

SIXTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT OF
UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON INFORMATION


LETTER

FROM

CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON INFORMATION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TRANSMITTING

THE SIXTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INFORMATION, DATED JULY 1952, PURSUANT TO SECTION 603 OF PUBLIC LAW 402, EIGHTIETH CONGRESS, AN ACT TO PROMOTE THE BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES AMONG THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD AND TO STRENGTHEN COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS



JULY 1, 1952.—Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON INFORMATION,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D. C., July 1, 1952.

The Honorable SAM RAYBURN,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I transmit herewith copy of the sixth semi-annual report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information, dated July 1952. This report is required by section 603 of Public Law 402, Eightieth Congress, an act to promote the better understanding of the United States among the peoples of the world and to strengthen cooperative international relations.

A copy of this report also is being sent to the Senate.

Sincerely yours,

MARK A. MAY, *Chairman,*
United States Advisory Commission on Information.

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FOREWORD

The United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (Public Law 402) was approved by the Eightieth Congress on January 27, 1948, an act to promote the better understanding of the United States among the peoples of the world and to strengthen cooperative international relations.

Public Law 402 created the United States Advisory Commission on Information to formulate and recommend to the Secretary of State policies and programs for the carrying out of this act. It required the Commission to transmit to the Congress a semiannual report of all programs and activities carried on under the authority of the act, including appraisals, where feasible, as to the effectiveness of the several programs, and such recommendations as shall have been made by the Commission to the Secretary for effectuating the purposes and objectives of the act and action taken to carry out such recommendations.

This is the sixth semiannual report by the United States Advisory Commission on Information to the Congress. The fifth report was transmitted in January 1952.

MARK A. MAY, *Chairman.*
ERWIN D. CANHAM.
PHILIP D. REED.
BEN HIBBS.

NOTE.—Mr. Justin Miller has been on inactive status as a member of the Commission while serving as Chairman of the Salary Stabilization Board and therefore did not sign the report. Mr. May succeeded Mr. Canham as chairman of the commission in May 1952.

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SIXTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT OF UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INFORMATION

INTRODUCTION

The United States Advisory Commission on Information was created in 1948 for the purpose of giving an "outsider's" viewpoint to the workings of the Department of State's overseas information program. As objective observers, our primary duty is to review the informational activities of the International Information Administration and related agencies and to make recommendations both to the Congress and to the Secretary of State.

In this, our sixth report to the Congress, we shall review the international information program, first in summary, then in greater detail, under the following headings:

- Present objectives of the program
- Operational policies and problems
- Facilities
- Reorganization
- Evaluation
- Public acceptance at home
- Future

On the next few pages you will find our summarized views and recommendations on the above seven aspects of the program. Following this summary is the main text of the Commission's report to the Congress.

SUMMARY

PRESENT OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAM

Since the appointment of the Commission in 1948, the objectives of the information program have undergone a marked change. The essence of this change has been a shift from an emphasis of attempting to give the peoples of the world an adequate and fair picture of the United States to greater emphasis on a program of hard-hitting propaganda.

The main purpose of the program today is to convince the peoples of the world, and particularly leaders and opinion molders, that the United States (1) wants world peace with freedom for all and (2) wants every nation to be free to form its own government and manage its own affairs and (3) wants a higher standard of living for the masses of people the world over. Moreover, the United States proposes and intends to do everything it can to defend the free nations of the world against aggressive warfare inspired by the Soviets, such as occurred in Korea, and against the disruptions of national economies by the Communists for the sake of gaining control within countries.

The international information and educational exchange program is now one of the "United States programs for national defense" which were developed by the National Security Council and approved by the President of the United States on October 18, 1951. Since that time an effort has been made to integrate this program with other programs of national defense, including the military and economic.

The Commission approves the integration of the information program with other defense programs both in Washington and in the field. We agree that the greatest hope of democratic world peace lies in our success in reaching the previously mentioned propaganda objectives.

The Commission recommends, however, that this shift in emphasis from a "full and fair picture" of America to a propaganda offensive of truth about our intentions and foreign policies and a counter-offensive against the "big lie" of the Russians be explained more clearly both at home and abroad.

The Commission agrees with this propaganda offensive. However, although the present objectives for the world as a whole, for the various regions, and countries have been fairly well formulated on paper, there is a continuing need for reemphasis, further explanation, and amplification. Recent trips to the field by the Commission reveal that many United States Information Service officers and some ambassadors do not fully understand or appreciate the complete significance of these new objectives of the Information Service.

The need for further explanation and reemphasis is particularly true because it is at the country level that our propaganda purposes must guide our operational procedures.

OPERATIONAL POLICIES AND PROBLEMS

The shift in emphasis to the campaign of truth or propaganda offensive has resulted in several changes in operational policies and created some operational problems. Some of these operational policies and problems noted by the Commission are as follows:

In order to establish priorities of importance and as the first step in pin-pointing operations, the countries of the world to which information is now being sent are classified under priority groups.—The Commission agrees that a priority classification is needed as a guide to the amount of time and effort to be spent by the staff in Washington and in each area. Such a priority system should take account of the fact that a noncritical area may soon become critical. The Commission feels that the priority system is most useful as far as immediate objectives are concerned but should not completely limit the operations that are aimed at longer range objectives. Furthermore, the priority system should not be administered with mechanical rigidity. The Commission has some evidence from the field that there has been inflexibility of operations.

Within each country certain target groups are specified to which the major propaganda efforts are directed.—This represents the second step toward the operational pin pointing of our propaganda. The Commission agrees that we must select the most important individuals and groups rather than attempting to influence the opinion of each man, woman, and child in every country of the world. However, the

Commission finds that only in a few cases have the target groups been adequately pin-pointed. We realize that personnel, and often a great deal of research, are required to locate with precision and accuracy the particular persons or groups of persons to whom our information can be most effectively directed. The Commission urges that the efforts in this direction be redoubled.

Methods of reaching the target groups must be reconsidered.—Until recently the United States Information Service attempted to reach its audiences in the field through existing channels of communication such as the local press, radio, lecture hall, and personal contacts. Attempts are now far advanced in many areas in utilizing new channels of communication where existing channels do not reach the targets.

The propaganda offensive requires more systematic study of Communist propaganda.—In psychological warfare it is just as important to have a knowledge of the strength and tactics of the enemy as it is in a shooting war.

For the consistency of any propaganda program, generally applicable themes are a prime necessity.—The Commission feels that consideration of the problem of themes has been neglected in the information program. We are well aware of the difficulty of the problem, but we do feel that further time should be given to the consideration of both the more general and specific themes.

More discretionary authority should be given to field officers.—In a shooting war the theater commander has full authority in all matters of how best to accomplish particular objectives. The same should be true in psychological warfare. The Commission has found that many public affairs officers (the chief of information activity within each mission) in the countries visited feel that they have sufficient authority and leeway to accomplish their main purposes except for certain budgetary restrictions. Some feel, however that they should have a stronger voice in defining particular target groups and in selecting personnel and materials for reaching these targets. Furthermore, a matter of considerable importance, if not of greatest importance, is the need for more local authority in the matter of field production of propaganda materials.

Good communication between the field and Washington is essential to efficiency in the information program.—Various steps have been taken to improve what was once an unnecessary slowness in this operation. Under the reorganization, conditions should improve to an even greater degree. The Commission emphasizes that this is a matter which deserves constant attention.

As one of the programs of national security, the International Information Administration should arrange closer cooperation with other agencies and with the informational aspects of other programs such as the Mutual Security Agency and point 4.—The Commission notes with satisfaction the progress that has been made toward the integration of the United States Information Service and other informational services both at the country and regional level. Problems still exist, but the fact is that in the field the tendency is toward the integration of all American information programs.

Trained personnel form another key aspect of the information program.—Since the United States has no schools for training propagandists, as does Russia, we are faced with an acute problem of producing the type of specialists needed for this job. The International Informa-

tion Administration now is giving consideration to several aspects of the training problem, and the Commission would strongly recommend that greatly increased emphasis be given these essential arrangements.

