

Report on Security Capacity Building



International Security Advisory Board

January 7, 2013

Disclaimer

This is a report of the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide the Department of State with a continuing source of independent insight, advice and innovation on scientific, military, diplomatic, political, and public diplomacy aspects of arms control, disarmament, international security, and nonproliferation. The views expressed herein do not represent official positions or policies of the Department of State or any other entity of the United States Government.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 7, 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING UNDER SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER

SUBJECT: Final Report of the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) on Security Capacity Building

I am forwarding herewith the ISAB's report on Security Capacity Building. The report responds to former Under Secretary Ellen Tauscher's request of July 5, 2011, that the Board undertake a study on the United States' approach to security capacity building. The report was drafted by members of a Study Group chaired by Mr. Walter Slocombe. It was reviewed by all ISAB members and unanimously approved by January 7, 2013.

The report is an effort to review current U.S. approaches to security capacity building, its goals, and its effectiveness. The Board undertook a strategic level review rather than a program-level evaluation of existing programs. The report describes some of the challenges, risks, and opportunities the United States faces in efforts to improve the security capacity of foreign partner countries. It also lays out some of the shortcomings of the current processes for planning and implementation of security capacity building programs and of the structure of the U.S. Government to conduct these activities.

The report offers recommendations in several areas: the development of a national strategy for security capacity building based on a National Security Staff-led review of existing arrangements and challenges; changes to the structure of executive agencies' decision-making processes, authorities, funding, and the relevant congressional oversight committees; a focus on the civilian side of the security and justice sector (vice the military side); and the development of a systematic monitoring and evaluation effort for security capacity building programs. We encourage you to consider all of the report's recommendations carefully. The Board stands ready to brief you and other members of the Administration on the report.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "William J. Perry".

William J. Perry

Chairman

International Security Advisory Board

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD

Report on Security Capacity Building

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Executive Summary

The U.S. approach to security capacity building is characterized by a multiplicity of programs and a lack of national strategy laying out clear priorities and processes. There should be a National Security Staff-directed (State-chaired) comprehensive review of all “security assistance” – broadly defined – to develop a national strategy, and to identify what is in fact being done, by which agencies, with what resources, and with what objectives and success.¹ The review should develop clear criteria for deciding resource allocations, including a regional approach and with a focus on “human security” as well as traditional security capacity building. Planning for security capacity building should be restructured so as to allow for greater use of multi-year budgets and programming, but also enhanced flexibility. The Board considers the civilian side of the security and justice sector to offer the best opportunities for improvement and for greater investment, and notes the effectiveness of exchange programs, both civilian and military. Finally, the U.S. should implement a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation process for its security capacity building programs, measuring effectiveness against defined goals in terms of basic national objectives, not just value for money or inputs provided.²

I. Introduction

The United States annually spends more than \$25 billion on what is broadly classified as “security assistance,” all of which is broadly aimed at improving the “security capacity” of the recipient states. There is, however, so far as this Board has been able to determine, no comprehensive definition of what “security capacity” means in this context, nor an overall strategy for determining how much to spend and how it should be allocated. Nor is there a coherent system for making those decisions or for evaluating the effectiveness of the program being undertaken.

The programs supported by these expenditures involve a very wide range of programs and activities, from assisting Israel to maintain its “Qualitative Military Edge” to supporting the efforts of countries in the midst of democratic transition to

¹The Board understands that the National Security Staff is leading an effort to review U.S. security assistance – through the Security Sector Assistance Interagency Policy Committee – and that these issues may be addressed in that forum.

² While all ISAB members have approved this report and its recommendations, and agree they merit consideration by policy-makers, some members do not subscribe to the particular wording on every point.

create police, justice, and corrections systems that are consistent with a society based on rule of law. The themes of this report are that there needs to be:

- A comprehensive review of the entire spectrum of “security capacity/security assistance” programs, involving all interested agencies, to set forth a strategy for the nation’s efforts in the field;
- A reform of the present Byzantine process for decisions, funding, and implementation of security capacity building programs to facilitate better prioritization, management, and evaluation, and to rationalize the relationships among programs and agencies;
- Greater emphasis placed on supporting civilian (or at least non-military) elements of the recipient nations’ security capacity;
- More overt recognition that assisting nations in building security capacity that is consistent with democratic norms, human rights standards, and rule of law provides the necessary space in which development – economic, social, and political – can take place, and that such development is important to U.S. long term interests in peace and stability. This should be incorporated more broadly into policy and program design;
- A better developed system for evaluation and feedback – to assist both in applying lessons learned in current operations to future efforts and in determining whether SCB programs are effective.

This study is an effort to review current U.S. approaches to security capacity building, its goals, and its effectiveness. The importance of security capacity building is not the issue (though the relative priority of differing aspects of the effort may be). Rather, the issues are whether the United States’ approach is appropriately scoped and effective, achieves a clear set of well-defined goals that relate to the U.S. national interest, supports broader national objectives and is coordinated with other efforts to advance those interests, reflects a reasonably prioritized allocation of resources, is as rationally organized for decision, allocation of funding, management, implementation, and evaluation as is possible, and, in general, represents the best use of U.S. resources devoted to these efforts.

As requested in the Terms of Reference for the study (at Appendix D), the Board undertook a strategic level review, admittedly aimed more at identifying issues that

require governmental decision than the substance of those decisions. Moreover, this is not a study focused on program-level evaluations of specific existing programs.

The Board decided to adopt a broad definition for security capacity building, not limited to those programs in which the State Department has a primary role, and considered capacity building for the whole range of programs, importantly including both armed forces, border control, and the civilian criminal and justice sector (i.e., both military and civilian institutions). This included high end military capabilities (such as provision of fighter jets and relevant training and support) down to local police, criminal justice, and corrections. The group looked at efforts for a range of countries from relatively undeveloped to more advanced, taking into account the various U.S. Government agencies that conduct security capacity building activities.

Some cooperative programs with foreign countries whose primary focus is elsewhere have secondary goals of assisting in the partners' security capacity. For example, the Nunn-Lugar program (formally known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program), though principally aimed at the securing and dismantling of nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union, also included elements designed to assist the Russian Federation in assuring the safety and security of retained weapons and related technologies.³

Our analysis has focused on security capacity building efforts of the Departments of State and Defense, but U.S. Government efforts at 'security capacity building' thus broadly defined are by no means limited to the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of Justice is involved in efforts to enhance the law enforcement capability of other nations, both generally and in specific areas of high U.S. interest, such as the suppression of the illegal drug trade. Similarly, the Department of Energy has programs to help foreign nations improve their capacity to control trafficking in materials and technology with a potential to support proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Department of Homeland Security cooperates with foreign nations on counter-terrorism activities, including protection of those nations from attacks within their borders. And from time to time the intelligence community assists in operations that could reasonably be described as attempts to increase and shape the general security capacity of foreign

³ Nunn-Lugar has also assisted with the engagement of scientists, technicians, and engineers with weapons and related expertise. The program started as a Department of Defense-led effort, and grew to include global programs to counter weapons of mass destruction at Defense, the Department of State and the Department of Energy.

countries (and not simply their intelligence efforts). While the Board has attempted to gather information on as many agencies' work in the field as possible, we are by no means certain that we have found them all.

The principles, if not all the details, of the recommendations outlined in our report for better coordination, management, and evaluation of State-Defense programs apply to these other efforts as well, and should be considered in the comprehensive review we recommend.

II. Overview of Current U.S. Security Capacity Building Programs




Figure 1

Acronyms in order of appearance

PM Bureau: Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, State
 SCOs: Security Cooperation Organizations, Defense
 OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense
 DSCA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Defense
 HACFO: House Appropriations Committee, Foreign Operations subcommittee
 SACFO: Senate Appropriations Committee, Foreign Operations subcommittee
 HFAC: House Foreign Affairs Committee
 SFRC: Senate Foreign Relations Committee

HASC: House Armed Services Committee
 SASC: Senate Armed Services Committee
 SAC-D: Senate Appropriations Committee, Defense subcommittee
 HAC-D: House Appropriations Committee, Defense subcommittee
 SSCI: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
 HPSCI: House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Stakeholders

There is a wide range of stakeholders in security capacity building, in both the executive and legislative branches. U.S. stakeholders are based in the United States as well as overseas in diplomatic missions and Defense Department installations.

