

To the Congress of the United States

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THE THIRTEENTH REPORT
OF THE

United States
Advisory Commission
on Information

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To the Congress of the United States

The United States Advisory Commission on Information was created by the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act (Public Law 402) enacted by the 80th Congress on January 27, 1948.

This Thirteenth Report to Congress which covers the Commission's work for the calendar year 1957 marks the tenth year of the Commission's existence. Three of the original members of the Commission, Mark A. May, the present Chairman, Erwin D. Canham and Philip D. Reed have served continuously during the past decade. Sigurd S. Larmon has served on the Commission since January 1954 and Lewis W. Douglas since January 1956.

In past years, members of the Commission have visited posts in Europe, Latin America, the Near East and the Far East.

In 1957 Mr. Larmon visited U. S. Information Service (USIS) posts in London, Frankfurt, Paris, Naples, Rome, and Tegucigalpa. Mr. Reed visited USIS posts in Milan, Paris, Rome, Naples, and Madrid. Mr. Douglas, in a separate trip, visited USIS posts in Madrid, London, and Paris. The Commission's Staff Director attended a joint Department of State-U. S. Information Agency (USIA) conference in Paris which was called to evaluate the impact of the Voice of America in Iron Curtain countries. In addition he inspected three USIS missions in France at Lille, Lyon, and Marseille.

In the past year the Commission met seven times. Five meetings were held in New York City and two meetings in Washington.

In 1957, too, the Commission for the first time met with top Agency officers to examine the Agency's proposed budget for fiscal year 1959. Recommendations were then made to the new Director concerning a number of Agency practices and policies which in the Commission's opinion required modification.

Closer liaison was also established between the Commission and the Congress in order to promote a more fruitful exchange of views between the two bodies. This exchange of views has been most beneficial to the Commission, and every effort will be made to continue to hold these occasional meetings between the Congress and the Commission.

During the past year the Commission undertook new functions which enabled it to develop independent sources of information. These new functions have aided the Commission in maintaining and further developing its independent status.

The Commission is pleased with the appointment of former Ambassador George V. Allen as Director of the U. S. Information Agency. He has taken hold with vigor and is providing the Agency with experienced leadership.

The Agency's two Advisory Committees have continued to contribute their time, energy and suggestions to the USIA. Composed of men who occupy top positions in the American communications and cultural field, they continue to bring to the Agency an invaluable source of expert counsel.

In 1957 the Broadcast Advisory Committee added to its membership the services of Mr. Sylvester L. Weaver, Jr., Broadcasting Program and Management Consultant, New York City. Other members are:

JOSEPH A. McDONALD
Acting Chairman
Assistant General Attorney
National Broadcasting Co.
New York City

ROGER W. CLIPP
General Manager
WFIL Radio Station
Philadelphia, Pa.

ROBERT T. COLWELL
Vice President
J. Walter Thompson Co.
New York City

DONLEY F. FEDDERSEN
Department of Radio-TV
Northwestern University
Evanston, Ill.

RAYMOND F. GUY
Manager
Radio & Allocation Engineering
National Broadcasting Co.
New York City

J. R. POPPELE
Consultant Television and Radio
Management and Engineering
South Orange, N. J.

RALPH N. HARMON
Vice President for Engineering
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,
Inc.
New York City

JACK W. HARRIS
Vice President and General Man-
ager,
Radio Station KPRC
Houston, Tex.

HENRY P. JOHNSTON
Radio and Television Consultant
Birmingham, Ala.

FRANK L. MARX
Vice President
American Broadcasting Co.
New York City

HOWARD MEIGHAN
Vice President
CBS Television City
Hollywood, Calif.

This Committee met four times during the year.

At the same time, the Advisory Committee on Cultural Information was enlarged by the appointments of:

HERBERT W. BAYER, Specialist in Design and Arts, Chairman, Department of Design, Container Corporation of America, Aspen, Colo.

GILBERT CHASE, Musicologist, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C.

LAWRENCE A. FLEISCHMAN, Art Collector, Vice President, Arthur Fleischman Carpet Co., Detroit, Mich.

HEROLD C. HUNT, Eliot Professor, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

FLORA B. LUDINGTON, Librarian, Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mass.

ALBERT H. MARCKWARDT, Professor, Department of English Language and Literature, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.

Other members are:

MARK A. MAY, Chairman

GEORGE P. BRETT, Jr.

President, The Macmillan Co.
New York City

ROBERT L. CROWELL

President, Thomas Y. Crowell
Co.
New York City

ROBERT B. DOWNS

Director of Libraries
University of Illinois
Urbana, Ill.

