

D&CP - ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

Resource Summary

(\$ in thousands)

Appropriations	FY 2011 Actual	FY 2012 Estimate	FY 2013 Request	Increase / Decrease
American Positions	142	142	142	0
Funds	32,672	30,812	30,992	180

Program Description

The Department's 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) called for the expansion of the capabilities of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security by establishing a new Bureau for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC). In FY 2011, AVC was created by merging the functions of the Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation (VCI) with the arms control functions of the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. This reorganization was directed by the Secretary of State to create a dedicated organization advocating for arms control, verification, compliance, and nonproliferation with the goal of better implementing key Presidential national security objectives as articulated in the President's April 2009 Prague speech, the National Security Strategy of 2010, the Nuclear Posture Review of 2010, and the Ballistic Missile Defense Review of 2010. AVC's focus, as called for by these documents, is to develop, secure agreement to, and lead the implementation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arms control, disarmament, transparency, and cooperative agreements and arrangements that protect the United States, its allies and friends, prevent or thwart proliferation of nuclear and other WMD and their delivery systems, and move the international community closer toward the President's vision of a stable and secure world without nuclear weapons and other WMD.

The QDDR reorganization has AVC placed as the lead on all bilateral and international efforts to develop, negotiate, and implement arms control policies to reduce the threat of WMD. This includes the use of existing agreements and the development of new accords, through verification and compliance tools, and programs for new transparency and confidence building measures. As a result, AVC has a much broader mandate beyond the activities of VCI and is now responsible for the arms control functions associated with the UN General Assembly, UN First Committee, Conference on Disarmament, UN Disarmament Committee, Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, and NATO nuclear weapons issues.

The creation of the AVC has revitalized the Department of State's ability to develop arms control tools and initiatives to address 21st Century realities. The reorganization realigned the missions of the ISN and AVC bureaus and since then the bureaus have worked closely together. For example, in the case of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), ISN has the overall policy lead of this nonproliferation issue while, consistent with its mission, AVC has responsibility for parts of the issue including the development of transparency and confidence measures for the BWC. AVC continues to exercise overall supervision (including oversight of policy and resources) within the Department of State on all matters relating to verification and compliance with international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements or commitments, including the annual Compliance Report.

Since the President's historic Prague speech, the United States has made important and significant strides in reducing the threat from WMD. However, serious challenges remain that will need to be overcome in order to achieve further progress.

D&CP - ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

In FY 2013, the Bureau will continue to expand and invigorate efforts to meet the President's goals including:

Nuclear Arms Reductions: Under the direction of AVC's Assistant Secretary, who served as the head of delegation, the New START Treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011. AVC is now leading efforts to implement this agreement, including meetings of the Bilateral Consultative Commission, which occur three times a year. AVC is also leading international efforts to develop agreed proposals for negotiations on further nuclear reductions, transparency, and other disarmament steps. Next steps will involve a more complex array of systems, issues, and players; progress in the future will be more challenging.

Verification Technology Requirements: AVC continues efforts under its Congressionally-mandated Verification Assets Fund (V Fund). This program directly supports the preservation of critical verification assets and the development of new verification technologies and approaches to address the most difficult arms control and nonproliferation verification challenges. The verification technology requirements developed to support the use of these funds has become a baseline in the planning and budgeting processes for verification technology research and development programs for not only the Department of State but also within relevant defense, energy, and intelligence community organizations. The V Fund is directly impacted by budget constraints (including partner agencies) which retard progress in translation of requirements into funded technology programs.

European Arms Control Architecture: AVC has been at the forefront of Euro-Atlantic efforts to strengthen stability and security in Europe by updating its arms control architecture. AVC has made significant strides in this area by orchestrating the first revision in twelve years to the fifty-six party Vienna Document to improve and update transparency among military forces in Europe and leading multilateral consideration of ways to enhance the Open Skies Treaty so it can be used for more robust verification of other arms control agreements. However unresolved differences with Russia and "frozen conflicts" in Europe have precluded the start of negotiations using a unified NATO alliance approach toward a new framework for conventional arms control in Europe. Those "frozen conflicts" include those in Transnistria in Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia.

