Diplomatic security is as old as diplomacy itself. Initially, diplomatic security was primarily the secure conveyance of government communications using couriers and codes. The Persian, Babylonian, Egyptian, Chinese, Greek, Roman, Aztec, and Incan empires developed courier services to carry imperial messages. The Greeks and Romans also developed ciphers to preserve confidentiality of diplomatic messages.¹ By the Renaissance (1500s), codes had emerged, and Spanish, French, English, Vatican, and Venetian foreign ministers routinely used ciphers and codes when writing to their diplomats abroad. The European monarchies also developed courier networks to carry messages. Courier work was seen as a training ground for diplomats because couriers had to exercise discretion, know the local language, and employ disguises to avoid detection.²

Colonial-era leaders in North America were acutely aware of the need to protect their correspondence. As tensions escalated between Great Britain and its American colonies in the 1760s, the Sons of Liberty communicated with each other by dropping letters at secretly designated coffee houses or taverns, where sympathetic postmen or ship captains would pick up and deliver the letters. During the American Revolution, the small fleet of sympathetic

Figure 1: Henry Laurens, U.S. Commissioner to the Netherlands. Laurens and his papers were captured by the British while en route to Europe. His papers provided evidence of Dutch aid to the American Revolution and led Great Britain to declare war on the Netherlands. Portrait by Pierre Eugène du Simitière, 1783. Source: Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division.
captains evolved into a proto-courier system, carrying U.S. diplomats or their correspondence across the Atlantic Ocean. The perils of trans-oceanic travel (bad weather, shipwreck, espionage, loss at sea) often delayed the delivery of diplomatic letters. Even in good weather, a letter took six to eight weeks to cross the Atlantic.\(^3\)

One of the most serious breaches of diplomatic security during the Revolution occurred in 1780 when the British captured Henry Laurens, U.S. commissioner to the Netherlands. Before his capture, Laurens burned and sank many of his papers, but he did not sufficiently weigh down the final pouch. A British captain retrieved the pouch from the water and forwarded the papers to the British Cabinet. One of the documents was a draft treaty between the American colonies and the Netherlands. As a result, England declared war on the Netherlands, which then allied with France and the United States. Laurens, meanwhile, was imprisoned in the Tower of London.\(^4\)

Revolutionary diplomats regularly used ciphers and codes, many of which were their own creations. From 1776 to 1789, U.S. diplomats used 17 ciphers, 10 cipher-codes, and 23 codes. A common code involved two correspondents using the same book to encode a message in which each word was replaced by a number. The first digit(s) was for the page of the book, the second for the line of the page, and the third digit(s) for the position of the word in the line.\(^5\)

Espionage plagued American Revolutionary diplomats. In 1776, the British planted Dr. Edward Bancroft as a spy on the staff of Benjamin Franklin, the U.S. Minister to France, and Bancroft operated undetected for years. The French Foreign Minister, the Comte de Vergennes, acquired the ciphers for several U.S. diplomats. In 1777, British Minister to Prussia Hugh Elliot learned that the American emissary to Prussia, Arthur Lee, kept a journal locked in his desk. While Elliot dined with Lee one evening, Elliot’s men stole Lee’s journal and copied it.\(^6\)

**Diplomatic Security and the Early Republic (1783-1840)**

After the Revolution, serving under the Articles of Confederation, Secretary for Foreign Affairs John Jay (1784-1789) instituted the first formal diplomatic security measures for the new American government. As head of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Jay organized documents and segregated “confidential” and “non-confidential” papers with the assistance of two clerks. He also insisted that all correspondence

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Figure 2: The American Commissioners sign the Treaty of Paris in 1782. U.S. diplomats John Jay, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Henry Laurens, and William Temple Franklin (left to right) were plagued by European espionage. The British planted a spy on Franklin’s staff; the French had the codes for Jay’s, Laurens’, and Adams’ correspondence; and the Spanish read Jay’s correspondence. Sketch by Benjamin West. Source: National Archives and Records Administration.
go to his office before being presented to the Congress of the Confederation. Jay complained to Thomas Jefferson that “little secrecy is to be expected” from Congress because members talked freely to the public about confidential matters.\(^7\)

