a long period of mediation involving the Catholic Church, the government, and the opposition. Maintaining public support for the Tshisekedi government will ultimately require the administration to deliver on the campaign slogan of “the people first.”
The security situation continues to be a concern. Thousands of members of armed groups have been disarming and turning themselves in to the United Nations’ DRC peacekeeping operation (MONUSCO) and the GDRC since President Tshisekedi’s election, according to international observers. Most of the defections have taken place in eastern and central DRC. International statistics indicate that over 140 armed groups continue to operate in 17 of the DRC’s 26 provinces, primarily in the east of the country. The ISIS-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebel group in eastern DRC is one of the country’s most notorious and intractable armed groups, and its members have shown no interest in demobilizing. Armed groups previously interfered with the effort to eradicate the Ebola outbreak in eastern DRC, but interference decreased and the eastern outbreak was declared over on June 25. President Tshisekedi appears cognizant of the important role security plays in attracting foreign investment, and has encouraged the Congolese army to work with MONUSCO to eliminate armed groups.
The DRC labor market has a large and low-skilled labor force with high youth unemployment. Expatriates frequently fill jobs requiring technical training in the key mining sector. About 85 percent of the non-agricultural workforce is in the informal sector.
DRC labor law stipulates that for businesses with over 100 employees, 10 percent of all employees should be local. If the managing director is a foreigner, his or her deputy or secretary general is expected to be a Congolese citizen. The government can waive these provisions depending on the sector of activity and expertise available. There are no onerous conditionality, visa, residence, or work permit requirements inhibiting the mobility of foreign investors and their employees.
While the agricultural sector is expanding, it continues to face poor infrastructure and a lack of access to technology. About 60 percent of the workforce is in agriculture.
The DRC faces a deficit in skilled labor across all sectors. There are few formal vocational training programs, though Article 8 of the labor law stipulates that all employers should provide training to their employees. To address the high unemployment rate, the GDRC enacted a policy giving Congolese a preference in hiring over expatriates. Laws prevent firms from firing workers under most conditions without compensation. These restrictions have deterred hiring and encouraged the use of temporary contracts in lieu of permanent hiring. There is no government safety net to compensate laid off workers.
Congolese law bans collective bargaining in certain sectors, including by civil servants and public employees, and the law does not provide adequate protection against anti-union discrimination. While the right to strike is recognized, there are provisions which require unions to obtain permission and adhere to lengthy compulsory arbitration and appeal procedures before starting a strike. Unions often strike for higher wages or the payment of back wages.
The DRC government ratified the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) eight core conventions, but some Congolese laws continue to be inconsistent with the ILO Convention on Forced Labor.
DRC law prohibits discrimination in employment and occupation based on race, gender, language, or social status. The law does not specifically protect against discrimination based on religion, age, political opinion, national origin, disability, pregnancy, sexual orientation, gender identity, or HIV-positive status. Additionally, no law specifically prohibits discrimination in the employment of career public service members. According to some businesses, the government does not effectively enforce relevant employment laws.
Labor law defines different standard workweeks, ranging from 45 to 72 hours, for various jobs, and prescribes rest periods and premium pay for overtime. Employers in both the formal and informal sectors often do not respect these provisions. The law does not prohibit compulsory overtime.
The labor code specifies health and safety standards, but the government does not effectively enforce labor standards in the informal sector, and enforcement is uneven to non-existent in the formal sector. The Ministry of Labor employs 200 labor inspectors but has not provided funds to conduct labor inspections.
12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation and Other Investment Insurance Programs
There is an active U.S.-DRC Bilateral Investment Treaty in force. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) provides political risk insurance and project financing to U.S. investors and non-governmental organizations. DFC has granted political risk insurance for projects in the DRC in the past and is open to working on future projects in the DRC.
13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics
Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
Host Country Statistical source
USG or international statistical source
USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data
Year
Amount
Year
Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($B USD)
No detailed information is available on the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) website and no information is available on outward direct investment from Democratic Republic of Congo.
Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
No detailed information is available on the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) website and no information is available on outward direct investment from Democratic Republic of Congo.
2020 Investment Climate Statements: Democratic Republic of the Congo
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2020 Investment Climate Statements
The U.S. Department of State’s Investment Climate Statements provide country-specific information on the business climates of more than 170 countries and economies. They are prepared by economic officers stationed in embassies and posts around the world and analyze a variety of economies that are or could be markets for U.S. businesses of all sizes.
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Global Overview
Topics include Openness to Investment, Legal and Regulatory systems, Dispute Resolution, Intellectual Property Rights, Transparency, Performance Requirements, State-Owned Enterprises, Responsible Business Conduct, and Corruption.
There are select examples of economies expanding openness to investment, improving transparency, and helping new businesses open. This likely reflects an acknowledgment by those economies of the vital role the private sector can play in economic competitiveness and growth.
On the other hand, the reports highlight a variety of challenges and barriers, such as local content requirements, lack of adequate transparency, problems with corruption, and sectors closed to foreign businesses.
Israel has an entrepreneurial spirit and a creative, highly educated, skilled, and diverse workforce. It is a leader in innovation in a variety of sectors, and many Israeli start-ups find good partners in U.S. companies. Popularly known as “Start-Up Nation,” Israel invests heavily in education and scientific research. U.S. firms account for nearly two-thirds of the more than 300 research and development (R&D) centers established by multinational companies in Israel. Israel has the third most companies listed on the NASDAQ, after the United States and China. Various Israeli government agencies, led by the Israel Innovation Authority, fund incubators for early stage technology start-ups, and Israel provides extensive support for new ideas and technologies while also seeking to develop traditional industries. Private venture capital funds have flourished in Israel in recent years.
The fundamentals of the Israeli economy are strong, and a 2018 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report said Israel’s economy is thriving, enjoying solid growth and historically low unemployment. With low inflation and fiscal deficits that have usually met targets, most analysts consider Israeli government economic policies as generally sound and supportive of growth. Israel seeks to provide supportive conditions for companies looking to invest in Israel, through laws that encourage capital and industrial R&D investment. Incentives and benefits include grants, reduced tax rates, tax exemptions, and other tax-related benefits.
The U.S.-Israeli bilateral economic and commercial relationship is strong, anchored by two-way trade in goods that reached USD 33.9 billion in 2019, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, and extensive commercial ties, particularly in high-tech and R&D. The total stock of Israeli foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States was USD 38.5 billion in 2018, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce. This year marks the 35th anniversary of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the United States’ first-ever FTA. Since the signing of the FTA, the Israeli economy has undergone a dramatic transformation, moving from a protected, low-end manufacturing and agriculture-led economy to one that is diverse, open, and led by a cutting-edge high-tech sector.
The Israeli government generally continues to take slow, deliberate actions to remove some trade barriers and encourage capital investment, including foreign investment. The continued existence of trade barriers and monopolies, however, have contributed significantly to the high cost of living and the lack of competition in key sectors. The Israeli government maintains some protective trade policies, usually in favor of domestic producers.
1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment
Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment
Israel is open to foreign investment and the government actively encourages and supports the inflow of foreign capital.
The Israeli Ministry of Economy and Industry’s ‘Invest in Israel’ office serves as the government’s investment promotion agency facilitating foreign investment. ‘Invest in Israel’ offers a wide range of services including guidance on Israeli laws, regulation, taxes, incentives, and costs, and facilitation of business connections with peer companies and industry leaders for new investors. ‘Invest in Israel’ also organizes familiarization tours for potential investors and employs a team of advisors for each region of the world.
Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment
The Israeli legal system protects the rights of both foreign and domestic entities to establish and own business enterprises, as well as the right to engage in remunerative activity. Private enterprises are free to establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises. As part of ongoing privatization efforts, the Israeli government encourages foreign investment in privatizing government-owned entities.
Israel’s policies aim to equalize competition between private and public enterprises, although the existence of monopolies and oligopolies in several sectors stifles competition. In the case of designated monopolies, defined as entities that supply more than 50 percent of the market, the government controls prices.
Israel established a centralized investment screening (approval) mechanism for certain inbound foreign investments in October 2019. Investments in regulated industries (e.g., banking and insurance) require approval by the relevant regulator. Investments in certain sectors may require a government license. Other regulations may apply, usually on a national treatment basis.
Other Investment Policy Reviews
The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted its fifth and latest trade policy review of Israel in July 2018. In the past three years, the Israeli government has not conducted any investment policy reviews through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The OECD concluded an Economic Survey of Israel in March 2018.
The Israeli government is fairly open and receptive to companies wishing to register businesses in Israel. Israel ranked 28th in the “Starting a Business” category of the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, rising seventeen places from its 2019 ranking. Israel continues to institute reforms to make it easier to do business in Israel, but some challenges remain.
The business registration process in Israel is relatively clear and straightforward. Four procedures are required to register a standard private limited company and take 12 days to complete, on average, according to the Ministry of Finance. The foreign investor must obtain company registration documents through a recognized attorney with the Ministry of Justice and obtain a tax identification number for company taxation and for value added taxes (VAT) from the Ministry of Finance. The cost to register a company averages around USD 1,000 depending on attorney and legal fees.
The Israeli Ministry of Economy and Industry’s “Invest in Israel” website provides useful information for companies interested in starting a business or investing in Israel. The website is http://www.investinisrael.gov.il/Pages/default.aspx.
Outward Investment
2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties
The Israel Export and International Cooperation Institute is an Israeli government agency operating independently, under the Ministry of Economy, that helps facilitate trade and business opportunities between Israeli and foreign companies. More information on their activities is available at http://www.export.gov.il/eng/About/About/.
