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26TH REPORT OF THE U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INFORMATION

COMMUNICATION

FROM

THE CHAIRMAN, U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INFORMATION

TRANSMITTING

THE COMMISSION'S 26TH REPORT ON THE INFORMATION, EDUCATIONAL, AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY, PURSUANT TO SECTION 603 OF PUBLIC LAW 80–402

FEBRUARY 27, 1973.—Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INFORMATION,
Washington, D.C., February 26, 1973.

Hon. CARL ALBERT,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Pursuant to provisions of section 603, Public Law 402, 80th Congress, transmitted herewith is the 26th Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, January 27, 1973.

A copy of this report also is being forwarded to the President of the Senate.

Sincerely,

FRANK STANTON.

THE 26TH REPORT TO CONGRESS

U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INFORMATION

JANUARY 1973

To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with requirements of section 603, Public Law 402, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information submits herewith its 26th report to the Congress on the information, educational and cultural programs administered by the U.S. Information Agency.

Respectfully submitted.

FRANK STANTON,
Chairman.

JANUARY 27, 1973.

The Commission:
Frank Stanton, *Chairman*
Hobart Lewis
James A. Michener
John M. Shaheen
George H. Gallup

Louis T. Olom,
Staff Director

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PART I.—THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

> "Let us continue to bring down the walls of hostility which have divided the world, and to build in their place *bridges of understanding*—so that despite profound differences between systems of government, the people of the world can be friends.
>
> "Let us build a structure of peace in the world in which the weak are as safe as the strong—in which each respects the right of the other to live by a different system—*in which those who would influence others will do so by the strength of their ideas,* not by the force of their arms."—President Richard M. Nixon's Second Inaugural Address, January 20, 1973

The two-fold mission of the United States Information Agency (USIA) [1] has been designed to accomplish the President's objectives. This mission is: (1) to present to the world with candor reliable information about the U.S. and its affairs, and (2) to reflect to American decisionmakers both at home and abroad the pertinent opinions of mankind which they should weigh and consider.

[1] Abroad, USIA is known as the United States Information Service (USIS).

Part II.—The United States Information Agency and International Understanding

Twenty-five years ago the Congress of the United States passed Public Law 402. The Senate passed the bill by voice vote on January 16, 1948. The final House vote—273 yea, 97 nay, 1 present and 58 not voting—took place on January 19. This Act has provided the legal framework and overall legislative policy guidance for this country's foreign information, education and cultural programs. It became effective when President Harry S. Truman signed it on January 27, 1948.

Public Law 402 was pioneer legislation, as it launched an experimental voyage into relatively new and uncharted seas for a democratic nation in times of peace. Despite justifiable suspicion of government propaganda, the Congress nevertheless expressed its determination that this country would be well represented in the ideological battles then raging around the world by equipping it with an instrument to achieve that purpose.

The objectives of Public Law 402 are "to enable the Government of the United States to promote *a better understanding* of the United States in other countries (then 81—now 132), and to increase *mutual understanding* between the people of the U.S. and the people of other countries."

The Congress singled out the *United Nations* for special attention, by declaring that "in carrying out the objectives of this act, information concerning *the participation of the United States in the United Nations*, its organizations and functions, shall be *emphasized*."

During the past quarter of a century the United States Information Agency and its predecessor organizations have developed within the framework of this legislation and sustained by the necessary appropriations that were justified—frequently in minute detail—an important American strategic capability in international communications that remains for the most part unknown to the American people.

Despite an original mix of trial and error with untested communications theory and doctrine the U.S. has gradually constructed and today enjoys:

1. A strong corps of specialists in international communications whose cumulative experience, insights and knowledge of foreign cultures and languages have equipped them to communicate effectively with foreign peoples. This is a unique capability.

2. A Voice of America that broadcasts to the world in 35 languages and operates around the clock.

3. One hundred and thirty information centers and libraries in 76 countries that are recognized by the people of these foreign countries as important institutions which they seek out, and with which they become actively involved and identified. Together with the 109 binational centers in 31 countries and 29 reading rooms in 17 countries these facilities have attempted to showcase the United States. However, again and again this Agency has represented the United States

abroad and has borne the full burden of organized attacks by some foreign citizens resulting from personal alienation, or from frustration and disenchantment with one or another American policy—domestic or foreign—or that stem from opposition to the acts and policies of their own country. This is our badge of honor. But, despite these occasional difficulties the centers have enjoyed considerable acceptance, appreciation and popularity in numerous cities throughout the world.

4. A radio teletype system capable of transmitting instantaneously news analysis and interpretation, features, official texts and other information to United States Information Service posts around the world.

5. Three major reproduction centers in Mexico City, Manila and Beirut, capable of producing large quantities of pamphlets, leaflets, posters, magazines, wall newspapers and other publications.

6. A motion picture and television capability, with in-house production facilities.

7. A USIS establishment consisting of 169 posts in 100 countries. To foreigners abroad the *USIS* symbol means the information, cultural and education arm of the United States. Next to the American Embassy, *USIS* has become the best known American public institution abroad.

8. The emergence of a design and exhibits service which performs the task of visually portraying for the world significant happenings in the U.S. These exhibits may be small, medium-sized or extremely large. They use every conceivable visual and audio-visual technique to depict such topics as American culture, education, architecture, space exploration, research and development among numerous others that are treated.

With these resources in personnel and facilities USIA has produced or sponsored abroad exhibits of America, English teaching classes, seminars and lectures on current topics and issues, American Studies programs and university chairs in American studies, concerts, musicals and displays of art. It has distributed millions of copies of books, magazines, records, photographs, newspapers and other publications. It has shown film in commercial theaters, before many groups and organizations and on television stations in many parts of the world. And the Voice of America's round-the-clock radio broadcasts have become a worldwide signal and symbol of America. USIS has also arranged events for American performing artists whose standards of quality and performance have evoked worldwide acclaim. And it has administered abroad the State Department's Exchange of Persons Program.

Attempts to calculate the worldwide audience that USIA reaches with all of its resources are exceedingly complex and still unreliable methodologically. The best estimates of this reach, by those research specialists who struggle with this question, range from a conservative figure of 150 million to 230 million people a year who are exposed in some manner to USIA's message from America. But no quantitative figure of exposure can describe or explain the significance of Prime Ministers or Presidents, Parliamentarians, Cabinet members or judges, editors or writers, professors or businessmen, leading political party

officials or labor union executives—those who constitute the influential driving forces and leadership of a society, when they listen to the Voice of America. Or when they read the full official texts of U.S. policy that are made available by USIS, visit an American exhibit, attend a lecture or seminar about the U.S., read an American book, see a motion picture or seek information in a USIA library or binational center.

These efforts have introduced into foreign countries a steady stream of information about the United States—its intentions, policies and way of life—for the attention of foreign elites, opinion molders as well as average citizens. American public opinion on U.S. policies and American opinion on the policies of other nations have been included. Also included were samples of our cultural, musical, scholarly and artistic achievements along with the State Department's exchange program of selected American students, scholars and leaders.

For this quarter century of effort, the taxpayer authorized through his elected representatives in Congress an average expenditure of 140 million dollars per year. And the Congress and taxpayer rightfully ask, sometimes with gnawing doubt, whether the original purposes of Public Law 402 have been achieved, whether the original assumptions of 1948 remain basically valid and tenable today and for the immediate future.

What has been the result? What has been the net impact of this effort? How much has been achieved?

This Commission's previous 25 Reports to Congress have examined the questions. These reports have focused on major trends—on accomplishments and failures, assets and liabilities, strengths and weaknesses—as observed by private citizens who have served as an outside, independent assessment and advisory body. USIA's own semi-annual reports to Congress have detailed its achievements and progress as the Agency's management saw them. Finally, voluminous records were developed by the appropriate committees of Congress on one or another aspect of this work which are available for public examination.

But how much understanding of the United States has been achieved with the peoples of the world?

COMMUNICATION AND UNDERSTANDING

Communications play an increasingly crucial role in the world today. Thanks to the explosive growth of communications technology which has evolved from moveable type to the communications satellite—there has developed a commensurate increase in human interaction on a global scale. And as this human interaction and human contact increased, *more and more people*—first, elite groups and later and more recently the general population—*have had to be taken into account* by decision-makers in the foreign ministries and in the offices of chief executives around the world.

This enlarged exposure of more people to international communications has resulted in increased *attention* to broader and less parochial issues. In the last 25 years this increased attention, interest and curiosity about the affairs of foreign countries, including the U.S. as one of the leading nations of the world and as a model for examination

if not emulation, has grown at a fantastic rate. At the same time, *opinions* about these countries and about the U.S. are slower in being formed, let alone in being modified once they have been crystallized. It has become an accepted article of faith therefore to reassert that the development of understanding is a long, slow process which requires steady, patient exertion.

But tourists, exchanges and the extraordinary growth in transportation and commerce have accelerated the opinion-forming process that is in turn supported and embellished by the international channels of mass communications. It is no exaggeration to state that *this increase in the peoples' "attention zone" all over the world is the major pivotal contribution of communications.* And all of the major nations of the world have taken note of this development by arming themselves with the entire panoply of communications. This includes short-wave broadcasting stations, press releases and publications, information and cultural centers, schools, exchanges, motion picture and television production facilities, supplemented by the export of their educational and cultural resources. Their purpose is to create attention, to stimulate and satisfy curiosity and interest abroad. The end result, each hopes, is greater understanding and respect, more trade, more influence and a more favorable position among the nations of the world.

As other peoples' "maps" of the world change, that is as other peoples' perceptions of the world change because of this explosion in mass communications, their expectations rise and their preferences are modified. For they encounter new ways of life, alternative standards of living, and different attitudes and views of people from other nations of the world.

Indeed, we can explain the 60's and the early 70's in the U.S. not only as a response to new vistas and opportunities opened up by new forms of communication or as a time when demands for change challenged many old customs, attitudes and practices but also as a response to new foreign influences that added to this country's ferment.

For if the U.S. had an impact on the world so did the world—nations with different religions, philosophies, economies, political systems and life styles—leave its mark on the U.S. The decade of the 60's and of the early 70's in the U.S., so difficult to explain abroad, also reflected this gigantic encounter—an encounter of clash and challenge, of new values brought about in large part by the revolution in communications. Leading this revolution was the most powerful communications force to arise, television, which ushered the entire world into our living rooms and indeed into living rooms all over the world.