The President, with the advice of the National Security Staff (NSS) in the White House, develops national strategy in conjunction with the departments and agencies of the executive branch. The Departments of State and Defense are the lead executive agencies for most programs, and work with other agencies with a role in the development or implementation of security capacity building programs, such as the Department of Justice.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reviews the budget submissions from executive branch agencies, which include spending plans for security capacity building programs. Once agencies' budgets are vetted and modified to fit into the President's overall budget, OMB submits it to Congress.

As depicted in Figure 1, a number of congressional committees play a role in decisions on funding for security capacity building programs, with the Senate Appropriations Committee and the House Appropriations Committee, and their Foreign Operations subcommittees, playing predominant roles.

Foreign governments engage the executive branch and Congress, both directly and through the employment of lobbying firms and supporters and friends in the U.S. population.

State and DoD Assistance Budget/Decision-Making Process




Figure 2
Acronyms and terms in order of appearance

CCMD: Combatant Command, DoD
 DSCA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Defense
 OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense
 JS: The Joint Staff, Defense
 CT: Bureau of Counterterrorism, State
 Regional: Regional bureaus, State

INL: Bureau of International Narcotics & Law Enforcement Affairs, State
 F: Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources, State
 DoD: Department of Defense
 MSRP: Mission Strategic and Resource Plan, State
 CBJ: Congressional Budget Justification
 POM: Program Objective Memorandum, Defense

Decision-Making and Budget Processes

Working closely with the departments and agencies of the executive branch, the National Security Staff develops national strategy documents such as the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy for approval by the President. The goals outlined in these documents inform the Departments of State and Defense as they develop policies and programs for security capacity building. In their budget submissions to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), State

and Defense, acting within broad guidelines as to available resources, lay out the programs they propose to continue or undertake.

After the President's budget is submitted by OMB to the Congress, Congress ultimately sets the level of funding for various programs, with some program funds earmarked for a specific country, and a much smaller percentage of funds left unearmarked and available for use globally by State and Defense.

The decision making processes of the Department of State and the Department of Defense for determining the resources required for security capacity building are fairly consistent as they both respond to the timeline and requirements set by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The bulk of the work takes place between March and September of each year in order to prepare an initial submission to OMB for the first government-wide review.

The Department of State

To reach the September deadline, State first issues programmatic guidance to its diplomatic missions and shares this guidance with DoD components, such as the military services (Army, Air Force, etc.), the Combatant Commands (Central Command, etc.), and support agencies (the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, etc.). Missions generate security assistance resource requests for Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), which make up the bulk of the U.S. security capacity building investment.

Once approved by the Ambassador, those resource requirements are provided to both the relevant State regional bureau as well as DoD and are compiled by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. State's regional bureau conducts a preliminary analysis of all mission resource requests. At DoD, the requests are consolidated, prioritized, and sent through Combatant Commands to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the Joint Staff (JS) for policy and execution validation in order to ensure the requested resources meet the defined programmatic needs and other guidance. Once validated, the full DoD request is transmitted to State in time for State's regional roundtable process in April. At the roundtable, all State and DoD stakeholders at the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State/Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense level come together to explain and defend their resource requests in order for State to build the initial global security assistance request by July. In

July, the roundtable process repeats through Senior Reviews at the Assistant Secretary of State/Assistant Secretary of Defense level.

Based on the results of the Senior Reviews, State has until September to complete the analysis and tradeoffs to submit to the State's Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources in time for the September submission to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Between September and February, all Departments work with OMB in what is known as the passback process to generate Congressional Budget Justifications (CBJ) that, when combined, make up the President's annual budget request to Congress. Through the passback process, OMB not only rationalizes the budget numbers but de facto exerts an oversight function on security capacity building resources. Within the CBJ and President's Budget are the Administration's positions on the funding levels required to carry out security capacity building. It represents a point of departure for congressional appropriators to determine final funding levels to be presented back to the President in the form of various appropriations bills.

The Department of Defense

Early each spring, military services and other defense agencies build their multi-year budgets known as the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). Within the POMs are security capacity building programs, such as Global Train and Equip (aka Section 1206), military exercise programs, military-to-military contact programs, and over one hundred others. Combatant Commands communicate their priorities to the Joint Staff and their Executive Agents⁴ through Integrated Priority Lists which are meant to inform the services' POM development. Combatant Commands and others in DoD then react to the POMs and seek adjustments based on their strategies and other guidance during the Program and Budget Review (PBR). The PBR functions similarly to State's roundtables, except that it is an internal DoD deliberation only (i.e., no State input). POM adjustments are decided at forums conducted at the 3- and 4-star officer level. Once all the decisions are taken, the POMs are compiled to form the Future Years Defense Program that is eventually submitted to OMB in the form of the defense budget, as part of the President's budget.

⁴ Combatant Command Executive Agents are military services (Navy, Air Force, etc.) responsible for programming the resources required by the commands.

The Three Traditional Models: Capacity Building Resources & Implementation




Figure 3
Acronyms in order of appearance

FMF: Foreign Military Financing program
 IMET: International Military Education and Training program
 INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement program
 NADR: Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, & Related programs
 USG: U.S. Government
 DIB: Defense Institution Building

CN: Counter-Narcotics
 CTFP: Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program
 OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense
 CCMD: Combatant Command, DoD
 COM: Chief of Mission (Ambassador)

Note: The glossary at Appendix A contains descriptions of some of the major security capacity building programs such as FMF, IMET, etc.

The Three Traditional Models


Different security capacity building programs are subject to quite different organizational arrangements. There are three traditional models for resourcing and executing security capacity building programs once the appropriations are decided by Congress.

The first model uses State resources, but is implemented by other agencies. Most important, the funds appropriated to State for FMF, IMET, and PKO are apportioned to DoD for implementation. Other programs are similarly implemented and managed by other agencies (e.g., the Department of Justice for most law enforcement and civilian justice sector efforts) using State funds.

For FMF, IMET, and PKO, State obligates the appropriated funding most often to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), a DoD agency. DSCA then expends the money through the military departments and other implementing agencies (such as the Defense Language Institute or other Defense Department educational institution). Throughout the process, State retains oversight and weighs in as required. Sometimes, State's oversight function includes reallocating funding to meet unexpected demand or to realign resources to meet high priorities. There are strict rules imposed by Congress on how to effect such changes. In the second model, State implements security capacity building programs using State resources. This model applies to Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related (NADR) programs, which fund humanitarian demining, the removal of unexploded ordnance, and work to eliminate excess, loosely secured, or other at-risk small arms and light weapons worldwide, among other things. The State program managers contract for goods and services directly (or have the option of transferring the resources to another government agency for execution). As in the first model, State retains oversight responsibility for the entire process.

The final model is where DoD (or in some cases, another non-State agency) both resources and executes the security capacity building program. Examples include multinational military exercises, defense institution building, the Warsaw Initiative Fund, military-to-military contacts, and many others, notably the very large assistance provided to Iraqi and Afghan security forces during the periods of large-scale U.S. combat activities. Resources flow from the military service or defense component directly to the implementer, normally a contract vehicle or a Combatant Command. Capacity building projects or activities are then designed and executed with the partner country. This is the point where State, normally the diplomatic Mission, gains an oversight function.

New Models



NDAAs Section 1206: Global Train & Equip
 NDAAs Section 1207: Reconstruction & Stabilization
 ASFF: Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
 ISFF: Iraq Security Forces Fund
 PCCF: Pakistan Counterterrorism Capabilities Fund

Global Security Contingency Fund (FY12)




Figure 4
Acronyms in order of appearance

NDAAs: National Defense Authorization Act

FY: Fiscal Year

NDAAs Section 1206: A DoD global train and equip authority for counter-terrorism or stability operations purposes

NDAAs Section 1207: A DoD reconstruction and stabilization transfer authority that expired at the end of FY2012

Notes:

DoD is appropriated funding for the programs listed on the left side of the graphic.

The new Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) does not receive appropriated funding directly. Rather, it is a transfer authority granted by Congress to State and DoD to transfer funds from certain other security capacity building accounts into the GSCF to address emerging security issues.

New Models

Post September 11th, the existing models were judged not adequate for the security capacity building requirements created by new strategic imperatives, notably those arising from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the broader counter-terrorism campaigns. Several different hybrid or “dual-key” approaches to security capacity building evolved, such as Global Train and Equip (also known as ‘Section 1206’), and the aforementioned security forces funding required for Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan. The most significant characteristics of these hybrid approaches are “joint formulation” and “joint concurrence” that put State and DoD on equal footing to determine the best application of limited resources and/or to design capacity building projects together to meet the most pressing needs, such as those of Iraq and Afghanistan. Generally, proposals bubble up from the field level, are validated jointly in Washington by State and Defense experts, then submitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for approval. The determination of the implementing agency depends on which agency is most suitable to accomplish the course of action approved by the Secretaries. The implementing agency could use military forces, contractors, or others for execution of the program on the ground. State and DoD jointly oversee this approach.