International Missile Defense Cooperation: In support of the President's European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), both the U.S.-Poland Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement and the U.S.-Romania Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement have entered into force. The focus in FY 2013 will be on implementing the EPAA and other regional missile defense architectures, and cooperating with Russia on missile defense. Gaining Russian cooperation is one of the major challenges that AVC faces and will need to address Russian concerns, while, at the same time, continuing efforts to deploy the most effective missile defenses possible to defend the United States, allies and friends.

Enhanced Understanding of U.S. Perspectives; Moving to Shared Priorities: Deepening collaboration with countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere has increased the international consensus on the need for the further arms control and disarmament activities laid out in the President's Prague Agenda. At the same time, outreach identified differences in perspectives that will need to be resolved.

AVC also is playing a central role in developing and implementing the strategy to secure international support for negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and in developing the procedures and provisions necessary to ensure that such a treaty would be effectively verifiable and contribute to the long-term goal of establishing the conditions for a safe, secure world without nuclear weapons. Further, AVC leads the Administration's efforts to obtain Senate advice and consent to ratification of the

D&CP - ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, secure international entry into force for that Treaty, and promote universal compliance with international treaties that the United States has ratified.

Performance

The President's priority goal in the nuclear arena is implementation of concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons. A part of the foundation required to achieve that end is enhanced confidence and transparency among the Permanent 5 Members of the UN Security Council (P-5) and other states. U.S. engagement with Russia and the other P-5 states (UK, France, and China) involves finding common ground and agreeing on the scope and type of follow-on steps to pursue. The indicator below and the identified targets for 2011-2013 are in direct support of this Presidential priority.

Strategic Goal 1: Counter threats to the United States and the international order, and advance civilian security around the world				
Active Performance Indicator	Deeper nuclear reductions and transparency measures among Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear weapons states strengthen strategic ability			
PRIOR YEAR RATINGS TREND				
FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2011
N/A	New Indicator, No Rating	◀▶ On Target	◀▶ On Target	◀▶ On Target
TARGETS AND RESULTS				
FY 2013 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) implementation is effective and efficient. • Continue efforts to seek deeper nuclear weapons reductions. • P-5 complete work on a shared nuclear weapons glossary. • P-5 completes work on one verification or transparency project agreed to in the P-5 forum. 			
FY 2012 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New START implementation is effective and efficient. • Based on NATO input, the U.S. develops and proposes to Russia a negotiations framework and policy proposals for deeper reductions that include strategic, non-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons. • Negotiations begin among the P-5 regarding transparency and confidence building measures. • P-5 continue to work on a shared nuclear weapons glossary and agree to establish a working group on verification challenges associated with nuclear disarmament. 			
FY 2011 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discussions begin among the P-5 regarding reductions of P-5 arsenals and/or transparency measures. • P-5 agree to establish a working group to develop a glossary of nuclear weapons-related terminology. 			