CHARLES W. FERGUSON

Sr. Editor

Reader's Digest

Pleasantville, N. Y.

FREEMAN LEWIS

Executive Vice President

Pocket Books, Inc.

New York City

CHARLES E. ODEGAARD

Dean, College of Literature,

Science and the Arts

University of Michigan,

Ann Arbor, Mich.

This Committee met six times in 1957

Preface

The main theme of this, the Commission's Thirteenth Report to Congress, is the urgent need for long-range planning in the international information field. This is essential if we are to wrest the initiative from the well planned, long-range, lavishly financed Communist propaganda effort.

This report relates the need for such long-range planning to the Soviet propaganda challenge. This challenge has existed for 40 years. It has been intensified in the last 15 years. It has reached a peak with the launching of Sputnik and other recent Soviet advances. It is truly a long-range challenge.

Matching the challenge, however, are some very real opportunities for U. S. information activity. To help take advantage of these opportunities the report considers the requirements of an effective long-range international information agency, and presents the proposition that the USIA should:

1. Continue its present non-partisan character;
2. Strive to develop closer relations with Congress;
3. Continue its independent status;
4. Recruit and train high caliber personnel who will have the benefits of a sorely needed career system;
5. Have the help of adequate representation funds;
6. Constantly clarify and review its objectives;
7. Do more than it is now doing in making available its specialized knowledge to the formulation and implementation of foreign policy;
8. Begin to wrest the initiative from the Communists and to maintain it in the information and propaganda field.

In the light of these long-range requirements, how does the United States Information Agency today measure up? What are its assets and liabilities?

The report covers both, with special attention to areas of weakness that exist in personnel, in training, in overseas operations and in physical facilities. Particular note is taken of the problem of evaluating the effectiveness of USIA programs.

Having considered strengths and weaknesses the report concludes with the Commission's recommendations for immediate action. These include:

1. Review and re-definition of objectives
2. Appraisal of major themes and programs
3. Steps toward improvement of personnel, including the establishment of a career system
4. Planning for increased East-West exchanges
5. Improving cooperation with private enterprise

It is the hope of the Commission that this report will prove clear and candid. And that it will be helpful to the Congress in appraising the present and future of the United States Information Agency.

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The members of the Congress are well aware of the fact that the last 15 years have seen a steady increase in Communist propaganda efforts. They also know that the year 1957 saw Soviet Communism's boldest, most successful challenge to the United States and the free world.

The boldness of the current challenge was given direct expression by Khrushchev in his TV interview in May 1957. He said in part:

"We want competition and we want the soundest forces to manifest themselves in this competition. We call our system, the socialist system, the soundest force because it is the most progressive and the youngest system . . .

"With regard to the ideology of capitalist and socialist countries we have never concealed that there will be a struggle in this field, an ideological struggle . . . This is a battle of ideas and victory is insured for the idea which will be stronger, more viable, and which will be supported by the people."

This was the bold challenge. It was a successful challenge because the Soviets backed their words with dramatic action. Their success in launching their physical satellites provided a propaganda leverage which has been exploited to the hilt.

Previous Communist challenges often have had negative propaganda value. The Berlin blockade of 1948, the attack on Korea in 1950, and the 1956 brutal intervention in Hungary belied Communist propaganda claims to peace. They cost the Communists friendship and admiration. They were propaganda defeats on which the free world could and did capitalize.

But the Soviet challenge of 1957 has been a propaganda victory. Sputnik provided a solid base for their propaganda output. They had "reached and exceeded" the capitalist countries in this field to which they had given priority.

The members of the Commission are impressed with the seriousness of the challenge to freedom-loving people. It is a double-barreled threat to the free world. One barrel is the evidence of scientific achievement. The other is the linked claim of ideological superiority.

Science to dominate the world . . . ideology to win the minds of men . . . both are essential elements in the Soviet plan of conquest. And it is important to realize that both are the products of carefully developed long-range plans. The Soviet advances in both fields have been persistent, continuous, aimed at specific long-range targets.

Science, Ideology. Both are parts of the Soviet challenge. Both are parts of the Soviet armament. Both must be defended against by the United States and the free world.

This Commission realizes that "first things should come first." Immediate needs call for the speeding up of defense weapons, the mobilization of scientific talent, and the strengthening of NATO. Longer term defenses are of secondary priority. These will include new emphasis on basic research, increases in scientific education, long-range planning in many areas.