Comparing Major Security Capacity Building Programs




Figure 5

Size of ovals indicate relative size of the programs

Blue – Programs funded through State. Red – Programs funded through Defense.

FMF: Foreign Military Financing program

INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement program

ASFF: Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

ISFF: Iraq Security Forces Fund

PCCF: Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund

CRSP: Coalition Readiness Support Program

1033: A DoD program that allows distribution of excess defense articles

1004: A DoD counter-narcotics program

PKO: Peacekeeping Operations

GSCF: Global Security Contingency Fund (a transfer authority; does not receive appropriated funds directly)

NADR: Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related programs

CCIF: Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund

CTFP: Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program

IMET: International Military Education and Training program

Section 1206: A DoD global train and equip authority for counter-terrorism or stability operations purposes

Fiscal Year 2012 Appropriation Summary

ASFF	\$11.6B	FMF	\$6.312B
CRSP	\$1.6B	•Israel	\$3.1B
ISFF	\$1.5B	•Egypt	\$1.3B
1033	\$0.75B	•Jordan	\$0.3B
1004	\$0.4B	•Iraq	\$0.85B
1206	\$0.35B	•Pakistan	\$0.3B
CTFP	\$0.02B	•Other	\$0.462B
CCIF	\$0.012B	(Other = 70 countries)	
<u>Total</u>	<u>\$16.232B</u>	INCLE	\$1.07B
		PCCF	\$0.75B
		PKO	\$0.383B
		NADR	\$0.15B
		<u>IMET</u>	<u>\$0.105B</u>
		<u>Total</u>	<u>\$8.77B</u>

Figure 6

Blue – Programs funded through State. Red – Programs funded through Defense.

Figures 5 and 6 provide an overview of major security capacity building programs. Figure 5 compares the flexibility given by Congress to the Departments of State and Defense in terms of a program's purpose (relatively broad or narrow authority regarding what services or goods can be provided) and its geographic flexibility (whether Congress has determined the funds can be spent with a single country/limited number of countries or with a wide range of countries/total flexibility). The size of the ovals give a rough sense of the relative amounts provided for the various programs, but are not truly to scale. (If the ovals were truly to scale, most of the smaller programs would be tiny dots if FMF and the Afghanistan programs were to fit on the page.)

III. Goals of Security Capacity Building

There is no comprehensive definition of the goal – or goals – of U.S. security assistance efforts, or a common management structure for them. All U.S. security assistance programs are in some broad sense aimed at dimensions of “security capacity” and all are designed to advance U.S. interests, but they differ dramatically in their goals. Some individual programs have several different goals. Some goals are explicitly stated in official U.S. Government documents; others are not. Regardless, it is the Board’s judgment that the U.S. Government should be more open and transparent (at least with itself and Congress) about what it seeks to achieve with security capacity building programs.

These goals include:

Building ‘high end’ military capabilities of allies and partners for conventional conflicts. This includes sale of fighter jets and other highly sophisticated arms and equipment and the provision of training and technical support for the aircraft. The financing for Israel’s military procurement in the U.S. is an example.

Building links with foreign militaries. Much of this effort is conducted through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, but it is also the goal of many DoD military-to-military programs. Specific objectives under this goal include:

- i. Interoperability of equipment so foreign militaries can fight alongside U.S. forces;
- ii. Maintaining the U.S. industrial base, which protects the strategic and commercial value of U.S. industry devoted to civilian security and military goods and services. It helps maintain the competitiveness of U.S. industries (by economies of scale), creates or sustains U.S. jobs, and assists in securing markets for U.S. equipment;
- iii. Pre-empting purchases of security-oriented equipment and services from other, non-U.S. suppliers that could give foreign nations influence;
- iv. Building personal relationships and understandings with the recipient countries’ militaries, other security institutions, and with their key leaders, and of their policies that may be valuable later, and the building by allies and partners of similar understandings of, and sets of relationships with, the United States.

Fostering good relations between the U.S. and the recipient countries.

Sometime the goals are quite specific – maintaining access to facilities in the

recipient country, sometimes broader, such as encouraging cooperation on general political, economic, or other issues, or simply showing U.S. interest in and support for the country.

Influencing the balance of power in a region – sometimes to influence both sides on a bilateral issue or multiple countries on a regional issue; sometimes to balance against other outside powers.

Providing financial, training, and material support for other countries' militaries or civilian security forces that are assisting the U.S. in an ongoing conflict. This was, of course, the objective of the very large amounts of assistance provided to the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan. It was also the rationale for the financial support provided to certain coalition countries to offset some of the costs of their military participation.

Promoting an ally's or partner's specific capabilities in 'functional' areas that are important to the U.S., so they can work with the U.S. and/or coalition forces in certain functional areas or perform a task independently that they otherwise would not be able or willing to do as effectively. Without the assistance, the task would have to be performed in part or in whole by the United States. Examples include: Assistance for peacekeeping operations, counterterrorism, counter-piracy, counter-narcotics, human trafficking, border controls, and non-proliferation.⁵

Assisting a country with an internal threat, such as a criminal groups, insurgency, and terrorism, where the U.S. interest is served by countering the threat.

Security and Justice Sector Reform. A goal that may be of increasing significance is encouragement and fostering of reform in recipient nations' internal security institutions and their operation. The premise is that assisting nations in building security capacity that is consistent with democratic norms, human rights standards, and rule of law provides the necessary space in which development – economic, social, and political – can take place, and that such development is important to U.S. long term interests in peace and stability. The U.S. encourages reform in a foreign partner's civil security and justice sector (to include police, courts, and corrections) for a number of mutually reinforcing reasons. These include strengthening civilian control of the military; protecting human rights;

⁵ The U.S. provides substantial assistance in the event of man-made and natural disasters, some of it in cooperation with local security or disaster response organizations. In general, that effort is financed and managed outside the "security assistance" framework.

protecting minorities, women, and children, in part to help them become more engaged in education, economic activity, and/or other aspects of their society; increasing accountability and transparency in security institutions; and/or as a precursor to and driver of economic development. Evidence indicates that a local population's belief in the existence of a working system of due process, however rudimentary, further vests that population in the development of its home area. Development and the improvement of governance cannot be accomplished without institutions, and security institutions are part of that.

The Board was struck by the fact that while these varied goals are, at least in most cases, legitimate and reflect U.S. interests, they are sometimes competing and imply quite different standards for decision and management. This reinforces the need to have all goals for assistance or for a particular program targeting a particular challenge clearly and openly stated, and to have a hard-headed system for assessing whether particular programs (which will often be intended to serve more than one goal) actually advance the particular objectives for which they were put in place. That way, decision makers at the senior level in Washington, in embassies, and in Combatant Commands, as well as the staff implementing programs, will be cognizant of and better able to balance competing goals, leading to better program design and implementation.

Findings and Recommendations.

To the members of the Board, the most striking feature of the current U.S. approach to security capacity building is the multiplicity of programs and the lack of a national strategy that lays out priorities and clear processes. The present “security assistance” efforts are scattered across a baffling host of different programs, with different goals, funded or operated by different agencies, and with different funding and implementation arrangements. That this is the case reflects that such efforts do, legitimately, serve different purposes. But it also reflects history, bureaucratic imperatives, congressional interests, and habit. Currently, security capacity building programs are a patchwork, with programs with closely related goals often run in isolation from others. It is only a modest exaggeration to say that the efforts have something of the feel of a philanthropic grant-making process by an assemblage of different foundations with different agendas rather than a well-managed and coordinated set of critical federally-funded programs, geared to (admittedly multifarious) national interests.

There is no overall prioritization of the challenges or opportunities that security capacity building programs might address. The United States would greatly benefit

from the development of an overarching strategic framework for security capacity building. This framework should make explicit the contribution towards broader national security objectives. While the Board members see value in a “bottom up” review of the entire effort and its priorities, they also recognize that major, long running programs will – and indeed in most cases should – continue. These include counter-narcotics efforts, provision of substantial assistance to Israel, and similar well known (and well supported) programs, as well as some highly specific functional programs and an extensive military-to-military relations effort. At the same time, the whole program needs a more comprehensive, strategic look, to assure that individual federal agencies’ programs will (rightly) reflect that their responsibilities and objectives are in alignment so that they work together towards achieving a common set of U.S. goals.