In general, there are no restrictions on Israeli investors seeking to invest abroad. However, investing abroad may be restricted on national security grounds or in certain countries or sectors where the Israeli government deems such investment is not in the national interest.
Israel has protection of investment agreements with Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria (amending protocol), China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro (with Serbia), Burma, Poland, Romania (Amending protocol signed in 2010 but not in force), Serbia (with Montenegro), Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa (not in force), South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Uzbekistan.
Israel has free trade agreements with the European Union (EU), European Free Trade Association (a regional trade organization and free trade area consisting of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland), Turkey, Mexico, Canada, Jordan, Egypt, Panama, and Mercosur (an economic and political bloc comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay). Israel’s free trade agreement with the United Kingdom will come into force only after the United Kingdom exits the European Union. Israel’s free trade agreements with Colombia and Ukraine are awaiting ratification by the Knesset (Israeli parliament).
The United States and Israel signed a free trade agreement in 1985.
Israel has a bilateral tax treaty with United States. Israel signed its Income Tax Treaty with the United States in 1975.
3. Legal Regime
Transparency of the Regulatory System
Israel promotes open governance and has joined the International Open Government Partnership. The government’s policy is to pursue the goals of transparency and active reporting to the public, public participation, and accountability.
Israel’s regulatory system is transparent. Ministries and regulatory agencies give notice of proposed regulations to the public on a government web site: http://www.knesset.gov.il. The texts of proposed regulations are also published (in Hebrew) on this web site. The government requests comments from the public about proposed regulations.
Israel is a signatory to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), which covers most Israeli government entities and government-owned corporations. Most of the country’s open international public tenders are published in the local press. U.S. companies have recently won a limited number of government tenders, notably in the energy and communications sectors. However, government-owned corporations make extensive use of selective tendering procedures. In addition, the lack of transparency in the public procurement process discourages U.S. companies from participating in major projects and disadvantages those that choose to compete. Enforcement of the public procurement laws and regulations is not consistent.
Israel is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. (http://unctad.org/en/pages/home.aspx ). Foreign and national investors can find detailed information on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations including the number of steps, name and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal basis justifying the procedures.
International Regulatory Considerations
Israel is not a member of any major economic bloc but maintains strong economic relations with other economic blocs.
Israeli regulatory bodies in the Ministry of Economy (Standards Institute of Israel), Ministry of Health (Food Control Services), and the Ministry of Agriculture (Veterinary Services and the Plant Protection Service) often adopt standards developed by European standards organizations. Israel’s adoption of European standards rather than international standards results in the market exclusion of certain U.S. products and added costs for U.S. exports to Israel.
Israel became a member of the WTO in 1995. The Ministry of Economy and Industry’s Standardization Administration is responsible for notifying the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, and regularly does so.
Legal System and Judicial Independence
Israel has a written and consistently applied commercial law based on the British Companies Act of 1948, as amended. The judiciary is independent, but businesses complain about the length of time required to obtain judgments. The Supreme Court is an appellate court that also functions as the High Court of Justice. Israel does not employ a jury system. Israel established other tribunals to regulate specific issues and disputes in a specific area of law, including labor courts, antitrust issues, and intellectual property related issues.
Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment
There are few restrictions on foreign investors, except for parts of defense or other industries closed to outside investors on national security grounds. Foreign investors are welcome to participate in Israel’s privatization program.
Israeli courts exercise authority in cases within the jurisdiction of Israel. However, if an agreement between involved parties contains an exclusively foreign jurisdiction, the Israeli courts will generally decline to exercise their authority.
Israel’s Ministry of Economy sponsors the web site “Invest in Israel” at www.investinisrael.gov.il
The Investment Promotion Center of the Ministry of Economy seeks to encourage investment in Israel. The Center stresses Israel’s high marks in innovation, entrepreneurship, and Israel’s creative, skilled, and ambitious workforce. The Center also promotes Israel’s strong ties to the United States and Europe.
Competition and Anti-Trust Laws
Israel adopted its comprehensive competition law in 1988. Israel created the Israel Competition Authority (originally called the Israel Antitrust Authority) in 1994 to enforce the competition law.
Expropriation and Compensation
There have been no expropriations of U.S.-owned businesses in Israel in the recent past. Israeli law requires adequate payment, with interest from the day of expropriation until final payment, in cases of expropriation.
Dispute Settlement
ICSID Convention and New York Convention
Israel is a member of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) of the World Bank and the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Israel ratified the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 in 1959.
Investor-State Dispute Settlement
The Israeli government accepts binding international arbitration of investment disputes between foreign investors and the state. Israel’s Arbitration Law of 1968 governs both domestic and international arbitration proceedings in the country. The Israeli Knesset amended the law most recently in 2008. There are no known extrajudicial actions against foreign investors.
International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts
Israel formally institutionalized mediation in 1992 with the amendment of the Courts Law of 1984. The amendment granted courts the authority to refer civil disputes to mediation or arbitration with party consent. The Israeli courts tend to uphold and enforce arbitration agreements. Israel’s Arbitration Law predates the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.
Bankruptcy Regulations
Israeli Bankruptcy Law is based on several layers, some rooted in Common Law, when Palestine was under the British mandate in 1917-1948. Bankruptcy Law in Israel is mostly based on British law enacted in Palestine in 1936 during the British mandate.
Bankruptcy proceedings are based on the bankruptcy ordinance (1980), which replaced the mandatory ordinance enacted in 1936. Therefore, the bankruptcy law in Israel resembles the British law as it was more or less in 1936. Israel ranks 29th in the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report’s “resolving insolvency” category.
4. Industrial Policies
Investment Incentives
The State of Israel encourages both local and foreign investment by offering a wide range of incentives and benefits to investors in industry, tourism, and real estate. Israel’s Ministry of Economy places a priority on investments in hi-tech companies and R&D activities.
Most investment incentives available to Israeli citizens are also available to foreign investors. Israel’s Encouragement of Capital Investments Law, 5719-1959, outlines Israel’s investment incentive programs. The Israel Investment Center (IIC) coordinates the country’s investment incentive programs.
For complete information, potential investors should contact:
Investment Promotion Center
Ministry of Economy
5 Bank of Israel Street,
Jerusalem 91036
Tel: +972-2-666-2607
Website: www.investinisrael.gov.il
E-Mail: investinisrael@economy.gov.il
Israel Investment Center
Ministry of Economy
5 Bank of Israel Street,
Jerusalem 91036 490 http://economy.gov.il/English/About/Units/Pages/IsraelInvestmentCenter.aspx
Tel: +972-2-666-2828
Fax: +972-2-666-2905
Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation
Israel has bilateral Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ) Agreements with Egypt and Jordan. The QIZ initiative allows Egypt and Jordan to export products to the United States duty-free, as long as these products contain inputs from Israel (8 percent in the Israel-Jordan QIZ agreement, 10.5 percent in the Israel-Egypt QIZ agreement). Products manufactured in QIZs must comply with strict rules of origin. More information is available at the Israeli Ministry of Economy’s Foreign Trade Administration website: http://economy.gov.il/English/InternationalAffairs/ForeignTradeAdministration/Pages/RegionalCooperation.aspx
Israel has one free trade zone, the Red Sea port city of Eilat. More information on the Eilat Free Zone is available at: http://economy.gov.il/English/Industry/DevelopmentZoneIndustryPromotion/ZoneIndustryInfo/Pages/EilatNShachoret.aspx
Performance and Data Localization Requirements
There are no universal performance requirements on investments, but “offset” requirements are often included in sales contracts with the government. In some sectors, there is a requirement that Israelis own a percentage of a company. Israel’s visa and residency requirements are transparent. The Israeli government does not impose preferential policies on exports by foreign investors.
5. Protection of Property Rights
Real Property
Israel has a modern legal system based on British common law that provides effective means for enforcing property and contractual rights. Courts are independent. Israeli civil procedures provide that judgments of foreign courts may be accepted and enforced by local courts. The Israeli judicial system recognizes and enforces secured interests in property. A reliable system of recording such secured interests exists. The Israeli Land Administration, which manages land in Israel on behalf of the government, registers property transactions. Registering or obtaining land rights is a cumbersome process and Israel currently ranks 75th in “Registering Property” according to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report.
Intellectual Property Rights
The Intellectual Property Law Division and the Israel Patent Office (ILPO), both within the Ministry of Justice, are the principal government authorities overseeing the legal protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) in Israel. IPR protection in Israel has undergone many changes in recent decades as the Israeli economy has rapidly transformed into a knowledge-based economy.
In recent years, Israel revised its IPR legal framework several times to comply with newly signed international treaties. Israel took stronger, more comprehensive steps towards protecting IPR, and the government acknowledges that IPR theft costs rights holders millions of dollars per year, reducing tax revenues and slowing economic growth.
The United States removed Israel from the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report in 2014 after Israel passed patent legislation that satisfied the remaining commitments Israel made in a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States in 2010 concerning several longstanding issues regarding Israel’s IPR regime for pharmaceutical products. Israel has not been included in the Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List since.
Israel’s Knesset approved Amendment No. 5 to Israel’s Copyright Law of 2007 on January 1, 2019. The amendment aims to establish measures to combat copyright infringement on the internet while preserving the balance among copyright owners, internet users, and the free flow of information and free speech.
In July 2017, the Israeli Knesset passed the New Designs Bill, replacing Israel’s existing but obsolete ordinance governing industrial design. The bill, which came into force in August 2018, brings Israel into compliance with The Hague System for International Registration of Industrial designs.