The Commission believes that a strong international information program should be high on the United States' list of long-range defense activities.

The reasons for this conviction are threefold:

1. Soviet Communism considers its ideological information program a vital weapon in what Khrushchev called "the battle of ideas." The United States cannot let this battle go by default. And we should not only defend against the Soviet attacks, we should be able to mount an information offensive of our own.
2. The United States may be a year behind the Soviets in missiles. It may be five years behind in mass technological education. But it is 30 years behind in the competition with Communist propaganda.

The Communists started in 1918 and have been at it ever since. The United States started in 1948. And the gap has not been closed.

Each year sees the Communists increase their hours of broadcasting, their production and distribution of books, their motion pictures and cultural exchanges and every other type of propaganda and information activity.

The cost of the Communist propaganda efforts has been estimated at anywhere from \$500 million to a billion dollars a year. It is also estimated that they spend eight times as much to "jam" United States broadcasts to Iron Curtain countries as the United States spends to do the broadcasting.

It would seem that we should start planning to close the gap in this field before it widens further.

3. Finally, despite the success of the Soviet challenge, the Commission believes that there exist both immediate and long-range opportunities which should be seized and exploited. It is possible to respond quickly and effectively to the present Soviet challenge.

It is important to take advantage of present world conditions that offer the United States a chance to achieve its own victories in the information area.

The Opportunities that Face the United States

In the opinion of the Commission there are five major opportunities which call for positive action. They are:

OPPORTUNITY NO. 1. *The chance to turn Sputnik to the free world's advantage.*

The Soviet attack on Korea has been called the greatest psychological blunder of Stalin's career. It served to unite and re-arm the free world. Soviet Sputniks and the challenge they represent can have a similar effect.

There is now not only an opportunity but a vital reason to strengthen NATO, and our other alliances in the free world. This will call for a maximum exchange of information at popular as well as official levels.

The need for unity emphasizes the necessity of presenting and explaining the position of the United States not only behind the Iron Curtain but to our friends of the free world. And it offers a new change to restate the fact that the United States does more for the lives of people than the Soviet system can possibly achieve.

Such an approach forcefully carried through could help turn what now appears to be a Soviet propaganda victory into a defeat.

OPPORTUNITY NO. 2. *The response to Khrushchev's challenge of "Let us compete."*

One of the results of the challenge to compete has been a slight lifting of the Iron Curtain. More visitors are permitted into Russia. More delegations are sent out from Russia. There is some increase of *communication* between the Soviets and the free world.

The Commission feels that more "people-to-people" communication can only result in good. In those areas

of communications more directly under USIA responsibility, the Agency should be encouraged to seek every means of increasing exchanges of information and visitation. It should be constantly alert to new opportunities for action within the Communist orbit.

OPPORTUNITY NO. 3. *The increased demand for news from and about the United States.*

The Soviet's scientific advances have been news around the world. They have, however, also whetted the appetite of the world for more news about what the United States is doing—and for more information about the United States and its people.

The demand can be met only in part by private news services. Much of it is a demand for exactly the sort of information that USIA produces. It offers opportunity for USIA to help clear up misunderstanding and ignorance of the United States.

Reports from the field indicate an aroused receptivity for books, pamphlets, exhibits and motion pictures. There is now probably more curiosity and concern about the scientific and economic strength of the United States than in the past.

OPPORTUNITY NO. 4. *The Ferment in Iron Curtain countries.*

The past year has witnessed some interesting shakeups in Communist policy and practice in certain Communist countries. Restrictions have been relaxed to some extent. Such ideas as the importance of individual initiative, greater freedom of discussion and other western ideas are beginning to appear in the Soviet orbit.

These, and other signs, indicate an increased interest among the East European countries, in western ideas, news, and information of all sorts. It represents another opportunity that should not be ignored.

OPPORTUNITY NO. 5. *The need for U. S. information activity in Africa.*

Much of the continent of Africa remains a wide open field. There is a real opportunity, especially in the central areas to reach the awakening people with long-range information programs.

Teaching English as an aid to combatting illiteracy, for example, should be developed. Other information programs can also be of real help to the people of this continent—and will help to make sure that their progress is along the path of freedom and the free world.

The challenges and opportunities have been outlined. Next the Commission raises the question of what kind of Information Agency can best meet these challenges and opportunities.

What Kind of International Information Agency Does the United States Need?

Considering the challenges and opportunities as they have been outlined above, one thing stands out: *the long-term nature of the problem.*

As has been said, the Communists have been at it since 1918. The United States foreign information program is ten years old. And the ideological struggle to which we have been challenged by Mr. Khrushchev will not end tomorrow. The Communist program is clearly based on long-range plans. So should be the United States program.