After the 1787 Constitutional Convention, Jay asserted in Federalist Paper #64 that diplomatic security was a key reason to ratify the draft Constitution of the United States. Writing as “Publius,” Jay said that diplomatic negotiations required “perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch” and many foreign diplomats would be uneasy about disclosing sensitive information to a large body such as Congress. By placing the conduct of foreign affairs with the President (in the executive branch), the Constitution allowed diplomats to confide sensitive matters to the President and his representatives, such as the Secretary of State.\(^8\)

After ratification of the Constitution in 1789, the new United States Department of State used several ciphers, codes, and cipher-codes. During the 1790s, it received more than 5,000 lines of code from its diplomats overseas. Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, and James Monroe each developed a 1,600- or 1,700-element cipher-code for the Department’s use. Monroe’s 1,700-element cipher-code, known as the Monroe cipher, was first employed during 1803 negotiations for the Louisiana Purchase. By 1815, the Monroe cipher was the Department’s standard code.\(^9\)

During the Early Republic period (1789-1840), the Department of State developed two methods for secure overseas transport for its correspondence: bearers of dispatch and forwarding agents. Used for a single, one-way trip, bearers of dispatch were often lawyers or merchants who carried letters or documents to or from Washington. Bearers—they were not called “couriers”—received a special passport and were reimbursed for expenses. The Department most often relied on forwarding agents. Starting in 1794, the Collectors of Customs in New York, Baltimore, and Philadelphia served as the Department’s forwarding agents. Forwarding agents learned of arriving
and departing ships, spoke with ship captains and officers, and sent letters and packages on appropriate ships. The
captain stored the letters in his cabin in a locked chest. When the ship arrived at its destination, the captain would
send word, and a legation or consulate officer would pick up the item. Letters or packages from posts overseas
were relayed by the forwarding agent to the Department. By 1801, the New York Collector of Customs was the
Department’s primary forwarding agent.10

During the Quasi War between revolutionary France and the United States (1798-1800), George Logan,
a Pennsylvania Quaker, prompted passage of the first diplomatic security statute. Distressed by the war, Logan
travelled to Paris and personally negotiated with French officials. After his return, Logan met with President John
Adams, and Adams admitted that Logan’s information encouraged him to send a diplomat to France, leading to a
peace treaty. Despite Logan’s success and good intentions, officials asked whether U.S. diplomacy would be secure
if U.S. citizens, on their own initiative, conducted negotiations on behalf of the United States. Adams proposed
that U.S. diplomacy be reserved to persons designated by the President. Congress agreed and passed the 1799
Logan Act, which made unauthorized diplomatic initiatives by private citizens a “high misdemeanor punishable
by fine and imprisonment.”11

One of the more serious security threats to the Department occurred during the War of 1812. As British
troops neared Washington in August 1814, Secretary of State James Monroe ordered all Department records and
other important government documents (including the Declaration of Independence) removed from the city.
Department of State Commission Clerk Stephen Pleasanton hid the records in a gristmill two miles upstream
from Georgetown and later moved them to a vacant house in Leesburg, Virginia. The records remained in
Leesburg for several weeks until the British left Chesapeake Bay.12

After the War of 1812, the Department expanded its diplomatic security measures. By 1815, Secretary Monroe differentiated between clerks who did “confidential” tasks and those who did “non-confidential” work. By 1820, the Department locked its doors at night and employed two night watchmen. In 1819, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams fired a Department employee for failing to observe security procedures, the first time an employee was dismissed for such an offense. Adams did so after President Monroe warned him that clerk John B. Colvin could not be trusted and that he (Monroe) had kept Colvin on “non-confidential” work during his term as Secretary. Later, Secretary of State Louis
McLane (1833-1834) instructed Department staff that they should consider all Departmental business and documents strictly confidential.\textsuperscript{13}

In 1830, the Department hired “despatch agents,” who assumed the forwarding agent’s duties and several other security-related tasks. The first despatch agent was William B. Taylor, who had his office in New York, the leading U.S. port. In 1832, the Department appointed John Miller, a book dealer in London, as its second despatch agent. Each man received an annual salary of $500.\textsuperscript{14}