From the widespread prevalence of the Japanese "transistor" to the numerous small cars from European countries that dot our highways, from the importation of Scandinavian furniture to Far Eastern philosophy and religion, from Brazilian samba to the Indonesian dancers, from the Bolshoi to Chinese ping pong players and acrobats, from student revolts to the growth of giant multinational corporations, from U.S. cultural and information centers abroad to Soviet friendship societies, from Summit meetings to foreign conferences and international meetings including those of the United Nations, from the televised reporting of wars, riots and revolutions to audio-visual exposure and examination of recent discoveries,

inventions and developments in scientific research and technology, these foreign ideas, products and events have left their impact on the people of this country.

Reciprocally, American ideas, products, money, and other facilities and resources that have been exported or exchanged have had similar impact and influence abroad as foreign cultures attempted to deal with them. This is a time therefore when it is almost impossible to remain impervious to or isolated from the swirl of new ideas and new products that are racing about the world.

One long-range consequence of such an increase in human interaction and contact is that certain kinds of national actions become unthinkable and unstatable, as communications about them are piped into the consciousness of the world. And although world opinion is far from being uniform or cohesive, preponderant views, moods and opinions do slowly take shape and subsequently harden into either sympathetic or hostile attitudes towards the actions of another country.

For example, there was almost universal acclaim for President Nixon's overtures to the People's Republic of China and to the Soviet Union, for his trips to Romania, Poland and Yugoslavia, for his visits to Austria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Iran, India and Indonesia, for the slow but steady success in negotiations to control spiraling armament developments and costs, and for his earlier successful tour of Western Europe. These dramatic initiatives created a highly favorable world opinion towards the U.S. Yet for almost a decade no amount or type of USIA effort to explain U.S. intentions and purposes in Vietnam—short-range and long-range—has succeeded in persuading most nations of the world about the righteousness and wisdom of our course.

Dr. George Gallup, a member of this Commission and life-long student of public opinion, recently wrote, "In the years I have devoted to the study of public opinion I have learned that events have a great impact on the attitudes of people. This probably explains why the U.S. during the last decade has fallen so far in world prestige—as judged by our study of international leaders. The reason Vietnam, crime and the other social problems of the U.S. have been so widely publicized is that they too have overshadowed the things we are doing right." This is not only an explanation of the facts. It is also a challenge for improving our methods of communicating "the things we are doing right."

Increased communications have played an important role in another but related dimension where the results have been more successful. Could such traditional enemies as France and Germany envisage taking up arms again against one another, given the tremendous effort made to promote mutual understanding and cooperation in the context of an enlarged and more unified European Community? To what extent are communications further cementing the fantastic changes in identities that have taken place during the past 2½ decades among the other peoples of Western Europe where a greater sense of community and unity is beginning to take shape?

We have learned from our limited experience with USIA and its predecessor agencies that *improvement in understanding does not necessarily mean acceptance or approval of U.S. policies and positions or of peace.* Failure to appreciate this is one reason that USIA has

been occasionally chastised by some members of the Senate and the House when foreign hostility to the U.S. or foreign disapproval of its actions and policies are calibrated against the activities and operations of USIA. Some appear not to understand why serious disagreement or even hostility can arise when an entire Agency's sole and exclusive task is devoted to the enhancement of understanding abroad. Others do not know or realize that USIA speaks daily to an extraordinary diversity of audiences with information about the U.S. and in the process its officers develop thousands of important personal contacts for the U.S. around the world. Viewed together and viewed cumulatively, this constant communication and the maintenance of these valuable personal contacts have become a powerful instrument of building a better understanding of the U.S.

For there is evidence that foreign elites, i.e., government decision-makers and opinion-molders as well as educated groups in many countries around the world, are well informed about U.S. foreign policies and actions. In countries where the indigenous communications channels are complex and well developed—as in Western Europe, Japan and the metropolitan centers of the world—the increment in understanding that foreign communications bring is more marginal. This is due to sheer surfeiture with the mass media and with other forms of communications. Therefore, USIA placement of its media products in such countries is far less successful than it was immediately after World War II. Nevertheless, even in such cities as Paris, London, Rome, Tokyo, Buenos Aires or Mexico City, an intelligent, sensitive, knowledgeable PAO and his staff can perceptibly affect the climate and facilitate immensely the operations of an American Ambassador and his Embassy.

In most of the developing countries today, however, such an increment is more easily discernible. In these countries the efforts of USIA frequently receive a better welcome. Such information efforts can be critical at times in clarifying and informing audiences accurately about the wisdom of a particular U.S. action or policy, to set straight distortions and to rectify outright errors.

As the President continues his search for peace through hard, carefully prepared political negotiations, USIA as the foreign communications arm of this search can simultaneously help develop a better and more extensive understanding of U.S. purposes and plans. With its output and programs tailored to particular countries it can help sustain an atmosphere favorable to the successful search for peace.

But USIA can perform one other important function. For its second mission, USIA can serve as an important feedback to the President on the success or failure of his proposals and plans *as measured by foreign public reaction to them.*

In 1963, President John F. Kennedy directed a document to the Director of USIA in which he elaborated on USIA's second mission.

The mission of the United States Information Agency—

He said—

was to help achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives by (a) influencing public attitudes in other nations—

But also by—

(b) advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated United States policies, programs and official statements.

The advisory function—

He continued—

is to be carried out at various levels in Washington, and within the Country Team at United States diplomatic missions abroad. While the Director of the United States Information Agency shall take the initiative in offering counsel when he deems it advisable, the various departments and agencies should seek such counsel when considering policies and programs which may substantially affect or be affected by foreign opinion. Consultation with the United States Information Agency is essential when programs affecting communications media in other countries are contemplated.

USIA's feedback role is *to increase the understanding of U.S. policy makers* and to keep them aware of the opinions and attitudes of foreign populations, in order that these views may be taken into consideration before policies are set and decisions made and announced. The USIA is especially well fitted by virtue of the enormous number of personal contacts that are developed by its staffs to provide top decision-makers in the political, diplomatic, military and economic realms with insights and estimates of the probable effects of their proposed policies on foreign public opinion. For it is in this milieu of extraordinarily varied types of personal contact that USIA officers work on a daily basis all over the world.

In spite of this country's serious problems abroad which sometimes tend to overshadow its more successful policies and productive programs, "the things we are doing right" continue to build a reservoir of good will, as Wendell Wilkie once put it, towards the United States throughout the world. As a structure of peace is carefully and laboriously put together—first among the major powers, then on a regional scale and finally between any two nations whose ostensibly irreconcilable interests become amenable to negotiation, arbitration or judicial settlement—respect for America and understanding of her aims will surface again. USIA has an important and imaginative role to perform in psychologically cementing the bricks and undergirding the structure of this peace. Also, USIA is peculiarly equipped to feed back what is bewildering people about the United States and why.

THE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS

The most important visible symbol of American foreign policy abroad is the President of the United States and to a lesser extent his representatives.

America's foreign policies of the past 25 years have been identified abroad as Roosevelt's, Truman's Eisenhower's, Kennedy's, Johnson's, and now Nixon's foreign policy. Whatever common underlying threads tie the foreign policy of one administration to another or of one generation to another are invariably forgotten or overlooked by foreign populations whose views of our foreign policy are personified by the Chief of State. Foreign Ministers or Secretaries, Defense Ministers or Secretaries, and Chief Foreign Affairs Advisors or Counsellors who may enjoy greater visibility from time to time are indispensable. But it is the Chief Executive's decisions that are reported and commented on abroad. He is the most authoritative and responsible source whose image is the embodiment of the nation and of its foreign policies. To the citizen of foreign countries the President's policies represent the

entire nation despite the existence of differences or criticisms from "the loyal opposition."

All the Presidents mentioned supported the mission of a foreign information and cultural program which is designed to explain the U.S. and U.S. foreign policy to the world. Some believed it was necessary in order to meet the competition, both friendly and hostile, in "the battle for men's minds." Some looked to USIA as a supplement to the efforts and resources of private individuals and institutions engaged in operations abroad. Some saw the USIA as essentially a publicity arm or trumpet for the purpose of announcing accurately to the world U.S. policies and programs, U.S. capabilities and intentions. All believed that a nation, in order to lead and command respect from its neighbors, must be credible, must be understood, and must exchange its persons, its ideas, its cultural resources with other nations.

On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Smith-Mundt Act (PL 402) in 1958, President Eisenhower made the following remarks:

> The Smith-Mundt Act was sponsored ten years ago by my good friends Senator Alexander Smith and Senator Karl Mundt who was then a Member of the House of Representatives. This Act forms the basic legislation for our government's overseas information and cultural exchange programs. These programs are an important part of our effort to convey to everybody in the world a simple basic truth: America wants peace.
>
> I personally testified before Karl Mundt's Committee, as he mentioned, some ten years ago on behalf of this legislation. I believed in it then and I believe in it now.
>
> Earlier, Senator William Fulbright had sponsored legislation to use the proceeds from the sale of some of our war materials overseas for educational purposes. I am pleased that Senator Fulbright is also with us today and that the law which bears his name continues in force and vigor.
>
> Even more than that, I most heartily endorse and support the sentiments that Senator Fulbright has just expressed. I believe, with him, that the exchange of students—to include under proper arrangements exchange of students coming from behind the Iron Curtain—should be vastly expanded. In my opinion that program could have no other effect than to increase understanding and to make more secure the peace—a just peace, that we all seek.
>
> *Information and education are powerful forces in support of peace.* Just as war begins in the minds of men, so does peace.
>
> The program supported by you three gentlemen will help to bring about international understanding, which is the surest way I know to bring about the lasting peace which the United States has always sought.

After leaving office President Eisenhower further developed his views about communications and foreign affairs and about the importance of the effort that is required. In 1965 he wrote:

> . . . there is much that we can and must do to project a true image of America throughout the world . . . For years, even in Western Europe, we have been confronted with persistent misunderstanding.
>
> During . . . the early 1950's, the Marshall Plan was becoming highly effective; with this massive assistance from us, Western Europe was rapidly being rebuilt, modernized industrially and restored to prosperity. Yet I was constantly astonished and dismayed to find that the European governments did little to inform their own people about the steps we were taking to help them—or to explain our purposes. Consequently, even those Europeans who knew of our aid were often far from persuaded that our efforts were inspired by decent and altruistic motives.
>
> If we are so seriously misunderstood in the mature and literate countries of the world, consider the far more formidable task ahead of us among the . . . peoples of Africa, Asia and parts of Latin America. Many of them have no conception of what we mean when we speak of freedom, democracy or an enlightened economic system.

Ever since the late 1940's, we have, of course, been making an effort—through both government and other agencies—to promote a better understanding of America throughout the world. But the money, brains and energy we have devoted to the problem are but a token effort compared with the gigantic communist propaganda system.