Nevertheless, the United States remains concerned with the limitations of Israel’s copyright legislation, particularly related to digital copyright matters and with Israel’s interpretation of its commitment to protect data derived from pharmaceutical testing conducted in anticipation of the future marketing of biological products, also known as biologics.
While Israel has instituted several legislative improvements in recent years, the United States continues to urge Israel to strengthen and improve its IPR enforcement regime. Israel lacks specialized courts, common in other countries with advanced IPR regimes. General civil or administrative courts in Israel typically adjudicate IPR cases.
IPR theft, including trade secret misappropriation, can be common and relatively sophisticated in Israel. The European Commission “closely monitors” IP enforcement in Israel. The EC cites inadequate protection of innovative pharmaceutical products and end-user software piracy as the main issues with IPR enforcement in Israel.
Israel is a member of the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). It is a signatory to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Universal Copyright Convention, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, and the Patent Cooperation Treaty.
For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/
Resources for Rights Holders
Mr. Peter Mehravari
Intellectual Property Attaché for the Middle East & North Africa
U.S. Embassy Kuwait
Tel: +965 2259 1455
Email: Peter.Mehravari@trade.gov
6. Financial Sector
Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment
The Israeli government is supportive of foreign portfolio investment. The Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) is Israel’s only public stock exchange.
Financial institutions in Israel allocate credit on market terms. For many years, banks issued credit to only a handful of individuals and corporate entities, some of whom held controlling interests in banks. However, in recent years, banks significantly reduced their exposure to large borrowers following the introduction of stronger regulatory restrictions on preferential lending practices.
The primary profit center for Israeli banks is consumer-banking fees. Various credit instruments are available to the private sector and foreign investors can receive credit on the local market. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and conform to international norms, although the prevalence of inflation-adjusted accounting means there are differences from U.S. accounting principles.
In the case of publicly traded firms where ownership is widely dispersed, the practice of “cross-shareholding” and “stable shareholder” arrangements to prevent mergers and acquisitions is common, but not directed particularly at preventing potential foreign investment. Israel has no laws or regulations regarding the adoption by private firms of articles of incorporation or association that limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control.
Money and Banking System
The Bank of Israel (BOI) is Israel’s Central Bank and regulates all banking activity and monetary policy. In general, Israel has a healthy banking system that offers most of the same services as the U.S. banking system. Fees for normal banking transactions are significantly higher in Israel than in the United States and some services do not meet U.S. standards. There are 12 commercial banks and four foreign banks operating in Israel, according to the BOI. Five major banks, led by Bank Hapoalim and Bank Leumi, the two largest banks, dominate Israel’s banking sector. Bank Hapoalim and Bank Leumi control nearly 60 percent of Israel’s credit market. The State of Israel holds 6 percent of Bank Leumi’s shares. All of Israel’s other banks are privatized.
Foreign Exchange and Remittances
Foreign Exchange
Israel completed its foreign exchange liberalization process on January 1, 2003, when it removed the last restrictions on the freedom of institutional investors to invest abroad. The Israeli shekel is a freely convertible currency and there are no foreign currency controls. The BOI maintains the option to intervene in foreign currency trading in the event of movements in the exchange rate not in line with fundamental economic conditions, or if the BOI assesses the foreign exchange market is not functioning appropriately. Israeli citizens can invest without restriction in foreign markets. Foreign investors can open shekel accounts that allow them to invest freely in Israeli companies and securities. These shekel accounts are fully convertible into foreign exchange. Israel’s foreign exchange reserves totaled USD 133.5 billion at the end of April 2020.
Transfers of currency are protected by Article VII of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of Agreement: http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/AA/index.htm#art7
Remittance Policies
Most foreign currency transactions must be carried out through an authorized dealer. An authorized dealer is a banking institution licensed to arrange, inter alia, foreign currency transactions for its clients. The authorized dealer must report large foreign exchange transactions to the Controller of Foreign Currency. There are no limitations or significant delays in the remittance of profits, debt service, or capital gains.
Sovereign Wealth Funds
Israel passed legislation to establish the Israel Citizens’ Wealth Fund, a sovereign wealth fund managed by the BOI, in 2014 to offset the effect of natural gas production on the exchange rate. The original date for beginning the fund’s operations was 2018, but has been postponed until late 2021. The law establishing the fund states that it will begin operating a month after the state’s tax revenues from natural gas exceed USD 280 million (1 billion New Israeli Shekels).
7. State-Owned Enterprises
Israel established the Government Companies Authority (GCA) following the passage of the Government Companies Law. The GCA is an auxiliary unit of the Ministry of Finance. It is the administrative agency for state-owned companies in charge of supervision, privatization, and implementation of structural changes. The Israeli state only provides support for commercial SOEs in exceptional cases. The GCA leads the recruitment process for SOE board members. Board appointments are subject to the approval of a committee, which confirms whether candidates meet the minimum board member criteria set forth by law.
The GCA oversees some 100 companies, including commercial and noncommercial companies, government subsidiaries, and companies under mixed government-private ownership. Among these companies are some of the biggest and most complex in the Israeli economy, such as the Israel Electric Corporation, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, Israel Postal Company, Mekorot Israel National Water Company, Israel Natural Gas Lines, the Ashdod, Haifa, and Eilat Port Companies, Israel Railways, Petroleum and Energy Infrastructures and the Israel National Roads Company. The GCA does not publish a publicly available list of SOEs.
Israel is party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the World Trade Organization.
Privatization Program
In late 2014, Israel’s cabinet approved a privatization plan allowing the government to issue minority stakes of up to 49 percent in state-owned companies on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange over a three-year period, a plan estimated to increase government revenue by USD 4.1 billion. The plan aimed to sell stakes in Israel’s electric company, water provider, railway, post office and some defense-related contractors. The GCA will likely auction minority stakes in a public bidding process without formal restrictions on the participation of foreign investors. Restrictions on foreign investors could be possible in the case of companies deemed to be of strategic significance.
Israel’s interministerial privatization committee approved plans in January 2020 to sell off the Port of Haifa, Israel’s largest shipping hub. The incoming owner will be required to invest approximately USD 280 million (1 billion NIS) in the port, including the cost of upgrading infrastructure and financing the layoff of an estimated 200 workers. That same committee voted to enable private investment in Israel Post in an effort to sell up to 40 percent of the government’s shares in Israel Post.
8. Responsible Business Conduct
There is awareness of responsible business conduct among enterprises and civil society in Israel. Israel adheres to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and a National Contact Point is operating in the Foreign Trade Administration. Israel is not a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.
Israel’s National Contact Point sits in the Responsible Business Conduct unit in the OECD Department of the Foreign Trade Administration in the Ministry of Economy and Industry. An advisory committee, including representatives from the Ministries of Economy, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and the Environment, assist the National Contact Point. The National Contact Point also works in cooperation with the Manufacturer’s Association of Israel, workers’ organizations, and civil society to promote awareness of the guidelines.
9. Corruption
Bribery and other forms of corruption are illegal under several Israeli laws and Civil Service regulations. Israel became a signatory to the OECD Bribery convention in November 2008 and a full member of the OECD in May 2010. Israel ranks 35 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index, dropping one place from its 2018 ranking. Several Israeli NGOs focus on public sector ethics in Israel and Transparency International has a local chapter.
Israel is a signatory of the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.
The Israeli National Police, state comptroller, Attorney General, and Accountant General are responsible for combating official corruption. These entities operate effectively and independently and are sufficiently resourced. NGOs that focus on anticorruption efforts operate freely without government interference.
The international NGO Transparency International closely monitors corruption in Israel.
Resources to Report Corruption
Ministry of Justice
Office of the Director General
29 Salah a-Din Street Jerusalem
02-6466533, 02-6466534, 02-6466535
mancal@justice.gov.il
Transparency International Israel
Ms. Ifat Zamir
Tel Aviv University, Faculty of Management +972 3 640 9176
+972 3 640 9176
ifat@ti-israel.org
10. Political and Security Environment
For the latest safety and security information regarding Israel and the current travel advisory level, see the Travel Advisory for Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza (https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/israel-west-bank-and-gaza-travel-advisory.html).
The security situation remains complex in Israel and the West Bank, and can change quickly depending on the political environment, recent events, and geographic location. Terrorist groups and lone-wolf terrorists continue plotting possible attacks in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Terrorists may attack with little or no warning, targeting tourist locations, transportation hubs, markets or shopping malls, and local government facilities. Violence can occur in Jerusalem and the West Bank without warning. Terror attacks in Jerusalem and the West Bank have resulted in the deaths and injury of U.S. citizens and others. Hamas, a U.S. government-designated foreign terrorist organization, controls security in Gaza. The security environment within Gaza and on its borders is dangerous and volatile.
11. Labor Policies and Practices
The most recent Central Bureau of Statistics data from the first quarter of 2020 indicate there are 4.1 million people active in the Israeli labor force. According to OECD data, 48 percent of Israelis aged between 25 and34 years have a tertiary education. Many university students specialize in fields with high industrial R&D potential, including engineering, computer science, mathematics, physical sciences, and medicine. According to the Investment Promotion Center, there are more than 145 scientists out of every 10,000 workers in Israel, one of the highest rates in the world. The rapid growth of Israel’s high-tech sector in the late 1990s increased the demand for workers with specialized skills.
The unemployment rate among 25-64 year-olds was 3.5 percent at the end of the first quarter of 2020, according to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.
According to Israel’s Population and Immigration Authority, at the end of 2019 there were 295,100 non-Israelis employed in Israel.