This means that the United States Information Agency should be measured not only in terms of its abilities to meet short-term needs, but more importantly in terms of its capabilities for a long-range program. The Commission believes this question of long-term capabilities should be considered first for the following reasons:

- A. Once the fundamental principles of an effective long-term organization have been established and agreed to, it will be simpler to appraise accurately the strengths and weaknesses of the present USIA.
- B. Building a sound long-term program is a long job. The Agency already has some of the essentials of such a program. Others need to be developed. The time has come to cease thinking of USIA as a year-to-year operation, and to encourage long-range planning. The first step is to seek agreement on the kind of organization that is needed.
- C. The foreign information program, established by Congress in 1948 starts its second decade under new leadership. Careful consideration of long-term needs can help this new leadership toward sound planning for the future.

The Commission, therefore, has addressed itself to the questions: "What kind of an International Information Agency can best serve the interests of the United States in the long struggle ahead? What are the fundamental principles for such an effective long-term organization and program?"

Based on the lessons learned in the past ten years—and on careful appraisal of future needs—the Commission suggests these basic principles.

1. *The organization should be non-partisan.*

The Information arm of the United States Government should be as completely outside partisan politics as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Non-partisan status will encourage continuity of leadership. (USIA has had eight Directors in ten years.) It will make possible more efficient planning and operation. (Budgets, personnel and program volume have shown wide variance in past years.)

Positioning of USIA as a non-partisan Agency will enable it to establish the continuity of policy and practice that is vital for a long-term organization.

2. *There should be close and continuous relationship with the Congress.*

Acceptance of the Agency as non-partisan will make possible the same close cooperation with Congress that is enjoyed by other non-partisan government organizations such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. One difference, however, will be the lack of the need for secrecy.

While the Agency of course is and must remain an activity of the Executive Branch of the Government, the Commission believes that relationships with Congress should be close. They should include:

Frequent consultation with Congress. The members of Congress should be encouraged to contribute suggestions for programs and activities. The experiences of Senators and Congressmen who have traveled abroad should be sought.

Discussions with Congress should be held from time to time to keep the Congress informed of foreign information activities. In addition the Agency should discuss with Congress at an early stage any proposed new major information programs.

Deeper accountability of Agency to Congress should be maintained. Budget presentations should be as specific as possible, and related to definite programs, objectives and achievements.

These, and similar cooperative relations with Congress are, in the Commission's opinion, essential to establishing a sound long-term information operation.

3. *The international information organization should continue to be an independent Agency.*

It appears to the Commission that the first two principles—non-partisan character, and close relationship with Congress—can better be realized if the United States foreign information program continues to have independent status.

This Commission has been in close contact with the information program for ten years. For five and one-half years it was in the Department of State. For the last four and one-half years it has been an independent agency.

The Commission's observations lead to the conclusion that the organization and work of the Agency have been more efficient and more effective during the years of its independent status.

The reasons for these views have been stated in previous reports to Congress. As we said in our Twelfth Report, "During the past three and one-half years USIA has proved groundless the fears that it could not operate well if separated from the Department of State. It has evolved methods of getting foreign policy guidance from the Department of State. And it has demonstrated its ability to function in the field as a helpful and important part of the Ambassador's team."

The Commission has observed that in the field there is practically no conflict. The Chief of Mission is in control, and the Public Affairs Officer is an integral part of his operation.

Furthermore, as the need for long-range planning becomes increasingly evident, the Commission also believes that such planning can best be carried out by an independent agency.

4. *The international information organization should have a career system.*

One of the most essential requirements of a long-range organization and program is the recruitment and training of personnel who can look forward to a career in information work.

A career system, covering both domestic and foreign service personnel, will offer the stability and security that will attract professionally competent people.

Attracting and keeping such people are essentials of any long-range organization. This is particularly true of an information operation where special skills and knowledge are important for international effectiveness.

It is for these reasons that the Commission urges that a career system be instituted immediately.

5. *Key personnel should be supplied with adequate representation funds.*

Representation funds of a reasonable but not extravagant amount are important working tools to help the United States information program achieve improved effectiveness. They help cement communications-contacts abroad. They contribute toward maintenance of the friendly relations so necessary for the acceptance and use of our information materials and programs. And they are important to the morale of United States personnel who at present must dip into their own pockets to make up the lack. Recent Agency studies show that on the average, overseas officials are reimbursed for only one dollar out of every three dollars which they spend in the performance of their duties.