D&CP - ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

FY 2011 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: On Target</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New START Treaty entry into force. Initial Data Exchanges and inspections began. • Consultations began on whether and under what conditions NATO would be willing to support deeper reductions of U.S. forward-deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons. • Bilaterally raised with Russia via the Tauscher-Ryabkov channel the idea of follow-on nuclear reductions. • The P-5 held the first follow-up NPT RevCon meeting as well as a follow up to the transparency and mutual confidence discussion held in the London Conference on Confidence Building Measures towards Nuclear Disarmament in September 2009. • The P-5 approved continuing work on an agreed glossary of definitions for key nuclear terms and established a dedicated working group. • The P5 agreed, as part of a U.S. initiative, to renew efforts before the 2011 UN General Assembly to start Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations.
Impact	Achieving outlined targets is central to making concrete progress toward the security and safety of a world free of nuclear weapons that the President committed to in his April 5, 2009 speech in Prague.
FY 2010 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: On Target</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia and China provided more information regarding their forces and doctrines at a P-5 meeting and at the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. • U.S. pressed China on its nuclear force levels and transparency during bilateral consultations on the NPR, at the Conference on Disarmament, and at the NPT Review Conference although Chinese force levels continued to increase. • UK and France indicated that they are modernizing but not increasing force levels.
FY 2009 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: On Target</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Department MASINT R&D requirements to support verification were articulated to the interagency • Cobra Judy Replacement (CJR) slipped due to manufacturing and procedural delays and cost overruns. • Key DOD Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) programs were protected from funding cuts. • Key MASINT sensor programs were deployed to assist verification.
FY 2008 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: New Indicator, No Rating</p> <p>Review of procedures for the possible closure of the U.S. on site monitoring facility at Russia's Votkinsk missile factory was completed.</p> <p>A team was assembled and trained for START follow-on negotiations with Russia. CJR proceeded on schedule.</p> <p>Key DOD MASINT programs were protected from funding cuts.</p> <p>MASINT sensor programs were deployed to support critical verification needs.</p> <p>MASINT R&D requirements were articulated at appropriate interagency forums.</p>
FY 2007 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: N/A</p> <p>Indicator and baseline established in FY 2008.</p>
VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION	
Methodology	The Bureau participates directly and/or leads the activities in support of the target goals. Additionally, the Bureau undertakes a rigorous review of all reporting and activities related to the target goals. The Bureau engages other countries and international organizations to further the target goals, and uses the outcomes of such meetings and engagements in its evaluation of performance.

D&CP - ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

Data Source and Quality	Data source and quality verified by independent and government-sponsored monitoring. Sources include outcomes and reports from bilateral and international organizations and meetings, as well as from Congressional deliberations and hearings. The Data Quality Assessment revealed no significant data limitations. Final assessment can be made only at the end of the fiscal year, as negotiations and meetings have not yet occurred/concluded.
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The United States is committed to seeking nuclear force reductions and other concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons, to the goals articulated in the President's Prague Agenda, and to the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). To mitigate the security risks along this trajectory, the U.S. Government must develop new detection and verification technologies and approaches, new ways of using existing technologies and approaches, and continue to deploy planned and operational systems to detect and verify clandestine nuclear weapons programs, foreign materials, and weapons production facilities and processes. The indicator and the identified targets for 2010-2013 directly support this Presidential priority.

Strategic Goal 1: Counter threats to the United States and the international order, and advance civilian security around the world				
Active Performance Indicator	Verification R&D programs focus on closing key detection and verification capability gaps identified in AVC's arms control R&D verification requirements document regarding nuclear weapons programs, foreign materials, and weapons production facilities and processes.			
PRIOR YEAR RATINGS TREND				
FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2011
N/A	N/A	New Indicator, No Rating	◀▶ On Target	◀▶ On Target
TARGETS AND RESULTS				
FY 2013 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • V Fund funds up to 5 projects to investigate cutting edge technologies, methodologies or approaches. • Program results inform development and implementation of relevant arms control, verification, and compliance policies, agreements and commitments. • Establishment and continuation of Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Defense (DOD) and Intelligence Community R&D programs to address AVC-identified detection and verification gaps. • Promising R&D programs, initially funded with AVC moneys, are pursued in greater depth by other agencies. • Planned critical intelligence collection programs key to verification, compliance and implementation are funded fully -- e.g., Cobra Judy Replacement, DOD Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) programs. • Key MASINT sensor programs and information analysis techniques to detect nuclear testing and ballistic missile launches are deployed to assist verification. 			