An important tool for conducting propaganda is the controversial matter of adequate funds for entertainment—called representation.—As the program moves toward one of hard hitting propaganda it is highly important for our field personnel to maintain close personal contact with skilled propagandists and local opinion leaders. The Commission is aware of the dangers and difficulties involved in the administration of more liberal allowances of funds for such entertainment. The abuses could easily exceed the uses. Yet we are convinced that appropriations for this purpose are far too limited for the requirements of the present propaganda offensive.

Unless there is an improved transfer and leave system, the continuity of program activity at the field posts will probably suffer.—The Commission has noted that some posts, because a departing officer leaves months before his replacement arrives, have no continuity of operation. It is essential that the new officer reporting to a field post have some on-the-job orientation before taking over the duties of his incumbent.

In the past, there have been indications that the integration of the United States Information Service with the Foreign Service at the various overseas posts has not always been as smooth as we would like to see it.—On the other hand, there have been marked improvements to eliminate friction between the two functions at the posts and to bring about a closer working relationship. The Commission recommends continued efforts be made to establish closer integration and cooperation between information and Foreign Service personnel.

The Commission wishes to note the need for stricter control and identification of administrative support funds transferred from the International Information Administration's appropriation to the Department.—We would recommend that serious thought be given to increasing the number of operations officers in the field, if need be, to insure the proper management and administration of the United States Information Service funds and activities.

FACILITIES

Is the physical equipment of the information program adequate to accomplish its objectives?

Although the Commission has not surveyed systematically the physical equipment, including such things as radio transmitters, motion picture projectors and mobile units, printing presses, housing, and numerous other items of material, we are under the impression that the necessary equipment has not yet reached a level of adequacy but that great improvements have been made in the past 3 years.

Under this heading of physical equipment, the Commission regrets that an item of \$36,727,086 toward the completion of a chain of powerful radio stations was rejected by Congress.

REORGANIZATION

The Commission feels that it is yet too early to judge the effectiveness of the present plan of organization from the standpoint of its adaptability to a hard hitting propaganda offensive. On paper it has the merits of greater centralization of authority, more unification of policy direction, and more flexibility for attacking special problems. There is some question in the minds of the Commission members as to whether the present channels set up to provide the necessary links between foreign policy and information operations will prove efficacious under all conditions. The Commission intends to reexamine this matter before its next report.

In the field, the administration of the program still remains under the ambassadors and consulates. The 10 posts visited recently in Europe by Mr. May reported to him that the International Information Administration reorganization in Washington has had no effect on field operations except for the new policy of regional representation within the Washington office.

EVALUATION

Almost from the beginning the Commission has been prodding the Department to do more about evaluating the results of the information program. We are gratified to learn that the Administrator has now established the position of Director of the Evaluation Staff. The Commission has seen a report by this Director. We are impressed with the number of research studies that have been and are being conducted. We have seen the results of some of these studies and find them most interesting. There is need, however, for more studies of changes in public opinion abroad over a period of 2 to 3 years. We are pleased to learn that certain polls conducted 2 to 3 years ago are now being repeated on the same populations. Furthermore plans are being made for systematic continuous surveys of changes in attitudes toward the United States and other governments that are working with us for democratic world security.

PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE

While approving the change of emphasis from a "full and fair picture" of America to a propaganda offensive of truth about our intentions and foreign policies, this shift must be explained more clearly both at home and abroad. We find that many of the current criticisms of the information program are based on the assumption that it is still boasting about assembly lines, tiled baths, high mountains, and deep canyons in a manner which is not acceptable or useful for foreign consumption.

The Commission is aware that Public Law 402 prohibits the use of funds appropriated for the program for informing the American public about it. We understand the reasons for this prohibition. Yet, we believe that the American taxpayers are entitled to know how their money is spent. The Commission does not recommend the establishment of a full scale domestic publicity program, but we do feel that the present effort to inform the public is too small.

FUTURE

From its observations in the field, the Commission has arrived at the opinion that the United States Information Service has established itself as an indispensable arm of our Foreign Service at every post. Likewise within most parts of the Government in Washington, the idea that this program is an incidental emergency operation is rapidly diminishing. The Commission recommends that a long range plan for the information program be undertaken by the Department. The Commission suggests that plans for at least 4 years be worked out—subject, of course, to revision—showing when and at what height the program should level off.

Another matter which concerns the future of the program is the use of counterpart funds and its effect on the program. The Commission looks with favor toward the effort to bring the informational activities of the Mutual Security Agency and the United States Information Service together under a single head overseas.

Congress should recognize that although the State Department is not authorized to use any counterpart funds or other foreign currencies for its information program (except exchange of persons and except by purchasing foreign currencies with dollar appropriations), its program overseas has been materially complemented by the Mutual Security Agency information program. This has been possible through the use of the counterpart funds and other foreign currencies. Should foreign currency and counterpart funds be cut off or reduced in the mutual aid program, the total information activities of the United States Information Service in the Mutual Security Agency countries (Europe) would be drastically reduced, unless appropriated dollars were substantially increased.

SIXTH REPORT TO CONGRESS

PRESENT OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAM

The objectives of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as defined by the act, are—

* * * to enable the Government of the United States to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.

The main purpose of the Information Service, as distinct from the Educational Exchange Service, is defined by the act as:

* * * to disseminate abroad information about the United States, its people, and policies promulgated by the Congress, the President, the Secretary of State and other responsible officials of Government having to do with matters affecting foreign affairs; * * *

Under this clause the Information Service becomes an integral part of United States foreign policy. The main objective of the Information Service therefore is to make United States foreign policy clearly understood throughout the world.

The objectives of the program that have been taking shape gradually during the past 2 or 3 years represent a shift in emphasis from giving the people of the world a "full and fair picture" of the United States to that of a campaign of hard-hitting propaganda. The essence of this campaign is to convince the world that this country (1) wants world peace with freedom for all, (2) wants every nation to be free to form its own government and manage its own affairs, and (3) wants a higher standard of living for the masses of people the world over. Moreover, the United States proposes and intends to do everything it can do to defend the free nations of the world against aggressive warfare inspired by the Soviets, such as occurred in Korea, and against the disruptions of national economies by the Communists for the sake of gaining controls within countries.

As a further part of this new propaganda offensive, the International Information Administration now is one of the "United States programs for national defense." As such, the information program has been taking steps to integrate its programs with those of other agencies having to do with the national defense. The Commission thoroughly approves of this integration.

The Commission believes that a necessary part of our propaganda counteroffensive is an explanation of the purposes of this new program both at home and abroad.

This country's propaganda offensive to a large degree has been brought about by the attitudes, activities, and propaganda of the Communists. Since early 1951 the immediate objective of all Soviet propaganda has been to isolate the United States, to cut the ties that

bind this country with Europe and Asia. To accomplish this purpose the Soviet Union and its satellites have rewritten history to "prove" that all the ills of the past are the direct results of America's greed and warmongering, and to demonstrate on the other hand the "peaceful and progressive nature" of international communism. The accusations against the United States, typical of which are the recent claims about germ warfare, have circled the globe over a vast network of propaganda agencies that had been set up for this very purpose. It was these facts and the constant crisis nature of international affairs that necessitated the American propaganda offensive.

By mid-1950 it was apparent that the United States should take the propaganda offensive, centering its attention on the prevention of the further spread of communism and the weakening of Communist organizations wherever they exist. The determination to fight fire with fire, to immunize large groups of people against the viruses of communism gave the information program an entirely new aspect.

The Commission is in agreement with this shift in emphasis in the direction of a more hard hitting propaganda offensive. This does not mean, however, that all efforts toward cultural exchange and dissemination of general information should cease. On the contrary, there are several countries where general dissemination of cultural information is the most feasible and most effective type of operation. In other countries programs of anti-Communist and profreedom propaganda are the most effective means of implementing our foreign policy.

Two regions recently visited by members of the Commission are Latin America and Western Europe. In Latin America our major objective is the promotion of an understanding on the part of leaders of the mutuality of interest between Latin-American countries and the United States. More specifically, the problem of the United States Information Service in each Latin-American country is to hold the ground gained during the days of the more extensive information and economic program that was administered by the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. In Western Europe the main purpose of the information program is to maintain and gain further public support for present plans and agreements having as their objective military defense, economic prosperity, and a sense of security and strength through unity. In Asia and the Middle East the major purpose is to combat neutralism.