Recommendation #1 – Strategy and Goals of Security Capacity Building:

- There should be a comprehensive review of all “security assistance” – broadly defined – to develop a national strategy for security assistance, and to identify what is in fact being done, by which agencies, with what resources, and most important, with what objectives and with what success. It should also consider whether the current allocation of funds and management responsibilities accurately reflects the priority of the various objectives in terms of the national interest.
- The review should be a National Security Staff-directed effort, chaired by State and supported by the NSS staff, and include all agencies that conduct – or have an interest in the effects of – the various programs.⁶
- During the development of a strategy, the clarity and appropriateness of current security capacity building goals – and any unstated assumptions underpinning them – and the extent to which these contribute to achieving broad U.S. national objectives should be reviewed.
- The review should include development of clear criteria for deciding resource allocations, by level, among, and within countries (a regional approach).

⁶ The Board understands that the National Security Staff is leading an effort to review U.S. security assistance – through the Security Sector Assistance Interagency Policy Committee – and that these issues may be addressed in that forum.

- “Traditional” security capacity building programs should be developed in conjunction with programs for “human security,” i.e., those for access to key resources (potable water, clean air, food), health care, energy, and similar basic needs. U.S. Government planning should take into account this linkage.

IV. Interagency Structure

The Board was directed to consider whether the interagency is optimally structured to deliver effective security capacity building. It does not meet that standard. Internal U.S. Government structure is a challenge, given that in the allocation of funds, money is not fungible and different groups within/among federal agencies decide where to allocate it. Funding comes from different budgets and is overseen by different congressional committees. There is inflexibility in making tradeoffs, either in the security capacity building arena or across broader categories/other areas of engagement with foreign partners that are of interest to the U.S.

The State Department, as the cabinet department with overarching responsibility for foreign affairs, should have a strong (indeed an enhanced) role in policy and coordination, both in Washington and at the embassy level, but the arrangement of State funding for programs implemented and managed by other agencies has its problems, as does the existence of programs funded and run essentially independently by various agencies. The two main determinants of which programs and countries get funded are history and the funding agency. On the former, there is resistance to reducing funding levels for any country, both from the agencies or offices that manage the program(s) for a country and, unsurprisingly, from the U.S. embassy in the recipient country. On the latter, the department or agency that controls the funding stream (regardless of whether it is also the implementing agency) has predominant influence in determining priorities, which may or may not align with broader national objectives for a particular country/region or a particular issue area.

A related challenge in implementing security capacity building in the field is the federal government’s employment of people with the right skills, and in sufficient numbers, particularly in war zones such as Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, and previously in Iraq, the State Department and other civilian agencies needed substantial numbers of specialists with backgrounds in engineering, rule of law, governance and administration, and similar fields. Federal personnel with these skills who are deployable do not exist in large numbers. The State Department has

worked with other members of the interagency to develop the Civilian Response Corps as a way to build a cadre of deployable experts drawn from the federal workforce and from private industry, but it is small in size. Many of the positions with specialized skills are filled with contractors or temporary hires, which present a separate set of challenges. There are areas such as disaster response, both for domestic and overseas disasters, where this works, but there is no such organization with sufficient numbers available for implementing security capacity building programs overseas when a large surge of civilians is needed.

Recommendation #2 – Interagency Structure (Strategy):

- The process for decision-making on programs and their funding should be more integrated from the point of view of policy so as to afford all interested agencies – and particularly State – an appropriate voice, regardless of the precise source of funding.
- The process should also be recast to foster clearer lines of responsibility and control for implementation and evaluation.
- The NSS-led review should consider both whether State’s policy and coordination authority (and that of the respective embassies) should be strengthened, and whether there are cases where programs, particularly those aimed at specific functional areas, or at direct and practical military cooperation, should be spun off to the U.S. agencies principally concerned.
- The review should also consider broadening the application of the “new” model of oversight and decision, whereby State and the “functional” or implementing agency both participate in planning and policy, but funding and implementation are linked.
- The model of closely coordinated oversight and planning of individual programs to serve integrated goals should apply at the embassy level as well as in Washington, with participation by the relevant military organization(s), including the leadership of Geographic Combatant Commands and of other U.S. entities with a stake and role in the effort.
- The federal government should develop a professional corps of civilian reservists with specialized skills (rule of law, engineering, etc.), and in sufficient numbers, to provide a surge capability for security capacity building in conflict zones and countries at risk of or emerging from conflict.

Regular training, as the military services do with their reserve forces, would be an important component.

- As it is difficult for U.S. agencies to approach a challenge with a common understanding when there is no agreed lexicon, the NSS-led review should include the development of a common terminology for national security issues, to include those for activities related to security capacity building. This process should take into account the definitions used by allies and partners to the greatest extent possible, as it would facilitate bilateral and multilateral collaboration.

Another obstacle to effectiveness and responsiveness is a slow and Byzantine decision-making process that is relatively inflexible once in train. The fact that the executive branch develops its budgets two to three years before they are implemented is a contributing factor to the difficulty of adapting programs to changing needs and opportunities. At present, the system is essentially one of year-by-year planning and decision-making. While Congress appropriates funding for varying terms – one year or multiple years (in which agencies can draw on the funds for the two, three, or more years) or in some cases, without expiration – federal agencies conduct planning and execution on an annual basis. Many objectives – particularly those that focus on reform, but also many that focus on effectiveness – necessarily are long-term efforts.

Recommendation #3 – Interagency Structure (Planning and Budgets):

- U.S. Government planning for security capacity building should be restructured so as to allow for greater multi-year planning and programming (recognizing that some appropriations will be annual), in a manner analogous to DoD's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).
- The executive branch should work with Congress to make programs more flexible and adaptable, without compromising congressional oversight.
- The Board recognizes that Congress is, under our constitution, the ultimate decision maker on funding and that programs vary widely in the degree to which they have congressional support. Moreover, the differing congressional oversight responsibilities have an impact on decisions on different programs. Nonetheless, the Board believes substantial changes are

needed, and this should be saleable to the relevant congressional committees.

V. Managing Risk and Unintended Consequences

Among the specific questions the Board was asked to consider is the question of potential unintended outcomes and tradeoffs that U.S. agencies must take into account when planning and undertaking security capacity building activities.

Most broadly, in efforts that are aimed in whole or in significant parts at shaping the internal security sector in recipient nations, the U.S. should seek to avoid, or should plan to manage the risks associated with, security sector assistance approaches that do not comprehensively address the full spectrum of security institutions within a partner nation. This broad focus is obviously important where the goal is “pure” security and justice sector reform, but it needs to be an element in the planning and implementations of U.S. security capacity building efforts focused on specific functional capabilities or on building general influence and good relations. In addition to civilian law enforcement, courts, and corrections and military organizations, these institutions may include irregular/de facto entities such as local, regional or tribal militias, non-state organizations such as insurgent groups, and private security companies, both indigenous or external.

This imbalance in focus may take place due to a partner country’s willingness to engage in reform in some but not all areas of the security and justice sector, to U.S. capabilities (or the practicality of securing appropriations) being stronger in one type of assistance relative to other types (such as a robust ability to conduct military train and equip programs but a limited capability to build national law enforcement organizations due to the lack of such in the U.S.), a U.S. agency’s preference for certain types of assistance, or variations in the availability of funds for one type of recipient compared to another.

Another risk in security capacity building efforts can occur when the U.S. builds a close relationship with a foreign military, or, indeed any other specific organization in the recipient country. In many countries, whether intended or not, the U.S. is choosing sides in the partner nation’s political process when it provides assistance to security forces. These forces are key factors in most societies, which means there is real value to building good links with them. However, security services often reflect power relationships and divisions in society. They may have a significant political role and ties to political leaders or parties. This is particularly

the case with non-military security services, such as national police, investigative services, or the judiciary system, but it will often be true of military services as well.

Further complicating these types of relationships is the tradeoff between effectiveness and methods, for example, between how well a military counters an insurgency, and methods, how it collects information on the insurgents and applies force. There is an inherent tension between effectiveness (how well a security institution fulfills its functional duties), particularly where effectiveness is critical, and accountability (the extent to which security institutions perform their duties in an acceptable manner as defined both by the partner nation or population and the United States). Particularly for foreign security forces it assists, the United States has a great stake in *how* security forces conduct themselves.