The national labor federation, the Histadrut, organizes about 17 percent of all Israeli workers. Collective bargaining negotiations in the public sector take place between the Histadrut and representatives from the Ministry of Finance. The number of strikes has declined significantly as the public sector has gotten smaller. However, strikes remain a common and viable negotiating vehicle in many difficult wage negotiations.
Israel strictly observes the Friday afternoon to Saturday afternoon Jewish Sabbath and special permits must be obtained from the government authorizing Sabbath employment. At the age of 18, most Israelis are required to perform 2-3 years of national service in the military or in select civilian institutions. Until their mid-40s, Israeli males are required to perform about a month of military reserve duty annually, during which time they receive compensation from national insurance companies.
12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation and Other Investment Insurance Programs
There is an Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) agreement between Israel and OPIC previously backed projects in Israel. Israel is a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).
13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics
Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
Host Country Statistical source*
USG or international statistical source
USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data
Year
Amount
Year
Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD)
Ethiopia’s economy is in transition. Coming off a decade of double-digit growth, fueled primarily by public infrastructure projects funded through debt, the Government of Ethiopia (GOE) has tightened its belt, reducing inefficient government expenditures and attempting to get its accounts in order at bloated state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Just in the last year, the GOE has also introduced a new and more liberal investment code, started the privatization process for the telecommunications monopoly, and eliminated numerous burdensome regulations. The IMF put the growth of the Ethiopian economy at 9 percent for FY2018/19, driven by manufacturing and services. While recent growth estimates have been revised downward due to the COVID-19 pandemic, growth prospects for Ethiopia remain better than those for most Sub-Saharan African nations. Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa after Nigeria, with a population of over 110 million, approximately two-thirds of whom are under age 30. Low-cost labor, a national airline with well over 100 passenger connections, and growing consumer markets are key elements attracting foreign investment.
The Government of Ethiopia (GOE) in September of 2019 unveiled its “Homegrown Economic Reform Plan” as a codified roadmap to implement sweeping macro, structural, and sectoral reform, with a focus on enhancing the role of the private sector in the economy and attracting more foreign direct investment. The ambitious three-year plan prioritizes growth in five sectors, namely mining, ICT, agriculture, tourism, and manufacturing. In December of 2019, the IMF approved a three-year, 2.9 billion U.S. dollar program to support the reform agenda. The program seeks to reduce public sector borrowing, rein in inflation, and reform the exchange rate regime.
The challenges remain vast. Ethiopia’s imports in the last three years have experienced a slight decline in large part due to a reduction in public investment programs and a dire foreign exchange shortage. Export performance remains weak, declining due to falling primary commodity prices and an overvalued exchange rate. The acute foreign exchange shortage (the Ethiopian birr is not a freely convertible currency) and the absence of capital markets are choking private sector growth. Companies often face long lead-times importing goods and dispatching exports due to logistical bottlenecks, high land-transportation costs, and bureaucratic delays. Ethiopia is not a signatory of major intellectual property rights treaties.
All land in Ethiopia is administered by the government and private ownership does not exist. “Land-use rights” have been registered in most populated areas. The GOE retains the right to expropriate land for the “common good,” which it defines to include expropriation for commercial farms, industrial zones, and infrastructure development. Successful investors in Ethiopia conduct thorough due diligence on land titles at both the regional and federal levels and undertake consultations with local communities regarding the proposed use of the land.
The largest volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Ethiopia comes from China, followed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Political instability associated with various ethnic conflicts could negatively impact the investment climate and lower future FDI inflow.
1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment
Policies towards Foreign Direct Investment
Ethiopia needs significant inflows of FDI to meet its ambitious growth goals. Over the past year, to attract more foreign investment, the government has passed a new investment law, ratified the New York Convention on Arbitration, and streamlined commercial registration and business licensing laws. The government has also started implementing the Public Private Partnership (PPP) proclamation (law), to allow for private investment in the power generation and road construction sectors.
The Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC) has the mandate to promote and facilitate foreign investments in Ethiopia. To accomplish this task, the EIC is charged with 1) promoting the country’s investment opportunities to attract and retain investment; 2) issuing investment permits, business licenses, and construction permits; 3) issuing commercial registration certificates and renewals; 4) negotiating and signing bilateral investment agreements; 5) issuing work permits; and 6) registering technology transfer agreements. In addition, the EIC has the mandate to advise the government on policies to improve the investment climate and hold regular and structured public-private dialogue with investors and their associations. At the local level, regional investment agencies facilitate regional investment. Though Ethiopia has shown relative progress in two doing business indicators, specifically the ease of obtaining construction permits and registering property, its overall rank on the 2020 World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index was 159 out of 190 countries, which is the exact same ranking from 2018 and 2019. In order to improve the investment climate, attract more FDI, and tackle unemployment challenges, the Prime Minister’s Office formed a committee to systematically examine each indicator on the Doing Business Index and identify factors that inhibit businesses.
The American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) works on voicing the concerns of U.S. businesses in Ethiopia. AmCham provides a mechanism for coordination among American companies and also facilitates regular meetings with government officials to discuss issues that hinder operations in Ethiopia. The Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce also organizes a monthly business forum that enables the business community to discuss issues related to the investment climate with government officials by sector.
Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment
Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish, acquire, own, and dispose of most forms of business enterprises. A new Investment Proclamation, approved in early 2020, outlines the areas of investment reserved for government and local investors. There is no private ownership of land in Ethiopia. All land is owned by the state, but can be leased for up to 99 years. Small-scale rural landholders have indefinite use rights, but cannot lease out holdings for extended periods, except in the Amhara Region. The 2011 Urban Land Lease Proclamation allows the government to determine the value of land in transfers of leasehold rights, in an attempt to curb speculation by investors.
A foreign investor intending to buy an existing private enterprise or shares in an existing enterprise needs to obtain prior approval from the EIC. While foreign investors have complained about inconsistent interpretation of the regulations governing investment registration (particularly relating to accounting for in-kind investments), they generally do not face undue screening of FDI, unfavorable tax treatment, denial of licenses, discriminatory import or export policies, or inequitable tariff and non-tariff barriers.
Other Investment Policy Reviews
Over the past three years, the government has not undertaken any third party investment policy review by a multilateral or non-governmental organization. The government has worked closely with some international stakeholders, however, such as the International Finance Corporation, in its recent attempts to modernize and streamline its investment regulations.
Business Facilitation
The EIC has attempted to establish itself as a “one-stop shop” for foreign investors by acting as a centralized location where investors can obtain the visas, permits, and paperwork they need, thereby reducing the time and cost of investing and acquiring business licenses. The EIC has worked with international consultants to modernize its operations, and as part of its work plan has adopted a customer manager system to build lasting relationships and provide post-investment assistance to investors. Despite progress, the EIC readily admits that many bureaucratic barriers to investment remain. In particular, U.S. investors report that the EIC, as a federal organization, has little influence at regional and local levels. According to the 2020 World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Report, on average, it takes 32 days to start a business in Ethiopia.
Currently, more than 95 percent of Ethiopia’s trade passes through the Port of Djibouti, with residual trade passing through the Somaliland Port of Berbera or Port Sudan. Ethiopia concluded an agreement in March of 2018 with the Somaliland Ports Authority and DP World to acquire a 19 percent stake in the joint venture developing the Port of Berbera. The agreement will help Ethiopia secure an additional logistical gateway for its increasing import and export trade. Following the July 2018 rapprochement with Eritrea, the Ethiopian government has investigated the opportunity of accessing an alternative port at either Massawa or Assab.
The Government of Ethiopia is working to improve business facilitation services by making the licensing and registration of businesses easier and faster, though online registration is not yet available. An amended commercial registration and licensing law eliminates the requirement to publicize business registrations in local newspapers, allows business registration without a physical address, and reduces some other paperwork burdens associated with business registration. U.S. companies can obtain detailed information for the registration of their business in Ethiopia from an online investment guide to Ethiopia: (https://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/ethiopia). Though the government is taking positive steps to socially empower women (approximately half of cabinet members are women), there is no special treatment provided to women who wish to engage in business.
There is no officially recorded outward investment by domestic investors from Ethiopia as citizens/local investors are not allowed to hold foreign accounts.
2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties
Ethiopia is a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and it has bilateral investment and protection agreements with Algeria, Austria, China, Denmark, Egypt, Germany, Finland, France, Iran, Israel, Italy, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen. Other bilateral investment agreements have been signed but are not in force with Belgium/Luxemburg, Brazil, Equatorial Guinea, India, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates. Ethiopia signed a protection of investment and property acquisition agreement with Djibouti. A Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, which entered into force in 1953, governs economic and consular relations with the United States.
There is no double taxation treaty between the United States and Ethiopia. Ethiopia has such taxation treaties with fourteen countries, including Italy, Kuwait, Romania, Russia, Tunisia, Yemen, Israel, South Africa, Sudan, and the United Kingdom.
3. Legal Regime
Transparency of the Regulatory System
Ethiopia’s regulatory system is generally considered fair, though there are instances in which burdensome regulatory or licensing requirements have prevented the local sale of U.S. exports, particularly health-related products. Investment decisions can involve multiple government ministries, lengthening the registration and investment process.
The Constitution is the highest law of the country. The Parliament enacts proclamations, which are followed by regulations that are passed by the Council of Ministers, and implementing directives that are passed by ministries or agencies. The government increasingly engages the public for feedback before passage of draft legislation through public meetings, and regulatory agencies request comments on proposed regulations from stakeholders. Ministries or regulatory agencies do neither impact assessments for proposed regulations nor ex-post reviews. Parties that are affected by an adopted regulation can request reconsideration or appeal to the relevant administrative agency or court. There is no requirement to periodically review regulations to determine whether they are still relevant or should be revised.