The hard truth is that this task of communication is so great that, in the main, it must be done by the federal government. I think . . . we must spend whatever is necessary on this job—a half billion or even a billion a year if it takes that much. If we must, let us take it out of the defense budget or the space effort or some other program. Surely, in a national budget of over $100 billion, we can find the needed money.

Although the political structures of countries vary considerably it is instructive to note that in Germany the foreign information activity is in the office of the Prime Minister. And although no similar proposal is being made here it is interesting to note with New York Times correspondent C. L. Sulzberger that "all around the world foreign policy [has moved] from foreign ministries to the office of the chief of government."

It is in the light of these recent world trends coupled with the Commission's previous recommendations, that we reiterate our belief that the National Security Council structure developed in recent years should include representation from the government's arm which specializes in foreign communication and in understanding foreign public opinion. If the national security equation is to be complete it should include representatives from such experts on communication whose principal purpose, as stipulated in the basic law, is to strive for understanding between the U.S. and the people of other countries.

The importance of positioning the director of foreign communications at the strategic levels of the government—both foreign and domestic—is that this enables him to be thoroughly familiar with Presidential initiatives and thinking in foreign affairs. In this manner the Agency can perform more skillfully and effectively in alerting and explaining to the world what we are about. In this manner too can the central role of the President in foreign communications be effectively supported.

THE COMMUNICATIONS OF DETENTE

In 1972, President Nixon said:

The fundamental goal of [our] leadership is the building of an effective—and lasting—structure of peace. In building a structure of peace, the most important consideration is the achievement of the set of agreements, of *understandings* and of practices, by which those seeking it will undertake to do so only through peaceful means.

In amplifying the shift in America's posture from confrontation to negotiation the President continued:

I said to the people of China, "While we cannot cross the gulf between us we can try to bridge it so that we may be able to talk across it."

He spoke in a similar vein to the Soviet people. To them he said:

We shall sometimes be competitive, but we need never be enemies.

The President's historic achievements in opening channels of communication to the People's Republic of China and in improving them to the Soviet Union and East European countries provide USIA with an enormous opportunity. For USIA is an ideal agency

in a time of detente and dialogue among nations. This opportunity is twofold. The first relates to the kind of sensitive and substantively knowledgeable information programs that should be devised for audiences in these countries. For there are special problems in communicating with the peoples of China and the Soviet Union which far transcend the obstacles of geographic distance and language barriers. They derive from the need for first hand understanding of the psychology and ideology of the peoples. More important than technical facilities and techniques of communication with which to reach them is the content of the communication. What is being said, or seen, or heard about the U.S. through overt official channels of public diplomacy must be designed to reflect and encourage the atmosphere of detente and dialogue.

At the same time we must be cognizant of how the Soviets view the present scene. The Soviet Union's leading ideologist and member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. A. Suslov has said that—

> We must never forget to wage a determined struggle against bourgeois ideology, to foster in Soviet people irreconcilability towards any of its manifestations. The main thing the CPSU Central Committee draws attention to is an increase in attacking force and militancy of our propaganda and enhancement of its effectiveness.

In discussing Suslov's statement V. Kudinov and V. Pletnikov said:

> This is particularly important in present conditions when, as a result of the energetic activity of the CPSU and the Soviet Government in foreign policy, there has emerged on the world scene a *turn towards a detente* and the establishment of mutually advantageous relations between states with different social systems on the principles of peaceful coexistence.
>
> The ideologists of anti-communism do not conceal their hopes that in conditions of a detente and the development of diverse forms of cooperation among states with different social systems, the ideological staunchness of socialist states will be weakened and opportunities will arise for the ideological penetration of socialist countries with the object of undermining them from within.
>
> In this situation it is especially necessary to intensify the struggle against bourgeois and revisionist ideology and against views and concepts hostile to socialist society. The successes of communist construction, the growth in the international prestige of the Soviet Union promote new victories of Marxist-Leninist ideology in the struggle against the reactionary ideology of the old world.

USIA's second opportunity, equally sensitive, difficult and challenging, is to convey this new atmosphere of improved relations between the U.S. and two historically hostile powers to the rest of the world, especially to the peoples of the nations in the so-called Third World—the developing nations in Latin America, Africa and Asia. It should also interpret this atmosphere to the people of Western Europe who have gradually buried their age-old hatchets of mutual hostility and war under a new and growing umbrella of cohesion, communication and unity. For as the President said in his June 16, 1972, *U.S. News & World Report* article on foreign policy, "We are also learning to take account of unique circumstances which distinguish country from country and region from region." This proposition *must be a basic maxim for all of USIA's operations* if it is to succeed in developing communications programs that present and explain U.S. foreign policy sensitively and effectively.

The communications of detente reinforce and help perpetuate atmospheres of detente. For they reiterate and emphasize the more

pacific means of resolving international political and economic disputes and conflicts by overcoming or undermining psychological obstacles and barriers and by reducing the animosities and hostilities that have accumulated over the years.

Just as crisis tends to feed on crisis so detente can generate detente without creating an exaggerated euphoria built upon unrealistic expectations that ignore the indispensable necessity of a solid security structure. USIA should exercise leadership and initiative in explaining and helping to further the laudable goals and objectives of the President's policies.

An Agency dedicated to such policies and goals, thoroughly integrated into the government's foreign affairs structure, cannot help but be acceptable to the Congress, to the President, and to the American people. For it will then be operating in accordance with the best wishes and hopes of those who wrote the basic legislation. Equally important, the United States as a force for peace will be brought home to the other nations of the world where competition between the ideologies and political systems of the major powers will continue for a long time.

THE CONGRESS AND FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS

There is evidence in the debates that led to the passage of Public Law 402 that those who designed the law were motivated by a deep desire to create an instrument of government that would grow and develop into an instrument of peace. At that time (1947–48) there was a profound belief that unless U.S. purposes and policies were properly presented and explained and unless the U.S. developed a capability for countering hostile distortion and deliberate falsification of these purposes and policies, the conditions necessary for the establishment and maintenance of peace would never be realized.

Near the end of the House debate on H.R. 3342, later known as Public Law 402, or the Smith-Mundt Act, the then representative from South Dakota, Karl Mundt, addressed his colleagues in the following manner:

> Preparedness alone and preparedness plus international alliances and organizations alone have been tried as devices for maintaining the peace almost since the beginning of civilization. . . . The result has been one recurring war after another, each conflict being bloodier and more destructive than the one preceding it. We offer you in H.R. 3342 [the Mundt Bill] an approach to peace which the world has never tried . . . the machinery and the methods by which America can help create those wide areas of human understanding, good will and international respect and confidence which are essential if peace is to endure.

It was therefore with high and noble hopes that this legislation was launched and signed. But as the information and cultural programs developed, often in spite of insuperable odds and obstacles, the U.S. encountered threats to what was perceived to be its vital interests in Korea and Vietnam. And USIA found itself attempting to explain the American purpose with not much success, as the Agency which had been conceived of as an instrument of peace was called upon to assist in the prosecution and execution of wars.

Throughout this period, Congressional oversight and appreciation of the role of foreign communications has been manifested in two ways. The first consisted and still consists of a strict review and accounting of the expenditures of funds for the above-stated legislative purposes.

The second was a less frequent examination and review of the Agency's programs and policies in the light of U.S. foreign policy objectives. The authorization hearings in 1972 augur an increase in examinations of USIA by the substantive committees of Congress.

At the same time, more members of the Senate and the House have increased their travels abroad. Some have examined and inspected this country's foreign communications installations and embassies. Some have attended interparliamentary meetings, NATO parliamentary conferences, other regional gatherings of legislators, and bilateral interparliamentary sessions where views are exchanged on some of the more difficult problems that confront the nations of the world and on methods of increasing cooperation between them.

The Commission believes that USIA has two obligations to the Congress that should be discharged more adequately. The first is that the story of USIA must be communicated more effectively to a better traveled and more knowledgeable Congress and through them to the American people. It is a long way, both psychologically and physically, from an officer's work in Nairobi to Washington. Consequently, too often, too much of what is done and accomplished gets lost in the verbal transmission. More needs to be done to acquaint the Congress and the American people with how USIA spends their money to improve worldwide understanding of the U.S., and with what success.

The second obligation is that USIA attempt to assess on a regular basis the level of understanding that has been reached in foreign countries with respect to the purposes and policies of the U.S., including its way of life. There will be need for a more precise definition of "understanding." And there will be need for the establishment of benchmarks, against which the assessment of effectiveness of the effort can be made more adequately.

Although some members of Congress have followed the activities of USIA, they are burdened by a thousand-and-one demands from constituents whose interests are almost exclusively domestic. Furthermore, there is a substantial turn-over in Congress every two years and it is therefore doubly important for USIA to acquaint new members of Congress with its purpose and operation. At the same time, it should make sure that oldtimers are kept up to date on the work of the Agency that has the principal responsibility for communicating on behalf of the United States with the peoples of the world.

THE APPROPRIATIONS BASE

After 25 years we have learned that the goal of achieving international understanding through communication is admittedly complex and long range. And we have learned that the most effective communications cannot make unpalatable policies acceptable, even if they are understood. The success of the communications instrument in achieving understanding requires wise policies. It is dependent upon properly trained personnel who have an understanding of the foreign audiences and milieu to which these policies are being presented. It needs a flexible and well-managed organization and the construction of adequate technical apparatus and facilities. But above all there must be adequate funds with which to discharge these responsibilities.

The Congressional commitment to authorize a foreign information and cultural program has been implemented by the appropriation of funds deemed necessary by the Congress to achieve the objectives of the basic statute governing this program. In the early years these appropriations attempted to fund information and cultural programs in the context of U.S. strategic, political and economic obligations as well as opportunities around the world. However, the recent record of Congressional appropriations coupled with the gradually reduced budgeting for these operations by the Executive has slowly impaired and eroded the Agency's capabilities. It has raised serious questions about the efficacy and further need of this foreign communications instrument. And it has exposed an information and cultural organization that has been sliding downhill for the past 6 or 7 years because of a seriously weakened financial base.