U.S. interest in the methods used by recipients of assistance includes proper accountability and the observance of human rights and the rule of law by security forces as they fight non-state armed groups that may not observe these. Whether the tension between effectiveness and methods is as sharp as it is usually claimed to be will, of course, vary from case to case, but it is almost always present to some degree.

Where the U.S. is focused on particular functional capabilities – say, suppressing piracy – there will always be some need to rely on existing organizations and on letting them get on with the job, without too much attention to how they do it. However, in providing assistance to existing security organs, especially in militarized countries or unstable governments, the United States may end up itself ‘betting on the wrong horse’ by providing support to authoritarian or ineffective governments or security forces.

The U.S. must be mindful of creating dependence in foreign governments, and plan assistance so that the partner nation can become self-sustaining in the area where the U.S. is providing support. This is particularly important where the goal is long term reform – and indeed long term effectiveness. As in other areas where the U.S. engages with foreign partners, there is often a tradeoff between short-term objectives and long-term interests. For example, providing military assistance for counter-terrorism purposes without similar assistance to civilian bodies that oversee the military and to the civilian justice system may not produce the type of government structure and capabilities that the U.S. would like to see over the longer term.

Security capacity building programs have the potential to promote institutions or programs that are dysfunctional or not in the interests of the partner nation. This may include assistance to a developing country in acquiring and maintaining unaffordable fighter jets and building the pool of pilots when that is not appropriate for the security environment the partner nation faces or its budget.

Other risks include diversion of funds and corruption, contributing to regional arms races, over allocation to the security and military sector while under-resourcing broader governance and economic development efforts, and an inaccurate reading of ‘threats’ in the U.S. allocation of assistance, all of which can result in suboptimal and unintended outcomes.

The difficult issues outlined above may be even harder to balance with non-military security organs – police, courts, and the corrections system – than when the assistance goes to traditional military forces because they are more local and political in nature and have an internal focus, so the U.S. may be less of a model. The fact that the U.S. does not have a national police force, and therefore does not have a natural counterpart partner for work on police issues, presents special challenges, making partnering with and training of a foreign national police force problematic.

By contrast, the United States, with the leading military organization in the world that is committed, among other things, to fostering good relationships with other militaries, has a natural tendency to focus on assistance for military institutions. Programs like IMET have a powerful potential, not only to advance strictly military interests, like interoperability, but also to encourage foreign militaries to operate in ways that advance democratic and rule of law values.

Nonetheless, it is important to have a balanced approach to the building of security institutions so as not to strengthen the military while leaving underdeveloped civilian oversight capabilities and civilian security organizations. The latter include a national gendarme or law enforcement force, local and state/provincial police, border agencies, judges and court officials, prosecutors, defenders, and prison officials.

In developing security capacity building programs that are aimed at “reform,” it is essential to distinguish between “security sector *assistance*,” which largely entails the provision of equipment and technical or operational training, and “security and justice sector *reform*,” which focuses on changing culture, institutions, and basic approaches to providing security (such as the use of tribal militia versus a

professional local or provincial police force). Unquestionably, “reform” in this broader sense will often be fostered by availability of good equipment, but it is the change of culture and institutions that is the most difficult but which also produces the most lasting results. Moreover, security and justice sector reform is inherently political – and usually controversial within the recipient nation – because it involves changes to the nature of local or national power structures. These changes are possible only through genuine partner nation commitment, local ownership of the reform process, and a persistent, long term effort by the partner nation and the United States. The effort must be maintained even as advances come in small increments and may take many years to come to fruition.

A final tradeoff is the tension between addressing immediate challenges and addressing root causes, or treating symptoms versus treating the disease. For example, it is difficult to eliminate terrorism until the sources of injustice and grievance that help drive it are addressed, but it is also true that without security, it is very hard to maintain stability or economic development. This is a special problem when a country undergoing development and democratization faces an active and violent internal opposition. An important topic for the overall review of security capability building that we recommend is a careful look at the links between reform and security and between security and development.

Recommendation #4 – Managing risk and the best area for improvement and investment:

- The civilian side of the security and justice sector, due to the potential for enduring change and the United States’ relative underinvestment in it, is the best area for improvement and for greater investment. Military assistance goals often outrank those for assistance to civilian institutions. The latter includes programs to increase civilian control of the military by improving the governance and management capabilities of civilian officials. It also incorporates exchange and education programs that expose foreign civilian and military officials to the norms of behavior in the U.S. Government and wider civil society, and the standards of the U.S. military, in which the military is a professional, non-political force that reports to senior elected civilian officials.
- Board members were struck by the effectiveness and the ‘bang for the buck’ of exchange programs, both civilian and military. Exchange programs for foreign participants range in length from a few weeks to a year at an advanced school. The State Department has a number of exchange

programs, such as the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) and the Professional Fellows Program. The IVLP routinely does projects for law enforcement officials and judges, corrections officials, and civilians (as well as some military) who work in foreign defense establishments and for elected officials, including those who oversee civilian justice and defense institutions, at all levels. As with any program involving foreign personnel, a good vetting system is needed to minimize the risk of including undesirable individuals. Exchange programs for foreign civilian and military personnel are often on the chopping block when budgets tighten. The Board sees these as worth protecting in an era of declining budgets, and in fact, worthy of greater investment.

VI. Criticisms of U.S. Security Capacity Building Approaches

In the course of its work, the Board was told of a variety of criticisms of U.S. security assistance efforts. Because of limited time and resources, we cannot fully evaluate the merits of the claims, but we do believe they should be examined, as part of the overall review we recommend.

These include:

- The United States puts more into hard power than soft power, i.e., more into the military than the civilian security elements of foreign governments. Along the same lines, the U.S. puts greater effort into improving partner nations' effectiveness relative to fostering greater accountability.
- When it comes to the balance between concrete results, or at least measureable inputs such as the provision of equipment and traditional operational training, and a 'cultural approach' that seeks organizational and behavioral changes in security forces, the U.S. excessively favors the former, even where the nominal objective is long-term reform. However, it is the latter that pays greater dividends over the long run. The latter is also significantly more difficult to measure.
- U.S. security assistance tends to ignore that organizational and behavioral changes require a long timeframe even if specific assistance programs may be of limited duration; U.S. decision makers should be more wary of the folly of expecting quick results.

- U.S. security assistance has a reputation for being heavily focused on hardware – equipment and “things.” Investment in human capital, through training, exercises, mentoring, and person-to-person contact is likely to be of great importance in achieving U.S. goals. This will be especially the case where the goal is fostering reform in recipient nations’ security institutions, but probably also in other contexts, like enhancing the potential of cooperation with U.S. forces in combat operations.
- Long term changes require sufficient political will from the partner nation (and the U.S.), and reform efforts too often lack high level support within the U.S. Government and/or the embassies that would be helpful in securing that commitment of will. Reform projects that lack the involvement and support of senior U.S. representatives in country are unlikely to succeed.
- At the same time as the U.S. too often expects quick results in developing and implementing programs in the civilian security sector, it is insufficiently cognizant of the issues of developing dependency in the recipient country and of sustainability (of funding and staffing on the U.S. side, and of political will as well as staffing and funding by the partner country).
- The U.S. focuses excessively on strictly bilateral and governmental programs. International organizations such as the United Nations or the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), regional organizations, other donor countries, and international and host country NGOs lead many programs in capacity building, particularly in the civilian security sector. In some functional areas, allies or international organizations are better situated to deliver certain types of assistance, such as in the development of national police/gendarme. In other areas, it may be more politically effective to have an international organization lead the effort.
- Programs, whether geared to security and justice sector reform or to enhancing recipients’ capacity in specific functional areas, generally work only if they start with a detailed understanding of the context of all assistance activities, including a “map of actors” in the recipient country, and if both planners and implementers possess an awareness of the politics and culture of the partner country. For implementers, language skills may be a requirement for success. U.S. personnel sometimes do not possess the appropriate level of knowledge of the politics, culture, or language of a partner country.