Legal matters related to the federal government are entertained by Federal Courts, while state matters go to state courts. To ensure consistency of legal interpretation and to promote predictability of the courts, the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division is empowered to give binding legal interpretation on all federal and state matters. Though there are no publicly listed companies in Ethiopia, all banks and insurance companies are obliged to adhere to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
Regulations related to human health and environmental pollution are often enforced. In January 2019, the Oromia Region Environment, Forest and Climate Change Commission shut down three tanneries in Oromia Region for what was said to be repeated environmental pollution offenses. The government also suspended the business license of MIDROC Gold Mine in May 2018 following weeks of protests by local communities who accused the company of causing health and environmental hazards in the Oromia Region. The Ethiopian Parliament in February of 2019 passed a bill entitled ‘Food and Medicine Administration Proclamation,’ which bans smoking in all indoor workplaces, public spaces, and means of public transport and prohibits alcohol promotion on broadcasting media.
Ethiopia published on April 7 the Administrative Procedure Proclamation (APP) in the federal gazette, the final step for a law to come into force. The APP’s main aim is to allow ordinary citizens who seek administrative redress to file suits in federal courts against government institutions. Potential redress includes financial restitution. The APP’s passage will require government institutions to set up offices that will handle such complaints. Complainants are required to follow an administrative appeal process, and only after exhausting administrative remedies will a person be allowed to file a suit in federal court. Four government institutions are exempt from the APP: the Federal Attorney General’s Office; the Ethiopian Federal Police; the Ethiopian Defense Forces and the intelligence agencies. The enactment of the APP is widely viewed as a positive step in increasing confidence in the public sector and addressing the need for governmental institutions to adhere to the rule of law.
Ethiopia is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. Foreign and national investors can find detailed information from the investment commission website http://www.investethiopia.gov.et/investment-process and https://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/ethiopia on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations. These details include the number of steps; name and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures; required documents and conditions; costs; processing times; and legal bases justifying the procedures.
The government released its five-year public finance administration strategic plan (2018-2022) in March 2018, mapping out reforms in government revenue and expenditure forecasting, government accounts management, internal auditing, public procurement administration, public debt management, and public financial transparency and accountability. In support of this initiative, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) issued a directive on Public Financial Transparency and Accountability in October 2018. The directive mandates that all public institutions report their budgetary performance and financial accounts in platforms that are accessible to the wider public in a timely manner. It also makes the MOF responsible for disseminating a regular and detailed physical and financial performance evaluation of large publicly-funded projects. The directive further outlines a clear timeline for the publication of each major piece of budgetary information, such as the pre-budget macroeconomic and fiscal framework, the enacted budget, quarterly execution reports, annual execution reports, and the annual audit report.
International Regulatory Considerations
Ethiopia ratified the AfCFTA on March 21, 2019. The AfCFTA aims to create a single, continental market for goods and services, with free movement of business persons and investments. Ethiopia is also a member of Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), a regional economic block, which has 21 member countries and has introduced a 10 percent tariff reduction on goods imported from member states. Ethiopia has not yet joined the COMESA free trade area, however. Ethiopia resumed its World Trade Organization (WTO) accession process in 2018, which it originally began in 2003, but which later stagnated.
Ethiopian standards have a national scope and applicability and some of them, particularly those related to human health and environmental protection, are mandatory. The Ethiopian Standards Agency is the national standards body of Ethiopia.
Legal System and Judicial Independence
Ethiopia has codified criminal and civil laws, including commercial and contractual law. According to the contractual law, a contract agreement is binding between contracting parties. Disputes between the parties can be taken to court. There are, however, no specialized courts for commercial law cases, although there are specialized benches at both the federal and state courts.
While there have been allegations of executive branch interference in judiciary cases with political implications, there is no evidence of widespread interference in purely commercial disputes. The country has a procedural code for civil and criminal court, but the practice is minimal. Enforcement actions are appealable and there are at least three appeal processes from the lower courts to the Supreme Court. The Criminal Procedure Code follows the inquisitorial system of adjudication.
Companies that operate businesses in Ethiopia assert that courts lack adequate experience and staffing, particularly with respect to commercial disputes. While property and contractual rights are recognized, judges often lack understanding of commercial matters, including bankruptcy and contractual disputes. In addition, cases often face extended scheduling delays. Contract enforcement remains weak, though Ethiopian courts will at times reject spurious litigation aimed at contesting legitimate tenders.
Ethiopia is in the process of reforming its Commercial Code to bring it in line with international best practices. The draft legislation appears to address many concerns raised by the business community, including the creation of a commercial court under the regular court system to improve the expertise of judges as well as to increase the speed with which commercial disputes are resolved. The new Commercial Code should also include regulations covering e-commerce and digital businesses.
Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment
The Investment Proclamation 1180/2020 is Ethiopia’s main legal regime related to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). This law instituted the opening of new economic sectors to foreign investment, enumerated the requirements for FDI registration, and outlined the incentives that are available to investors.
The 2020 investment law allows foreign investors to invest in any investment area except those that are clearly reserved for domestic investors. A few specified investment areas are possible for foreign investors only as part of a joint venture with domestic investors or the government. The Investment Proclamation has introduced an Investment Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, to accelerate implementation of the new law and to address coordination challenges investors face at the federal and regional levels. Further, the new law expanded the mandate of the EIC by allowing it to provide approvals to foreign investors proposing to buy existing enterprises. The EIC now also delivers “one stop shop” services by consolidating investor services provided by other ministries and agencies. Still, the EIC delegates licensing of investments in some areas: air transport services (the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority), energy generation and transmission (the Ethiopian Energy Authority), and telecommunication services (the Ethiopian Communications Authority).
Ethiopia’s Trade Practice and Consumers Protection Authority (TPCPA), operating under the Ministry of Trade and Industry, is tasked with promoting a competitive business environment by regulating anti-competitive, unethical, and unfair trade practices to enhance economic efficiency and social welfare. It has an administrative tribunal with a jurisdiction on matters pertaining to market competition and consumer protection. The authority also annually entertains many cases associated with consumer protection and unfair trade practices.
The EIC reviews investment transactions for compliance with FDI requirements and restrictions as outlined by the Investment Proclamation. Nonetheless, companies have complained that SOEs receive favorable treatment in the government tender process. The public sector’s heavy involvement in economic development means that SOEs often obtain a sizeable portion of open tenders.
Expropriation and Compensation
Per the 2020 Investment Proclamation, no investment by a domestic or foreign investor or enterprise can be expropriated or nationalized, wholly or partially, except when required by public interest in compliance with the law and provided adequate compensatory payment.
The former Derg military regime nationalized many properties in the 1970s. The current government’s position is that property seized lawfully by the Derg (by court order or government proclamation published in the official gazette) remains the property of the state. In most cases, property seized by oral order or other informal means is gradually being returned to the rightful owners or their heirs through a lengthy bureaucratic process. Claimants are required to pay for improvements made by the government during the time it controlled the property. The Public Enterprises, Assets, and Administration Agency stopped accepting requests from owners for return of expropriated properties in July of 2008.
According to local and foreign businesses operating in the Oromia Region, there have been a number of isolated incidents threatening investors in that region. Various pretexts have been used to close legitimate operations. False charges have been filed with regional courts, property has been confiscated, and bank accounts have been frozen, all in the name of “returning the land” to the “rightful owners” or “creating job opportunities” for the youth. Regional officials, however, deny any systematic attack on investors and have repeatedly provided assurance that all legitimate investors will be protected. Meanwhile, other investors who have invested heavily in government and community relations and actively engaged local and regional officials have prospered. The experience of investors is overall uneven and clear trends are not evident.
Dispute Settlement
ICSID Convention and New York Convention
Since 1965, Ethiopia has been a non-signatory member state to the International Centre for Settlement of Disputes (ICSID) Convention. In 2020 the Parliament ratified the Convention on The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (commonly known as the New York Convention).
Investor-State Dispute Settlement
The constitution and the investment law both guarantee the right of any investor to lodge complaints related to his/her investment with the appropriate investment agency. If he/she has a grievance against a legal or regulatory decision, he/she can appeal to the investment board or to the respective regional agency, as appropriate. According to the new investment law, the investment dispute between the state and foreign investor can be resolved either through the courts or via arbitration, with the precondition of government agreement for resolution via the latter. Additionally, a dispute that arises between a foreign investor and the state may be settled based on the relevant bilateral investment treaty.
Due to an overloaded court system, dispute resolution can last for years. According to the 2020 World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report, it takes on average 530 days to enforce contracts through the courts.
International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts
Arbitration has become a widely used means of dispute settlement among the business community as the Ethiopian civil code recognizes Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms as a means of dispute resolution. The Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce has an Arbitration Center to assist with arbitration. Subsequent to Ethiopia’s ratification of the New York Convention, local courts now must automatically recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards from a New York Convention member state country. There are no publicly available statistics that indicate a bias in the courts towards state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as pertains to investment/commercial disputes.
Bankruptcy Regulations
The Ethiopian Commercial Code (Book V) outlines bankruptcy provisions and proceedings and establishes a court system that has jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings. The primary purpose of the law is to protect creditors, equity shareholders, and other contractors. Bankruptcy is not criminalized. In practice, there is limited application of bankruptcy procedures due to lack of knowledge on the part of the private sector.