Recent studies of the USIA appropriations record for the past two decades show that the annual appropriation has risen from $84 million in fiscal year 1954 to slightly over $200 million for fiscal year 1973. However, measured in stable dollars the fiscal level in fiscal year 1973 is not much greater than it was in fiscal year 1954. In the meantime, the world shrunk further, new countries in continental Africa emerged, the Middle East assumed a more important strategic significance, South and East Asia have posted sharp new challenges to the U.S., Eastern Europe and the USSR have provided encouraging new opportunities, and Latin America has beckoned for understanding and assistance at the same time that it affords new opportunities for trade and commerce and financial investment. This leaves the dynamically developing Western European community, with perhaps the largest market in the world now, and Japan, the third industrial nation of the world, who need to be reached with a new kind of message that associates the U.S. with their new, exciting, promising internal developments and their new world outlook.

As the difficulty of USIA's mission increased and the demands upon it expanded, the appropriations necessary to sustain and support this mission have in fact declined to the point where the impact and usefulness of the information program has been questioned.

Each year since 1967 the USIA has been compelled to cut programs in order to stay within its allotted fiscal resources, despite the actual enlargement of obligations that stemmed from these new developments in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe.

It is clear to this Commission that both the Executive and the Congress will need to reexamine their respective assumptions about the purpose of the program, face up to their expectations about its utility in the modern world, and recalculate the magnitude of the effort that should be authorized and appropriated. If not, then the present policy of using a 1954 order of magnitude budget to meet the obligations and opportunities of 1974 will continue to remain grossly inadequate. (In 1948 there were 82 nations to deal with. Today there are 132.) There is no question that much smaller nations, or others with fewer far-flung vital interests are supporting a larger effort in this domain than does the United States of America in proportion to gross national product, size of national budget, per capita income, or any other comparable index. The following table, (Chart 1), based on

available data or on reasonable estimates, is an indicator of the magnitude of effort expended by five other nations compared to the U.S.:

CHART I.—COMPARATIVE EXTERNAL INFORMATION AND CULTURAL (I. & C.) PROGRAMS DATA

[Fiscal data (million dollars)]

	1971 GNP	1971 annual budget	Expenditures for external I. & C. programs	Percent of budget of external I. & C. programs
Arab Republic of Egypt	5,802	[1] 4,800	[2] 112-118.0	2.3-2.5
Federal Republic of Germany	234,700	[3] 31,500	[2] 310.0	.9
France	178,000	33,800	430.0	.9
Japan	[1] 267,000	38,000	80.0	.21
United Kingdom	[1] 122,800	36,000	[2] 162.0	.45
United States	1,093,100	[3] 231 900	[2] [4] 206.8; [2] [5] 45.0	.1

[1] 1971-72.
[2] Estimate.
[3] 1972.
[4] USIA.
[5] CU.

It is for this reason that this Commission has urged the Congress and the Executive to reexamine the original assumptions of Public Law 402, to test them against the actual realization of legislative policy objectives, to relate the magnitude of the effort to accomplishment, and to define more tightly and precisely what is to be expected from this potentially effective instrument of international communications. Unless goals and objectives are defined more precisely, the Agency will find it difficult to organize and plan for the use of its resources in the most economic and efficient manner. Hopefully, the Little Hoover Commission, which has been created by the Congress and whose members will be appointed by the Senate, the House and the President, in addressing itself to a study of the entire foreign affairs establishment will also reexamine the USIA mission and attempt to relate it to the total U.S. capability, structure, funding and performance in foreign affairs.

COMMUNICATION, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND DIRECT SATELLITE BROADCASTING

Arthur C. Clarke, British scientist and author of "2000: A Space Odyssey" and the first man to sketch the possibility of satellite communications, referred to the permanent INTELSTAT charter [1] as—

the first draft of the articles of federation of the United States of Earth. The engineering problems—

He went on—

of bringing education, literacy, improved hygiene and agricultural techniques to every being on this planet have now been solved. But of course—

He continued—

the technical problem is the easy one. Do we have imagination—and the statesmanship—to use this new tool for the benefit of all mankind?

The invention of the communications satellite represents a quantum jump in further shrinking and binding the world together through communications. But additional refinements and technological modifications through research will eventually expand the power, scope and

[1] This charter for INTELSAT, the International Telecommunicators Satellite Organization, was signed in Washington on August 20, 1971.

reach of the satellite. Scientists and engineers now believe that satellites in the near future will be capable of transmitting televised broadcasts from one country directly into home receivers of viewers in neighboring or distant countries without the need of intermediary ground stations.

The spectacular breakthroughs that will make direct satellite broadcasting possible, however, have alarmed an unusually large number of nations. Many fear that alien communications will invade their sovereignty and will provide their citizens with information that governing groups may find unacceptable or incompatible with the traditional mores and folkways of the country. Rich and powerful nations with huge resources and facilities, they maintain, will overwhelm and inundate the smaller ones who may become the unwilling targets and recipients of such direct broadcasts.

The Commission observes that this matter has received preliminary consideration by the UN General Assembly which recently voted 102 to 1, with the U.S. as the sole minority vote, to instruct the UN Commission on Outer Space to come up with a set of principles governing the use of the satellite. The U.S. protested in vain that this exercise was premature and inappropriate.

Invoking the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states "everyone has the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers," the U.S. representatives at UNESCO and at the UN nevertheless suffered lopsided defeats.

There are very few countries in the world where government does not insist on censorship and control over the mass media (press as well as radio and television) and its contents. Only recently, the International Press Institute reported that barely 20 percent of the 132 members of the UN "enjoy what can genuinely be called freedom of information." The vast majority of nations simply does not permit the existence of competitive private media that are free to report and editorialize as they see fit. Since this is a luxury that only a handful of countries possesses, it may be difficult for the U.S. to persuade others to join in establishing principles which permit the free flow of news from any source or channel including direct satellite broadcasting. Unfortunately totalitarian dictatorships strongly reject such principles, and a number of democratic countries which normally allow the vote and other liberties associated with democratic life also reject them. For when it comes to mass media they somehow insist on government monopoly or control or stringent regulations of radio, television and newspapers.

The Commission hopes that the U.S. will continue to vigorously pursue these matters in and out of the UN Committee in order to press for a policy that encourages and promotes the free and unhampered flow of information from one country to another. At the same time, an effort should be made to find some formula which will allow nations who are sensitive and fearful of being engulfed by alien communications to gain access to the satellite for the presentation of their own culture, their own way of life, and for the dissemination of news about their country to the rest of the world. A formula (1) emphasizing mutuality of interest, (2) showing an awareness of national sensitivity and concern, and (3) insuring accessability to the communi-

cations satellite may go a long way in overcoming this initial resistance to direct satellite broadcasts.

The Commission believes further that USIA by virtue of its distinctive mission has a unique responsibility in this arena since it uses all mass media that are available to it for disseminating information about the U.S. to the world including international short-wave radio broadcasting. As this country's public agent for foreign communications and public diplomacy it should initiate and sponsor a continuing information and education program through seminars and lectures and through its media operations in order to discuss and dissect the problems inherent in direct satellite broadcasts across international boundaries as they impinge on the doctrine of freedom of information.

The world has about a decade before this technology will be prefected. In the meantime, the Commission believes that ventilating the problem for the next few years will go a long way in disipating much of the opposition among the non-communist countries of the world which is based on both legitimate concerns and unfounded or exaggerated fears. There is need to explore those legitimate concerns expressed by young, struggling nations that do not at the moment have the internal stability and cohesion they feel is necessary before direct broadcasting of television to their people can be allowed.

Progress toward freedom of information is slow, both at home and abroad. The long-range health, security and prosperity of the globe, the long-range conditions for peace will depend upon a world in which the free flow of information, ideas and persons will be encouraged and insured by national guarantee and sanctioned by international agreement.

Ten years ago President Kennedy recalled that—

> In 1946 the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution reading in part, "Freedom of information is a fundamental human right, and the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated." This is our touchstone as well . . . We welcome the views of others. We seek a free flow of information across national boundaries and oceans, across iron curtains and stone walls. We are not afraid to entrust the American people with unpleasant facts, foreign ideas, alien philosophies, and competitive values. For a nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people."

The Commission believes that in the future structure of a peaceful world communications between countries should be free and unimpeded. The Commission urges USIA as the communications arm of American foreign policy to formulate and undertake programs wherever feasible for the purpose of exploring with the people of other nations the importance of safeguarding and extending this principle for the betterment of all mankind.

On December 15, 1972, on the occasion of the receipt of the ratifications necessary to bring the INTELSAT agreements into effect, President Nixon said:

> The global communications satellite system is helping to bring the peoples of the world closer together. *It is our hope that the closing of communications gaps will greatly enhance understanding among nations.* We can now look forward to the day when nations around the world will be linked together for instantaneous communications. *The implications of this development are enormous, presaging improved international relations in the political, economic, cultural and scientific spheres.*

Part III.—Recommendations

The Commission's views expressed in Part II are based on information derived from its monthly meetings in Washington and from its observations of the program in the course of visiting USIS offices and libraries abroad.

During the past four years all members of the Commission have made a vigorous attempt to inspect USIA operations in the field. They have visited 40 countries in Western and Eastern Europe, in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Some members of the Commission inspected USIS programs and personnel, some were programmed by the Embassy, some have represented the U.S. at the inauguration of USIA exhibits, some have attended PAO and CAO conferences, some have counseled with PAO's and Ambassadors in the course of their business travels while others have attended meetings of the Commission abroad.

It is on the basis of this experience that the Commission has formulated and herewith offers 18 recommendations about the USIA and its mission. The Commission believes that these recommendations can produce a more effective organization better equipped to represent the U.S. abroad as it seeks to help produce a better understanding of the U.S. Secondly, they can help contribute to what President Nixon has called "goal-oriented policy formation and advice to the President," in this instance advice on trends in foreign public opinion.

1. USIA's unique resources and knowledge of foreign public opinion should be communicated by its Director at the highest levels of government—the President, the Secretary of State and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. USIA should be "in on the takeoffs as well as the landings" in foreign policy

USIA's existence as an independent agency has three advantages. First, its Director has direct access to the President, the Secretary of State and the National Security Council, although the degree of such accessibility and closeness has varied from administration to administration. Second, its functions and mission are not buried in another government agency nor is its personnel subordinated either in emoluments or position to those in other foreign affairs agencies, thanks in part to the Congressionally-created foreign service career system. Third, as an independent operating agency it enjoys the advantage of controlling completely its own budget and personnel. This permits far greater operational flexibility with respect to its ability to shift both financial and personnel resources when unexpected critical situations or opportunities arise. This has also made for much faster decision-making with respect to policies and programs.

Part II of this report described the desirability of tying the Director into the decision-making process at the highest levels for reasons of information output as well as input. If this formula for the effective

functioning of the Agency is followed than the advantages of retaining USIA as an independent agency become clear.