A brief explanation of the workings of the Department’s mail system reveals the critical security role of despatch agents. The Chief Clerk collected all outgoing mail and ensured that the proper amount of postage was affixed (governments required postage for diplomatic letters).\textsuperscript{15} The U.S. Post Office hauled the canvas bags of Department letters by horse-drawn wagon to the New York Despatch Agent’s office. For packages, the U.S. Government contracted U.S. Express and, after 1847, the Adams Express Company to transport parcels at least once, often twice a week.\textsuperscript{16} In New York, the despatch agent sorted the correspondence by geographic region and re-bagged it in bags labeled “U.S. Government.” Correspondence marked “confidential” was placed in leather pouches or carpetbags. After routing bags and pouches onto appropriate ships, the despatch agent logged each letter and parcel, gave it a number, and noted its arrival date, departure date, the ship, and the captain. Most Department mail headed to Europe, Africa, Asia, and South America went to Liverpool, where the London Despatch Agent sorted it by geographic sub-region, re-bagged it, and routed it on U.S. or British ships. Despatch agents forwarded incoming items to Washington and investigated problems such as lost pouches.\textsuperscript{17}

In retrospect, the despatch agent system offered an innovative, secure, effective means to transport diplomatic mail within a relatively closed system, separate from regular mail. Unlike the Europeans who could rely upon couriers because their countries were in close proximity to each other, U.S. officials relied on trans-oceanic transport for nearly all diplomatic correspondence. Only despatch agents, ship captains, and authorized legation or consulate staff handled correspondence between Washington and its posts. At sea, diplomatic mail was often locked in a chest in the captain’s quarters. The system also saved money; expenses for a bearer of dispatch ranged from $294 for a trip to Paris, to $3630 to travel to Lima; but expenses for
6 months of postage for the despatch agent system ranged from $6 to $60. The despatch agent system's effectiveness and economy delayed creation of a U.S. courier network for another century.  

**Security Imperatives from Steam Power**

During the 1840s and 1850s, three innovations—steamships, railroads, and the Panama route—prompted the Department to add several security procedures. Steamships regularized shipping schedules and cut the time for Atlantic crossings from five weeks to two, fostering more frequent exchanges of diplomatic correspondence between Washington and its 31 legations and 282 consulates. Despatch agents entrusted diplomatic pouches to the purser instead of the captain because the purser managed the steamship's “secure room” or “strong room,” in which the pouches were stored and locked. With the 1848 acquisition of California and Oregon, the Department used the Panama route for diplomatic mail to Asia and South America's west coast. By 1858, the Department was using locks on pouches and lead seals on bags, and the Post Office, U.S. Express, and Adams Express were hauling pouches and parcels by railroad. A lead seal was a length of two, intertwined iron wires wrapped in a loop around the top of the canvas mailbag and secured with lead solder.

**Loyalty and Security during the Civil War**

The Civil War presented new diplomatic security issues. During the war’s first days, the few Union troops in Washington could not protect the foreign diplomatic corps. Diplomats scrambled to obtain their national flags to fly over their legations for protection from military attack. Few diplomats possessed their nations’ flags; in fact, the Prussian Minister resorted to painting “The Prussian Legation” in large letters over his mission’s doorway. Secretary of State William H. Seward worried about the loyalty of Department employees. He asked all employees one question: Did they favor Union or Secession? Those who favored secession were dismissed, and those who professed loyalty to the Union were retained. In April 1865, as the Confederacy’s surrender neared, John Wilkes Booth and his conspirators plotted to kill Secretary of State Seward in addition to President Abraham Lincoln. While Booth went to Ford’s Theater and fatally shot Lincoln, former Confederate soldier Lewis Powell forced his...
way into Seward’s home and slashed the Secretary several times with a Bowie knife. Seward was recovering from a carriage accident, and the braces and bandages on his head and neck saved his life. Powell was captured two days later, tried, and hanged; meanwhile, an Army detail protected Seward.24

Post-Civil War Technological Imperatives

After the Civil War, Secretary of State Hamilton Fish upgraded diplomatic security at the Department. Four watchmen, instead of two, guarded the Department after business hours. Pouches and mailbags were routinely secured with padlocks and lead seals. Secretary Fish issued foreign affairs manuals that outlined security practices and mandated adherence. Papers of a “reserved or secret character” had to be “conspicuously marked” as “Confidential,” correspondence had to be numbered, and all drafts and extra copies had to be destroyed. Fish made the Chief of Mission at every U.S. diplomatic post responsible for any security failures.25