Both a career system and representation funds will prove to be long-term economies for they will lead to more capable personnel and less personnel turnover.

6. Objectives should be continually reviewed.

Broad objectives for the information program have been defined by Congress in Public Law 402, by the President and by this Commission.

Nevertheless, the Commission feels that some confusion still exists as to the actual purposes of an international information program.

Clarifying objectives can help to clear up confusion. This is particularly important for the long-range objectives which should be clearly spelled out and agreed to by Congress and the Agency.

By establishing mutually agreed upon goals, the long-term growth of the Agency can be according to a definite plan rather than by unplanned expediency.

In addition, short-term objectives which may change as world conditions change, can be judged not only in light of immediate needs, but also in terms of their agreement with or departure from the long-term objectives. Adherence to sound long-term plans and policies will help to avoid the ups and downs which have adversely affected USIA operations in past years.

Two possible objectives of a long-range program appear so basic to United States needs that they have been included as the following and final two principles.

7. The information organization should make available its specialized knowledge at policy-making levels of Government.

Although USIA at all times should be under the policy direction of the Department of State, an effective foreign information agency should have both the opportunity and the ability to offer public relations advice in the area of United States foreign policy. It should be able to counsel as to the probable reactions abroad to United States decisions or announcements. The Agency and its spe-

cialized knowledge should be available to help in the wording, the timing, and the presentation of our policies to the world to insure maximum positive results.

8. *The organization should help the United States Government take the leadership in worldwide information programs.*

In addition to presenting United States policies abroad, and to counteracting Communist propaganda efforts, the Information Organization should provide information initiative for the United States.

With 40 years of experience behind them Communist propagandists have frequently seized the initiative. This forces the United States to react to them, rather than acting positively on its own.

A carefully planned creative United States program could reverse this situation and help to establish United States leadership in this area.

In summary, the basic principles, the essentials of an effective long-term international information program should include:

1. Non-partisan character.
2. Closer relations with Congress.
3. Independent status.
4. Establishment of a career system.
5. Adequate representation funds.
6. Clarified objectives.
7. Making available specialized knowledge at policy-making levels of the United States Government.
8. Providing information leadership for the United States.

In the opinion of the Commission none of these essentials, except for the Agency's independent status, is sufficiently realized at the present time. Improvement in each category is necessary to the planned development of the kind of Information Agency that the United States needs. The sooner a

start can be made, the more vigorously improvement can be pursued, the sooner will United States information needs—both short-term and long-term—be achieved.

The foregoing is a general appraisal of international information needs and objectives. It is time now to be more specific. What is the Commission's appraisal of how well the present USIA is serving the United States?

What are the Assets and Liabilities of the United States Information Agency?

On January 27, 1948, the 80th Congress passed Public Law 402:

“AN ACT to promote the better understanding of the United States among the peoples of the world and to strengthen cooperative international relations.”

Now, a decade later, as the Commission attempts to appraise the strengths and weaknesses of USIA and its ability to carry out the purposes of Public Law 402 there is one fact that emerges above all:

The greatest asset of the United States Information Agency is its ten years of experience in foreign information activity.

The Commission believes that during those years real progress has been made. Starting 30 years behind the Communists, the United States has built up an organization and facilities that are a sound base for present operations and further growth.

Many mistakes have been made. The United States has had to learn by doing and errors are a natural result of that process. For example, there has often been too much emphasis on United States material achievements and comforts which, in many instances, appeared boastful. But the foreign

information program has learned from its mistakes. Many of the early errors are being corrected.

Many successes have been achieved. The ten-year record shows victories as well as defeats. Advances have been made in explaining United States policies and the United States itself to the peoples of the world. For example, the Agency has done well in explaining and in communicating to the world the President's "Atoms for Peace" program. Acceptance for, use of, and belief in United States information material has grown year by year.

This ten-year experience—whether of success or of failure—is an asset that will help in every phase of future operations. It is a background of inestimable help in developing the long-range plans and programs that are so urgently needed.

Experience, however, is a broad and general asset. What are the more specific strengths and weaknesses of the USIA today? In the opinion of the Commission they may be grouped as follows:

Areas of Strength

1. *Facilities:* Over the past ten years the Commission has observed the accumulating inventory of materials, equipment and other facilities. Among the more important items of this inventory are the following:
 - A. United States information missions in 79 countries and a total of 193 information service posts.
 - B. 155 Information Centers in 64 countries.
 - C. 77 Binational Centers in 25 countries.
 - D. Radio transmitters at 7 locations in the United States and at 10 overseas locations.
 - E. Motion pictures. About 1,100 program films in USIS film libraries.
 - F. 2,542,275 books in USIS libraries, of which 1,764,191 are in English and 778,084 in translations.
 - G. 22 bookmobiles.