If, on the other hand, the Agency's independence is to be brought to an end because neither the President nor the Congress agrees with the Commission's recommendation, then the Commission suggests two alternative courses of action: The first is to return USIA and all of its functions to the Department of State in accordance with a reorganized foreign affairs establishment as originally proposed by the Brookings Institution in 1960. This called for the creation of a Super Secretary of State in a manner not too different from the way in which the President is restructuring the domestic part of the government by appointing three Super Secretaries for Human Resources, Community Development and Natural Resources. The Brookings proposal simultaneously called for the creation of three Secretaries, one in charge of a Department of Political Affairs, one of Economic Affairs, and one of a combined Information, Educational and Cultural Affairs. The question of retaining the Voice of America as part of this new conglomerate or of allowing it to float freely as an independent or quasi-independent organization reporting to a board of directors would be resolved separately.

The second alternative would return those functions that are considered strictly information in character to the Department of State in order to provide it with the resources and expert personnel required to present and explain American foreign policy abroad. To succeed, this alternative would require the closest integration between information officers and policy desk officers in the State Department. Under this proposal VOA would be set free as an independent or quasi-independent group reporting to the Congress.

Under this second alternative, the present USIA would be replaced by a new agency of Government which would consolidate and absorb all of the foreign cultural and educational programs that are presently located in USIA and in the State Department, including the cultural and educational exchange programs of other government agencies. The closest liaison would be established with comparable public and private institutions that range from the Humanities and Arts Foundations, the Office of Education and Smithsonian to the Council on Learned Societies, the American Council on Education, the Social Science Research Council as well as the large private foundations.

Some believe that in the construction of this new agency the U.S. should follow the philosophy and structure developed by the British Council or the Canadian Council. Others insist that the structure finally devised should reflect more accurately America's unique ways of conducting its affairs and in the light of prevailing Congressional sentiment. The Commission suggests that a new U.S. Educational and Cultural Agency or Department of Educational and Cultural Affairs should reflect our own distinctive philosophy but at the same time take advantage of and benefit from the successful experiences of other countries. The Commission hopes that the Chief Executive and the Congress will accept Recommendation No. 1 and therefore not be compelled to resort to either of the two alternatives that have been presented.

2. The President's active role in foreign communications calls for a more explicit utilization of the resources and personnel of USIA

USIA is the only agency of government devoted exclusively to the art and science of all aspects of foreign communication. It is, in this Commission's view, ideally suited to the task of elaborating, reporting and making clear to the peoples of the world the ideas for peace, freedom and international justice that have been developed by the President as a guide to his second term in office. The spectacular success and breakthrough in negotiations reached during the past year will require continued explanation in order that the U.S. position, U.S. intentions and hopes for a peaceful world can be communicated to the peoples of the world with a minimum of distortion. The President's second inaugural address further underlined and dramatized his foreign policy goals.

These ideas and policies can be implemented by the able, dedicated men and women who work for USIS all over the world. Their talent and experience have made them uniquely qualified professionals capable of communicating and translating the President's policies into the native idiom of foreign audiences and with an awareness of their psychology and of their interests. They can do much to stimulate a wider and deeper foreign understanding of the President's policies and purposes in foreign affairs. They are also sensitive barometers of foreign reaction to these policies and ideas, especially their impact on the average man. They constitute therefore an invaluable national resource. They should be properly marshalled during the next four years for the purpose of disseminating and explaining the President's foreign policies to the peoples of the world.

3. The U.S. should remain competitive with other nations in the information and cultural fields

The blending of foreign communications with foreign policy has become a universal function of governments that are free and of governments that are totalitarian and communist. Here is what the Soviet writer A. Stepanov states in his "Diplomatic Practice-Forms and Methods":

> *Providing systematic information to Soviet people and peoples of the world on foreign affairs activities of the U.S.S.R.* is an important form of Soviet diplomacy that is constantly used. People of all countries must have objective information about international events, the peaceful policies, proposals and measures of the U.S.S.R. and other socialist states, as well as the policies and actions of imperialist forces seeking to prevent relaxation of international tensions. There is an unbreakable organic link between the forms of Soviet policy and the methods of implementing it. The two comprise a single whole.

And again in a discussion of Soviet communications and diplomacy Mr. Stepanov says:

> *Appeal to world opinion and enlistment of the peoples in active struggle for peace and social progress* are part and parcel of Leninist diplomacy. As Lenin emphasized we should "help the peoples to intervene in questions of war and peace" . . . The principled, open, upright and truthful diplomacy of socialism plays an important role in drawing the mass of people into the struggle for peace and social progress. *It speaks to the masses (by no means ignoring governments and official authorities)*, explains its positions and actions and appeals to them for support. Hundreds of millions of people in all parts of the world have joined the lines of fighters against the world threat and for the preservation and strengthening of peace.

Information on other nations' external information and cultural programs is difficult to obtain or even estimate, especially in communist countries where the magnitude of their effort is known to be high but specific, detailed budgets or description of their activities are unavailable. Chart II prepared by the Research Service of USIA is an attempt to collate the fragmentary information that is available and to estimate the number of official foreign personnel engaged as communicators. It includes data about broadcasting, publications, cultural and information centers and exchanges in eight countries. For in all parts of the world many countries and all the major powers are heavily involved in disseminating information about their country and its people and by sponsoring exchanges of all kinds. At a time when different ideas are competing for attention all over the world, when other nations are increasing their efforts, the U.S. must not reduce its own programs in this vital area of U.S. foreign affairs. It should remain competitive.

4. USIA should develop plans to orient both new and veteran U.S. Ambassadors to the Agency's mission and resources and to urge the closest relationship between Public Affairs Officers and their Ambassadors

Although preparations for an ambassadorial assignment are usually burdensome and full, the Commission believes that outgoing Ambassadors should receive a full briefing about USIA in Washington before they depart. These presentations should be carefully prepared by the Agency. Ambassadors should be exposed to the extraordinary variety and quality of communications resources that will be available to them when they assume their next post.

The Agency may wish to consider preparing a film for Ambassadors (which could be used for other non-Agency officials serving abroad) which would depict not only the structure and resources of USIA in Washington but how Ambassadors effectively organize and integrate information and cultural programs with the rest of the U.S. mission.

It is especially important to stress the need to develop the closest relationship between the Ambassador and the PAO, for without it neither the Ambassador nor USIS can perform with maximum impact. Although the Ambassador is the President's and indeed this nation's representative abroad and therefore administers many different kinds of functions and programs, he is also the major spokesman for the U.S. abroad. If the PAO is permitted to share in the Ambassador's plans and activities, then the overall mission of the Embassy, the intentions of the Ambassador and of the United States can be better communicated to the foreign media and to other influential opinion moulders.

Finally, it is hoped that Ambassadors when returning from their assignments, either on sabbaticals or for new duties, can be prevailed upon to address those officers in USIA who have helped support or have a deep interest in their mission. This kind of briefing would enable Washington-based personnel to hear from the head of the U.S. foreign mission a firsthand appreciation of the manner in which the information and cultural programs related to overall U.S. objectives.

5. USIA should expand its practice of inviting U.S. Senators and Representatives to attend U.S. Information Agency regional conferences and exhibitions abroad

Part II of this report sketched the increased foreign travel and growing involvement of members of Congress in multinational parliamentary conferences and meetings or in visiting American installations and binational cooperative institutions abroad.

During the past four years the former Director of USIA made a determined effort to invite members of Congress from both political parties to attend PAO and CAO conferences, to represent the U.S. Government at USIS exhibits and other U.S. events abroad, and to visit USIS libraries, binational centers, and USIS offices. This experience has been rewarding to the Congress and to the nation. And incidentally, USIA has profited from their insight. For the Agency has become a recipient of constructive criticism and suggestions from those whose unique political sophistication and experience frequently enable them to notice opportunities that escape the best-intentioned administrators.

6. USIA should substantially augment its programs in explaining U.S. economic policies and problems. It should develop further its personnel capabilities in this complex but increasingly important area of American foreign policy

An important lesson learned from the experiences and events that led to World War II was that American foreign policy could not be conducted, planned or formulated without reference to defense policy or to military capability.

In the last few years it has become equally clear that the U.S. can no longer treat foreign economic problems and international political matters as distinctly separate issues. Indeed, many free nations are increasingly placing trade and offshore investment at the very core of their foreign policies. The U.S. is moving inexorably in this direction. For as President Nixon has said, "A nation's foreign policy embraces more than its diplomacy and in the case of the U.S. our foreign economic policies are a vital part of the mix."

The importance of international economic issues and intense competition among nations for foreign trade therefore will increase. At the same time, the use of military power—as threat or coercion to achieve national ends—is being gradually supplanted by economic power which has its own kind of threat as well as carrot. Nations can constructively offer economic exchange, trade, investment or technical cooperation. Or they can withdraw such support and offers of cooperation and replace them with economic barriers and other kinds of discriminatory policies and measures. National power and influence will not be measured alone or even primarily by the military factor which will continue to be important in case of aggression or of national survival. But the power and influence of nations in the post-Vietnam War world will tend more to be a function of economic power and economic strength, domestic and foreign. Therefore, atmospheres and conditions should be created in which U.S. economic interests can legitimately compete.

In Kansas City on July 6, 1971, the President first outlined his doctrine of the five Great Powers. He said:

> What we see as we look ahead 5 years, 10 years, perhaps it is 15, but in any event, within our time, we see five great economic super powers: the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, Mainland China, and, of course, Japan.
>
> Now, I do not suggest, in mentioning these five, that Latin America is not important, that Africa is not important, that South Asia is not important. All nations are important, and all peoples in underdeveloped or less developed countries will play their role. But these are the five that will determine the economic future and, because economic power will be the key to other kinds of power, the future of the world in other ways in the last third of this century.

To meet this challenge the USIA role in presenting and explaining U.S. economic policies should be substantially augmented. There are three tasks which USIA can perform providing it accelerates efforts to strengthen its capability and understanding of economic analysis, especially of international economic relations.

The first is the simple task of explaining U.S. domestic and foreign economic policies in order to gain support of the major economic powers for the building of a fair monetary and trading world. We also need to explain the way in which our policies help the developing world with its problems. The second task is to help create an atmosphere abroad which is conducive to and facilitates the operations and activities of American business and trade abroad. Together with other responsible agencies, USIA can help disseminate information about U.S. business, commerce and investment resources. In so doing, it can help implement the objectives of U.S. foreign economic policies that include a more favorable balance of trade, a better balance of payments, increased exports, etc. The third task is to conduct surveys of foreign attitudes towards U.S. foreign economic policies including American business policies and practices. There is little reliable objective information on foreign reaction to these policies and the Agency should attempt to fill the gap. And the U.S. foreign business community can be a source of information for the USIA.