- In some countries with serious security challenges, U.S. Government staff and contractors live in a “Little America” and have limited interaction with the local community and with the local staff who may have a role in implementation.
- Hiring the right implementers is a challenge. Some are good operators in their field but are not good at imparting skills to local personnel.
- Continuity of personnel is always an issue. Rapid turnover undermines institutional knowledge on the U.S. side and hampers the building of the necessary relationships with partner country personnel.
- The use of contractors for politically or culturally sensitive projects, or functions that are inherently governmental, can be problematic. Oversight by contractors gives less control to the U.S. Government over the selection of implementing personnel and over the conduct of the project.
- The use of temporary appointments is also potentially problematic. These are typically for a one year term, to fill positions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq where special skill sets (engineers, rule of law specialists, etc.) are needed and those skills do not exist in sufficient quantity in the workforce of the State Department and other federal civilian agencies. The positions are considered direct-hire positions, distinct from bringing in someone from an outside contracting company, but function much like contractor positions. While the people hired to fill them may be highly skilled, foreign partners perceive them as distinct from career State and USAID staff. Foreign partners often see them as not speaking with the same authority as career staff and understand that their contracts can be cut short. In addition, while temporary hires are embedded within the State Department and USAID, they generally do not bring an understanding of those agencies’ bureaucracies (or the Defense Department’s) to the job.
- A substantial amount of the in-country implementation of security capacity building is performed by U.S. military personnel (or temporary civilian appointees, as noted above), particularly in war zones. This includes the delivery of assistance for predominately civilian functions, such as civilian law enforcement. A U.S. military presence can be controversial within recipient countries, and employing military personnel to such a significant degree adds to the controversy.

- U.S. funding is too often spread too thin, giving a modest amount of assistance to many countries, if only to avoid diplomatic complications, rather than concentrating limited funds on a few priority and/or successful countries/programs.
- Implementation in countries is fragmented and gets relatively little high level post attention, particularly where agencies other than State are responsible for implementation. The ambassadors and the country teams should be empowered – and required – to exercise more active oversight.

Recommendation #5 – Response to Constructive Criticism:

- Programs should document, whether anecdotally or more quantitatively, examples of successful outcomes that are not well encapsulated by existing metrics. Document successful outcomes, for example: through non-material contributions, or non-military interactions; involving cultural (e.g., organizational, behavioral) changes; achieving higher standards of accountability, rule-of-law, or observance of human rights; working effectively with U.S. representatives in-country; transitioning to self-sufficiency; partnering with international organizations; showing success after long engagement.
- The State Department should periodically document how specific criticisms of programs have been addressed through an accounting of "lessons learned" (e.g., every 1-2 years).
- As a U.S. military presence can be controversial within countries receiving U.S. assistance, a method of reducing the controversy would be to make assistance more civilian in nature. This could be accomplished through greater use of career Foreign Service Officers or members of the civil service (from the Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, etc. and USAID) rather than the use of U.S. military personnel to implement security assistance in-country. Over the longer term, a professional reserve corps of civilians with specialized skills (as noted under Recommendation #2 above) recognized as equivalent in ability to military reservists and full partners with members of the Foreign Service, could also serve this purpose. The Board recognizes that a civilian reserve corps involves significant bureaucratic and budgetary challenges.

VII. Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation

An effective, comprehensive program depends for success on effective assessment (what the U.S. should do) and a good system for monitoring and evaluation (how programs are graded) and for incorporating experience, good and bad, in future efforts (what works and what does not). Security assistance will be a major area in which the Secretary of State's recent call for attention to assessment and evaluation must be applied. The State Department's new Program Evaluation Policy, issued in February 2012, can be found online at:

www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/evaluation/2012/184556.htm#A

At present, there is an apparent lack of a systematic approach to evaluation from the point of view of either program effectiveness or practical implementation, as contrasted to financial regularity, and there are inadequate methods for feedback and a systematic learning process.

A good system of evaluation needs to address performance against defined goals in terms of basic national objectives, not just value for money or inputs delivered on schedule. It must also include a system for extracting, communicating, and applying lessons learned.

The hard fact is that some goals are inherently easier to measure than others. In general, it is easier to measure "hard power" results than "soft." And it is almost always easier to measure inputs than results. It is relatively easy (and by no means unimportant) to count equipment transferred, personnel trained, troops sent to help the U.S. Even in these "hard" programs, there is a need for more systematic reviews and data collection.

However, to measure outputs and results is much more difficult – how do you develop metrics for the building of relationships between people and organizations? How do you find out whether programs that are, by definition, long term in their effects, are working? For example, one purpose of IMET is to reach the officers who will form the future leadership of their country's military. That requires not merely establishing how many people complete a training program, but whether they stay in the military, whether they are promoted, and whether their IMET experience seems to translate into the kinds of attitudes and behaviors the U.S. wants to encourage in the long run.

A special element of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation is building a system for feedback and learning at the operational level. This requires systematic

attention to gathering and communicating data on what works and what does not in elements of operation and in achieving accepted goals. For example, in a particular country, what steps translate into local ownership and commitment to projects the U.S. seeks to promote, whether those projects are long term reform (like better police observance of human rights standards) or highly concrete, short term results (such as more effective suppression of an insurgency or better control of borders)?

Both evaluations against objectives and improving feedback and learning can be assisted by making evaluation a task of the people directly working the programs, through such measures as structured and systematic reporting, “no-fault” reviews, and exchanges of experience and data. The sensitivity of partner nations and, for that matter, U.S. implementers, to being evaluated or “graded” is one particularly difficult factor in the review of programs. A good evaluation system must include an element of “no-fault” review as well as “grading.” There is a place for external review, however, the basic task of evaluation should not be based on an Inspector General model but on integrating implementation and evaluation. Modern technology can be very important in this process, both as a way of simplifying recording data and as a way of communicating experience and information. That much of the evaluation must necessarily be subjective and qualitative because of the qualitative nature of goals is a challenge, but not an insuperable one.

The issue of evaluation of assistance programs in foreign contexts is a general problem on which many entities are working. As the U.S. Government in general and the State Department in particular develop evaluation and feedback systems, it will be helpful to draw on the experience of other programs, including those with different goals and approaches. There is a substantial international effort on processes for (and particularly the application of technology to) evaluation and lessons learned. These include work of international organizations like the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the World Bank, the recent UN Monitoring & Evaluation exercise, and efforts by USAID in the field. The experience of these evaluation initiatives can be instructive for the U.S. security capacity building effort, even where the particular assistance programs of other organizations are very different in substance; the question at this stage is techniques and process, not just substantive results.

Recommendation #6 – Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation:

- The U.S. should develop and employ a systematic and comprehensive monitoring and evaluation effort for its security capacity building

programs. It should measure effectiveness against defined goals in terms of basic national objectives, not just value for money or inputs provided.

- The evaluation effort should include a system for extracting, communicating, and applying lessons learned so that experience informs future efforts.
- One of the metrics for evaluation should be that each program has articulated a substantial and effective means by which future performance can be rigorously evaluated: if appropriate, quantitative metrics with specific timescales are optimal; justification for more qualitative criteria or schedules should be provided in other instances.
- The U.S. should draw on the experience of other programs, including those with different goals and approaches, and from the efforts of a range of U.S. agencies, allies, and international organizations. International organizations have put a significant amount of work into the development of processes for (and particularly the application of technology to) evaluation and lessons learned.

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Appendix A – Summary of Recommendations

Recommendation #1 – Strategy and Goals of Security Capacity Building:

- There should be a comprehensive review of all “security assistance” – broadly defined – to develop a national strategy for security assistance, and to identify what is in fact being done, by which agencies, with what resources, and most important, with what objectives and with what success. It should also consider whether the current allocation of funds and management responsibilities accurately reflects the priority of the various objectives in terms of the national interest.
- The review should be a National Security Staff-directed effort, chaired by State and supported by the NSS staff, and include all agencies that conduct – or have an interest in the effects of – the various programs.⁷
- During the development of a strategy, the clarity and appropriateness of current security capacity building goals – and any unstated assumptions underpinning them – and the extent to which these contribute to achieving broad U.S. national objectives should be reviewed.
- The review should include development of clear criteria for deciding resource allocations, by level, among, and within countries (a regional approach).
- “Traditional” security capacity building programs should be developed in conjunction with programs for “human security,” i.e., those for access to key resources (potable water, clean air, food), health care, energy, and similar basic needs. U.S. Government planning should take into account this linkage.

Recommendation #2 – Interagency Structure (Strategy):

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⁷ The Board understands that the National Security Staff is leading an effort to review U.S. security assistance – through the Security Sector Assistance Interagency Policy Committee – and that these issues may be addressed in that forum.

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(recognizing that some appropriations will be annual), in a manner analogous to DoD's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).