The Department adopted the telegraph for communications but struggled with telegraphic security. On November 23, 1866, to inaugurate the first sustainable, trans-Atlantic line, Secretary of State Seward sent the first coded U.S. diplomatic telegram, using the Monroe cipher. Telegraph companies stipulated that a coded message using number groups (as Monroe’s cipher did) had to spell out the numbers (e.g. 387 was “three eight seven”), so Seward’s 780-word cable expanded to 3,772 words. Also, the Anglo-American Telegraph Company, which owned the line, charged double ($5 per word) for coded messages. Seward’s telegram cost $19,540.40, more than three times his salary. Seward then compounded the fiasco by sending his message to Paris in code and releasing it to the press. This enabled the French, if they were so inclined, to break the U.S. code. Moreover, the Department had used Monroe’s cipher for so long (60 years) that the British already had broken it, lost their key, and retraced most of their work.26

The “first telegram” fiasco led the Department to improve telegraphic security. Seward ordered a replacement code for the Monroe cipher, and the new

Figure 7: William Henry Seward, Secretary of State (1861-1869). As part of the same conspiracy in which John Wilkes Booth shot President Abraham Lincoln at Ford’s Theater, conspirator Lewis Powell tried to assassinate Seward at his home. Afterwards the Army assigned a protective detail to ensure the Secretary’s security. Source: Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division.
code was in use six months later. Several cables in the new code, however, arrived as one, long string of letters, and the “conundrums,” as they were called, took weeks to decode. 27 In the 1870s, the adoption of the five letter/digit group as the telegraph industry’s standard “word” provided the basis for the Red Code, which was introduced in February 1876. Designed by John H. Haswell, Chief of the Bureau of Indexes and Archives, the Red Code favored economy over security. Its codebook—the cover of which was red—had nearly 1,200 pages. Secretary of State Fish mandated that every codebook be numbered and the person to whom a codebook was assigned be held responsible for its security and return. 28

In 1898, Secretary of State John Sherman offered Haswell $3000 to develop a new code; and a year later, Haswell produced the “Blue Code,” again named for the codebook’s cover. Haswell added nearly 2,600 words and phrases to the codebook; and in 1900, Second Assistant Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee appended a one- and two-letter coding for dates. Two copies of the Blue Code, however, were soon stolen from U.S. posts in St. Petersburg (1905) and Bucharest (1907). As a result, the Department issued the Green Code in 1910 and demoted the Blue Code to unclassified messages. 29

Security on the Eve of World War I

The United States’ growing wealth and power expanded the extent of its diplomatic relations, which increased the Department’s need for diplomatic security. The United States began assigning military attachés to posts in the 1880s, raising its legations to
embassies in 1893, and doubled Department staff (80 to 178) between 1896 and 1909. The amount of diplomatic mail and classified documents grew exponentially. The Chief of the Bureau of Indexes and Archives reported in 1897 that handling and sorting of mail, as well as coding and decoding of telegrams, kept him and ten clerks so busy that they could do little else. The London despatch agent and his staff picked up and sent off pouches and parcels multiple times per week at four ports: Liverpool, Southampton, Plymouth, and Falmouth. By 1906, chiefs of mission and consuls pleaded with Washington to hire qualified clerks to handle the growing cable traffic, and several admitted to assigning code work to their wives or foreign national employees.

The Department enhanced security measures to address the situation. By 1909, Department employees presented cards issued by the Chief Clerk or their bureau chief to gain access to the building. Between 1900 and 1909, the United States negotiated bilateral agreements with 26 countries for free exchange of diplomatic pouches without interference. Department officials separated the pouch room from the mailroom and restricted access to it. Pouch workers registered each pouch and recorded its contents. In an early tracking system, the Chief Mail Clerk cabled the New York despatch agent about arriving pouches, and the despatch agent, in turn, notified the post of a forthcoming pouch. A missing pouch prompted an immediate inquiry, as did instances of missing items. The Chief Mail Clerk locked the pouch room at day’s end and gave the key to the night watchman. Only those with written authorization from the Chief Clerk or division chief could obtain the key.