Here again it would be useful for USIA to try its program in one or two countries and see what success it has before deploying its resources and personnel on a worldwide basis.

The indiscriminate use of USIA as a trumpet and as a hard-sell tool of American business, however, should be avoided for it is full of pitfalls and can lead to counterproductive consequences. In the Commission's view, it is more important for USIA to remain a fact-disseminating information agency than to sound the clarion call for particular business organizations or specific products. But it can be prepared to counsel with American business and industry about the public relations and economic information problems that face them. It should make its services available to and cooperate with the major departments of government, e.g., State, Treasury, Agriculture and Commerce, in the discharge of their responsibilities abroad. And finally, it should develop close relations with the commercial and economic sections of U.S. embassies and with commercial attaches and economic officers abroad for the purpose of achieving the foreign economic objectives of the United States. To accomplish these ends, the Commission recommends that USIA improve its programs, continue to elevate the competence of its personnel in economic

affairs and appoint a distinguished economist to serve as an Assistant Director for Economic Affairs.

7. USIA should bring into better balance its cultural and information programs. It should also appoint a prominent cultural affairs director to invigorate the cultural programs and to help achieve this balance

The Commission urges the Agency once again to strengthen its cultural affairs programs by employing a distinguished American who is prominent in the cultural field. He would provide both conception and direction to the Agency's cultural programs in Washington and become a source of professional guidance, cohesion and inspiration to the CAO's abroad. If long-time government service is not possible for men of their accomplishment and stature, then the Agency should accept their services for a shorter period and then develop a planned replacement program to seek out adequate successors.

Although USIA's primary mission has been to disseminate information, the Commission believes that it is at least as important in the long-run to sponsor cultural programs as it is to move hard news on a daily basis through the media. And although a mix of cultural and information news programs can be found in almost every USIA activity, the predominant emphasis has been on news. USIA should attempt to insure that a better balance is achieved between cultural and informational affairs in its worldwide programing.

The U.S. has made extraordinary progress in the arts and humanities during the past two decades which has stimulated worldwide interest. The private sector as well as public foundations and agencies should be enlisted to strengthen USIA's effort to satisfy this interest.

8. USIA should avoid "press agentry" in its programs to reach important foreign audiences

The Commission believes that it is unproductive to "sell" or "propagandize" foreign audiences in a conscious and overt manner. It is equally opposed to an attempt to censor or omit news that is "bad."

The Commission directs this recommendation at top management and to the so-called "fast media" in USIA that deal in "hard" news. Agency history and tradition combined with the past press or radio experience of its personnel dictated an initial preoccupation with the need to cover "hard" and sometimes "spot" news. But USIA's media should consider that there exists a great deal of interesting and constructive news that is seldom covered by today's journalists for two reasons. First, it does not meet the test of "hard" or "spot" news, and second, it takes considerable digging as well as special training to produce.

For example, the people of the world—whether they live in highly complex societies or in the most underdeveloped nations—are interested in their health, in their pocketbooks, in their children's education and in their future.

Fortunately, America clearly holds the lead in medical science and research. The U.S. is universally regarded as the nation with the highest standard of living—and the greatest source of new products, new inventions, new ways to make a living. The U.S. is also doing more research in education than any other nation. In short, the U.S. is a predominant news source in the world in these and other areas.

The Commission recommends that USIA reinforce these strengths by developing specialized research resources or tapping into those that exist in government and in the private sector. The results can be programs and news that would be less repetitive or fleeting. They would be more educational, with more immediate relevance and with greater import to the listener, reader or viewer. Audience interest could be sustained by offering supplementary printed materials that are prepared in greater depth.

The results over a long period of time would eventually eliminate traces of "press agentry" that may have been ascribed to USIA. The Agency would produce more materials of depth and substance to the foreign audiences that have been established.

9. USIA should focus as much of its time on improving the substance of its effort as it does on techniques and methods

Both content and technique lie at the heart of the Agency's work. Constant preoccupation with these twin engines of USIA's operations will enhance the quality of both with a correspondingly more effective impact of its message on the eventual receiver. Hopefully, the combined exercise will also lead to a reduction in the amount of output of all the media which unfortunately continue to produce too much.

On the question of technique, the Agency has been experimenting with new ways of transmitting important events in the U.S. to audiences abroad. Two are worthy of mention and commendations.

The first is the recent successful effort to produce "live-by-satellite" television programs from the U.S. to carefully selected targets in Italy. Highly placed U.S. officials who are expert on important topics, usually trade and economics, are on-camera in USIA studios in Washington. The carefully selected audiences are brought together in a studio in Italy. They listen to and watch a short, simultaneously-translated presentation or a previously edited videotape by a top U.S. official who outlines the issues underlying the purposes of U.S. policy. This is then followed by a spontaneous question-and-answer period across the Atlantic.

Initial reactions to this technique have been enthusiastic and the following day's press coverage of the international encounter via satellite has been excellent. This new technique appears to show considerable promise.

The second technique is the Agency's experiments with half-inch videotape recordings known as VTR's. In 1972 USIA received permission from CBS to use all of the CBS news-produced broadcasts providing they are shown only on the official premises of the U.S. Embassy or in USIS. ABC and NBC have agreed to allow USIA limited access to their news and public affairs programs.

The value of using VTR's in this manner is that it makes available quickly for selected foreign audiences who understand English up-to-date, original, professionally prepared news and educational programs that have appeared on American networks. The potential of this new technique, especially with influential audiences, is almost unlimited. Equally important are the benefits accruing to the entire Embassy staff that can now be kept abreast of the major news and issues at home and how they are being analyzed and debated. The Commission urges USIA to move more rapidly to implement this development and to expand its limited initial applications of this new technique.

On the question of the substantive contents of USIA communications the Commission recommends that some sampling mechanism must be devised by top management which would enable it to inspect content in order to raise its quality. General material produced for worldwide audiences or even for a particular country has become increasingly difficult to place. Therefore, more in-depth analysis and interpretation of the news is needed by all media, even if this means fewer productions. It should be prepared by thoroughly grounded subject matter experts.

These experts may be located in-house or they may be found in other agencies, public and private. On foreign affairs topics, USIA should draw closer to the State Department where a large reservoir of substantive competence and professionalism on foreign areas and on specialized international topics exists that could be better tapped for USIA's purposes. Although administrative relations with State are and have been close, there does not appear to be a comparable relationship on many matters of substance. The improvement in this relationship could also lead to an improvement in the substance of communications about foreign policy that USIA produces.

USIA's media do not and should not compete with the private American wire services whose daily fare is generally hard news. Therefore, USIA's features, pamphlets, motion pictures and radio programs should be more interpretive providing background and perspective and reflecting solid substance and analysis without being dull or boring. State Department officers are in a unique position to assist USIA with substance on U.S. foreign policy and on foreign affairs.

The Commission recalls that USIA and the Department of State had concluded an arrangement for the exchange of officers between the two agencies in order that their respective experiences would be broadened and extended. Although a start was made in this direction, the program is in need of revitalization. The Commission believes that each can benefit from the experience and knowledge of the other. The Commission hopes that the Secretary of State and the new Director will attempt to further develop and expand on the initiatives that were taken a few years ago.

Too often, the contents of communications do not interest the audiences to which they are directed. Too many of USIA's products are conceived and prepared with a worldwide audience in mind. Too few deal with specific topics that are of interest to and desired by particular countries but which may not be of great moment in Washington or elsewhere in the U.S.

There is therefore a much greater need for those who produce programs and prepare media materials in Washington to conduct a simple analysis of the foreign communications market and to operate in a service capacity to officers stationed abroad who have the responsibility for actually placing Washington-produced material.

The Press and Publications Service began a commendable effort recently to plan its products on the basis of the field's specific requirements. Its goal is to become a service agency. The Commission believes that all USIA's media should strive to become essentially services aimed at satisfying the requirements of those who work abroad and have on-the-spot responsibility for placing these services. The pen-

dulum has swung too far in the media direction. It should be reversed and placed in better balance else more and more products will find fewer and fewer markets.

10. The Voice of America must be kept competitive. Today it ranks fourth behind the USSR, the PCR and the Arab Republic of Egypt in number of languages and in number of hours broadcast per week. VOA also lags in its capacity to deliver a signal

There is keen and even fierce competition among the 20 major international broadcasters of the world. There is competition in number of languages broadcast, number of hours, number of frequencies in the short-wave band. There is also the continuing increase in number of high-power transmitters and the continued expansion in short-wave facilities by countries as diverse as the Soviet Union, West Germany and Mexico.

The Voice of America is an extraordinarily valuable and special communications instrument for the U.S. For it has the means to disseminate information about the U.S. and its policies to all areas of the world including those to which we do not normally have access. In these countries, radio is the only way in which the U.S. can communicate to foreign audiences. And there is striking evidence from diverse sources that many listen. In 1971 Yuri Mairov, a Soviet media studies specialist in the USSR said that the Voice of America was "the most powerful" of all foreign radio stations that broadcast to the USSR. "We are far from asserting," he continued, "that none of the Soviet young people are interested in Voice of America broadcasts. Research, for example, conducted at one time by the Komsomol Central Committee, confirms the assumption that a certain part of the youth more or less regularly listens to broadcasts of American radio."

During the past decade world events have placed increasing responsibility on the Voice of America in carrying out its mission as the radio arm of USIA. To meet this challenge, the number and variety of VOA's foreign language programs have risen, but its technical facilities have not been permitted to keep pace.

For example, in Europe and Asia we do not have enough high power transmitters now to carry adequately the present program load. In other areas where VOA may have a sufficient number of transmitters, some of them are obsolete or of insufficient power to deliver a satisfactory signal. And more urgently, competing foreign broadcasting organizations are bringing into service a record number of new, high power shortwave transmitters which will eventually drown out the U.S. effort.

The present level of the Government's program demands, based upon our foreign policy needs that have been placed on VOA, exceeds the amount that can be accommodated effectively on existing high power transmitters.

Furthermore, in the important mediumwave or standard broadcasting band, VOA has no capability in several important regions. This eliminates the large potential audience which could otherwise be reached on this popular listening band.

To achieve maximum effectiveness, VOA must not only be audible on an adequate number of transmitters, but the audience must be able to hear the signal as easily and reliably as the signals of

competing stations. The Voice of America is falling seriously behind the rest of the world in its ability to deliver a competitive signal. The last time it received Congressional approval for a major technical project was in fiscal year 1966. *While VOA stands still, the rest of the world is building high power shortwave installations at an accelerated rate.* The result will be an outgunned, outpowered Voice of America.