At the country level the objectives of the program become even more specific. One of the first questions asked by members of the Commission on their visits to the field is, What is the United States Information Service at this post attempting to achieve? We were particularly interested to find out whether the United States Information Service officers view their operations merely as distributing centers for information sent out from Washington or as tasks of influencing the opinions and attitudes of particular individuals or groups of individuals toward the United States and its purposes and policies in that country. In general the answer received to the question of "what are we here for?" at each post includes both specific tasks and the general dissemination of information. The emphasis varies in different countries depending upon the internal political situations and in some part on the views of the ambassadors and those of the chief public affairs officers. In one European country the

ambassador told a member of the Commission that he saw no need for an information program in that country in the propaganda sense, but felt that the emphasis should be put entirely upon the dissemination of a "full and fair picture" of the United States and particularly its culture. In another country the chief public affairs officer, with the support of the ambassador, is concentrating his efforts almost exclusively on attempting to reach particular target groups with particular types of information that are designed not only to influence their attitudes but their votes in forthcoming elections. This officer told a member of the Commission that he is deliberately not attempting to give every adult of that country a "full and fair picture" of the United States and its foreign policy. He feels that such an objective would be utterly unrealistic and wasteful.

The Commission is pleased with the efforts that are being made to adapt information objectives to the political, social, and educational conditions of various regions and countries of the world. In some instances, however, they appear to be somewhat unrealistic. To think of giving every adult of any country in the world an adequate picture of the United States and its foreign policies is manifestly beyond the reach of any United States Information Service country operation. In general, though, we believe that the objectives of the program are defined with sufficient clarity and specificity to serve as guides for field operations.

OPERATIONAL POLICIES AND PROBLEMS

To attain the objectives indicated in the preceding section, several important changes in emphasis have been made in the United States information and educational exchange program. Some of these changes have been accomplished and merely need continued emphasis. Other changes have not been fully realized, and it is here that the Commission expresses its views on what needs to be done to make the program more effective.

Pin pointing our propaganda—priority system.—Prior to the inauguration of the Campaign of Truth in mid-1950, the operational plan was mainly to collect, prepare, and send to the field news and information about the United States of America for world distribution. The initiation of the propaganda offensive resulted in three main changes: (1) A classification of countries of the world from the standpoint of their strategic importance in the Campaign of Truth, (2) the designation within each country of target groups, and (3) the selection of the most effective materials and media for reaching and influencing these groups.

The Commission understands that information now is being disseminated to 100 countries which are classified as follows:

(1) Iron curtain—Soviet Union and satellites.....	10
(2) Crucial countries under threat of aggression.....	19
(3) Danger zones.....	13
(4) Vulnerable.....	30
(5) Sensitive.....	8
(6) Noncritical.....	20

The Commission approves the general plan of concentrating efforts at places where they will yield the best results. A priority system is useful as a guide but should not be followed with mechanical rigidity. In one country visited by Mr. May, the films officer complained that

he was unable to get from Washington a sufficient number of prints of certain pictures because his country is classified as noncritical with a low priority.

The Commission believes that funds and facilities should be available for doing an adequate job in each country regardless of its classification. The size of the staff and the budget should not be a matter of rigid and unchanging priority, but of need.

Pin pointing our propaganda—target groups.—A second step toward pin pointing our propaganda is the designation of target groups within each country. Prior to the beginning of the propaganda offensive the target groups in each country were in considerable part self-selected. They were groups who for various reasons wished to receive information from the United States. For example, public health officials and physicians were keenly interested in learning of our health and hospital activities. An effort was made by the United States Information Service to "fill this order." When Mr. May returned from Europe in 1949, he stressed the importance of finding out "who wants to know what about us." The Commission recommended in one of its earlier reports that the Department conduct research studies on the populations of the world for the purpose of defining groups to which information might be effectively conveyed. At that time a target was any group that was in the market for information about the United States of America. They were for the most part professional-technical groups who were seeking information relative to their professions and interests. One of the main tasks of the United States Information Service was to fill these orders for information.

With the shift in emphasis to the propaganda offensive the basis for selecting target groups has changed. They are for the most part individuals whose opinions and actions are of the greatest importance in combating the spread of communism and in promoting the truth about the United States of America and its foreign policy. Among target groups in each country are persons who by virtue of their positions may exert influence over the opinions of larger groups. They are called opinion molders. In some countries students and teachers are selected as target groups; workers, because of their organization into trade-unions, are definite targets both of the Communists and of ourselves.

In 1952, upon Mr. May's revisit to Europe, he found in each of the 10 European countries visited target groups had been defined in response to a request from the Department. In most countries these definitions are in terms of occupational groups such as laborers, teachers, students, journalists, etc. In a few countries the targets are more specifically defined for a particular class of workers such as electrical or communications; or a particular group of teachers, e. g., college or secondary schools. In a few countries it appears that the United States Information Service officers are not concentrating their efforts primarily on the specified target groups, but are rather trying to fill orders or requests for information from all sources.

The choice of target groups and the means to reach them are based on knowledge generally available to the country specialists in the Department of State and partly on intensive field studies. These studies are conducted through contracts with research organizations outside of the Department. Several of them have been completed

and information has been obtained that is very useful not only in identifying groups to which our efforts may be most effectively directed, but also in determining the media that are best adapted to reach them. The field studies are conducted with the cooperation and advice of the United States Information Service staff at each post.

Media best suited for reaching and influencing target groups.—In general, the Commission finds two main avenues of approach to target groups. One is via the established channels of mass communication in each country including the local press, movies, and radio. From the beginning a policy of the United States Information Service has been to use the facilities of the host country to present broadcasts or other information in that country. There are, of course, always limitations on the extent to which press, radio, and motion picture theaters in any country can be used to disseminate information that is desired by another country.

In addition to using existing channels of communication the United States Information Service in some countries has found it expedient to create new channels of its own. In Europe these channels have been created by the Economic Cooperation Administration, later by the Mutual Security Agency, and in Germany by the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany. They consist of certain overt publications such as *Rapport* in France, *Der Monat* and *Neue Zeitung* in Germany; of newsreel material furnished by the Mutual Security Agency; of special pamphlets and exhibits; and of our own radio stations such as the Armed Forces network in Germany. The recent merger of the information services in Europe of the United States Information Service with the Mutual Security Agency has resulted in a marked increase in the extent to which specially created channels of communication with target groups are being used. Moreover there are many indirect local channels that are becoming highly effective.

Studies of Communist propaganda, its goals and methods of operation.—Closer attention now is being given and analyses are being made of the volume of propaganda that is being put out by the Soviet Union and her satellites over the radio, in the press, in motion pictures, and through various cultural groups. Special attention is paid to how Communist organizations carry on their propaganda in each country of the world.

The Commission believes that an increasing amount of time should be spent in the study of this important aspect of the world's propaganda battle. The Soviet-inspired "hate America" campaign is an intensive effort, one that has had appalling results in many parts of the world. To counter the inertia and continued drive of this campaign, we must understand the themes and subthemes of Communist propaganda. For example, one of these themes is the "imperialistic" nature of the United States. We must be acquainted with the means by which this idea has been spread, the subthemes used in various cultures of the world, and the degree of success of this campaign. Although our propaganda effort should by no means be a purely defensive one, part of our effort should attempt to counteract Soviet-

inspired ideas. Only by understanding these ideas can we achieve success.

The need for positive propaganda themes.—In a recent speech at Georgetown University, Dr. George Gallup said:

If I were to cite my chief criticism of our propaganda efforts of the last 10 years, it would be that we have never followed the simple rule of selling ideas one at a time; we say one thing today, another tomorrow.

The Commission finds that this is substantially correct insofar as our positive themes are concerned. Our negative theme, namely, that Communists are liars, is more constant.