Figure 10: An encoded Department of State instruction, likely in Blue Code, from Secretary of State John Hay to U.S. Ambassador to Germany Andrew D. White. Source: Department of State Files, National Archives and Records Administration.

Figure 11: Portion of a map of telegraph lines, circa 1910. The number of lines from the United States to Great Britain had expanded markedly beyond Anglo-American’s first line in 1866. By this time, the Department had a 24-hour-a-day telegraph office with five to six code clerks. In addition to St. John’s, the other major relay station shown here is Canso, Nova Scotia. Source: Department of State Files, National Archives and Records Administration.
The physical structure of telegraph networks undercut U.S. security efforts. Coded U.S. messages to and from Europe passed over British lines, and Department code clerks long knew that the British intercepted cables and had a bureau for breaking codes. The White House and the Department shared the same telegraph line, enabling a curious code clerk to monitor the President’s cables. Department code clerk Herbert O. Yardley did just that, claiming that he broke the President’s code in two hours.37 Between 1905 and 1912, the Department doubled its number of code clerks from three to six, and its new telegraph office operated 24 hours every day. Department code clerks handled 1,000 telegrams per month, one-half of which were coded. The clerks worked with multiple codes, including the Secretary of State’s code, because not all posts had received the Green Code or even the Blue Code.38

**Conclusion**

The United States has always had some form of diplomatic security. Although no single office or person was designated to enforce security before World War I, early U.S. diplomats like John Jay were acutely aware of the need to protect U.S. diplomacy. They drew upon past precedents to devise practices that laid the foundations of diplomatic security in the U.S. Department of State. Although diplomatic security was associated mostly with communications security (correspondence and telegrams), Department officials prior to the twentieth century created early forms of document classification and conducted employee clearances and counter-espionage efforts. Technological innovations like the steamship and telegraph, events like World War I, and the emerging
U.S. presence in international affairs pushed the Department to enact more security procedures and also regularized security as a function of Department operations. By the start of the First World War, Department officials had better security measures in place than their predecessors but felt less secure.

Endnotes

1 Ciphers, codes, and cipher-codes have notable differences. For a cipher, a person substitutes each letter of the text with a different letter. For example, each letter might be replaced by the letter three positions earlier in the alphabet; therefore, “qorzb” would equal “truce.” For a code, groups of letters, numbers, and/or symbols replace words or phrases; hence, “36” might equal “King Phillip II of Spain.” A cipher-code combines the two systems.


19 Register of Despatches Received and Forwarded to/ from the Department, 1846-1853, Volumes I and II: passim, RG 59 – Entry 285. Entries for 16 April 1858, 2 November 1858, and 2 April 1860, Daybook of Contingent Expenses, 1833-1889, I: 107, 115, 133. Staff, The Transatlantic Mails, 59-61, 72, 78, 86-90. Francis E. Hyde, Cunard and

20 Letter, James A. Hill, New York Despatch Agent, to William L. Marcy, Secretary of State, 12 May 1856; Memorandum “Report of Despatches Received from the Department of State and Forwarded by Nathaniel D. Hubbard, Despatch Agent in Boston for One Quarter ending July 31, 1857,” attached to Note, Hubbard to John Appleton, Assistant Secretary of State, 31 July 1857; Report of Despatches Received from the Department of State and Forwarded… Quarter ending 30 June 1859; and Report of Despatches Received from the Department of State and Forwarded… Quarter ending 30 June 1860; all Box 1, Letters and Accounts for Despatch Agents in New York and Boston, 1840-1860, Office of Budget and Planning and Its Predecessors, RG 59 – Entry 247, NA.


22 For locks and lead seals, see Register of Despatches Received and Forwarded to/ from the Department, 1846-1853, 2 volumes, I and II: passim. Entries for 2 November 1858 and 2 April 1860, Daybook for Foreign Intercourse Expenses, 1833-1889, I: 115, 133. For use of railroad, see Letter, Samuel R. Glen, U.S. Despatch Agent Boston, to William L. Marcy, Secretary of State, 6 December 1855; Letter, Glen to Marcy, 2 March 1856; and Letter, James A. Hill, U.S. Despatch Agent New York, to Marcy, 13 June 1856; all Box 1, Letters and Accounts for Despatch Agents in New York and Boston, 1840-1860, RG 59 – Entry 247, NA.