According to the 2020 World Bank Doing Business Report, Ethiopia stands at 149 in the ranking of 190 economies with respect to resolving insolvency. Ethiopia’s score on the strength of insolvency framework index is 5.0. (Note: The index ranges from zero to 16, with higher values indicating insolvency legislation that is better designed for rehabilitating viable firms and liquidating nonviable ones.)
4. Industrial Policies
Investment Incentives
Ethiopia is currently drafting updated investment regulations that are expected to outline detailed incentives for investors. According to the Investment Regulation 270/2012 and the 2014 amendment, however, new investors in manufacturing, agro-processing, and selected agricultural products are entitled to income tax exemptions ranging from two to five years, depending on the location of the investment. Any investor who produces for export or supplies to an exporter, or who exports at least 60 percent of his products or services, is entitled to an additional two years of income tax exemption.
An investor who establishes a new enterprise in less prosperous areas shall be entitled to an income tax deduction of 30 percent for three consecutive years after the expiry of the regular income tax exemption period. These areas include Gambella Region; Benishangul/Gumuz Region; Afar Region (except in areas within 15 kilometers from each bank of the Awash River); Somali Region; Guji and Borena Zones of Oromia; South Omo Zone, Segen Zone, Bench Maji Zone, Sheka Zone, Dawro Zone, Kaffa Zone, Basketo Woreda, and Konta Special Woreda, all of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region.
Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation
The Industrial Park Proclamation 886/2015 mandates that the Ethiopian Industrial Parks Corporation develop and administer industrial parks under the auspices of government ownership. The law designates industrial parks as duty-free zones, and domestic as well as foreign operators in the parks are exempt from income tax for up to 10 years. Investors operating in parks are also exempt from duties and other taxes on the import of capital goods, construction materials, and raw materials for production of export commodities and vehicles.
An investor who operates in a designated Industrial Development Zone in or near Addis Ababa is entitled to two years of income tax exemptions, and four more years of income tax exemption if the investment is made in an industrial park in other areas, provided 80 percent or more of production is for export or constitutes input for an exporter.
Industrial Parks can be developed by either government or private developers. In practice, the majority have been developed by the Ethiopian government with Chinese financing. The government has announced plans to construct a total of 17 industrial parks in various locations around the country. As of April, operational industrial parks include Hawassa Industrial Park, Bole Lemi Indusrtial Park, Eastern Industrial Zone, George Shoe Ethiopia, Mekele Industrial Park, Kombolcha Industrial Park, Adama Industrial Park, and Debre Berhan Industrial Park. The government also has plans for four agro-industrial processing parks to be located at strategic sites across the country, though none have yet been completed.
Performance and Data Localization Requirements
Ethiopia does not formally impose performance requirements on foreign investors, though investors in Ethiopia routinely encounter business visa delays and onerous paperwork requirements. In addition, investors are required to allocate a minimum of 200,000 U.S. dollars per investment project, with the requirement being lowered to 100,000 U.S. dollars for architectural or engineering projects. For most joint investments with a domestic partner, the investment requirement is lowered to 150,000 U.S. dollars.
The minimum capital requirement is waived if the foreign investor reinvests profits or dividends generated from an existing enterprise in any investment area open for foreign investors; and if a foreign investor purchases a portion or the entirety of an existing enterprise owned by another foreign investor. There are no forced localization or data storage requirements for private investors. Local content in terms of hiring, products, and services is strongly encouraged but not required. The EIC, in collaboration with the Immigration, Nationality and Vital Events Agency, facilitates visas and work permits for investors and expatriate workers. The government typically issues three to five year multiple entry visas for foreign investors, senior management, and board members.
In the absence of qualified local personnel, an investor can employ foreigners in positions of higher management (chief executive officer, chief operation officer, and chief financial officer), supervisor, trainers, and other technical professionals. While the investor is in theory supposed to replace expatriates with Ethiopian employees within a limited period of time, in practice many qualified expatriates have worked in Ethiopia for years. Although not a legal requirement, in joint ventures with state-owned enterprises investors report informal requirements of up to 30 percent domestic content in goods and/or technology.
EthioTelecom is the sole telecommunications service provider in Ethiopia. The government in 2018 announced plans to liberalize the telecommunications sector and open the market to foreign service providers and foreign telecom infrastructure companies. Ethiopia approved a bill in August of 2019 which established a regulatory agency for communication services that will regulate the telecommunications sector and develop rules and guidelines for foreign investment. The communications regulator has also released three of 12 planned telecommunications directives, which provide detailed regulatory guidance for the liberalization. Proclamation No. 808/2013 mandates that the Information Network Security Agency (INSA) control the import and export of information technology, build an information technology testing and evaluation laboratory center, and regulate cryptographic products and their transactions.
5. Protection of Property Rights
Real Property
The constitution recognizes and protects ownership of private property, however all land in Ethiopia belongs to “the people” and is administered by the government. Private ownership does not exist, but land-use rights have been registered in most populated areas. As land is public property, it cannot be mortgaged. Confusion with respect to the registration of urban land-use rights, particularly in Addis Ababa, is common. Allegations of corruption in the allocation of urban land to private investors by government agencies are a major source of popular discontent. The government retains the right to expropriate land for the common good, which it defines as including expropriation for commercial farms, industrial zones, and infrastructure development. While the government claims to allocate only sparsely settled or empty land to investors, some people have been resettled. In particular, traditional grazing land has often been defined as empty and expropriated, leading to resentment, protests and, in some cases, conflict. In addition, leasehold regulations vary in form and practice by region. Successful investors in Ethiopia conduct thorough due diligence on land titles at both regional and federal levels, and conduct consultations with local communities regarding the proposed use of the land before investing.
We encourage potential investors to ensure their needs are communicated clearly to the host government. It is important for investors to understand who had land-use rights preceding them, and to research the attitude of local communities to an investor’s use of that land, particularly in the region of Oromia, where conflict between international investors and local communities has occurred.
The 2020 World Bank Doing Business Report has ranked Ethiopia 142 out of 190 economies in registering property, as it takes on average 52 days to register property.
Intellectual Property Rights
The Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office (EIPO) oversees intellectual property rights (IPR) issues. Ethiopia is has not completed its WTO accession and consequently is not party to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Ethiopia is not yet a signatory to a number of major IPR treaties, such as the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty, the Berne Convention for Literary and Artistic Works, the Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks, or the Patent Cooperation Treaty. Ethiopia recently ratified the Marrakesh Treaty to facilitate access to published works for persons who are blind, visually impaired, or otherwise print disabled. The government has expressed its intention to accede to the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, and the Madrid Protocol. EIPO is primarily tasked with protecting Ethiopian patents and copyrights and fighting software piracy. Historically, however, the EIPO has struggled with a lack of qualified staff and small budgets; further, the institution does not have law enforcement authority. Abuse of U.S. trademarks is rampant, particularly in the hospitality and retail sectors. The government does not publicly track counterfeit goods seizures, and no estimates are available. Ethiopia is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or Notorious Markets List.
Ethiopia has a limited and undeveloped financial sector, and investment is largely closed off to foreign firms. Liquidity at many banks is limited, and commercial banks often require 100 percent collateral, making access to credit one of the greatest hindrances to growth in the country. Ethiopia has the largest economy in Africa without a securities market, and sales/purchases of debt are heavily regulated.
The IMF, as part of its Extended Credit Facility and Extended Fund Facility, in December of 2019 approved a three-year, 2.9 billion U.S. dollar program to support Ethiopia’s economic reform agenda. The program seeks to reduce public sector borrowing, rein in inflation, and reform the exchange rate regime. In preparation for the program, Ethiopia rescheduled much of its external debt with significant bilateral lenders.
The Ethiopian government has announced, as part of its overall economic reform effort, its intention to liberalize the financial sector. The government has already made good progress by allowing non-financial Ethiopian firms to participate in mobile money activities, introducing Treasury-bill auctions with market pricing, and reducing forced lending to the government on the part of the commercial banks. Still, the creation of a stock market and the fuller participation of foreign financial firms in the sector likely remain years away.
The NBE began offering, in December of 2019, a limited number of 28-day and 91-day Treasury bills at market-determined interest rates. The move was part of an effort to expand the NBE’s monetary policy tools and finance the government in a more sustainable way. Previously, the NBE had only sold Treasury bills at below-market interest rates, and the only buyers were public sector enterprises, primarily the Public Social Security Agency and the Development Bank of Ethiopia.
Ethiopia issued its first Eurobond in December of 2014, raising 1 billion U.S. dollars at a rate of 6.625 percent. The 10-year bond was oversubscribed, indicating continued market interest in high-growth sub-Saharan African markets. According to the Ministry of Finance, the bond proceeds are being used to finance industrial parks, the sugar industry, and power transmission infrastructure. Due to its increasing external debt load and the terms of its IMF program, the Ethiopian government has committed to refrain from non-concessional financing for new projects and to shift ongoing projects to concessional financing when possible.
The Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX), launched in 2008, trades commodities such as coffee, sesame seeds, maize, wheat, mung beans, chickpeas, soybeans, and green beans. The government launched ECX to increase transparency in commodity pricing, alleviate food shortages, and encourage the commercialization of agriculture. Critics allege that ECX policies and pricing structures are inefficient compared to direct sales at prevailing market rates, triggering an amendment to the ECX law in July 2017 that eliminated a number of criticized regulations, and permitted the trading of financial instruments at a future date.