The Commission has received communications from thoughtful citizens urging that the State Department decide on a few simple but forceful and positive propaganda themes which will be played with variations throughout the world. The International Press Service (IPS) has suggested a plan of themes to be emphasized systematically according to a time schedule. It is too early for the Commission to assess the value of this, except to say that recent visits to the field have revealed that press officers in Europe are, on the whole, not enthusiastic about the plan.

The Commission believes that attention should be given to the definition of positive propaganda themes which can be used by all media.

The need for more discretionary authority for field officers.—Field trips by members of the Commission have revealed an increasing need and desire for more material prepared in the field, either regionally or countrywise. In 1949 Mr. May found several United States Information Service posts in Europe which were clamoring for more raw materials with which to make exhibits, more photos of local events, more motion pictures suited to the particular audiences and people of a country, more broadcasts over local stations, locally programed. In 1952 he found a great improvement in this respect, due in considerable part to the union of the International Information Administration and the Mutual Security Agency information services at the country level. This merger brings the Mutual Security Agency's counterpart funds into the United States Information Service where they can be used freely for local production of exhibits, movies, overt publications, etc.

In the Latin-American countries Mr. Miller, on his field trip in the summer of 1951, found many examples of materials being unusable because they were designed for the entire world rather than having Latin America particularly in mind. Because of his realization that more materials had to be prepared for particular areas only, Mr. Miller recommended various changes which would to a certain degree shift the emphasis from production in this country for world-wide use to area production for area targets. In the film activity, Mr. Miller pointed out the need for more field production of motion pictures so that the films would be more meaningful to the target audience. In those films which could not be produced overseas, Mr. Miller suggested that the American information officers be given greater discretion and equipment for editing, excerpting, and dubbing-in, the purpose in all of this being to make the films a more successful medium in a given area of the world. Mr. Miller made similar recommendations for locally originated radio programs, and in the field of press and publications, he suggested the use of local and regional production centers,

all of which would be staffed with writers intimately acquainted with the problems of Latin America.

On his recent trip to Europe, Mr. May discovered great improvements over 1949 in respect to usability of materials sent from Washington. Some of his observations and recommendations to the Commission on this point were as follows:

Press officers as a rule select from the Wireless Bulletin, from pamphlets, feature articles, comments, photos, etc., the materials which they think are most useful for their purposes. They do not feel obligated to try to "place" in local papers and magazines all the materials they receive. Likewise film officers select the films that are best suited to their purposes. There has been, over a period of 3 years, substantial increase in the number of local radio programs that use materials from the United States. A most notable change in radio is the establishment of a radio center in Munich which is now programming in Polish, Lithuanian, Russian, Estonian, and Hungarian, aimed at countries behind the iron curtain. The Munich Radio Center is housed in the consulate building. It uses the radio relay facilities in the Munich area.

Regional production centers for the press service have been set up in Manila and in London. Others have been planned and will be put into operation as soon as possible. Many pamphlets, leaflets, and feature articles are now written by the personnel of the posts which expect to use them. Washington continues to turn out raw materials to be sent overseas for adaptation in ways that seem most useful for reaching the target groups of each country.

In accordance with the recommendations made earlier by the Commission, more films are being produced overseas with local people in the story, with each picture being designed for particular use in a target area of the world.

Along the lines of some of the recommendations of Mr. Miller and Mr. May, more and more radio programs are being produced in the field for broadcasting over local stations. The International Broadcasting Service (Voice of America), operating from New York, is receiving more intensive guidance from the field concerning its programs.

All of these steps have been accomplished, and the Commission feels that they are the right ones. But, as the various findings of the field trips demonstrated, more needs to be done. The effort must be a constant one if the potential effectiveness of the overseas information program is to be fulfilled.

Improving the lines of communication between the field and Washington.—Until recently, one of the weakest points in the whole organization, in the opinion of the Commission, has been the lack of prompt and effective attention to requests from the field.

On his first trip to Europe in 1949, Mr. May discovered and reported several examples of requests from the field where the answer had not been forthcoming from Washington or the delay had been a matter of many months. He recommended that proper corrective steps be taken.

Likewise, in Latin America, Mr. Miller found many similar examples. Mr. Miller recommended a greatly improved coordinating system for the entire Latin-American operation, and because of his recommendations specific steps were taken in Washington to facilitate the answering of field requests. As a result of these steps, a recent Departmental survey indicates that 90 percent of all field requests from the Latin-American area are now handled expeditiously in

Washington, with the other 10 percent having to do with slower moving policy matters.

In the past, the Commission has recognized and noted the need for materially shortening the communication lines between the home office and the field. It is too early to say whether the establishment, under the recent reorganization, of a deputy administrator in charge of field operations will fully and competently satisfy this need. We should like to reemphasize, however, that this is a matter which deserves continuous scrutiny and appraisal by the Administrator and his chief subordinates.

Closer cooperation with other agencies and groups both governmental and private, both in Washington and in the field, is needed.—As the information program has shifted its emphasis from the "full and fair picture" to the propaganda offensive, its aims become inseparable from the other groups interested in the cause of freedom.

In Washington, this means that the objectives and policies of the International Information Administration must be coordinated with psychological warfare activities of the Defense Department, the information programs of the Mutual Security Agency and of the Technical Cooperation Administration, and the intelligence activities of America's overseas personnel.

In 1951, the Psychological Strategy Board was established under the National Security Council for the purpose of coordinating this country's over-all propaganda activities. This Board was not intended to be an operating agency, but rather an organization which, with a very small staff, would translate America's international policies into a workable and consistent propaganda strategy.

In the Department of State there is also a Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (under the chairmanship of the Administrator of the International Information Administration) which has as its task the developing and coordinating of interdepartmental operational plans and policies based on the United States Government's over-all psychological strategy. This would seem to be a step in the right direction, since we have felt in the past that plans and policies have not been altogether successful in sifting down to the various operators in the media. We should all recognize the need for having some instrument that can conceive and initiate propaganda plans as well as respond to political, national, and international events and interests.

The Commission must emphasize the continuing need for a greater effort in top level coordination and policy formulation, without which much of the effectiveness of the operating propaganda agencies, including the International Information Administration, is lost.

Overseas, as we have noted particularly in Europe, the purposes and plans of all propaganda efforts of the United States should be closely coordinated. In the past, the lack of this coordination has, in the opinion of the Commission, weakened the effectiveness of our over-all efforts.

In 1949 Mr. May found in Europe two separate information programs—the United States Information Service and the Economic Cooperation Administration. At some posts the individuals who were operating these two programs were friendly and worked together as far as possible; in other posts they worked independently.

In 1952 Mr. May found that the informational activities of the Mutual Security Agency and the United States Information Service

had become officially merged in all but one or two posts. This merger was approved, in fact ordered, by the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the International Information Administration, and the Director of the Mutual Security Agency. Consideration is now being given to including in the merger the informational work of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Defense Community, and other regional organizations.

Under the merger of the information programs of the United States Information Service and the Mutual Security Agency the entire staff is part of the mission. In some cases the public affairs officer is a former Mutual Security Agency man, and still on that payroll; in other cases he is a United States Information Service man. The significant fact is that at each European post the United States Information Service and Mutual Security Agency information personnel work as a team. Furthermore, the budgetary resources of both are pooled which gives the public affairs officer much greater leeway in the use of the counterpart funds that are assigned by the Mutual Security Agency mission chief to information work.

It is understood of course that most of the information objectives of the Mutual Security Agency and the United States Information Service are the same, yet there are points of difference. The Mutual Security Agency has no cultural responsibilities; the United States Information Service has no responsibilities for sending information back to the United States on reactions to military and economic aid.

It is too early for the Commission to determine whether the recent appointment of a regional field officer to coordinate the information activities of the United States Information Service at the regional level in Europe with those of the Mutual Security Agency, the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will insure a full and adequate integrated mechanism to handle all Government information efforts in Europe. The Commission strongly endorses such moves toward better coordination and integration of these activities, and urges careful observation and review of this very essential and important area by responsible officials in the Department of State, the Mutual Security Agency, the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is imperative that we not be competing with ourselves; rather we should be telling the same story in a single voice. The Commission would further note the need for insuring that lines of responsibility are clearly understood and that there will be absolutely no duplication of work. In this latter respect, the Department of State, Mutual Security Agency, Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization should, we believe, make certain that (1) adequately trained and oriented personnel are on the job, (2) that lines of responsibility are clearly drawn and understood, (3) that duplication of work and personnel be assiduously avoided, and (4) that the various information offices not compete with themselves but work toward the same end in a coordinated manner.