23 Frederick W. Seward, Seward at Washington, as Senator and Secretary of State: A Memoir of his Life, with Selections from His Letters, 1846-1861, 2 volumes, (New York: Derby and Miller, 1891), II: 553, 520. Stuart, The Department of State, 131.


History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State


31 Letter, Robert Bacon, Acting Secretary of State, to Diplomatic Officers of the United States, 27 November 1908, File #16682, MA 862, Microfilm Roll #971; Letter, Thomas C. Dawson, U.S. Minister to Colombia, to Elihu Root, Secretary of State, 15 December 1908, MA 862, Roll #9761; and Letter, Root to the Diplomatic Officers of the United States, 16 January 1909, File #17530, MA 826, Roll #997; all Numerical Files 1906-10, RG 59, NA.

32 Rachel West, O.S.F., The Department of State on the Eve of the First World War (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1978), 75. Memorandum, Wilbur J. Carr, Chief Clerk, to Lieutenant Ulysses S. Grant III, Superintendent of the State, War, Navy Building, 17 November 1909; and Memorandum, Acting Chief Clerk to Grant III, 4 September 1909; both Folder – Unmarked [#14], Box 1, Miscellaneous Correspondence of the Chief Clerk 1909-1910, Records of the Chief Clerk, RG 59 – Entry 319, NA.

33 The 26 countries were Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Germany, Great Britain, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Russia, and Venezuela. The Department would soon add Costa Rica, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, and the Ottoman Empire to the list. Memorandum, Charles A. Sidman, Mail Clerk, to William Phillips, Third Assistant Secretary of State, 31 August 1909, Folder – Unmarked [#4], Box 1, Miscellaneous Correspondence of the Chief Clerk 1909-1910, Records of the Chief Clerk, RG 59 – Entry 319, NA.

34 Memorandum, Sidman to Phillips, 9 September 1909, attached to Memorandum, Phillips to Carr, 13 October 1909, Folder – Unmarked [#14]; and Departmental Notice “Register of Pouches,” William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State, to the Diplomatic and Consular Officers of the United States having Pouch Service with the Department of State, 7 February 1914, 051.01/26a, Folder – Unmarked [#3]; both Box 1, Miscellaneous Correspondence of the Chief Clerk 1909-1910, Records of the Office of the Chief Clerk, RG 59 – Entry 319, NA. Memorandum, McNeir to Roosa, 13 June 1912, 051.01/20c; and Instruction, Philander C. Knox, Secretary of State, to the Diplomatic and Consular Officers of the United States Having an Official Pouch Service, 14 June 1912, 051.01/20e; both Folder 1, Box 351, Decimal File 1910-1929, RG 59, NA.

35 Memorandum, McNeir to Roosa, 13 June 1912; Folder 1, Box 351, Decimal File 1910-1929, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, McNeir to Roosa, 20 January 1912; Telegram, Robert Bacon, U.S. Ambassador to France, to Secretary of State, 20 January 1912; Roosa to McNeir, 24 January 1912; all Folder 2, Box 361, Decimal File 1910-1929, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, James F. Stutesman, U.S. Minister to Bolivia, to Charles A. Sidman, Mail Clerk, 8 November 1909; Memorandum, McNeir, to Roosa, 9 December 1909; Memorandum, McNeir to Roosa, 20 January 1910; and Memorandum, McNeir to Roosa, 16 December 1910; all Folder – Unmarked [#3], Box 1, Miscellaneous Correspondence of the Chief Clerk 1909-1910, Records of the Office of the Chief Clerk, RG 59 – Entry 319, NA.

36 Memorandum, Sidman to Phillips 9 September 1909; and Memorandum, Carr [?] to Captain John H. Poole, Superintendent of the State, War, and Navy Building, 29 May 1909; both Folder – Unmarked [#14], Box 1, Miscellaneous Correspondence of the Chief Clerk 1909-1910, Records of the Chief Clerk, RG 59 – Entry 319, NA.

XXX
INTRODUCTION  THE FOUNDATIONS OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY