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- Programs should document, whether anecdotally or more quantitatively, examples of successful outcomes that are not well encapsulated by existing metrics. Document successful outcomes, for example: through non-material contributions, or non-military interactions; involving cultural (e.g., organizational, behavioral) changes; achieving higher standards of accountability, rule-of-law, or observance of human rights; working effectively with U.S. representatives in-country; transitioning to self-sufficiency; partnering with international organizations; showing success after long engagement.
- The State Department should periodically document how specific criticisms of programs have been addressed through an accounting of "lessons learned" (e.g., every 1-2 years).
- As a U.S. military presence can be controversial within countries receiving U.S. assistance, a method of reducing the controversy would be to make assistance more civilian in nature. This could be accomplished through greater use of career Foreign Service Officers or members of the civil service (from the Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, etc. and USAID) rather than the use of U.S. military personnel to implement security assistance in-country. Over the longer term, a professional reserve corps of civilians with specialized skills (as noted under Recommendation #2 above) recognized as equivalent in ability to military reservists and full partners with members of the Foreign Service, could also serve this purpose. The Board recognizes that a civilian reserve corps involves significant bureaucratic and budgetary challenges.

Recommendation #6 – Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation:

- The U.S. should develop and employ a systematic and comprehensive monitoring and evaluation effort for its security capacity building programs. It should measure effectiveness against defined goals in terms of basic national objectives, not just value for money or inputs provided.

- The evaluation effort should include a system for extracting, communicating, and applying lessons learned so that experience informs future efforts.
- One of the metrics for evaluation should be that each program has articulated a substantial and effective means by which future performance can be rigorously evaluated: if appropriate, quantitative metrics with specific timescales are optimal; justification for more qualitative criteria or schedules should be provided in other instances.
- The U.S. should draw on the experience of other programs, including those with different goals and approaches, and from the efforts of a range of U.S. agencies, allies, and international organizations. International organizations have put a significant amount of work into the development of processes for (and particularly the application of technology to) evaluation and lessons learned.

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Appendix B – Glossary

*Note that some terms below are Department of Defense definitions that may or may not be used in other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government.

Combatant Command – A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. Abbreviated as CCMD. (*Definition from Defense Department Joint Publication 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*)

Combatant Command (command authority) — Nontransferable command authority established by Title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, Section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called/abbreviated as COCOM. (*Definition from Defense Department Joint Publication 1-02*)

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) – Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is a critical foreign policy tool for promoting U.S. interests around the world by ensuring that coalition partners and friendly foreign governments are equipped and trained to work toward common security goals and share burdens in joint missions. In that regard, FMF is vital to supporting U.S. coalition partners in the war on terrorism. FMF provides grants for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services and training, which promotes U.S. national security by contributing to

regional and global stability, strengthening military support for democratically-elected governments, and containing transnational threats including terrorism and trafficking in narcotics, weapons, and persons. These grants enable key allies and friends to improve their defense capabilities and foster closer military relationships between the U.S. and recipient nations. Increased military capabilities build and strengthen multilateral coalitions with the U.S. and enable friends and allies to be increasingly interoperable with regional, U.S., and NATO forces. By increasing demand for U.S. systems, FMF also contributes to a strong U.S. defense industrial base, an important element of U.S. national defense strategy that reduces cost for Department of Defense acquisitions and secures more jobs for American workers. (Description from www.state.gov/t/pm/65521.htm)

FY – Fiscal Year. The federal government’s fiscal year runs from October 1 to September 30.

Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) – The GSCF is a new “pooled” fund that brings Department of State and Defense resources and expertise together in response to emergent challenges and opportunities in order to develop security capacity tailored to partner countries’ unique needs. Specifically, through the GSCF, State and Defense can fund assistance to national military and security forces, as well as the government ministries responsible for overseeing these forces. State and Defense can also fund assistance for the justice sector (including law enforcement and prisons), rule of law programs, and stabilization efforts in situations where civilian providers are challenged. It has no appropriated funding; rather, State and Defense received authority to transfer up to a combined total of \$250 million into the GSCF in FY 2012. DoD can transfer up to \$200 million from Defense-wide Operations & Maintenance. The State Department can transfer up to \$50 million from certain security assistance accounts (FMF, INCLE and the PCCF). Once transferred, these funds will remain available until September 30, 2015. Finally, as per the authorizing statute, the State Department should not contribute less than 20 percent for the total amount required, and DoD no more than 80 percent.

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) – The mission of this program is to work with foreign governments to develop professional and transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism. Situated in the Department of Justice's Criminal Division, and funded primarily by the State Department, ICITAP provides international development assistance that supports both national security and foreign policy objectives.

(Definition from Department of Justice website at www.justice.gov/criminal/icitap/about)

International Military Education and Training (IMET) – The IMET program is an instrument of U.S. national security and foreign policy and a key component of U.S. security assistance that provides training and education on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. In addition to improving defense capabilities, IMET facilitates the development of important professional and personal relationships, which have proven to provide U.S. access and influence in a critical sector of society that often plays a pivotal role in supporting, or transitioning to, democratic governments. IMET's traditional purpose of promoting more professional militaries around the world through training has taken on greater importance as an effective means to strengthen military alliances and the international coalition against terrorism. *(Description from www.state.gov/t/pm/65521.htm)*

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement program (INCLE) – This program supports country and global programs critical to combating transnational crime and illicit threats, including efforts against terrorist networks in the illegal drug trade and illicit enterprises. INCLE programs seek to close the gaps between law enforcement jurisdictions and to strengthen law enforcement institutions that are weak or corrupt. Significant INCLE funds are focused where security situations are most dire, and where U.S. resources are used in tandem with host country government strategies in order to maximize impact. *(Description is edited version of that found at www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rpt/pbg/fy2012/185676.htm)*

Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs - Humanitarian Demining (NADR-HD) – The U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program seeks to relieve human suffering caused by landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) while promoting U.S. foreign policy interests. Program objectives are designed to protect victims of conflict and promote regional stability by reducing civilian casualties, creating conditions for the safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes, and restoring access to land and infrastructure. The U.S. furthers these objectives by supporting mine action projects and by helping to develop indigenous mine action capabilities in mine-affected nations. *(Description from www.state.gov/t/pm/65521.htm)*

Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs - International Trust Fund (NADR-ITF) - The program supporting the International Trust Fund (ITF) for Demining and Mine Victims' Assistance is a

special component of the U.S. humanitarian demining program, which conducts and monitors mine action activities primarily in the Balkan region. (*Description from www.state.gov/t/pm/65521.htm*)

Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs - Small Arms/Light Weapons (NADR-SA/LW) – The Small Arms/Light Weapons (SA/LW) destruction program is designed to eliminate excess, loosely secured or other at-risk small arms and light weapons worldwide. Destruction of these weapons contributes to U.S. force protection and regional security efforts by helping prevent the spread of illicit weapons to insurgent groups and terrorist organizations. The FY 2007 program will focus on destruction of shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles, or MANPADS, that increasingly have been sought after and used by terrorist groups in Kenya, Iraq, and elsewhere. (*Description from www.state.gov/t/pm/65521.htm*)

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) – PKO funds support multilateral peacekeeping and regional stability operations that are not funded through the UN mechanism. This funding helps to support regional peace support operations for which international coalitions or neighboring countries take primary responsibility. These funds also help build capabilities in countries seeking to participate in international peace support missions. The United States is committed to enhancing the ability of other nations and international organizations to carry out voluntary peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, thereby sharing an international burden to restore regional stability and peace. (*Description from www.state.gov/t/pm/65521.htm*)

Security assistance – Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (*Definition from Defense Department Joint Publication 1-02*)

Security cooperation — All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and

contingency access to a host nation. (*Definition from Defense Department Joint Publication 1-02*)

Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) – All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance/cooperation management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance/cooperation functions. (*Definition from Defense Department Joint Publication 1-02*)

Security Force Assistance (SFA) – Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (*Definition from Defense Department Joint Publication 1-02*)

Security and Justice Sector – The security and justice sector includes both military and civilian organizations, and personnel operating at the international, regional, national, and/or sub-national level. Security actors may include the following:

- **State Security Providers:** Military forces; civilian police; specialized police units; formed police units; presidential guards; intelligence services; coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; highway police; reserve or local security units; civil defense units; national guards and government militias, and corrections officers, among others.
- **Governmental Security Management and Oversight Bodies:** The office of the Executive (e.g., President, Prime Minister); national security advisory bodies; ministries of defense, public administration, interior, justice, and foreign affairs; the judiciary; financial management bodies (e.g., finance ministries, budget offices, comptrollers general, and financial audit and planning units); the legislature; local government authorities (e.g., governors and municipal councils); institutional professional standards authorities, auditing bodies, and official public complaints commissions; among others.
- **Civil Society:** Professional organizations; civilian review boards; policy analysis organizations (e.g., think tanks and universities); advocacy organizations; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; non-governmental organizations (NGOs); media; and other actors. In addition to monitoring security actor performance, civil society actors articulate the public demand for safety and security. In some cases, particularly where a national government's

capacity may be limited, civil society and other non-state actors may also serve functions that provide some degree of security and justice to local communities.