- H. 68 magazines or editions of magazines produced abroad—18 in English and 50 in foreign languages. The Agency also produces two English and one foreign language publications in the United States for overseas use.
- I. The Agency has a complete radio teletype facility at 79 posts for receiving the Agency's wireless file.
- J. 225 exhibits of a permanent nature.

As the Agency develops long-range programs, many of these facilities will continue to be useful. Some may be curtailed and others expanded.

- 2. *Staff:* A small corps of skilled professionals with up to ten years of experience in foreign information activities provides the nucleus of a strong USIA staff. Around this nucleus is growing a larger group of Americans and foreign nationals, increasingly professional and better able to carry out USIA policies and programs.
- 3. *Audiences reached:* Audience surveys are becoming increasingly available. For example, surveys of Hungarian refugees showed a large majority had listened to Voice of America broadcasts before and during the revolution. This coupled with the Russian efforts to "jam" such broadcasts are evidence there may be a growing audience behind the Iron Curtain as in the free world.

There is additional evidence—such as figures for attendance at exhibits and reports from qualified observers that indicate more and more people are aware of USIA efforts.

- 4. *Acceptance of United States material:* Media in other countries are showing a growing tendency to accept United States material for their own use. This leads to the publication and broadcasting of U. S. material to large audiences that otherwise would not see or hear it.
- 5. *Respect for material and staff:* Experience and contacts developed over the years are now paying dividends.

There is growing confidence in the accuracy and believability of USIA material. There is also growing respect for the USIS staff among the foreign press and people of other countries. The use of USIS material in the daily press of the world is visible proof.

6. *Foreign acceptance of USIS:* Information Centers, libraries and other facilities have become familiar and important parts of life in many foreign countries. People are coming to accept them as familiar—and friendly—symbols of the United States abroad.

Areas of Weakness

The Commission believes that the Agency's weaknesses should have greater attention and concern than its strengths.

Certain weaknesses, especially those relating to the Agency's long-term needs, have been criticized and discussed earlier in this report. They included the Agency's past relations with Congress, the need for clarification of objectives, the lack of a career system, and other broad areas.

Objective appraisal of the USIA also discloses other more specific areas of weakness, correction of which is important to improvement both short and long term. These include:

1. *Weaknesses in personnel:* Despite progress referred to in staffing, the Agency should step up its efforts to improve personnel. In some areas the caliber of personnel is not satisfactory. Those whose performance is inadequate should be replaced.

The Commission feels that certain areas are understaffed while others may well be overstaffed. Greater critical attention should be given to the Agency's personnel policies and practices, as well as to the quality and quantity of the personnel itself.

For example, improvement can certainly be made in reassignment policies to avoid wasted time by personnel

who have completed a tour of duty and must wait for assignment to their next post.

2. *Weakness in training:* One of the weakest spots in the Agency's personnel system is its language training. There are simply not enough people in USIS who are adequately equipped to do the job in the field.

The Commission has been informed that the Agency is seriously working on this matter. Nevertheless, it must be reported at present as an admitted important weakness. The Commission strongly re-states its belief in the necessity for a long-range training program for Agency personnel.

3. *Weaknesses in overseas operations:* The Commission is concerned that in too many posts USIS efforts are spread too thin. In addition to the major projects there is a tendency to participate in other activities not directly related to basic programs. Concentration of effort on a smaller number of projects, and elimination of the more marginal, less essential activities, would be more economical and more effective.

In this same area, criticism can also be made of the selection of media used by USIS. The Commission has observed that frequently all media are utilized when concentration on one or two media would be more productive and more economical.

It would be well if each country reviewed its operations to determine if it is really necessary to use all media in every post. For example, in areas where the literacy rate is low, concentrating on motion pictures and lessening of publication efforts could provide both greater impact and greater economy.

4. *Weakness in television:* Another weakness is the Agency's inability to use effectively a powerful new medium that is gradually spreading around the world, namely, TV.

For the past three years the Broadcast Advisory Com-

mittee has studied this problem and has come up with recommendations to the Agency. Programs and a plan of action have been recommended by them but the Agency has been unable to develop an imaginative and constructive TV program. This is an area in which long-range planning is essential, in view of the fact that scientists foresee in the not too distant future still more far-reaching developments in world-wide TV communications.