This Commission believes that the United States must not allow its broadcasting voice to the people of the world to be drowned out or dimmed into ineffectiveness or stagnation. The years ahead will require more sophisticated methods of communicating the truth about America in order to counter distortion, ignorance or outright falsification. They will also be years in which millions of people in the areas of the world that are presently denied to external influences will be listening to the Voice for understanding.

VOA programs must continue to broadcast the official U.S. policy statements. It is the official radio voice of the government. At the same time, it should strive strenuously and conscientiously to provide foreign audiences with the rich diversity of opinion that exists in this country about every major issue. In attempting to capture the incredible excitement and surge of America and its way of life, VOA should continue not to ignore or conceal our own severe trials and difficulties. It should continue to represent the variety of Congressional opinion, the different points of view in the U.S. mass media, and the voices and views of leading personalities, commentators and columnists. It should strive for distinctive yet lively programs that also reflect analysis, depth and perspective. And it should insist on a continuing evaluation of its programs' effectiveness. But above all, as a major technological country the U.S. should at least keep up with the competition.

On the 20th Anniversary of the Voice of America, President John F. Kennedy spoke to USIA employees about his conception of the Agency and of the Voice. He said:

> I was most anxious to come here personally today, because I put such great importance is the work that you are doing. The Voice of America occupies, I believe, a key part in the story of American life. What we do here in this country, and what we are, what we want to be, represents really a great experiment in a most difficult kind of self-discipline, and that is the organization and maintenance and development of the progress of free government. And it is your task, as the executives and participants in the Voice of America, to tell that story around the world. This is an extremely difficult and sensitive task. On the one hand you are an arm of the Government and therefore an arm of the Nation, and it is your task to bring our story around the world in a way which serves to represent democracy and the United States in its most favorable light. But on the other hand, as part of the cause of freedom, and the arm of freedom, you are obliged to tell our story in a truthful way, to tell it, as Oliver Cromwell said about his portrait, "Paint us with all our blemishes and warts, all those things about us that may not be so immediately attractive." We compete with other means of communication, of those who are our adversaries who tell only the good stories. But the things that go bad in America, you must tell that also. And we hope that the bad and the good is sifted together by people of judgment and discretion and taste and discrimination, that they will realize what we are trying to do here . . . The Voice of America thus carries a heavy responsibility. Its burden of truth is not easy to bear. It must explain to a curious and suspicious world what we are. It must tell them of our basic beliefs. It must tell them of a country which is in some ways a rather old country—certainly old as republics go. And yet it must make our ideas alive and new and vital in the high competition which goes on around the world since the end of World War II.

11. Although USIA is compelled at present to live within its reduced budgets by concentrating primarily on select audiences, it should not ignore or turn away from responding to interest in the U.S. that is expressed by the average citizen or by those "natural audiences" disposed to use USIS libraries abroad

USIA has been struggling for years with the delineation of the target audience. Should its activities be directed at and confined to select audiences exclusively? Should it concentrate on the 200, or 2,000, or 20,000 most important people of a country who are its public opinion moulders and decisionmakers, or should it be a mass-oriented agency intent on reaching and informing the average foreign citizen with news and information about the U.S. and its policy?

As budgets declined the issue quickly resolved itself for belt-tightening led to wholesale curtailment of many mass-directed activities, the elimination of information centers and libraries that had become well-known institutions, a sharpening of objectives, and a tightening of target audiences.

In Japan, an experiment was launched by an imaginative and energetic PAO with the support of the Agency to drastically change the mode of operation of USIS in that country. Reduced, precisely defined objectives, and sharply curtailed and highly selective audiences were to be approached with a multiplicity of modern communications methods and technology. And a specially designed information center would be the hub of their activities. The major goal of this operation is to explain U.S. foreign policy to a highly selected audience in Japan and to obtain support for it.

From its inception USIA instruments directed at mass audiences, as well as elites, were press, radio, motion pictures and libraries. Subsequently, exhibits were introduced where the target was and remains the average man.

Today, the Agency and the Congress share the same dilemma. In a period of tight budgets the mass audience strategy has given way in large measure to an elite audience strategy. The Japan experiment is an innovative example of an elite audience strategy carried to the *n*th degree. It is still too early to judge the results of this relatively new and highly disciplined experiment. It is too early to know whether the introduction of modern methods of communications technology and design aimed at highly selective audiences will make a substantial difference in the attainment of objectives.

In the meantime, the horns of the dilemma remain. The original intent of Public Law 402 called for achieving understanding not only of U.S. foreign policy but of the U.S. and its people. Secondly, communist propaganda operations, our most intensive and almost always hostile competitors, are directed primarily at mass audiences—"at the masses," as they put it, although they do not neglect governments and elites. Thirdly, in democratic countries where public opinion is more important in determining the direction of foreign policy the general public remains a vulnerable and sometimes volatile audience. A recent illustration is the case of the Norwegian vote on the Common Market. There the people in the countryside, those who are located outside of its capital which is dominated by elite and government groups, unexpectedly defeated the latter on the question of joining the Common Market.

12. USIA must improve the coordination of its media programs

This has been another longstanding and unresolved issue in USIA. When coordination of plans and programs among the media does occur, it is too often accidental or occasional.

The coordination of media is important in order that one medium will know what the others are doing and planning. Also, individuals in the various media who are subject-matter specialists or experts on particular geographic areas and countries seldom see one another for the purpose of pooling their resources, plans and knowledge. Such coordination should be instituted by top management. It leads to cross-fertilization of ideas. It can also lead to the elimination of unnecessary duplication of effort. It can make maximum use of scarce resources, specialized knowledge and manpower. And it can ensure top direction and control over Agency-wide programs.

Multimedia programs are being developed for worldwide audiences or from time to time for a given geographic area or a specific country. The Commission believes that the planning and coordination as well as the direction of such programs msut be lodged with and flow from the Agency leadership. All elements in USIA should cooperatively participate under the central direction of this leadership in preparing multimedia plans and programs. Without such direction by a media coordinator or by the Director's Deputy this promising program will not be successful.

Within the Agency, architectural design for its installations abroad should also be better coordinated with the newly-emerging art, design and exhibits department. The time has come to establish a single unit in which these related elements would be consolidated under single direction. For the interior and exterior appearance of USIS structures abroad are badly in need of coordinated guidance and standards that reflect a thoroughly considered and well conceived policy.

13. USIA should reexamine the effectiveness, format and content of its magazines

It is especially easy in the magazine field to fall into routines in style, format and content in order to facilitate the production job. One of the reasons is that we do not have the usual measure of consumer acceptance. Therefore there is need for constant innovation in order to maintain that excitement and lively interest that are found only in well edited magazines.

The Commission believes that USIA's magazines may have fallen into a rut and therefore recommends a thorough review of them. This includes not only those that are published in Washington but the magazines that are published abroad. The Commission believes it is important to produce and maintain high quality magazines. A critical self-examination would help.

14. USIA must conduct a comprehensive review of its motion picture and television objectives

Motion picture and television products in USIA have been of uneven caliber despite the number of Hollywood Oscar Awards won and despite the dedicated work of directors and their creative colleagues, both inside and outside the Agency.

First, there is a natural tendency on the part of American producers and directors to think primarily of the interests and habits of a domestic audience when they produce films for foreign consumption. Too frequently the message that may be meaningful and effective for U.S. audiences is lost on foreign audiences because geographic areas and individual countries differ considerably in what interests them. These interests may be purely preoccupation with themselves and their own personal problems. Or they may be about events and issues in their country and in their area of the world. Or they may have only specific and narrow interests about certain portions of the U.S. itself. Therefore, without some kind of periodic audience research and analysis the best creative work or the finest technical production can go down a blind alley containing a message that is not relevant to a particular foreign audience.

Second, it is exceedingly difficult to produce motion picture films that are equally acceptable all over the world. In the drive for a steady flow of production to worldwide audiences the quality of the product becomes diluted because of the least common denominator effect.

The Commission also believes that the *volume* of original production should be reduced in order to produce films of highest quality. These would be supplemented by the acquisition of the very best of what movie-makers in the United States produce every year. Many experimental groups, university groups, and industrial concerns as well as Hollywood itself produce film annually on a wide variety of subjects. The problem is to separate the excellent product from the multitude. But the Commission believes that this valuable ore is worth mining.

It is for all these reasons that the Commission urges a comprehensive review which would assess the contents as well as the effectiveness and impact of the motion picture and television program.

15. USIA is ready to provide the fullest assistance to national plans for the celebration of the American Bicentennial

In 1966, the Commission alerted USIA to the American Bicentennial and recommended that it begin to develop a 10-year plan of operations and activities that would culminate in 1976. The Agency has done so.

It has solicited ideas from its own officers and from university professors with previous USIS experience abroad concerning what the Agency might be prepared to do. A successful Airlie House conference led to a number of useful initiatives that appear quite promising.

The USIA is to be commended for its efforts and for the resourcefulness it has shown in examining how and to what extent America's experience of 200 years relates to the interests and experiences of other nations. Here care must be given to those countries with which we have had a long experience as well as with those who are just developing.

The Commission believes that since USIA operates in this field all the time, it wishes to go on record as recommending that this nation celebrate its 200th anniversary with vigor and that plans be formulated to program the celebration to 1989, a year which would coincide with the ratification of the Constitution.

The Commission believes that once the Bicentennial Commission begins to move ahead, USIA will be capable of supporting the national program with well-formulated plans and with the experts to assist.

16. The Commission wishes to repeat a recommendation made in its 25th Report which called for a maximum information program in a test country in order to determine the effectiveness of the function in achieving U.S. objectives if that function is properly funded.

In that 25th Report to Congress the Commission asked:

Would it be worthwhile, even at the risk of greatly neglecting one or more countries, to double, treble, or quintuple the money spent on one test country in order to examine the results of a crash program? Before undertaking such an experiment, one would need to agree on what are the relevant indices by which to measure the success or lack of it of such a program. . . . Perhaps, then, an extensive effort in a single country over a period of one. two, or three years, would provide information (concerning the utility of such programs in which USIA engages) of great usefulness to the Agency, to Congress, and to the President.