- **Non-State Providers of Justice and Security:** This category encompasses a broad range of actors with varying degrees of legal status and legitimacy. Unaccountable non-state actors or illicit power structures may engender human rights abuses and facilitate inappropriate links between the private and public security sector and political parties, state agencies, paramilitary organizations, and organized crime. Local actors, such as informal and/or traditional justice systems or community watch groups, may conversely offer a stabilizing effect in conflict and post-conflict settings.

Note: This is an edited version of the definition that appears in the Definitions and Terms section on page 3 of the Security Sector Reform paper published by the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Defense Department in February 2009 (Available online at www.state.gov/documents/organization/115810.pdf) The term has been changed from ‘Security Sector’ to ‘Security and Justice Sector’ to reflect that used in the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (Available online at www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/index.htm).

Security and Justice Sector Reform (SJSR) – The set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. The overall objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. From a donor perspective, SJSR is an umbrella term that might include integrated activities in support of: defense and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice; police; corrections; intelligence reform; national security planning and strategy support; border management; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); and/or reduction of armed violence.

Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF) – A bilateral U.S. security cooperation program that provides support to developing countries that are members of the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. WIF is the primary tool the Department of Defense uses to advance defense reform and institution building in PfP Partner countries; improve the interoperability of Partner countries with U.S. and NATO; and promote Partner country integration and accession to NATO. Program activities are conducted in accordance with regional and country-specific priorities established by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP),

U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). (*Description from www.dsca.mil/programs/pgm/mgt/wif.pdf*)

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Appendix C - Matrix of Current Major Security Capacity Building Programs - FY2012

Program	Countries	Amount of Funding	Funded Agency	Implementing Agency	Metrics (Yes/No)
FMF	Approx. 70 countries Major programs: --Israel, \$3.1B --Egypt, \$1.3B --Jordan, \$0.3B --Iraq, \$0.85B --Pakistan, \$0.462B	\$6.312B	State	Defense	Yes
INCLE	27 countries through bilateral programs and another 40+ through regional or multilateral programs	\$1.07B	State	State/Justice	Yes
PCCF	Pakistan	\$0.75B	State	Defense	Yes
PKO	28+ countries and a range of regional and multilateral programs	\$0.383B	State	State/Defense	Yes
NADR	39 programs (bilateral & global) Major programs: --Afghanistan, \$40M --Iraq, \$25M	\$0.15B	State	State	Yes
IMET	140 countries	\$0.105B	State	Defense	Yes
ASFF	Afghanistan	\$11.6B	Defense	Defense	----
CRSP	Georgia	\$1.6B	Defense	Defense	----
ISFF	Iraq	\$1.5B	Defense	Defense	----
1033 + 1004	80 countries and 7 multilateral programs	\$1.15B	Defense	Defense	----
1206	*40 countries in FY2006-FY2011 period	\$0.35B	Defense	Defense	Yes
CTFP	142 countries	\$0.02B	Defense	Defense	----
CCIF	Mexico	\$0.012B	Defense	Defense	----

*Source: Congressional Research Service report, Security Assistance Reform: "Section 1206" Background & Issues for Congress, January 13, 2012

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Appendix D - Terms of Reference

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
WASHINGTON

July 5, 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD (ISAB)

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference – ISAB Study on Security Capacity Building

The International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) is requested to undertake a study of U.S. efforts to build the security capacity of our foreign partners.

The United States annually spends billions of dollars on efforts to improve the security capacity of nations around the globe. Such security capacity building is a prime mission of the United States. It involves a range of programs and activities, including military education and training, military equipping and financing, and capacity building in the security and justice sector (i.e., training, education, and/or equipping for court and detention officials and police and border forces). The current U.S. approach to security capacity building would benefit from a fundamental review of the goals of this effort and its effectiveness. The importance of such security capacity building is not the question; the issues are whether the United States' approach is appropriately scoped and effective, achieves a clear set of appropriate goals, and represents the best use of U.S. resources. The ISAB review of U.S. security capacity building may identify different national goals, revise current key assumptions underpinning U.S. policy, and could help the United States evaluate and better target assistance. The need is for a strategic level analysis across U.S. security capacity building efforts, not a study focused on program-level evaluations of specific existing programs.

It would be of great assistance if the ISAB review of security capacity building could examine and assess:

- Whether adequate metrics and evaluation procedures are in place to measure efficiency and effectiveness;

- The clarity and appropriateness of current security capacity building goals and the extent to which these effectively and sufficiently contribute to achieving broad U.S. national objectives;
- Criteria for deciding resource allocations, by level, among and within countries, measures for determining the return on the U.S. investment, and what can be done to improve the results of U.S. investment;
- The risks associated with security sector assistance approaches that do not comprehensively address the full spectrum of security institutions within a recipient nation. The study may explore the risks of U.S. assistance to militarized countries, the nature of threat assumptions, root causes of insecurity, internal vs. external security, and the ability of countries to employ and effectively maintain U.S.-provided programs and equipment;
- Whether the U.S. approach to such security capacity building is appropriately scoped in terms of the different types of assistance provided and the goals of specific assistance; and
- Whether the interagency is appropriately organized (authorities, funding, manpower, etc.).

During its conduct of the study, the ISAB may take on additional tasks within this delineated focus, as it deems necessary. I request that you complete the study in 180 days. Completed work should be submitted to the ISAB Executive Directorate no later than January 17, 2012.

The Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security will sponsor the study. The Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs will support the study. Tom Cooney will serve as the Executive Secretary for the study and Chris Herrick will represent the ISAB Executive Directorate.

The study will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the "Federal Advisory Board Committee Act." If the ISAB establishes a working group to assist in its study, the working group must present its report or findings to the full ISAB for consideration in a formal meeting, prior to presenting the report or findings to the Department.



Ellen O. Tauscher

Appendix E – Members and Project Staff

Board Members

Dr. William Perry (Chairman)
Mr. Charles Curtis (Vice Chairman)

Dr. Graham Allison	Dr. David A. Kay
Dr. Michael R. Anastasio	Lt. Gen. Frank Klotz (USAF, Ret.)
Hon. Doug Bereuter	Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs (USA, Ret.)
Dr. Bruce G. Blair	Rep. Harold Naughton
Mr. Joseph Cirincione	Mr. Robert N. Rose
Hon. Terry Everett	Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft (USAF, Ret.)
Amb. Robert Gallucci	Mr. Walter Slocombe
Amb. James Goodby	Dr. James Tegnalia
Amb. Robert E. Hunter	Mr. William H. Tobey
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Hon. Terry Everett	Rep. Harold Naughton
Dr. Raymond Jeanloz	Dr. Joan B. Woodard

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Mr. Thomas F. Cooney, Jr. Executive Secretary	Ms. Thelma Jenkins-Anthony ISAB Action Officer

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Appendix F – Individuals Consulted

Persons Consulted in Study Group Meetings

November 21, 2011

Mr. Kevin O’Keefe	Director, Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Mr. Arthur Collins	Team Lead, Plans and Policy Team, Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Mr. Todd Gobeille	Security Assistance Team, Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Mr. David Cate	Defense Institution Building (DIB) team, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense
Mr. Thomas Kelly	Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Amb. James Dobbins (Ret.)	Former Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia; former Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia, U.S. Department of State
Mr. Robert Cassilly	Office of Iraq Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Ms. Donna Hopkins	Coordinator for Counter-Piracy and Maritime Security, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Mr. Michael L. Smith Team Lead, Global Peace Operations Initiative,
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
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January 18, 2012

Mr. James Walsh Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
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Mr. David Froman Office of the Coordinator for U.S. Assistance to
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Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs,
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Mr. Robert Perito Director, Security Sector Governance Center,
U.S. Institute of Peace

Mr. Daniel Rosen Office of Strategic Plans and Policy,
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U.S. Department of State