5. *Weaknesses in facilities:* Certain physical facilities, especially radio, need rehabilitation, repair or replacement. A first rate foreign information program demands first rate equipment or funds will be wasted through lowered efficiency of operation. The Broadcast Advisory Committee has examined this problem and has recommended a long-range plan of rehabilitation in the light of current problems and possible future emergencies.

In addition there are important parts of the world where United States facilities are just too weak to provide adequate competition to communist propaganda efforts. The Agency's request for new more powerful transmitters needed to strengthen United States broadcasts to critical areas in the Commission's judgment is justified.

6. *Weaknesses in evaluation:* Efforts at evaluation of the Agency's work is still deficient. However the Agency has started a new program on an experimental basis.

Four-man "evaluation-teams" have been sent to two countries. Their job is to find facts through surveys, personal interviews, and such other research techniques as are applicable and available in each country. They will provide an appraisal of United States efforts.

The Commission is withholding judgment on this program until results from the first two teams can be seen and judged.

In the opinion of the Commission, however, evaluation by the Agency of its own efforts will always suffer from the problems inherent in any self-evaluation. Most businesses, when they wish an objective appraisal, seek it from outside independent organizations.

Under Public Law 402, the Commission has the responsibility of providing such objective evaluations where feasible. However, ten years of experience has proved that the limited time available to the Commissioners (all of whom have important responsibilities in business or the professions) is not adequate for complete appraisal.

Therefore, in addition to personal visits abroad by the Commissioners, more detailed studies by competent evaluators are needed.

If the Commissioners could be put in a position to use independent investigators from time to time who would report to them, they would be willing to inaugurate such a program. In this way the Agency might begin to obtain the independent objective audit of its work that has long been needed.

The present strengths and weaknesses of the Agency have been listed.

Next, the Commission turns to certain specific suggestions for prompt action. These recommendations in the opinion of the Commission can help to achieve the following:

- A. Bring the Agency more in line with today's needs.
- B. Produce a stronger, more efficient organization by helping toward correction of current weaknesses.
- C. Serve as turning points in converting the Agency from a short-term type of operation to an effective long-term foreign information program.

Suggestions for Immediate Action

1. *Review and redefine objectives*

As indicated earlier, the Commission believes the establishment of both long-term and short-term objectives is of primary importance.

Long-term objectives should be reviewed by the Agency with the advice and assistance of Congress and the Department of State.

Short-term objectives necessarily vary in different parts of the world. To be realistic they must be tasks that an information program can be expected to accomplish in each country.

The Department of State, United States Ambassadors, Public Affairs Officers, the Office of Policy and Plans and Assistant Area Directors can contribute importantly to the formulation of short-term objectives.

2. *Appraise major themes and programs*

The Agency should review current programs to determine which should be continued, which should be dropped, and where new or expanded programs are needed.

In this area the Commission has three recommendations.

- A. Such current themes as People's Capitalism, The Family of Man, Free Elections, Atoms for Peace, and United States culture have proved effective. They should be continued and extended to areas where they have not as yet achieved full impact.
- B. The program for the teaching of English should be given special attention both as an immediate project and as a part of the long-range activity.

The Commission believes worldwide interest in the English language is one of our greatest assets. Demands for the teaching of "American English" far exceed the supply. The Agency should give this top priority as an independent activity and in cooperation with other countries through Binational Centers.

In addition to the work of the Department of State which has primary responsibility, the Agency, when feasible, should encourage and support American schools which have been established abroad.

- C. In light of recent events, the Commission recommends to the Agency that special consideration be given to the possibility inherent in two new themes:

First, an increased emphasis on news of science, research, and technical achievement by the United States and the free world. Particular weight should be given to the way the free world has used science to improve health, welfare and living standards of all people.

In addition, the Soviets have borrowed heavily from the free world's ideas of competition, rewards for excellence, and the spirit of free inquiry in developing their physical sciences. They could now be challenged publicly as to why they had not carried the same free world ideas into the social sciences—human relations, economics, government—where they would be of benefit to the Soviet peoples.

3. *Step up personnel improvement*

The Agency should start planning now to meet the personnel needs required for a long-range program. This will call for careful selection, planning, and activity in many areas of personnel recruitment and relations. The Commission wishes to call attention to four specific suggestions:

- A. The necessity for a career service in attracting and holding high caliber people. This has been discussed earlier in this report.
- B. Higher priority of foreign language training. While the Agency has recognized the importance of this, the Commission has observed that other considerations are often given priority over language training.