Money and Banking System
Ethiopia has 18 commercial banks, two of which are state-owned banks, and 16 of which are privately owned banks. The Development Bank of Ethiopia, a state-owned bank, provides loans to investors in priority sectors, notably agriculture and manufacturing. By regional standards, the 16 private commercial banks are not large (either by total assets or total lending), and their service offerings are not sophisticated. Mobile money and digital finance, for instance, remain limited in Ethiopia. Foreign banks are not permitted to provide financial services in Ethiopia, however, since April 2007, Ethiopia has allowed some foreign banks to open liaison offices in Addis Ababa to facilitate credit to companies from their countries of origins. Chinese, German, Kenyan, Turkish, and South African banks have opened liaison offices in Ethiopia, but the market remains completely closed to foreign retail banks. Foreigners of Ethiopian origin are now allowed to hold shares in financial institutions.
Based on recently made available data, the state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia mobilizes more than 60 percent of total bank deposits, bank loans, and foreign exchange. The NBE controls the bank’s minimum deposit rate, which now stands at 7 percent, while loan interest rates are allowed to float. Real deposit interest rates have been negative in recent years, mainly due to inflation. The government of Ethiopia in November of 2019 rescinded the so-called “27 percent Rule,” which mandated forced, below inflation rate lending by the commercial banks to the NBE.
Foreign Exchange and Remittances
ForeignExchange
All foreign currency transactions must be approved by the NBE. Ethiopia’s national currency (the Ethiopian birr) is not freely convertible. The GOE removed in September 2018 the limit on holding foreign currency accounts faced by non-resident Ethiopians and non-resident foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin.
Foreign exchange reserves started to become depleted in 2012 and have remained at critically low levels since then. At present, gross reserves stand at about 4 billion U.S. dollars, covering approximately 2 months of imports. According to the IMF, heavy government infrastructure investment, along with debt servicing and a large trade imbalance, have all fueled the intense demand for foreign exchange. In addition, the decrease in foreign exchange reserves has been exacerbated by weaker-than-expected earnings from coffee exports and low international commodity prices for other important exports such as oil seeds. Businesses encounter delays of six months to two years in obtaining foreign exchange, and they must deposit the full equivalent in Ethiopian birr in their accounts to begin the process to obtain foreign exchange. Slowdowns in manufacturing due to foreign exchange shortages are common, and high-profile local businesses have closed their doors altogether due to the inability to import required goods in a timely fashion.
Due to the foreign exchange shortage, companies have experienced delays of up to two years in the repatriation of larger volumes of profits. Local sourcing of inputs and partnering with export-oriented partners are strategies employed by the private sector to address the foreign exchange shortage, but access to foreign exchange remains a problem that limits growth, interferes with maintenance and spare parts replacement, and inhibits imports of adequate raw materials.
The foreign exchange shortage distorts the economy in a number of other ways: it fuels the contraband trade through Somaliland because the Ethiopian birr is an unofficial currency there and can be used for the purchase of products from around the world. Exporters, who have priority access to foreign exchange, sell their allocations to importers at inflated rates, creating a black-market for dollars that is roughly 30 to 40 percent over the official rate. Other exporters use their foreign exchange earnings to import consumer goods with high margins, rather than re-investing profits in their core businesses. Meanwhile, the lack of access to foreign exchange impacts the ability of American citizens living in Ethiopia to pay their taxes, or for students to pay school fees abroad.
The Ethiopian birr has depreciated significantly against the U.S. dollar over the past ten years, primarily through a series of controlled steps, including a 20 percent devaluation in September 2010 and a 15 percent devaluation in October 2017. The NBE increased the devaluation rate of the Ethiopian birr starting in November of 2019, and it has continued to be devalued at a more rapid rate since that time, as per the terms of the IMF program. The official exchange rate was approximately 33.60 Ethiopian birr per dollar as of May 2020. The illegal parallel market exchange rate for the same time was approximately 42 Ethiopian birr per dollar.
Following the 15 percent devaluation of the Ethiopian birr, the NBE increased the minimum saving interest rate from four percent to seven percent, and limited the outstanding loan growth rate in commercial banks to 16.5 percent, which limits their loan provision for businesses other than those in the export and manufacturing sectors. Moreover, banks were instructed to transfer 30 percent of their foreign exchange earnings to the account of NBE so the regulator can use the foreign exchange to meet the strategic needs of the country, including payments to procure petroleum, wheat, and sugar, as well as to cover transportation costs of imported items.
Ethiopia’s Financial Intelligence Unit monitors suspicious currency transfers, including large transactions exceeding 200,000 Ethiopian birr (roughly equivalent to U.S. reporting requirements for currency transfers exceeding 10,000 U.S. dollars). Ethiopia citizens are not allowed to hold or open an account in foreign exchange. Ethiopian residents entering the country from abroad should declare their foreign currency in excess of 1,000 U.S. dollars and non-residents in excess of 3,000 U.S. dollars. Residents are not allowed to hold foreign currency for more than 30 days after acquisition. A maximum of 1000 Ethiopian birr in cash can be carried out of the country.
RemittancePolicies
Ethiopia’s Investment Proclamation allows all registered foreign investors, whether or not they receive incentives, to remit profits and dividends, principal and interest on foreign loans, and fees related to technology transfer. Foreign investors may remit proceeds from the sale or liquidation of assets, from the transfer of shares or of partial ownership of an enterprise, and funds required for debt servicing or other international payments. The right of expatriate employees to remit their salaries is granted by NBE foreign exchange regulations. In practice, however, foreign companies and individuals have experienced difficulties obtaining foreign currency to remit dividends, profits, or salaries.
Sovereign Wealth Funds
Ethiopia has no sovereign wealth funds.
7. State-Owned Enterprises
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate major sectors of the economy. There is a state monopoly or state dominance in telecommunications, power, banking, insurance, air transport, shipping, railway, industrial parks, and petroleum importing. State-owned enterprises have considerable advantages over private firms, including priority access to credit and customs clearances. While there are no conclusive reports of credit preference for these entities, there are indications that they receive incentives, such as priority foreign exchange allocation, preferences in government tenders, and marketing assistance. Ethiopia does not publish financial data for most state-owned enterprises, but Ethiopian Airlines and the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia have transparent accounts.
Ethiopia is not a member to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and does not adhere to the guidelines on corporate governance of SOEs. Corporate governance of SOEs is structured and monitored by a board of directors composed of senior government officials and politically-affiliated individuals, but there is a lack of transparency in the structure of SOEs.
Privatization Program
The government in July of 2018 announced its intention to privatize a minority share of Ethiopian Airlines, EthioTelecom, Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Service Enterprise, and power generation projects, and to fully privatize sugar projects, railways, and industrial parks. The privatization program will be implemented through public tenders and will be open to local and foreign investors. The government has prioritized privatizations in the telecommunications and sugar sectors, and in those sectors has begun asset valuations of the enterprises, standardization of the financial reports, and establishment of modernized legal and regulatory frameworks. The GOE has also reached out to potential investors and has begun creating tender and bidding documents that will guide the privatizations. To broaden the role and participation of the private sector in the economy, and to implement the privatization program in an open and transparent manner, in December 2019, the Council of Ministers approved a new privatization law, which is awaiting approval by the parliament.
The government has sold more than 370 public enterprises since 1995, mainly small companies in the trade and service sectors, most of which were nationalized by the Derg military regime in the 1970s. Currently, twenty-two SOEs are under the Public Enterprise, Assets, and Administration Agency.
8. Responsible Business Conduct
Some larger international companies in Ethiopia have introduced corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. Most Ethiopian companies, however, do not officially practice CSR, though individual entrepreneurs engage in charity, sometimes on a large scale. There are efforts to develop CSR programs by the Ministry of Industry in collaboration with the World Bank, U.S. Agency for International Development, and other institutions.
The government encourages CSR programs for both local and foreign direct investors but does not maintain specific guidelines for these programs, which are inconsistently applied and not controlled or monitored. In early 2015, the Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce & Sectorial Associations published a ‘Model Code of Ethics for Ethiopian Businesses’ that was endorsed by former Ethiopian President Mulatu Teshome as a model for the business community.
Ethiopia was admitted as a candidate-member to the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2014. According to Ethiopia’s 2019 EITI work plan, to become a fully compliant member the country needs to revamp legal frameworks, improve revenue collection in the sector, and improve stakeholder oversight. Per the Commercial Code, extractive industries and other businesses are expected to conduct statuary audits of their financial statements at the end of each financial year, though the financial statements are not available to the public, only to financial institutions and share companies.
9. Corruption
The Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC) is charged with preventing corruption and is accountable to the Office of the Prime Minister. The Commission provides ethics training and education to prevent corruption. The Federal Police Commission is responsible for investigating corruption crimes and the Federal Attorney General handles corruption prosecutions.
The Attorney General’s Office opened in February a new and consolidated Anti-Corruption Directorate to recover stolen assets and fight corruption. The Directorate is empowered to enter into mutual legal assistance treaties (MLAT’s) and otherwise coordinate with foreign nations to fight corruption.
The Federal Police is mandated with investigating corruption crimes committed by public officials as well as “Public Organizations.” The latter are defined as any organ in the private sector that administers money, property, or any other resources for public purposes. Examples of such organizations include share companies, real estate agencies, banks, insurance companies, cooperatives, labor unions, professional associations, and others.
Transparency International’s 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index, which measures perceived levels of public sector corruption, rated Ethiopia’s corruption at 37 (the score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of zero to 100, with the former indicating highly corrupt and the latter indicating very clean). Its comparative rank in 2019 was 96 out of 180 countries, an improvement from its rank of 114 out of 180 countries in 2018. The American Chamber of Commerce in Ethiopia recently polled its members and asked what the leading business climate challenges were; transparency and governance ranked as the 4th leading business climate challenge, ahead of licensing and registration and public procurement.