D&CP - ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

FY 2012 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • V Fund funds up to 3 projects to investigate cutting edge technologies, methodologies or approaches. • Program results inform development & implementation of relevant arms control, verification, & compliance policies, agreements & commitments. • DOE, DOD, & IC agencies seek AVC input and/or invite AVC to sit on R&D investment decision-making panels and start projects to address AVC-identified detection & verification capability gaps. • Promising R&D programs, initially funded by AVC, are pursued by other agencies. • Planned critical intelligence collection programs key to verification, compliance and implementation are funded fully -- e.g., Cobra Judy Replacement, DOD MASINT programs. • Key MASINT sensor programs and information analysis techniques are deployed to assist verification.
FY 2011 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • V Fund allocation and leveraging results in Department verification and transparency requirements, particularly for New START and follow-on agreements and identifying illicit nuclear weapons testing, being substantially reflected in other departments' R&D programs. • Verification R&D programs of other agencies focus on closing the detection and verification gaps identified in the Bureau's Verification Technology Research and Development Needs document. • Planned critical collection programs that support verification, compliance, and implementation are funded fully for the year -- e.g., Cobra Judy Replacement, DOD MASINT programs. • Key MASINT sensor programs are deployed to assist verification. • Radionuclide Collection Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) study is completed.
FY 2011 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: On Target</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bureau technology requirements established and disseminated throughout Science & Technology community. Seed monies provided through the V Fund have been allocated to twelve technical projects with community partners. • AVC, DOE and National Nuclear Security Agency jointly-sponsored calls for research and development projects, working groups and verification technology demonstration projects relating to nuclear testing and nuclear-related monitoring issues. • Agencies provided candidate projects for review and recommendation by interagency committees chaired by AVC. • Critical collection programs remained funded and supported.
Impact	<p>Funding will enhance AVC efforts to verify compliance with relevant arms control policies, agreements and commitments. Closing identified detection and verification gaps will improve verification of weapons of mass destruction, missile and conventional treaties and agreements and provide capabilities to detect, manage, and mitigate potential security risks from noncompliance with these obligations.</p>
FY 2010 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: On Target</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seed monies provided through the V Fund have been allocated to over a dozen technical projects with community partners. • AVC, DOE and NNSA jointly-sponsored calls for research and development projects, working groups and verification technology demonstration projects relating to nuclear testing and nuclear-related monitoring issues. • Agencies provided candidate projects to the Verification and Monitoring Task Force. • Critical collection programs were fully funded.
FY 2009 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: New Indicator, No Rating N/A</p>

D&CP - ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION	
Methodology	All proposed V-Fund projects are evaluated prior to any contractual obligation. Evaluation is based on guidelines used by the National Academies of Science for program selection. All ongoing V-Fund programs are evaluation on an annual basis to ensure milestones are met and required deliverables are provided. Evaluations are based on simple "go-no go" criteria. Progress on other targets will be measured by examination of actual outcomes.
Data Source and Quality	Data sources will be both internal and external, including from other agencies and contracts. The Data Quality Assessment revealed no significant limitations. Final assessment can be made only at the end of the fiscal year, as results are not yet fully available.

Justification of Request

The Department's FY 2013 request of \$31.0 million and 142 positions for the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance reflects current services and administrative savings. In response to the President's Accountable Government Initiative, this request also includes a decrease of \$82,000 in efficiency savings from proposed reductions in contractual services.

Resource Summary

	Positions					Funds (\$ in thousands)		
	American			FSN	Pos	Bureau	American	Funds
	CS	FS Dom	Overseas		Total	Managed	Salaries	Total
FY 2011 Actual	113	14	15	0	142	16,426	16,246	32,672
FY 2012 Estimate	113	14	15	0	142	14,566	16,246	30,812
FY 2013 Built-in Changes								
Administrative Savings	0	0	0	0	0	(82)	0	(82)
American COLA	0	0	0	0	0	61	80	141
Domestic Inflation	0	0	0	0	0	121	0	121
Total Built-in Changes	0	0	0	0	0	100	80	180
FY 2013 Current Services	113	14	15	0	142	14,666	16,326	30,992
FY 2013 Request	113	14	15	0	142	14,666	16,326	30,992

D&CP - ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

Staff by Program Activity (positions)

Arms Control, Verification and Compliance	FY 2011 Actual	FY 2012 Estimate	FY 2013 Request	Increase / Decrease
Conduct of Diplomatic Relations	142	142	142	0
International Security Affairs	142	142	142	0
Total	142	142	142	0

Funds by Program Activity (\$ in thousands)