Mr. Miller looked into similar problems as they exist in Latin America. He found that in the information and cultural fields, the International Information Administration is not alone among American agencies. The Institute of Inter-American Affairs carries on cultural and technical improvement functions, and there are various

semiautonomous, binational cultural institutes throughout Latin America. The work of all such groups is similar to that of the International Information Administration, and Mr. Miller found that a certain amount of overlapping of functions is the result. To correct this, Mr. Miller has recommended that these agencies should be given a definite field of operation and the functions of all such organizations should be coordinated through the local American Embassy. Recent steps have been taken to give to the Institute of Inter-American Affairs much of the coordinating function that Mr. Miller believes is essential.

Finally in April of 1952, the Technical Cooperation Administration and the International Information Administration agreed upon a system of close cooperation in their various information functions. The two organizations will establish joint information activities in those countries where both operate, with the International Information Administration being responsible for publicizing all point 4 programs and the two exchanging information in other fields where cooperation is essential.

The need for better trained personnel.—In its previous reports the Commission has commented upon the difficulties encountered in the improvement of personnel in a rapidly expanding program. We recognize, as Congress certainly recognizes, the possibility of a long range struggle in the battle for the minds of men. The Commission believes, now that this program has become better established, that immediate attention should be given to the development of a complete training program, both within the International Information Administration and through outside sources. In making these recommendations, the Commission agrees with the general substance of a training report (see appendix) made to it by a subcommittee of the Radio Advisory Committee. This report referred only to the personnel for the radio activities of the information program, but we believe that it is applicable to all personnel in the International Information Administration. The Commission has submitted this report to the International Information Administration for action, and it is now being considered.

The first type of training needed is that required within the Administration. Although the Department of State has a generalized orientation program for all new employees, more specific training is needed for those employees whose assignment is or will be in the information program. Also, advanced courses and training manuals should be prepared for those employees who move upward to more responsible positions. Finally, in this type of internal training, there is the problem of training personnel destined for overseas assignment. A new employee who will soon be representing the International Information Administration and the United States Government at an overseas post should be intimately acquainted with the policies and operations of the home office. This cannot be accomplished through a few weeks of orientation. All such personnel should have at least 6 months of media training before beginning their work abroad.

The second type of training that is needed is one that is required for more long range purposes. This is the training which could be carried on through outside sources, especially through cooperation with the universities of this country. The International Information

Administration should be able to advise colleges on graduate and undergraduate courses that could be given for students interested in a future career in propaganda activities. Furthermore, when these courses are known to be well organized, arrangements should be made for a few of the more promising employees of the International Information Administration to obtain a leave of absence to attend the universities. If necessary, in particularly outstanding cases, scholarships should be arranged so that a few officers of the information program could attend these courses.

The Commission urges that these training recommendations be given immediate attention and initiated as soon as feasible.

Finally under personnel special mention should be made of the local personnel working at our overseas missions. These local people are on the whole well selected, loyal, and extremely capable. The present plan to give them orientation in this country is good, but there is need for a more carefully worked out and explicit training process.

Special funds for use by field personnel.—The Commission has felt for some time the need for an increase in the amount of funds allocated for use by field personnel for entertainment of foreign officials. Many officers in the field, we have found, are spending substantial portions of their salary to do the things which must be done if they are to do the job expected of them. As Mr. Miller has said:

* * * it seems inconceivable to me that anyone with the slightest understanding of what is involved in an Information Service could imagine that our embassies in the Latin-American countries could get along without entertainment funds in pretty substantial amounts.

Similarly Mr. May upon his return from Europe in 1949 noted:

* * * the importance of personal, friendly contacts for winning friends and influencing people is so well known, particularly to businessmen and political leaders, that it need not be emphasized here. There is need, however, to point out that it is just as effective abroad as it is at home, if not more so. By providing United States Information Service officers with more funds for travel and entertainment, the effectiveness of our field people would in all likelihood increase immeasurably. Present budgets for these purposes are pitifully small compared with those of other countries, or with those of American concerns doing business in Europe.

The Commission would like to take this opportunity to reemphasize these points made by individual members. The entertainment fund for fiscal year 1952 was limited to \$50,000, an amount that had to be spread among the approximately 180 United States Information Service posts throughout the world. We believe that for more effective personal and public relations abroad, this figure should be realistically reconsidered and increased.

In addition to the matters already discussed, there are three other problems which should be mentioned under operational policies, although these relate entirely to field operations:

Need for continuity in personnel through an improved transfer and leave system.—The information program is at its most effective state when the program is a continuous one, one in which there is no perceptible change when the personnel of overseas staffs change. But such is not always the case, a fact that was noticed particularly by Mr. Miller on his 1951 trip to Latin America. He discovered that often key officers are transferred just as they have begun to have full command of the situation at their posts. Then, rather than having an overlapping orientation period with the new incumbent, there is

often a gap of many months before the new officer arrives. When he does arrive, his orientation is entirely dependent on his own efforts.

This is a situation which must be corrected if the information program is to function to the most effective degree possible. It would be best in most instances, in our opinion, to have an overlapping in the transfer system so that there will be no lack of continuity in the program and so that the new person arriving on the scene will have an opportunity to become familiar with the operation under the guidance of the departing officer.

United States Information Service—mission integration.—As the overseas information program is a part of America's total diplomacy, necessity dictates that each United States Information Service mission become more closely integrated with the embassy or legation under which it operates. Where complete integration and cooperation would be the ideal working relationship, Commission members have found that in many cases something far less than this ideal now exists.

Mr. Miller pointed out after his trip to Latin America in 1951 that the "destructive sniping" between Foreign Service personnel and United States Information Service personnel must cease. To attain this, the Commission believes, a written policy statement should be prepared on the United States Information Service, stating its aims, continuity, future, place in total diplomacy, etc. We feel that information personnel must have prestige similar to that of the Foreign Service if the two groups are to work in harmony toward the same goal.

Mr. May, in 1949, stated that most of the information personnel in Europe seemed pleased, or at least satisfied with the existing situation, but he did feel that in many cases higher rank, within the embassies, should be given to the public affairs officers.

This is a point which the Commission feels deserves attention by the Department. We appreciate the efforts which have been made so far in the direction of integration, and we further realize that many of the remaining problems are purely subjective ones, problems which cannot be solved by administrative fiat. But it must be realized both internally and from the outside that both the information program and the Foreign Service have important and necessary roles to play and neither should suffer because of minor personal difficulties. The Commission wishes to emphasize the need for further integration between these two groups.

Administration of the International Information Administration funds at posts abroad.—Mr. Miller on his trip to Latin America in 1951 and Mr. May on his trip to Europe in 1948-49 and again in 1952 found a need for better budgeting and accounting for administrative support funds and personnel.

The Commission understands that procedures are being developed to require the overseas missions in each country to prepare annual estimates of United States Information Service (USIS) administrative support requirements and that the Department will specifically identify the funds and positions made available for such purposes. The Commission also understands that separate accounting will be required for certain USIS administrative support expenses.

The Commission would strongly endorse any move that would insure closer management of the International Information Adminis-

tration's funds in the field. Under the budget system for the past fiscal years, there have not been any separate allotments for administrative support. Identification of funds made available in other allotments has not been provided. There have been separate allotments for programing needs.

In addition to establishing a more effective mechanism to insure the proper allocation, control, and expenditure of International Information Administration funds, we would recommend that the Department give serious consideration to increasing the number of operations officers assigned to the overseas posts. The operations officer would be responsible to the public affairs officer and would be charged with the management and administrative functions of the USIS activities at the post.

In the final analysis, the International Information Administration cannot operate effectively if its funds are not immediately identifiable and strictly controlled both in the field and at home.