Ethiopian and foreign businesses routinely encounter corruption in tax collection, customs clearance, and land administration. Many past procurement deals for major government contracts, especially in the power generation, telecommunications, and construction sectors were widely viewed as corrupt.
PM Abiy Ahmed has launched a corruption clean-up that has resulted in several hundred arrests. In connection with the embezzlement schemes involving hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars, particularly with government procurement irregularities, the government arrested and charged in September 2018 over 40 mid- and senior-level Metal Engineering Technology Corporation (METEC) officials. In addition, the PM transferred the management of large government projects from METEC (which is widely viewed by the public as corrupt) to other government organizations. Similarly, the government arrested 59 officials and business people suspected of corruption in April of 2019. The officials are primarily from the following government institutions: Public Procurement & Property Disposal Service, Food & Drug Administration Agency, Pharmaceuticals Fund & Supply Agency, and the Ethiopian Water Works Construction Enterprise. A former Communications Minister was charged with corruption and mismanagement of public companies in May; he was sentenced to six years in jail.
Ethiopia is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Ethiopia is a signatory to the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. Ethiopia is also member of the East African Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities.Ethiopia signed the UN Anticorruption Convention in 2003, which was eventually ratified in November 2007. It is a criminal offense to give or receive bribes, and bribes are not tax deductible.
ResourcestoReportCorruption
Contacts at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption:
Ethnic conflict — often sparked by historical grievances or resource competition, including land disputes — has resulted in varying levels of violence across Ethiopia. According to surveys and research conducted by the International Organization for Migration, the number of internally displaced persons has dropped from its peak last year of 3.2 million, but remains at 1.8 million people nationwide. 1.17 million of those are displaced due to conflict, with the remainder being displaced due to climactic reasons. Insecurity, often driven by ethnic tensions, persists in many areas, notably Gedeo, West Guji, and other areas of southern and western Oromia and eastern SNNP, and in the Hararges on the border of the Somali Region. In the four Wellega Zones in Western Oromia, the Oromo Liberation Army and other illegal armed groups continue to execute attacks on the public and local government officials, violence which occasionally spills over into other parts of Oromia. Regional security forces and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) have been engaged in combatting these groups. In Amhara Region, there have been incidents of violence along a main road between Gondar and Bahir Dar. In early April, the government deployed the ENDF to the area around Gondar in Amhara Region to control the activities of what the Gondar City Administration identified as an illegal armed group in the area. Disputed territory in the north between the Amhara and Tigray regions is a continuing flash point.
Under PM Abiy’s administration, political space in Ethiopia has opened dramatically. Constitutional rights, including freedoms of assembly and expression, are now widely supported at the level of the federal government, though the protection of these rights remains uneven at regional and local levels. Most political prisoners have been released, though there have been some concerning reports of short-term detentions. Opposition parties usually operate freely, although regional and local authorities have occasionally employed politically-motivated procedural roadblocks to hinder opposition parties’ efforts to hold meetings or other party activities. The media has become significantly more free following reforms instituted by PM Abiy Ahmed. Still, journalism in the country remains undeveloped, social media is often rife with unfounded rumors, and government officials occasionally react with heavy-handedness, especially to news they feel might spur social unrest. The Parliament is currently considering potential dates in 2021 for the national and regional parliamentary elections, originally scheduled for May of 2020, which were delayed due to technical challenges and the COVID-19 pandemic. The electoral and pre-electoral period may represent a potential catalyst for unrest.
PM Abiy has also initiated a process of modernization, de-politicization, professionalization, and civilian accountability in the security services. Still, there are certain geographic areas where the security situation remains fraught due to clashes between illegal armed groups and security forces. Though foreigners are rarely targeted, spillover ethnic violence has occasionally resulted in the death of foreigners.
The new administration has also increased regional autonomy. Successful American investors tell us that understanding the different business climates across the regions — there are different regional taxation regimes, unique ethnic conflicts, varying levels of reception towards profit-making companies, and contrasting approaches to policing and security issues — is key to successfully investing in Ethiopia.
The Ethiopian Parliament on April 10 approved a five-month long State of Emergency (SOE) focused on COVID-19 mitigation. Actions mandated under the SOE include discontinuation of meetings involving more than four people; closure of entertainment and sports centers; requirements that restaurants distance tables and seating; and limitations on the number of passengers in public transport vehicles. Social distancing is required, facemasks are mandatory in public, and handshakes are prohibited. Other restrictions included limitations on prison visits (except to deliver food) and land border closures, with the exception of cargo transportation.
11. Labor Policies and Practices
More than 80 percent of Ethiopians work in agriculture. The second-most important employer is the government. If the population continues to grow at the current rate of 2.5 percent, Ethiopia will have more than 138 million people by 2030, only 27 percent of whom will live in urban areas. Ethiopia’s youth, between the ages of 15 and 29, account for 30 percent of the population; 70 million Ethiopians are under the age of 30. The youth unemployment rate in urban settings is over 25 percent (CSA, 2018). The gender gap in employment is high; the unemployment rate among young women in urban areas is over 30 percent, compared with 19 percent for young men. Young women are three times more likely to be neither in employment, education, or training (NEET). According to International Labor Organization (ILO) statistics, Ethiopia’s youth NEET accounts for 10.5 percent of the youth population (5.7 percent for men, 15.1 percent for women).
Although labor remains readily available and inexpensive in Ethiopia, skilled manpower is scarce. Approximately 50 percent of Ethiopians over the age of 15 are illiterate, according to UNESCO’s definition. The primary school enrollment rate (age 7 to 14), on the other hand, has now reached 94 percent. To increase the skilled labor force, the GOE has undertaken a rapid expansion of the university system in the last 20 years, increasing the number of higher public education institutions from three to 49. It has adopted an education policy that requires 70 percent of public university students to study science, engineering, or technology subjects, but many students are not well prepared by secondary school to study in those fields.
Ethiopia has ratified all eight core International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions. The Ethiopian Criminal Code and the 2019 Labor Proclamation both outlaw work specified as hazardous by ILO conventions. There is no national minimum wage, and public sector employees – the largest group of wage earners – earned a monthly minimum wage of 420 Ethiopian birr (approximately 19 U.S. dollars).
Labor unions and confederations are separate entities from the government, and are subject to a great deal of regulation and direct pressure/involvement from the government. The Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions (CETU) comprises well over two hundred thousand members in enterprise-based unions in a variety of sectors, but there is no formal requirement for unions to join the CETU. Much of the labor force remains in small-scale agriculture/industry and thus is not covered by enterprise unions. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs’ Directorate of Harmonious Industrial Relations provides labor dispute resolution services, but the caseload and the directorate’s capacity are low.
Employers offering contracted employment are required to provide severance pay. The vast majority of employees that work in small-scale agriculture and in many micro and small enterprises, however, do so without a contract. Large labor surpluses and lax labor law enforcement allow employers to retain employees without contracts that ensure strong worker protections.
Although the government actively engages with the international community to combat child labor and human trafficking, which includes forced/coerced labor, both remain widespread in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Parliament ratified ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor in May 2003. While not a pressing issue in the formal economy, child labor is common in the informal sector, including construction, agriculture, textiles, manufacturing, mining, and domestic work. Child labor is present in both urban and rural areas. According to the ILO International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor, more than 50 percent of Ethiopia’s child laborers work in the agriculture sector. Ethiopian traditional woven textiles are included on the U.S. government’s Executive Order 13126 list of goods that have been known to be produced by forced or indentured child labor. Both NGO and Ethiopian government sources concluded that goods produced (in the agricultural sector and traditional weaving industry in particular) via child labor are largely intended for domestic consumption, and not slated for export. Employers are prohibited from hiring children under the age of 15, and the minimum age is 18 for certain types of hazardous work. Ethiopia has a National Action Plan (NAP) for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, which it is currently updating. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs conducts tens of thousands of targeted inspections on occupational safety and standards, although they are not legally empowered to assess fines for infractions and they do not make this data publicly available. Due to the shortage of labor inspectors and other enforcement resources, and the fact that inspectors do not inspect informal work sites, most child labor goes unreported.
In April 2020, the Ethiopian Parliament approved and published in the federal gazette the new Anti-Human Trafficking and Smuggling Criminal Proclamation 909/2019. The new legislation breaks down silos between stakeholder agencies, provides clear guidelines regarding how anti-trafficking efforts are funded, and provides clear, commensurate penalties for those involved in trafficking.
The Overseas Labor Proclamation legalizes and regulates the employment of Ethiopians in foreign countries. The law does not disallow Ethiopians from migrating to other countries to seek work, but it imposes requirements that are lengthy and expensive, making irregular migration more attractive for many. The main driver for irregular migration is economic incentives. Although trafficking remains problematic, experts report that the GOE has increasingly shown the political will to address this issue.
12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation and Other Investment Insurance Programs
The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) is currently exploring insurance and investment opportunities in Ethiopia, but does not currently have a significant portfolio in country.
13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics
Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
Data regarding inward direct investment are not available for Ethiopia via IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) site (http://data.imf.org/CDIS), the above data is from the Ethiopian Investment Commission. *The yearly average exchange rate is used for each year from 1992-2018 to convert the amount of FDI from domestic currency into U.S. dollars.
*The yearly average exchange rate is used for each year from 1992-2018 to convert the amount of FDI from domestic currency into U.S. dollars. *** Total Outward investment data are not available.
*** Total Outward investment data are not available.
Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data regarding the equity/debt breakdown of portfolio investment assets are not available for Ethiopia via the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) and are not available for external publication from the Government of Ethiopia.
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