17. USIA top management, its senior officials in Washington and its Public Affairs Officers abroad, should subject its programs and policies to systematic appraisal

In previous reports to the Congress this Commission has repeatedly urged the Agency to improve the caliber and extend the scope of its research and evaluation program. The Commission is pleased to report that considerable progress has been made in the last three or four years to strengthen the research capability and resources. Many useful reports have been prepared, including two comprehensive and systematic evaluation studies. One was an analysis of USIS libraries, the other a study of the Voice of America. Both were excellently conceived, well executed and rank with some of the best that USIA has completed. However, there appears to be little disposition on the part of most of the Agency's senior personnel who occupy positions of direction and management either to call for research as an aid in decision-making or to use the results of research studies that have been initiated by others.

The Commission recommends that senior assignments should not be made unless the candidates for these positions have either had some experience in the utilization of research and evaluation reports in the development and execution of communications programs or have demonstrated an ability to do so within the Agency. Too many decisions continue to be made on impression and hunch. Annually devised plans and programs and annually constructed budgets therefore tend to be routine repetitions of what has been tried in the past. And there is a need to test rigorously the unstated assumption that all media are equally effective and therefore equally necessary in USIA post abroad. This ancient assumption should be verified irrespective of how difficult it may be to do so. The Agency's product rating scheme is a good first step.

If the central purpose of the U.S. Information Agency's programs is to create a better attitude towards the U.S. then this is what should be evaluated. There are two tasks in this type of evaluation. The first is a periodic inventory of attitudes towards the U.S. irrespective of the USIA effort. The second is an analysis of the contents and effectiveness of the USIA message that is conveyed by the channels, persons or instruments available to it.

The Commission believes that each post should conduct such evaluations annually or at least biennially. And the Agency as a whole should make periodic efforts to conduct an overall evaluation. In view of the fact that a comprehensive evaluation of all media would be an undertaking of considerable magnitude, the Commission suggests that the Agency begin with the Voice of America, the largest operation in USIA. The Commission therefore recommends that as a first step, USIA conduct an evaluation of the contents and effectiveness of VOA programs.

18. The Commission once again renews its recommendation first enumerated in the 23d Report to Congress in February 1968 that there be instituted an independent comprehensive reexamination of USIA's mission and operations by an outside organization

The Commission believes that the need for an overall review of USIA, including its position in the overall structure of the government's foreign affairs community, remains necessary. After 25 years of experience, it is time for a reexamination and an appraisal of its accomplishments, its role and its future potential.

The Commission remains persuaded that such a study should be undertaken by an outside independent organization, perhaps under the authorization and general supervision of this Commission.

There has been no comparable overall examination of USIA's activities since the Sprague Committee which completed its systematic work in 1960. Even at that time, that "Committee believe (d) that more frequent independent reviews of the overall balance, interrelations and effectiveness of U.S. information activities is desirable, perhaps not less than once every three years." In February 1968, this Commission added, "that was eight years ago." Now it is 13 years ago.

In the 24th Report to Congress this Commission made specific recommendations about the form in which the examination of USIA would be conducted. On page 11 of that report the Commission suggested:

> The President would appoint a Committee of Nine—one member each from the Senate, the House of Representatives, the National Security Council, the Department of State, the United States Information Agency and the United States Advisory Commission on Information, and, from the private sector, a chairman and two additional members knowledgeable in the fields of information, education and cultural affairs. This committee would select the study organization, review and approve the direction and plan for the study, and critique its findings.
>
> The study itself would be conducted by professional researchers and experts in foreign policy, members either of an existing research and development organization or, perhaps, drawn together on an ad hoc basis under the auspices of a school of international studies.

This is only one of a number of alternatives that exist. One that has been considered is to use the resources of such reputable organizations as the Brookings Institution or the RAND Corporation or a combination of their resources for the purpose of this inquiry.

The problem is not the method of conducting the review. The problem is one of decision and of will.

POSTSCRIPT

This report was in preparation during a period which represented another turning point in American life and in the pattern and structure of America's responsibilities in the world.

This period marked the deaths of two former Presidents of the U.S. and the virtual end of America's formal participation in the Vietnam war.

The late President Harry E. Truman signed the original law in 1948 which gave statutory birth to the U.S. foreign information and education exchange programs. Subsequently, he issued a statement announcing a "campaign of truth" that guided the information program during its early history.

The late President Lyndon Johnson demonstrated to the world that there could be continuity to American democracy at a time of national shock as this country recoiled from the assassination that struck down the life of President John F. Kennedy. President Johnson's Great Society programs, coupled with voting rights and civil rights legislation, provided USIA with opportunity. On the other hand, the escalation of the war in Vietnam gave USIA considerable difficulty which should diminish now that a peace agreement in Vietnam has been signed.

President Richard Nixon begins his second term in office with a set of foreign policies and goals which provide constructive framework and scope for the work of USIA. He has appointed Mr. James Keogh as its new Director. Mr. Frank Shakespeare, now in the process of turning over the leadership of the Agency to his successor, departs as the first Director of USIA to have served a full term.

Finally, the four members of this Commission wish to acknowledge with genuine appreciation the distinguished leadership of Dr. Frank Stanton, the former President and current Vice Chairman of the Board of the Columbia Broadcasting System, who is retiring from the Commission after having been its Chairman for almost nine years.

Dr. Stanton led this Commission with vigor and imagination. He gave of his time, thought and energy with unstinting generosity, and left a record deeply etched by his personality, foresight and accomplishments. One of America's statesmen in mass communications, his advice and counsel to the Executive, to the Congress, and to Directors of USIA have helped substantially improve the U.S. Government's projection of the voice, pen and vision of America to the people of other countries. This we would like to record as colleagues and as witnesses in the enterprise.

CHART II—COMPARATIVE EXTERNAL INFORMATION AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS DATA[1]

	Arab Republic of Egypt	Cuba	Federal Republic of Germany	France	Japan	Peoples Republic of China	United Kingdom	U.S.S.R.	United States of America
Fiscal data (million dollars):									
Gross national product.	(1971) 5,802	(1971) 4,800 (estimate).	(1971) 234,700	(1971) 178,000	(1971–72) 262,000 (estimate).	(1971) 128,000	(1971–72) 122,800	(1971) 525,000	(1971) 1,093,100 (preliminary).
Annual budget	(1971–72)[2] 4,800.	(1966) 2,700	(1972) 31,500	33,800	38,000		36,000	(1972) 211,000	(1972) 231,900 (estimate).
External propaganda expenditures.	81.7–90		310 (estimate)	430	80 (estimate)		162 (estimate)		(1972) USIA—206.8, CU—45.
External propaganda percentage of budget.	1.7–1.9 (estimate).		0.9	0.9			0.45		0.1.
Personnel:									
Cultural attaches			70 (approximately).	125 (approximately).	142 of whom 14 full time; others are also press attaches.		115 officers, 900 locals (46 are British Council officers).		249 cultural affairs officers (all ranks) serving abroad; summer, 1972.
Press attaches			87 of whom 10 also cultural attaches.	125 (approximately).		65 (approximately).	No comparable figures available.		118 information officers (all ranks) serving abroad; summer, 1972. 18 press attaches.
Technical advisors, instructors.	15,000 (estimates).		3,000 (estimate).	(1969) 10,768	372		7,000		
Teachers			500 Germans, 1,100 other nationals.	(1971) 30,700	(1972) 33		428 British Council English teachers.		350 at language centers.
Center administrators			120		28		120		90.
Librarians			17				26		17.
Broadcasting:									
Radio (hours per week).	1,076 (tentative).	366	643	321	259	1,270	726	1,886	931 (Voice of America).
Languages	33	8	35	16		38	38	84	36.
Transmitters[3]	15	14[4]	22[5]	20	11	60 (estimate)	63	130 (estimate)[6]	115.
Publications:									
Donated books			900,000 to 1,000,000.	(1969) 400,000 volumes.	21,000 (of which 15,600 language texts).	Large quantities of a few titles by Mao, Marx, Lenin, Stalin.	(1971) 233,000 volumes.	60,000,000 copies plus about 100,000,000 copies printed abroad.	624,000 volumes.
Major periodicals	104 (9,600,000 copies 1967–68).	18 (approximate).	38 (up to 85,000 copies per issue).	15 (up to 50,000 copies per issue).	8 (of which 6 in irregular frequency); circulation of 1 quarterly up to 480,000).	6	Some 20 titles distributed overseas (up to 100,000 per issue).	Over 16,000,000 copies (up to 500,000 per issue).	35.
Films: (Government-sponsored production and distribution):									
Documentaries		(1960–68) 375 documentaries and "popular encyclopedia" films.	(1971) 140 including newsreels).	(1971) 30	4 produced by Foreign Ministry an additional 29 were purchased in 1972 by foreign ministry for overseas distribution).	20 (approximately).	80 to 100	(1971) 431	(1971) 38 original film documentaries; 235 original television documentaries.
Feature films		44 (1960–68)	(15 and several dozen TV films sold abroad in 1972).	40	About 40 commercially produced films shown at Japanese embassies, 1971.	10 (approximately).	70 to 80	178 (includes TV production).	
Prints distributed abroad.			11,300 (25 mobile units).	1,700 (features), 7,800 (documentaries).	Mobile film units operated in 34 countries.		2,500		About 16,000 (includes features); 550 newsclips (1972).
Cultural and information centers.	17	13 in Latin America.	124	162	21	6(?)	118	70 plus	(1972). Information centers 130; reading rooms 34; binational centers 127.
Exchanges (under Government auspices):									
Incoming	25,000 to 30,000 mainly Arab students.	Heavy with Chile, Panama, and Peru.	About 20,000	4,000 foreign grantees—15,000 foreign students.	1,207 foreign grantees.	10,000 (all travelers).	25,700 (under British Council auspices).	Approximately 40,000 foreigners in U.S.S.R.; 13,000 of that number are students.	4,804 foreign grantees in 1971. 144,708 foreign students (1970–71) of whom 4,504 supported by U.S. Government.
Outgoing		do	About 2,500	1,200 Frenchmen abroad.	2,468 Japanese abroad.	3,000 (estimated)		Approximately 40,000 Soviet citizens abroad.	1,289 U.S. citizens abroad as Government grantees out of 32,148 studying abroad.

[1] Foreign governments, particularly in the United States, use public relations and advertising firms or individuals to carry out information activities in lieu of stationing additional personnel in their embassies and consulates.
[2] Excluding war emergency budget.
[3] This includes both shortwave and mediumwave transmitters of at least 50 kw, except for the United States for which the figure includes transmitters of at least 35 kw.
[4] This includes seven mediumwave transmitters used to carry a domestic night program "abroad."
[5] This includes transmitters of both DeutscheWelle and Deutschlandfunk.
[6] This is the estimated minimum in the European part of U.S.S.R. and Soviet Far East.