FACILITIES

Are our facilities adequate? As we stated in our summary, the Commission members have not made a systematic survey of physical facilities. However, our observations in the field, especially those of Mr. Miller in Latin America, have led us to believe that there are still an insufficient number of certain useful items in the overseas missions. Mr. Miller noted this fact especially in relation to mobile units for the film operation.

In the field of radio, the Commission regrets that the Congress did not grant the Voice of America's request for \$36,727,086 for further work on its world-wide facilities. Our studies of the program show that the Voice needs a stronger signal to be heard easily at target areas far away from initial transmitter and relay bases. One step that should prove helpful in making a stronger signal for the Voice of America is the recent launching in February of a floating transmitter. This step was the commissioning of the first seagoing radio broadcasting station—the United States Coast Guard Cutter *Courier*.

This 5,800 ton, 338-foot vessel, manned with a crew of 80 and equipped with one 150-kilowatt medium wave transmitter (three times the power of the largest American broadcasting station) and two 35-kilowatt shortwave transmitters and supporting communications equipment, will make possible further penetration of International Broadcasting Service (Voice of America) programs to areas behind the iron curtain, despite the large Soviet jamming mechanism.

The Commission would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the International Information Administration for its initiative, imagination, and perseverance in completing this project, known as operation Vagabond.

As to housing, the Commission is under the impression that the United States Information Service activities and personnel in Europe and Latin America are fairly adequately housed, but that in the Near and Far East the housing problem is more acute.

On the whole, though, the Commission is pleased with the advances which have been made in the field of material facilities. These improvements have been real ones, as for example in the number of

mobile units; 3 years ago there were only 62 in the field, today there are 342 and 12 more on which work has begun. As long as such advances continue, the Commission is well satisfied with almost all aspects of the information program's material facilities.

REORGANIZATION OF THE PROGRAM

Purpose.—On January 16, 1952, the State Department announced a reorganization of its information and educational exchange activities. The Department outlined the purpose of this reorganization as follows:

1. To improve the United States information and educational exchange program by a greater centralization of responsibility for its planning and execution in a United States International Information Administration to be established as a semiautonomous agency within the Department of State.
2. To maintain and to further strengthen the integration of the United States International Information and Educational Exchange activities with the conduct of United States foreign relations generally.
3. To make available to the Secretary and top officers of the Department expert advice on information problems and information considerations in the development of foreign policy on a sounder basis by freeing the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs of any responsibility for the planning and execution of the United States Information Service program.

The Commission in reporting to the Congress shortly after this reorganization announcement in January 1952, said that it intended—
to make careful comment on the reorganization * * * at the earliest useful date.

We are taking this opportunity to so comment.

The Commission has been concerned with the organization and position of this program within the Department of State since its appointment in 1948. In our first report to the Secretary of State on December 23, 1948, we said:

In administration, as well as in matters relating to policy, the Commission wishes to emphasize that there should be full realization by the officers of the Department of the objectives of the information program and the requirements of fast-moving operations. We are certain that continued study by the Department would result in adequate administrative flexibility which would meet the needs of the operating divisions of the international information program.

And again, in our fourth report to the Congress, dated April 1951, we reviewed the status of the progress made to date on integration at the policy-making level as a result of the Hoover Commission reorganization and added:

* * * A better organizational status for the growing information program within the Department is desirable.

The purposes of the reorganization as stated by the Department are commendable ones. The true meaning of the reorganization, however, can be found more in the particulars than in the generalized objectives. We would like therefore to examine more closely the reorganization to date, indicating changes made and the significant results of those changes.

The first significant change brought about by the reorganization was the centralization of authority for the planning and execution of the program.

Under the former organization, responsibility for the program was too broadly diffused within the Department of State. It seemed that all elements in the Department had some supervisory role to play in the administration and execution of the program. The regional bureaus, the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, and the General Manager, all had responsibilities for parts of the program planning and operation and often it appeared that these respective roles were conflicting.

The reorganization has corrected this lack of centralization of authority for the operation of the program by vesting in one person, the Administrator, complete authority and supervision of the International Information Administration with a further provision that the Administrator report directly to the Secretary of State. The regional bureaus and the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs do, however, give necessary guidance with respect to information policies. Their respective relationships to the program will be discussed more fully later.

Another major change under the reorganization has been the shift in responsibility for country program planning from the regional bureaus to the International Information Administration. Previously, although the General Manager was responsible for developing a world-wide program, he shared with the regional bureaus, not accountable to him, the important responsibility of planning the specific country programs. The obvious result was to limit the authority of the General Manager, while at the same time making coordination of country planning in the regional bureaus with media planning in the media divisions exceedingly difficult and cumbersome. Under the present organization both these tasks are performed in the International Information Administration. This will enable the Administrator to coordinate country and media planning into a well-integrated program.

A third important change brought about by the reorganization was the establishment of a Deputy Administrator for Field Programs to control the field operations of the International Information Administration. Previously the regional bureaus had supervisory responsibility over the field operations of the program, again limiting the authority and control of the General Manager and Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs over the program. Under the present organization, the Deputy Administrator reporting directly to the Administrator is able to give entire attention to the field program activities and requests, while at the same time affording the Administrator the control and supervisory responsibility needed. Another advantage of this aspect of the reorganization is that it gives the field a single identifiable unit within the framework of the program, to which it can report, and from which it can expect general supervision, guidance, and direction. This aspect of the reorganization will also enable the International Information Administration to make the best use of funds appropriated by Congress for the accomplishments of United States foreign policy objectives as well as allowing for flexibility in the program as political situations change.

The regional bureaus will maintain small staffs to develop information policies for their areas and advise the International Information Administration on programs for their areas.

A fourth change brought about by the reorganization has to do with the role of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. Under the old organization of the program, the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs had responsibility for the conduct of the domestic public affairs program, including the role as the officer responsible for advising the Secretary of State on opinion and attitude factors in the development of foreign policy. He also had responsibility for the entire United States Information Service program in the many matters affecting Congress, the public, and other departments of the Government. The Office of the General Manager was established following the report of the Hoover Commission to relieve the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs of the operating details of the United States Information Service program. As a practical measure, however, this split proved unmanageable, particularly with the growing importance of the information program.

The reorganization has relieved the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs of the supervision of the International Information Administration in order that he may devote his full time to other major duties. He will continue to serve as the officer responsible for advising the Secretary on domestic public opinion and attitude factors in the development of foreign policy, for providing to the international information program guidance based upon policy decisions at the highest levels in the Department of State, and for directing programs designed to keep the United States public informed on international problems. In addition the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs serves as a channel by which the International Information Administration will get guidance on information policy and, conversely, a channel through which, in the making of foreign policy, overseas information factors can be considered.

Finally, some progress has been made in the reorganization to give the Administrator greater flexibility and autonomy of operation in the management and administrative functions of the International Information Administration. Where previously the General Manager had to rely considerably upon the central management and operating service facilities of the Department of State, which were not subject to his control, there has now been delegated to the Administrator of the International Information Administration additional authority in these fields. However, the Commission notes that this authority is subject to the general administrative policies of the Department for the carrying out of these services. Thus to this extent the International Information Administration continues to rely upon the Administrative area of the Department for certain centralized administrative services.

Special arrangements are being worked out to allow the International Information Administration to have greater autonomy of operation in the administrative fields of personnel, administrative management, operating facilities and services, and budget and fiscal operations. In some cases these arrangements already have been completed, as in the case of the budget and fiscal operation, whereas in other cases arrangements have not been worked out.

One major move which has been completed in the administrative portion of the reorganization has been the transfer of responsibility for the New York administrative office to the International Information Administration, under the supervision and direction of the Assistant Administrator for Management.

We feel that the whole matter of administrative services for the International Information Administration both in the United States and in the field deserves constant appraisal and scrutiny by the Administrator. Because of the incompleteness of this part of the reorganization, and the consequent difficulty which we would have in appraising it now, we intend to give a more detailed analysis of this important phase of the reorganization in our next report to the Congress.

The Commission understands that the Administration is planning to contract for management surveys of special aspects of the program. We are heartily in favor of such surveys and would recommend that the entire International Information Administration operation be surveyed by such means as soon as feasible.