- C. Improvement and speed-up in re-assignment of people returning from the field. Currently many personnel returning to the United States are either misassigned or remain unassigned for far too long a time. This can be corrected by better, longer range planning of personnel assignments.
- D. Greater attention to Cultural Affairs Officers (CAOs). The Commission recognizes the importance of the status and duties of the CAO. The Agency's Advisory Committee on Cultural Information, composed of outstanding leaders in American cultural activities, has been most helpful in the cultural programs.

This Committee, and the Commission, agree that Cultural Affairs Officers can and should be key men in the long-range program of the Agency. The Agency should pay greater attention to them, their qualifications, and their careers than it has in the past.

4. Plan for increased East-West exchanges

The Agency should make advance preparation to take advantage of any further lifting of the Iron Curtain. It should be ready for new opportunities for East-West contacts and exchanges of information.

In addition, it should be noted that the U. S. S. R. is opening new areas to tourist travel. The United States Congress has relaxed some of the McCarran Act restrictions. In this atmosphere of encouragement to international travel, the Commission recommends that the Agency, together with the Department of State and other Government agencies and private groups, develop and promote a positive program encouraging tourism to the United States.

5. Improve cooperation with private enterprise

The Commission has observed that the Agency has excellent cooperative relationships with the publishing in-

dustry, the movie industry and the broadcasting industry.

Special tribute should be given to the Broadcast Advisory Committee and the Advisory Committee on Cultural Information. The members, distinguished representatives of American industry, professions, and academic life have given generously of their time and have been most helpful.

Relations with some of the wire services have been less than satisfactory. The Agency should do all it can to improve these relations and to establish the principle of "cooperation—not competition."

In addition, the Agency should continue and expand its efforts to be of service to the People-to-People movement and to other private groups and organizations, both at home and abroad, which are actively seeking to improve our international relations.

Budgetary Action

The Commission has neither the responsibility nor the wish to advise on the size of the USIA budget.

The Commission, however, has discussed with top officers of the Agency the budget of fiscal year 1959.

The members agree with the Agency's recommendation for action on the budget to:

1. Provide increases needed to cover higher costs due to inflationary trends abroad.
2. Provide funds to re-institute some of the programs given up to meet 1958 budget requirements, which a year's experience has shown were important to the overall United States program.
3. Provide increases to cover the cost of new or expanded programs called for by the present world situation.
4. Provide for adequate representation funds.

In addition, the Commission believes that the USIA budget should contain provisions for a contingency fund. Such a

fund would be for use by the Director for emergencies and for unexpected events which may occur in the rapidly changing international scene. The fund could not be used for ordinary expenses. It would be left unused if circumstances justifying its use did not occur.

The Commission also suggests that budgetary considerations should be an important facet of the development of its long-term character by USIA.

Such long-term planning will help avoid the budgetary ups and downs that have occurred in the past.

Conclusion

In summary, this Thirteenth Report to the Congress of the United States expresses the concern of the Commission in three main areas.

1. The challenges and opportunities that face the free world, and the need for a sound active international information program to meet the challenges—and to take advantage of the opportunities.
2. The need for a long-term information Agency—one that is planned, organized, and equipped not only to meet immediate short-term demands, but to develop and carry on a consistent program in the years to come.

There is also the necessity that such an organization and program be:

- non-partisan
 - closely responsive to Congress
 - an independent agency of government
 - offer a career service
 - meet other basic principles to be established by the Agency and agreed to by Congress.
3. Appraisal of the USIA shows many valuable areas of strength. The Commission however is more concerned with the still existing areas of weakness. Examination of these leads to the belief that they can be corrected. Every effort should be made to do so as quickly and efficiently as possible.

The Commission has discussed its views on the United States international information program with the new


Director of the Agency. The members of the Commission are in accord with his approach to this assignment.

The Commission also believes that under the guidance of the new Director—with the advice and help of Congress—it is possible for the United States to develop the kind of Information Agency that will in the long run build toward United States leadership in the constantly increasing ideological struggle between Communism and the free world.


Respectfully submitted




MARK A. MAY,
Chairman



ERWIN D. CANHAM



SIGURD S. LARMON



PHILIP D. REED

NOTE: Because of illness at the time of preparation of this report, Mr. Douglas has not been able to review it in full or to make his suggestions to other members of the Commission. For this reason, his signature does not appear above. His disposition, however, is to agree with most of the major points made by the Commission, especially the need for an Information Agency that will enjoy important status.