Arms Control, Verification and Compliance	FY 2011 Actual	FY 2012 Estimate	FY 2013 Request	Increase / Decrease
Conduct of Diplomatic Relations	32,672	30,812	30,992	180
International Security Affairs	32,672	30,812	30,992	180
Total	32,672	30,812	30,992	180

Program Activities

Department Of State	Positions			Funds (\$ in thousands)			
	American		FSN	Pos Total	Bureau Managed	American Salaries	Funds Total
	Domestic	Overseas					
Conduct of Diplomatic Relations	127	15	0	142	14,666	16,326	30,992
International Security Affairs	127	15	0	142	14,666	16,326	30,992
Total	127	15	0	142	14,666	16,326	30,992

Staff by Domestic Organization Unit (positions)

Arms Control, Verification and Compliance	FY 2011 Actual	FY 2012 Estimate	FY 2013 Request	Increase / Decrease
Office of Assistant Secretary	19	19	20	1
CTBT Preparatory Commission	2	2	2	0
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear and Strategic Policy	2	2	2	0
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Space and Defense Policy	2	2	3	1
Euro-Atlantic Security Affairs	12	12	10	(2)

D&CP - ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

Arms Control, Verification and Compliance	FY 2011 Actual	FY 2012 Estimate	FY 2013 Request	Increase / Decrease
Missile Defense and Space Policy	11	11	10	(1)
Multilateral and Nuclear Affairs	14	14	15	1
Nuclear Risk Reduction Center	21	21	20	(1)
Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Affairs	14	14	14	0
Office of Verification Operations	0	13	13	0
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Policy and Technology	2	2	2	0
Strategic Affairs	14	14	15	1
U.S. Chief Delegate CFE, JCG	2	2	2	0
U.S. Commissioner INF, U.S. Rep. Moscow Treaty	0	0	1	1
U.S. Rep Conf. on Disarmament	6	6	6	0
U.S. Rep Prohibition Chem Weapons	5	5	5	0
Verification and Transparency Technologies	16	16	15	(1)
Total	142	155	155	0

Funds by Domestic Organization Unit

(\$ in thousands)

Arms Control, Verification and Compliance	FY 2011 Actual	FY 2012 Estimate	FY 2013 Request	Increase / Decrease
Office of Assistant Secretary	3,244	3,179	3,195	16
CTBT Preparatory Commission	583	562	565	3
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear and Strategic Policy	309	304	306	2
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Space and Defense Policy	402	391	393	2
Euro-Atlantic Security Affairs	1,987	1,950	1,961	11
Missile Defense and Space Policy	1,905	1,866	1,878	12
Multilateral and Nuclear Affairs	3,752	3,621	3,643	22
Nuclear Risk Reduction Center	4,790	3,782	3,800	18
Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Affairs	2,310	2,267	2,280	13
Office of Verification Operations	0	1,980	1,980	0
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Policy and Technology	293	289	290	1
Strategic Affairs	2,712	2,645	2,659	14
U.S. Chief Delegate CFE, JCG	803	768	772	4
U.S. Rep Conf. on Disarmament	1,841	1,771	1,784	13
U.S. Rep Prohibition Chem Weapons	2,706	2,576	2,593	17
Verification and Transparency Technologies	5,035	4,841	4,873	32

D&CP - ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

Arms Control, Verification and Compliance	FY 2011 Actual	FY 2012 Estimate	FY 2013 Request	Increase / Decrease
Total	32,672	32,792	32,972	180

Funds by Object Class

(\$ in thousands)

Arms Control, Verification and Compliance	FY 2011 Actual	FY 2012 Estimate	FY 2013 Request	Increase / Decrease
1100 Personnel Compensation	13,626	13,739	13,806	67
1200 Personnel Benefits	3,375	3,397	3,414	17
2100 Travel & Trans of Persons	1,889	1,809	1,822	13
2200 Transportation of Things	11	0	0	0
2300 Rents, Comm & Utilities	440	459	462	3
2400 Printing & Reproduction	70	80	81	1
2500 Other Services	12,721	11,272	11,351	79
2600 Supplies and Materials	275	46	46	0
3100 Personal Property	265	10	10	0
Total	32,672	30,812	30,992	180