Finally, the Commission has been informed that a request has been made for 14 supergrade positions within the framework of the International Information Administration. This reorganization, we feel, is a substantial step toward adapting the Administration to a hard-hitting psychological operation, but from our viewpoint to match this elevation in organizational structure within the Department of State, there must be provided to the program a salary structure which would persuade a sufficient number of outstanding men from private life to come into the program. The Commission should quickly note, however, that with the level of the organization being lifted considerably by the recent reorganization, it would be a mistake to have higher grades without top-level people to fill those grades. In short, the Commission is of the opinion that any request for supergrades be made and granted on the condition that, for the most part, specialists from private industry be obtained to fill those grades.

The Commission feels the moves in the reorganization toward greater flexibility of operation are basically sound. It is, of course, too early for us to say whether or not the reorganization in part or in total has been effective and useful. We can say that it would appear to us, now, that these measures taken *should* be an improvement. We are, of course, aware of the many arguments for a separate agency and some will say that this reorganization, although placing the program on a semiautonomous basis, does not go far enough. We reviewed our position on the question of a separate agency in our fourth report to the Congress dated April 1951. At that time we said:

This Commission has no vested interest in the placement of the information program. We are solely concerned with its maximum effectiveness. If we were persuaded that it could function more effectively outside the State Department, we would feel obligated to say so. But our experience has led us to have grave doubts that the program in the hands of a separate agency would operate as well as it does now. We believe the subject requires very careful study. We would therefore gladly endorse the proposals in Congress for an investigation of the information program, although we hope the investigation will not completely monopolize the time of those trying to administer these operations.

Our position today is as it was in April of 1951. We are under no compunction whatever to stand assiduously for one view or the other. Our minds are open, and if, as we have already noted, we were persuaded that the organization would function more effectively outside the Department of State, we would announce ourselves for the separation forthwith.

Since parts of the reorganization are still to be completed, it would be premature for this Commission to fully endorse the reorganiza-

tion of the program. We feel that the steps taken toward achieving a semiautonomous operation are right ones, but whether or not they alone will accomplish all that needs to be done to make the program truly effective in every sense is a matter that must be held in abeyance until further appraisal of the program can be made.

In the meantime, the Commission would endorse a recent Senate committee action for investigating this program. The Foreign Relations Committee has approved a resolution by Senators Benton (Democrat, Connecticut) and Wiley (Republican, Wisconsin) which would establish a subcommittee to investigate the program. Our trips overseas indicate that any such investigation should include trips to the field. We would hope, however, that the proposed investigation would not hamper the efforts of the overseas information program.

Despite the progress already made to date on the reorganization, we recommend that the Administrator and his subordinates continually scrutinize and appraise the steps taken in the reorganization, as we intend to do.

EVALUATION

The matter of evaluation of the International Information Administration has been of primary interest to the Commission for some time. We have consistently recommended a strengthening of this important aspect of the International Information Administration's operation.

In the reorganization of the program, begun in January 1952 and still in progress, the evaluation activities have been set up as a staff function under the Administrator with the responsibility for over-all planning in this area. Each of the media offices will continue to ascertain its own needs in terms of evaluation studies, polls, surveys, etc., in consultation with this central evaluation staff.

Most of the evaluation work is being contracted for with independent research organizations and groups. The present size of the evaluation staff is about 7 persons (total planned, 14 persons), which is too small to be able to do much more than coordinate and plan the over-all evaluation activities of the program. On the other hand, the media services have evaluation staffs varying in size from 4 persons in the press service (total planned, 7 persons) to 87 persons in the International Broadcasting Service. Also, there are two evaluation officers assigned to field posts who are carrying on small-scale studies on some aspects of the program. It is hoped that more such officers can be assigned to the field to perform similar functions.

Generally speaking, the Commission has felt that more attention should be given to continuous evaluation of the effectiveness of the program.

The Commission has invited some experts on evaluation to come into the Department for a few days and look over the present plans and programs with a view to assessing the results of the Administration's efforts in this field. These individuals will report to the Commission. Their findings will be incorporated in our next report to the Congress. This is being done for the purpose of aiding and assisting those who are responsible for this operation, while at the same time giving the Commission expert appraisal of a very vital field of activity in this program, which we ourselves are unable to do.

PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE

The American public should be better informed concerning the major purposes, policies, and means of operation of this program. The Commission deplors the lack of understanding of this program on the part of the American public.

The most that the administrators of the program now can do, under the law, is to make available, on request, to the press and the radio, materials and information within the limits of security regulations. On the other hand, there is no authorization for the initiation of regular information concerning the program for domestic consumption. The Commission and the committees have been concerned with this problem of domestic information for some time. One of the members of the Radio Advisory Committee has underwritten a domestic radio series of 14 programs based on the files of the Voice of America. This series is being used by over 1,000 stations in the United States.

The Commission views the benefits of public information as a twofold matter. The benefits to the American citizenry could be found in the needed information and understanding that they would gain of the International Information Administration. Secondly, the information program would benefit in many ways such as greater public appreciation of the complex problems of propaganda. Because of all of the benefits that would result from such a program, the Commission feels that action must be taken in this field. We are not recommending a complex and costly organization for domestic information. But we do recommend that Public Law 402 be amended so that the public can be informed about the overseas information program without specific requests having to be made for information.

FUTURE OF THE PROGRAM

Attention should now be given to long-range plans for the program. From 1948, when Public Law 402 was enacted, to 1952 the program has undergone rapid expansion. The budget has increased from \$14,820,352 in 1948 to \$88,287,200 in 1952, including the pay increase and funds for the Japanese program. During these 4 years the personnel employed by the program has increased from 1,728 to 8,316 (as of April 30, 1952). The number of field posts staffed with personnel has increased from 95 to 181. On the whole the Commission feels that this expansion in the program has been justified in the light of world events. The time has come, however, when a plan should be established for leveling off the program. In developing this plan attention should be given to needed facilities such as broadcasting stations, even though these facilities cannot be acquired in any one fiscal year. The plan should include personnel for staffing these facilities.

When a top level of operations is established it would, of course, need to be flexible to meet the changes in world events and the Government's program of national security. It would also need to be defined in terms of the value of the dollar. Such a plan would be an advantage to the program because it would enable its administrators to plan more efficient uses of their funds. In addition, the Congress must

make up its mind as to the importance of this program and appropriate funds adequate for maintaining it.

As we pointed out in our summary, another matter which affects the future of the information program is the use of counterpart funds. The move to bring the Mutual Security Agency and the United States Information Service under a single head overseas is, we feel, very necessary and we endorse all moves toward a better coordination in the field of information activities.

Any reduction or curtailment of counterpart funds or foreign currency in the mutual aid program would affect seriously the extent of information activities of the United States Information Service in Mutual Security Agency countries, unless appropriated dollars for the United States Information Service were substantially increased.

APPENDIX

THE UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INFORMATION,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D. C., May 5, 1952.

Dr. WILSON COMPTON,
*Administrator, United States International Information Administration
Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.*

DEAR DR. COMPTON: I am transmitting herewith a report on personnel training prepared by Mr. Donley Feddersen of the Radio Advisory Committee. This report was prepared at the request of the Acting Chairman of the Radio Advisory Committee (Mr. Theodore Streibert, who is also Chairman of the Subcommittee on Organization and Personnel Training).

I would appreciate receiving a report from you on these recommendations.
Sincerely yours,

ERWIN D. CANHAM,
*Chairman, Advisory Commission on Information,
Editor, The Christian Science Monitor.*

APRIL 18, 1952.

To: Chairman, Radio Advisory Committee.
From: Don Feddersen, Chairman, Department of Radio and Television, Northwestern University.

PERSONNEL TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING SERVICE

Submitted by request of Subcommittee on Organization and Personnel Training,
Theodore Streibert, Chairman

INTRODUCTION

It is no longer realistic to think of our activities in the field of international information and education as "temporary" measures. A long term effort of major proportions is clearly indicated and appears virtually inescapable.

For this work, the United States must have a continuing supply of able, well-trained specialists who can handle their assignments with a high degree of skill and imagination. We cannot afford the luxury of incompetence in any part of this program.


The rapid expansion of the program in the last 4 years has made emergency recruitment practices mandatory. However, if the above assumptions are correct, we must take steps now to hasten the time when "crisis" recruiting can be replaced by more orderly methods.

Two considerations have guided us in the formulation of the recommendations which follow: First, that the best training program is that which obtains maximum effectiveness at minimum cost; and second, that the use of existing instrumentalities is preferable to the formation of an elaborate new machine.

The temper of this country is not sympathetic to the so-called propaganda school; moreover, there is reason to believe that such an entity lacks the flexibility which a democratic country requires. These considerations should not sway us, however, from a determination to develop the highest level of skill in those who will be entrusted with explaining the United States to the peoples of other countries.

OUTLINE OF TRAINING PROGRAM PATTERNS

The following outline will illustrate the over-all conception of the training program recommended in the attached memorandum. It attempts to show the stages of training through which prospective employees of varying levels of qualification might be routed.



DESCRIPTION OF THE PROGRAM

I. Preparation of detailed job analysis

The precise nature of all the succeeding phases of the training program cannot be determined until a detailed analysis of personnel requirements has been made. This analysis should separate jobs into major categories, should describe each position, and should list the qualifications and backgrounds which the Service feels are necessary or desirable for persons holding such positions. It is recommended that this analysis be undertaken at once. Besides serving as a guide in the setting up of the training program, it can also be distributed to selected college and university advisers, to libraries, and to other persons who have frequent occasion to answer questions about opportunities in the International Broadcasting Service.

Apart from the obvious values of such an analysis, it should be borne in mind that many able young men and women who might ultimately be very useful in IBS posts will be encouraged to begin a program of studies and preparation far in advance of their actual application for a position. Today, many of these high-grade people are turning to other better defined areas.

II. Development, with advice and cooperation of educators, of some recommended patterns of undergraduate preparation for the field

This step does not require any commitment on the part of the Department. It is intended merely to define some channels which undergraduates may follow. There is every likelihood that these patterns would be of a rather general nature, involving only the listing of recommended courses which ought to be elected by persons who one day hope to work in the field of international information and education. The elective system which obtains in most universities permits the student many choices of emphasis; the patterns suggested would merely act to guide the student's choices.

Coincidentally with the development of such pattern suggestions, each cooperating institution might be requested to designate a faculty adviser, whose function would be to assist students who wish to follow such channels. This individual could then act as liaison between IBS and the university on training problems.

III. The development of specialized and intensive programs of study, probably of a graduate nature, for promising prospects

Many colleges and universities have the facilities to undertake advanced specialized programs which the Service could use as part of its training program. Some applicants for IBS positions who may qualify on most counts but whose backgrounds are deficient in some respect might be processed through such specialized programs.

The detailed job analysis will reveal certain areas of need to which such programs should be tailored. They will tend to group themselves around such headings as the Techniques of Communications Research, Communications and Propaganda, Broadcasting Techniques, Area Studies Emphasizing Culture and Communications Habits, and Engineering Problems in International Broadcasting.

It is by no means necessary to make such programs rigid and inflexible or to develop elaborate administrative machinery to accomplish the purposes of this segment of the training program. Basic patterns for each area can be established by the Service and the colleges selected; beyond these basic patterns, the primary needs of the individual can determine his specific program.

Neither is it necessary for all students in a given area to be potential employees of IBS. The Service can be most helpful by encouraging colleges and universities to develop these programs and by advising with college administrators on what basic patterns should be; its subsequent support of the program might well be limited to providing scholarship support for persons it has reason to believe will ultimately become employees. It may also wish to arrange leaves of absence for some of its present employees who can profit from study of this nature.

In making the above recommendations, we have considered and rejected the more generalized approach typified by the so-called Foreign Service Institutes. A modification of this plan for IBS would call for the establishment of a course of study incorporating in one program *all* of the general areas mentioned above. Thus an individual student would be required to take courses dealing with area, media, research, propaganda techniques, etc. While granting the *desirability* of such a broad background for the individual specialist, there is every likelihood that the *range* of the work could be achieved only at the expense of *intensiveness*. Only the man without adequate background in any field would find all sections of such a program equally useful. Such a man is scarcely the ideal candidate for IBS employment. Moreover, the nature of IBS work requires specialists, not general practitioners—as the job analysis will no doubt demonstrate.

The final argument against the Foreign Service Institute program is its tendency to draw far more candidates into training than the Service could ever possibly absorb.

It is therefore recommended that the Service, once it has analyzed its present and future needs, call selected educators into conference for the purpose of drafting program patterns of the sort described above.

IV. The development of in-service orientation and training programs

Many of the specifics in the training problem can be dealt with only within the Department itself. A new recruit entering the operation must inevitably go through a period of orientation before he can begin to do productive work. He becomes more valuable *more* quickly the more efficiently and effectively this orientation is done.

No prescription for this program is possible until the job analysis is fully completed and studied. However, the following suggestions may merit consideration:

- A. Systematizing of orientation lectures.
- B. Preparation of training manuals and training aids.
- C. Adoption of apprenticeship or internship training plans.

Only the last suggestion requires interpretation. It may be desirable for the Service to establish internship or apprenticeship status for certain new recruits in order that they may be temporarily assigned to sections of the operation for training purposes. Thus the Service may wish to send new language desk recruits for a tour of field service duty prior to their permanent assignment. Engineers and others might profit from a similar arrangement.

The "apprenticeship" arrangement might also be used with certain prospective employees in cases where the Department's operation constitutes the only appropriate place to observe a specific phenomenon. At Northwestern University, for example, the Technological Institute operates on a cooperative education plan wherein students alternate between attendance at school and work assignments in industry. One or two young engineers interested in IBS work might well be assigned to apprentice roles in the Service during their "work" periods. These men, when they had completed school, would be ready for employment.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
 UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
 Washington, June 6, 1952.

Dr. MARK A. MAY,
 Chairman, United States Advisory Commission on Information,
 Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR DR. MAY: Reference is made to Mr. Canham's letter of May 5 and its enclosure, acknowledged by Mr. Harris on May 8.

The whole subject of training personnel of the International Information Administration is coming in for extensive study. We feel very keenly the need for an aggressive approach to the problem. We agree thoroughly with Mr. Feddersen when he says that "It is no longer realistic to think of our activities in the field of international information and education as 'temporary' measures," and when he says that "we must take steps *now* to hasten the time when 'crisis' recruiting can be replaced by more orderly methods." Although he was directing his entire report toward the requirements of the International Broadcasting Service, it is equally applicable to the needs of the entire International Information Administration. We are establishing within the office of the Assistant Administrator for Management a Personnel Management Division which we believe will, when adequately staffed, be able to accomplish many of the things Mr. Feddersen had in mind.

Referring specifically now to the International Broadcasting Service, I might point out that major efforts have already been made in the direction of certain of Mr. Feddersen's suggestions.

1. Several months ago we developed in detail a cooperative university training program for students in the field of electronics engineering. Discussions have been held with a small number of interested universities.

2. A postinduction orientation course for New York personnel similar to that given by the Foreign Service Institute for Washington and Foreign Service employees has been installed. The coverage of the course will be enlarged as rapidly as circumstances permit.

3. The framework for an internship training in New York to supplement the department-wide intern program has been built and we hope to have it in operation within the next few months.

The three steps outlined above were worked out by a training committee which was set up in our New York office several months ago and represent only a portion of the over-all effort of that committee. The committee looks with great favor upon Mr. Feddersen's suggestions for recommending to American colleges and universities specialized programs of study, both at the undergraduate and graduate level, for students wishing to prepare themselves for careers in the International Information Administration. Since that proposal may be assumed to have equal value for our entire program, we don't want to limit its consideration to the International Broadcasting Service. Consequently, it will be a subject for examination by the new Personnel Management Division as soon as it is staffed. I hope that will be soon.

We are immensely grateful to the Advisory Commission for bringing these recommendations to our attention and particularly to Mr. Feddersen for the thought and effort which he has put into the report. I will see that you are kept informed of the progress we make in this direction.

Sincerely yours,

WILSON COMPTON, *Administrator.*

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